Defining the "New Terrorism": Reconstruction of the Enemy in the Global Risk Society

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ABSTRACT:

Employing the conceptual frameworks provided by Ulrich Beck and Carl Schmitt; this article argues that the reconstruction of the enemy in the global risk society reflects a reincarnation of a "crude" form of "the political". As the powerful –the US– determines our knowledge on global terrorism, the global risk society itself becomes political, through the reconstruction of the enemy as inhuman and, thus, right-less: an enemy who should be captured and punished severely. This also refers to a deconstruction of the classical conception of war and its reconstruction as a special kind of war which involves the use and legitimization of measures that violate all rules of war, international law and human rights. This article concludes that attempts to define the "new terrorism" on positivist lines risk contributing to such reconstruction of the enemy and war, and, therefore, critical and post-structuralist approaches might offer more insight into understanding the post-9/11 world.

Keywords: Terrorism, the Political, Global Risk Society, Enemy, War

"Yeni Terörizm"i Tanımlamak: Küresel Risk Toplumunda Düşmanın Yeniden Yapılandırılması

ÖZET:

Bu makale, Carl Schmitt ve Ulrich Beck'in sundukları kavramsal çerçeveden hareket etmekte ve küresel risk toplumunda düşmanın yeniden yapılandırılmasının, "siyasal"ın "kaba" bir halinin yeniden doğuşunu yansıttığını öne sürmektedir. Küresel terörizm ile ilgili bilgimizi güçlü olan –ABD– belirlerken, düşmanın, yakalanması ve şiddetle cezalandırılması gereken, insanlık dışı yolara başvurduğu için hiçbir hakka sahip olmayan biri olarak yeniden yapılandırılması söz konusudur. Bu da küresel risk toplumunu siyasal hale getirmektedir. Bu, aynı zamanda, klasik savaş kavramının yapısının bozulması anlamına da gelmektedir. Artık özel bir savaş biçimi ortaya çıkmıştır. Savaşın bu şekilde yeniden yapılandırılması, insan hakları, uluslararası hukuk ve savaş hukukuna aykırı önlemlerin kullanımını ve meşru görülmesini de içermektedir. "Yeni terörizm"in pozitivist hatlar üzerinden tanımlanması, düşman ve savaşın bahsedilen şekilde yeniden yapılandırılmasına katkıda bulunmaktadır. Bu makalenin vardığı sonuç, eleştirel ve yapısalcılık-sonrası yaklaşımların 11 Eylül sonrası dünyayı anlamakta daha çok fayda sağlayabileceğidir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Terörizm, siyasal, küresel risk toplumu, düşman, savaş

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Introduction

This article combines the works of Ulrich Beck and Carl Schmitt in explaining the evolution of terrorism and approaching the global "war on terror" critically. It proceeds from Beck's analysis[1] on the relationship between terrorism and war, and, enquires into how the enemy is reconstructed in the global risk society as the "new terrorist". The argument of this article is that the reconstruction of the enemy in the global risk society reflects a reincarnation of a "crude" form of "the political" in Schmittean[2] terms. As the powerful – the US – determines our knowledge on global terrorism, the global risk society itself becomes political, through the reconstruction of the enemy as "a right-less perpetrator of crimes against humanity"[3] who should be captured and punished severely. This also refers to a deconstruction of the classical conception of war and its reconstruction both as a special kind of war conducted against an enemy, which is "non-territorial"[4] and "ubiquitous"[5], and, as one which involves the use of measures that impair multilateralism and international law. Exception, unavoidably, becomes the norm.

This article is designed in such a way to first offer a conceptual overview, laying down how it approaches some concepts – risk, global risk society, and the political. Second, it takes stock of the literature on the definition of terrorism and its evolution. Third, it looks into how the definition of terrorism has changed after 9/11 events and how the enemy is reconstructed in the global risk society. It concludes that because positivist attempts to define the "new terrorism" risk contributing to such reconstruction of the enemy and war, employment of critical and post-structuralist approaches might offer more insight into assessing the "global war on terror" narrative.

Conceptual Overview

Beck defines risks as unintended latent side effects of modernization/industrialization and as *politically reflexive*.[6] They refer to "*a systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernization itself*"[7] and thus "depend on *decisions.*"[8] about what constitutes a risk and how it can be dealt with. Because the new risks are not perceptible to senses and are usually invisible, there is a lot of room for speech act in the risk society in the identification of risks. "They can thus be changed, magnified, dramatized or minimized within knowledge and to that extent they are particularly *open to social definition and construction.*"[9] Beck argues that socially recognized risks carry "a

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[1] Ulrich Beck, "The Terrorist Threat: World Risk Society Revisited", *Theory, Culture and Society*, Vol. 19, No. 4, 2002, p.39-55; "The Silence of Words: On Terror and War", *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 34, No. 3, 2003, p.255-267; and "War is Peace: On Post-National War", *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 36, No. 1, 2005, p.5-26. It should be noted that this article does not refer to Beck uncritically. Nevertheless, it does not also discard value of his arguments such as those on the relation of empowerment between the state and the global terrorist.

[2] Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, George Schwab (Trans.), Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press, [1932] 1996.

[3] Beck, "War is Peace", p.11.

[4] Ibid., p.24.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ulrich Beck, *Risk Society*, Mark Ritter (Trans.), London, Sage Publications, 1992.

[7] Ibid., p.21 (Emphasis original).

[8] Ibid., p.183 (Emphasis original).

[9] Ibid., p.23 (Emphasis original).

political explosive: what *was* until now *considered unpolitical becomes political*".[10] He names risk society as "a *catastrophic* society"[11] in which "the exceptional condition threatens to become the norm".[12]

For Carl Schmitt, it is the *decision* made about who is an enemy and who is a friend which turns things into the political.[13] The political, is thus "a particular sector of human practice that differs from other sectors because it defines social relations on the basis of the opposition between friend and enemy".[14] The concept of the political is important in the sense that it makes "the possibility of war the defining condition of politics at a particular point in time".[15] This definition also carries with it the passage to the state of exception: "The exception, which is not codified in the existing order, can at best be characterized as a case of extreme peril, a danger to the existence of the state, or the like. But it cannot be circumscribed factually and made to conform to a performed law."[16] It is, on the other hand, "the sovereign" "who decides on the exception".[17] This empowers the sovereign –the state– through legitimating its acts in cases which it –itself– constructs as "a situation of radical danger and contingency for which no prior law, procedure or anticipated response is adequate".[18] Enemy construction inevitably leads to a parallel definition of the state of exception. Huysmans argues that it creates a condition in which normal political rules and procedures are questioned and the way for "new rules and a new understanding of political community" is opened.[19] In his view, "[t]his understanding of the political as a move from normal to exceptional politics defines the political problematique of securitization, as defined by Waever, Buzan and their colleagues at COPRI".[20] This is because securitization is a process which legitimates the use of "extraordinary" measures which may involve a breaking of "the normal political rules of the game".[21] It therefore refers to a shift "from normal liberal-democratic to exceptional politics".[22] This is exactly the point where the exception threatens to become the norm and, thus, carries a political explosive.

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[10] Ibid., p.24 (Emphasis original).

[11] Ibid. (Emphasis original).

[12] Ibid.

[13] Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*.

[14] Jef Huysmans, *The Politics of Insecurity – Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU*, London and New York, Routledge, 2006, p.128.

[15] Ibid., p.134-135.

[16] Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology–Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*, George Schwab (Trans.), Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press, [1922] 2005, p.6.

[17] Ibid., p.5.

[18] C.A.S.E. Collective, "Critical Approaches to Security in Europe: A Networked Manifesto", *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 37, No. 4, 2006, p.465.

[19] Huysmans, *The Politics of Insecurity*, p.135.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ole Waever, "European Security Identities", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 1, 1996, p.106. Buzan, Waever and de Wilde contend: "The special nature of existential threats justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them. The invocation of security has been the key to legitimizing the use of force, but more generally it has opened the way for the state to mobilize, or to take special powers, to handle existential threats." Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Boulder and London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1998, p.21.

[22] Huysmans, *The Politics of Insecurity*, p.135.

"Global risk society", on the other hand, is a society which has to deal with transboundary, unidentifiable and uncontrollable "global" risks. Global risks are the latent side effects of globalization and they are laden with the "double infinity of risk": catastrophe and uncertainty.[23] Therefore, the decision about what constitutes a global risk becomes crucial and the "political explosiveness" of the global risk society is greater. Beck contends:

> "The novelty of the global risk society lies in the fact that our civilizational decisions involve global consequences and dangers, and these radically contradict the institutionalized language of control – indeed the promise of control – that is radiated to the global public in the event of catastrophe (as in Chernobyl, and now also in the terror attacks on New York and Washington). Precisely this constitutes the *political* explosiveness of the global risk society. This explosiveness has its centre in the mass mediated public sphere, in politics, in the bureaucracy, in the economy, though it is not necessarily contiguous with a particular event to which it is connected. […] In it 'explodes' – if I am permitted to this metaphor – responsibility, claims to rationality, and legitimization through contact with reality."[24]

Beck lists three dimensions of danger in the global risk society: "first, ecological crises; second, global financial crises; and third –since 11 September 2001– terrorist dangers caused by transnational terror networks."[25] Terrorism is the most significant dimension of the global risk society which openly reflects its political explosiveness. This article, thus, attempts to show how the conception of terrorism has transformed; how the "new terrorism" –named as "an attack from 'inner Mars'"[26] by Beck– is constructed; and how the employment of the discourse of the "war or terror" –as a new kind of war– legitimizes the state of exception and empowers the state.

Definition of Terrorism and Its Evolution

Academics, policy analysts, policy makers and practitioners all define terrorism in different ways. This section looks into how some analysts attempt to explain terrorism and how the definition of the term has evolved. The argument that shapes this section is that although studies on terrorism before 9/11 had also reflected the regimes of truth[27] to which they belonged, they had not contributed to the construction of the political to the extent that they have done after 9/11.

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[23] Claudia Aradau and Rens Van Munster, "Governing Terrorism through Risk: Taking Precautions, (un)Knowing the Future", *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2007, p.101.

[24] Beck, "The Silence of Words", p.257 (Emphasis original).

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid., p.258.

[27] In this article a regime of truth is understood as: "'general politics' of truth: that is the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true." Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977*, Colin Gordon (ed.), New York, Pantheon Books, 1980, p.131.

A review of the literature on terrorism reveals that most of the analysts refer to a distinction between the old terrorists and the terrorists of their own times, regardless of when they wrote about them. They refer to the terrorism of their own times as "new terrorism" or "contemporary terrorism". This clearly shows that terrorism is a dynamic phenomenon. Depending on the regime of truth within which it is made, the definition of terrorism differs not only from one society to another but also from one particular time period to another.

Some examples might help to explain this better: Referring to the revolutionary times of 1960s and 1970s Walzer draws a distinction between "contemporary terrorists"[28] and the assassins of pre-World War II, claiming that the latter had a political code which the former discarded. According to this political code, the old terrorists had made a moral distinction between who could and could not be killed.[29] Defining contemporary terrorism as a "new form of violence" Sloan contended, in 1982, that such terrorism signalled "the rise of non-state actors in international affairs" and he emphasized its "non-territorial aspects".[30] Referring to "the breakdown of the monopoly of the coercive power of the state and the consequent blurring of the line between public force and private force"[31]; he named terrorism "as a new form of the diplomatic method"[32] and "as a new form of warfare".[33] In 1989, Wardlaw argued that "contemporary terrorism" is different from "its historical forebears" in terms of its "philosophy and tactics" as well as "the social and political environment in which it operates".[34] Crenshaw also used the term "contemporary terrorism" arguing that it had its roots in the French and Russian revolutions.[35] Pomper referred to the "heterogeneity of the recruits of terrorism", stating that "contemporary terrorists" lacked the degree of humanity involved in assassinations perpetrated by Russian revolutionaries.[36] Today, the same temporal distinction is still made, this time between *contemporary terrorists* and the pre-9/11 terrorists.[37]

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[28] Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars– A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, Second Edition, USA, Basic Books, 1992 (first edition 1977), p.200. "Contemporary terrorist campaigns" on p.203.

[29] Ibid., p.199. Those who could be killed were the ones regarded as "political agents of the regimes" that were "thought to be oppressive". Ibid. Donelan also refers to the distinction that the assassins made about who is a legitimate target, based on the evaluation of whether a particular life is itself injurious to life. Michael Donelan, "Terrorism: who is a legitimate target?", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 3, 1987, p.229-233.

[30] Stephen Sloan, "International Terrorism: Conceptual Problems and Implications", *Journal of Thought*, Vol. 17, No. 2, 1982, p.19-20.

[31] Ibid., p.20.

[32] Ibid., p.22.

[33] Ibid., p.23.

[34] Grant Wardlaw, *Political Terrorism –Theory, Tactics and Counter-Measures*, Second Edition, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, p.25.

[35] Martha Crenshaw, "Preface", Martha Crenshaw (ed.), *Terrorism in Context*, Pennsylvania, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995, p.x.

[36] Philip Pomper, "Russian Revolutionary Terrorism", Crenshaw, *Terrorism in Context*, p.91.

[37] For more on the new and old terrorists, see: Stuart Croft and Cerwyn Moore, "The evolution

Another important point about defining terrorism is that it is a relative, intersubjective term. Not only analysts but even those countries/peoples which suffer from a particular threat of terrorism tend to regard terrorist acts that target other countries/peoples as insurgency or freedom fighting. Laqueur contends: "The French and British press would not dream of referring to their countries' native terrorists by any other name but call terrorists in other nations militants, activists, national liberation fighters, or even 'gun persons.'"[38]

Such problems with its conceptualization have led some analysts to define terrorism by the act rather than the motive behind it.[39] This is especially made so, to emphasize that terrorism is a criminal act "albeit for political motives".[40] Such positivist definitions deliberately ignore the moral quality of that political motive – i.e. whether it has a justifiable cause such as freeing people. Positivist analysts usually attempt to provide an objective definition because they see it "indispensable" for combating terrorism.[41] They also find the aphorism "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter" problematic. Applying strategic theory to the case of terrorism, Smith claims that this is a "false dichotomy" as one "can be both".[42] He contends: "The point is that one part of the terrorist-freedom fighter equation is a description of policy (terrorist/terrorism) while the other is a moral judgement on the nature of a belligerent (freedom fighter)."[43]

Terrorism is usually regarded as an asymmetrical strategy employed by the weak/civilian against the strong/the state/the sovereign. In many cases, acts by the states are not regarded as terrorism but rather as "'counter-terror' or 'low-intensity warfare' or 'self-defence' and, if successful, 'rational' and pragmatic', and on an occasion to be 'united in joy'".[44] This is especially the case for realist/state-centric accounts of terrorism. This, in a sense, reflects the privileged status of the state in those analyses and how they contribute

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of threat narratives in the age of terror: understanding terrorist threats in Britain", *International Affairs*, Vol. 86, No. 4, 2010, p.821-835.

[38] Walter Laqueur, "Postmodern Terrorism: New Rules for an Old Game", *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 1996, http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/laqueur.htm (Accessed on 11 October 2011).

[39] Jenkins contends: "To avoid distracting polemics about who was a terrorist or whether ends justified means, it was necessary to define terrorism according to the quality of the act, not the identity of the perpetrator or the nature of the cause." Brian Michael Jenkins, "Foreword", Ian O. Lesser (*et.al.*), *Countering the New Terrorism*, Washington D.C., RAND, 1999, p.v. Bruce Hoffman is among those who explained terrorism through its methods. Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1998. http://www.nytimes.com/books/first/h/hoffman-terrorism.html, (Accessed on 10 October 2011).

[40] Ibid.

[41] Boaz Ganor, "Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist Another Man's Freedom Fighter?", *Police Practice and Research*, Vol. 3, No. 4, 2002, p.287.

[42] M.R.L. Smith, "Holding Fire: Strategic Theory and the Missing Military Dimension in the Academic Study of Northern Ireland" Alan O'Day (ed.), *Terrorism's Laboratory: the Case of Northern Ireland*, Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1995, p.232.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Noam Chomsky, "Who are the global terrorists?", Ken Booth and Tim Dunne (eds.), *Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p.134.

to the empowerment of the state. Nevertheless, if one accepts that terrorism can be defined by its methodology, then it may also be possible to name the acts of some states as terrorism.[45]

On the other hand, randomness is the most characteristic feature of terrorism because it is what terrorizes people. Walzer states: "Death must come by chance […]".[46] This means that one can never be sure whether it will be himself/herself passing by a bomb the next day. This refers to the relationship between ontological security and terrorism. Terrorism engenders and heightens ontological insecurity.[47] The aim in terrorizing people is to make them "feel fatally exposed and demand that their governments negotiate for their safety".[48] Terrorism is "directed against entire peoples or classes" and "tends to communicate the most extreme and brutal intentions".[49] This is exactly the point which shows that "'terrorism' is a pejorative term".[50] The nature of terrorism which is closely related with ontological insecurity constitutes an apposite ground for states to securitize certain issues using the discourse of a terrorist threat and legitimize their acts accordingly. It becomes easier to represent the terrorist as evil and inhuman in the face of a receptive audience which fears from passing by a bomb the next day. Terrorism itself, in a sense, empowers the state and legitimates its acts. The more the state engages in policies that go beyond the limits of a proportionate response, the more it also empowers the terrorists as they gain new recruits and public support. This refers to a circle of empowerment between the terrorist and the state.

Perhaps reflecting a shift towards a new and, this time, global regime of truth, a novel definition of terrorism was offered by RAND, in 1999.[51] Lesser *et.al.* mapped the Al Qaeda terrorism, two years before 9/11, naming it as a "central threat"[52] and as a "netwar".[53] Contending that "terrorism evolves"[54], they made a comprehensive comparison between the old and new terrorism. Defining terrorism as netwar, they stated that the new terrorists acted within networks and different terrorist groups were linked to each other without a hierarchical organizational framework –they rather operated in a loose

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[45] Walzer sees terrorism as a strategy of both conventional and guerrilla war used by established governments as well as radical movements. Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, p.198. It is, thus, not only a tool of the weak against the strong, but it can also be used by states as a strategy to repress their peoples –in case of authoritarian regimes– and/or to avoid direct engagement with the enemy –in war. Ibid., p.197. Note that Walzer underlines that although it can be used in war, terrorism is mainly a civilian strategy. Ibid. p.198.

[46] Ibid.

[47] On the link between the globalization of terror and ontological security, see Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, "'A Parallel Globalization of Terror': 9-11, Security and Globalization", *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 37, No. 3, 2002, p.323-349.

[48] Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, p.197.

[49] Ibid., p.203.

[50] Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, (Revised and Expanded Edition), New York, Columbia University Press, 2006, p.23.

[51] Ian O. Lesser *et.al.*, *Countering the New Terrorism*, Santa Monica, CA, RAND, 1999.

[52] Bruce Hoffman, "Terrorism Trends and Prospects", Lesser *et.al.*, *Countering the New Terrorism*, p.7.

[53] John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt and Michele Zanini, "Networks, Netwar, and Information-Age Terrorism", Lesser *et.al.*, *Countering the New Terrorism*, p.39-84.

[54] Jenkins, "Foreword", p.iv.

decentralized structure.[55] In their view, the new terrorists intensively used information technology for coordination and gathering information for their future attacks.[56] In a sense, these terrorists have waged a "netwar" against their targets.[57]

RAND's book shows that the new terrorism, as a central threat, had already been defined in 1999. Before the 9/11 attacks, RAND's definition could have been interpreted as just another study on the new terrorism. Nonetheless, it needs to be reconsidered/reread within the new light of 9/11 and the following wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Such rereading would offer significant insight into how terrorism has, since then, come to be recognized as a global threat. This takes us to the major problematique of this article: the process within which the enemy –the global terrorist– is reconstructed "as the right-less perpetrator of crimes against humanity" in the global risk society.

Reconstruction of the Enemy in the Global Risk Society in the Post- 9/11 Era

> "If the attack against the World Trade Center proves anything it is that our offices, factories, transportation and communication networks and infrastructures are relatively vulnerable to skilled terrorists… Among the rewards for our attempts to provide the leadership needed in a fragmented, crisis-prone world will be as yet unimagined terrorists and other socio-paths determined to settle scores with us."[58]

Quoting this from an article published in the *New York Times* in 1993, upon the first terrorist attack on the World Trade Center, James Der Derian attempted, in 2002, to warn "against reading terrorism only in the light –the often-blinding light– of the events of September 11."[59] His quotation is important as it shows how terrorist acts are almost always portrayed with a similar discourse –the discourse of fear which heightens ontological insecurity. What marks the distinction between 9/11 and the previous terrorist acts is that its scale, its targets, its symbolism, its lethality were so shocking that it inevitably caused unprecedented securitization; legitimizing any act, on the part of the sovereign –this time "the imperial sovereign"[60], the US– to counter the new terrorism at

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[55] Arquilla, Ronfeldt and Zanini, "Networks, Netwar".

[56] Ibid.

[57] Ibid., p.45-72.

[58] Mark Edington, *New York Times*, 2 March 1993 quoted in James Der Derian, "*In Terrorem*: Before and After 9/11", in ?", Ken Booth and Tim Dunne (eds.), *Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p.103. Note that the title of the article in New York Times is not provided in Der Derian.

[59] Der Derian, "*In Terrorem*", p.104, 280.

[60] Andreas Behnke, "Terrorising the Political: 9/11 within the Context of the Globalization of Violence", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 2, 2004, p.294-297. Behnke claims that the process of globalisation entails a changed notion of sovereignty. (p.293.) "Imperial sovereignty is not an a-historical ideal case. It is in fact the very notion of sovereignty that constitutes the United States as a republic." (p.294) He argues that it is due the US's identification with globalisation and its claim to be representing universal values for "the emancipation of humanity" that this particular version of sovereignty puts the US into a privileged position: "Speaking the Truth of History to humankind, deciding which elements are part of it and which have to vanish

the global level. Following Schmitt, if one considers that it is the sovereign who decides on the exception, it can be argued that 9/11 has legitimized the US, as "the imperial sovereign", to decide on the exception – i.e. to decide who the enemy is and the ways/means to deal with that enemy.

Beck argues that it is the representation of global terrorism as an "attack from 'inner Mars'" which brings about "the universalization of the terrorist threat against the states of the world".[61] It "changes the war against global terror into a challenge for Grand Politics, in which new alliances are forged beyond antagonistic camps, regional conflicts are dammed up, and the map of global politics is mixed up anew".[62] Universalization of the terrorist threat is, in a sense, juxtaposed with the universality represented by the US –its identification with globalisation and its self-proclaimed mission of freeing humankind.[63]

Behnke claims that by "making humankind the definition of its political identity, or the 'Friend'", the US attaches "a particular significance" to "the question of who the 'Enemy' is".[64] It paves the way for representing the enemy as "*in*human".[65] This is also what Beck points to: "the USA is pursuing its 'enemy' not as an enemy (in the sense of the law of war), but rather as a right-less perpetrator of crimes against humanity."[66] Ukai also claims that the term "terrorist" is used in such a way to "dehumanize the enemy".[67] For Carl Schmitt "the enemy existed in essence as a 'proper enemy'"[68] which should be fought within the confines of the rules of war.[69] Nevertheless, by dehumanizing the enemy, these confines have been removed. This is exactly why this article argues that the reconstruction

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is part and parcel of the discursive construction of globalisation and the American role in it. Globalisation as such is a positive force […] In this process, the United states is the 'indispensable nation', as it provides the technical as well as normative resources of this process."(p.295) Imperial sovereignty gives the US a self-proclaimed universalist mission setting cultural and civilisational standards for humankind. (p.295-296.)

[61] Beck, "The Silence of Words", p.258.

[62] Ibid.

[63] Rasmussen refers to the symbolism of the attacks on the Wold Trade Center as both an American target and the symbol of globalisation. He argues: "the West constructed the attack in the context of globalization, because only in this context did the attack make sense to the West." See Rasmussen, "'A Parallel Globalization of Terror'", p.324. Such construction also gave the US the legitimacy to fight against the perpetrators in the name of humankind.

[64] Behnke, "Terrorising the Political", p.297.

[65] Ibid.

[66] Beck, "War is Peace", p.11.

[67] Satoshi Ukai, "The Road to Hell Is Paved with Good Intentions: For a 'Critique of Terrorism' to Come", *Positions*, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2005, p.237.

[68] Ibid.

[69] Prozorov claims that the enemy which is constructed in the post-9/11 world is not an enemy in the Schmittean sense, but rather a foe – reflecting the liberal mode of enmity, i.e. the enemy of liberalism. Sergei Prozorov, "Liberal Enmity: The Figure of the Foe in the Political Ontology of Liberalism", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol.35, No.1, 2006, p.75-99. For Prozorov, it is the definition of the foe which opens the way for excluding it "from both nature and humanity, in the context of the struggle against international terrorism." p.75. Behnke also argues that the enemy is represented as the "inhuman foe" by the US. He articulates that the Enemy is transformed into the Foe. "Terrorising the Political", p.297.

of the enemy in the global risk society reflects a "crude" form of "the political" – the term "crude" signifying the removal of all limitations on violence in the conflict between the self and the enemy.

Once the enemy is defined as inhuman or as the right-less perpetrator of crimes against humanity, it becomes legitimate to deal with it through measures which might involve violations of human rights – as has been the case in Guantanamo. What makes this situation even more problematic is the construction of the new enemy as "non-territorial"[70] and "ubiquitous"[71] at the same time. This means not only that the enemy can be anywhere and everywhere, but also that it can be anyone. Under such circumstances, precautionary risk replaces insurable risk: the line between risk management and securitization is crossed and precautionary risk management extends from everyday administrative measures to pre-emptive war (such as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq).[72] War becomes part of risk management and the danger is that it may become embedded in everydayness: the sovereign legitimizes its control on our everyday lives. Aradau and Van Munster argue: "Precautionary risk management implies the surveillance of all population, of all flights for example, independent of existing intelligence."[73]

> "If evidence is uncertain, the responsibility of the "suspected terrorist" is a matter of decision. This decision is no longer the juridical decision for which careful consideration of evidence is necessary, but it becomes an administrative decision, where the rule of zero-risk takes precedence. […] The "burden of proof" is no longer on the state to show guilt, but on the prisoners to prove that they are harmless."[74]

This means that on the one hand, terrorism targets "entire peoples or classes"[75], on the other hand, today's terrorist is also from "entire peoples or classes". Potential victims may also be potential terrorists. Once the terrorist is no longer identifiable/distinguishable, everybody may be treated as a potential terrorist and everyone's freedom can be restricted. If anyone can be a "right-less perpetrator of crimes against humanity" then human rights can be discarded through the simple attachment of the label of terrorism. This also reflects the political explosiveness of the global risk society. As Beck contends, in it explodes "responsibility, claims to rationality and legitimization through contact with reality".[76] Panopticism and governmentality increases while fundamental rights and freedoms are discarded.

> "[H]uman rights abuses against terrorists (torture, unlimited imprisonment without judicial process, etc.) are not considered illegal. Obligatory distinctions between criminal,

[70] Beck, "War is Peace", p.24.

[71] Ibid.

[72] Aradau and Van Munster, "Governing Terrorism", p.103-104. For a similar argument, see also Claudia Aradau and Rens Van Munster, "Exceptionalism and the War on Terror: Criminology Meets International Relations", *The British Journal of Criminology*, Vol. 49, No. 5, 2009, p.686-701.

[73] Aradau and Van Munster, "Governing Terrorism", p.104.

[74] Ibid., p.106.

[75] Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, p.203

[76] Beck, "The Silence of Words", p.257.

enemy and terrorist are absent. The label "terrorism" justifies and gives states the power to free themselves from what are otherwise the thin and malleable boundaries of the law of war."[77]

This refers to a decivilization of state force in Beck's terms.[78] He argues that the methods employed by the terrorists reflect an "extreme form of the privatization of violence"[79] coupled with a "moral loss of inhibition"[80], targeting "the universal vulnerability of the ultimately unprotectable civil society".[81] In turn, the state loses its "juridical inhibition"[82], disregarding international laws and norms –i.e., it also gets decivilized.

The decivilized terrorist and the state that wages war against it empower each other through their practices. This, in a sense, sets "in motion a *circle of decivilization*".[83] Beck argues: "the state–terrorism dialectic develops in a reciprocal empowerment through disempowerment. Each side puts the other existentially into question and thereby reciprocally expands the other's power space."[84] This not only enhances the state's hegemony but also promotes "the transnational terrorist into a kind of irregular counter-hegemon".[85]

It is not only the enemy which is reconstructed in the post-9/11 world. In Beck's view, the "war against terror" which was once metaphorical has become real.[86] Furthermore, the classical conception of war is deconstructed. "War on terror" is a reconstruction. War is reconstructed, first, as a special kind of war conducted against an enemy which is "non-territorial"[87] and "ubiquitous"[88]. It can be fought anywhere and preferably far away from the homeland. Second, it involves the use of measures that impair the rules of war, international law and multilateralism, and, paves the way for the violation of fundamental rights and freedoms.

> "War is mobilized alongside other technologies of precaution in a governmental dispositif to avoid terrorist irruptions in the future. The "war on terror" or the consequent war of Afghanistan and Iraq do not speak of a recent discovery of militarism, but of governmentality that activates all the technologies imaginable in the face of uncertainty."[89]

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[77] Beck, "War is Peace", p.18.

[78] Ibid.

[79] Ulrich Beck, *World at Risk*, Cambridge and Malden MA, Polity Press, 2009, p.148. See also Beck, "War is Peace", p.10.

[80] Beck, "War is Peace", p.18.

[81] Ibid. p.22.

[82] Ibid., p.18.

[83] Ibid. (Emphasis original).

[84] Ibid., p.24. Beck also contends elsewhere: "Bush's alarmism has a paradoxical effect: it gives […] terrorists what they want most – a recognition of their power. Bush has encouraged the terrorists to believe that the United States can be badly hurt by terrorist actions like these. So there is a hidden mutual enforcement between Bush's empowerment and the empowerment of the terrorists." "The Terrorist Threat", p.45.

[85] Beck, "War is Peace", p.23.

[86] Ibid., p.11.

[87] Ibid., p.24.

[88] Ibid.

[89] Aradau and Van Munster, "Governing Terrorism", p.105.

Beck's approach is insightful in terms of the reconstruction of the enemy and war in the post-9/11 world[90]; however, it is not also without problems. His treatment of the threat of terrorism as a risk, which can be managed, inevitably expands the boundaries of what should normally be limited to the realm of the state of exception. Although Beck sees cosmopolitanism as a solution to global problems[91], what he offers –"that all practices of security can be reduced to one type of risk"[92]– may not always work. This is because the logic of securitization does not function in the same way. Securitization inherently involves a breaking of "the normal political rules of the game"[93] and limitations on fundamental rights and freedoms. The more the area of security is expanded to our daily lives through the adoption of a risk approach, the more fundamental rights and freedoms will be restricted. It is due to the contingent nature of risk that it may not be possible to avoid such expansion.[94]

> "[T]he infinity of risk does not lead to a democratic politics that debates what is to be done but to intensified efforts and technological inventions on the part of the risk managers to adjust existing risk technologies or to supplement them. […] Governing terrorism through risk entails drastic prevention at the catastrophic horizon of the future as well as generalized and arbitrary surveillance at the limit of knowledge."[95]

This is exactly why this article has attempted to merge Schmitt's views on the political, the state of exception and sovereignty, as well as his decisionism, with Beck's definitions of the global risk society and terrorism as a global risk. The former provides an analytical tool through which the latter's treatment of all dimensions of security, and especially terrorism, as risk can be critically[96] assessed. On the other hand, Beck's work is especially significant as it draws attention to how the new terrorist empowers the state and the states' policies in turn empower the new terrorist.

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[90] On how Beck's conceptual framework "can illuminate the changing nature of terrorism in contemporary society", see Gabe Mythen and Sandra Walklate, "Terrorism, Risk and International Security: The Perils of Asking 'What If?'", *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 39, No. 2-3, 2008, p.221-242.

[91] Cosmopolitanism may not also be the solution as well if it cannot go beyond the creation of a cosmopolitan ethics based on the distinction "civilized cosmopolitans" versus "barbaric terrorists". James Brassett, "Cosmopolitanism vs. Terrorism? Discourses of Ethical Possibility Before and After 7/7", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 2, 2008, p.311-337.

[92] Aradau and Van Munster, "Governing Terrorism", p.108.

[93] Waever, "European Security Identities", p. 106.

[94] On the relationship between contingency and risk see, Michael Dillon, "Underwriting Security", *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 39, No. 2-3, 2008, p.309-332.

[95] Aradau and Van Munster, "Governing Terrorism", p.108. On how the "technologies of risk and practices of risk management" shape the way "possible dangers and their potential propensity are conceptualized", and, "play a deeply political role in constituting the norms, ideas and identities that underlie contemporary *dispositifs* of security and the emerging forms of state power"; see Benjamin J. Muller, "Securing the Political Imagination: Popular Culture, the Security *Dispositif* and the Biometric State", *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 39, No. 2-3, 2008, p.199-220 (Quotation p.217).

[96] Using Carl Schmitt's work as an analytical tool may not also be without problems. For a criticism of the use of Carl Schmitt's work by critical theorists, see David Chandler, "The Revival of Carl Schmitt in International Relations: The Last Refuge of Critical Theorists?", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 1, 2008, p.27-48.

Conclusion

This article has attempted to reveal how the concepts of "enemy" and "war" have been reconstructed in the global risk society. It has used the works of Ulrich Beck and Carl Schmitt as analytical tools with this purpose. Schmitt's conceptions of "the political", the "friend-enemy" distinction, sovereignty and the state of exception have been employed with a view to explaining the political explosiveness of the global risk society. The importance that Schmitt attaches to the decision of the sovereign to define the state of exception has provided the ground for looking into how the 9/11 attacks and the discourse built around them empower the "imperial sovereign" –the US– to decide the state of exception at the global level. The article has also utilized Beck's conception of the global risk society to reveal that it is actually the employment of the technologies of risk (such as precautionary risk and profiling) in dealing with terrorism which has caused the imperial sovereign's interference with our daily lives and turned the exception into the norm/everyday practice.

Against such theoretical backdrop, this article has argued that the reconstruction of the enemy in the global risk society reflects a reincarnation of a "crude" form of "the political" in Schmittean terms. It has pointed to a deconstruction of the classical conception of war and its reconstruction as a special kind of war. It has also reflected on the reconstruction of the enemy within this framework. Although some analysts prefer to employ the term "foe" to reflect on how the "new terrorist" is constructed in the "global war on terror" narrative, this article has used the term "enemy". It has especially done so to point to the "crudeness" involved in constructing the political: the undisguised use of measures that violate all rules of war, international law and human rights and their legitimization through the portrayal of the enemy as inhuman.

Critical and post-structural approaches draw attention to discourses and how they help the construction of the self and the other, the enemy and the friend, or the Good and the Evil. They look into the interplay between power and knowledge and reveal how the regimes of truth are constructed. A critical assessment of the literature on terrorism has availed this article to conclude that positivist studies –which define the "new terrorism", draw attention to the various aspects of the danger involved, and, offer ways to eliminate it– inevitably feed into "a *circle of decivilization*"[97] and empowerment between the terrorist and the state. This is not to say that the threat of terrorism should be downplayed or the state should be condemned for countering terrorism. Instead, keeping a critical distance from both sides and adopting a post-structuralist approach might offer more insight into assessing the "global war on terror" narrative.

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[97] Beck, "War is Peace", p.18 (Emphasis original).

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