|
|
|
|
The Psychological Bases of War
By Robert A. Hinde
Professor Hinde of Cambridge University, the distinguished author of numerous books and articles in the field of psychology, earned a Ph.D. at Oxford University in 1950. He presented a somewhat extended version of this paper at the TISS-sponsored Study of War Conference in June 1997 at Wheaton, IL.
~ Ed.
Introduction
Psychology today includes studies of processes within individuals, where relations with neurophysiology are being established; studies of the behavior of individuals in isolation or when interacting with machines; and studies of individuals in groups. Research has been concerned primarily with questions of causation and development, therein differing from research on behavior carried out by biologists, who have been interested also in questions of the biological function and evolution of behavior.
Most of the psychological research relevant to war has been concerned not with the causes of war as such but with its conduct — for instance, with the selection of military personnel, the behavior of soldiers in and out of battle, the maintenance of morale, the performance of human operators in charge of war machines, and the design of such machines to optimize performance. Developments in psychology permitted increased sophistication in the selection of personnel in World War II, especially in officer selection; and the increasing complexity of war machines requires designs compatible with human capabilities, so that considerable psychological research has been devoted to such topics as the vigilance of radar operators and other aspects of human performance. For these purposes psychology has employed both experimental approaches in appropriately controlled but contrived situations, and "field" data from real-life situations. Such studies have had strictly specified practical objectives, but they have had some impact on psychological theorizing: there have been, for instance, notable advances in control theory stemming from military research, and in theories of habituation and memory from the work on human performance.
Since the monumental studies of war summarized by Quincy Wright (1965), considerable efforts have been made to establish links between psychology and other disciplines. In forging those links, psychologists have become increasingly interested in principles drawn from biology, but are rightly distrustful of analogies between the behavior of particular animal species and particular human practices: there are so many animal species, and so many human cultures, that analogies to back up any thesis are always available. The resemblances of conflicts between ant colonies and international war are entirely superficial, and even the inter-group conflicts of chimpanzees lack all the defining features (see below) of international war
More importantly, the last fifty years have seen intense efforts to link advances in endocrine and neurophysiology with individual functioning (e.g., Damasio, 1994), to relate the behavior of individuals to their social situation and group membership (Turner et al., 1994), and to incorporate the insights of sociology and anthropology on the role of culture (Hinde, 1987,1997). It is with such issues that this essay is primarily concerned, because they throw light not on the causes of particular wars, but on how it is that individuals are prepared to accept the horrors of war.
A linguistic point is first necessary. In everyday speech we speak of one individual behaving aggressively to another, and we use exactly the same words when speaking of two nations, each with a population of many million individuals. The factors that increase the likelihood of aggression between individuals are not the same as those that increase the likelihood of war between states; the processes are quite dissimilar. Again, some ascribe the propensity to harm other individuals to assertiveness and even associate it with creativity (Lorenz, 1966; Mansfield, 1991). This is simply wrong: an assertive salesman does not hit his clients, and the motivational bases of assertiveness have little in common with those of aggressiveness, though they may contribute to aggressive acts. To say that, without man's aggressive capabilities, "humans would never have been able to build cathedrals, fight disease, or devise scientific theories" (Mansfield, 1991) is absurd.
To anticipate the argument made here, in order to understand any aspect of human social behavior it is necessary both to distinguish successive levels of complexity — physiological/psychological processes within individuals, individual behavior, interactions, relationships, groups, and societies — and to come to terms with the relations between them. Each of these levels affects and is affected by those adjacent to it, and each also affects and is affected by the socio-cultural structure of beliefs, norms, values, and institutions with their constituent roles. Thus, in the present context, an aggressive interaction between two individuals, group aggression, and the societal phenomena of war can be described in similar words, but they differ in many respects. For instance, group aggression may involve individual aggressive propensities but also issues of group dynamics irrelevant to the behavior of individuals; and war involves issues of group dynamics but must be seen also as an institution with its constituent roles. This paper therefore discusses three examples of aggression to illustrate the continuum from individual aggression through group, religious, and ethnic conflicts to international war.
Levels of Complexity
In order to discuss these three paradigmatic cases of individual aggression, intergroup aggression, and international war, a digression explicating both the distinctions between successive levels of social complexity and the relations between them is first necessary.
The first two levels are the province of individual psychology/physiology — processes within individuals (which could, of course, be further subdivided into intracellular, cellular, organic, and so on) and individual behavior.
Moving to social psychology, an interaction is defined as involving at least two individuals and lasting only a brief span of time. During an interaction the behavior of each individual is influenced by his/her own goals and by the norms and values held, by perceptions of those of the other, and by the context. Each participant seeks to understand the goals and strategies of the other and to realize his/her own so far as possible.
In terms of the behavior involved, a relationship involves a series of interactions between two individuals, each interaction being influenced by past ones and, often, by expectations of further interactions in the future. Thus a brief conversation between two strangers would constitute an interaction, but next time they met they would be influenced by the first interaction, and start to have a relationship. Of course, behavior is not all: relationships continue in the absence of interactions and involve wishes, emotions, judgments, and so on.
Each relationship is usually nested within a network of other relationships. These may constitute a psychological group, namely one whose members define themselves and are defined as a group and see themselves as interdependent, and whose interactions are mediated, at least to some extent, by rules and norms more or less characteristic of the group (see below).
An individual may belong to several groups. A collection of groups whose membership may or may not overlap, but whose members recognize the groups as constituents in a larger unit, constitute a society. Group processes may operate to augment the cohesiveness of the society.
Three points about these levels of complexity must be emphasized.
The relations between these levels can be seen as dialectical, in the sense that new "truth" is continually emerging from their reciprocal interaction. The successive levels of complexity, including that of the individual, must be regarded not as entities but as processes in continuous creation, maintenance, or degradation mediated by internal factors and by the dialectical relations with other levels (Hinde, 1997).
We shall return to these dialectical relations between levels repeatedly in later sections. In the meantime, it will be apparent that their importance for understanding the phenomena of war depends on the precise question being asked. Analyses of the causes of war in political, economic, or historical terms are likely to focus on the dialectics between societies and their socio-cultural structures. Understanding the causes and course of a particular war would involve also reference to group processes and to the relationships of and interactions between the leaders on each side, as well as to the behavior of individuals. The following sections, therefore, consider some of the factors involved in individual and group aggression before considering how each contributes to institutionalized war.
Individual Aggression
For present purposes, it is convenient to consider the behavior of individuals as caused in part by internal propensities, while acknowledging both that such propensities are not to be seen as unitary entities and that they may be influenced by external factors. Certain behavioral propensities, including the capacity for aggression, are common to virtually all humans. This does not mean that they are genetically determined. "Human nature" is a consequence of common genetic factors and of ubiquitous factors in the environment. The combination of genetic endowment and environmental factors almost inevitably encountered in development lead to the presence of a capacity for aggression in virtually every individual. But that does not mean that aggressive behavior stems from an innate "drive" that must be discharged in some way; there is neither psychological (Berkowitz, 1963) nor cross-cultural evidence for such a view. Humans have the capacity to be both aggressive and altruistic, cooperative and cantankerous; the behavior shown depends on a host of developmental, experiential, social, and circumstantial factors.
Within that framework, aggressive acts are seldom due solely to aggressive motivation; other motivations are usually present. For instance, the behavior may involve an attempt to acquire an object or situation, which for present purposes we may call acquisitiveness. There may also be a tendency to show off — assertiveness. Furthermore, aggression usually involves risk of injury for the attacker, so that it is combined with self-protective or withdrawal responses. Thus, whether or not aggression actually occurs will depend not only on the individual's aggressiveness, but also on motivations of other types.
Individual aggression is often categorised into a number of types. For instance, one system distinguishes "instrumental aggression," deliberate and concerned primarily with obtaining an object or position or access to a desirable activity; "emotional aggression," hot-headed and angry; "felonious aggression," occurring in the course of a crime: and "dyssocial aggression," regarded as appropriate by the reference group or gang, but not so regarded by outsiders (e.g., Blurton Jones, 1972; Tinklenberg & Ochberg, 1981). Such categories, though useful for some purposes, usually turn out to be less clear-cut than they might appear for an obvious reason: a variety of motivations may contribute to a single act, and they may be present in various strengths and combinations. The very fact that such categorization systems can be only partially satisfactory is in itself an indication of the motivational complexity of even apparently simple aggressive acts.
It is convenient to divide the factors contributing to an aggressive act into three categories, with dialectical relations between the levels of social complexity operating in each case. These three categories follow:
The preceding paragraphs do no more than hint at the complexity of the factors involved in individual aggression, but they may serve to indicate that full understanding even of interactions between individuals requires analysis of individual characteristics and their bases, a variety of situational factors, and coming to terms with the dialectical relations between the levels of complexity and the socio-cultural structure.
Aggression Between Groups
Aggression between groups requires cooperation between the individuals within each group. But beyond that, it involves principles additional to those pertaining to individual aggression, principles that arise from the very nature of groups and from the relations between the group and its individual members. The literature on the nature of psychological groups and inter-group relations is now vast (see e.g. Brewer & Brown, in press), but some issues important in the present context must be reviewed briefly.
Individuals see themselves both as autonomous individuals and as members of groups. In addition to seeing himself as John Smith, born in such-and-such a place, cleverer than most, and not so good with his hands, an individual may see himself as a member of a variety of groups — the middle classes, Jewish, a citizen of this or that country. Thus Tajfel and Turner (1986) distinguished between an individual's personal identity (involving comparisons with other individuals) and social identity (derived from membership in emotionally significant social groups or categories). The greater the salience of the latter, the less that of the former; perception of the self as an interchangeable unit in a social group involves diminution in perception of the self as special or unique. It has been suggested that this partial depersonalisation is basic to many group phenomena (Turner et al., 1987; Turner et al., 1994); such a view is certainly in harmony with the methods used to instill discipline and group loyalty into military recruits.
Members of a psychological group not only label themselves (and usually are defined by others) as a group, but see themselves as more similar in group-relevant and distinctive respects to each other than to outsiders. And they see themselves as in some degree interdependent, and often as having a common task or goal. There is some disagreement as to which, if any, of these is primary or fundamental (see e.g. Rabbie, 1989; Sherif, 1966; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, 1981).
Membership in a psychological group has certain consequences on individual behavior. Members of the in-group tend to be treated as heterogeneous differentiated individuals, members of the out-group as undifferentiated units. Individuals who see themselves as members of a group tend to elaborate, and to subscribe to, group norms and values and to conform to them (Tajfel & Turner. 1986).
A frequently important aspect of group membership stems from the fact that individuals need to find support for their beliefs (Festinger, 1954), and this may be obtained from those who share those beliefs. Finding that others share one's beliefs may increase one's liking for and feeling of solidarity with them, especially if the convictions, such as religious beliefs, are otherwise unverifiable (Byrne, Nelson & Reeves, 1966); and reciprocally common group membership authenticates the potential of other group members to provide consensual validation (Gorenflo & Crano, 1989).
The self-esteem of group members is influenced by group membership. Individuals seek a positive social identity, but membership of a group will contribute to that only if it can be evaluated favorably relative to other groups. People therefore tend to identify with groups that they evaluate favorably, and to evaluate favorably groups with which they identify, even in the absence of objective evidence for their qualities. The more individuals identify with a group, the more they are likely to strive to enhance their own self-image by contributing to the group. Group cohesiveness and in-group cooperation are thus facilitated, and are likely to be greater in groups that are seen as successful. In-group membership provides a sense of security for individuals, and outsiders may be stereotyped and denigrated. Individuals receive "reflected glory" from the achievements of their fellow group members, even though not contributing themselves (Cialdini et al., 1976; Tesser, 1988).
Again, negative acts by the out-group are more likely to be ascribed to characteristics of that group than similar acts by in-group members, while achievements and positive acts by the in-group are more likely to be ascribed to shared in-group characteristics than to external circumstances (Hewstone, 1990). Reciprocally, negative evaluations of the out-group may enhance the self-esteem of in-group members and their tendency to identify with their own (highly esteemed) group (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; see discussion by Brewer & Brown, in press).
Because individuals want both to see themselves as individuals and as related to another or others (Baxter,1990), groups that are exclusive tend to be especially cohesive. A distinctive social identity can satisfy both the need to feel part of a group and the need to feel special and different from others (Brewer, 1991).
There are, it must be noted, exceptions to these generalisations. For instance, in-group preference may be diluted or reversed in lower status groups. Minority groups may perceive themselves to be homogeneous, and yet evaluate the out-group more favorably than the in-group (Sachdev & Bourhis, 1991). But in general, individuals tend to show loyalty and preference to the in-group, to exaggerate differences from out-groups, and to evaluate the in-group favorably. Recent evidence suggests that such characteristics of inter-group behavior are most pronounced when (a) intra-group cooperation, collective achievement, and interdependence with fellow group members are emphasized; and (b) the existence or importance of the group depends on the existence of other groups (Brown et al., 1992).
It will be apparent that many aspects of inter-group relations are of special importance in times of conflict or war. This evidence from social psychology is not undermined by the tenuous evidence from anthropology. While conflict situations by definition involve two or more groups with conflicting goals, it is in the interests of leaders to enhance the distinctive identity, and thus the integrity and cohesiveness, of their group. This is especially the case within a fighting unit, where the need for in-group cooperation makes it essential for social identity to be augmented and the perceptions that individuals have of themselves as unique and autonomous downplayed. The image of the in-group must be enhanced, the out-group denigrated, and the difference between them emphasized. Effective action is more likely if it is seen as likely to be successful, and this depends on the morale of those involved, which in turn influences and is influenced by group processes, as discussed above. As long ago as 1800 the regulations for the British Rifle Corps laid down that every man should have a comrade, and that a family feeling and loyalty to comrades should be fostered (Richardson, 1978). More recently, unit leaders have been advised to exercise "professional paternalism" (Rodine, 1977). Camaraderie, kameradschaft, comradeship are seen as essential elements in morale — though sometimes less effective on modern battlefields where men are widely dispersed.
Other differences from individual aggression arise from the fact that the very presence of other group members affects the behavior of each individual, with the internal dynamics of the group escalating or inhibiting tendencies towards violent action. In an unstructured group, individuals may be more ready to behave aggressively because of the arousal produced by the group situation or by the relative anonymity and sharing of responsibility bestowed by group membership. If the group values violence, individuals may assert themselves and show off by behaving aggressively, hoping thereby to rise in the esteem of their associates; but if the group is predisposed towards restraint, hot-heads may be inhibited. Because of the dialectical relations between the propensities of individuals and group norms, the aggressive potential of a group is not simply the sum of that of its members.
While many aspects of group aggression can be understood by regarding individuals as units in a collective, that is by no means the whole story. For one thing, long-standing cultural precedents may set the scene for violence (Liddell, Kemp & Moema, 1993). For another, there is likely to be some differentiation of roles even in quite small groups. The role of leaders may be critical. Leaders may achieve their position because they epitomize group values. or they may inculcate their own values into the group. They may represent the group in negotiations. In some circumstances, the psychology of the leaders may be crucial.
Beyond the differentiated leaders, the other individuals are not identical units and are likely to have very different personalities. In a study of violence in South African townships before the end of Apartheid, Straker (1992) identified the following types in the groups of "Youths".
Leaders. Well-balanced, idealistic, dedicated, skilled, popular. Expressed independent views.
Followers. Searching for a script as warrior heroes, attempting to achieve an ego-ideal. Labile. Could become leaders. Potentially reckless.
Conduits. Lacked sense of self, and used group to define it. Could lead, but would not intervene or change course of group.
Conformists. Motivated by social conformity rather than by ideals. Sought group acceptance, camaraderie, but passions not engaged.
Psychological Casualties. Anti-social but might justify criminal acts as political. Perceived negatively by the group.
Such diverse personalities are held together in group action in part because group action satisfies for each his or her particular needs. But cohesion may be augmented by outside forces, for instance by the very fact that they are treated as a group, or that they perceive themselves to be unjustly portrayed as an inchoate mob by the media.
It will be apparent that many of the factors that influence individual aggression also influence group aggression, but additional social factors are also involved. While for some purposes groups can be personified and treated as individual entities, the dynamics of relationships within the groups may be as important as the relations between the groups. We shall see that individual aggression is of even less importance in institutionalised modern war.
Institutionalised War
Individual aggression, intergroup aggression, and international war as discussed here must be seen as points on a continuum of increasing complexity, with many intermediates. Over time, from the Greek wars to World War II, there has been an increase in complexity, in the diversity of the roles of those involved, in the destructiveness of the weapons, and in the involvement of the civilian population (Pogge von Strandmann. 1991). And in the twentieth century, there have been all intermediates between tribal conflict in New Guinea to near-global war. The continuing violence in the Basque country and in Northern Ireland have the characteristics of inter-group conflict, while the recent conflicts in Rwanda and in the former Yugoslavia come closer to international war.
The extreme of the continuum from individual aggression to international war can be distinguished by three criteria:
First, international war involves conflict between societies, each of which is itself complex and consists of many overlapping groups. Any negotiations between potential combatants take place not between unified nation states but between large bureaucracies representing diverse interests (Druckman & Hopmann. 1989). Indeed maintaining the integration of the groups within each side of the conflict may be a major preoccupation for leaders.
Second, the role of leaders is paramount, both political leaders and military leaders at every level.
Third, and most importantly, international war is best seen as an institution. The concept of institution perhaps needs some elaboration here. In our society, marriage is an institution, with husband and wife as constituent roles. Each role has certain rights and duties associated with it. Parliament is an institution, with a large number of constituent roles — prime minister, ministers, members of Parliament, members of the voting public, and so on. Again, the incumbents of each role have certain duties that they are expected to perform, and certain rights consequent upon their roles. In the same way, war must be seen as an institution with a large number of constituent roles, those of politicians, generals, officers, soldiers, munitions workers, transport workers, air raid wardens, doctors, nurses, and many others. Indeed, virtually every member of the civilian population may come to have a role in total war. Each role is associated with its particular rights and duties, and it is the individuals' duties in the roles that they occupy in the institution of war that primarily motivates their behavior. Satisfaction in duty well done contributes to self-esteem.
The motivations that are responsible for individual aggression play little part in total war. Hope of material gain is unimportant, at any rate amongst the combatants. Hope of increasing the status that the institution of war can confer with promotion or decoration may play a minor role. Fear is certainly an issue, and can contribute to defensive aggression, though the excessive arousal associated with fear reduces military efficiency (Marshall, 1947). The issues involved in the formation and dynamics of groups, discussed in the last section, are of course relevant at every level in the complex organization of societies at war. Loyalty to and a tendency to cooperate with comrades may be a major issue, though this is to be seen as part of the combatant's duty. But aggressive motivation is seldom an important issue in international war, and when it is, as at My Lai, it is often not condoned. It is most likely to be important in short-term interactions, especially in religious and ethnic wars, but the primary motivation stems from duty associated with the role occupied in the institution of war. International war may cause aggression, but aggressiveness does not cause war.
As we have seen, most analyses of the causes of war focus on societal, socio-cultural or economic factors. Psychological issues, other than perhaps the personalities of the leaders, are seldom mentioned. But such approaches neglect an important issue: rational appraisal, historical knowledge, and personal experience all testify to the horror of war, yet wars continue to happen. Thus, for reasons which must surely be sought, wars remain an acceptable way of solving conflicts. This must be due to powerful forces that support the institution of war.
These factors that make war acceptable to the individuals who take part, or who support the institution of war in other ways, can be grouped into three categories;
At the same time, war may be trivialised by kitsch (Mosse, 1990). Shell cases used as umbrella stands, cigarette lighters in the shape of guns, board games on militaristic themes, tin soldiers and the like reduce war to pleasant nostalgia. Worse still, some writers manage to find positive virtue in the fact of war. Mansfield (1991, p. 161) writes "The aesthetic experience of the sublime on twentieth century battlefields makes sense emotionally, if only temporarily, of our mechanistic and anomic way of life." It has also been suggested that, while heroic myths have inspired men to fight, anti-war myths can, perversely, romanticise it (Hynes, 1997). As another example, it has been argued that the paintings and etchings of the German war artist Otto Dix show not only its horrors but also a reverence for war as a cosmic principle (see critique by Midgley, 1994). To most of those familiar with the stark immediacy of Dix's work, it must seem that any such ambiguity must lie in the eye of the post-war beholder.
The relation between the Christian religion and war has been a complex one. The Old Testament, concerned with what were effectively tribal conflicts, is full of bloody battles. In the Christian Church the believer is portrayed as a soldier "fighting the good fight," and the Book of Revelations makes extensive use of the imagery of war and death. Nevertheless, the early Christians were essentially pacifists and accommodated to militarism only in the 4th Century, when the Emperor Constantine was converted to Christianity. This posed a problem, and Saint Augustine, attempting to justify the contradiction, provided a moral justification for Christian participation in war with the concept of the "Just War" (Santoni, 1991;Teichman, 1986). A war was considered "just" if it was necessary to avenge injury or to maintain earthly justice. The Just War tradition thus legitimated at least some wars, and the flexibility of its criteria, adjusted to meet political aspirations and the indiscriminate nature of modern weapons, has helped to maintain the institution of war over the centuries.
In the two World Wars, each side used Christian imagery to make war appear acceptable and necessary. Particularly potent has been the equation of death in war with Christ's sacrifice on the Cross. "Greater love hath no man than this. . ." is proclaimed on many war memorials. Often, a sword is superimposed on the cross in military cemeteries or memorials. The close relations between the perception of Christ's death on the Cross and death in battle have been demonstrated by Mosse (1990) and by Sykes (1991). Christ's death is portrayed as a sacrifice, and the ritual celebrating it is referred to as the Eucharistic sacrifice. Death in war is referred to in similar terms; for instance, one propaganda poster showed a dead soldier with a neatly sanitized bullet hole in his forehead lying at the foot of the Cross. As Mosse (1990, p. 35) puts it, "The fallen were made truly sacred in the imitation of Christ." Hitler similarly used the language of sacrifice to inspire the German people to tolerate losses for the sake of the German Volk. Sykes (1991, p. 97) is at pains to point out the many positive contributions that the Christian religion has to make, including the "command to love the enemy" (to resist their depersonalisation, that is).
Other religions have had even more devastating effects in fueling the institution of war. Watson (1995, p. l67), analysing statements of soldiers from the Arab-Muslim world and from Northern Ireland, points out that "The fighter's language blurs the boundaries of the sacred-secular and religion-politics by describing and locating temporal concerns within a religious framework." Fighting for the just cause of a new sociopolitical system is defined in terms of religious belief, personal identity, and political conviction.
Part of the explanation lies in the way in which national traditions, religious beliefs, and current situational demands are channeled into nationalism. It is helpful here to distinguish between patriotism, involving love for one's country, and nationalism, involving attitudes of superiority or a need for power over other national groups. Feshbach (1991; Kosterrnan & Feshbach, 1989) showed that these attitudes, though positively correlated with each other, can be distinguished. In research carried out in the USA during the Cold War era, they found that individuals scoring high on nationalism in a questionnaire were more hawkish about nuclear weapons, but less willing to risk their lives for their country, than those scoring high on patriotism. This is in harmony with distinctions that have been made in studies of the dynamics of groups (Brewer & Brown, in press). Discrimination between in-group and out-group may arise from enhanced favoritism to in-group members without any change in effect on others, or from enhanced denigration of those seen as different from oneself; or finally from perceived inter-group competition. Apparently, patriotic individuals are higher on susceptibility to the first, nationalistic individuals to the second, and a war situation inevitably involves the third.
That, however, merely puts the question one stage back: what is it that maintains these patriotic/nationalistic attitudes? Because the two are related, forces that maintain patriotism may also maintain nationalism. Naturally and properly, cultural beliefs and love of one's country must be maintained. Cultural diversity is to be valued in its own right — a uniform Coca-Cola culture is not an acceptable prospect. Unfortunately, customs like saluting the flag and playing the national anthem enhance not only love of one's own country but also (though perhaps to a lesser extent) comparison with and denigration of others. The balance between the two depends, of course, on the context of the ceremony, the precise way in which it is carried out, and the wording of the anthem.
The psychological bases of patriotism/nationalism have already been implied. Patriotism contributes to an individual's social identity (see above), to individuals seeing themselves as members of their country. In times of actual or impending war, propaganda increases social identity at the expense of individual identity. Integration of the in-group is augmented by patriotic symbols such as flags and by the ritual of parades and ceremonies. In military units a familial type of unity may be fostered. On a broader canvas, the country may be seen as the Fatherland or Motherland, and other soldiers as brothers-in-arms. Indeed Johnson (1986,1989) has suggested that patriotism depends on an unconscious perception of fellow countrymen as kin, and is therefore parasitic on a biological propensity to help related individuals. Animal and human data support the view that familiarity does augment attraction to other individuals (Bateson, 1980; Zajonc, 1968). It is also likely that natural selection has acted to promote group solidarity independently of questions of relatedness (Krebs & Davies, 1981). In either case, both processes of socialisation and social rituals, especially militaristic ones, would act to augment the effect.
In time of war, the balance is swung towards nationalism. The threat posed by the enemy becomes a threat to individuals' social identities. Categorization of the enemy as such readily leads to stereotyping and prejudice. An individual who is seen as a member of a category is seen as imbued with the stereotypical qualities of that category (Hamilton & Trolier, 1986), and those qualities are seen as (to different extents) associated with each other. Individuals high and low on prejudice differ in the extent to which stereotypical attributes are associated with the category label (Lepore & Brown, in press).
Nationalism involves and is augmented by denigration of the enemy. Thus in propaganda the enemy is portrayed in a number of ways that are calculated to augment hostile feelings towards him (Wahlstrom, 1987; Keen, 1991). A variety of human propensities are exploited. Most frequently the enemy is portrayed as an aggressor and therefore to be blamed for the conflict and to be feared and resisted. The blame may be augmented by an implied association between the enemy and evil; he may even be portrayed as the Devil or as Anti-God. The culpability of the enemy, as well as his fear-evoking properties, are sometimes augmented by portraying him as a barbarian, supporting an anti-culture, or as greedy, trying to acquire what is not his. Racism is readily recruited to aid the denigration of the enemy. This is familiar enough to Westerners from the differences between the portrayal by the Allies of the Germans and the Japanese even before the savagery of the Pacific war. Reciprocally, the Japanese saw the war as "just revenge for decades of condescension and discrimination by the 'white' powers, whose 'demonic' nature was shown by the mutilation of Japanese war dead and the systematic bombing of urban areas in both Europe and Japan" (Dower, 1986, p. x).
The strangeness of the enemy conveyed in such images also has fear-evoking properties which again play on basic human propensities. Infants start to show fear of strangers in the second half of the first year (Bronson, 1968), and this may persist in some degree throughout life. Fearsomeness, as well as the culpability of the enemy, is also conveyed by showing the enemy as criminal, anarchic, a terrorist, and even as a torturer and rapist. There is, of course. a need for balance here, as he must not be shown as invincible.
Humans do not readily kill other humans, and in some tribal warfare killing is often limited, especially in formal battles as opposed to raids and ambushes (Lewis, 1995). In modern war this inhibition against killing may be less important if, as is often the case, the enemy is unseen and at a distance. The area bombing in Europe and Asia, the use of atomic weapons, and the use of defoliants and napalm by the USA in Vietnam, epitomize the issue. But modern war still sometimes involves hand-to-hand combat, and the inhibitions against killing may then be overcome by fear or under conditions of long-term experience of frustration and danger (Lifton, 1973). Some aspects of enemy images are also important here. The culpability of the enemy allows the soldier to see killing as justified, and portrayal of the enemy as beast, reptile, or germ legitimizes his extermination. Killing is also justified by making war an expression of social solidarity in defense of homes, religion, or way-of-life. This readily leads to conscientious objectors being seen as traitors.
Most of the images used in propaganda symbolise the enemy as an individual, whether human or non-human. This immediately reduces the conflict to terms comprehensible to the individual. But with the increasing impersonality of modern war, the enemy is sometimes depersonalised and portrayed merely as a weapon — a bomber or a nuclear missile. This again provides respectability for aggression against him. War may even be referred to as a computer game. There is perhaps here an echo of the much earlier tradition of war as a chivalrous conflict between heroes, as seen in contests between knights or samurai.
One important issue about such propaganda is that, by showing the enemy as barbaric, evil, greedy and so on, it is at the same time saying that we are righteous and civilized, and thus bolstering the self-image by contrast with the other-image. Depictions of the enemy may serve self-interest in other ways. In the 9th to 12th centuries, Irish writers portrayed the marauding Vikings not only as aggressive and rapacious but also as desecrators of the sacred, as barbarians capturing innocent women and causing monks to break their vows, as surpassing beasts in savagery, and as utterly uncivilised (Ni Mhaonaigh. 1977). The aim appears to have been not so much (or not only) to induce antagonism to the enemy, but rather to advance the interests of the literati, who were mostly monks. The enemy were seen as providing retribution for inadequate religious observance, or were used to provide an opportunity for glorifying their own kings for vanquishing such foes.
This was well demonstrated during the Cold War era. At the military corner of the triangle, the competitive force of inter-service rivalry was a powerful force: for instance, in the 1960's the Navy and Air Force of the USA competed to develop their own strategic counter-force weapons, and worst-case assumptions about Soviet intentions allowed for no restraints. Turning to the science corner, the arms race in the Cold War was due as much to the science-induced pull of technical advance as to democratic political decisions, and defense spending came to play a major role in the country's academia. Finally, industry had its own goals and its own interests at stake. The long lead-time necessary for the development of new weapons placed arms contractors in a strong bargaining position, for the government could not allow a contract, once placed, to fail. Furthermore, it is in the interests of both the military and industry that weapons should be sold to other countries, as thereby the unit cost is reduced. Without the arms trade by industrialized countries, many of the wars elsewhere would at least have been less bloody and perhaps would not have occurred (for fuller discussion, see Prins et al., 1983).
Each of these three sub-institutions has its own internal organization with appropriate sets of roles, and the incumbents of each have rights and duties appropriate to their roles. But there is one factor in common to each member of the military-industrial-scientific triad — the career ambitions and inertia of the individuals involved. This is no doubt augmented in many cases by feelings of loyalty and patriotism, themselves augmented in turn by long-term patriotic traditions and propaganda. But military careers depend on the possibility of winnable war, scientists' careers can be made by military research, and industrialists and their shareholders inevitably have financial goals.
Conclusion
Psychology has contributed in many ways to the understanding of war, even though the major part of the research has focused on how to conduct wars efficiently. This paper is concerned with the ways in which psychology reveals mechanisms that make war acceptable to those who take part, in spite of its horrors. It involves sketches of the factors involved in violence at three levels of social complexity. The importance of individual aggressiveness decreases along the continuum from individual aggressiveness through mob violence, ethnic and religious wars, to modern institutionalised war, while the importance of group processes and of institutionalisation increase. The factors that contribute to support war as an institution include everyday background factors (e.g., books, films), pervasive cultural factors (national traditions, some uses of religion, propaganda). and the military-industrial-scientific complex.
References
Bateson, P.P.G. (1980). "Optimal Outbreeding and the Development of Sexual Preferences in the Japanese Quail." Zeitschrift Fur Tierpsychologie. 53, 231-14.
Wright, P.Q. (1965). A Study of War, Vols 1 & 2, 2nd Ed. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Yee, M.D, & Brown, R. (1992). "Self-evaluations and Intergroup Attitudes in Children Aged Three to Nine." Child Development, 63,619-29.
Zajonc, R.B. ( 1968). "Attitudinal Effects of Mere Exposure." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. Monograph Supplement, 9. 1-27.