CIAO DATE: 07/2011
Volume: 67, Issue: 6
June 2011
Defence Policy: After Pakistan (PDF)
Gareth Price
The death of Osama bin Laden, and the manner in which it was carried out, will have major repercussions for Afghanistan and Pakistan. The coming weeks will reveal whether these will take the form of threats or opportunities. For Afghanistan, bin Laden's death may enable the Taliban to formally disown al Qaeda. Given that western intervention in Afghanistan has been increasingly predicated on the need to prevent the country from being used as a base by international terrorists, such a move would expedite moves towards a 'political settlement' in Afghanistan. Involving the Taliban in a political settlement is clearly unappetising, and would have been almost certainly avoidable had different tactics been adopted in the early years after 9/11. But from here, a thought through political process appears more amenable than the alternative. A couple of years ago, the numbers of Taliban fighters were estimated to be around ten thousand. Now, despite recent western military successes, the number of fighters is thought to be in the region of 35,000. The longer a kinetic approach predominates the western strategy, the greater the Taliban's appeal, not simply as a religious movement but as a movement against western occupation. At the same time, the realisation that western public opinion is shifting away from continued engagement in Afghanistan implies that the political process should begin sooner rather than later. The death of bin Laden is unlikely to increase western publics' appetite for prolonged intervention. Whether a political settlement is feasible depends on the mindset within the Taliban as much as in the west. On that, messages are mixed. The west claims that drone attacks have been successful in targeting mid-level fighters and that the Taliban is on the back foot in provinces like Helmand. On the other hand, recruitment to the Taliban would seem to be strong. The recent jail-break from Kandahar returned another one hundred or so mid-level commanders to the field, and the failings of the Afghan government are well documented. The Afghan High Peace Council had been appointed to forge links with the Taliban. Having made little progress, in early May the Taliban announced that members of the Council were legitimate targets. Until the west - or more likely a Muslim interlocutor, such as Turkey - begins some kind of dialogue process with the Taliban, the plausibility of any eventual political settlement will be unknown. But while the path towards a political solution may have become clearer, so has the threat of a premature western withdrawal. Soon after bin Laden's death, the French foreign minister, Alain Juppe, said that France would take time to reflect over the event, and did not rule out an early withdrawal of troops. The United States' (US) draw-down is scheduled to begin in July 2011. While it had been thought that this would be largely symbolic, bin Laden's death may allow a more rapid withdrawal than previously planned. There is a widespread recognition that the job in Afghanistan is far from finished, and that the Afghan National Army (ANA) is not ready to take over Afghanistan's security. But while wars are conducted by militaries, they are begun and ended by politicians. With economic difficulties in Europe and North America, political crises in the Middle East and newspapers proclaiming that bin Laden's death means that the job is done, the temptation to speed up the transfer of security responsibility to the ANA will grow. The Taliban would be emboldened, and a return to the civil war of the 1990s, with Iran, Russia and India backing one side, and Pakistan the other, would represent the worst possible outcome for Afghans. The choice facing Pakistan is equally stark. In the immediate aftermath of bin Laden's death, around ninety Pakistanis were killed in two suicide bomb attacks near Peshawar. A couple of days later, a Saudi diplomat was murdered in Karachi. Bomb attacks and targeted killings are common-place in Pakistan, and the country has learnt to muddle along. But they do little to engender faith in the capacity of the civilian government and the increasingly tarnished military. The Pakistani establishment is caught in a bind of its own making; it cannot side openly with the US for fear of further enraging public opinion. And it cannot side with the militants because of its need for US support. Rather than "looking both ways", as Prime Minister David Cameron described, Pakistan's establishment could be equally accused of burying its head in the sand. A policy of toleration towards some Islamist groups has failed to prevent the current blowback from taking place. The outlook for Pakistan depends on what happens next. A few days after bin Laden's death, Pakistan arrested a 'midlevel' al Qaeda operative in Karachi. Were Pakistan to launch a prolonged campaign against al Qaeda (possibly even uncovering Ayman Al-Zawahiri or the rumoured acting leader of al Qaeda, Saif al-Adel) then the US would be likely to quickly forget past indiscretions. The dismantling of al Qaeda would certainly ease the path for a settlement in Afghanistan: Pakistan's price would be a greater say in Afghanistan's future, to the likely chagrin of India. While some of the highly-charged language within Pakistan is rhetorical, there is genuine anger at US operations within the country. The threat to cut NATO supply lines has recurred sporadically in recent years, as has the threat to reposition foreign policy around China. If such threats were carried out, the impact on western troops in Afghanistan would be dire. But so too would be the consequent impact on Pakistan. Such a move would almost certainly scupper assistance from the US, and related aid from the International Monetary Fund and other multilateral institutions. Pakistan's reliance on foreign assistance stems from its oft-criticised inability to tax its own citizens. This in turn creates short-falls in the provision of social goods. With half of the country's tax revenue spent on debt repayments, and half of what's left spent on the military, this leaves precious little to spend on the health and education of its people, paramount for its long-term sustainability. While China and some Gulf states may step up their assistance, there is little evidence that this would compensate for the ending of western support. But even if Pakistan does step up its fight against al Qaeda, it will still face severe challenges, not least exacerbating the on-going blow-back. While there is awareness that the existence of Islamist groups within Pakistan threatens the state, at the same time the threat ensures Pakistan's continued strategic relevance. Pakistan has demonstrated the ability to balance violent dissent whilst remaining a functioning state. It seems unlikely that this can continue indefinitely. Pakistan's other strategic asset is its nuclear capability, the importance of which is strengthened by the fear that it could fall into the hands of militants. The rapid build-up of its nuclear capacity may strengthen Pakistan's hand, but it also increases concern in neighbouring India and points against any accommodation between the two countries. The fact that bin Laden's death has heightened the risks for the region may be his final legacy, on top of massacring Hazaras in Afghanistan, Shias in Pakistan, attacks on two US embassies in Africa, the US Navy destroyer USS Cole off Yemen and, of course, 9/11. Had he been discovered in a cave in Pakistan's tribal areas, Pakistan's expressions of surprise would have been taken at their word. Bin Laden's decision - forced or otherwise - to live in a garrison town close to Islamabad may have been his final curve ball. Gareth Price is Senior Research Fellow for the Asia Programme at Chatham House.
Defence Policy: The Changing Debate (PDF)
Xenia Dormandy
The end of an era? With a surprisingly subdued bang, the ten-year drive to find Osama bin Laden is over. The first night saw Washingtonians, mainly students who grew up in the 'bin Laden era', celebrating outside the White House. A week followed of front page news coverage analysing the Black Op and dissecting the small nuggets of information being released by the White House, alongside the predictable political debate between Republicans and Democrats over what was done right and wrong. Largely congratulatory messages were received by the Barack Obama administration from other nations (the exception being Ismail Haniyeh, head of the Hamas administration in the Gaza Strip, who condemned the assassination of an Arab holy warrior). But a few weeks on and the news has largely moved to the inner pages and to a longer-term assessment of the implications. So, how has bin Laden's capture and death changed the debate, and what does this mean for America, its policy, use of resources, and politics? For now, at least, we should consider the threat of al Qaeda to be unchanged. Osama bin Laden was an ideological figurehead, no longer the daytoday operational leader of the group. That role is being performed by Ayman al-Zawahiri, who still runs free. While information collected during the operation suggests that bin Laden was still very involved in the strategic decisions of the organisation, his death is unlikely to impact on operations already in planning except in two respects. Firstly, some actions could be moved forward in retaliation for his killing. And secondly, attacks may be reassessed if information on them was gathered during the operation. In the longer term however, the effect on al Qaeda is more uncertain. Bin Laden was apparently much loved by the rank and file, unlike his number two, Zawahiri. He was the glue that brought together many previously independent terrorist groups in the Middle East and Asia and held them together to create the franchise that is al Qaeda. It is not clear that Zawahiri, an Egyptian, or the rumoured interim leader, Saif al- Adel, have the charisma to keep them all intact. The result could be a delinking of such groups, bringing more independence to each, which would make them harder to rollup, but also provide them with less access to resources. However, while the threat may be ever-present, attitudes within the United States (US) towards the war on terror are changing; this is something that is already being reflected in the debate in Washington and beyond. It is playing out in military and intelligence terms - which resources Americans need to focus on the war on terror, on Afghanistan, on Pakistan - and in budget terms. On both sides of the aisle, Democratic and Republican, questions are being raised as to how bin Laden's departure can free up funds for new tasks. Soon after being elected, President Obama conducted a long review of the war in Afghanistan, and concluded that it was necessary to significantly ramp up military engagement. There was lengthy debate over whether, particularly given the state of the economy, this was the right policy - whether, as the president put it, the "right war" continued to be a priority for America's security. That debate is very much in evidence again, with polls in late April showing 49 percent of Americans disapproving of the war in Afghanistan, as against 44 percent who approve - a reversal of the January numbers. Osama's death is likely to revitalise those who say that al Qaeda in Afghanistan is no longer a threat (only approximately one hundred al Qaeda members are purported to still be in Afghanistan) and that we should pull out. The administration is going to find it hard to push back. The impact will also affect US counterterrorism more broadly. The large team in the Central Intelligence Agency and in other intelligence arms of the government who have been focused on bin Laden will be reassigned to broader topics, some still al Qaeda-related, but others in the Middle East and Asia more broadly. There will be a strong push to refocus intelligence attention on the events in the Middle East and North Africa, where the lack of understanding of the constituency of the rebel groups is of increasing concern. Perhaps most complex is the impact on America's relationship with Pakistan, already a controversial and complicated interaction. The discovery of bin Laden in Abbottabad, a town close to Pakistan's military capital, and one that includes a large military presence and training facility, has strengthened the voices of those who insist that Pakistan is not to be trusted. That President Obama and his team did not inform the Pakistanis before going in suggests that the administration agrees. The immediate response in Pakistan was embarrassed silence as the government and military leadership tried to find an acceptable argument as to how bin Laden could have been so close to the heart of Pakistan without their knowledge. Perhaps believing that the best defence is offence, days later the head of the military, represented by arguably the most powerful man in Pakistan, General Kayani, went on the attack, threatening the US if it ever again came onto Pakistani soil without permission. I have long argued that the US needs Pakistan as much as Pakistan needs the US. But with bin Laden's death the equation may have changed, at least in the short-term. As a nuclear power on the doorstep of the Middle East and Asia, and as a Muslim democracy - albeit an unstable one - Pakistan remains of strategic, long-term interest. But in the immediate term, given Pakistan's current hedging strategy between the US and the Taliban, it is unclear whether it wants to be a serious partner; until it does, perhaps the US should be a little more standoffish. Unless Pakistan re-evaluates its interests, a cooling off period might be in order. Notwithstanding the initial celebrations outside the White House, the response in America was in large part one of relief: relief that 'we had got our man' and could now move on. America's determination, and the message of deterrence that this sends, is an important one that is worth recognising. As suggested earlier, this is playing out in American politics, as it would at any time but particularly with an election coming up next year. To those who have criticised President Obama for being weak, vacillating, and unwilling to make hard decisions, a strong message has been sent that when necessary, he steps up. This has strengthened his image as Commander-in-Chief and has begun to address concerns about Obama's broader decision-making ability that even many Democrats have held. There are some in Washington who suggest that 'getting' bin Laden makes President Obama unbeatable in November 2012. The Republicans can no longer attack him on one of the two issues - security - where the Democrats are traditionally accused of being weak. He will now have a potent response: 'Remember who got Osama bin Laden.' But that is to forget one of the absolutes of American politics: 'It's the economy, stupid.' With eighteen months to go before the next election, there is a lot of time for other events to interject themselves. And, in the end, appropriately, bin Laden will have the smallest of voices against the cacophony of unemployment rates, house prices, taxes and inflation. Xenia Dormand is the Senior Research Fellow, US International Role at Chatham House.
Defence Policy: Narrative Shift (PDF)
Claire York
John Maynard Keynes once wrote: "when the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do, sir?" The recent death of Osama bin Laden on May 1 in Abbottabad, Pakistan, has prompted a reassessment of the facts regarding the west's fight against international terrorism and its involvement in Afghanistan and the wider region. The achievement of a key mission objective is a fillip for the United States (US) who has sought his capture for over a decade, and it will have an effect on US and British strategy and policy towards both the region and international terrorism. However, his death does not lessen the threat of al Qaeda, nor does it much alter the situation on the ground in Afghanistan and Pakistan. As the west moves into the post-bin Laden era, it is the political and public narrative - the explanation and articulation of policy decisions - which is most likely to change. Political and military leaders in the US and Britain will need to reframe existing objectives in Afghanistan, the continued threat from al Qaeda, and the new opportunities which have been presented in order to provoke and prolong support among increasingly apathetic and uncertain domestic populations. For over ten years Osama bin Laden has been the figurehead of international Islamic-inspired terrorism. He was the mastermind behind 9/11 in the US and 7/7 in Britain, while behind the scenes he continued to control a vast network of terrorist activity. Despite the diffuse nature of al Qaeda - an umbrella organisation for a wide array of grievances, political agendas and ideologies in the name of Islam rather than a single coherent entity - it was his name and his image which fronted the global brand. He was the clear enemy and target: an objective set up for government leaders, policymakers and military chiefs to meet. His demise means the campaign loses a strategic target. This symbolic achievement may be exactly the political lifeline needed by those seeking to extricate themselves from a seemingly endless and intractable problem. Both the myth and rhetoric surrounding his persona have been policy and media constructs, part of tendency, evident in the three most prominent military campaigns of the past ten years, to find a 'fall guy'. From Saddam Hussein in Iraq to Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan to Colonel Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, all have been a key figure against whom to rally support and popular opinion through the creation of a threatening 'other'. Yet, is this an essential part of the justification for foreign interventions? Is the personification of a campaign necessary for a narrative to encourage support rather than more expansive goals? Would the US, Britain and their allies have gone into Afghanistan with an argument that it was solely for humanitarian objectives? Would the rationale of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies bringing security and democracy to Libya be possible without the prominence given to the repression of Colonel Gaddafi and his forces? And would the intervention in Iraq have occurred in the same way without the presence of Saddam Hussein and his supposed weapons of mass destruction? Though it is unclear whether this is a fundamental requirement for the narratives of intervention, it will be crucial for the allies to find a new way to effectively and convincingly articulate the challenges that remain and why they are working together in the absence of bin Laden. In particular, is there still a clear objective in Afghanistan or was the hunt for 'America's most wanted' the only clear aim? Whatever form such a narrative takes, it will have been shaped to some degree from the nature of the American raid. Although much uncertainty remains about the reality of the operation, the opacity of the events inevitably leaves room for interpretation - and invariably exploitation - by both sides. It stands in contrast to operations in Iraq in 2003 where Saddam Hussein was shown 'caught like a rat' in a hole, and then later diminished as a former leader with a hangman's noose around his neck before masked executioners. Images of the former Iraqi leader served as a demonstration of a long awaited victory among the allies, but simultaneously contributed to his martyr-like image among supporters which could be used against the allies' campaign. The absence of any images in the case of bin Laden may mean a clean break, so attention can be focused on the remaining tasks. However, as initial debate has shown, US leaders in particular will need to acknowledge and attempt to address some reasonable questions. These include the justification of the US's preference for a military raid over a formal trial, as well as the consequences for the sovereignty and security of Pakistan, and in turn others, given its government's apparent lack of knowledge of and involvement in a foreign assault on its territory. Though the Afghan intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 was built on a narrative of a military campaign against international terrorism, with a key milestone being the capture of bin Laden, this was not the only rationale. In October 2001, following the 9/11 attacks, British parliament was recalled to discuss the intervention. Prime Minister Tony Blair declared that "even when al Qaeda is dealt with, the job will not be over." He further stated that "we will not walk away from [the Afghan people] once the conflict ends, as has happened in the past. We will stand by them and help them to a better, more stable future under a broad-based government involving all the different ethnic groupings." Today humanitarian objectives to deliver security, stability and better governance to the region still remain. Despite progress in some areas such as the development of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and even the police forces, key goals to tackle injustice, corruption, the drugs trade, and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are yet to be met. However, these original motivations are almost ten years old and it remains to be seen whether Blair's expansive and non-personal goals will be adopted and sustained by his Conservative successor. Indeed, Prime Minister David Cameron has the option to use this development to maintain continuity with the Labour Government on its policy to the region or to define new alternatives. Will Afghanistan remain a priority for the Conservatives and their Liberal Democrat partners in the coming months? Will a desire for short term political expediency alter the approach? Initial indications suggest no radical departure from prior policy. Already the Prime Minister has spoken of the potential for the region while reinforcing the continued commitment from ISAF forces. Just hours after the events of May 1, he spoke about the new opportunity that this presented for Afghanistan and the region to achieve stability and security. Yet there is a new political opportunity and only a few days after he first addressed Parliament on May 2, national media reported that the prime minister planned to reduce force numbers in Afghanistan in the summer. The demise of the leader of al Qaeda was connected to a potential acceleration of the drawdown of operations in Afghanistan, a move which put the prime minister at odds with military chiefs. Similar connections were being made in the US. Aware of the significance of events, the White House has sought to find the balance between maximising a good news story for domestic support and recognising the longer term implications for its involvement in the region - most notably the continued presence of military personnel. US President Barack Obama has been keen to make clear that, while a 'significant achievement', Bin Laden's death is in no way the end game in operations: the fight against international terrorism and the commitments to the region continue. Nonetheless, there may be a shift from counter-insurgency to counter-terrorism operations on the ground as ISAF forces adjust to changing dynamics in the region - though the insurgency will remain and they need not necessarily operate in exclusivity. There may be the chance to build bridges with some of bin Laden's more fickle partners. There is talk of new openings to engage with Taliban leaders such as Mullah Omar, and to appeal to the less radical insurgents in the region. Though there is proof that al Qaeda is a very well run organisation, politicians and the media in the west have already sought to use the image of an isolated man in a well kept and secure compound in Pakistan to dispel the myth of bin Laden as a strong leader among those who may have supported his cause, orchestrating events from the ground-level and safety of the Afghan caves. The drawdown of troops seems set to go ahead in July. Rather than a knee-jerk response. this is continuity with a policy previously set by British and American leaders as a starting point for transition to Afghan forces by 2014, and is part of a timetable agreed at the NATO summit in Lisbon last November by NATO leaders and the Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai. Whatever comes next, all sides will have to prepare militarily and politically for the fallout. The aftermath of May 1 will be felt as al Qaeda members seek revenge for the loss of their leader. Retribution attacks have already occurred and a bomb attack in Pakistan on May 13, killing at least 69 people, is an early indication of what may be to come. The dismantlement of al Qaeda is unlikely and reports of factionalism over the successor do little to deny its continued potency. If the US, Britain and ISAF forces decide to remain engaged in Afghanistan, they will need to make clear what the objectives are and demonstrate that bin Laden was not their only achievable goal. Policy and strategy should be responsive to events, yet change should be for the right reasons and at the right time within the bounds of what is reasonable. There is a danger that bin Laden's death may be used for political reasons from al Qaeda is undiminished; already the attacks in Pakistan in the past two weeks have shown what is likely to come, and continued engagement with both Pakistan and Afghanistan will be integral to domestic security concerns in the west. It will be for political and military leaders among the ISAF forces to determine whether they have the appetite and will to meet the remaining challenges. Continuity in the policy of the US and Britain will send a strong signal to allies and adversaries about their commitment and their intent. In the long term, it is likely to prove more productive, even if immediate and pressing issues regarding force numbers, resources and funds remain. Yet in the short-term can a new narrative be sought around the persisting realities? Or is the loss of one of the most prominent symbols in the campaign sufficient justification for a change of mind and, perhaps more significantly policy, towards the region? More importantly, will increasingly apathetic and uncertain publics in the west sustain the engagement for much longer in light of bin Laden's death? Claire Yorke is the Programme Manager of the International Security Programme at Chatham House.
Europe: Multicultural Europe? (PDF)
Martyn Bond
Muliculturalism has failed. So said Chancellor Angela Merkel in a speech in Potsdam last October. David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy both echoed her opinion early this year. But it is not easy to know just what they meant. The term is open to so many interpretations and used in so many different ways. Is it an ideology, a set of policies, or a social reality? In some ways the term confuses more than it clarifies. If political declarations could do the trick, those speeches might have buried the debate, but the obstinate facts behind the term cannot be brushed aside with political declarations. A recent report - Living Together: Combining Diversity and Freedom in 21st Century Europe, written by a group including Joschka Fischer, Emma Bonino, Timothy Garton Ash, and Martin Hirsch and commissioned by the Council of Europe - avoids using the term but deals with the substance. Diversity, it declares, is Europe's destiny. The continent is a patchwork quilt of languages and tribes, the residue of migrations over several thousand years. Today's migratory flux is little different from the past, except that migrants arrive in larger numbers and, in some cases, come from further afield. It is a fact of globalisation. As in the past, however, many immigrants into Europe remain attached to their heritage, recreating for themselves and with their neighbours the familiar culture of their previous home. Culture determines identity, and maintaining traditional religious faith can help bond communities - a little Anatolia in Berlin, an echo of Algeria in the Parisian suburbs, a miniature Pakistan in the English Midlands. But, the Report asks, what is wrong with multiple identities? If the United States (US) can live with African- or Italian- Americans, why can Europe not accept 'hyphenated Europeans' - Turkish-Germans, North African-Frenchmen or Asian-Brits? Cultural diversity has been a constant feature of European history. It has been the source of many of our continent's greatest achievements - but, when mishandled, has also played a part in some of its greatest tragedies. It represents a challenge which will continue, for at least two reasons. Firstly, most of those who have come to Europe in recent decades expect to stay. Many immigrant families have now been in Europe for two or even three generations. Secondly, Europe is aging, which means that the economy needs more immigrants. The European Commission calculates that in the European Union (EU) alone, over the next fifty years, the workforce will potentially decrease by 100 million or so people. Without additional migration, this is a recipe for economic decline. Europe is a crowded, urbanised and highly sophisticated society. As immigrant numbers increase and their share in the population rises, the stakes grow higher than before. Without adequate preparation and adaptation, European society will be put under intolerable strain. But Europe's record on coping with recent immigration is not good. As numbers rise, intolerance increases and support grows for xenophobic and populist parties, leading to widespread discrimination and a large population of undocumented migrants, Islamic extremism, and the clash between respect for religion and freedom of expression. All these are indicators of a failure both of the settled population to accommodate the newcomers and of immigrants to adapt to their new environment. The Report highlights several causes that contribute to this malaise: Europe's current economic difficulties, the fear of globalisation, and a sense of relative decline and insecurity added to distorted media images, harmful stereotypes of minorities, inherent prejudice against foreigners in public opinion, and a shortage of leaders who can inspire confidence by articulating a clear and positive vision of Europe's destiny. To minimise the strains in society, the Report argues that all long-term residents in European countries should be accepted as full citizens - and all, whatever their faith, culture or ethnicity, must be treated equally by the law, the authorities and their fellow citizens. As residents in Europe, they should enjoy the protection of the European Convention on Human Rights, and like all other citizens in a democracy, they should have a say in making the law. But neither their religion nor their culture can be an excuse for breaking it. To apply these principles in practice, the Report urges states to extend the full rights and obligations of citizenship, including the right to vote, to as many of their resident population as possible and - as an interim step - to give all foreign residents the right to vote in local elections. At a minimum, newcomers should obey the law, learn the language used by the majority of their new neighbours, and make themselves economically useful in their new society. The Report proposes seventeen guiding principles, which policymakers, opinion leaders and civil society activists can refer to as a checklist for positive diversity. Much of the Report is couched in terms of 'should' rather than 'must.' It explicitly states that it aims to "minimise compulsion and maximise persuasion". Hence many of its recommendations are addressed as much to civil society as to public authorities. Teachers, the media, employers, trade unions, civil society, churches and religious groups, celebrities and other role models, all have a role to play in changing public attitudes in the direction of greater tolerance and mutual respect. The Report starts from the universal validity of human rights reflected in the European Convention of Human Rights, but it does not shy away from suggesting special measures to ensure that members of disadvantaged or marginalised groups within Europe enjoy genuine equality of opportunity. The Report describes the treatment of Roma, for instance, as "a standing reproach to the entire continent". At the same time special treatment does not imply special privileges. The right to freedom of expression must not be curtailed, by law or practice, to appease violent intimidation by minorities asserting values that are not shared by the wider community, as in the case of the cartoons of Mohammed. Nor should public statements tending to build or reinforce public prejudice against members of any group - immigrants or others - be left unanswered by figures in society who command respect. Laws against discrimination in all areas of public life should not only be explained to the wider public - take the recent burqa ban in France, for instance - so that they rest on an accepted consensus, but also fully implemented in practice. The Report urges states to present citizens with a more realistic picture of Europe's economic and demographic needs. While states have a right and duty to control immigration, all Europeans should treat asylum seekers and migrants arriving in Europe fairly and humanely, with appropriate solidarity and burden-sharing among European states. Countries should work towards a comprehensive, coherent and transparent immigration policy with a view to minimising the acute local problems - for instance, in the Mediterranean - that often hit the headlines. EU states reneging on the principle of free movement by dismantling the Schengen Agreement is no answer, though this has been the first reaction to Italy's granting temporary residence permits to recent migrants, allowing them to travel freely to neighbouring countries. At the same time they should reach out to Europe's neighbours in the Middle East and North Africa, offering them the chance to participate in European institutions and European conventions that help to ease the problematic aspects of migration in countries of origin, as well as countries of destination. Beyond its strategic recommendations, the Report also proposes more than forty specific measures to improve the situation: facilitating migrants' access to citizenship, easing the practical plight of asylum seekers, developing education in what it terms "intercultural competencies" and media literacy, as well as guidelines for ending discrimination in the media and promoting a better balanced narrative about migration. It also proposes measures to monitor discrimination, racism and xenophobia at local and regional as well as national levels, and urges politicians not to seek political advantage by pandering to extremists and playing the migration card. It is no small mountain to climb, but the Report is confident that, if states recognise its principles and follow its recommendations, Europe's democratic security could be better assured. It would become a less anxious and more hopeful place than it is today. The term 'multiculturalism' may be played out, but the reality of diversity in our European societies still needs considerable attention if we are to manage it without sacrificing some of the freedoms that have made Europe attractive in the first place. The Report was produced by the Group of Eminent Persons established by the Council of Europe - Joschka Fischer, Emma Bonino, Timothy Garton Ash, Martin Hirsch, Danuta Hübner, Ay e Kadıo lu, Sonja Licht, Vladimir Lukin and Javier Solana. The Group Secretary was Edward Mortimer, and the full text of the Report can be found at www.coe.int . Thorbjørn Jagland, Secretary General of the Council of Europe, will address a meeting on this issue at Chatham House on 7 June. Dr Martyn Bond is Visiting Professor of European Politics and Policy at Royal Holloway, University of London, and Fellow of the Institute for Contemporary Studies at the European Business School, Regent's College.
Europe: No Happy Anniversary (PDF)
Vanessa Rossi, Will Jackson
Considerable headwinds are hampering efforts to bring debt under control. Firstly, annual interest costs alone will be as much as seven to eight percent of GDP and rising as debt is now estimated to reach around 150 percent of GDP in 2011. Thus the government will not be able to reduce the budget deficit unless it achieves a substantial surplus on the primary budget - the balance between revenues and noninterest expenditure. Secondly, it is extremely difficult to achieve and maintain a primary budget surplus. The programme of structural adjustments, spending cuts and tax reforms agreed as part of the bail-out deal has been only partially implemented. The tax take remains low, and moves towards deregulation and privatisations are progressing only slowly, hindered also by recessionary conditions. And thirdly, while government debt was expected to peak at about 150 percent of GDP, it is now likely to rise to over 160 percent of GDP even if the tough budget targets set in the bailout deal are met, which is unlikely. With weak local growth and low national savings, the level of debt and interest payments in Greece are simply too high to be supported. Last year's rosy image of Greece beginnning to bring debt under control and return to capital markets for funding by 2012, or even starting to repay the emergency loans by 2014, was not realistic. Talks are now in progress over extending the funding programme and modifying the terms. However, to many observers, this is becoming increasingly like a permanent bail-out or restructuring exercise, and concerns about the risk of a Greek default and/or euro exit have escalated once more. Limits Of Credibility Last year, as the Greek crisis threatened to boil over and infect other countries, the Eurozone's announcement of a sizeable bail-out plan for periphery debtors - the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), to be operated in conjunction with the IMF - was punchy enough to convince investors that there would be no disorderly defaults in the short-term. Countries at risk would be protected for the coming one to two years. It also provided a breathing space for a more thorough, long-run solution to be thrashed out. Yet, after a short respite, the situation steadily deteriorated and, one year on, even the terms of the Eurozone bail-out mechanism have yet to be fully settled. It is now much harder to persuade markets that there are no default risks and debts will be repaid in full. It is no surprise that the periphery debt crisis continued to escalate through 2010-11. As its banking crisis overwhelmed national resources, Ireland was forced into accepting assistance at the end of 2010 - a total of 85 billion euro - at the limit of what the government could credibly take up and still claim to be solvent. This was followed in May this year by the practically inevitable bail-out for Portugal - of nearly eighty billion euro - just in time to prevent its banking system from collapsing. In addition, Greece is seeking more money over an extended period to meet its obligations and Ireland is also to receive more funding from the IMF. Bail-outs do not appear to be coming to an end. Apart from the shifting scale of the bail-outs, their varying terms are also somewhat confusing, prompting complicated wrangles over the differing interest rates applied across the four to six percent range, and demands for adjustments to reduce the cost of loans. Negotiations over the ESM - likely to be completed at the European Summit in June - by the countries being bailed out are expected to focus on easier repayment terms and lower interest costs. However, any such subsidies will have to be provided using Eurozone funds, as the IMF has no mandate to pursue such concessions. In theory, there is also potential for a creditor agreement on rescheduling, involving the European banks (which are the main holders of periphery debt), as well as the European Union (EU) and the European Central Bank. Nevertheless, the Eurozone may persist in declaring that any such aid would not represent a restructuring - although, effectively, it would be. Debtors would not repay all debt and interest costs in full. It is hardly surprising that creditors are less than eager to agree, in fact the ECB is also uneasy as it is now a major creditor. What Would Be A Viable Level Of Debt? The latest surge in market interest rates on periphery sovereign debt towards twenty percent or more reflects further downgrades from the credit rating agencies and a renewed slump in investor sentiment. Access to markets is restricted and would be too costly to be supportable for the troubled periphery economies. This is not the fault of markets and speculators - the scale of debt in these countries, coupled with the difficult task of achieving both fiscal austerity and a return to growth, have damaged confidence in the ability of the respective governments to meet the terms of bail-out plans and repay debts, even under a regime of cheap emergency loans. For debtor countries, a moratorium on all interest costs - effectively a form of staggered 'hair cut' for creditors - would probably not be sufficient to bring debt down to manageable levels by 2013, the end of the present ESM. To return to a sustainable position, some debt reduction will be necessary. Instead of trying to fudge the terms of repayments on debts that cannot be repaid, suppose the question is turned around: what level of debt might the periphery economies actually be able to afford to repay? How much would the 'hair cut', of one form or another, have to be to reach a viable level? For example, cancellation of about a third of the present debts should leave the debt burdens of Ireland and Portugal close to a sustainable range. Fiscal austerity would still have to continue over some years to bring debt back to safer levels of around sixty to seventy percent of GDP, but this would not be impossible to achieve and would offer the prospect of a resumption of normal policymaking within a reasonable time frame. However, for Greece, the situation is more complex. A onethird of debt cancellation would still leave debt at just over one hundred percent of GDP. Moreover, high interest payments make stabilising the debt a tough task. Reducing Greece's debt level closer to sixty to seventy percent of GDP may therefore require a combination of debt cancellation and easier interest payments - or a massive upfront 'hair cut' of fifty to sixty percent. Fractious Politics Politically, the tensions have also grown. Not only are troubled debtor countries seeing voter resentment build up over the scale of fiscal austerity and persistently weak economic conditions, but those countries providing the bailout funds are also restive. This was perfectly illustrated by the electoral gains made by anti-bail-out parties such as the True Finns, and the loss of support for the ruling coalition in Germany. Periphery voters see themselves unfairly bearing the cost of paying back EU banks, while voters in the rest of the Eurozone are unhappy at bailing out periphery governments. In addition, there could be trouble brewing in EU relations with the IMF, the Eurozone's bail-out partner, as its terms of engagement in financial assistance are constrained - bail-out terms must be adhered to, loans must be repaid and it cannot offer lower interest rates on the funds made available. There may also be disagreements about progress on budgets and reforms and policy options - which could become more difficult to manage given the likely departure of Strauss-Kahn as head of the IMF. If additional assistance is to be granted to debtors, then the Eurozone may find that it has to provide all of the new funding itself. This could also be a financial challenge if the cost of bail-outs continues to escalate. A Realistic Endgame? For the Eurozone, the imperative for all member states must be to reduce debts to sustainable levels while ensuring that reforms put economies on a sound footing to achieve future growth. But more must be done to collectively contain the risks posed by the periphery debtors. First of all, an injection of realism is necessary. Over-optimistic projections for the speed and scale of reforms and fiscal adjustment will lead to the debilitating experience of persistent failures. This is unlikely to ensure a return to capital markets for periphery governments. Secondly, excessive debt must be recognised as uncontrollable by fiscal austerity alone. In the case of Greece, with the highest level of debt, a solution will require not only progress on raising the tax take, deregulation and privatisation receipts, but also some combination of measures to reduce debt and lower interest payments in order to bring the overall debt level down. And thirdly, simply extending existing emergency financing arrangements, either in maturity or scale, may only make political tensions within Europe worse, reduce the incentive for debtors to get their fiscal houses in order and fail to resolve the underlying problem of excessive debt. The reluctance of the Eurozone leadership to contemplate the 'R' word (restructuring) may be due to concern that easier terms for debt will simply encourage both a return to laxity and more requests for debt relief. But the risk of moral hazard and debt games cannot hold back a final resolution of the debt dilemma for ever. The ultimate endgame will simply be default for countries with uncontrollable debts. And the prudent parts of the Eurozone may be unable to finesse either the timing or the impacts of any default. It may be better to settle early and decisively. Vanessa Rossi is an Associate Fellow with the International Economics Programme at Chatham House and Will Jackson is a former Research Assistant with the International Economics Programme at Chatham House.
China: New Incentives? (PDF)
Su Hsing Loh
The People's Republic of China's twelfth five-year plan, which provides the overarching guidelines for its domestic policies from 2011- 2015, was officially adopted on March 14 of this year. Notably, the average rate of gross domestic product (GDP) growth has been lowered from eight percent to seven percent, signifying that economic development will not be pursued at the expense of other priorities. The plan suggests China's attempt at a long-overdue transition from an overly export-dependent economic development model mainly based on low-cost manufacturing, to one driven by domestic consumption and services. Widely regarded as the most 'green' five-year plan to date, significant targets for reducing the environmental costs of development are also outlined, with energy consumption per unit of GDP to be reduced by sixteen percent, and carbon dioxide emission per unit of GDP to be cut by seventeen percent, while non-fossil fuel will account for 11.4 percent of primary energy consumption. Seven 'Strategic Emerging Industries' have been identified: these are biotechnology, new energy, high-end equipment manufacturing, energy conservation and environmental protection, clean-energy vehicles, new materials and next-generation information technologies. The development of these industries will be encouraged through tax breaks and beneficial procurement policies, with the intention of increasing their contribution of GDP to eight percent by 2015. China has indicated the intention for reform in monopoly industries for easier market entry and greater competition. This is an interesting development in view of the controversy surrounding Baidu, which faces accusations of engaging in unfair practices by making use of its dominant share of the Internet search market in China. In the context of these objectives, what are some of the areas which might hold economic opportunities for Britain and strengthen its relationship with China? The largest investor in China among European Union (EU) member states, Britain is China's third largest trade partner, whilst China is the sixth largest source of investment for Britain. In 2004, the two countries signed the China-UK Joint Declaration opening other bilateral channels, which now include the Prime Ministerial Summit, UK-China Economic and Financial Dialogue and Sector-specific Ministerial level dialogues. Since coming to power in May 2010, David Cameron has embarked on an active economic courtship of China, pledging "closer engagement" and stating that "the UK-China relationship is at the highest level". His visit to China in November 2010 swiftly followed Foreign Minister William Hague's visit in July 2010, during which Hague pushed for market access into China. It is noteworthy that the British delegation in November 2010 was the largest in recent history, with four Cabinet ministers and fifty business leaders, and that the last visit to China by a prime minister was Gordon Brown's visit back in January 2008. Tony Blair had visited China only three times in his ten years in the office. Li's reciprocal visit in January 2011, with a sizeable delegation of 150 and subsequent statement that "there is huge potential for China-UK cooperation" - as well as Ambassador Liu Xiaoming's comments that the new government is pursuing "a positive China policy...Sino-British relations have achieved a smooth transition and sustainable development," - indicate that Cameron's charm offensive was a success. Trade deals worth over four billion dollars were signed during Li's visit to Britain, which will double annual bilateral trade by 2015. The recent visits and positive overtures demonstrate the two countries' commitment to strengthening bilateral relations and establishing strong grounds for cooperation, and this is an opportune period for Britain to broaden and deepen its economic relationship with China. Based on the five-year plan, there are several areas of possible interest for Britain. Firstly, Britain might benefit from the planned growth in China's clean energy and green technology markets. China's investment in environmental protection is expected to increase to around 460 billion dollars over the five-year period. A significant part of this will be channelled toward pollution control, with the target to cut the release of major pollutants by eight to ten percent. China's focus on green technology coincides with Britain's efforts to boost its renewable energy industry. The British budget for 2011 features several initiatives to this end, including the initial capitalisation of the Green Investment Bank. The ten million dollar renewable energy technology licensing deal signed by Vice Premier Li during his visit to Scotland in January signifies China's interest in looking to Britain for green technology. Clearly, investment and cooperation have to take place within a strengthened intellectual property rights framework, and on a reciprocal basis. In addition, government procurement remains a thorny issue as China has yet to accede to the World Trade Organization's Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA). Only limited areas are open to foreign business in the Chinese government procurement market, and government bodies lean strongly toward domestic goods and services providers. However, some improvements have been put forward by China in its revised GPA accession offer that was submitted in July last year. Secondly, Britain could further explore research and development projects with China. China is aiming to reach two million annual patent filings by 2015 and has introduced an array of incentives, including cash bonuses and tax breaks for companies that are patent producers. Currently, China publishes more joint scientific research papers with Britain than any other EU country. With the five-year plan allocating 2.2 percent of GDP to research and development, Britain could establish stronger research links with China. At present, Britain and China have undertaken research in various fields, including climate change, infectious diseases, biomedicine and traditional Chinese medicine, nanotechnology and materials science. The commercialisation of the results of these collaborative research efforts would yield benefits for both countries. Thirdly, Britain might make inroads into the services sector. Under the five-year plan, China is aiming to increase the service sector's value-added output to account for 47 percent of GDP. China's leaders are aware that the development and expansion of the service sector, especially in the fields of banking and telecommunications, lags behind the demand generated by China's fast economic growth. Despite China's accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001, the services sector is still strongly protected and continues to be plagued by problems of restricted exposure to overseas direct investment and dominance by state-owned enterprises. Indications in the five-year plan for reform in monopoly industries to provide for easier market entry and greater competition is certainly a welcome development, though it remains to be seen how these plans will be implemented, and more importantly, if they will be strongly enforced. There are compelling incentives for Britain to invest in China's economic growth and attain mutually beneficial outcomes. In addition, strengthened economic ties might have positive spillover effects on other domains of the bilateral relationship that are more difficult to navigate due to ideological differences, as economic interdependence confers the advantage of convergence in strategic interests. In this context, the opportunities for greater economic engagement offered in the five-year plan ought not to be overlooked. Su Hsing Loh is an Associate Fellow with the Asia Programme at Chatham House.
The Middle East: The Persian Illusion (PDF)
Shashank Joshi
A spectre is haunting the Persian Gulf - the spectre of Persia. The era of the Gulf's most iconic bête noire, Saudi born and raised Osama bin Laden, has drawn to a close. But outsiders persistently underestimate the degree to which it is a state - the Islamic republic of Iran - rather than a non-state group, al Qaeda, which today captures the strategic attention of those in the corridors of power in Riyadh, Manama, and Amman. Dangling a few hundred kilometres above the Gulf states, like a geopolitical Sword of Damocles, post-revolutionary Iran has long been the principal strategic concern for the sheikdoms and emirates on the other side of the water. And yet, the strenuous efforts to place Iran at the heart of pro-democracy uprisings reveal a more cynical and selfserving effort at threat inflation, distracting attention from the unavoidable reform agenda dodged for so long by the Gulf autocracies. Of course, the Iranian threat is not without pedigree. After the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the export of revolution - sudur inquilab - was adopted as official policy. Even after its Office for Global Revolution closed in the late 1980s, Tehran was abetting (mainly, but not exclusively, Shia) armed movements in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, and elsewhere. Saudi Arabia responded in kind by backing the Taliban in Afghanistan, Sunni militias in revolutionary Lebanon, and extremist parties in Pakistan, to mention but a few. Saudi state institutions disseminated a retrograde and radical interpretation of Islam - its Wahhabi variant - around the world drawing, from the 1970s, on their extraordinary oil wealth. Both these sets of actions were largely destabilising and often subversive of nascent democratic currents. Then, in the five years after 9/11, Iran found not only that two long-standing adversaries - the Taliban in Afghanistan, and Saddam Hussein in Iraq - had been eliminated by the United States, but also that its ally Hezbollah had been emboldened and aggrandised by an urban war with Israel. Iran's regional clout was at a high, though no one was quite clear on whether this 'clout' was usable. Moreover, its opaque nuclear programme raised the troubling question of whether, like Pakistan with its support for Lashkar-e-Taiba and other jihadi groups, Iran might soon possess a nuclear shield behind which it could safely wield the instrument of proxy militants. It is therefore unsurprising that states like Bahrain and Saudi Arabia are seemingly convinced that pro-democracy protesters are Iranian fifth columnists, less interested in basic rights for downtrodden Shias than in clerical rule and Iranian hegemony over Arab lands. It is even less surprising that western observers have bought this line, and are muted in their criticism for the de facto Saudi occupation. After all, Iran claimed Bahrain as its own territory for many years, and has been locked in a pseudo-sectarian cold war with the wider Saudi-led bloc. But the truth is likely to be less sinister. Firstly, Bahraini protesters agitated not for the overthrow of minority Sunni rule, but for their fair treatment within existing political structures. Their demands for political liberalisation were predicated on the royal family's own pretensions to reform, which have stalled or regressed in the past five years. In 2002, the king tore up the results of an earlier referendum and introduced his own constitution that gave greater power to the forty appointed parliamentarians rather than their forty elected colleagues. In the interim, widely accepted allegations of torture and arbitrary detention have been rife. During this crisis, it was the regime's use of often indiscriminate violence, divisive sectarian rhetoric, and imported Sunni mercenaries that transformed a restrained and cross-sectarian protest movement into something more unruly, with a distinctly anti-Sunni inflection. The Bahraini and Saudi monarchies know this, but are obviously unwilling to articulate that their violent techniques are aimed at the perpetuation of their rule rather than national security. Secondly, the effort by the Saudi and Bahraini monarchies to slander the protesters as Iranian stooges was a disturbing echo of early modern Europe's obsession with 'Popish plots' concocted by subversive Catholic minorities. In fact, most Bahraini Shias are Arabs and have little interest in serving Iran's regional ambitions. Iran responded to the Saudi injection of troops into Bahrain by withdrawing its ambassador and urging 'resistance', but this was of little relevance or interest to nationalist protesters, many of whom had constructively worked within Bahrain's progressively enfeebled parliament and had set out with a gradualist, not radical, agenda. Al-Wefaq, the paramount Shia political grouping, formed in the aftermath of an anti-Shia crackdown in the 1990s, has worked inside Bahrain's parliament for five years despite continuous gerrymandering and repression. Many Shia groups have also noted the example of Lebanon, where Iran had helped Hezbollah shatter that country's institutions, as a cautionary tale. Thirdly, the Iraq war ought to chasten western policymakers about the dangers of threat inflation. It can undercut efforts at engagement, harden already rigid differences in perception, and induce reckless and disproportionate policy responses. This does not require appeasement, but does require identifying between actual and amorphous threats. A sign of how low the threshold for alarm has fallen is the reaction to Iran's transparently diversionary effort to send two warships through the Suez Canal for the first time since 1979. Aside from undertaking a perfectly legal journey, neither they nor Iran's creaking navy present any conceivable military or intelligence threat to Israel or Gulf states. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's regime acted not from strength, but weakness. Yet regional powers, both Arab and Israeli, unwisely rose to the taunt, and expressed dark and implausible visions of encirclement. None of this is to deny that Iran is likely, willing, and probably able to foment some degree of violence inside Bahrain and its anxious neighbours, if it was determined to do so. It is prudent to warn off Iran, given its history of intervention and impetuous diplomacy. But what is more likely to render aggrieved Shia groups receptive to Iranian meddling: peaceful dialogue and meaningful reform, or bitter sectarian accusations and crushing violence? The Saudi-led effort to vilify essentially moderate demonstrators will, in the long-term, radicalise these groups, harden confessional fault-lines, and thereby produce the very Iranian backlash on which these policies are conditioned. Shashank Joshi is a doctoral student of International Relations at Harvard University and is an Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute.
Serbo-Croat Relations: Addressing Injustice (PDF)
Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik
On August 4, 1995, Croatian forces launched Operation Storm, a military action to gain control of the land occupied by Serb forces. The operation displaced some 200,000 Serbs from Croatia's Krajina region, but concluded the Croatian war, which started in 1991. Serbian public opinion has long maintained that this event constitutes genocide, and Storm became symbolic in Serbian politics, being held up as an emblem of perceived injustices against Serbs. On April 15, 2011, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) delivered its judgement on the 'Gotovina et al' case, concluding a trial of three generals in charge of Operation Storm. In Croatia, there was hope for a lenient sentence or an acquittal were expected, since the generals in questions - Ante Gotovina, Mladen Markac and Ivan Cermak - are figures of esteem in some circles, and where most of the wartime operations are also seen as acts of self-defence. In Serbia, there was also an anticipation of acquittal, since the public opinion, shaped by deeply politicised anti-ICTY rhetoric, believes that the court is an anti-Serb institution, which hands down large sentences only to Serbs, whilst acquitting other nationals. Therefore, surprise ensued when the ICTY sentenced Gotovina to 24 years imprisonment, and Markac, former Commander of the Special Police of the Ministry of the Interior, to eighteen years incarceration. Ivan Cermak, the Assistant Minister of Defence in the Croatian Government (1991-1993), was acquitted. The judgement finds, inter alia, that Gotovina and Markac "participated in a joint criminal enterprise, the common purpose of which was the permanent removal of the Serb population from the Krajina region of Croatia by force, fear or threat of force". The judgement also found that Franjo Tudjman, then president of Croatia, was "a key member of the joint criminal enterprise" who intended to "repopulate the Krajina with Croats, and ensured that his ideas in this respect were transformed into policy". Beyond Tudjman, the judgement also reached the very top of the Croatian ruling elite at the time - it also found that then-Minister of Defence Gojko Susak, Chief of Staff Zvonimir Cervenko and "others in the political and military leadership" were also a part of this "joint criminal enterprise". This judgement was significant for transitional justice in the Balkans in several ways. First of all, it implicated the Croatian ruling elite, naming specifically its role in expulsions and other crimes committed. The ICTY has had some success in rounding up high ranking politicians and leaders such as former leader of Bosnian Serbs Radovan Karadzic and Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic, but for the most part, it tends to prosecute the intermediaries who or the 'foot soldiers' who carried out orders, rather than order givers. Significant also were the reactions of key regional leaders. The official Croatian response, expressed by Croatian Prime Minister Jadranka Kosor and President Ivo Josipovic, was of shock, but remained calm and diplomatic. Kosor found the "joint criminal enterprise" label "unacceptable" whilst Josipovic added that this judgement does not question the legitimacy of the war. The Serbian response - both official and unofficial - was surprisingly muted, with President Boris Tadic warning Serbian citizens not to celebrate this sentencing. Speaking on the Radio Television Serbia (RTS), Bruno Vekaric, the Deputy Prosecutor for War Crimes in Serbia, added that this sentencing might start a confrontation with the past in Croatia. Finally, and perhaps most significantly for Serbia, the wording of judgement gives a clear and unequivocal legal articulation to Serb persecution in Krajina, Croatia. It is significant in the context of the Serbian debate on war crimes. Serbian media, public opinion and large sections of the right-leaning political elite have always maintained several points about the 1990s: that the ICTY had a particular agenda and prosecuted only Serbs whilst 'someone' was always working to suppress the extent of crimes committed against the Serbs in the 1990s. This line of reasoning also contributed to the narrative which looked for a declaration of the 'others' guilt, before any such declaration can be expressed by Serbia. Key figures in Serbian politics who advocate cooperation with the ICTY, such as Boris Tadic, have to contend with this kind of ideological obstructionism in order to implement their policies. But, the subdued reactions of Serbian leaders may also be explained in another way: the conclusion of the Gotovina case sits very uncomfortably alongside Serbia's long-time failure to find, arrest and transfer to the ICTY the two remaining fugitives, Ratko Mladic and Goran Hadzic, who are wanted by the tribunal for war crimes. Mladic, who has now been arrested in Serbia but was still a fugitive at the time of the Gotovina arrest, is indicted for the Srebrenica massacre of 1995, and has been missing since approximately 2001. Hadzic, indicted for war crimes in Croatia, has been missing since 2004 and at the time of writing there have been no indications of his arrest. Gotovina, who was also on the run for a number of years, was located in 2005 in Spain and transferred by the Croatian government to the tribunal. Mladic, much like Gotovina, is also seen by some forty percent of the Serbian population as a war hero, according to poll results publicised by Rasim Ljajic, the Serbian Minister for Labour and Social Policy and head of the National Council for Cooperation with the ICTY on May 15. The poll also indicates that 51 percent of the population is against the handover of Mladic, whilst 78 percent would not give information about him and claim the more than fourteen million dollar reward. Based on very similar poll results throughout the 1990s and 2000s, most observers, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and academics have interpreted as Serbia's failure of confronting the past. However, these figures of support for Mladic are in fact, not about Mladic at all. Rather, they tend to be about perceptions of injustice and misunderstood work of the Tribunal. In the popular, political and media discourses, non-cooperation with the tribunal has always been bolstered by the perceptions of the ICTY as a biased institution, which according to the poll 53 percent of the population believe. This propagated the belief that 'our generals' should not face trial until 'their generals' do the same. And now, one of 'their generals' has. Despite being just one out of ICTY's 125 concluded cases, the Gotovina sentencing is the first sentence of such magnitude for Serbia. That Serbia is lagging behind Croatia in ICTY cooperation was highlighted even more clearly during the May 2011 visit of Serge Brammertz, chief prosecutor of the ICTY, who produced a rather damning statement: Serbia is not doing enough to find the fugitives. Now, it has at last captured Mladic, but not before the search for him had gone on for so long that it became rather embarrassing for the current government. Brammertz's sentiment has been expressed also by his predecessors and repeated with some frequency ever since the fall of Milosevic, and particularly ever since Serbia's European Union (EU) integration prospects became linked to its full cooperation with the ICTY. However, recently things had started to look up. Brammertz's previous reports had been a shade more positive, and there has been general agreement that the hunt for Mladic and Hadzic had seen vast improvements since 2008, owing in part to a new, pro-European government, replaced security staff and new operations in the hunt for the fugitives. However, Brammertz's most recent statement, also comes at a very bad time for Serbia since, at the beginning of 2011 it submitted its EU membership questionnaire to Brussels. Ever since then, the promise of membership has been a constant background noise in Serbia, with the ruling coalition promising its electorate that candidacy status will be gained by the end of 2011. The arrest of Mladic is likely to speed up Serbia's EU candidacy proceedings but this, of course, is an extremely long and drawn out process, unlikely to yield any immediately obvious results or changes. Moreover, Brammertz's reprimand of Serbian authorities only weeks before the arrest of Mladic,will require the government to reflect very seriously on why the Mladic search took so long, and why in the end, he was found to be living in Serbia, something that the government has always denied. Over the years, the hunt for Mladic had become expensive and embarrassing. Until recently, it has been stated that some ten thousand operatives were working on the case every day without many visible results. Earlier this year, Rasim Ljajic, helpfully remindeds us that daily expenditure for the Mladic hunt is between 21,000 and 42,000 dollars. Now, the Serbian public is likely to start demanding answers: who was protecting Mladic all these years? The questions of complicity, on part of certain individuals in the army or other security agencies, is likely to become a serious topic of debate. On the other hand, Mladic's arrest is of huge significance to all the victims of the Bosnian war. It is likely to provide as a catalyst for normalising Serbia-Bosnia relations since the absence of Mladic was a key point of contention between the two countries. With regards to the Gotovina judgement, however, it may be too late for not create a war crimes rapprochement between Croatia and Serbia, who still have pending genocide cases against each other at the International Court of Justice (Serbia's is a counter-suit to Croatia's case). It is, on the other hand, likely to change Serbia's perception of itself as the permanently discriminated-against state, and it may finally start dispelling some long-standing conspiracy theories about the cover-ups of atrocities committed against the Serbs. This change of perception will go a long way to contributing to a much more reasoned debated on war crimes of the 1990s. That reasoned debate will most likely not be led by the governments of the former Yugoslav republics, who have proven with their accusations and counter-accusations that they are not capable of opening a dialogue on war crimes that is satisfactory to victims of the wars and the general public. Events such as the arrest of Mladic and the sentencing of Gotovina are also outside of that debate - for most victims who have gone through the conflicts in the Balkans, the suffering of the past and the reconciliation that eventually needs to follow is much more complicated than a set of legislative procedures which inevitably become politicised. Frustrated by the politicisation of the past, and the failure to establish basic facts about the wars - such as the numbers of the dead and the missing - a coalition of 1500 regional NGOs started collecting signatures in late April for the establishment of a Balkan truth and reconciliation commission. This initiative, Recom, aims for one million signatories and has already gathered some 750,000. If successful, the commission would be the first victim-centred and region-wide attempt at addressing the injustices of the past, outside of the political context. An initiative of that kind would be most welcome in a region where figures such as Gotovina and Mladic have come to symbolise frustrations over the unrecognised crimes and other perceived injustices. Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik is a Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at Aston University.
Bosnia: Crisis Averted? (PDF)
Kenneth Morrison
Relatively few column inches have been devoted to the recent political crisis which enveloped Bosnia, possibly the most acute since the signing of the Dayton Agreement in 1995. One notable exception was Lord Paddy Ashdown, a former High Representative (HR) in Bosnia, who made a timely intervention reminding those who do not closely follow the country's affairs of the potential dangers that lie ahead if the international community continues to turn a blind eye. In an article for The Times, he argued that while great efforts were being made to prevent a Bosnian-style scenario in Libya, the international community's approach to Bosnia itself was, conversely, characterised by inaction. The fundamental problem remains Bosnia's complex political structure, and the competing interpretations of what kind of state it should be. Divided into two entities - the predominantly- Serb Republika Srpska and the Croat-Bosniak Federation, the latter of which was further decentralised into ten cantons - each possess their own governments, parliament and presidency, but are linked only by weak and increasingly embattled central institutions. Consequently, political power has remained concentrated at entity, not state, level. Bosnian Serbs, in particular, have vigorously resisted constitutional reforms that would, as they see it, undermine their autonomy. Their strategy of strengthening their own institutions by blocking as much state-level legislation as possible has assured that the Bosnian state remains weak. Acting as arbiter, the Office of the High Representative (OHR) has attempted to implement its vision of the Dayton Agreement and push reforms that would make Bosnia a functioning state, and one better prepared to embark upon the process of Euro-Atlantic integration. The HR, who from 1997 was endowed with the so-called 'Bonn Powers', possessed wide-ranging authority which could be used to exclude politicians deemed to be obstructing the Dayton Agreement. But since 2006, under the watch of Christian Schwarz-Schilling (an advocate of a less proactive role for the HR), momentum has been lost. Bosnia subsequently lurched from one crisis to another, and numerous initiatives such as the 'April Package' and the 'Prud Process' failed to bring about much-needed reform. Scheduled for closure in 2007, the OHR has remained in place, but its authority has gradually diminished. The current HR, Valentin Inzko, has attempted to take a more robust approach, but his actions have brought him into conflict with Bosnia's major Croat and Serb parties. Political Crisis In The Federation The latest in a seemingly endless series of crises was triggered by Bosnia's last elections in October 2010. Seven months on, the country still does not have a state-level government nor, if recent events are anything to go by, is it likely to have one any time soon. The gridlock was caused primarily by the inability of the major Bosniak and Croat parties in the Federation to create a governing coalition. Months of protracted negotiations over the distribution of key posts produced no tangible results, further fuelling tensions between the Social Democratic Party (SDP), the big winners in the election, and the two major Croat parties, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and the Croatian Democratic Union-1990 (HDZ-1990). So in March, five months after the elections, a group of parties led by the predominantly-Bosniak SDP - which includes the Bosniak Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and two smaller Croat parties, the Croatian Party of Rights (HSP) and the People's Party 'Prosperity through Work' (NSRzB) - triggered a constitutional crisis by moving to form a new government without the consent of the two largest Croat parties. Enraged by this, the HDZ and HDZ-1990 reacted angrily to the proclamation of the new government, both stating that they would not recognise what they deemed an illegitimately established and unconstitutional authority. The new government was, they argued, bereft of parties that represent the majority of Bosnian Croats, and thus one which would advance the interests of Bosniaks at the expense of Croats. Matters were further complicated when Bosnia's Central Electoral Commission (CEC) ruled that the formation of the government was illegal because the strict conditions required in order to facilitate it had not been met. The CEC assessed that the proclamation was essentially illegal because delegates from all ten Federation cantons were not present when agreement was reached among the parties in attendance. The HDZ and HDZ-1990, who hold the majority in a number of those cantons, failed to send representatives to the 'House of Peoples' on the basis that no prior agreement had been reached with the SDP-led bloc. As a consequence, the CEC ruled that the decision to form a new government should be annulled. Following the CEC's decision, however, Inzko announced that their decision was to be 'suspended until further notice', the justification being that the HDZ and HDZ-1990 had refused to fulfil their legal obligation of electing delegates to the House of Peoples within the required timescale. With the Croat parties chastised, the new government, seemingly confident that the ruling was permanent, continued with the business of government (with the support of the HR). Suitably antagonised by the HR's intervention, the HDZ, HDZ-1990 and a number of smaller Croat parties subsequently established a parallel Croat National Assembly in Mostar which would be used as an instrument to coordinate between Croat-majority cantons. They have also demanded that the Dayton Agreement be revised to accommodate a third, Croatdominated, entity. The Bosnian Serb Challenge Inzko's ruling was grist to the mill of nationalists in Republika Srpska. The president and leader of the dominant Union of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), Milorad Dodik, used the events to underscore his argument that Bosnia is a dysfunctional state; an artificial construction underpinned by the engagement of the international community. Critical of both the SDP and the HR's decision to override the CEC's ruling, he has made it clear that he considered the Federation government illegal. Moreover, in a move that would intensify the political crisis, the RS National Assembly declared on April 13 that they planned to hold a referendum, scheduled for June, which would challenge the legality of Bosnia's state court, prosecutors office and rulings imposed by the HR, all of which they perceive to be anti-Serb. The Bosnian Serbs were, therefore, challenging the legitimacy of not simply these institutions, but the very body that established them. An inevitable stand-off between Inzko (who claimed that the referendum would undermine the Datyon Agreement and would represent a dangerous step toward the disintegration of Bosnia) and Dodik ensued; the former threatening to remove the latter from office if the referendum went ahead. In response, Serb members in the Bosnian federal government, who argued that the referendum was needed to stem the growing power of Sarajevo and the arbitrary authority of the HR, threatened to resign their posts en masse. However, on May 12, Dodik, ever the master of brinkmanship, announced following the visit to Sarajevo and Banja Luka of the EU's foreign policy chief, Baroness Catherine Ashton, that he would postpone the proposed referendum as a 'sign of goodwill', but on the basis that the EU commit to addressing Serb concerns. He also expressed his hope that channels of dialogue be opened on the issues most sensitive for Bosnian Serbs. By making such a concession now, Dodik may have strengthened their hand in subsequent negotiations, so while Inzko may interpret the Serb climbdown as a victory, there are significant challenges ahead for him. After all, the latest crisis has made clear that the OHR has lost credibility among Serbs while its authority has diminished among Bosnian Croats. Crisis Averted? These events demonstrate that the political climate in Bosnia remains fractious. Sixteen years since the signing of the Dayton Agreement, the fundamental problem remains that there exists no consensus among Bosnia's political elites, be they Serb, Croat or Bosniak, regarding the future of the state. All claim to be defending Dayton but, equally, all interpret it differently. This has led to Bosnia's three main ethnic groups increasingly indulging in rhetoric and engaging in brinkmanship akin to that which characterised Bosnian politics in the early 1990s, creating an increasingly toxic political ambience. There is a general consensus among regional analysts that a return to violence is unlikely any time soon, but both Serbs and Croats are increasingly challenging the legitimacy of Bosnia's state institutions, and the worsening political climate has only served to heighten tensions. The latest crisis has underlined that the European Union (EU) is still an important actor, but one in need of clear strategy that will facilitate the reform necessary for Bosnian to realise the objective of EU accession. Baroness Ashton has reiterated the EU's commitment to the country's European perspective, but enlargement fatigue and Bosnia's internal political problems will likely dictate that EU accession is many years away. In his recent address to the United Nations Security Council, Valentin Inzko acknowledged that Bosnia's Euro-Atlantic integration processes had 'come to a complete halt.' After five years of intermittent crises, only a more proactive EU policy can stem the cycle of crises. Further inaction or procrastination could have wider-ranging consequences, for Bosnia, for Southeast Europe and for the EU. Kenneth Morrison is a Senior Lecturer in Modern European History at De Montfort University, Leicester.