


ISSN 2238-6262 / e-ISSN 2238-6912

AUSTRAL

Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations

Revista Brasileira de Estratégia e Relações Internacionais



Geopolitics and International Security

Porto Alegre, v.3, n.6 | Jul./Dec. 2014



Austral	Porto Alegre	n.3, v. 6	p. 1-278	Jul./Dec. 2014
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ABOUT THE JOURNAL

AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations is an essentially academic vehicle, linked to the International Strategic Studies Doctoral Program (PPGEEI) of the Faculty of Economics (FCE) of the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) and to the Brazilian Centre for International Relations and Strategic Studies (NERINT). Its pluralist focus aims to contribute to the debate on the international political and economic order from the perspective of the developing countries.

The journal publishes original articles and book reviews in English, Portuguese or Spanish about themes that lie in the vast area of Strategy and International Relations, with special interest in issues related to developing countries and the South-South relations, their security issues, the economic, political and diplomatic development of emerging nations and their relations with the traditional powers. The journal's target audience consists of researchers, specialists and postgraduate students of International Relations.

The journal will try, through its publication policy, to ensure that each volume has at least one author from each of the great southern continents (Asia, Latin America, Africa), in order to stimulate the debate and the diffusion of the knowledge produced in these regions. All of the contributions will be subjected to a scientific review.

This work was supported by the Journal Edition Supportive Program
(PAEP) – UFRGS.



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Cataloging-in-Publication (CIP)

Austral : Revista Brasileira de Estratégia e Relações
Internacionais = Brazilian Journal of Strategy &
International Relations / Universidade Federal do Rio
Grande do Sul, Faculdade de Ciências Econômicas,
Programa de Pós-Graduação em Estudos Estratégicos
Internacionais. – v. 3, n. 6 (Jul./Dec. 2014). – Porto Alegre:
PPGEEI/FCE/NERINT/ UFRGS, 2012-

Semestral.

ISSN 2238-6262. e-ISSN 2238-6912

1. Political Science. 2. International Relations. 3.
International Politics. 4. Diplomacy. 5. Developing Countries.

CDU 327

Biblioteca Gládis Wiebelling do Amaral, Faculdade de Ciências Econômicas da UFRGS.

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EDITOR'S NOTE: THE ECONOMIC WAR AND THE SILENCE OF THE ACADEMY

Paulo Fagundes Visentini¹

The last several years have been characterized by a growing acceleration of International Relations. With the end of the Cold War, amidst the Gorbachev government, the fall of the Eastern European socialist regimes in 1989 and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, there was room for a reordering of forces in the world-system. When the vacuum started to be occupied by old and new international players, the situation turned into a War of Positions. China and the other emerging nations, especially the members of BRICS, were able to gain more leverage. But this precarious balance was significantly affected by the economic crisis of OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries since 2008-09.

This phenomenon was combined with U.S. failure in its War on Terror in Middle East and Central Asia. However, the Euro-American reaction did not take long for trying to restore the *statu quo ante*. The developments of the "Arab Spring" constituted the first stage of a domino counter-offensive (sometimes accompanied by military escalation), which continued with the Western projection of power in Africa (second stage), a continent whose position was being altered due to the cooperation with emerging powers. The third stage resulted from the increasing tensions on Eastern Asia, which China has been able to neutralize so far, but that are still growing. The fourth stage of the

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escalation is directed against Vladimir Putin's Russia through the Ukrainian conflict.

Local conflicts and regional strains have been receiving a *post factum* attention from the Academy, in a dissociate form. We are lacking a comprehensive thought that will be able to well understand current affairs in a coherent framework. All these episodes seem confusing, but not as much as the academy, that is dealing with them as specific and atypical phenomena. Therefore, the silence of the academy regarding all the turmoil of these processes calls our attention.

When one takes into account the events that took place in Brazil, since the demonstrations of June 2013, passing through the World Cup till the presidential elections and the weakening of Brazilian internationalized companies (private and public ones) hit by a unusual wave of corruption accusations, the fifth stage of the general reaction can be identified. It also affects Argentina, Venezuela and the induced pressure for the decrease in oil prices. This phase is heavily applying the so-called smart power. And its motivation seems to be primarily economic.

The difficult economic and international recovery of the North Atlantic powers has been achieved at the expense of the monetary reserves and estate of emerging powers. The growing anti-BRICS discourse is associated to this phenomenon. There is a true Economic War in course that is the guiding thread that integrates present-day conflicts and tensions. It is accompanied by a cleverly engineered geopolitical realignment, by the United States and the United Kingdom, aiming to articulate an Atlantic geoeconomic space capable of regaining ground towards the Pacific.

However, the geopolitical dimension can only be considered as a result of the growing economic competition that is in course. It is a phenomenon that deserves the attention of analysts in the mark of World War I's centenary outbreak. Surely, the world is different and history does not repeat itself. But the silence of the academy regarding the economic fundamentals of the current conflicts, maneuvers and strains may lead it to be apart from history. The world is changing from a War of Positions to a War of Movement.

* * *

We thank the Office of Research of the Deanship of Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, which, through the Support Program for Journal Editing (PAEP), supported the translation work, as well as the whole team that worked on editing and translating this number, especially Edition Assistant Pedro Alt and Prof. Cristina Pecequilo, for a final revision of the translated versions of the articles. We are also pleased to inform that the Brazilian Centre for Strategy and International Relations (NERINT), co-editor of *Austral*, and the Brazilian Centre for African Studies (CEBRAFRICA), were relocated to the Faculty of Economics of the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, shortly after its fifteenth anniversary, beginning a new phase.

THE BRAZIL-UNITED STATES BILATERAL RELATIONS IN THE DILMA ROUSSEFF ADMINISTRATION, 2011-2014

Cristina Soreanu Pecequilo¹

Introduction

The Brazil-U.S. bilateral relations are structural in the evolution of the Brazilian international relations because of the political, economic, strategic and ideological weight that the U.S. holds on the country's agenda. This weight results from a complex combination of factors that involves the nature of the U.S. power resources, its projection capacity and Brazil's perception of itself and about such partner. This trend of the debate ideologization and internal polarization that breaks down into currents which are in favor or against an autonomous foreign policy, in opposition to the alignment with the U.S., has remained until the twenty-first century, going through the administration of Luis Inácio Lula da Silva (2003/2010) and reaching that of Dilma Rousseff (2011/2014).

Whereas in the Lula administration the international assertiveness prevailed and raised Brazil's global presence, even facing the U.S. and despite criticism, Dilma Rousseff's period seems to represent an inflection point in this process. Such difference would correspond to an attempt to reconcile the aspects of autonomy and alignment. Nonetheless, this process has proved to be quite

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controversial and sensitive, since the option for an autonomous foreign policy refers to a project of state and not just a project of government. This equation failed to take into account the comprehensive elements of the exchange and the U.S. position as hegemon.

Facing this scenario, this article seeks to analyze the evolution of the bilateral relations in the Rousseff administration, identifying its main pillars, controversies, limitations and opportunities, having as backdrop the broader context of Brazil's international relations as an emerging country. It is a contemporary analysis, which will bring a study based on conjunctural themes and long-term considerations about the strategic views of both partners. For that purpose, the text is divided into two parts: diversification and accommodation (2011/2012), detachment, rethinking and stagnation (2013/2014).

Diversification and Accommodation (2011/2012)

Elected in 2010, President Dilma Rousseff represented the continuity of the Lula administration. Domestically, this commitment was clearly preserved, including the expansion of the social agenda and the investment increase in sectors as infrastructure (*Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento-PAC* and the works related to the major sporting events of 2014 FIFA World Cup and 2016 Summer Olympics) and affordable housing with the *Minha Casa, Minha Vida* program. In terms of foreign policy, however, this continuity began to be questioned, evidencing a possible break in the international relations as well as the rapprochement with the United States.

Assessing the foreign policy when it comes to the strategic thinking and the bilateral relations, a moderate continuity is observed, which brings the risk of stagnation and low profile. Although there is not a paradigm rupture, by keeping the focus on the South-South relations and multilateralism, the 2011/2012 years presented some modifications: first, a variation in style between both administrations, with President Dilma practicing the Presidential Diplomacy in a less intense way; second, an attempt to reshape the exchange with the United States.

The reshaping has an ambiguous character: to minimize internal criticism towards the foreign policy without reframing the country into the U.S.

orbit. Such criticisms had been high in the 2010 presidential elections, being focused on the Iran-Brazil-Turkey Tripartite Nuclear Agreement and the human rights theme, symbolized in the sentence of death by stoning of Sakineh Ashtiani by the Ahmadinejad government, which Brazil would not criticize (not taking into account the fact that the country was negotiating the pardon). Both matters were criticized by the United States and used by the opposition. In the post-2011 the Ashtiani theme vanished, and the United States, after its pressure for the non-approval of the Tripartite Agreement, closed a new nuclear deal with Iran, similar to that of 2010. The U.S. positions went against Turkey, too, and they reflect its shrinking in face of regional pivots.

The Dilma presidency began under the sign of compromising on controversial themes, with emphasis on the electoral conjuncture. Therefore, a possible hypothesis is that this tactical adjustment emerges more from an internal debate than from the need of repositioning to obtain U.S. recognition, since the perception of Brazil as a power already existed.

It was not a change in the policy of state but an adjustment in the policy of government. The appointment of former Brazilian Ambassador in Washington Antonio Patriota (2007/2009) to the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs, who had previously been the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs² in the final years of Ambassador Celso Amorim administration (2009/2010), came up as an important element. The idea was to offer a counterpoint to the Lula administration for the domestic public, but one that could bring advantages, as the support to the permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council. However, what was the status of the bilateral relation and which were the paths in the Dilma Rousseff administration?

When Rousseff took office in January 2011, the Brazil-U.S. bilateral relations were at a level of Strategic Dialogue. Established in 2005 by the administrations of Luis Inácio Lula da Silva (2003/2010) and George W. Bush (2001/2008), the Strategic Dialogue represented the U.S. acknowledgement that Brazil laid in a new position in the world power balance. It was defined that the partnership held global implications and was not restricted to regional themes.

² From 2003 through September 2009, Ambassador Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães occupied the post.

This did not reflect full convergence of interests or elimination of conflict, but rather a status of exchange between powers.

Despite the criticisms from pro-alignment groups towards President Lula, the very establishment of the Dialogue was only possible because of the change in foreign policy. Undertaken by President Lula and Ambassador Celso Amorim as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, changes allowed for the maturation and strengthening of the agenda through the resumption of the South-South cooperation and the Third-Worldism identity. The 1990s positions of subordination and alignment were dropped, recovering an autonomous vision and a development project.

The project has internal and external dimensions. Internally, the national power reinforcement was sought through economic adjustments to guarantee stability and growth and to reduce vulnerability. The government developed actions to correct social inequalities, for the technical cooperation potential and soft power: *Fome Zero*, *Farmácia Popular* and *Bolsa Família*. In the same referential is Brazil's participation in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, also known as MINUSTAH, since 2004 as a leader.

The integration deepening in South America was observed (Southern Common Market-MERCOSUL, Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America-IIRSA, Union of South American Nations-UNASUL and Community of Latin American and Caribbean States-CELAC), as well as the active participation in multilateral negotiations in traditional organizations (United Nations, International Monetary Fund, Financial G-20), the creation of alliances of variable geometry among the emerging countries (India-Brazil-South Africa-IBSA; Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa-BRICS; Trade G-20), the reinforcement of extra-regional partnerships with the EU, and the resumption of a South-South policy in Africa, Asia and Middle East. The Summits of South American-Arab countries (ASPA, in Portuguese) and African-South American countries (ASA) were unprecedented signals.

Insofar as the United States did not take part in the twenty-first century regional integration arrangements, a counterpoint has been offered to the traditional Inter-American system created in the Cold War and based on strategic-military mechanisms, the 1947 TIAR (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance) and the 1948 OAS (Organization of American States).

Such institutions became U.S. bridgehead from 1947 to 1989, and they were emptied by the South American initiatives.

This system and the U.S.-Cuba relations, characterized by the trade embargo in place since the 1959 Communist Revolution, demonstrate the freezing in regional policies. These policies were somewhat updated in the 1990s with the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI) and the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) that sought to establish the Hemispheric Free Trade Zone, without any alterations in the U.S. vision of the region as a "reserve zone". Among the proposed projects, the ones created were NAFTA, the Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Canada and Mexico (1994), and CAFTA, the Central American Free Trade Agreement (2007), as well as bilateral Free Trade Agreements with Chile, Peru and Colombia were established.

The integration led by Brazil questioned the projects of asymmetric social and economic conditionalities (Washington Consensus). By rebuilding, and leading, changes in its regional surrounding and at global scale, Brazil made itself present in the world, with autonomous identity and interests. As mentioned above, this culminated in 2005 in the Strategic Dialogue and the definition of Brazil and other emerging countries as pillars of the new world order. In 2008, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice considered the emerging countries as "stakeholders of the world order". To this term, it was added in 2010 that of the "new centers of global power", of President Obama's National Security Strategy (NSS-2010).

Nevertheless, this scenario is not characterized only by the recognition of Brazil by the U.S., which takes the attempts of engagement by the hegemonic power. It is also marked by the crisis of this hegemony, provoked by George W. Bush: the military unilateralism and the intervention operations of the Global War on Terrorism in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). This focus on the Eurasian system generated the imperial overextension and the 2008 economic crisis.

Besides the engagement, the containment of Brazil and other emerging countries became present with the criticisms towards the Brazilian and Chinese "neoimperialism" in the Third World, strategic measures in the military sector regarding areas as South America and Africa, and new economic alliances in Europe and the Pacific. Such movements unfolded: reinforcement of the

existing mechanisms and creation of new projection instruments by Bush junior (and which were going to be completed by Barack Obama).

In the first dimension, the reinforcement of mechanisms, is found the investment increase in Plan Colombia and the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). Specifically, the Plan Colombia of war on drugs was launched in the 2000s by the Bill Clinton administration (1993/2000). The Andean Counterdrug Initiative³ established the U.S.-Colombia cooperation in combating drug trafficking through aid and the military presence of U.S. troops on Colombian soil (including the cession of bases) and fumigation of coca crops in the Amazon region, with effects over all the countries that share it (as Brazil and Venezuela).

Since 2001, Plan Colombia incorporated the language of the Global War on Terrorism (GWT) with the definition of "narco-terrorism" as a threat to the hemispheric security. This classification was brought to identify a new threat category: the use of narco-trafficking money to finance terrorist groups. The launch of the Plan coincided with that of IIRSA, the project of infrastructure integration led by Brazil in South America, in a context of autonomy. Reinforced by the Lula administration, this project began in the late 1990s, mainly in the Andean region with the rise of the twenty-first century Socialism project of Chávez, with critical content towards the hegemony.

Classifications as "Rogue States" and "Axis of Evil" were applied in these situations, denoting the existence of authoritarian governments in the region, prone to disrespecting the norms of the international community (in the case of the Latin "Axis of Evil", Cuba and Venezuela were identified by the Department of State as the main risks)⁴. These perceptions were repudiated by the local diplomacies, demonstrating their concerns with the risk of interventionism, stressed by the launch of the Bush Doctrine of preemptive action in 2002.

³ Since 2008, the Mérida Initiative in Mexico complemented the war on drugs.

⁴ In addition to the category of Rogue State, the United States created that of Failed State to refer to nations without internal organization, as terrorist safe havens and marked by civil war and humanitarian tragedies. The post-9/11 Axis of Evil was composed of Iran, Iraq and North Korea, to which Syria and Libya were later added.

The narco-terrorism and rogue states issues are related to the expansion of the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) action, with the identification of the Brazil-Argentina-Paraguay Triple Frontier as focus of international terrorism since 2001. According to U.S. analyses, groups as Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah would use the area, with the presence of terrorist cells in South America and sponsorship of illegal activities as drug trafficking and money laundering. The city of Foz do Iguacu would be the focus of this movement (USSOUTHCOM 2014).

The strengthening of the USSOUTHCOM also had as its part the reactivation of the U.S. Navy Fourth Fleet in 2008, which had been created in 1943 and disestablished in 1950, when its responsibilities were taken over by the Command related to NATO and North Atlantic (Second Fleet, in turn disestablished in 2011 in the process of restructuring of the forces in the Atlantic, Pacific and Afro-Asian world). The resumption of these operations was justified by the Department of Defense as part of the rise of state and transnational security risks in the Western Hemisphere.

In the twenty-first century, the South Atlantic⁵, the area between South America and Africa, has regained its relevance for various reasons: gas and oil reserves, passing zone for raw materials and energy resources, and the growing Sino-Indo-Brazilian influence. The sum of Plan Colombia with the Fourth Fleet represents a relevant U.S. geopolitical move to project power where it had lesser strategic presence. These actions seek to provide a capacity for rapid deployment in the South Atlantic and collide with the Brazilian and African stance of demilitarization of the area. These different positions are not unprecedented, resuming the divergences of the 1980s regarding the creation of ZOPACAS (South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone), by Brazil, and the establishment of SATO (South Atlantic Treaty Organization), by the U.S.

According to Brazil's White Paper on National Defense (2012), the South Atlantic, also known as the "Blue Amazon", is an area of high relevance for the country for the same reasons it is for the United States,

In the Brazilian maritime area, over the Atlantic Ocean, important navigation

⁵ See *Austral* v.2, n.3: <http://seer.ufrgs.br/index.php/austral/issue/view/1891>.

routes cross, which are vital to the national economy. There are the Brazilian pre-salt reserves, of high economic, political and strategic significance (...) The projection eastward leads to the West African countries, where the Cape route is highlighted, for being a considerable strategic way of communication of Asia and Africa with the Northern Hemisphere. The segment that extends from São Roque cape to the river Oiapoque projects Brazil to the northern portion of Africa, to Western Europe, Panama Canal, the Caribbean and Central and North America. (Ministério da Defesa 2012, n/p)

In the geopolitical and geo-economic scope of South Atlantic, there is another U.S. action that is inserted in the new mechanisms of projection: the establishment of the U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) in 2008. Formerly part of the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), the geographic area of this command overlaps in the South Atlantic the forces of the Southern Command, and, as its South American part, seeks to occupy spaces and deter Sino-Brazilian and Indian advance in Africa. The motivation is similar to that of the Fourth Fleet reactivation.

Those are complementary efforts that represent the acknowledgement of the Brazilian force and its potential of threat. Independent of these moves, and parallel to and convergent with them, a solid base is built for the bilateral relation, sustained by these very factors. This is the complex level upon which the Dilma-Obama exchange is built: Brazil remained recognized as a power. So, why did the Dilma administration begin with attempts of tactical adjustment of the exchange?

Unlike other powers as China and India, which tend to deepen the bargain with the U.S. in the same proportion that their force rises, Brazil faces internal pro-alignment pressure that hampers consensus building around autonomy. Thus, as indicated, it was under Dilma that the tactical adjustment came up in 2011, in a context of relative decline in the diplomatic offensive. This movement began in President Barack Obama's visit to Brazil in March, which was for some internal groups considered "agenda clearing" (a vision propagated by the media). However, when Obama arrived in Brazil, he was visiting a country considered a global power in the twenty-first century context, the result of almost a decade of national strengthening rather than in response to the recent changes Dilma sought to implement after only two months of the administration.

What mattered most was the tactic to recover areas in the regional context, which could not be detached from the global: continuing economic crisis in the U.S. and European Union, strengthening of the emerging countries and their international geopolitical and geo-economic projection, deepening of the South American integration, instability in the Iraq-Afghanistan Eurasian military theaters and the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2010. The actions in Latin America are compensatory, without moving the U.S. focus from Eurasia. While in Brazil, President Obama announced the beginning of the UNSC-authorized military operation into Muammar Gaddafi's Libya, for humanitarian reasons. The UNSC voting that authorized it was not consensual and showed a representative pattern of the new global forces: the countries that abstained were permanent and temporary Security Council members, China and Russia, Brazil, India and Germany.⁶

What were the concrete results of the visit? And of the tactical adjustment? Regarding the visit's media content, a formal sponsorship to Brazil's insertion as a UNSC permanent member and the abolition of visas had no advances. Unlike India and Japan that rely on formal support statements, Brazil had one of "appreciation" only. Visas were kept, upon promise of facilitation.

There were changes in the 2005 Strategic Dialogue, with the elevation of its components to the presidential level. The goal was to signal that the relation was a priority and aggregate to the negotiations more visibility and diplomatic dimensions, placing them as a task of both Executives and agencies. This institutionalization defines greater regularity in meetings, making them permanent forums. The main dialogues are the Global Partnership Dialogue (GPD), the Economic and Financial Dialogue (EFD), the Commission on Economic and Trade Relations, the Economic Partnership Dialogue, the Trade Partnership Dialogue and the Strategic Energy Dialogue (SED). They updated forums as the Brazil-U.S. Chambers of Commerce, as well as corporate forums

⁶ Brazil offers a criticism against the humanitarian interventions justified by the UN's "responsibility to protect" concept, by contrasting it with that of "responsibility while protecting". The aim is questioning the criteria that rule such actions.

(Brazil-U.S. Business Council) and of the civil society.

In the scope of the "Brazil-U.S. Global Partnership Dialogue" (GPD), priorities were defined as follows: Trilateral Cooperation, Education Cooperation, Space Cooperation, Cooperation for Social Inclusion, and Cooperation in the Health Area. Among these, the education cooperation was strongly represented by the Science Without Borders Program, sponsored by the Brazilian government and the funding agencies in the education sector at the level of research and undergraduate and graduate education, CNPq and CAPES, which aims to train Brazilian students in foreign institutions (Diálogo da Parceria Global, Brasil-Estados Unidos 2012).

Another growing area was that of trilateral cooperation, which establishes a joint action of Brazil and the U.S. in third countries especially in Central America, the Caribbean and Africa. The main programs developed concern food safety, fighting HIV/AIDS, fighting forced and children labor, cooperation in biofuels, the environment and conservation, and drug trafficking.

In 2011 were signed the Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation, Partnership for the Development of Aviation Biofuels, Memorandum of Understanding on Dimensions of Biodiversity, Memorandum of Understanding for the Establishment of the Brazil-U.S. Strategic Dialogue Program, Memorandum of Understanding for the Implementation of Technical Cooperation in Third Countries in the Field of Decent Work, and the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation to Support the Organization of Major Global Sporting Events.

Regarding the Strategic Energy Dialogue, the launch of the detailed program of energy cooperation defined four areas: biofuels, renewable energy and energy efficiency, oil and natural gas, and nuclear security. Since 2011, the meetings of the technical groups as well as the energy ministries have been frequent, without interruption. The United States pledged to work with Brazil on the achievement and formatting of the Rio+20 agenda, the 2012 conference on the environment.

One of the key elements of this energy partnership lies in the exploration of the Brazilian pre-salt and the concern with the increasing participation of Chinese companies in the process. Despite U.S. advances in the exploration of shale for generating gas and oil, touted as an "unconventional

revolution" (Yergin 2014) that would make the country autonomous, the extension and environmental viability of this production remain in question. However, many claim that the use of shale, combined with the expansion of oil exploration in protected environmental areas such as Alaska and the Gulf of Mexico, can change the world geopolitical and geo-economic panorama with the disengagement of troops and investment in key areas.

The U.S. is interested in guaranteeing the access to the Brazilian pre-salt, since it would allow for an energy partnership with a "friendly country", which offers fewer risks than the scenarios of Middle East, Central Asia and Africa (and that of Venezuela in Latin America). The military-strategic risks are included here, as well as the strong Sino-Indian competition. Insofar as there is no change in the U.S. consumption patterns and energy supply, it is arguable that any new internal (or even external) source would meet the demand.

Defense and trade are other sectors in which the negotiations were kept. On the defense agenda, the innovation was the establishment of a strategic dialogue, which seeks to increase the joint training actions and threats identification. For the U.S. it is interesting to expand its exports in the military sector to Brazil and South America, hampering the development of technological autonomy, as well as the contacts with other nations that are active in this market. This dimension was accelerated upon the establishment of the CDS (Council of South American Defense) under UNASUL in 2008. CDS represented a qualitative leap forward in the South American security relations, composed of local countries only, aiming at cooperation and confidence building. It seeks to offer an alternative to its strategic repositioning, as Plan Colombia and the Fourth Fleet, as well as a way to contain and deter new attempts of military presence by the United States. Finally, it offers an autonomous regional mechanism to deal with security themes.

With regard to trade, the downward trends in the bilateral flow were kept since there was no move towards the opening of the U.S. market or correction of protectionist and subsidy mechanisms. The interactions at the WTO and the locking of the Doha Round exemplify these dimensions, in addition to various contentions between both diplomacies. Some disputes as that of the orange juice are recurrent, whereas the contention on cotton has remained unsolved since 2002. In 2009 the WTO authorized Brazil to levy up to

US\$ 829 million in retaliation against the U.S., a decision which was rejected by the United States, which appealed and lost. In 2011 the United States agreed to pay Brazil's Cotton Institute US\$ 147.3 million annually to compensate those figures and reform its Farm Bill, only to, soon after, suspend the payments in October 2013. Brazil's option was, in 2014, to set up a panel to press for the agreement implementation and the Farm Bill revision.

Moreover, there was the dissonance in the WTO presidential election in which a coalition of Southern countries managed to elect Ambassador Roberto Azevedo in 2013, opposing the U.S.-backed candidate. A comparative analysis of Brazilian trade flows in the last five years, focusing on the Brazil-U.S. and Brazil-China bilateral partnerships, demonstrates that there have not been significant changes despite the Global Dialogues (see Table 1).

**Table 1: Balance of Trade – Exchanges
Brazil-United States and Brazil-China***

(Brazil and United States: US\$ FOB)

Year	Exports U.S.	Exports China	Imports U.S.	Imports China	Net Exports with U.S.	Net Exports with China
2010	19.307	30.785	27.042	25.595	-7.735	5.190
2011	25.805	44.315	33.962	32.788	-8.157	11.527
2012	26.849	41.228	32.603	34.248	-5.754	6.980
2013	11.575	22.957	17.587	17.585	-6.012	5.372
2014**	12.792	23.880	17.613	18.405	-4.821	5.475

*Prepared by the author with data from MDIC

** Figures up to June 2014

The same blocking occurs at the G20 negotiations, which gained greater visibility after the 2008 global financial crisis. Although negotiations started at an intense pace after the crisis outbreak, they have been emptied in the last years due to the maintenance of U.S. and European unilateralism in the face of emerging countries' demands of adjustment of the economic agenda of recovery and reform of financial institutions. There remains a detachment between the policies of regulation and adjustment demanded by the emerging countries and

the agenda of the North. This detachment must be seen as one of the reasons for the strengthening of South-South alliances such as the BRICS. In July 2014, the creation of the BRICS bank demonstrated the strength of this organization.

Furthering this panorama, the Obama administration intensified, and complemented, this process of containing the emerging countries started by Bush junior. To the positive rhetoric of cooperation, a more aggressive one was added:

Countries like China, India, and Brazil are growing by leaps and bounds. We should welcome this development, for it has lifted hundreds of millions from poverty (...) and created new markets and opportunities (...). And yet, as this rapid change has taken place, it has become fashionable in some quarters to question whether the rise of these nations will accompany the decline of American and European influence around the world. Perhaps, the argument goes, these nations represent the future, and the time for our leadership has passed. That argument is wrong. The time for our leadership is now. It was the United States (...) and our democratic allies that shaped a world in which new nations could emerge. (Obama 2011a, n/p)

There have been many allegations of a "new imperialism" against the emerging countries, be it Chinese (as in the words of former Secretary of State Clinton about the China-Africa relation) or Brazilian as aforementioned. Brazil has been accused of human rights violations and exploitation in economic activities in Africa and South America. The action of companies as Odebrecht, Petrobras, among others, has been the subject of numerous external criticisms. This offensive has been intensified, since both China and Brazil increased their power projection on both continents. Such criticisms are incorporated in the internal debate.

The rhetorical offensive was accompanied by the actions of USSOUTHCOM/USAFRICOM, as well as by land military projection in South America. Obama has incorporated two containment initiatives, the Asian pivot and the European pivot, of economic and military character. The Asian pivot strategy presented in 2011, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), restructures the economic relations of the United States with Asia, bringing pressure to the Sino-Indian activities (and trying to revitalize the Japanese-American alliance), and which affects South America in its Pacific zone. There was a readjustment of military troops in USPACOM. The United States supports the establishment

of the Pacific Alliance in South America, composed of Chile, Peru, Mexico and Colombia, aiming to distance these nations from the integration projects of UNASUL/MERCOSUL.

The European pivot, the Transatlantic Partnership, launched in 2013, establishes negotiations for a free trade zone between the United States and the European Union. It seeks to close the room for the emerging countries in both markets. For Brazil, it relativizes even more its importance on its partners' agenda and brings obstacles to the ongoing negotiations of the MERCOSUL-European Union Trade Agreement.

With or without dialogue, U.S. standards have not changed. Even so, in 2012, President Dilma visited the United States and, once again, the interaction was touted as evidence of a new bilateral stage. In 2012, there were no advances in Rio+20, which did not enjoy the expected U.S. support. The announcement in 2013 that the President would be received, in October, as Head of State in Washington only raised these expectations, particularly in the pro-alignment sectors that defended the hypothesis of a break in the Lula-Dilma continuum.

However, there was no break: what prevailed was a tactical adjustment towards accommodation. If there was reduction in conflict, it derived from the relative retreat of diplomacy, which, in principle, reduced the areas of tension. This does not mean that there was convergence between Brazil and the United States in the areas of previous disagreements, but it rather means that the country was less visible.

Detachment, Rethinking and Stagnation (2013/2014)

From the 2011/2012 assessment, a "positive" year of 2013 was expected; however, the detachment of the structural and conjunctural dimensions of the relation was going to become more complex and sharp. The short-term visions overlapped the analyses of exchange, reducing it to the spying theme given the accusations of Edward Snowden published by journalist Glen Greenwald in June 2013. These reports indicated that the U.S. maintained a regular practice of espionage conducted by their National Security Agency (NSA). The justification remained that of safety, aimed at combating transnational terrorism. However, the NSA watched enemy nations and allied countries like Brazil and Germany (including President Dilma and Chancellor Angela Merkel)

and companies in which the U.S. held interest, as energy-sector Petrobras (Trinkunas 2013).

Although one cannot deny the seriousness of the allegations, the Snowden case took much larger and media proportions than it should have. In different proportions, it assumed a central role in the domestic agenda as the Ahstiani case had, and the tendency is to follow suit in terms of emptying. The cancellation of the visit of President Dilma as Head of State to the United States, scheduled for October 2013, was cited as evidence of conflict. Moreover, almost all foreign policy decisions or economic issues involving the United States somehow became attributable to the Snowden case. This ignored the context in Brazil and the United States in which the NSA outcry arose, as well as the institutionalization of bilateral relations.

Examining this context, and chronologically the relation dynamics of from June 2013 to 2014, when Vice President Joe Biden came to Brazil in the World Cup to meet with President Dilma, we can observe that the Snowden affair represented a strong smoke screen. Although this screen was instrumental to both countries, it cannot be turned into the "trigger" of what happened.

Snowden's allegations were not unprecedented, just take the WikiLeaks case. In 2010 the site of Julian Assange released similar information. Snowden keeps stating that he has requested political asylum in Brazil, which would not have been granted by the government. In turn, the government denies this request to be official. In any case, this episode shows that the government does not want to confront the U.S. interest. As of August 2014, this issue is still pending. Why did the Snowden case reach such repercussions?

With regard to the United States, the fact that the accusations would have been payable to the Obama administration represented the differential due to the condemnation by Democrats of these practices. For Brazil, the allegations called into question the prior tactical adjustment advocated by pro-alignment groups, and emerged at a time of relative crisis. The months of June and July 2013 were characterized by a wave of protests in major Brazilian cities as of the Confederations Cup (with the movement "there won't be Cup").

These protests, especially in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, had been occurring since January, for various reasons: free bus services, anti-political parties and anti-corruption sentiment, homeless and landless movements, etc.

In 2014, the FIFA World Cup took place and protests were further restricted, without broad popular participation. From the beginning, the segmentation of agendas and the violence of the Black Blocs indicated that the reach of anti-government demonstrations was low, evidencing the movement's lack of identity and the media utilization by the opposition. In this context, the Snowden case came as a relief valve, aiming to support and create facts for a new tactical adjustment and the resumption of political initiative.

In August 2013, we observed a movement of this second adjustment with the ousting of Ambassador Patriota as Minister of Foreign Affairs and his replacement with Ambassador Luiz Alberto Figueiredo Machado (Patriota began to act as Brazil's representative to the UN, a position that had been held by Figueiredo). The ousting of Patriota was caused by the episode of the escape of Bolivian Senator Roger Pinto Molina to Brazil, with the help of diplomat Eduardo Saboia, after almost two years of exile in the Brazilian Embassy in Bolivia. In August, Secretary of State John Kerry visited the country as part of the preparations for the visit of Dilma in October, which had not been canceled yet, and continuing the Strategic Dialogues (Negroponte 2013).

September and October were marked by the creation of new facts: the Snowden crisis led Brazil, in alliance with Germany, to take a leadership role in criticizing the espionage and the demand for the regulation of digital media. The subject occupied the central place of the President's Statement at the Opening of the 68th General Assembly of the United Nations, with strong criticism against the United States (Rousseff 2013).

In Brazil, the situation was even more serious, as it emerged that we were targeted by this intrusion. Personal data of citizens was intercepted indiscriminately. Corporate information - often of high economic and even strategic value - was at the center of espionage activity. Also, Brazilian diplomatic missions, among them the Permanent Mission to the United Nations and the Office of the President of the Republic itself, had their communications intercepted. Tampering in such a manner in the affairs of other countries is a breach of International Law and is an affront to the principles that must guide the relations among them, especially among friendly nations. A sovereign nation can never establish itself to the detriment of another sovereign nation. The right to safety of citizens of one country can never be guaranteed by violating fundamental human rights of citizens of another country. (...) We expressed to the Government of the United States our disapproval, and

demanded explanations, apologies and guarantees that such procedures will never be repeated. (...) For this reason, Brazil will present proposals for the establishment of a civilian multilateral framework for the governance and use of the Internet and to ensure the effective protection of data that travels through the web (...) (Rousseff 2013, n/p)

This resulted in the adoption by the General Assembly, in December, of the "Right to privacy in the digital age" resolution. This theme became symbolic since Dilma had not presented innovations in the history of foreign policy until then, keeping Lula's initiatives. Therefore, the espionage theme was exploited (its domestic counterpart was the *Marco Civil da Internet*, an Internet bill of rights, approved in 2014). But what about the Brazilian decisions in the second half of 2013 that were touted as a result of the Snowden affair and which reflect long-term strategic issues? There are two cases worth highlighting: the purchase of fighter jets for the Brazilian Air Force and the auction of the Libra pre-salt field.

Started under the Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration, the studies for the purchase of the jets had a long trajectory affected by budgetary and strategic (access to technology) issues, which resulted in three options: Rafale-France, Boeing-United States and Gripen-Sweden. Quite delayed, the decision occurred only in 2013, on an emergency basis, and after the deactivation of the national fleet. The option was for the purchase of the Swedish GRIPEN NG-SAAB jet, in a contract valued at US\$ 4.5 billion. According to analyst Roberto Godoy,

The choice of the Swedish Gripen NG will enable the development of a high-performance national fighter jet - a supersonic with BR designer, created to meet specific demands of the Brazilian military aviation. According to the Defense Minister, Celso Amorim, such aircraft may be exported. It is the main benefit of the proposal of Saab, which also took advantage at the time of closing the deal: it won the contract for US\$ 4.5 billion, the lowest budget of the three finalists, covering the supply of 36 aircraft, parts, components and, of course, the fourth-generation technology required by the Air Force at large scale. That means a lot. With the knowledge incorporated by the joint program, Embraer - the main aerospace agency in the country and designated as Saab's partner - may in the future offer a new product in the military market. (...) The announcement of the choice does not preclude the immediate crisis of the air defense. (Godoy 2013, n/p)

This decision, as well as the partnership with France in the Submarine Development Program (PROSUB), in association with the Brazilian Navy, is part of a process of modernization of the Armed Forces accelerated by the Lula administration. This process aims to restore the defense sector, after its dismantling over the 1990s (initiated by Fernando Collor de Mello). Despite the establishment of the Brazil-U.S. Defense Dialogue, the choices in the industry have been the diversification of partnerships with developed and emerging countries, be it for the purchase of equipment and the development of research, or for training and joint operations (see IBSAMAR). This concerns the United States and the partnership with China is mentioned in the 2014 USSOUTHCOM strategic posture,

In the defense realm, Chinese technology companies are partnering with Venezuela, Brazil, and Bolivia to launch imagery and communications satellites, and China is gradually increasing its military outreach, offering educational exchanges with many regional militaries. In 2013, the Chinese Navy conducted a goodwill visit in Brazil, Chile, and Argentina and conducted its first-ever naval exercise with the Argentine Navy. (USSOUTHCOM 2014, 11)

The concern is extended to the pre-salt exploration. Regarding this agenda, the Brazilian approach has been the same: the diversification of partnerships, and the search for conditions to ensure greater benefits to the Brazilian state. In 2013, the auction of the Libra Field was representative of this tactic when the consortium formed by Petrobras, Shell (Netherlands), Total (France), CNPC and CNOOC (China) acquired the right to explore the field, with parcel to Brazil as well as bonus by the concession contract. The non-participation of Anglo-Saxon companies like Exxon Mobil, Chevron, British Petroleum and BG was pointed out as a result of the unwillingness of the Brazilian government with its U.S. counterpart because of the Snowden case, ignoring the fact that these companies did not consider the proposed sharing system interesting enough. The perception of the energy problem is, as stated previously, a factor that involves hemispheric and African dimensions, regarding the advance of the emerging countries in the South Atlantic. In 2014, it becomes evident on both the USSOUTHCOM and USAFRICOM agendas,

The African continent's energy and strategic mineral reserves are also of growing significance to China, India, and other countries in the broader Indian Ocean Basin. Africa's increasing importance to allies and emerging powers, including China, India, and Brazil, provides opportunities to reinforce U.S. security objectives in other regions through our engagement on the continent. While most African countries prefer to partner with the United States across all sectors, many will partner with any country that can increase their security and prosperity. We should be deliberate in determining where we leave gaps others may fill. (AFRICOM Posture Statement 2014, 5)

Vice-President Joe Biden mentioned the energy theme on a trip to Brazil in June 2014:

It is obvious that the potential of cooperation between Brazil and the United States in energy is great. Since the creation of the Brazil-U.S. Strategic Energy Dialogue (SED) in 2011, we have worked on major challenges in energy and climate change. In fact, the SED was formed upon a bilateral cooperation in biofuel, hydrocarbon and civil nuclear energy, to name a few that already existed. That is, our partnership in energy is already some years old. The U.S. oil companies have been active in the oil and gas industry in deep waters in Brazil for many years, while Petrobras has a history of deep-water operations in the United States. This is an area that each country can contribute with expertise and can benefit from bilateral technical and commercial engagement. What we have learned from the partnership in the SED is that U.S. service companies are eager to explore partnership opportunities for the development of oil and gas reserves in Brazil, including non-conventional ones. (Lopes 2014)

Held during the World Cup in 2014, this visit was defined by the Vice President in an interview with *Folha de São Paulo* as a "date" between both diplomacies, but he underscored that the "worst moments" of the NSA espionage post-crisis had been overcome.⁷ Biden stressed that these noises did not prevent the continuation of the dialogue, as well as agendas of cooperation and business related to the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics. Programs like

⁷ Biden attended the game between the United States and Ghana in Natal, which, in the 1940s, was representative of the US-Brazil strategic partnership in World War II, between the governments of Getúlio Vargas and Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

Science Without Borders were highlighted. In a similar tone, President Dilma Rousseff, in an interview analysed by *O Globo* on July 10, 2014 stated:

I do not believe that the responsibility for the habits of espionage is of the Obama administration. I think it is a process that has been occurring since September 11. What we did not accept and still do not is the fact that the Brazilian government, Brazilian companies and Brazilian citizens were spied (...) (Alencastro 2014, n/p)

The Biden-Rousseff statements mean there is interest to change the focus. These efforts have their motivations, including instrumental ones: on the U.S. side, repositioning on the agenda; for Brazil, to eliminate a subject of contestation of foreign policy in the 2014 presidential campaign by the opposition. The tactic is unlikely to succeed, since the pro-alignment groups have a clear stance: either there is a structural change or criticisms remain. Therefore, the question refers not to the government policy, but the state policy.

The bilateral relations from 2011 to 2014 express the traditional contradictions of this interaction and its weight in domestic politics, such as the U.S. hegemonic power in the quest to preserve its regional and global power. Brazil's strengthening emphasized its autonomy, which led to a new U.S. perception about the possibilities of cooperation or threats arising from this growth. This increased contacts, elevating conflicts.

The United States retreated internationally due to the economic crisis and reinforced the use of strategic and military mechanisms in the pressure on Brazil and emerging countries. Ideological instruments and the reaffirmation of zones of influence in the Pacific and in Europe, as well as the creation of new areas of power projection in Eurasia and Africa offer a counterpoint to regional powers. Moreover, concerns about terrorism and drugs remain:

Clan-based, Lebanese Hezbollah-associated criminal networks exploit free trade zones and permissive areas in places like Venezuela, and the Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay Tri-Border to engage in money laundering and other illegal endeavors, as well as recruitment and radicalization efforts. (...) (USSOUTHCOM Posture Command 2014, p. 4) Working with our interagency colleagues and international partners, we will assist as appropriate in countering diversified illicit drug trafficking and transnational criminal organization networks in Latin America that

are expanding in size, scope, and influence. The Department will continue to maximize the impact of U.S. presence in Latin America by continuing to foster positive security relationships with our partners to maintain peace and security of the Western Hemisphere. (Department of Defense 2014)

Thus, we are confronted with a complex picture of socio-political, economic and strategic considerations that guide the bilateral relations between Brazil and the United States in regional and global terms. Such relations are also inserted into a broader framework of transformation in the balance of world power.

Final Considerations

As discussed throughout the text, the government of President Dilma Rousseff has elements of both continuity and discontinuity when compared to that of President Lula. Although there is a continuity of an internal and external project of state, retreats on agendas such as the bilateral relations between Brazil and the United States indicate some discontinuity, associated with a lower external intensity. This was the tone of the first two years of the administration between 2011 and 2012, and which was extended to regional and multilateral organizations.

Particularly in bilateral trade with the United States, these tactical adjustments do not impact the structural dimensions analyzed here, particularly in the U.S. strategic interest in containing the advance of Brazil (or any other emerging country). Moreover, they may lead to the risk of weakening the Brazilian position. Since 2013/2014, the resumption of assertiveness introduced a path correction to this readjustment, which, although it has generated new controversy with the United States and the defenders of alignment, signaled a commitment to autonomy.

These oscillations of the Rousseff administration fall into a vision of state, under discussion in Brazil, which is not limited to international relations. Foreign policy and its definition from the perspective of bilateral relation is a component that is present even in the twenty-first century despite all the changes in the country, the United States and the world. A realistic relation with the United States passes through this assessment, and without it, no

agenda can be complete, or suitable to the project of a strong, autonomous and fairer Brazil.

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ABSTRACT

This article aims to present an analysis of the Brazil-U.S. bilateral relations in the Dilma Rousseff administration from 2011 to 2014, from the development of the contemporary Brazilian foreign policy in the twenty-first century. In both global and regional contexts, it analyzes its political, strategic and economic components, opportunities and bottlenecks.

KEYWORDS

Brazil-United States Relations; Brazilian Foreign Policy; United States Foreign Policy; Dilma Rousseff; Barack Obama.

*Received on August 30, 2014.
Approved on September 30, 2014.*

Translated by Airton Gregório Martins

THE RETURN OF GEOPOLITICS: THE ASCENSION OF BRICS¹

Ronaldo Carmona²

The sixth BRICS Summit, which took place in the Brazilian city of Fortaleza last July, by starting the second cycle of annual Meetings of Heads of State of five major developing nations of the world³, marked a *qualitative leap* of the alliance, which enters a *new phase*, strengthening the trend to a polycentric world.

Decisions taken in Fortaleza, especially the creation of a BRICS Bank and Reserve Fund, to be discussed below, when implemented, will leverage the leeway of each member of the BRICS and all of them as a set, allowing greater autonomy of these countries in the international arena.

Representing just over 40% of the world population and nearly a quarter of the global economy, the BRICS are the object of attention by the originality and uniqueness of a grouping with these characteristics: it is the

¹ This essay is an expanded version of a text that was crafted based on three articles, written over 2014 and listed in the references, which sought to update challenges for the international insertion of Brazil and the recent evolution of BRICS, markedly the “pre” and “post” Fortaleza Summit. The term “return of geopolitics” is relatively imprecise as it would be a mistake to argue over a “lull” of the bipolar concert of the Cold War and so imagine that the assumptions of classical geopolitics “walked away”. This is a recent essay of *Foreign Affairs*, which is listed in the references.

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³ With the editions of Yekaterinburg in 2009, Brasília in 2010, Sanya in 2011, New Delhi in 2012 and Durban in 2013, there was a complete a cycle in which the five BRICS members hosted a summit; Fortaleza opened a new cycle.

most important global coalition not to include the presence of established powers.

The first cycle of Summits – held from 2009 to 2013 – was marked by consolidating BRICS as a political instrument of coordination of large developing countries regarding the main issues on the international agenda. The second cycle, initiated in Fortaleza, installs the block institutionalization by creating the *means* to intervene more strongly in the contemporary international order.

Thus, from the Fortaleza meeting, the BRICS now have institutional instruments to bring about changes in the international financial and monetary architecture: the *BRICS Bank* and the *BRICS common fund of reserves*, formally called the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) respectively.

In addition, the Fortaleza meeting was an important move in the *grand chess match* that is played on the world geopolitical board as to what will be the outcome of the ongoing transition in the international system. After all, the decisions taken at the sixth Summit revealed a *maturation of a common vision* of the BRICS about the key issues of contemporary international situation. Something of great significance in the current phase marked by fierce fighting among the traditional powers, which seek – in a countertrend – to reverse the loss of their relative position in light of the rise of large developing countries, especially China. Through their alliance, these countries, in turn, seek to maximize the window of opportunities opened with the transition in the global geopolitical framework.

At their sixth Summit, the BRICS kept advancing in forging this common vision in a set of sensitive issues on the global agenda. Of great political importance is the positioning in the Fortaleza Declaration on the situation of Ukraine, frankly favorable to the end of the conflict, for a peaceful settlement; thus opposing the attempt of the “*West*” to isolate Russia⁴. Such

⁴ In March, the UN voting of a hypocritical resolution sponsored by NATO countries, for the “territorial integrity of Ukraine” (sic), in a political gesture of great importance, the four BRICS abstained collectively. The Fortaleza Declaration presents the first common opinion of the BRICS regarding the crisis in Ukraine. In paragraph 44 we read that “We express our deep concern with the situation in Ukraine. We call for a comprehensive dialogue, the de-escalation of the conflict and restraint from all

attempt, furthermore, has produced a significant reduction of the ambiguities of post-Soviet Russian foreign policy, making the BRICS a priority for Moscow and solidifying its geopolitical alliance with China.

Specifically for Brazil, we can say that the BRICS sixth Summit, for its results and entailed perspectives, is undoubtedly the *most significant* Brazilian geopolitical initiative, at least in recent history, bearing in mind its consequences in this great game of space and power dispute in the contemporary international "order"⁵. Thus, it is a big move, played by Brazil, in the world geopolitics.

The Fortaleza Summit, for its results, disqualifies the common analysis (or rather, the *desire*) among think-thanks and analysts of the major communication means of the central countries, according to which, for its cultural and geographical diversity, the BRICS would be unable to settle substantive agreements with each other and act together, with common positions on the major themes of the current global order. For them, conflicts would prevail over cooperation. However, the six summits have shown a growing maturity of the alliance.

In the current term, the BRICS becomes a solid *tactical alliance* in favor of the transition to multipolarity, in that it corresponds to the national interest of its members in the aspiration to change the relative position of these countries in the international system. With the NDB and the CRA, furthermore, the BRICS gains additional "gears" to support this rise. *Western* skepticism and unwillingness towards the BRICS – an ideological part of the ongoing geopolitical struggle in the world – is contradicted by the facts, since this coalition has been demonstrating increased capacity to cohere considering the convergence of each member's national interests.

This essay, which seeks to relate the moment and the current challenges of the BRICS *vis-à-vis* the current geopolitical setting, consists of three parts.

the actors involved, with a view to finding a peaceful political solution, in full compliance with the UN Charter and universally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms”.

⁵ Another outstanding geopolitical action of Brazil was in 2010, as of the diplomatic articulation among Brazil, Turkey and Iran which resulted in the signing of the *Declaration of Tehran* over Iran's nuclear affair, which led, at that time, to the entry of these new actors on the global geostrategic scenario, generating blunt reaction of the *status quo*.

The first part will seek to offer an interpretation of the BRICS, noting its potential and its limits. Some theoretical frameworks under which the BRICS can be read will be presented. A second part will seek to evaluate the results of Fortaleza in its relation to the great uncertainty and the geopolitical dispute scenario that has characterized the current transition in the international system. The third part aims to assess how the BRICS can be read in view of the Brazilian aspiration to rise to status of global power, as well as the impact of Brazil's participation in the coalition in its geographic and strategic surroundings. Finally, some conclusions will be presented, markedly seeking to observe challenges after the historic sixth Summit.

1. Interpreting the BRICS, its potential, its limits. By which theoretical frameworks can we read the BRICS?

The alliance between the five BRICS countries is, first of all, *functional* to the development of the national project of each of its members. To a greater or lesser extent, with greater or lesser clarity, all five BRICS aim to “change their relative position” in the international system, the “international distribution of power and wealth”, from factors such as territory, resources and social cohesion⁶. In other words, the alliance between the BRICS is a means of increasing the scope of each of them as a whole and in their scope in the international system⁷.

In the quest to ascend, the five BRICS amass, to a greater or lesser extent, *national will* and an *objective basis* at the same time. According to Hurrell (2009, 11) “it is easy for the stony realist to laugh at empty pretensions of countries whose ambitions crumble before their limited material capacities. However, the power in international relations requires purpose and design”.

To become a power, on the one hand, a country should have more than national will, it is necessary to gather objective conditions – classic power

⁶ As argued, for example, by José Luis Fiori in “Poder, geopolítica e desenvolvimento”, in Valor Econômico, June 26, 2013.

⁷ “El rol geopolítico de los BRICS: una visión brasileña”. Ronaldo Carmona. Presentation at the I Conference of Strategic Studies. Havana, Cuba, October 2013.

attributes such as territory, population, wealth, military and scientific capacity – on the other hand, it would be naive to think that there being an objective basis, absolutely, by determinism, a country would then become a power in the international system. On the contrary, a country that has objective conditions but scarce national cohesion around the goal to ascend to the condition of a power invariably falls back, and it even, ultimately, gives in utterly or in part its power attributes to other peoples who have a better designed *national project*.


Regarding the first point, it is essential to note that the alliance between the BRICS countries has an objective basis, rather than the product of random definition. As shown in Chart 1, if we make a clipping based on the factors of territory, population and the size of the economy, we find the four original BRICs and the United States.

The incorporation of South Africa, decided in the third Summit held in Sanya (China), provides a clear geopolitical dimension to the alliance, starting with the geographical condition of the African country as a contact point between the Atlantic and Indian oceans. Moreover, it incorporates a relatively stable country in Africa, run by a progressive coalition led by the African National Congress (ANC) and leader of the African Union (AU) – South African Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, former wife of President Zuma, elected last May, has been the general secretary of the AU since 2012.

The five BRICS gather an extraordinary power combined: both the “non-Western” members of the United Nations Security Council, three nuclear-armed powers, besides being countries with strong base of natural resources, food production and industrial capacities, scientific, technological and innovation clusters in areas that are, generally, complementary.

Thus, the alliance among the BRICS should be seen through structural factors rather than conjunctural ones. For example, these are countries that bring together a higher potential for economic dynamism than the now central countries, starting with the very intrinsic dynamics of capitalism regarding the uneven development. The ability of resistance to the first phase of the current crisis of capitalism that erupted in 2008 reveals this factor. Certainly, given the proportions of the crisis, it would be unrealistic to ignore that even the BRICS would be impacted in their growth rates.

Chart 1: Major areas, populations and world economies



Factors such as the extraordinary room for growth of the mass domestic markets of each of the BRICS, in a context of more or less redistributive policy, which led to an important social mobility, were and have been important factors for economic dynamism in these countries. Similarly, these countries, given their own size, have in the state's presence – "state capitalism" – through state-owned enterprises and mechanisms for economic planning, a very important factor. In general, these nations have not adhered to the neo-liberal fad.

Despite having been synthesized by an econometric study of an investment bank⁸, the BRICS are characterized by their extraordinary potential; all countries are *bearers of future* – far beyond the recent decrease in the economic growth from the effects of the crisis. Moreover, the centrality of the role of *megastates* or "whale-economies" is recurrent in the geopolitical theory – here there is no originality from Mr. O'Neill. These are countries whose combined factors reveal extraordinary potential.

⁸ Refer to *Building Better Global Economic BRICs* (2001), available at <http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/archive-pdfs/build-better-brics.pdf>

As recalled Ricupero (FUNAG 2012), “this conceptual innovation (the BRICs) was, in fact, created by George Kennan rather than this minor character of an investment bank”. Ricupero refers to the concept of *monster countries*, proposed by the U.S. diplomat and geopolitician, regarding countries that combine at the same time “a continental extension and great population”⁹. For Kennan, the five monster countries were the U.S., then Soviet Union, China, India and Brazil. It is worth recalling – for the subject will be resumed later on – that Kennan is also known for developing Nicholas Spykman's *rimland theory*, in what would later become the *theory of containment* or the *Truman Doctrine* – that is, the idea of geostrategic moves seeking to confine USSR's power to the limits of its heartland.

What can be observed so far shows how the BRICS is founded on geopolitical and geostrategic concepts and analyses that are much more complex than Mr. O'Neill's *investors' report*.

Another essential theoretical aspect to be considered regards the way the BRICS countries take on their *reformist posture*, through which they seek “to demand the revision of the established order and its ruling norms so that their own interests, concerns and values may be reflected” (Hurrell 2009, 11).

Being the BRICS an “*anti status quo*” alliance, what does it mean for these countries to actualize their purposes?

To answer this question, important concepts can be found in the literature. Ideas such as balance of power, proposed by the realist school, or *bandwagoning* are useful in understanding the behavior of countries in general and that of the BRICS, specifically.

In the *balance of power*, Waltz (2000), for example, claims that states will respond to the concentrated power with various kinds of balancing arrangements, joining forces against the most powerful.¹⁰ *Bandwagoning*¹¹, consists of the opposite act, that is, to form an alliance with the strongest

⁹ Ideas presented in *Around the Cragged Hill: A Personal and Political Philosophy*, whose first edition dates back to 1993.

¹⁰ Originally, we find the concept of “Balance of Power” in Spykman, Nicholas. *America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1942, 447.

¹¹ Term assigned to political scientist Stephan Van Evera (Hurrell 2009, p.17).

country or coalition, in a sort of pragmatic accommodation in relation to the hegemon.

In the case of the BRICS, I agree with Hurrell (2009, 34-35) and other authors¹² that the most appropriate is to consider that the BRICS adopt a type of *soft balancing*. According to the author, soft balancing “does not involve direct attempts to confront and constrain the dominant country through military alliances (external balance) or military mobilization (internal balancing)”. Rather, he says, it “involves other forms of cooperation: *ententes*, informal understandings, *ad hoc* cooperative exercises or collaboration in international and regional institutions”. The author argues that “the purpose of these cooperative forms is to complicate and increase the cost of U.S. policies in international institutions (especially denying them legitimacy)”, therefore making use of “non-military mechanisms” to achieve their reformist purposes.

It could be argued that with the creation of instruments that act directly on the international economic and financial order – as the BRICS Bank and Fund – the major five countries intervene to change the *status quo* in a way that is far from mild. In any case, apart from the possibility of developing strategic cooperation – currently only embryonic¹³ – effectively, the *sui generis* transition in the current international order precedes that *manu militari*.

One last question to interpret the BRICS is to understand the uniqueness of each of its members. Note that these differences, natural when it comes to mega countries, are amplified by the mainstream in the campaign to discredit the BRICS. Though real, these differences are not obstacles in view of the prevailing convergence of interests on their rise in the international system, as argued in this essay.

Three of the BRICS are ancient civilizations: Russian, Indian and Chinese. Out of these, historically, two have experienced the status of superpower: Russia, as the pinnacle of the Soviet Union, and China as the powerful *Middle Kingdom* until the beginning of the humiliation century in 1850. In this sense, the intentions of (re)ascension of Russia and China may be seen as *restorationist* efforts towards a condition already seen in the past.

¹² In Hurrell, there are references, on this concept, to T.V. Paul and Robert A. Pape.

¹³ The reference here is the relatively regular meetings – four sessions have already taken place – of the *National Security Advisors* of the BRICS.

Beside the three ancient civilizations, it is added a *new civilization*, the Brazilian, established more recently yet with unique characteristics that grant it enormous potential. One could speak here not only of objective potentialities of Brazil but also of its extraordinary civilizing potential, which is rooted in its original social formation, the constitution of a *new-people*, amalgamated by the confluence of its three constituent parts.

As the fifth BRICS, South Africans do not constitute a civilization in a more complex anthropological sense, given its marked ethnic and even tribal division. However, their presence in the coalition strengthens it, as mentioned before, for geopolitical and geostrategic reasons, for it is the apex of African integration and lies in a geographical area (Africa's Southern Cone) of confluence between the Atlantic and the Pacific.

Let us then identify some of the geopolitical and strategic reasons for each of the RICS – later in the article there will be a whole section dedicated to discuss the Brazilian case. The motivation here is to resume the argument that the BRICS is essentially an alliance of countries with common interests. This is a *tactical alliance*: the BRICS countries combine their strength, as said, to accelerate a transition in the international arena that favors the national project of each of its members, gathering more favorable conditions for the course of its development. In particular, the three giants of the Eurasian land mass – Russia, India and China – have historically balanced between cooperation and conflict; in the context of the early twenty-first century though, the cooperation factor has certainly overridden that of conflict.

Russia and China, specifically, have dense and structured geopolitical thinking. India and Brazil, although recent, have it as well. South Africa is structuring its national vision.

Russia inherits from czarism and especially from the Soviet geopolitics, of over seven decades in the twentieth century, a long tradition of strategic thinking. Largely under Putin, this tradition is resumed in the recovery of *Eurasianism*.

Based on this tradition, there is a major contemporary strategic novelty of the *new Russian stance*. Although it had been tested for a few years, now under the second presidency of Putin is taking a clear shape. Increasingly threatened in its *core interest* – which includes the country's territorial integrity

and the maintenance of its geostrategic area of influence – Moscow shows signs of clear abandonment of the traditional geopolitical uncertainty that has been its characteristic since the end of the USSR, balancing between the need for autonomy that a great country must have and the alliance with the *West*, in which co-opting the G7 – extended to G8 – is a symbol.

The first major move representative of Russia's new stance was the action that ensured the bases for a *game changer* in the war in Syria last October, preventing, through bold diplomatic maneuver, the consummation of the NATO intervention based on the gross manipulation regarding the alleged use of chemical weapons by the government of Bashar al-Assad. More recently, in a new Russian move that was even more daring, there was the establishment of a *red line* on its territorial integrity in face of the European/Western cooptation of Ukraine – Kiev is a cradle of the Russian nationality. The annexation of Crimea hence was a clear message that Moscow's limit is the threat to its territorial integrity and the Russian minorities scattered along its borders.

The Fortaleza Summit, therefore, occurs in this context of a new Russian geopolitical posture while there is a resurgence of geostrategic pressures aimed at China, to put this country on the defensive in its own territorial sea. This is the geopolitical framework in which one should read Vladimir Putin's recent visit to Beijing, last May, and the signature of a 30-year energy pact for the supply of Russian gas to China – dodging the Western attempt to isolate Russia. An alliance between two large countries, members of the Security Council and major nuclear powers – an alliance that, if strengthened, has direct effects on the solidification of the BRICS alliance.

For Russia, that is the way the recent Fortaleza meeting can be read. For Moscow it had a key strategic sense, especially considering the revival, in face of Moscow's return of international leadership, of movements by the established powers to embarrass Russia in its own geographical area – see the advance of NATO on Ukraine. The presence of President Putin in Fortaleza was his first post-Crimea appearance in a multilateral forum and the second expressive move seeking to break the isolation attempt – the first was the visit to Beijing in May, upon the signature of the aforementioned energy agreement.

Nevertheless, Obama followed his anti-Russian offensive and, in a provocation (extensible to the Summit's host country), announced new rounds

of sanctions while President Putin was in Brasilia. The shoot-down of the *Malaysia Airlines* aircraft in eastern Ukraine – two days after the Fortaleza meeting and about the same time that Putin’s airplane was on its way back to Moscow – added to this offensive, in a clear “false flag operation”, in military terms ¹⁴.

Days later, it was time for Putin to announce retaliation: being the fifth largest importer of agricultural products, Moscow announced the cancellation of purchases in the European and U.S. markets – the EU alone exported US\$ 13.8 billion in agricultural products to Russia in 2013. In an important gesture, Moscow hinted it might seek in the Brazilian market an important part of these products. Also, the Russian defense industry, an intense subject of Western sanctions, may seek the same path together with the BRICS.

For **China**, the participation in the BRICS adds to the central concern of contemporary Chinese foreign policy: “the active search of a peaceful international environment benefiting its own development”, in the words of President Xi Jinping¹⁵. Moreover, the alliance adds to China’s aspiration to solidify its presence in the international arena and increase its financial diversification. The relationship with large countries with raw materials also serves China’s interest to ensure the steady inflow of these goods, supporting the Chinese development. In this case, besides the relationship with Brazil, Russia and South Africa – large holders of raw materials – the alliance facilitates the access to their surrounding countries, especially in Latin America and the Caribbean and Africa¹⁶.

It should be noted – despite the *Sinophobia* propagated by some conservative Western think-thanks – the Confucian uniqueness of Chinese geopolitics. As proposed by Torres (2014),

¹⁴ *False flag* are military or intelligence operations that appear to be made by the enemy to take advantage of the resulting consequences. What interest would the Ukrainian rebels have in attacking a civilian airliner? The right-wing government of Kiev, on the contrary, an opportunity arose to terminate with extreme military force the separatist movement.

¹⁵ Interview with four media outlets in Latin America, on July 14, 2014.

¹⁶ Yet, it is noteworthy, the *reprimarization* in this relation is a growing concern, for example, for Latin American countries. This is the case of Brazil, which in 2013 had on commodities 87% of its sales to China, while out of its imports from China country, 60% were manufactured products (Carta Capital, July 23, 14).

The "Confucian" narrative stems most from the ancestral roots, in which China was interpreted as the universal center of culture. This center should be respected and assimilated by the peoples around it, who should be governed by its hierarchy and managed in harmony. In this order, conflict was not necessary, being seen as an aberration, a consequence of moral laxity or error of command. This narrative, which is deeply rooted in the current discourse of China's geopolitics, suffered its most serious setbacks when the Western powers of the nineteenth century, embedded in early geopolitical concepts, almost immediately turned it into a colonial territory.

The influence of the social formation in the geopolitical thinking is a subject to be considered as crucial to understand the world view of a particular state.

Also in the **Indian** case, it must be considered the influence of the state thinking to evaluate the attitudes and traditional positions of the country. Thus, despite the new right-wing government, elected last May, the first six months of the new government have shown a line of relative continuity in foreign policy.

The Fortaleza meeting represented the first international trip of new Prime Minister Narendra Modi. It is worth noting that the first meeting of Modi with his two major neighbors – Russia and China – has taken place on Brazilian soil – from which it was agreed on the densification of the Indian presence in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, an alliance in the geopolitical dispute in the world's heartland.

Modi's interventions reiterated India's commitment to the BRICS, reinforced by the fact that the prime minister goes back to New Delhi with the first presidency of the NDB – it is important to note that the idea came up in the fourth Summit, held in India in 2012.

South Africa, in turn, has special interest in consolidating the commitments that it spearheaded at the Durban Summit (2013), regarding the BRICS support to African integration through infrastructure financing: the country holds the presidency of the African Union. To this end, Zuma leaves Fortaleza with an NDB office, which will be concurrently opened with the headquarters in Shanghai, renewing the commitments to Tshwane government's priorities.

2. The Fortaleza meeting and the uncertainties in the transition in the International System

This section of the text will seek to analyze the expressive potential of the decisions taken at the Fortaleza meeting for the *great game* of global geopolitics. Initially, I will present the results of the sixth Summit, in which the BRICS created “gears” (*instruments*) and politically approximated positions (increasing their *degree of cohesion*) on the major issues of the contemporary international situation.

Was the meeting of Fortaleza the test for a new *Bretton Woods*?

The sixth Summit was marked, as said above, by the emergence of the BRICS Bank and Fund. For some analysts, a new *Bretton Woods* was outlined in Fortaleza. Exaggerations aside, however, it was correct the interpretation of the transcendental decision expressed in the words of the South African President, Jacob Zuma, to whom the meeting was “*a historic and seminal moment which saw, for the first time since the post-Bretton Woods Institutions era, the creation of a new and unique financing initiative*”¹⁷.

The Bank (NDB) comes up with an authorized capital worth US\$ 100 billion and initially subscribed capital worth US\$ 50 billion, with equal contributions by the five partners¹⁸. Nevertheless, as it will consolidate, says an analyst, “the Bank will attract other deposits and grow ten or twenty times”¹⁹. This is explained by the peculiar leverage capacity of a financial institution of this nature and the possibility of attracting capital from various funds. China, for example, with its high liquidity, may find in the Bank a profitable alternative to its resources.

The Fund, in turn, “a mini-IMF”, with a common reserve of US\$ 100 billion, is an important insurance against future crises in the balance of payments, a present threat especially if the monetary maneuvers of the rich countries persist, mainly those of the United States, which, in face of the

¹⁷ See <http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/pebble.asp?reid=17711>

¹⁸ Unlike the Bretton Woods institutions, the NDB comes with a strictly equivalent governance in terms of distribution of power among its five founding partners. It is highly questionable, therefore, the interpretation of certain Western analysts that the Bank would be an “instrument of Chinese expansion.”

¹⁹ Michael Wong, a professor at Hong Kong City University, in an interview with BBC Brazil, July 15, 2014.

withdrawal of stimulus in response to the crisis, has taken measures that generate a (still moderate) outflow of foreign exchange in emerging economies – an “escape to liquidity” in the words of Luiz Gonzaga Belluzzo²⁰. It may be an important instrument for the protection of national currencies and the very economic stability of the BRICS countries.

From the geopolitical point of view, the initiatives contribute directly to the relative decline of influence of the U.S. and European Union – via the institutions they control with an *iron hand*, IMF and World Bank – over developing countries, creating financing alternatives stripped of the degrading political and economic conditionalities of these traditional institutions – admittedly, more draconian for some than for others. For example, Ukraine, upon the establishment of its pro-Western government in Kiev, had an US\$ 18 billion-loan approved in record time. The same would hardly occur, for example, if a country like Argentina needed the same support – unless it adhered to a heavy *adjustment program*.

The fact is that the fundamental functions of the World Bank and the IMF – which, as envisioned 70 years ago in Bretton Woods, comprise “financing for development” and “containing crises in the balance of payments” – are increasingly difficult to implement, either for their ultra-liberal ideological criteria, or for its very dimension that is insufficient given the needs of today's world, characterized by huge lack of resources for infrastructure and development financing worldwide, especially in the developing countries – UNCTAD estimates such demand at US\$ 1 trillion for infrastructure alone.

The creation of the NDB and the CRA results, first of all, from the enormous resistance of the *establishment* countries to cede power and reform the international financial institutions – a fact expressed bluntly in paragraph 18 of the Fortaleza Declaration. Even with the enormous need for funds in the world, the G7 countries are reluctant to expand the role of institutions, as the World Bank, while they are not willing to reduce their control – in order to express the real economic weight of each country that is now very different from the post-war years. China, for example, has fewer votes in the IMF than the corresponding chair of the Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands and

²⁰ “Em um mundo de inevitáveis colisões”. Carta Capital, July 23, 2014.

Luxembourg). The G7 has 43% of votes in the IMF; BRICS, as a whole, keep 10.3%, despite representing about a quarter of world GDP.

It is worth stressing that the BRICS have contributed significant amounts of resources to the IMF in the crisis aftermath, becoming *unprecedentedly* the institution's **creditors**. As noted Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr., an IMF director indicated by the Brazilian government in 2012, “China announced additional US\$ 43 billion (to the IMF); Brazil, Russia and India announced US\$ 10 billion each; South Africa will contribute US\$ 2 billion. In the previous round of loans to the IMF in 2009, the BRIC countries contributed the sum of US\$ 92 billion – China with US\$ 50 billion, Brazil, Russia and India with US\$ 14 billion each”²¹.

The *reformist* attitude of the BRICS towards the international financial institutions concerns the fact, says Hurrell (2009, 27), that these are effectively arenas of power, being able of even “constraining the most powerful”, given the ability of bodies such as the IMF and the World Bank to define economic policy standards for countries. Invariably, these standards meet the national interests of the countries that rule them – in this case, the United States and the European Union, “owners” of the quotas that ensure their control, since its post-war formation.

The NDB comes as an attractive alternative to the allocation of liquidity and the increasingly bulky foreign reserves of the major emerging economies, shifting from the “safe” low-yielding securities as the *treasuries* (the U.S. Treasury bonds) to investments in the potentially profitable infrastructure projects in Latin America and Africa, with guarantees on government-to-government transactions. Therefore, as noted in a recent *Financial Times* article, “the BRICS bank will mark a significant shift in the international development finance architecture”²².

In the case of China, since 2009 the country has announced a strategy to reduce exposure – and therefore its vulnerability – of keeping much of its

²¹ Our translation from “Os BRICS no FMI e no G-20”, December 2012.

²² According to Columbia University economist Stephany Griffith-Jones (see “China vence e será sede do Banco dos BRICS”. Folha de São Paulo, June 8, 2014, p. B9).

reserves applied in U.S. bonds²³. Moreover, the NDB fits like a glove in the Chinese strategy of monetary diversification and the pursuit of *renminbi* internationalization.

Thus, the arrival of the NDB and the allocation of part of the BRICS reserves in the CRA can be read as a movement of decreasing their exposure to the dollar. Considering this movement, an important question regards the medium- and long-term consequences for the dollar hegemony in the international financial system, for that is one of the key factors for U.S. global hegemony.

As it manifests itself clearly, the *G7 financial war* against the BRICS may recrudescence. After all, the international financial governance is increasingly marked by geopolitical impacts, derived from the fact that in the G20 itself there is a gradual crystallization of two power blocs: on the one hand, the G7 – a coalition of countries of the old liberal *status quo*, whose character is reaffirmed with the recent purge of Russia – and, on the other hand, the BRICS and their allies. Jim O'Neill, in an appraisal in *The Telegraph* of the sixth Summit, even speaks of two “factions” in dispute within the G20²⁴. The outcome of this struggle will largely result in the twenty-first century international financial architecture.

A promising measure to impact on dollar hegemony is the increasing use of national currencies in the relations among countries, via currency exchange agreements (*swaps*) and other similar mechanisms.

The NDB, besides its great financial potential, might play an important role in the very update of the development theory in face of the twenty-first century challenges. After all, the BRICS countries, beyond their differences, point to a “non-neoliberal” development proposal based on productive investment and infrastructure. They reject the “neo-rentier and classical economic reform perspective”²⁵.

²³ See the article, which was widely reported at the time, by Zhu Xiaochuan, governor of the Central Bank (People's Bank of China).

²⁴ See <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/globalbusiness/10991616/The-Brics-have-a-100bn-bank.-Can-the-West-start-taking-them-seriously-now.html>

²⁵ As said Michael Hudson, in Carta Capital, July 23, 2014.

Thus developmental tradition is strongly present in the economic trajectory of each of the BRICS and in what Hurrell (2009, 38) calls the “strong statism featured in all these countries”, that is, the existence of the state leadership through most of the economic history of the BRICS in conducting the development path.

It is worth noting that the Bank emerges upon the know-how and expertise of robust national development banks of its members. This is the case of Brazil, with BNDES, a bank that has greater dimensions than the World Bank itself.

Being the emergence of the NDB and the CRA movements of deep geopolitical and geo-economic impacts, it should be highlighted Brazil’s demonstration of strategic vision in the maneuver that allowed its announcement in Fortaleza. Regarding the Bank, it is widely known that Brazil was the only country of the five not to claim the headquarters of the institution, just to better position itself for another election, namely indicating the first president of the new institution. It has been reported, however, that on the eve of the leaders’ meeting in Fortaleza, an impasse remained between New Delhi and Beijing for the head office of the Bank; it was then that President Dilma advised that Brazil give in the first presidency to India, thus enabling the outcome which established its headquarters in Shanghai, and hence the successful outcome of the meeting of Fortaleza²⁶. In doing so, Brazil also reiterated new Indian government’s commitment to the BRICS. Nevertheless, fundamentally, it allowed for a decisive move on the global geopolitical chessboard.

As one analyst stated, in an interesting analogy, the BRICS started by wanting to “sit at the table”, whose access was forbidden to them; then they sought to “change the menu”. Facing impossibility, they went on to “set their own table”²⁷. This is the meaning of the emergence of the promising BRICS Bank and Fund.

²⁶ Brazil will chair the Board of Directors of the NDB and have will the next president after the Indian administration; Russia will chair the Board of Governors (ministers).

²⁷ Anthony W. Pereira, King’s College, London (The BRICS Post, July 15, 2014).

2.1. Advances in political cohesion of the BRICS on the major global issues in a panorama of deterioration in the international scenario

The sixth BRICS Summit was also marked by further improving common viewpoints among its five members. The reading of the 72-point Fortaleza Declaration allows us to note that, unlike the *mainstream* skepticism, there is a growing convergence on key themes on the international agenda.

This constant convergence on positions, after six meetings of heads of state, permits these five major countries to take common positions in “hard” issues such as the war in Syria, the UN reform and the espionage affair promoted by U.S. government intelligence agencies against several countries. This growing cohesion of the BRICS has great importance in view of the recent geopolitical course. Let us analyze important aspects of this recent development in the global scenario.

More recently, the evolution of the international framework has been characterized, in addition to the resilience of the international crisis, by actions that seek to render victorious the *countertendency* against the movement observed in the first decade of this century: the decline, albeit slow and gradual, of traditional powers – notably the United States and Europe – and the rise of large developing countries, most notably the BRICS, and especially China among these.

The rise of the “periphery” has been the great mark of the early twenty-first century. From the late 1990s until recently, one in seven developing countries exceeded the U.S. growth at 3.3% per year on average, so, in 2013, for the first time the “emerging” markets accounted for more than half of world GDP in purchasing power parity.

One should bear in mind that the current transition breaks out from this structural data: the relative decrease in economic weight – and hence political and then military weight – of the core countries, i.e. the United States and the European bloc, alongside the increase of relative weight of large developing countries, as seen in the accelerated economic rise of the BRICS in this twenty-first century.

Nevertheless, the main established power, the United States, given its immense accumulated power, remains the leading nation in the world in terms of power, be it political, economic, cultural, ideological or especially

military. And it gives clear signs of maneuvers to prolong or even revive this condition.

Under President Barack Obama, the United States thus seeks this countertrend in relation to its diagnosed decline, even by its own think-tanks and official policy documents. It seeks a reaction on the economic level, putting in full swing a strategy of decrease in energy dependence (by exploring shale gas) and through an active re-industrialization policy supported on the large capacity in Science, Technology and Information that the U.S. has amassed over time. In the geostrategic plan, the current government is trying to end the Bush era (whose focus was on counterterrorism asymmetric warfare), by shifting its focus to the Asian *pivot* – strategic preponderance in the vast Asia-Pacific region – by updating the doctrine of containment, targeting China.

But such maneuver proves more difficult than planned: doubts about the sustainability of the “energy revolution” loom – serious studies evince its short live – and the gradual withdrawal from the “greater Middle East” is clouded by the very “legacy” left by the wars, generating chaos and instability in countries like Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya – see the current war against the so-called *Islamic State*.

The international crisis, of course, reached the center before the periphery – given a phenomenon intrinsic to capitalism on its uneven development, which gives a relative greater dynamism on the “new frontiers” of capitalism. Lasting, however, the crisis registered an overflow to developing countries in recent years – though not to the degree seen in the core countries, especially in Europe, which still suffers a prolonged recession and social crisis. But the fact is that the BRICS, which accounted for two-thirds of world GDP growth in 2008, accounted for less than half in 2012, a factor that is expected to remain stable in the coming years, according to IMF projections.

Certainly, the above-mentioned deceleration of the “emerging” markets produced an exaggeration, especially in part of the *Americanists*’ interpretations. But, in fact, neither are the United States the engine of the world economy again as advertised (based less on reality than desires of some more daring interpretations), nor is the deceleration of “emerging” markets as sharp as presented – China, for example, remains with relatively high growth for its standards, at 7.5% of GDP.

The pursuit, by central countries, to make this countertrend victorious in an ongoing protracted struggle for what the outcome of this transition will be has striking geopolitical and geostrategic features. As mentioned above, there is a notorious rehabilitation in the strategic orientation of the core countries – mainly the U.S. – of classical geopolitical theories and principles, especially of authors who formulate *theories of containment*.

There is a new labor division within NATO; while the United States is heading steadily towards the *Asian pivot* policy – seeking to achieve hegemony in the Pacific basin, squeezing China as much as possible in its own territorial sea – Europeans, increasingly *walled* in their own fortress, seek to be in charge of the “stabilization” of its long and unstable regional environment – which runs from the North African Sahel to Ukraine, the current object of the strategic arm wrestling between Moscow and Brussels.

As never before, regime change operations are being used more frequently, in an escalation that follows a recurring script, which runs from the demonization of their leaders by the global propaganda apparatus and promotion of internal divisions in the targeted countries to direct intervention itself. The recent case of Libya, and currently, Syria and Ukraine are patent examples. One cannot rule out the use of the same *modus operandi* in relation to other countries, including the BRICS.

The pursuit of U.S. “withdrawal” from the Middle East – frustrated due to the systemic instability in the region – in addition to the attempt of the Obama presidency to solve the Iranian affair, is an answer to the need to focus on trying to reverse the rise of large developing countries – especially China, but also, less explicitly, the other BRICS.

New powers, which naturally come to challenge the previous *status quo*, become a strategic priority in the range of actions of the main world power. Thus, in this U.S. strategic turn, classical geopolitical doctrines, such as those by Admiral Mahan, geo-strategist Nicholas Spykman and Ambassador George Kennan, are rehabilitated and updated.

An important novelty, derived from technological developments, which allows more leeway in this U.S. move, is the production of shale-based oil and gas – which, despite doubts about its durability, has allowed significant import substitution. Optimists even talk about energy self-sufficiency in the United States as soon as the 2020s, a fact with outstanding strategic effects.

The centrality of geopolitics, materialized by the more explicit resumption of the containment policy towards emerging poles by the main world power, happens in a multifaceted shape, expressed not only in the strategic and military field.

For example, the geopolitical objectives are clearly present in the negotiations of economic rules currently carried out by the United States as the TPP (short for Trans-Pacific Partnership) – which includes Chinese surroundings yet excludes Beijing – and the TTIP (acronym for Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, between the U.S. and the European Union). At the hemispheric level, the Pacific Alliance, arising under clear inspiration from the U.S. State Department, has an equal strategic motivation: to isolate Brazil and the more autonomous bloc of South American countries. As recently stated by a U.S. analyst close to the financial market and above suspicion, Jean Pierre Lehmann, “with TPP and the TTIP, the United States leads a counter-offensive to contain and isolate economic rivals such as Brazil, India and China”.

2.2. The resumption, by the established powers, of the geopolitics of containment towards the BRICS

Let us develop the issue, presented above, of the rehabilitation of the *containment doctrine*. Historically, the overtaking of an established power by another occurs in the context of military victory²⁸. In the ongoing transition observed in the international scenario, however, the overtaking will occur primarily by material power. The Chinese overcoming upon the U.S. economy is imminent – according to the World Bank statistics agency, in a study released in late April, it is expected to take place still in 2014 based on purchasing power parity, i.e., the relative weight of economies at the real cost of life. According to the same study, the U.S. has led this index since 1872. While India, according to the study, would surpass Japan to become the third world economy. The economic overtaking, however, does not lead to the immediate overtaking in terms of political leadership, let alone in military ones.

²⁸ See, among others, “The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers” by Paul Kennedy (Ed. Record, 1989) and “Os impérios na história”, ed. Francisco Carlos Teixeira (Ed. Campus, 2009).

There not being a direct military confrontation now, as we have seen, the countries of the *status quo* will act strongly in order to operate a counter trend, which currently serves mainly the rehabilitation of the old geopolitical doctrines of *containment*. Suggested by Spykman, the containment strategy takes shape from George Kennan's celebrated article entitled "The Sources of Soviet Conduct", published in *Foreign Affairs* in 1947. In it, the then U.S. ambassador in Moscow begins to outline what was initially known as the *Truman Doctrine* and that would ultimately lead the United States to victory in the Cold War, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

Contemporaneously, Brzezinski (1998, 201) is explicit in claiming that "the most immediate task is to make certain that no state or combination of states gains the capacity to expel the United States from Eurasia or even to diminish significantly its decisive arbitrating role"²⁹.

Recent events in the global strategic scenario suggest that, by direct or indirect means, open or covert, overt or subtle, the BRICS are object at this time, individually or collectively, to what might be called as a rehabilitation of *geopolitical containment*.

Under Obama, especially, it has been announced the strategy which is known as "*pivot*" or "*rebalance*" to Asia. In which is certainly the main geostrategic novelty of the last period, there appeared a document with the suggestive title of "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense" in 2012³⁰. The new U.S. geostrategy supersedes the previous stage – the *war on terror*, in force since the attacks of September 11, 2011 – and aims to answer the great ongoing geopolitical change in the early twenty-first century: the slow yet effective *erosion* of clout of the traditional Western powers on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the mounting – though not without setbacks and obstacles – *rise* of large developing countries, symbolized in the

²⁹ Here, in addition to acting on the rimland, Brzezinski advocates the direct intrusion into the heartland. It is worth recalling, in the recent period, the establishment by the United States, with the pretext of the war in Afghanistan, of its military bases in two countries of the former Soviet Union: in Karshi-Khanabad (Uzbekistan) and Manas (Kyrgyzstan). Due to combined pressure from Russia and China, especially from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the United States left these bases respectively in 2005 and 2014 (June).

³⁰ See http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf. Accessed October 1, 2014.

BRICS alliance and having its most striking expression in China – the world’s second economy in the process of becoming its premier.

Thus, since 2012, the United States has begun to focus its military strategy on the Asia-Pacific region, specifically on the containment of China. This strategic posture is confirmed in the recent *Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR), sent to the U.S. Congress last March 4, 2014³¹.

Moreover, the *geopolitical containment* strongly acts to foster divisions and instability in the strategic environment of each of the BRICS. Among the most obvious cases, there are the current tension in the Russian-Ukrainian border and the troubled *China Sea*.

Furthermore, the contention occurs in less perceived cases as well, such as the control of the South Atlantic by NATO from an “islands cord” and the permanent campaign to fracture the South American union, either through fostering instability in countries such as Venezuela and Argentina – the two main partners of the Brazilian project – or through open interventions through agents, as is the creation of *Alianza del Pacífico*, focused on clear geopolitical purposes against Brazil.

In each of the BRICS, there have also been identified pressures on a key factor for the rise of a country in the international system: national cohesion. Russia is permanently pressed by the ethnic factor, either through centrifugal tendencies on the part of a minority in its territory (the Chechens, for example) or through threats to its nationals living in former Soviet republics. China lives under constant territorial threat concerning Tibet and the Uyghur minority in Xinjiang. India is pressed by a constant tension between the Hindu majority and the Muslim minority. South Africa remains, two decades after the end of *apartheid*, with problems of racial nature. Even Brazil, characterized by a mixed social formation, is no exception: in addition to the ideological promotion of multiculturalism – by wealthy foreign agencies – absolutely foreign to the Brazilian society, it is constantly pressed by manipulations regarding indigenous issues, among other pressures of *racialist* nature.

³¹ See http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf. Accessed October 1, 2014.

Threats to the BRICS, in its ascending path, also take place by the very deterioration of the international situation, from the introduction of certain concepts to the multilateral “legal order”. This is the case of the concept of *responsibility to protect*, which has given rise to modern “humanitarian” or “civilizing” wars as well as indirect actions of *regime change*, the concept by which contemporary *coups* have been called.

The spotlight of geostrategic tension on Russia, China or the Middle East, should not cloud explicit movements against Brazil, in a geopolitical analysis. Let us examine these tokens.

3. The BRICS in the Brazilian strategy for rising internationally

For Brazil, the participation in the BRICS represents a path in favor of increasing the country’s leeway in face of a troubled international scene, through an alliance with major emerging countries with convergent national interests, which represent the essence of the alliance’s growing strength. Also, it will resonate through Brazil’s geographic and strategic surroundings, as will be shown later in this article.

However, the Brazilian project to become a *power*, emerging as a pole of power in the outcome of the current transition in the international system, is faced with frequent obstacles, historically and contemporaneously. Endogenously and exogenously.

Historically, for example, Brazil’s desire to play a central role in both major institutions of global governance in the twentieth century – the League of Nations and the United Nations – demonstrates this aspiration³². In the second half of the twentieth century, this problem became frequent, as Vizontini (1996) shows.

The aim of becoming one of the poles in the evolving multipolar world derives primarily from the search of achieving exogenous conditions that are more favorable for the course of its national project, since, as one of the major actors in the international system, Brazil will have better conditions to defend

³² Historian Eugenio Vargas Garcia documented this Brazilian claim in two books: *O Brasil e Liga das Nações* (1919-1926). Porto Alegre: UFRGS, 2000; and *O sexto membro permanente. O Brasil e a criação da ONU*. Rio de Janeiro, Editora Contraponto, 2012.

its own interests and those of its allies, preventing others from embarrassing or contradicting its legitimate national aspirations.

However, the difficulties stem from the very course of the international geopolitical developments – marked, as seen above, by forceful movements to prolong the *status quo* by the established powers. There are also impasses and strategic uncertainties of Brazil at a time when it must overcome new crossroads to switch to a new national development project.

In this early twenty-first century, Brazil has experienced a spiral of unprecedented autonomy in national history. The country positioned itself seeking to maximize the window of opportunities opened by the power rebalance in the world. Nevertheless, the national strategic aspirations to deepen this autonomy, achieving the ascension to the degree of power or pole in the increasingly multipolar world, are contradicted by both foreign and domestic forces, in which powerful political and social forces question Brazil's ambition to have an international presence befitting its stature.

The last three presidential terms, started by Lula in 2003, have as a key legacy, in addition to the stunning social mobility, the sovereign international ascension of Brazil. The recent re-election of President Dilma Rousseff, to be in office until 2018, points out that this stance on political and strategic international insertion will continue, according to the government program.

This period has recorded the launch of major initiatives related to the “Brazilian strategic environment”, particularly in the West (South America) and the East (South Atlantic and Africa). At the same time, Brazil has engaged in initiatives and alliances – from which the BRICS stands out – aimed at reforming the international system. In particular, from the Brazilian perspective, it is highlighted the goal to reform the anachronistic United Nations Security Council, which has frozen reality for 70 years and yet remains the center of power in the international system.

After twelve years, however, Brazil deals with an increasingly hostile external environment towards its international rise, at the same time that it faces internal difficulties to become a pole of power in the world. Thus, Brazil's rise *depletes a first stage*, clearly in need for renewed goals to deepen its course.

The Brazilian rise needs, first of all, a greater *national cohesion* around its basic postulates, its essential national goals. The lower the cohesion is, the more fragile it is, and this means greater leeway for those against it.

As observed by José Luis Fiori, “the change in position within the hierarchy of power and the distribution of international wealth” was obtained by “societies that mobilized and acted in a unified manner, to face and overcome moments of difficulty and their inferiority situations, keeping their strategic objective for long periods of time, regardless of internal changes of government.”

The Brazilian ascension is also fragile given objective factors, especially those of strategic and military nature. Despite important advances in the ongoing modernization of the Armed Forces and the recovery of an industrial and technological base of Defense, Brazil is a country with no relevant military capabilities to defend its interests, if contradicted. Sometimes, it happened even by self-limiting restraints concerning strategic capacity, as the case of the gratuitous association in the 1990s, without any consideration, to restrictive regimes as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

The Brazilian rise in the international system also occurs in fragile economic foundations. The three governments initiated in 2003 have failed to complete the shift from neoliberalism to a new national development project. They have only outlined this new national project.

Conditioned by a political pact established with the *Plano Real*, to subordinate any other issue to the so-called “currency stability”, for the last twenty years the country has remained in the “straitjacket” that constrains its rise. Even the progressive governments of Lula and Dilma, given the correlation of forces on the one hand and the lack of convictions on the other hand, did not dare to question this “national consensus”, including the risk of eroding the government's political base of support.

As an expression of weakening, in the twelve-year-old transition there is a relative de-industrialization of the economy and the *reprimarization* of the export basket, deriving, above all, from more than a decade of overvalued exchange rate and high interest rates, and serious productivity problems that have accumulated, with its frayed logistics infrastructure and insufficient integration of the national territory.

Among the Brazilian political and economic forces, those which one can dub as the financier-liberal bloc have defended what one can call a “new cycle of adherence to globalization”, based on the diagnosis that Brazil is a “closed economy”, outside the “global value chains” and isolated and attached to a MERCOSUR dominated by “Bolivarians”.

Here, first and foremost, one needs to understand the ongoing movements that will undoubtedly have profound impact on the course of the Brazilian national project. I refer to the *normative impulse* featuring contemporary global economic relations that may create heavy new conditionalities for the autonomy of the national project.

The ongoing “mega” negotiations (the aforementioned TPP and TTIP) involve little cutting of import and export tariffs – already at minimum levels in developed countries – and *many rules and regulations*, such as definitions of phytosanitary cordons for agricultural goods, standards for manufactured products, rules of intellectual property, government procurement and even limitations on the role of public banks and state enterprises. When setting restrictive regulations within these economic blocs that may arise, trade is deviated from those who have not joined to those who have. For example, part of Brazilian exports would be replaced by others within these mega blocs.

The adherence to the conditionalities and restrictions gestating within these blocs bind and tie the economies of developing countries that join the project of the central countries, limiting autonomy and the capacity to leverage autonomous development projects. Thus, for Brazil, the membership of these agreements would greatly limit the autonomy of economic policy or what international literature calls *national policy space*.

A recent example is the process that the European Union has just opened at the WTO against Brazil, questioning the latter’s industrial policy measures, such as the policy of national preference for cars produced in Brazil and that of regional development, comprising the Free Economic Zone of Manaus and EPZs (Export Processing Zones).

Brazil needs to upgrade or even relaunch its project of international ascension. One of the five largest countries in the world, if considered the territory, population and GDP combined, Brazil definitely cannot play in the *second division*. On the contrary, for its size and potential, it needs to have

an active policy in all global issues. It will soon need to overcome its national vulnerabilities and complete the transition to a new national development project.

The relation between foreign policy and national project is cut-clear; the former aims to act in the international game of powers seeking more favorable conditions to achieve the latter. In other words, each country operates on the international stage attempting to gather forces to create more favorable conditions for its development project.

With regard to its international insertion, Brazil will need, from January 2015 onward, within the new term of President Dilma Rousseff, to tackle basic problems.

The first of them – part of great national debate that has its South American dimension – is *how to finance* the project of ascension and shared development with our surroundings, the main impasse of South American integration project and to solidify our presence in Africa, our Western and Eastern borders.

The existing tools for this – Focem (MERCOSUR Structural Convergence Fund) and ABC (Brazilian Agency for Cooperation) – have serious financial constraints. In South America, UNASUR's portfolio of projects in infrastructure – bearing in mind that infrastructure is a premise of integration – has immense financial difficulties in moving forward.

Soon, the government and the productive sector need to be engaged in the problem of production integration and of the creation of regional value chains at the South American level – as seen on a regional scale, for example, among the countries of Southeast Asia. An example was the recent debate at UNASUR to seek the establishment of regional production chains from the industrialization of natural resources. At the same time, the participation in the BRICS has important repercussions for the Brazilian strategic environment.

Given the urgency of the issue of development in the world, the emergence of new institutions in the BRICS, especially the Bank, generates wide expectation among developing countries, especially for the potential to advance the financing of integration infrastructure in Latin America and the Caribbean – especially in South America – and Africa.

This perception was strongly expressed in the “second act” of the BRICS meetings: the meeting with South American presidents in Brasilia,

which repeated the experience of the Durban Summit, when the five heads of state met African leaders.

Chilean President Michelle Bachelet made a direct mention to the possibility of NDB financing the portfolio of infrastructure projects of COSIPLAN (UNASUR Council of Infrastructure and Planning), which priority list includes financing worth US\$ 17.3 billion. At this moment, furthermore, it is adequate to refer to Brazil's inability to finance this project portfolio, an underlying cause of the current impasse to advance the South American integration project and the result of lack of strategic understanding within significant sectors of its elites³³.

Bolivian Evo Morales commented that the NDB, whose capital is three times Bolivia's GDP, is an opportunity to end the "submission and conditioning" that traditional institutions impose on Latin American countries.

President Rafael Correa particularly welcomed the creation of the CRA; it important to note the frequent support by the Ecuadorian president of a *Southern reserve fund*. Correa argued that with its constitution developing countries would use their reserves to finance their own development, instead of sending dollars to the first world.

President Nicolas Maduro, in turn, argued that the Fortaleza decisions "will change the course of history in the twenty-first century". The Venezuelan president praised the "virtuous leadership" of Brazil in Latin America and proposed an alliance between the NDB and the Bank of the South. Days later, the MERCOSUR Summit, held in Caracas, reaffirmed the need for the Bank of the South to come into operation.

From the geopolitical point of view, for Brazil, the possibility of financing integration projects in its geographical surroundings by the NDB introduces important factors. While it will help balance the serious problem for integration of project financing – a factor of paralysis and exhaustion – it will keep the trend that has been underway for some years, that is, the deepening of

³³ Brazil has been the major contributor (70%) of the resources of MERCOSUR's FOCEM (Structural Convergence Fund), aimed to finance development projects in the regional bloc. However, with modest values. In seven years, the FOCEM has funded 45 projects worth US\$ 1.4 billion.

the presence of new powers in our surroundings, in addition to the presence of the old traditional powers, especially the United States.

Since there is currently a serious internal cohesion problem around the terms of the international rise of Brazil – with the state having a strategic vision considerably superior to its elites, especially those most linked with mercantile interests abroad – temporarily, until greater unity is established, an inevitable result is the greater presence extra-regional powers – old and new – in our geographical surroundings.

The two powers that are members of the UN Security Council try to do it, either bilaterally, or multilaterally. In the first case, it is worth highlighting the tour of presidents Putin and Xi upon coming to Fortaleza and Brasilia. The Russian president also visited Cuba, Nicaragua and Argentina, before arriving in Fortaleza. The Chinese president, in turn, left Brasilia towards Buenos Aires, later visiting Venezuela and Cuba. In Brasilia, both presidents had an extensive schedule of bilateral meetings with South American leaders.

China met with the *troika* of CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) and carried out, with Brazil's support, a China-Latin American and Caribbean Countries Summit. The major Eastern country announced an ambitious plan called "1+3+6", to be launched in a China-CELAC Ministerial Forum, to be held in Beijing next year³⁴. In Brasilia, it also announced credit lines with Chinese investment of US\$ 5 billion for a Cooperation Fund. Finally, the Chinese agreed with Brazil and Peru on the creation of a tripartite working group to finance the Transcontinental Railroad – an old Brazilian geopolitical ambition, since Mario Travassos – linking the Atlantic to the Pacific, though probably with rails and locomotives *made in China*.

Also noteworthy is the high Chinese financing to Venezuela: our neighbor, since *fundo chino* started its operations in 2001, received around US\$ 50 billion, out of which 95% have been paid. As Foreign Minister Elias Jaua

³⁴ "1" refers to a "program to develop" (2015-2019 China-Latin America and the Caribbean Cooperation Programme), "3" refers to the three "big engines" (trade, investment and financial cooperation), and "6" means the six priority areas of cooperation (energy and natural resources, infrastructure construction, agriculture, manufacturing, scientific and technological innovation and information technology).

said, the equation is “energy for China, funding for the development of Venezuela”³⁵. Venezuela currently exports about 600 thousand barrels of oil/day to China, proposing to increase this shipping in “the medium term” to 1 million barrels/day (CO, July 20, 2014). During the visit, Xi announced new credit worth US\$ 4 billion to Venezuela.

The BRICS, thus, begin dialogues with the geographical environment of each of its members. After the creation in Durban (2013) of the BRICS-Africa Council, in Brasilia the BRICS-UNASUR mechanism was established. More broadly, the China-CELAC Forum emerges and Putin proposes a CELAC-Eurasian Union Forum.

New alliances are important for Latin America to diversify relations. Potentially, they affect the very traditional U.S. presence in its primary geopolitical perimeter.

4. Post-Fortaleza agenda

Throughout this essay, it was argued that the BRICS featured a qualitative leap after its sixth Summit, and more broadly, the very struggle for what will be the outcome of the current transition in the international “order” will enter into new chapters.

The statements of the six BRICS Summits reveal a framework of subjects on which the BRICS have built increasing consensus. Among them, one can find issues far from trivial, related to a *reformist agenda* of changes in the international order, including those related to the reform of the international financial system and the reform of the anachronistic global governance, in particular the UN Security Council. The opposition to NATO wars – disguised as humanitarian – is also of great importance, increasing the cohesion of the BRICS in the rejection of aggression against Libya and, more recently, Syria.

Countermovements will reappear; for it is not a transition that is happening *manu militari*, on the contrary, which takes place while preserving the position of the great strategic superpower on the planet, it is expected an

³⁵ See *Correo del Orinoco*, July 23, 2014.

increase in direct or indirect maneuvers aimed at fostering contradictions among the BRICS. The “geopolitics of containment”, as addressed in these pages, will persist and intensify. Especially those directed against the national and territorial cohesion of each of the BRICS.

Brazilian *pro tempore* presidency of the BRICS goes up to the seventh Summit, which will take place on July 9 and 10, 2015, in the city of Ufa, Russia – symbolically located in the Russian land border with Asia, marking the point of contact between West and East. The annual meeting of heads of state of the *Shanghai Cooperation Organization* – a Sino-Russian joint aiming Central Asia – will occur on the same date and city.

Until then, it will be the implementation period of the so-called Fortaleza Action Plan – which provides for a wide range of initiatives – and, above all, to advance in the challenge of bringing the Fortaleza agreements into operation, in particular the set-up of the BRICS Bank, expected by 2016.

It will not have gone unnoticed the proposal of a bold new geopolitical challenge stated by Russian President Vladimir Putin in Fortaleza: the formation of an **energy association between the BRICS** (“BRICS Energy Association”). The idea includes the formation of a *bank of fuel reserves* (“Fuel Reserve Bank”) and an *energy policy institute* (“BRICS Energy Policy Institute”)³⁶. The alliance would bring together two of the largest oil producers – Russia and (potentially by the pre-salt) Brazil – and two larger consumers, China and India. For Brazil, a major producer of oil in the medium term, it is interesting to enter the big game of *energy geopolitics* in this way.

After the political and economic coordination, the BRICS will have to go a step further into the strategic coordination, already tested with meetings of “national security” officials.

In the next period the BRICS will also have to increase its level of coordination on the major issues of the international agenda, in a *pro-cyclical agenda*, that is, in favor of accelerating the transition to a multipolar world, creating more favorable conditions for the course of national development projects of each of its members and of developing countries in general.

³⁶ See <http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/22677>

The BRICS alliance may have enormous potential in the near future. As for the present, not by chance, it is worth noting what said a veteran observer of the international scenario and its protagonist for over fifty years, Cuban President Raúl Castro – who traveled to Brasilia in the condition of member of the CELAC *troika*. For Raúl, the meetings of July were “a historic fact to which there is no comparison”³⁷.

³⁷ See *Granma*, July 19, 2014.

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ABSTRACT

The convergence of five major developing countries around the common national interest of ascending in the international system is the amalgam that increases the cohesion of the BRICS in face of the troubled transition to multipolarity in the world. This essay, which seeks to relate the moment and the current challenges of the BRICS *vis-à-vis* the modern geopolitical scenario, consists of three parts. The first part will seek to evaluate the results of Fortaleza in its relation to the great uncertainty and scenario of geopolitical dispute that characterize the current transition in the international system. A second part will seek to offer an interpretation of the BRICS, observing its potential and its limits. There will be an effort to present some theoretical frameworks through which we can read the BRICS. The third part aims to assess how the BRICS can be read in view of the Brazilian aspiration to rise to the status of global power, as well as the impact of participating in the coalition for Brazil's geographic-strategic environment. Finally, some conclusions are presented, markedly seeking to observe challenges after the historic sixth Summit of Fortaleza.

KEYWORDS

Geopolitics; BRICS; Brazil; China; India; Russia; South Africa.

Received on October 30, 2014.

Approved on December 22, 2014.

Translated by Airton Gregório Martins

FROM CONTAINMENT POLICY TO REEMERGENCE: RUSSIA IS BACK TO THE CHESSBOARD

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Introduction

The US government became used to face the world, especially after the Cold War end, as a chessboard. But a chessboard in which it was the only chess player to play – the others were just pieces. This practice reflected the disintegration of the USSR and the North-American perception that the world had turned unipolar. During the 1990s, China prioritized modernization and the overcoming of the vulnerabilities resulting from the socialist camp's collapse; Brazil, with great economic hardships (unemployment, foreign debt with the IMF, stagnation), had a foreign policy with a high degree of alignment towards the decision-making centers of the international system; India initiated reforms and sought to overcome the constraints related to the stressed tensions with Pakistan and due to the effects of going nuclear; and Russia faced a unique disorganization during a peace scenario. Naturally, such scenario reduced the scope of peripheral countries which seek an autonomous and/or non-aligned international insertion.

However, the international framework quickly changed at the turning of the 21st century. China has become the largest exporter and the second largest GDP at the end of the decade, while becoming more assertive

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internationally; the Brazil from Lula emphasized South-South relations and closer relations with emerging countries; India, despite a rapprochement with the US to legitimize its nuclearization, expanded its scope of global actions; and the Russia from Putin made the country reemerge as a great power with the capacity to assert its interests in key international issues, such as Syria, Iran and its regional near abroad. This allowed peripheral countries to have opportunities to build new alignments, seek funding and commercial alternatives in other regions and, with effect, resist political pressures from the West/U.S.. There is no doubt that the scenario has become more complex and that there are more chess players participating on the board.

In front of that, this paper analyzes Russia's challenges in its resurgence as a world power after Putin's rise to the government. The central argument is that Russia's reemergence highlighted the historical US tendency of containing it, avoiding its control over the vast Eurasian territories, a running concept among U.S. foreign policy makers, such as Brzezinski (1997). Well, what it is intended is to present, as an overall view, Western policies for Russia's containment and its answers to avoid isolation. For such, the paper is organized as it follows: the first part discusses Russia's containment history, seeking to highlight the continuity elements of this process; the second discusses how such policies aim to isolate Russia, seeking to avoid its resurgence; and, finally, the last part deals with the Russian responses and the eventual reverse effects of US attempts to preserve unipolarity.

A History of Russia's Containment

The historical framework of Russia's relations with the West is full of contradictions since the Bolshevik Revolution, especially. As Isaac Deutscher highlights, Western hostility occurred in various ways, such as with the predatory Peace of Brest-Litovsk, at the end of World War I; with the support of the White Army to overthrow the nascent revolution and its Soviets; with the blockade, boycott, and "cordon sanitaire" that followed; and the smart delays through which the West slowed the opening of a second front in World War II, leading to a holocaust and destruction of Russia (*apud* Visentini 2004, 17). It is, somehow, the containment policy's embryo that the United States would implement after the Second World War.

The US, therefore, formulated the Doctrine of Containment as a foreign policy vector in the Post-War, especially during Harry Truman's administration (1945-1953). The inspirational source was, at large, a young diplomat from the embassy in Moscow, George Frost Kennan, when he writes his account of the Soviet claims, known as the Long Telegram. In this, he interpreted the international insertion of the USSR as the combination between communist ideological zeal and Czarist expansionism. From this assumption, followed the discussions that were shaping and changing the emphasis and priorities of U.S. foreign policy. Despite the controversy, the common ground was the Soviet containment policy, whose influences range from the famous Kennan's article, in 1947, in *Foreign Affairs*, using anonymity, to the famous document of the National Security Council (NSC-68), among others (Kissinger 1997, 528-559). Not surprisingly, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) creation, the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were conceived to keep Western Europe as a privileged ally in containing the nascent Soviet bloc.

As maintained by Mello (1999, 131-132), these policies were based on the geopolitical and strategic formulations of Spykman's texts, according to which whoever controlled the Rimland would control Eurasia (Mackinderian Heartland) and, thus, the world. This explains the US strategy of creating military pacts in the Soviet surroundings, such as NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), SEATO (Southeast Asian Treaty Organization) and CENTO (Central Treaty Organization), as well as bilateral military alliances with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Philippines, for example. The siege and the containment of the USSR continued to receive theories in such direction, as with Brzezinski's case. According to him, the policy should consist of creating three basic containment strategic fronts towards the Geostrategic Center (the Soviet Bloc): Far West, Populous South and Far East (Brzezinski 1986, 51).

In this sense, the containment and the cordon sanitaire represented not only the policies that guided US actions before and during the Cold War. Such policies were maintained with the USSR's disintegration and the emergence of the New Russia. The "singular Soviet collapse" (Halliday 1999) and the consequent vulnerabilities that the new Eurasian country had to experience, combined with its choice of a passive international insertion aligned with the

West, eventually obscured the containment policy. It was enough to a leadership arise willing to replace Russia in the center of international politics, challenging initiatives and imposing resistance to US and their allies' plans for the policy of containment to gain evidence.

The most symptomatic tensioning has been occurring due to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) expansion towards the countries that were part of the former socialist bloc. After the disintegration of the USSR, instead of disappearing, NATO strengthened, expanding its political agenda of action, with a security discourse that covers not only military issues, but also political, economic and social ones, and also its geographical scope, with the expansion to the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CCEE). The Organization has more than doubled the number of its members: in 1999, joined in Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic; in 2004, were included Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia; and in 2009, adhered Albania and Croatia. To such political and geographical expansion, this context marked the first intervention outside the member countries' domain (Balkans), without these being threatened and, to complete, exceeding the UN mandate – which should be to serve only as additional airpower.

In front of the vulnerabilities, the new Putin government, elected one year after the Russian affirmation against the Chechen separatist insurgency of 1999, seized the September 11 attacks situation to extract diplomatic dividends. On the external front, there was the replacement of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (JPC) by the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) in May 2002², giving Russia greater representation. In the domestic sphere, it allowed to legitimize interventions in Chechnya and, consequently, the fight against terrorism in the Caucasus. It was a temporary move, as it became increasingly clear that the US used the fight against terrorism to legitimize the overthrown of secular (Iraq, Syria) and non-aligned (Iran) regimes, as well as to expand its defense system and, in practice, contain challenging powers (Russia, China).

² Composed by the countries of the organization and Russia, the council is seen as a mechanism for consultation, consensus building, decision-making and formulation of joint actions. In order to ensure equality between the parties, the NRC decisions are consensual. To illustrate its importance, the position of NRC's chairman is exercised by NATO's Secretary General. For more details, see the official NATO website: <http://www.nato-russia-council.info/en/about/>

The fact is that, gradually, NATO became an organization with a global scope and at the margin of the United Nations system, expanding West's capacity, especially US, to protect its interests through the usage of force. Therefore, as highlighted by Rachwald (2011), the Russian government has developed a dual policy for NATO, mixing a rhetorical rejection of the organization's expansion and, at the same time, bargaining and cooperating in areas of specific interests. This duality also reflected, it is important to highlight, the own (drastic) changes of path from the USSR/Russia since the 1980s. Certainly, the Russian government has not harbored great expectations in relation to the intentions of NATO leaders. And the conflict in Ukraine was a crystalline example: the Secretary-General of the organization, Anders Fogh Rasmussen³, decided, in August 7, 2014, to suspend cooperation with Moscow in favor of a country (Ukraine) whose government is the result of a *coup d'état* clearly supported by fascist political forces. As Waltz had already called attention for, although NATO was an instrument for the maintenance of US domination over the foreign and military policies of European states, inevitably it would stimulate the strengthening of Russia's military capabilities and its approach to China (Waltz 2000, 22).

Parallel to NATO's expansion, there has been a notable expansion of the European Union (EU) since the Maastricht Treaty signing, in 1992, when it had 12 members. In 1995 it included more 3 more members (Finland, Sweden and Austria) and in 2004 it was given the decisive expansion into countries of the former European socialist bloc: except Malta and Cyprus, entered three Soviet countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) and five Eastern European ones (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia). In 2007, Romania and Bulgaria adhered to and, in 2013, Croatia, while others are in conduct process, especially former Yugoslavia countries (Serbia, Bosnia, Macedonia), plus Albania, Iceland and Turkey. Finally, Poroshenko's Ukraine signed an association agreement with the European Union providing trade liberalization and further integration with the bloc. In an explicit statement, the EU

³ See the news in the German DW Agency website: <http://www.dw.de/crisis-in-ukraine-economy-forecast-2014/a-17674372>. Access on 28/09/2014.

Expansion Commissioner, Stefan Füle, openly defended the entry of Ukraine, Georgia and the Republic of Moldavia in the European integration process. Obviously, the geographic, military and political expansion of a military alliance against the borders of a country cannot result in trust patterns or pacifist answers.

In addition to the expansion of NATO and the European Union, it should be stressed other Western initiatives designed to limit Russia's sphere of maneuver in international politics. First, the US government of newly elected George W. Bush withdrew the country in 2001 of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), signed in 1972 with the USSR, aiming to carry forward the idea of building a missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. In 2008, the three countries signed an agreement providing for the installation of this system with a base of ten interceptor missiles in Poland and a radar detector in the Czech Republic, provoking strong reactions of President Medvedev and the retreat of President Obama. Such as Byers (2007, 187) calls attention for, besides the ABM, the U.S. government rejected the Kyoto Protocol on global warming, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, an agreement on the sale and transfer of small weapons and a protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention.

Second, post-Cold War U.S. interventionism and unilateralism have led to insecurity. Note that such demonstrations of force are concentrated in the strategic surroundings of Russia, especially interventions in the Balkans, at the time of Yugoslavia's disintegration, and in Afghanistan, with the Global War on Terror declaration. In parallel, the U.S. took the opportunity to expand its force projection capability with the construction of the Uzbek air base of Khanabad and the Manas airport in Kyrgyzstan. Such presence in the region was confronted by Russia and China through the SCO, which resulted in the closure of these military bases in 2005 and 2014, respectively⁴. In addition, many interventions have occurred exceeding the mandates given by the United Nations, as the attacks on Iraq (2003) and Libya (2011). Without exception,

⁴ See the news on the radio Voice of Russia website: http://portuguese.ruvr.ru/news/2014_06_03/Base-acea-dos-EUA-no-Quirguistao-oficialmente-encerrada-7774/. Access on 07/10/2014.

from Somalia (1993) to Libya and Syria (2013-14), all interventions have had tragic results in any perspective.

Third, there was an open support for opposition groups in Russian neighboring countries. The “color revolutions” are illustrative: the Rose Revolution in Georgia (2003), the Orange Revolution in Ukraine (2004) and the Tulips Revolution in Kyrgyzstan (2005). Clearly, these are the XXI century coups, with large mobilization of intelligence, financial assets, non-governmental organizations performances, etc. As Bandeira highlights, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED)⁵, established in 1983 by U.S. Congress induction, operates as an agent of public diplomacy doing what was once considered a task of State Department, CIA and Embassies secret operations, using the rhetoric of financing and promoting democracy to change governments or sustain allies (Bandeira 2013, 39). In fact, Zbigniew Brzezinski (1997) had been very clear in recommending Western control over Ukraine as a geopolitical pivot in the containment of an Eurasian Russia.

In short, Russian government’s perception and responses must be analyzed in the light of overcoming internal vulnerabilities and external threats related to the growing U.S. unilateralism and interventionism in the post-Cold War. That is, U.S. governments have sought to expand the scope of powers of the UN Security Council; to create resolutions with intentional ambiguity or implied authorizations to open gaps for using force; to build justifications such as inherent rights of preemptive defense, humanitarian intervention and responsibility to protect to intervene without the consent of international organizations; and, simultaneously, to neglect the importance of international law for the protection of combatants and civilians (Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib), and for courts and tribunals for war crimes⁶, as the ICC (Byers 2007). The expansion of the security agenda by the superpower and the consequent weakening of the concept of sovereignty are two sides of the same coin; and one of the major challenges to peripheral and emerging countries with independent claims in the international system.

⁵ With the support of civil organizations such as Freedom House, USAID, Open Society, among others.

⁶ Perhaps because they were allies of the US in certain opportunities, Saddam, Bin Laden and Gaddafi could only have had an end without a fair trial. Farcical trial or extrajudicial physical elimination helped hide promiscuous relationships with the most contradictory facets of these leaders cited.

The “New Cold War” Discourse

To understand the logic of the “New Cold War” discourse, it may be better to turn to U.S. history of international insertion. In a perspective approach, it is observed the exceptionality role of its foreign policy. The blurring of religion and politics, whose expression are the presidential speeches invoking “God bless America”, is translated in concepts such as “holy war”, “chosen people”, and “imperial mission” (Losurdo 2010). In the US, liberal democracy is the self-government of the white and proprietary communities (“democracy for the people of the lords”), of Western supremacy, while revealing the mission to explore and/or “civilize” the colonial peoples (Losurdo 2006a). Red-skinned, Mexican, Nazis, Communists and Islamic terrorists have populated the imaginary and the expansionist discourse of US governments over time. Most of the times using an universalist and liberal discourse to operate ethnocentric and imperial interests (Losurdo 2006b).

In this sense, the USSR disintegration has created a vacuum in the U.S. discourse to affirm the momentary unipolarity situation. In order to redesign its foreign policy, the US government raised the discourse of neoliberalism and the “end of history”. The social costs of liberalizing reforms accelerated counter-trends that depleted over the 1990s. In any case, as highlights Bandeira (2013, 52; 91-99), at the strategic level, they worked to advance over the spoils of Soviet disintegration, as it is clear at the Defense Planning Guidance document of 1990. It is in this context that one should understand NATO expansion, the creation of the GUAM group (Georgia, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova) in 1999 as a military organization and the “colored revolutions” (regime change) in Russia’s surroundings.

With the entry into the XXI century, the 11 September attacks provided the “propaganda reason” for the Global War on Terror’s implementation. And the Patriot Act deepened the relationship between civil liberties restrictions, underground operations and foreign interventionism (Bandeira 2005). The “green peril” (Islamic terrorism) had been created to replace the “red peril” (Communism). The Global War on Terror legitimized aggression and hostility against countries with no linkages with Al-Qaeda’s Sunnis, such as the secular regime of Saddam, the Shia government of Iran and the communist North Korea. It was a way to give global dimension to American exceptionalism: under the allegation of ensuring their safety at any

cost, it was legitimized “preemptive strikes”; under the pretext of defending democracy and freedom, the use of force was openly used; and, in the defense of universality, the Islamophobia has spread. In the past, they financed the Taliban for later intervene in Afghanistan in 2001; now they supported the Libyan and Syrian “rebels” for later on bomb the Islamic State (IS) with the Persian Gulf monarchies – historical supporters of the most fundamentalist segments of Islam, such as the ones from the IS.

Looking into perspective, in the Eurasian region’s case, it might be observed: 1) the rise of interventionism in the Greater Middle East and the region, as the Kuwait invasion (1991), the intervention in Somalia (1993), the aggression against Afghanistan from 2001, the war against Iraq (2003) and Libya (2011) and the attempts to overthrow the Syrian government since 2011; 2) and a growing presence in Russia’s surroundings, including the intervention in the former Yugoslavia, the implementation of military bases in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea, the pressure against North Korea and Iran, the acting in favor of anti-Russian governments in its near abroad (Georgia and Ukraine) and the expansion of NATO itself.

It is in this aspect that lays the continuity line between the schizophrenic role in the Middle East and towards Russia’s case: create conditions to forge an enemy. Create friction and threats on the Russian border and wait firm responses as a way to develop Russophobia and try to isolate the Eurasian country. This is what is observed in this emblematic case of the current conflict unleashed in Ukraine (2014), the 2nd Orange Revolution: it has been promoted a coup supporting fascist orientation groups, encouraging the entry of a country that is an integral part of Russian history in NATO and the EU. The Russian response, with the annexation of Crimea and the support to the uprisings in the provinces of eastern Ukraine (Lugansk and Donetsk), create tensions that meet the wedge role to confront Russian and European interests – just as it was with Yugoslavia’s disintegration. Thus, the U.S. prevent the formation of a Heartland, or, a possible Berlin-Moscow-Beijing axis completely out of Washington’s control.

These conflicts foster anti-Russian sentiments in Europe, nursing a rhetoric that the West would be the mainstay of liberalism and democracy, as opposed to the authoritarian and expansionist bias of Russia. It is interesting to

observe the current view among important European intellectuals, such as Pierre Hassner (2008), according to which Putin is taking Russia from a democracy to an autocracy. Convenient, perhaps, to forget that Yeltsin's Russian government, allied with the West, has responsibilities on the disorganization of the country, whose effects include the mafia's strengthening, the closing of parties and even the parliament bombing in 1993! As stated by Colin (2007, 50-51), Yeltsin era was, rather, a retreat of democracy to the point that the term has acquired a pejorative sense for many ordinary Russians.

On the same line follows João Almeida's explanation, assistant to the President of the European Commission and director of the Portuguese Institute of National Defense, when he argues that Russia is a Clausewitzian of the nineteenth century for using war as a political mean, while Europe is the XXI century of Kantian peace (Almeida 2008). These Manichean divisions do not contribute to the understanding of the contradictions that pervade the European and Russian spaces in these centuries. Dialectically, the major European powers were also promoters of imperialism in the nineteenth century; the epicenter of the two bloody World Wars; and, after that, and already concomitantly with European integration, the responsible for violent wars against national liberation movements. In the post-Cold War, Western powers were the craftsmen of Yugoslavia's traumatic disintegration, of the European Union's expansion in the former Soviet space, of destabilizing regimes in Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004 and 2014) in favor of fascist profile regimes. Not to mention their contribution to the political and territorial destruction of countries objects of intervention such as Afghanistan (2001), Iraq (2003) and Libya (2011). Russia, by contrast, was the scene of the XX century's most important revolution, central to the universalization of social rights, including in the Welfare State Europe, and for combating the most retrograde political force of the century, the Nazi fascism.

Anyway, intellectuals, politicians and the great Western media have fostered a Russophobic speech, feeding back typical feelings of the Cold War period's anti-communist frenzy. However, as highlights Henry Kissinger when referring to the West, "the demonization of Vladimir Putin is not politics, it is

an alibi for his absence”⁷ (Kissinger 2014). In addition to the demonization of its leadership, its initiatives are always presented as hostile, as in the case of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization creation, often called as an anti-Western military alliance by both the mainstream media⁸ and by intellectuals (Marketos 2009, 61). In contrast, the Organization emerged aimed at combating terrorism, fundamentalism and separatism in the region, while strengthening in all documents the imperative of multilateral organizations in conflict resolution.

It is obvious that the Russian government understands the motivations emanating from the “New Cold War” speech. The enemy construction is part of a central feature of American exceptionalism and, indeed, of its international history. However as said the Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, Moscow does not intend to be involved in the use of “primitive standards” for the straight confrontation between Russia and the West⁹. This explains, as we shall see, Russia’s answers to the siege, including a combination of deterrence, demonstrations of force and movements to build new international alignments.

The resurgence of Russia and its responses

The Russian calculation that the opening to the West would be the best international insertion option reveals more than unpreparedness, but the level of promiscuity from the Russian elite led by Yeltsin during the 1990s. The looting and the dismantling of state capacities resulted in an unprecedented weakening of Russia. In order to keep certain domestic legitimacy (with nationalist sectors) and to have the means to negotiate with the West, at times this government had to reduce the urge of this integration model based on alignment. The appointment of Evgenii Primakov in 1996 to the Foreign Ministry represented this reaffirmation of the Russian foreign policy’s autonomist movement. Primakov set as Russia’s permanent interest the

⁷ See article in the Washington Post “To settle the Ukraine crisis, start at the end: http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/henry-kissinger-to-settle-the-ukraine-crisis-start-at-the-end/2014/03/05/46dad868-a496-11e3-8466-d34c451760b9_story.html. Access on 09/10/2014.

⁸ See news in the German DW site: <http://www.dw.de/anti-western-alliance-in-asia/a-17914677>. Access on 19/10/2014.

⁹ See news on the Voice of Russia website: http://portuguese.ruvr.ru/news/2014_10_13/Moscou-se-op-e-a-esquemas-primitivos-de-confronto-com-pa-ses-ocidentais-4911/. Access on 13/10/2014.

creation of external conditions for strengthening its territorial integrity, the recovery of its ascendancy over former Soviet space and the prevention of conflicts, especially ethnic, on its regional environment (CIS and Yugoslavia), as well as focus of weapons of mass destruction (Donaldson and Noguee 2005, 131).

The nomination of Putin as Prime Minister in 1999, followed by its election in 2000, deepened the orientations initiated by Primakov. The choice of Sergei Lavrov to the Russian Foreign Ministry since 2004 consolidates the affirmation of an autonomous and increasingly assertive foreign policy. It is possible to say, following the line of MacFarlane (2009, 98-99), that Russian policy has been pragmatic, seeking to address its weaknesses and knowing about the US preponderance, but now without giving up its priorities, such as to restore or preserve the influence over its immediate border and to regain the lost status of power.

The recovery of state capacities has been a tortuous route from the Soviet inheritance, the drawbacks of the 1990s and the difficulties of an international scenario in which the US could exert unprecedented supremacy. Thus, Russia has sought to recover its military structure, after the scrapping and partial disorganization of the superpower heritage that happened during the Yeltsin government. For that, the country restored the naval fleet in the port of Tartus, in Syria, and in Crimea. Among the newly developed equipment, it is included the anti-aircraft missile system S-300 with a range up to 300km; the new generation attack helicopter Ka-52; the first strategic missile-port cruiser submarine from project 941 Akula, with 20 ballistic missile of 8.3km range; the medium multi-mission helicopter Mi-8 for passenger, cargo and weapons transport; the mobile Soviet-Russian strategic land missile system equipped with intercontinental ballistic missiles of 11,000km range; the 5th generation fighters, among others¹⁰. Remembering that in response to US proposals for the deployment of a missile shield in Europe, Russia installed

¹⁰ See news on the Voice of Russia website: http://portuguese.ruvr.ru/2014_09_19/photo-As-armas-mais-poderosas-da-R-ssia-8620/?slide-1. Access on 13/10/2014.

Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad¹¹ and did not dismantle the three missile regiments (with 10,000km range) in Kozelsk.

Another sector that required major changes was the hydrocarbon sector. The government has retaken the stock control over the main companies in the sector, encouraging the creation of national champions with the ability to compete globally; renegotiation of the relationship with foreign firms in order to internalize technologies and capital; and tax reform aimed to capture the oil income in favor of national development, among others (Schutte 2011). In addition to national strengthening, Russia has used hydrocarbons as a tool of its foreign policy. In 2006, 2009 and 2014, the Russian government has stopped the supply of gas, compromising Ukraine and other European markets. Behind the battle between the Russian state company Gazprom, which charges price adjustments and debts, and the Ukrainian government, which bargain prices and charges for the transit of gas to Europe, is the usage of this power resource as a bargaining tool.

In the same direction was the recent agreement reached between Gazprom and the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) in the natural gas sector. The pipelined called Siberian Force is a deal with a 30 years validity and delivery, from 2018, of 38 billion cubic meters of gas annually, with a total value estimated at about 400 billion dollars¹². This shift to the East is added to the Siberia-Pacific pipeline (East Siberia-Pacific Ocean – ESPO), whose inauguration in 2012 has allowed the export of 300 thousand barrels of oil per day over its approximately 4,200km extension to China and other countries in the region¹³. Even though negotiations were previous to the conflicts with Ukraine and the EU, as well as the Western embargoes, Western hostility has forced Russia to seek eastern markets, as with the finalization of the agreement for the construction of Siberian Force. If for China it was an important means of diversifying energy supply, for Russia it accounted as a signal in the sense

¹¹ See news on the Voice of Russia website: http://portuguese.ruvr.ru/news/2014_09_01/Russia-comecou-construcao-de-gasoduto-para-Asia-2545/. Access on 13/10/2014.

¹² See news on BBC Brasil website: http://www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/noticias/2014/05/140521_china_russia_analise_jm_cc. Access on 13/10/2014.

¹³ See news on Reuters Brasil website: <http://br.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idBRSP8BN04S20121224>. Access on 13/10/2014.

that it can find new customers faster than Europe could find new hydrocarbon suppliers.

Agreements in the hydrocarbon sector are only one aspect of the Sino-Russian rapprochement that has evolved since the mid-1990s. For both, the bilateral relationship was configured as an alternative international insertion that allows resistance to US pressure and its allies in the West. Although Sino-Russian relations, obviously, do not be devoid of mistrust and competition, at the current state it characterizes as a necessary approach. Not surprisingly, as highlighted (Pautasso 2011a), Russia has developed a policy of rapprochement with China on numerous fronts, including the development of security and integration organization (Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS), cooperation under the strategic-military field, trade and investments, energy infrastructure integration, among others. In fact, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization strengthening, created in 2001 from the Shanghai Group of Five (1996), is part of Putin's Russia's efforts to seek to reconstruct a sphere of influence, even to fill the vacuum left by the USSR disintegration and later due to the ineffectiveness of the Community of Independent States (CIS). Besides SCO, it was signed this year the constituent treaty of the Eurasian Economic Union between Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, which will come into force in 2015, with the possible accession of Armenia and Kyrgyzstan¹⁴.

On the diplomatic-military sphere, Russia responded to attempts to include Georgia and Ukraine in the military alliance (NATO) and to the construction of the Missile Shield in Poland and the Czech Republic. Even leaders of the US staff, such as Henry Kissinger, understand that to include Ukraine in NATO is an affront to Russia and that leaves it trapped. To this end, the same author justifies that the Eurasian country was born from Kieva-Rus, where its main ethnicity and religion was find, as well as its greatest political and military battles (Kissinger 2014). This observation of Kissinger may help to understand why it has been unequivocally the demonstrations of force in the war with Georgia in 2008 and in the conflict in Ukraine in 2014. In both cases, Russia did not hesitate in front of Western maneuvers, with coups

¹⁴ See news on Voice of Russia website: http://portuguese.ruvr.ru/news/2014_09_30/Uniao-Aduaneira-e-Uniao-Eurasiatica-alagam-suas-fileiras-3552/. Access on 19/10/2014.

and signs of entry in its military alliance (NATO), and has reacted actively. In either case, the Russian government supported groups of same ethnicity or sympathizers, such as South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia and Crimea, Donetsk and Lugansk in Ukraine. As Putin stressed, on the annexation of Crimea's speech, this initiative is as legitimate as Ukraine's independence in 1991 or Kosovo's in 2008. These cases, according to him, are based on Article 2, Chapter 1 of the UN Charter, noting that the International Court agreed with this approach on 22 July 2010 when addressing that neither the Security Council nor general international laws contains any prohibition to declarations of independence¹⁵.

This way, for Russia, the current conflict in Ukraine does not represent a problem in relation to international law or to the military supremacy that it has in the region, but it is instead due to attempts to isolate it, reinforcing Russophobia in the West. The reverse of the coin, however, is that Ukraine lost (temporarily at least), three provinces, its most important industrial area, much of its Navy, the coal resources and access to the Russian market and its subsidized gas. For such, it obtained promises of a limited Europe in severe socioeconomic situation and an IMF loan with fiscal adjustments at a very high social cost. Ukraine, which had been presenting trade deficits since 2005¹⁶, for all it seems, will be reduced, still further, to a primary-exporting country in the regional division of labor.

The state capacities' strengthening in Russia gave conditions for it to respond to the constraints arising from the tensions that these wars and conflicts generated. After the conflicts in Ukraine, the US government urged Europe to sanction Russia after the Crimea's annexation as a way to put it on the defensive. Rather than acknowledge the coup, the Russian government introduced retaliatory sanctions against the European Union, whose annualized values surpassed 11 billion Euros and 10% of European exports¹⁷. The effects of the Ukrainian conflict made the Russian veto towards Western food products

¹⁵ Putin speech on the Crimea annexation: <http://g1.globo.com/mundo/noticia/2014/03/leia-integra-do-discurso-em-que-putim-reconhece-crimea.html>. Access on 19/10/2014.

¹⁶ Ukraine trade data: <http://www.datosmacro.com/comercio/balanza/ucrania>. Access on 19/10/2014.

¹⁷ See news on the Voice of Russia website: http://portuguese.ruvr.ru/news/2014_09_22/Produtores-europeus-comecam-a-sentir-efeitos-do-embargo-russo-3066/. Access on 13/10/2014.

turn into opportunities for new suppliers in South America¹⁸. Taking the opportunity, and in response to attempts to isolate it, the Russian government has intensified its presence in Latin America. In an attempt to reduce US influence in this geographical area, the Latin American countries, many governed by center-left parties, have taken advantage of this scenario to diversify its international relations. In July 2014, Putin made a tour in the region, signing important agreements¹⁹ with Cuba, Argentina and Brazil²⁰, in key sectors such as hydrocarbons, nuclear energy, military equipment, among others.

The Russian leadership's unquestionable return may be evidenced in the last decade in other relevant topics of the international system. These are the cases of the Middle Eastern conflicts related to Iran and Syria. In the first case, during the Western siege against Ahmadinejad's government, with various pretexts ranging from democracy to the nuclear program, the Russian government have supported Iran and led negotiations. Russia has become one of Iran's major trading partners and cooperated in strategic sectors such as the nuclear one and oil – in this latter case, allowing to connect, in 2011, the first plant in Bushehr to the country's power grid²¹. In addition, the Russian government has boosted a negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear program through the P5+1 conversations (China, USA, France, Russia, United Kingdom and Germany) with Iran. In the case of Syria, Russia worked actively to the stabilization of the country under Assad's leadership, seeking a political solution, either rejecting the use of force, or building the agreement to the Syrian chemical arsenal delivery. In fact, Russia had warned that the so-called

¹⁸See news from Diario de Pernambuco: http://www.diariodepernambuco.com.br/app/noticia/economia/2014/08/07/internas_economia.521204/embargo-russo-castiga-produtores-europeus-e-pode-beneficiar-america-latina.shtml. Access on 13/10/2014.

¹⁹ See news from RT website: <http://actualidad.rt.com/actualidad/view/133381-presidente-putin-gira-america-latina>. Access on 27/09/2014.

²⁰ In the case of Brazil, several acts were signed, including the one in the military-technical sector which provides for the acquisition of anti-aircraft system Pantsir I. Available in the MRE website: <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/sala-de-imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/atos-assinados-por-ocasio-da-visita-ao-brasil-do-presidente-da-federacao-da-russia-vladimir-putin-brasilia-14-de-julho-de-2014>. Access on 27/09/2014.

²¹ See DW news: <http://www.dw.de/rela%C3%A7%C3%B5es-entre-r%C3%BAssia-e-ir%C3%A3-s%C3%A3o-marcadas-pelo-pragmatismo/a-16799526>. Access on 19/10/2014.

Syrian rebels were Islamist groups linked to Al-Qaeda, anticipating the problem linked to the Islamic State²².

However, perhaps the most important Russian initiative takes place within the BRICS grouping. The BRICS Fourth Summit, and its Declaration of Fortaleza, held in July 2014, resulted in the creation of the New BRICS Development Bank (NBD) and the Contingency Arrangement of Reserves (ACD), with initial capital of \$ 50 billion and \$ 100, respectively. There is no doubt that it reveals the new distribution of international reserves around the world and, as noted by Ramos et al (2012), the consequent construction of a new financial architecture in response to the constrained space given to emerging countries at the Bretton Woods system (dollar, IMF and World Bank). Moreover, it is, above all, an alternative to neoliberalism and its Washington Consensus – in favor, obviously, of the state role as a development vector. As three of the BRICS members are Asian, and in that region of East Asia reside the highest rates of economic growth, one can substantiate Arrighi's (2001) argument of the economy's epicenter shift to Asia. And if China is its pivot, we would be walking to the Sinocentric system's (re) construction (Pautasso 2011b).

In short, Russia, despite and in the light of the weaknesses that came from the Soviet collapse, will not passively accept that a new cordon sanitaire be constituted through alliances and military infrastructure (NATO, bases and missile shield) and/or the support to anti-Russian regimes (via “colored revolutions”) at its border. In fact, part of Russia's elite also realizes this, and the very destabilization of Syria, the threats to Iran, as part of the siege to the Caucasus and, therefore, to Russia – which would undermine the control over major oil routes and access to hot water ports (Tartus in Syria and Odessa in Ukraine), besides opening gaps for domestic destabilization (separatist movements). In addition, Russia already has many challenges related to its demographic collapse (Vishnevsky 2009) and/or towards the necessity to diversify its productive structures (Pomeranz 2012).

²² See news at Estadão website: <http://internacional.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,russia-e-eua-discutem-genebra-acordo-para-armas-quimicas-da-siria,1073983>. Access on 19/10/2014.

Final considerations

The Vladimir Putin government came into power in Russia in a situation of great economic, political-territorial and diplomatic-geopolitical vulnerabilities. Given this situation, Putin had to mobilize the power resources at its disposal to reorganize the country and to recover the leading role on the international stage. On the Western side, Russia tried to earn time with a tense and negotiated coexistence with NATO, even though it had to face a systematic expansion and recurring shows of force (Yugoslavia). On the Eastern front, the country has been integrating with China through the intensification of bilateral relations and the SCO construction. At the same time, due to the increasing constraints, the Russian government has resorted to the use of force to set limits, as during the occupations of the Pristina airport (1999), the invasion of Georgia (2008), and the conflict with Ukraine (2014). The fact is that since Primakov's rise to the Russian Foreign Ministry (1996), and later with Putin's leadership, the Russian government has been ceasing to feed hopes of the US/Western policy for the region. There is, therefore, a clear contradiction between the US unipolar and unilateral claims and the multipolarization and multilateralisation trends intended, among others, by emerging countries and Russia.

The 2008 crisis in the international system's epicenter and the emerging regions' projection, nucleated by BRICS, reveals that history exposes its contradictions and conflicts, accelerates its course and poses new challenges. At the same time that such challenges mount up, hopelessness generates various forms of escape from reality, while those that should forge alternatives to the barbaric manifestations (the left), part deny their identity (and history), and part limit themselves too much to the electoral routine, consuming efforts that should also be devoted to thinking about the future.

On the international arena, the new power configurations rise among the old ones and manifest themselves in many different ways²³. Certainly, the emerging countries and Russia are protagonists of this new scenario. The risk not properly calculated by the U.S. is that its policy of containing Russia, with

²³ See our article written on the strengthening of South-South relations (Pautasso 2011c).

unilateralism and destabilization of the border regions, has reverse effects, since it deepens nationalism, accelerates the state capacities' strengthening and stimulates Russian autonomist foreign policy. And it can, in the search for new allies capable to avoid the Russian siege and isolation, accelerates the ongoing changes in the international system.

This new historical framework generates growing perplexity and difficulty to the U.S. government, since they are not used to play chess with a large and growing number of chess players. And the unilateral calculation has generated unexpected responses and undesired results to the U.S.. That is, the contradictions in U.S. foreign policy are rapidly redesigning the chessboard. The rhetoric in favor of the end of chess (history) actually defended the actions of just one chess player (U.S.). It should be recognized, however, that the chessboard is more dynamic with the new chess players' performance, though also less predictable, especially in the light of certain theoretical traditions. After Russia would like and before the U.S. hoped, the Eurasian country passed from a piece to the chess master.

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ABSTRACT

The present article has the objective to analyze Russia's challenges in its reemergence as a world power after the presidency of Vladimir Putin. The central argument is that this reemergence evidenced the American historical contention policy against Russia. However, we suggest that this contention policy has reversal effects, for deepens nationalism, accelerates the strengthening of state capabilities and stimulates an autonomous Russian diplomacy. Thus, it quickens Russia's return as a great chess player of the international arena instead of containing the Eurasian country.

KEYWORDS

Russia; "New Cold War"; West.

*Received on October 30, 2014.
Approved on November 12, 2014.*

Translated by Willian Moraes Roberto

CHINA ALSO LOOKS TOWARDS THE ARCTIC

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1. Introduction

The increasing defrost in Arctic ice layer has been causing great concern among environmentalists. On the other hand, the actual possibility of decreasing the amount of ice in the Arctic opens up a set of new perspectives for the region, both for countries bordering the area and for the ones elsewhere. Within the second list, a certain state deserves particular attention: China.

Which Chinese strategic interests justify the great attention this country gives to the Arctic scene? A first answer to this question states that China, as a global major player, is virtually interested in all regions and in all kinds of matters. However, two of these issues especially draw China's attention to the region: exploitation of natural resources and the opening of new commercial maritime routes.

Nevertheless, given the particularities in Arctic's geopolitical scene, China has to practice a much cautious diplomacy in the region, and it has been doing exactly that, both on a bilateral and on a multilateral basis.

2. The Arctic's geopolitical scenario

Different from what occurs in Antarctica – where there is an extensive landmass – the situation in the Arctic is deeply influenced by the Arctic Ocean and a few

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closer seas. In this sense, a distinct feature of this ocean is that it resembles a semi-enclosed sea, having a small gateway with the north of the Pacific Ocean (Bering Strait) and a deeper and larger one next to the North Atlantic Ocean (Fram Strait). Because of this distinctive character some scholars refer to the Arctic Ocean as a “Polar Mediterranean”. Moreover, the permanent presence of a thin ice layer over the ocean is typical in this region (Rothwell 1996, 35-36).

In comparison with the Antarctic, the Arctic is also distinct since the former is part of an existing legal framework, as exemplified by the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) and its legal instruments, such as the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 and the Madrid Protocol of 1991. The existence of such internationally recognized legal framework in the South Pole encouraged the proposal for establishing a similar juridical structure for the Arctic. This possibility, nonetheless, displeases some main actors in the Arctic.

The set of Arctic states can be organized according two groups: the A-5 and the A-8. The former refers to those states that have their shore pointed towards the inside of the Arctic Ocean, which are: Canada, Denmark (Greenland), the United States (Alaska), the Russian Federation and Norway. The second group of states, A-8, is composed by all those five plus Finland, Iceland and Sweden, which are located within the Arctic Circle².

Against this territorially confined and environmentally inhospitable background, two major global actors confront each other: the United States and the Russian Federation. Great enemies during the Cold War period, the U.S. and the former U.S.S.R. neighbor each other in the Arctic region. Not even the isolation and remoteness of the Arctic were enough to keep these two superpowers from building their air-strips, radar stations and acoustic devices for detection of submarines. At the time of the Cold War, the possibility that nuclear submarines could use the route underneath the ice cap in order to pass through the Arctic to the Atlantic, brought some considerable attention to the region (Byers 2009, 59-60).

² There are different criteria that can be used to define or to limit the Arctic. According to the geographical criteria the Arctic is formed by all land sites, submerged areas and the inner waters of the Arctic Circle (66° 33'). Other usual classifications are: the limit of the permanently frozen lands (permafrost); the extent of the pack-ice; the treeline criteria; and limit set by the isothermal line (Dupuy, Vignes 1991, 529).

During the process of political openness introduced by the soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, the Arctic experienced the easing of tensions surrounding the region. In 1987, the launching of the Murmansk Initiative called for a wide cooperation in the region, in terms of trade, environment, culture and arms control. Later on, this Initiative lead to the idea about the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy – AEPS and to the establishment of a new system of governance, with the creation of the Arctic Council (Numminen 2010, 86).

In the following years, influenced by the end of the Cold War, cooperation among the eight countries in the region gradually started to increase. This led to the Ottawa Declaration of September 1996, establishing the Arctic Council, a high-level intergovernmental forum whose main goal is:

[t]o provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States, with the involvement of the Arctic Indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic.

Some people consider that this stage of cooperation within the A-8 group was put into question when, in the 2007 North hemisphere's summer, two unmanned Russian midget submarines attached a stainless titanium flag underneath the ice cap in the North Pole, to a measured depth of 4,262 meters. This event aroused fierce political reactions, especially coming from Canada and from the United States. In the media and among scholars, the Russian action brought up renewed fears that a new “(Truly) Cold War” was about to begin. These suspicions were aggravated by the fact that, in the absence of a general international treaty on the Arctic, this region resembled an anarchic zone, subjected to the geopolitical will of the neighbor countries and other interested parts.

The lack of a comprehensive convention especially oriented to the issues of the Arctic rise two opposing statements, although they are not in conflict with each other at the moment. On the one hand, there are the non-Arctic states, which fear their interests might be jeopardized, once they are excluded from processes of negotiations and decision-making within the region. The

opening of new commercial routes, for instance, could hamper these countries' commercial benefits. On the other hand, the Arctic states do not seem very thrilled with the idea of devising a legal framework for the region. In this sense, the A-5 constitutes a subgroup within the eight countries that form the Arctic Council. Besides rejecting the necessity of a treaty, the A-5 clearly manifested its position when stating that a widely accepted legal instrument applied to the Arctic already exists, referring to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

The main reason why the A-5 group is interested in applying the UNCLOS to the Arctic is due the possibility of extending their continental shelves, which is, the seabed and the subsoil of the underwater landmasses that extend beyond the limits of the territorial sea. According to the Article 76 in the Convention, every coastal state holds the right to a continental shelf of 200 nautical miles, a limit that can be extended. In order to do so, the coastal state must provide information on the limits of the continental shelf – beyond the 200 nautical miles to a maximum of 350 nautical miles – to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), an organ created by UNCLOS itself. After examining the gathered information, the Commission will give “definitive and mandatory” recommendations that will serve as a basis for establishing the external limits of the continental shelf.

The Ilulissat Declaration of 2008, signed only by the countries of the A-5 group, albeit not explicitly mentioning the UNCLOS, makes clear that the international law of the sea applies satisfactorily to the Arctic Ocean. It registers that:

By virtue of their sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in large areas of the Arctic Ocean the five coastal states are in a unique position [...] In this regard, we recall that an extensive international legal framework applies to the Arctic Ocean [...] Notably, the law of the sea provides for important rights and obligations concerning the delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf, the protection of the marine environment, including ice-covered areas, freedom of navigation, marine scientific research, and other uses of the sea. We remain committed to this legal framework and to the orderly settlement of any possible overlapping claims. This framework provides a solid foundation for responsible

management by the five coastal states and other users of this Ocean through national implementation and application of relevant provisions. We therefore see no need to develop a new comprehensive international legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean.

One must regard that the Russian-led event was not sufficient to create animosities among the other members of A-5. The action happened in the midst of *Arktika 2007* expedition and served the purpose of collecting more data that could be used to better support the Russian proposal for an extended continental shelf in the Arctic. The media reaction did not follow the political unfolding in the Arctic scene, which has been of great cooperation among countries of the North Pole. Another example demonstrating the positive relations among countries of the Arctic region was the signature of an agreement between the Russian Federation and Norway in September 2010 about marine limits and cooperation in the Barents Sea and in the Arctic Ocean. The agreement between these two countries brought an end to four decades of negotiations over the matter.

Yet, this cooperation and seemingly harmony among countries of the region reinforces the concerns of non-Arctic states over the creation of an “exclusive club” for the Arctic countries, which could solely decide upon the course of the region. In this regard, China's position is disadvantageous, once this country does not feature a coastline facing the Arctic Ocean, nor is located within the boundaries of the Arctic Circle, and neither could it be placed within any other criteria used to determine the region. This situation seems to have compelled the Chinese to a kind of “geographical stretching”, in which they refer China as a “near Arctic State” and assign themselves “stakeholders” in the region (SIPRI 2012).

The growing interest of the Chinese government in the North Pole is mainly justified by the necessity of researching the consequences that climate change brings to the Arctic region. The air stream coming from the Arctic seems to be one of the main causes behind the severe climate impacts China has experienced in the last few years. Thus, the climate effects with origin in the Arctic are a cause of great economic and social worry for China's development and security (Alexeeva and Lasserre 2012, 83).

Besides these factors there are, at least, two other reasons that justify a careful look from China over the Arctic: exploitation of natural resources and the opening of new commercial maritime routes.

3. Exploitation of natural resources

Scientists might disagree over the causes of global warming, but it is undeniable that the rising temperatures have accelerated the defrosting process on the Arctic. Some people guess that during the summer of 2040 there will be virtually no ice in the North Pole, and that the warming up of the Arctic has already past crossed the point of no return. This way, exploitation of oil, natural gas and other reserves in the region starts to become technically and economically viable, shifting from simple work of fiction to become a close reality (Rajabov 2009, 420-428).

According to estimates of the U.S. Geological Survey (2008) the amount of uncovered oil and natural gas in the Arctic could reach the level of 90 billion barrels of oil, 1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 44 billion liquid barrels of natural gas, wherein 84% are found in oceanic zones. The totality of this supply could account for up to 30% of the world unknown natural gas reserves, or even 13% in the case of oil. Besides oil and gas, another important economic feature present in the Arctic is the extraction of ores, such as nickel, copper, tungsten, zinc, gold, silver, manganese and titanium.

For China, which is a major importer of oil, the opening of a new and promising energy scenario in the Arctic is very attractive. Since 1993, when China became a net importer of oil, its dependency on foreign market suppliers highly increased. It is estimated that Chinese consumption of oil nears ten million barrels a day, half of it being imported, while future projections outline an even sharper scenario. According to the latest report from the International Energy Agency (IEA), by 2020 China will have become the premier oil importer in the entire world, surpassing the United States and becoming the main consumer of this natural resource in 2030 (IEA 2013, 1-5; Rainwater 2013, 64).

In order to join the exploitation of natural resources in the Arctic, China will need to establish partnerships with foreign companies, especially Russian ones (i.e.: Gazprom, Rosneft) that already control several areas for exploitation within the Exclusive Economic Zone belonging to the Russian

Federation. However, Russian companies will need more technology and capital to fully retain these resources, which creates new possibilities of joint ventures between Russians, Chinese and Western companies— like BP, Shell and even Brazilian Petrobras (Jakobson 2010, 8-9).

Thereby, exploitation of these natural resources in the Arctic will depend upon a major flow of investments and technology. In this sense, China's position for occupying an important position in the regional scene is quite positive, once this country has a fair amount of capital reserve and is apt for investing abroad. An example that rests closer to the Brazilian reality and demonstrates the great Chinese necessity for oil in the future was the partaking of Chinese state-owned CNPC and CNOOC – next to Petrobras, Shell and Total –in the consortium that won the bid in the auction of Libra pre-salt oil field. Thus, the Chinese involvement in this consortium must be understood not only in reason of its interest in the pledged pre-salt oil reserves, but also because of the acquisition of deep-water drilling technology.

4. Opening of new maritime routes

The phenomenon of defrost in the Arctic will lead to other effects, besides those related to the utilization of the natural resources in the region. The melting of the ice will cause, initially, the opening of two new economic maritime routes: the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route. There is, still, the possibility of a third alternative, called the Transpolar Route.

The Northwest Passage consists of at least four possible routes through the “Canadian Arctic Archipelago”, a group of more than 19,000 islands and rocks connecting the north of the Pacific Ocean, throughout the Bering Strait – with its 52 nautical miles of maximum aperture and depth varying between 30 and 50 meters – along 1,500 kilometers until reaching the Baffin Bay and the Davis Strait, located between Canada and Greenland. The Northwest Passage shortens the distance between East Asia and the North Atlantic in approximately 7,000 kilometers (Roston 2009, 451; Spears 2009, 11).

The Northern Sea Route, in turn, crosses the Russian arctic seas – Barents, Kara, Laptev, Eastern Siberian and Chukchi –in the West/Eastdirection. As it occurs in the Northwest Passage, in the Northern Sea

Routes several different pathways are available, depending on the ice conditions. The most common route is located next to the Russian coast. Supported by the Russian ports, this route is mainly used for coastal shipping. The farther away from the Russian coast, the most appropriate routes should be for the traffic of shipments, since the distances get shorter. However, ice conditions are also more severe, and the maritime routes remain blocked most of the time. Accordingly, ships would have to be escorted by icebreakers, a situation in which the speed of the transport is drastically reduced becoming, thus, economically unviable. Taking into account the shrinkage of Arctic ice, the potential use of the Northern Sea Route is unlocked. Then, a trip from Shanghai to Hamburg throughout this route is around 6,400 kilometers shorter than through the Strait of Malacca and the Suez Canal (Xu et al 2011, 543-549).

Between August and September 2009, two German ferries for heavy loads carried a load of steel pipes from Arkhangelsk (Russian Federation) to Nigeria going through the Northern Sea Route, cutting the distance in some 5,500 kilometers and reducing the use of fuel in 200 tons per ship, which saved approximately US\$ 600,000. In the following year, a ship with a flag from Hong Kong transported iron ore from Kirkenes (Norway) to Shanghai making use of the same route and reducing the costs in around US\$180,000. In 2012, forty-six ships carried more than 1.2 million tons of cargos through the Northern Sea Route, an increase in 53% when compared to the previous year. Some analysts estimate that until 2020 around 30 million tons of shipments will go through this route (Guschin 2013).

The Transpolar Route would cross the Atlantic Ocean “through its middle”, outside the jurisdiction of any state in the region, which means, on the high seas. Accordingly to the UNCLOS, there is no restriction imposed on high seas navigation and the vessel is subject only to the laws of its flag. There never was any considerable commercial interest in the Transpolar Route, mainly due the great barrier of permanent ice in the Arctic Ocean. The lack of salt in these frozen layers produces an even thicker layer of ice. Even so, most commercial navigation companies do not disregard future plans for making use of this route. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) – a specialized United Nations agency that establishes the standards for international maritime navigation – has been working on the adoption of a Polar Code with the main goal of

standardizing the minimum requirements for building commercial ships that intend to navigate on the Arctic waters (Spears 2009, 11-12).

In the future, the opening of these new commercial maritime routes would bring additional advantages, besides considerably shortening the distance and saving fuel. First, it opens the possibility of navigation for all those *Post-Panamax* vessels, which means the ones that, due its large size, cannot make use of the Panama Canal. The second additional factor is the considerable reduction in the insurance costs. Because of piracy in the horn of Africa, insurance costs for ships that go through the Gulf of Aden towards the Suez Canal have increased ten times since September 2008 and March 2009 (Jakobson 2010, 5; Xu et al 2010, 559).

Even though the opening of these new maritime routes brings a series of advantages, especially the Northern Sea Route – from Eastern China to Western Europe – some disadvantages shall be considered. The lack of infrastructure and the adverse conditions might impede the commercial usage of the routes, at least in the short term. Single ice blocks will remain a serious problem, even during the periods in which the passage is considered free of ice. There will be a tendency for increasing the number of icebergs, especially resulting from the ice melting in Greenland, which shall force the ships to decrease even more their speed and to take detours. Moreover, the shallow depth in some parts of the routes, especially in the Bering Strait, might impose a problem for large freighters. At last, there remains the distrust in front of the possibility that the Russian might charge exorbitant service taxes in the Northern Sea Route (Jakobson 2010, 8).

For a nation the size of China, which is a great importer and exporter and that has a large amount of its commerce going through maritime routes (at least 50% of this country's GDP relies on maritime navigation), new alternatives for maritime traffic arouse great interest. In reason of this dependency on international navigation for its economic development, any change in these routes has a direct impact for Chinese economy. Thus, opening the Arctic Ocean presents a unique opportunity for China and also for international trade in general, since almost 90% of it happens through the sea (Spears 2009, 10).

5. The main Chinese actions: bilateral and multilateral strategies

Chinese interest in the Polar Regions started in the beginning of the 1980s. In 1981 was created the Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration (CAA) and two years later the country became part of the Antarctic Treaty, turning into an advisory member of the Treaty in 1985. The first Chinese base in Antarctica (“The Great Wall Station”) was installed this same year, and a second base (*Zhongshan*) was built in 1989 (CAA 2014).

Chinese presence in the North Pole, however, relies upon a considerable diplomatic effort. Since China is a non-Arctic state, its presence in the region has to be conducted together with other states in the region. This need, thus, leads the Chinese to conduct their policy for the Arctic with a double strategic-diplomatic bias: bilateral and multilateral.

5.1. Chinese bilateral strategy for the Arctic

In bilateral terms, Chinese interest in the Arctic issues involves a closer relationship with two countries in the region: Iceland and Denmark.

As a consequence of the economic collapse that happened in Iceland in 2008, China has focused considerable attention on this country. In 2010, it made available to Iceland the amount of US\$500 million, through a current swap operation, for helping in the reconstruction of Iceland's crashed bank system. Besides that, analysts of the Arctic region share the belief that because of global warming, Iceland will become the most important logistic axis in the region. In April 2012, Chinese Prime Minister Mr. Wen Jibao, in a visit to Reykjavik, signed several bilateral agreements, including a free trade agreement between the two countries – the first of this kind with a European country – as well as a framework treaty for Arctic cooperation. Another important feature of this relation is that China possesses in the Icelandic capital the biggest foreign embassy of the country. In retribution, Prime Minister Johanna Sigurdardotir, showed her support for giving China the status of Permanent Observer member in the Arctic Council (Rainwater 2013, 72).

Chinese presence in the region is not restricted solely to the role of the government. For instance, magnate Huang Nubo recently announced an investment in the range of US\$100 million in order to build a resort and a golf field in Grimsstadir, Northern Iceland. His announcement engendered certain

suspicious, given the climate conditions in the region, which are adverse to the practice of this sport (NYT 2013).

The Danish also started to openly support the Chinese application as a Permanent Observer in the Arctic Council. It happened mainly after the signature of several agreements between Denmark and China that together sum up to US\$740 million in the fields of “green economy”, agriculture and food security. The Danish support overlaps with the Chinese interest for investing in the region of Greenland – still a province of Denmark – that controls important deposits of rare earth metals, uranium, iron ore, lead ore, zinc, gemstones and oil (Alexeeva and Lasserre 2012, 85).

In January 2013, also Sweden and Norway started to support the Chinese application as a permanent observer member in the Arctic Council – even with the disagreements raised after the awarding of the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize to Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo. Other factor that guides Chinese financial help to small countries in the region is its particular interest in developing large infrastructure works, such as construction of harbors, ships repair stations, transportation hubs and rescuing centers. These are necessary in order to make possible the use of the Arctic routes throughout most time of the year (Guschin 2013).

The relations with the larger countries in the Arctic –Canada, the United States and the Russian Federation – are also considered positive, even though arousing more suspicions. For Canada, for example, it would be well received if China recognized the full sovereignty of the former over the “Canadian Arctic Archipelago”, the broad group of islands located in the Northwest Passage. The Chinese, together with the United States, are reluctant to accept the Northwest Passage as a historical Canadian possession, understanding this route is an international strait, thus subject to the regime of transit passage, as stated in the terms of the UNCLOS (Wright 2011b, 2).

5.2. Chinese multilateral strategy for the Arctic

Chinese strategy for approaching matters of the Arctic has prioritized scientific diplomacy by means of cooperation with the eight countries in the region. Since the 1990s, China has developed an intense project for the Polar Regions, with the creation of the *Polar Research Institute of China*, coordinated by CAA. In

1997, this country bought the Ukrainian icebreaker vessel *Xuelong* (“Snow Dragon”), which already took part in four scientific expeditions in the Arctic region since 1999. Besides, in 2004, China established its first permanent Arctic base called *Huanghe* (“Yellow River”) in Ny-Ålesund, in the archipelago of Svalbard, Norway³. One of the purposes of the scientific station is to monitor climate change in the Arctic and its effects over the terrestrial and marine Chinese environment. More recently, in 2011, the Chinese government decided to invest US\$300 million to build a second icebreaker ship to increase the support in the research projects in the Polar Regions. With two icebreakers the expectation is that polar expeditions could last more than 200 days a year (Alexeeva and Lasserre 2012, 81-82).

Moreover, since 1996 China has participated as a member of the *International Arctic Science Committee*, which promotes interdisciplinary researches over the Arctic and its global impacts. Chinese scientists have made its presence at international forums on the Arctic environment, such as the Arctic Science Summit Week and the International Polar Year Program (Rainwater 2013, 71).

The strategy of multilateral scientific cooperation showed important advances in December 2013, when it was launched in Shanghai the China-Nordic Arctic Research Center (CNARC), a partnership between the Polar Research Institute of China (PRIC) and other six Nordic institutions. CNARC establishes an academic platform of cooperation to increase awareness, understanding and knowledge over the Arctic and its global impacts, promoting cooperation for sustainable development in the Nordic Arctic and a harmonious development for China in the global context. Also, the country carried out five scientific expeditions in the Arctic (in 1999, 2003, 2008, 2010 and 2012), covering areas like the ocean, snow and ice, atmosphere, biology and geology. It is common the presence of scientists from other countries of the region during Chinese scientific missions in the Arctic (Arctic Center 2013).

³ The Svalbard Treaty (or Spitsbergen Treaty) was signed in February 1920 during the Versailles peace process. Because of this Treaty, the signatory countries recognized the sovereignty of Norway over the archipelago, even though certain limitations still remain, especially related to the fair use of fishing and hunting resources, as stated in the original text that “shall enjoy equally the rights of fishing and hunting in the territories”. China is part on this treaty since July 1925.

However, the main action defined by Beijing in order to increase its presence in the North Pole is to become an observer member in the Arctic Council. As seen, the Arctic Council is a high-level intergovernmental board, founded in 1996, that consolidated the efforts of cooperation among countries in the region after the end of the Cold War. The Arctic Council defines three categories of membership: i) the members – only the eight countries in the Arctic Region (A-8); ii) the permanent members – entities representing the native people of the region, currently numbering six⁴; and, iii) the observers – non-Arctic states, regional, global, intergovernmental and inter-parliamentary organizations, as well as non-governmental organizations.

The forum held its first meeting in September 1998, in Canada. The presidency rotates among its members every two years and the biannual meetings happen in the country that is holding the presidency at each time. The last meeting was in Kiruna, Sweden, in May 2013, closing up the first round in which every country has already presided the Arctic Council and starting a second round with the Canadian presidency for the 2013-2015 years.

According to what is established in the Ottawa Declaration of 1996, establishing and regulating the Arctic Council, the status of observer is given to those states and entities that as understood by the Council “are able to contribute with its work”. The membership as observer requires the consensus among all eight members (A-8). Therefore, the candidates to observer membership shall meet certain criteria: i) accept and support the objectives of the Arctic Council as defined in the Ottawa Declaration; ii) recognize that the Arctic states hold the sovereignty, rights of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the Arctic; iii) recognize the existence of a wide legal framework that applies to the Arctic including, especially, the international law of the seas, and that this framework provides a solid basis for the responsible management of the Arctic Ocean.

China's search for a seat as permanent observer member in the Arctic Council is based upon the argument that climate change had impacts over the

⁴The current permanent members are the following: Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC), Aleut International Association (AIA), Gwich'in Council International (GCI), Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), Russian Association of Indigenous People of the North (RAIPON) and Saami Council.

environment, both at the regional and global level, thus justifying its participation in the governance of the region.

In 2007, China was admitted as an *ad hoc* observer in the Arctic Council, a vulnerable position that was renewed in the meetings of 2009 and 2011. Since decisions in the scope of the Arctic Council must be taken by consensus among state members, any of them could veto Chinese participation. Aware of its condition, China's pledge has demanded great bilateral and multilateral diplomatic effort.

In January 2013, a few months before the biannual meeting of the Arctic Council, Chinese ambassador Zhao Jun was invited to speak during the conference named Arctic Frontiers, annually held in the city of Tromsø, Norway. In his speech Ambassador Zhao emphasized the preeminent role that the Arctic Council has, besides acknowledging the sovereignty and the sovereign rights of the Arctic states:

China considers the Arctic Council as the most important regional inter-governmental forum to discuss issues of environmental protection and sustainable development in the Arctic. [...] China respects the sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the Arctic states, attaches importance to the Arctic scientific research and environmental protection, and supports the principles and objectives of the Arctic Council.

In May 2013, during the meeting in Kiruna, Sweden, the Chinese request to become a full observer was accepted. China's admittance in this position does not reduce the power held by the A-8 group, since observer members⁵ do not vote, being able only to join the discussion and exercising the right of speech during the sessions. However, it was not a trivial diplomatic victory, especially when one considers that another important candidate had its application denied, namely the European Union.

The lack of a voting power for China in the Arctic Council was deemed unimportant by Qu Xing, director of the China Institute of International

⁵The other permanent observer states in the Arctic Council are Germany, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, France, Italy, India, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland and the United Kingdom.

Studies, who believes that China can direct its influence throughout bilateral actions and increase the transparency and equity in the themes related to the Arctic region. Besides, Qu understands that the Chinese admission as a permanent observer member demonstrates that the Chinese activities were acknowledged by all members of A-8 (Xinhua Insight 2013).

Many scholars point out that the current institutional structure to deal with the issues surrounding the Arctic is insufficient in order to face the severe challenges on sustainable development in the region. However, the great majority of scholars believe that changes in this structure in the short- or even medium-range future seem unlikely, given the complexity and the relatively recent nature of the broad Arctic cooperation (Vanderzwaag, Huebert and Ferrara 2002, 166-171).

Thereby, the possibility of taking part in the Arctic Council, even if just as a permanent observer member, ensures to the Chinese a stable position in the most important intergovernmental forum on the region. The Arctic Council has gained undeniable importance in the last few years. Evidence of this was the presence, for the first time, of a North-American Secretary of State in this forum – Hillary Clinton in 2011 during the meeting held in Nuuk – an action that was repeated in 2013 by her substitute John Kerry at the meeting in Kiruna⁶.

6. A Chinese policy for the Arctic?

Officially, China denies having an Arctic policy. This was the case, for example, when then Deputy Foreign Minister Hu Zhengyue, during the forum organized by the Norwegian government in Svalbard, in June 2009, categorically stated that, “China does not have an Arctic strategy” (*apud* Jakobson 2010, 9).

⁶Two North-American actions directed to the Arctic deserve to be highlighted: the first was the launching of the “National Strategy for the Arctic Region”, in May 2013, signed by President Barack Obama. The second was the explicit desire of the Department of State of creating a position of high-level representative for the Arctic, given the growing importance of this region for the United States.

However, Chinese actions in the region hint the contrary. Three important statements over the last years (2010, 2012 and 2013) about the Arctic can give an interesting Chinese political perspective for the region (Joensen 2013, 29).

On July 30, 2010, then representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs –now Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin – made a brief speech presenting Chinese interests in the Arctic region during the *High North Study Tour* event, held in Norway. Liu Zhenmin began his speech justifying the reasons that have led China to express interest in the Arctic cooperation, which were essentially three: the geographical location of China, scientific research and possible climate impacts on the country. In the words of Liu himself (2010):

The most northern part of China is around 50 degrees of north latitude. As a country located in north hemisphere, China is seriously affected by climate and weather in Arctic. [...] Arctic is a unique place for global climate research and environment assessment. [...] In case the Arctic shipping routes open someday, global shipping energy activities and trade will be affected. We feel we are part of the world, changes in the Arctic will affect China.

In a cautious speech and always preaching cooperation between Arctic and non-Arctic states, Liu (2010) ended his brief manifestation stating that:

The parties have different rights, interests and specific concerns with regard to Arctic-related issues. However, peace, stability and sustainable development in the Arctic serve the common interests of both Arctic and non-Arctic states. Arctic and non-Arctic states are partners, not competitors. We should continue to enhance mutually beneficial and win-win cooperation, and jointly uphold and promote peace, stability and sustainable development in the Arctic region.

The three official Chinese objectives in the Arctic cooperation were subsequently ratified by Ambassador Lan Lijun during the meeting between the Swedish Presidency of the Arctic Council and the observers – China was not yet a permanent observer member – held in November 2012. In line with the

previous Chinese manifestation on the Arctic, Lan used the expression that China is “a near Arctic state” and reinforced the conciliatory tone by stating that “The participation of observers does not prejudice the dominant role of Arctic states in the Council”. On the other hand,

[s]ome of the Arctic issues are trans-regional, such as climate change and international shipping, which involve the interests of non-Arctic states. Arctic states and non-Arctic states share common interests in addressing trans-regional issues and should further their communication and cooperation. (*apud* Lijiang and Chenyuan 2013, 378-380).

The third major Chinese demonstration regarding its attention towards the Arctic was the aforementioned speech by Ambassador Zhao Jun, in January 2013. In addition to highlighting the importance of the Arctic Council for the governance of the region, Zhao emphasized the dramatic changes in the region in recent decades that will influence the overall scene of navigation, trade and energy. Following the line of previous Chinese positions on the Arctic, the ambassador stressed that international standards, in particular the Treaty of Svalbard and the UNCLOS, created a fundamental legal framework for all parties participating in Arctic issues. But Zhao (2013) underscored the Chinese position of actively participating in the Arctic cooperation, asserting that:

China holds that this partnership of cooperation should be established on the legal basis of recognition and respect of each other’s rights, so as to commit ourselves to peace, stability and sustainable development of the Arctic. To this end, we must understand and trust each other at the political level, and carry out joint research activities to address the transregional issues. China will make its own efforts to achieve this goal.

Finally, Ambassador Zhao stated, as did his colleagues previously, the Chinese geographical position of about 50 degrees of north latitude and placed China as “near Arctic state”.

As mentioned before, the cautious but persistent effort, to seek a seat as a permanent observer member of the Arctic Council, had a positive outcome in May 2013. Over a year later, China has essentially followed the same

“unwritten Arctic policy”, seeking closer approximation with smaller countries in the region, especially Iceland and the Danish province of Greenland, and a positive relationship, but perhaps not as close, with larger Arctic states. But, either with the former or with the latter, it keeps reinforcing the discourse of scientific cooperation, given the unique conditions of the North Pole.

Having its seat secured in the Arctic Council, a fluent relationship with regional states and a constant presence in the North Pole, through its scientific research, the Arctic policy of China can move to a more proactive stance within Arctic’s international legal and political mechanisms. This is the view of Li Zhenfu:

[A]ctive participation in the formulations, revisions, and improvements of international mechanisms dealing with Arctic affairs is an effective avenue and the best choice for realizing China’s Arctic sea route rights and interests imperatives, accelerating its economic and social development, bringing into play China’s functions as a responsible major power in the international arena, and hastening the rationalization and democratization of international relations. (*apud* Wright 2011a, 18)

The outlook is that China will strengthen its position in the region, from a cautious diplomatic behavior to a more active attitude, now that the country gained its own space to present its views. Therefore, the expectation is that Beijing will, in the coming years, consolidate its Arctic position, bilaterally and multilaterally.

7. Conclusion

The first stage of China’s “unwritten Arctic policy” seems to have achieved its goals: permanent access to the Arctic Council, dialogue with the A-8 and consolidation of its presence in the region. The cautious diplomatic strategy of finding its own place in the discussions on the Arctic proved positive.

As shown above, the Chinese interest in the region stems from a scientific perspective of monitoring the effects of climate change and the melting of the ice sheet in its regional and global impact. However, it is undeniable the great economic appeal that the North Pole also has on China, be

it in the exploitation of mineral wealth or with the opening of new maritime trade routes.

Although Beijing has not explicated an Arctic policy, the commitment and consistent manifestation of some of its officials indicate a path of consolidation and strengthening of its new position as a full observer member of the Arctic Council, in addition to deepening bilateral ties with certain Arctic states. It is reasonable to imagine that China's political position will become more active in the coming years, though hardly "aggressive", particularly in light of the need to cooperate with all stakeholders in the Arctic: Arctic and non-Arctic states, indigenous peoples, and international and non-governmental organizations.

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ABSTRACT

This article analyzes the current political and strategic situation in the Arctic, giving special attention to Chinese interests on the region. First, it introduces the geopolitical background in the North Pole considering the current international framework. Second, the work investigates the two main components that draw Chinese attention to the region: exploitation of mineral resources and opening of new commercial maritime routes. Later, this work describes the main actions that China is taking in order to become an important player in the Arctic, both with bilateral and multilateral strategies. At last, it introduces the general guidelines of the Chinese policy for the Arctic.

KEYWORDS

China; Arctic; Diplomacy; Strategy.

*Received on August 28, 2014.
Approved on November 07, 2014.*

Translated by Airton Gregório Martins and Luciana Costa Brandão

APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMME AND ITS IMPACT ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

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Apartheid South Africa's nuclear related activities in Southern Africa have a long history. Apart from, inter alia, the development and existence of at least six nuclear devices (which was denied for decades), South Africa operated a nuclear test site in the Kalahari Desert on the border of Botswana, utilised uranium from Southwest Africa (now independent Namibia), and employed a nuclear deterrent strategy in response to Soviet support for Angola and liberation movements in the region. This elicited responses from the so-called Frontline States (FLS) as well as the members of the Southern African Development Community (SADCC). Therefore, the purpose of this contribution is to determine the extent of South Africa's nuclear activities as well as its impact on the region from the mid-1970s until 1991. This period covers the period since the Portuguese regime's collapse in 1974 and its domino effect in Southern Africa, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the termination of the Cold War.

Apartheid and the region

Fueled by white nationalism, and international condemnation and isolation the National Party (NP) government in South Africa became convinced that white

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rule in Southern Africa is threatened by African liberation movements supported by the Soviet Union and Cuba. South African-led excursions into Angola from Southwest Africa increased towards the end of the 1960s and, with South Africa's support for Ian Smith's government in Rhodesia, by the early 1970s marked new frontiers in South Africa's efforts to maintain white rule in the region. In an effort to establish links with other African states to counter support for the pro-Soviet liberation South African movements, Prime Minister John Vorster's "uitwaartse beleid" (outward movement policy) of accommodation and diplomacy or *détente* commenced in the early 1970s (Wallenstein 1971, 85-99). The purpose of Vorster's *détente* was to convince states in Southern Africa that South Africa's apartheid policies is not a threat to regional stability. However, Vorster's initiatives were short-lived.

Portuguese colonialism in Africa ended in 1974 with the military coup *d'état* in Portugal on 25 April 1974. One of the immediate consequences of the coup was that the so-called 'buffer states' between South Africa and the rest of black-ruled Africa was under grave threat with the independence of Angola and Mozambique, and developments in Rhodesia. Cuban support to the *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (MPLA) secured the movement's victory in Angola. Newly-independent Mozambique under the leadership of *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (FRELIMO) signed a cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union. For South Africa, this created new insecurities on its borders (including Southwest Africa's) as Marxist and Communist liberation movements took over the governments of these countries (Saunders and Onslow 2009, 225). In an effort to stem what was regarded as a communist threat to South Africa, the country intervened militarily in Angola in 1975.

From the mid-1970s, conflicts in Southern Africa were predominantly the result of the ideological rifts between the Cold War superpowers, namely the United States of America (U.S.) and the Soviet Union. The perception of white minority governments in South Africa and Rhodesia was that the Soviet Union's support for black liberation movements increased the Communist threats to these white regimes. These threat perceptions became the justification for, amongst others, cross-border military actions against countries supporting the liberation movements. With Soviet support for liberation movements and governments in Southern Africa, the South African

government realised that it will have to counter the influence of this nuclear Goliath in the region.

In an effort to stem the perceived tide of communism in the region, South Africa retreated into a nuclear *laager* in South Africa². The next section outlines the establishment and development of South Africa's nuclear weapons programme before proceeding to the country's regional policy. Thereafter, the article addresses three cases studies (Angola, Botswana and Southwest Africa) to illustrate the impact of South Africa's nuclear weapons programme on the region.

The Nuclear *laager*

South Africa's interest in the development of nuclear energy can be traced as far back as the 1940s. South Africa has one of the largest uranium reserves in the world. Uranium exploitation commenced in 1950 when the Anglo-American agency, the Combined Development Agency, installed equipment in South African mines to produce uranium oxide (Väyrynen 1977, 35). South Africa started to supply uranium to the UK and the US from 1953. By the mid-1970s, South Africa maintained a major position in terms of its known uranium resources (see Table 1).

One of the significant events in this process was Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd's inauguration of the first nuclear reactor on the African continent, the South African Fundamental Atomic Research Installation-1 (SAFARI-1), in 1965; a few years after the banning of the African National Congress (ANC). Whereas South Africa continued its stance on its preference for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, Verwoerd's domestic policies soon became a matter of international concern. His government's emphasis on apartheid soon resulted in the country's international condemnation and eventually isolation.

In 1970, Prime Minister John Vorster announced that the Atomic Energy Board (AEB) of South Africa has developed a new uranium enrichment

² A *laager* is an enclosure and a reference to the positioning of ox wagons during the Great Trek in order to enhance safety.

process. Although Vorster maintained that the aims of the South African nuclear programme is for peaceful uses such as power generation but that South Africa would not be limited to the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Table 1: Estimated world resources of uranium (January 1975)

Country	Reasonably assured reserves (RARs) (‘000 tonnes)	Estimated additional reserves (‘000 tonnes)
US	320	500
Australia	243	80
South Africa	186	6
Canada	144	324
Niger	40	20
France	37	25
Gabon	20	5
Others	80	35

Source: Väyrynen (1977, 36)


By 1976, South Africa's first uranium enrichment plant, Valindaba, was completed with the assistance of West Germany (Väyrynen 1977, 40). Although South Africa's nuclear explosives programme was “officially still aimed at peaceful uses until about 1977...the emphasis changed officially to a strategic deterrent capability” (Stumpf 1995) once the NP government's threat perception increased, the Border War escalated and violent control of domestic democratic forces further increased the country. As an adjunct of this shift in April 1978, Prime Minister John Vorster approved a three-phased deterrent strategy for South Africa (see Figure 1).

More pertinent were the results of the South African nuclear weapons programme that underpinned the deterrent strategy. Although denied for decades, the programme produced significant results. The first South African device was completed in 1978 with more devices completed at an ‘orderly pace of less than one per year’ (Stumpf 1995). The first aircraft-deliverable vehicle was completed in 1982 and eventually six ‘nuclear devices’ were produced (De Klerk 1993).

South Africa’s regional policy

By 1977, South Africa’s defence spending has increased by 21.3%; amounting to 18% of the total budget (BETTS, 1979: 97) in the wake of the implementation of the UN’s mandatory arms embargo in 1977. South Africa’s regional policy of destabilisation and its nuclear weapons programme elicited various responses from countries in the region. These responses ranged from diplomatic engagement to diplomatic isolation (as a result of, inter alia, Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and UN sanctions). In addition to this, responses also included government support for liberation movements fighting against the NP government in South Africa.

Figure 1: South Africa’s three-phased nuclear deterrent strategy:



Sources: De Klerk (1993) and Stumpf (1995).

South Africa’s presence Southwest Africa has been discussed in great detail elsewhere. See, for example, Seiler (1982). South Africa’s duplication of apartheid in the country was met with fierce domestic and international condemnation. South Africa has often been accused of the “illegal occupation” of Namibia (although it was then known as Southwest Africa) and the “illegal acquisition of Namibian uranium” (IAEA 1984, 1). For South Africa, the

outcomes of the 1966 International Court of Justice (ICJ) case presented by Liberia and Ethiopia against the country were viewed as a justification for South Africa's involvement in Southwest Africa (Seiler 1982, 691).

Botswana: "So far, and no further"

Botswana shares a border with both South Africa and Namibia. Whereas Angola tested South Africa's aerial supremacy, landlocked and arid Botswana was in close proximity to South Africa's underground testing facility bordering on Southwest Africa, South Africa and Botswana. As part of South Africa's "Vreedsame Plofstof Projek" ('VP Projek' or the Peaceful Explosives Project), the Atomic Energy Board (AEB) acquired the farm Vastrap, north of the town Upington in the Kalahari Desert bordering on Botswana, in the 1970s as a demonstration site (Slabber 2012)³. The construction of the Vastrap Testing Range which included two test shafts (238m and 385m deep respectively) and completed in 1976 and 1977 (Venter 2008, 205) went largely undetected⁴. A so-called cold test was scheduled for mid-1977 but prevented by unforeseen circumstances.

Shortly after this appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pik Botha received a visit by the America Ambassador to Pretoria in April 1977 (Botha 2008, 10). During the meeting, Ambassador Hepplethwaite, according to Botha, spread out "10-12 photographs" on his desk, asking Botha what the pictures "represented". Botha recognised it as a "large drill in an arid region [Kalahari Desert] digging a rather large hole". Botha realised that it was Soviet pictures forwarded to the Americans and undertook to discuss the matter with the Prime Minister. Vorster, according to Botha, was "upset". Warning of further international against South Africa, Botha and Vorster decided to complete the drilling and "remove all evidence".

With Pretoria's regional policies escalating in the mid-1970s, international attention on South Africa's nuclear ambitions was brought into sharp focus in August 1977 when a Soviet spy satellite, Cosmos 922, detected

³ Johan Slabber joined the AEB in 1963 and the IAEA in 1994.

⁴ *Vastrap* is an Afrikaans expressing meaning to dig in one's heels or standing one's ground.

what appeared to be an underground nuclear test site in the Kalahari Desert (UN, 1991: 8). On 6 August 1977, Soviet president Leonid Brezhnev forwarded a message to US President Jimmy Carter about the Soviet Union's detection of what appeared to be a South African underground nuclear test site in the Kalahari. In an address to Parliament on 24 August 1977, Prime Minister Vorster went on to accuse the US, the UK, and Soviet Union of "blatant discrimination against South Africa" and accused the Soviet Union of "double standards" in accusing South Africa "of preparing a nuclear explosion" while itself is testing nuclear weapons. Vorster (in Barber and Barratt 1990, 241) then issued a stern warning: "If these things [accusations, double standards] continue and don't stop the time will arrive when South Africa will have no option, small as it is, to say to the world: So far, and no further, do your damndest if you so wish". In response to the international reaction (most notably by the US, the United Kingdom, French and West German governments) to the Soviet allegation and Prime Minister Vorster in a speech in Parliament, the South African Department of Foreign Affairs issued a confidential letter to all the South African Heads of Missions, confirming that it had "formally advised" the UK, U.S., German and French governments that:

South Africa does not have or intend to develop a nuclear explosive device for any purpose, peaceful, or otherwise. The so-called Kalahari facility is not a testing facility for nuclear explosions. There will not be any nuclear explosive testing of any kind in South Africa. (DFA 1977, 1)

South Africa was ill-prepared for the international reaction to the Kalahari Incident. In response to reports in the Washington Post, in a telegram – dated 31 August 1977 and captioned "TOP SECRET" on "South Africa and the bomb" – to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the South African Embassy in Washington, referred to the "flurry occasioned" by the event (South Africa 1977, 1)⁵. The telegram also referred to US President Carter's comments in the Washington Post. The telegram stated that the effect of Carter's announcement

⁵ At the time, Donald Sole served as South Africa's Ambassador to Washington.

“has been to make the international community believe that South Africa has manufactured a nuclear device, which remains untested” (South Africa 1977, 1). The telegram concluded that “This undoubtedly implied a new watershed in South Africa’s international relations. Nothing can be the same again, South Africa has become the seventh nuclear power even though it will not be recognised as such. Carter’s statement [in the Washington Post] is a tacit confirmation of this” (South Africa 1977, 1). The telegram also stated that the “implications of this watershed in our foreign relations’ is ‘too soon to assess” (South Africa 1977, 2). However, the telegram stated that South African can expect increased international condemnation and possibly Chapter VII sanctions against it; and that the US and USSR, with the support of Western Europe is viewed as “further proof of the extent of South Africa’s isolation”, and that South Africa was ‘far more exposed than ever before in her history’ (South Africa 1977, 2-3). The telegram concluded by suggesting that the whole situation could be “defused by a certain extent” if South Africa could show ‘to the world that the facility near Upington reportedly identified as a nuclear device testing ground if not in fact anything of the kind’ (South Africa 1977, 4).

Pressurised by the US, South Africa is told not to make a commitment not to test nuclear devices. In an interview with the ABC News programme “Issues and Answers” in October 1977, Prime Minister Vorster denied that he gave any undertakings to President Carter that South Africa would not develop nuclear weapons (Rand Daily Mail 1977).

The detection of an underground nuclear test site in the Kalahari and the so-called “double flash” over the South Atlantic incident left no doubt that South Africa indeed had a nuclear weapons capability. For African states, these incidents confirmed South Africa’s nuclear intentions on the continent (Saxena 1998). Therefore, several African states including Egypt and Nigeria embarked on a global campaign to force the South African government to dismantle its nuclear weapons programme and change its domestic policies. This campaign included diplomatic actions, UN sanctions and OAU resolutions against South Africa. While the majority of African states’ rhetoric on a denuclearised Africa and post-apartheid South Africa continued unabated, a small number of African states embarked on the development of their own nuclear capability when Egypt, Libya and Nigeria commenced with nuclear development programmes in the mid-1970s (Oyebade 1998, 97).

The *Groot Krokodil* and the Total Onslaught

P.W. Botha, called *die Groot Krokodil* (the Big Crocodile), was elected Prime Minister in 1978 and initiated the concept of a “total onslaught” against South Africa by the Soviet Union and its allies in the region. In response to this, Botha’s government adopted the Total National Strategy. The decision to develop nuclear weapons was taken in 1978 by a small group of decision-makers who constituted the so-called Witvlei Committee. Chaired by Prime Minister P.W. Botha, the Witvlei Committee also included the Minister of Mining (F.W. de Klerk), the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Pik Botha), the Ministers of Finance and Defence, the chairman of Armscor (Commandant Marais), Dr Wally Grant (AEB) (succeeded by Dr. Wynand de Villiers), and the Director General of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), Dr. Brand Fourie as secretary. Within a month of his election, Botha established a Cabinet committee to oversee the military aspects of nuclear devices. At a meeting of the Cabinet Committee on 31 October 1978, it was decided that Armscor, the Defence Force and the AEB should start to cooperate and prepare a top secret programme to initiate a nuclear weapons programme (Gould 2009, 91-93). This has resulted in a now declassified CIA (1984, 15) report observing that, since 1977, South Africa has followed a policy of “calculated ambiguity” with respect to its nuclear intentions by “intimating that it has the capability to produce nuclear weapons while disavowing any interest in doing so”. Thus, South Africa embarked on the development of nuclear weapons as the ‘ultimate defensive measure’ (Saunders and Onslow 2009, 225) despite decades of public denials by the South African government.

By 1980, growing international condemnation and isolation had resulted in, amongst others, South Africa, despite a founder member, losing its seat on the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1977. This was followed by the rejection of the credentials of the South African delegation to the 1979 General Conference of the IAEA. South Africa’s isolation was further entrenched by the fact that, since 1979 the UN Disarmament Commission kept the question of South Africa's nuclear capability on its annual agenda. Moreover, economic sanctions against South Africa had additional results. Whereas the country’s uranium production peaked in 1980-1981 when it supplied 14% of the world total, this figure

decreased to 8% in 1989; in part due to the country's loss of the profitable Rössing uranium mine in Namibia, which produced an annual income of \$US 350 million for South Africa (UN 1991, 13).

Following more calls for South Africa to terminate apartheid and its nuclear weapons programme, and accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the country maintained that it was not "in principle opposed to the NPT, provided that its basic requirements can be met" (DFA 1981). South Africa also stated that, despite it having not acceded to the NPT, has conducted its 'nuclear affairs' in line with the "spirit, principles and goals of the NPT" (DFA 1981). In addition to this, the South African government also indicated that, in the presence of a threat by the Soviet Union and its allies in the region and in the absence of UN support to South Africa, the country "cannot in the interest of its own security sign the NPT" (DFA 1981).

By 1980, the impact of South Africa's regional policy has resulted in major developments in the region and had been widely condemned. A study by the UN Secretary General released in 1980 concluded that the NP's policy of apartheid posed the "greatest threat" to peace in Southern Africa. The report concluded that "the greatest threat to peace in the region stems from a racist regime's denial of basic rights to the overwhelming majority of the population and its willingness to use strong repressive means, both internally and externally, to preserve its interests and privileges" (UN 1991). The report also cited possible reasons for South Africa's nuclear weapons programme, namely "as a deterrent or intimidatory instrument against neighbours; as an assertion of defiance and desperation (presumably a last resort device); and as a means of intimidating black South Africans and lessening the risk of internal unrest while boosting the morale of the beleaguered whites". The report also suggested that South Africa "rather than deploy or openly test nuclear weapons", the country "might seek to follow and exploit a policy of ambiguity of latent proliferation" (UN 1991).

In 1991, the UN, again, addressed South Africa's regional policy. It explained that South Africa's regional emphasis on coercion and threat' is deeply rooted in "a deep doubt about the prospects for the long-run viability" of apartheid. The UN declared that it is this "linkage" between the domestic regime and its strong-arm tactics regionally that characterized South Africa's

relations with its neighbours. In other words, South Africa’s internal coercion was duplicated regionally (UN 1991, 38).

Although the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s (TRC) investigated South Africa’s chemical and biological weapons programme, it did not investigate South Africa’s nuclear weapons programme. This is an inherent flaw of the TRC’s mandate, which was to investigate individual human rights abuses only. The extent of the impact of South Africa’s regional policies is contained in the TRC’s report on the amnesty applications of the security forces of the NP government. Covering the period 1960-1994, the TRC concluded that “the regions beyond South Africa’s borders bore the brunt of the counter-revolutionary warfare waged by the South African security forces, including the police, the defence force and intelligence” (TRC 2003, 182).

Although only a total of 293 members of the apartheid security forces applied for amnesty, the extent of the country’s regional policies are clearly illustrated in these few cases. Of the 293 members that applied for amnesty, only 31 served as members of the South African Defence Force (SADF). These 293 members applied for amnesty for a total of 550 incidents, which included 73 incidents outside South Africa. These external incidents occurred in Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Southwest Africa/Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, the UK, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (TRC 2003, 182-191). Security forces’ operation in these countries included, amongst others, killings, abductions, bombings and cross-border raids with the aim to destabilise countries supporting and/or hosting the South African liberation forces. The TRC, for example, received 114 applications for amnesty from members of the security forces involving 889 killings. As Table 2 indicates, a large number (684) of these killings took place outside South Africa.

Table 2: Killings by South African security forces outside South Africa

Period	Number of killings
1970-1979	627
1980-1984	13
1985-1989	44
Total	684

Source: TRC (2003, 192)

South African security forces also conducted several cross-border raids in the region (see Table 3). Several cross-border abductions also took place. Of these, amnesty applications for 80 of these abductions were received; 17 of these took place outside South Africa (TRC 2003, 204-205).

Table 3: Cross-border raids by the South African security forces

Date	City/Country	Security Force
30 January 1981	Matola, Mozambique	SADF Special Forces
9 December 1982	Maseru, Lesotho	SADF Special Forces
23 May 1983	Matola, Mozambique	SAAF
14 June 1985	Gaborone, Botswana	SADF Special Forces
19 December 1985	Maseru, Lesotho	Security Branch
19 May 1986	Botswana, Zambia & Zimbabwe (the so-called EPG Raids)	SADF
April 1990	Botswana (the so-called Chand Incident)	Vlakplaas operatives

Source: TRC (2003, 196; 220)

In addition to these, other joint operations by Special Forces and Security Branch included the bombing of two houses in Mbabane, Swaziland, on 4 June 1980; the abduction from Swaziland, and subsequent torture of ANC member Dayan “Joe” Pillay on 19 May 1981; an attack on the home of Nat Serache in Gaborone (13 February 1985); a car bomb explosion which killed Vernon Nkadameng (aka Rogers Mevi) on 14 May 1985 in Gaborone; a raid on Aubrey Mkhwanazi (aka Take Five) and Sadi Pule on 31 December 1986 in Gaborone; a car bomb which killed Mmaditsebe Phetolo and two children on 9 April 1987 in Gaborone (the so-called McKenzie car bomb); a bomb at the Oasis Motel in Gaborone which did not detonate but was intended for in August or September 1987; the Zimbabwe cell of the Civil Co-operation Bureau’s (CCB) car bomb in Harare, Zimbabwe, on 11 January 1988 (the so-called Bulawayo Operation); a “hot pursuit” operation into Botswana after the “discovery” of an arms cache in Krugersdorp on 28 March 1988 (TRC 2003, 212-216).

Angola: Going ballistic” The rationale for nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles

Angola is unique in Southern Africa in that it was both the theatre of battle for the conventional and Cold War in the region. Cuban and Soviet support for liberation movements such as the Southwest People’s Organisation (SWAPO) and the ANC in the Angola fighting against the SADF culminated in a full-scale conventional war from mid-1970 to 1989 when Namibia became independent.

Once it became clear that parties to the Alvor Agreement in Angola – the MPLA, the FNLA and UNITA – is not prepared to jointly govern Angola (after the Portuguese left the country) until 11 November 1975, the Portuguese governor gave in and gave precedence to the MPLA. In Angola, this resulted in a civil war with the MPLA (now in government) being assisted by Cuban troops to stabilise the country. Unita according to Pik Botha (then South Africa’s Ambassador to Washington, U.S.) requested South Africa’s assistance against the MPLA/Cuban offensive (Botha 2008, 2). In South Africa the question was: “where would the Cubans stop?” (Botha 2008, 2).

South Africa’s missile development programme commenced in 1963 and resulted early in the manufacturing of the 22km-range Valkiri (a tactical surface-to-surface artillery rocket) and the 4-10km-range V3 Kukri (a tactical air-to-air missile) (UN 1991, 18). As South Africa’s missile-related expertise improved, a missile test range was constructed in St. Lucia (close to the Mozambican border) in 1968. The NP government also commenced with the development of a single-stage, intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), the first of what became known as the Republic of South Africa (RSA) missile series (see Table 4). This initiative formed part of a government-supported commercial space launch vehicle programme in the 1970s with the assistance of, inter alia, Israel and Iraq (NTI 2009). Originally, the intended payload for these missiles was most likely to be the ‘fission gun-type devices’ developed in South Africa between 1971 and 1989 (Stumpf 1995).

In 1978, Kentron Missiles, a subsidiary of the state-owned Armscor was established as the country’s dedicated missile manufacturer (NTI 2009)⁶. In

⁶ While still in office, President de Klerk’s government presided over the establishment of Armscor successor, Denel (Pty) Limited on 1 April 1992.

1983, the South African government announced its intention to close the St. Lucia test range and constructed a new range, the Overberg Toetsbaan (OTB or Overberg Test Range) in the De Hoop Nature Reserve in the Overberg in the Western Cape. This development signaled a new era in South Africa's missile capabilities.

Table 4: South Africa's missile series

Name of missile	Type	Trajectory (km)	Warhead mass (kg)
RSA-1	Intermediate range, single-stage ballistic missile	1 100	1 500
RSA-2	Intermediate range, single-stage ballistic missile	1 900	1 500
RSA-3	Solid-fuel orbital launch vehicle	Information not available	Information not available
RSA-4	Solid-propellant	Information not available	700

Source: NTI (2010)

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The decline in the relative strength of the South African Air Force (SAAF) in Angola in the early 1980s illustrated that the SADF required substantial support to counter Angolans' air superiority which included 140 Soviet tactical aircraft such as MiG-21, MiG-23 and Su-22. South Africa's Buccaneers, Mirage-III and Mirage F-1 were largely outnumbered and technologically inferior (UN 1991, 23). Feeling the impact of international arms

⁷ While still in office, President de Klerk's government presided over the establishment of Armscor successor, Denel (Pty) Limited on 1 April 1992.

embargoes and the military might of the combined Angolan, Cuban and Soviet forces on the northern borders of Southwest Africa, the South African military establishment increased efforts to enhance the country's weapons capabilities to reduce casualties and to continue to counter the offensive against the country. This included expanding the country's nuclear capabilities. With the South Africa's regional dominance in the balance, the South African military establishment began to consider long-range missiles to secure the country's neighbourhood.

By the 1980s, according to Hannes Steyn (a former member of the Armscor Board); Richardt van der Walt (a former General Manager of the AEC); and Jan van Loggerenberg (a former Chief of the South African Air Force), South Africa's missile arsenal included, *inter alia*, air-to-air missiles and an anti-tank missile (Steyn, van der Walt and van Loggerenberg 2003, 54-55)⁸. The RSA-3 missile could have delivered a small warhead, and was most likely a space launch adaptation of the RSA-2 missile. In order to support its missile development programme, the NP-led South African government developed an indigenous solid-propellant production capability, the RSA-4 missile, which was developed when President de Klerk announced the dismantlement and destruction of South Africa's nuclear devices and, subsequently, its space programme. The RSA-4 missile may have been capable of delivering a 700kg nuclear warhead from South Africa to any location in Southern Africa (Steyn, van der Walt and van Loggerenberg 2003, 54-55).

South Africa continued with its missile development programme and on 5 July 1989, two months before President De Klerk took office, successfully launched what the South African government called a "booster rocket" but what US intelligence sources called a missile from the OTB (UN 1991, 19; NTI 2009). According to the UN (1991, 25), the range of this rocket was 1 450 km. Toward the end of 1989 the Berlin Wall collapsed which, *inter alia*, ushered in the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. These events cascaded to Southern Africa with the independence of Namibia; the withdrawal

⁸ Steyn, van der Walt and van Loggerenberg were closely involved in various aspects of the South African nuclear weapons programme.

of Cuban troops from Angola; and the Soviet Union's departure from the region.

Playing the regional card again: South Africa and the “accession dilemma”

F.W. de Klerk became the Acting President on 15 August 1989 following the resignation of P.W. Botha on 14 August 1989 due to ill health. According to Pik Botha, he “intimated to De Klerk that the two top priorities awaiting us were the release of Mandela and the dismantling of our nuclear bombs. He agreed” (Botha 2008, 12; Botha 2010).

By September 1990, a written statement issued by Pik Botha was circulated at the 34th Regular Session of the IAEA GC. In the statement Botha indicated that South Africa was “prepared” to accede to the NPT, but with a *caveat* “in the context of an equal commitment by the other states in the Southern African region” (South Africa 1990, 2). Moreover, Botha also indicated that his government intended to commence talks with the IAEA on concluding a Safeguards Agreement with the Agency (South Africa 1990, 2). The South African diplomatic effort paid off: the IAEA Director General indicated that the Agency was ready to commence talks with South Africa “without delay” (UN 1991, 11).

The international community “anticipated” that South Africa's accession to the NPT would create a “favourable condition for other regional hold-outs to sign as well”. These “regional hold-outs” included Algeria, Angola, Djibouti, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The UN added that, “in this way, joining the NPT would greatly strengthen South Africa's place in the international community and reinforce the Treaty” (UN 1991, 14). In March 1990, South Africa informed the NPT's repository states that it will accede to the NPT upon the condition that certain Frontline States make a similar commitment. De Klerk repeated this position in a letter to US President George HW Bush dated 31 August 1990. De Klerk mentioned that the Frontline States made South Africa's relinquishment of its nuclear weapons a condition for their accession to the NPT. De Klerk also indicated to Bush that South Africa intends to open “all” South facilities, irrespective if the country accedes to the NPT, in November 1991. De Klerk outlined the “dilemma that accession to the Treaty poses presently”, i.e. the challenges

associated with the country's political transition (De Klerk 1990). Furthermore, the "accession dilemma" means that De Klerk's government should not be seen as giving in to foreign demands in the initial phases of the country's transition. De Klerk also expressed his fears of the 'political exploitation' of South Africa's accession and suggests that an initiative by the three depository states should commence in order to broker Frontline States' accession to the NPT in order to "create the required context for South Africa to accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date" (De Klerk 1990).

In June 1991, Pik Botha announced that the South Africa government intended to reverse its years of opposition to the NPT and sign the Treaty. At the time, the *New York Times* (21 March 1990) reported that the development that "appears to have swung South Africa around in favour of signing the treaty, officials say" was an assurance from the US, the UK and the USSR that "for procedural reasons" the IAEA:

[...] would not be in a position to start inspecting South Africa's plants for about two years after it signed. Britain also assured South Africa that if it signed the treaty, European countries were likely to lift their ban on nuclear cooperation with South Africa.

On 8 July 1991, the *New York Times* (9 July 1991) reported that Pik Botha had signed South Africa's accession to the NPT at a ceremony in Pretoria. This was later confirmed by the South African government and the IAEA.

Conclusion

In search for security and supremacy, South Africa left no stone unturned. In fact, it developed not one, but six nuclear devices to secure its protection (de Klerk 1993). Whereas South Africa employed a nuclear deterrent strategy since the 1970s, Pik Botha admitted that he was always convinced that South Africa would never use a nuclear weapon in the region but that its true value was that South Africa's nuclear weapons constituted a deterrence in the region. According to Botha:

The SA [South African] military believed that was a powerful deterrent, and it should be kept, not as a battlefield weapon, but as a deterrent. The question was - particularly after the Angolan incursion – where would the Soviets stop? If they advanced in Angola, and then Botswana and Zimbabwe, the Witwatersrand industrial area would come within range of Soviet aircraft. This would be potentially disastrous for the security and survival of the SA [South African] state. Therefore atomic weapons could be used as a deterrent against this advance, and as a means to get western aid – along the lines of unless you help us, we will drop the bomb. Personally, I did not think this would work, or that atomic weapons would ever be used – and I believed that the West would realise this. South Africa had so much more to lose, if there was a nuclear exchange with the USSR. (Botha 2008, 11)

However, Botha has the luxury of hindsight which did not exist during the period under discussion. For South Africa's minority government, the threats to the country were real and required every effort to counter the spread of communism and all that threaten white rule. Therefore, the country employed several strategies for survival ranging from diplomatic efforts such as the "uitwaartse beleid" to intervention (Angola 1975), and cross-border raids, abductions and killings in Southern Africa. In addition to these, the country employed a nationalist ideology to defend the *laager*, garner support for its Border War and destabilization policies. Public efforts to garner nationalist sympathies were complemented with secrecy, delaying tactics and selective cooperation with states in Southern Africa and elsewhere. For countries in the region, the legacy of South Africa's apartheid policies may persist. What is clear is that the region's post-Cold War and post-apartheid ambitions to move towards closer unity remains elusive.

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ABSTRACT

Apartheid South Africa's nuclear related activities in Southern Africa have a long history. Apart from, inter alia, the development and existence of at least six nuclear devices, South Africa operated a nuclear test site in the Kalahari Desert on the borders of Botswana, utilised uranium from Southwest Africa (now independent Namibia) as its Class C Mandate and employed a nuclear deterrent strategy in response to Soviet support for Angola and liberation movements in the region. This elicited responses from the so-called Frontline States as well as the members of the Southern African Development Community (SADCC). Therefore, the purpose of this intended contribution is to determine the extent of South Africa's nuclear activities as well as its impact on the region. Based on archival research, the article intends to make a contribution to the study of the region, the evolution of regional integration in Southern Africa and Cold War studies in Southern Africa.

KEYWORDS

South Africa; Southern Africa; Nuclear Weapons; Regional Impact.

*Received on August 28, 2014.
Approved on September 29, 2014.*

THE STRATEGIC MILITARY PLANNING IN ARGENTINA (2003-2013): REFLECTIONS ON THE POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION OF DEFENSE

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1. Introduction

The national defense policy of Argentina has experienced advances and regressions since the democratic return in 1983. This result has been connected to the dynamics that civil-military relations have inherited from the dictatorial period. The necessity to subordinate the Armed Forces dominated the defense agenda during most part of the democratic period, constituting the core problem of this jurisdiction.

The democratic governments implemented various initiatives that underpinned the civil control of the Armed Forces and that also caused, from a normative point of view, what has been characterised as a “basic consensus”. These measures restricted the autonomy of the men in uniform, whether through the demilitarization of civil functions or through the specific delimitation of the martial responsibilities.

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The habilitation of the spaces required for the exercise of the political administration of the jurisdiction did not necessarily implied, however, that civilians have fully developed this task. The performance of the democratic authorities in the area of defense had its shades of gray. At times, these deficiencies were associated to the very restraints of the domestic political conjuncture; at others, they were a result of the planning of the specific agenda of the sector, though.

This paper studies how the Ministry of Defense managed the tasks under its responsibility during 2003-2013. The analysis focuses on the conduction of the strategic dimension of the sector; in particular, on the relative responsibilities of the military strategic planning. In this frame, the demarches of ministers José Pampuro (2003-05), Nilda Garré (2005-10) and Arturo Puricelli (2010-13) are resorted to.

The time framework defined for the study of our object assumes that a set of unprecedented measures were implemented. For the first time since the return of democracy, for example, an effective debate on the conduction of the strategic dimension of the defense policy was addressed. Nevertheless, for reasons that are object of analysis during this article, the empowerment process of the political conduction survived along with ambiguities and setbacks that, during the same period, made the absence of a solid consensus regarding the results of the sectorial agenda evident.

This article is organized as follows. Initially, the theoretical spectrum, on which our study object is built, will be presented. We refer to the differences between “defense policy” and “military politics” proposed by Jorge Battaglino (2011), as well as the categories of “civil-democratic government” and “civil-military dualism” developed by Marcelo Sain (2010). Our concept of “political administration of the defense” will be a result of the conjunction of the first author’s types. In the second part of the paper, the practiced agendas of the ministerial tenures between 2003 and 2013 will be examined. This section contains a review of the political context faced by the ministers and is focused mainly on the professional aspects of the sector. Finally, a few conclusions are presented, while some lines of actions in terms of strategic planning of the defense are also formulated.

2. Conceptual focus and recent background

The governments' defense policies, as well as the criteria that organize the design of their military instruments, are susceptible to approaches from a myriad of conceptual points of view. In our country, the origin of this field of research is relatively recent. Its emergency begins at the democratic transition, and the route of its academic agenda – mainly in the sociology and political science fields – has been accompanying the bloom of the sector's public agenda³.

It explains why the experts' attention has been focused on the democratization of civil-military relations for such long time. Thus, the challenge to subordinate to the Armed Forces has gathered the concerns of academics in respect to “what to do about the military”. This slant concerning the “military question” dominated the researches on the problem not only in our country, but also in most part of the continent⁴.

In the beginning of the 21st Century, a qualitative change in the approach of the military affairs took place, though. This renovation was probably linked to the consolidation of the democratic regimes at a regional level and, especially on the case of Argentina, to the displacement of the problem of civil control at the margins of the agenda. Accordingly, the Argentine academic sphere began a process of analysis that conducted, on the one hand, the identification of the established programs' debilities in previous years and, on the other hand, the search for the incorporation of new themes with respect to the debates on defense.

Our conceptual focus is directed towards the renewal of sectorial studies, and it is based on the distinction, within the jurisdictional agenda, of the two kinds of responsibilities: the civil control of Armed Forces and the conduction of the strategic dimension of defense.

As aforementioned, we use the conceptualization proposed by Jorge Battaglini (2011) in this study. In fact, we employ the term “military politics” to refer to those initiatives that present as an objective to limit the political

³ It does not mean, however, that works on the Armed Forces' organization were not produced before the return of democracy. However, the thoughts about military problems provoked little interest among the civilians (Stepan 1988, 156-157).

⁴ See Fontana 1984; López 1987; López 1994; Stepan 1988; Moneta, López and Romero 1985; López and Pion Berlin 1996; Sain 1994; Sain 1999; and Diamint 1999.

influence that the Armed Forces tend to develop (Battaglini 2011, 242)⁵. For its part, the concept of “defense policy” is reserved to address definitions of strategic, doctrinal, organizational or operative character, which set the ways of use of military force and have the assurance of state survival as a main goal (Battaglini 2011, 243).

From the confluence of both elements, the “political administration of the defense” emerges as a product. It is understood as the effective political conduction of the whole of the question that forms National Defense. This broad definition contemplates both the policies that tend to subordinate the military to political power (military politics) and the establishment of strategic definitions for national defense (defense policy). The expression “political administration of defense” definitely embraces – and transcends – the traditional notions of “civil control”⁶.

The differentiation between military politics and defense policy eases the visualization of a spectrum able to characterize the sectorial agenda’s evolution since the return of democracy. Since 1983, and until the first years of 21st Century, military politics has maintained a certain preeminence, which enabled the approval of a normative axis that contributed to the decrease of the Armed Forces’ corporative power⁷. Hence, it was able to substantially reduce what David Pion-Bernin (1996, 16) defined as the “offensive autonomy” of the military, that is to say, their disposal to defy the civilians’ political authority.

However, even when the administrations of Raúl Alfonsín (1983-1989), Carlos Menem (1990-1995 and 1995-1999) and Fernando de la Rúa (1999-2001) delegated some priority to the “military politics” question, the same process did not happen in respect to the “defense policy”. The attention to strategic

⁵ According to this vision, the “military politics” also comprehends the formation and capacitation; the public health system; the habitation policies; the management of pay increases; and the human rights policy.

⁶ Our conceptual frame regards itself as tributary to the restrictive or “of civilian control” approaches to the defense (see Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1967; and López 1994). The notion of “political administration” that is presented in this study recognizes an anchorage in the “civilian control”, since it incorporates the definition of large guidelines in terms of strategic military planning.

⁷ See Ley de Defensa Nacional N° 23.554 de 1988; Ley de Seguridad Interior N° 24.059 de 1992; and Ley de Inteligencia Nacional N° 25.520 de 2001.

questions was unstable and stayed largely connected to the implementation of other agendas of political or economic nature⁸.

This characterization of the agenda before 2003 constitutes the starting point to introduce one of this analysis' research premises. Simply put, we understand that there was a deficit regarding political administration of defense until the period in question since the subordination of the Armed Forces was not accompanied by great strategic guidelines or by a consequent integral, organic and function reform of the military system of defense (Montenegro 2012).

From the aforementioned questions we approach a second category, connected to the conditions through which the political administration of defense is exercised, that is to say, to the way the military politics and defense policies are articulated. For that to be done, it is propitious to present the difference between the patterns of control that Marcelo Sain has defined as "civil-democratic administration" and "civil-military dualism" (Sain 2010, 30). The "civil-democratic administration" is a pattern of control of the defense that supposes: 1) the exercise of the political-institutional administration over the Armed Forces; and b) the effective subordination of the military to the governmental authorities. If we do compare this differentiation to the one developed by Jorge Battaglino, it is clear that the subordination to the governmental authorities constitutes what this last author defines as "military politics", while the exercise of the political-institutional administration refers to the "defense policy" itself (see Chart 1).

Up to this point, the ideas of both authors converge. Our formulation of the "political administration of the defense" aims to condensate in one sole concept parts of the theoretical approaches of these academicians, considering – complementarily – the normative and strategic-military changes experienced in Argentina between 2003 and 2013.

Furthermore, the aforementioned notion of "civil-military dualism" formulated by Sain turns out to be useful. This concept recognizes two subcategories: "the autonomous military complacency" and the "deficient civil complacency" (Sain 2010, 48). The first refers to the autonomous political

⁸ See Alfonsín 2009, and Sain 2002/2003.

intervention of the military, i.e., the disposition of the Armed Forces to question the political authority of civilians. On the other hand, the “deficient civil complacency” lies on the problem’s counterpart: to focus the attention on the civilians’ debility to exert their responsibilities to control (Sain 2010, 48).

Chart 1: Comparison between Battaglini (2011) and Sain (2010)

Battaglini (2011)	Sain (2010)
Military Politics (civil control)	Civil-Democratic Administration
Defense Policy (strategic guidelines)	Civil-Military Dualism: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Autonomous military complacency • Deficient civil complacency

That said, it is possible to present the second premise of this research. Thus, we understand that if new conditions concerning the exercise of the political administration of defense were developed in the period between 2003 and 2013, many deficiencies that blurred the civil performance were also evident. Different from previous decades, however, these deficiencies were not related to a tendency to the “autonomous military complacency”, but to the categories of control deployed by the very civil administration.

3. “Military politics” and “defense policy” in the *Kirchnerista* decade

This article is based on the premise that, until the first years of this century, the defense agenda was maintained focused on the issuing of measures of military politics. This search for limiting the political behavior of the Armed Forces was materialized both in the orders designed in the very ministerial ambit and in the policies adopted by other areas of the state. However, these decisions – that deliberately or collaterally impacted the “military politics”⁹ – were not

⁹ Among the decisions that deliberately impacted the military politics, it is worth to mention the limitation of the Armed Forces’ participation in operations of internal security. In respect to the decisions that collaterally affected the military politics, the dismantling of the military industrial complex; the foreign policy decisions related to the deactivation of antique hypothesis of conflict; and the increasing participation of Argentine military in Peacekeeping Missions of the UN.

accompanied by an integral modernization of the strategic guidelines that regulate the functioning of the sector.

It means that in spite of the fact that the military regarded their capability to impose corporative pressure as debilitated during the pre-*kirchnerista* period, the criteria for the composition of forces – yet with budgetary restrictions – remained largely unaltered. The military retained the capability to “self define”, which resulted in outdated armed institutions’ procedures (Montenegro 2012). Consequently, the Armed Forces preserved an internal organization unattached from the doctrinarian agreements achieved in the political level.

Nonetheless, despite the mentioned difficulties in terms of strategic guidelines, it is relevant to highlight that the military policy implemented since 1983 allowed specifying the boundaries of military power operation. Thus, the strict normative and doctrinarian delimitation would end up having a decisive impact after 2003 in the strategic modernization of the sector. In other words, the “maximization of the subordination and the civil control” (Battaglini 2013, 268) – which resulted in the consolidation of the juridical bases of national defense – constituted a key element when facing the military strategic guidelines.

In the following sections, the ministerial administrations of the 2003-2013 period are presented. If our analysis is focused on the matter of the strategic-military question, the conceptual framework presented in the foreseen paragraphs forces us to tangentially get into the military policy exercised throughout these years.

3.1. The tenure of José Pampuro (2003-2005)

The arrival of Pampuro at the Ministry of Defense was publicly announced on May 20, 2003, a few days before Néstor Kirchner took office. The military ambit was not unknown for him and for that his nomination did not generate big surprises. During his tenure as secretary-general of the Eduardo Duhalde administration, Pampuro had worked as an interlocutor to the then-Minister of Defense, Horacio Jaunarena, and with the Armed Forces themselves.

Pampuro's proximity to the military made a predictable horizon with respect to the Armed Forces possible. The first task Kirchner demanded of the

new minister destroyed those expectations, however. One day before his oath, the presidential decision to integrally dismiss the military high command was known¹⁰. The change in the command surprised the military because – a few days before – Pampuro had guaranteed the continuity of a large part of the Armed Forces. If the military "discomfort" was firstly noticed on the shape of non-official announcements, the subject gained more attention in the dismissal ceremony of the Army Chief, Lieutenant General Ricardo Brinzoni. In the occasion, the official manifested that his retirement was due to "unexplained circumstances" and adverted that "the political intrigue about the barracks [seemed] to move backwards after 20 years" (Veiras 2003a, our translation).

The presidential response did not take much time. In a speech made at the Military School due to the anniversary of the Armed Forces, Kirchner affirmed that "nobody can be surprised [...] or qualify a situation as unexplained when constitutional and legally binded faculties were exercised" (Kirchner 2003, our translation).

Brinzoni's declarations marked the beginning of a series of disjointed manifestations among the Armed Forces' ranks and the political power. These disagreements were fundamentally related to the expectations generated by the progressive advance of the juridical processes related to human rights violations during the last military dictatorship among the military (Canelo 2006, 14). In this context, the Supreme Court's imminent definition on the unconstitutionality of the Acts No. 23.521, of *Obediencia Debida*, and No. 23.492, of *Punto Final*, , as well as the federal government's decision of responding the international claims for the extradition of Argentine officials¹¹, conducted the "military question" to the center of the agenda once again.

The will to advance in terms of human rights was directly communicated by Kirchner to the military in the traditional Annual Dinner of Comradeship (*Cena Anual de Camaradería*, in Spanish). During the occasion, the president affirmed – with reference to the “revision of the past – that the reunion of the Argentine people “cannot come from silence or complicity” (La

¹⁰ The dismissal encompassed the retirement of 75% of the generals, and 50% of the Admirals and Brigadiers. See Veiras 2003b.

¹¹ Argentina had systematically refused the international requirements until then, the decision was made official through the Act 1581/2001.

Nación 2003). In this context, the resumption of the judicial causes presumably conducted the reactivation of the debates on the civil control of military institutions.

However, this apparent “comeback” of debates on military autonomy took place in a distinct context when compared to the 1980s and 1990s. Different from what happened then, the military questionings were not able to go unnoticed by civil authorities at any moment. In effect, these manifestations could hardly be interpreted as signs of a potential “offensive autonomy” (Pion Berlin 1996, 16). On the contrary, it was about a type of autonomous-reactive tendency of the Armed Forces, presented after the suppression of old prerogatives¹².

This diagnostic about the disagreements with the Armed Forces was quickly noticed by Kirchner. For this reason, parallel to the incentives towards decisions concerning the “military politics”, the government proposed to guide the military concerns about specific professional subjects. In this context, minister Pampuro announced the project to convoke a committee formed by defense experts, both civil academics and military professionals. The initiative was called “The National Defense in the Democratic Agenda” (*La Defensa Nacional en la Agenda Democrática*, in Spanish) and was announced at the Casa Rosada by President Kirchner himself. According to Actg 545/2003, the objective was to “generate consensus on the approach to the main axes of the National Defense policies”. Also, it aimed at “advancing in diagnostics and proposals that could be a base for the elaboration of a Strategic Plan of National Defense”.

The round of discussions lasted for more than a month and the conclusions drawn constitute an early sign of the modernization process of the next years. The main aspects included in the final results were related to the necessity to strengthen the managing capability of the Ministry of Defense, fundamentally concerning the functional dimension of the jurisdiction’s responsibilities. Likewise, it was pointed out that a reconsideration of the role of the Joint Staff in order to obtain a bigger military efficacy, since this organism should “[assist and advise] the Ministry of Defense in terms of military strategy

¹² For more details on the military resistance during this period, see Braslavsky 2009.

and [understand] the elaboration of the Joint Military Planning, according to the guidelines established by the President of the Republic” (Ministerio de Defensa 2003, 39. Our translation).

Regarding the interpretation of the international scenario, the conclusions referred to the “uncertain character of the present threats” and to in what extent this uncertainty could affect the strategic dimension of the defense:

Due to the existence of a strategic uncertainty, there is a necessity, with or without evident threats, to rely on a military instrument adequate enough to capably defend the human and material patrimony of the country, counting on a power-projection capability for the defense of national interests. The Armed Forces definitely do not justify themselves solely by threats, but also by the existence of State and the need for its defense. The aforementioned uncertainty determines the necessity to rely on warning, immediate reaction and quick deployment capabilities, as well as on a certain level of polyvalence. (Ministerio de Defensa 2003, 24. Our translation)

The previous conclusions mentioned the necessity of adapting the Armed Forces’ design to the uncertain character of the international scenario. Furthermore, it was affirmed that the defense continued to be an inalienable function of the state. For that reason, it was necessary to count on military capabilities that guaranteed the national defense in the present strategic context, then weighing the Armed Forces’ surveillance and control, and quick deployment functions¹³. In this sense, the reflexion on the strategic aspects would be complementary to the impetus granted to the reaffirmation of civil control during the first years of the *kirchnerista* decade.

It allows us to postulate that, though significant advances in terms of military-strategic planning – since this responsibility continued in great terms on the hands of the military (Verbitsky 2003) –, Kirchner’s decision to keep up with the advances registered in the ambit of civil control since the beginning of

¹³ Some points registered on the project’s conclusions had been noted in the 1998 Restructuring of the Armed Forces Law (no. 24.948).

debates on the professionalization of the sector laid the foundations for the start of a new era regarding the handling of strategic affairs.

In a word, the tenure of José Pampuro was characterized by a series of measures that rectified the civilians' capability to control the Armed Forces. Thus, the beginning of this "military politics" provoked an autonomous-reactive military behavior. In a mark that could be labeled "unfavorable"¹⁴, the "defense policy" occupied a place clearly subordinated in the sector's agenda. In this sense, the political elite's performance was similar to a "deficient civil complacency" (Sain 2010, 48), since the strategic aspects were assessed only in an embryonic way. This deficiency in military strategic planning would be reverted during the next ministerial term.

3.2. The tenure of Nilda Garré (2005-2010)

Different from the "easiness" found in the barracks after the arrival of Pampuro in the Ministry of Defense, its swap for Garré was not only unexpected, but also generated uncertainty in the military. With militant origins in the Peronist Youth (*Juventud Peronista*, in Spanish), the political-ideological profile of Garré's was miles away from the leadership's prototype desired by the martial ranks.

The first actions of the new minister were combined into a two-front advance. On the one hand, the deepening of the "revision of the past" policy firmly put in practice since the beginning of the Kirchner administration; on the other hand, the will to keep up with this aspect of the "military politics" with the boost of the specifically professional dimension of military activity.

Furthermore, and complementarily to the "human rights agenda", the new minister advanced in terms of the materialization of the challenges that affected the sector's strategic management. In this context, the Ministry of Defense ordered the elaboration of a situational diagnostic that would allow laying the required foundations for a gradual modernization process, oriented towards the adaptation of the military apparatus' design to new necessities of

¹⁴ We used this expression in a sense similar to the one used by Jorge Battaglini in order to characterize the management of the defense ambit during the Raúl Alfonsín years. However, the limitations experienced by civilians were substantially more severe during the first years of the newly-recovered democracy. See Battaglini 2010.

national defense. As a consequence of this advance, on November 2006 the National Defense Council (CODENA, initials in Spanish) was convoked for the first time since its creation, with the objective to elaborate the Comprehensive Assessment on the National Strategic Situation¹⁵. As a result of this call, the Directive on the Organization and Functioning of the Armed Forces (Act 1691/2006) was approved, establishing the agenda for the patterns, deployments and selections of equipments for the military apparatus. The approval of this directive and the regimentation of the National Defense Law (Act 727/2006) – in this case, ending a 18 years-old debt – have brought a foundational breakthrough in the defense policy.

The Act 1691/2006 established the bases for the Armed Forces' modernization. It indicated that the main guiding principle of the design of forces would be the "main mission"¹⁶ and that subsidiary missions should not affect "the required capabilities for the fulfillment of that main and essential mission"¹⁷. The need to articulate the design of forces with national and regional strategic assessment, as well as with the objectives of cooperation at the South American level, was also remembered.

Finally, the directive established that the design of forces would be accomplished in function of the planning method based on the military capabilities level, instead of the anachronistic method of conflict hypothesis. This way, and for the first time since the return of democracy, the political conduction rectified its will to materialize national defense positions in the areas linked to the military strategic planning.

In this context, the "Cycle of National Defense Planning" (*Ciclo de Planeamiento de la Defensa Nacional*, CPDN, in Spanish) was approved through the Act 1729. This presidential directive laid the foundations for the planning of defense in short, medium and long terms, responding to the need for adapting

¹⁵ CODENA was created in 1988 with the approval of National Defense Act 23.554.

¹⁶ The main mission of the military apparatus is "to ward and to repel external military state aggressions", definition that excludes as a deployment hypothesis the so-called "New Threats" (Act 727/2006).

¹⁷ The Armed Forces may be part of four subsidiary missions: 1) multilateral operations of the United Nations; 2) internal security operations in cases provided by the Homeland Security Law no. 24.059; 3) operations in support of national community of allied countries; and 4) contribution to the build of a Sub-regional Defense System.

the policies to variations occurred in the strategic scenario. The directive established that each cycle should begin with the writing of a new Directive for National Defense Policy (*Directiva de Política de Defensa Nacional*, DPDN, in Spanish), created by the Executive. After the advent of this directive, the Joint Staff, based on its character of organization of technical-military advising and under ministerial supervision, would elaborate the related Military Strategic Plan¹⁸.

According to the normative, the defense planning must be developed sequentially, starting – and ending – at the national strategic level, besides passing through every actor of the jurisdiction. This sequence must privilege the systemic coherence between both national strategic and military strategic planning, and the convenient joint design of forces.

As aforementioned, CPDN inaugurated the military capabilities-based planning. In a context of strong uncertainty – product of both international and regional scenarios derived from the Cold War’s end –, the absence of clear enemies and the reduction of interstate conflicts put the traditional methods of planning, which stipulated the deployment of Armed Forces based on previously known threats, in an inexorable crisis¹⁹. Hence, and before the impossibility of precisely defining where threats can be found – although it is understood that it should be an external state military threat –, the design of forces conforms the development of military equipment of probable deployment, based on the defense of vital interests identified by the National Strategic Level, in the mark of a defensive strategic attitude that stops the offensive projection of power resources.

This decision meant the continuity of the path elaborated by the military distension measures that made Argentina deactivate the hypotheses of

¹⁸ The Military Strategic Plan is composed of the following documents: the Directive for Elaboration of the Military Strategic Plan; the Military Strategic Assessment and Resolution; the Military Strategic Directive; the Military Plans of Short, Medium and Long Terms; and the Military Capabilities Project. See Act 1729/2007.

¹⁹ South America detains an extraordinary record in terms of interstate peace. This reality makes us label as “anachronistic” the claims on which the methods of planning centered on hypotheses of conflict with neighbor states are based and, as such, to dismiss the existence of supposed arms races. For more information, see Battaglino 2008. For a different point of view, see Calle 2007.

conflict with neighbor states since the 1980s²⁰, with a consequent boost for regional integration²¹. In this sense, we could affirm that the adoption of this planning methodology was not a result of a conjunctural option, but it was strongly conditioned by the historical failure of the decisions adopted between 1983 and 2003. Thus, it was the result of a process in which the restitution of civil control over the Armed Forces and the measures adopted in terms of foreign policy played an important role, and not a military-strategic option of methodological nature without any historical constraints.

In sum, Garré's tenure was characterized by the deepening of an agenda of "military politics" that formalized a number of mechanisms for the civil control of the Armed Forces. In contrast to the "deficient civil complacency", which characterized the tenure of José Pampuro in an unfavorable context, the Ministry of Defense had been keeping up with these "military politics" since the end of 2005, with progressive advances in the strategic modernization of the jurisdiction. Indeed, the aspects related to the military strategic planning provoked an unprecedented attention, which was translated into the instauration of a planning cycle entirely supervised by civilians. In this sense, the necessary steps for the exercise of an effective "political administration" of the sector were taken for the first time since the return to democracy.

3.3. The tenure of Arturo Puricelli (2010-2013)

On December 14, 2010, Puricelli was indicated as the new Minister of Defense. After his nomination, military sectors expressed their "hope" for a change in the administrative style of Garré, which was regarded as a "confrontational" stand (De Vedia 2010)²². Nonetheless, the new minister ratified the continuity

²⁰ Some inescapable examples are the détente measures adopted by Argentina and Brazil in 1979 after the Corpus-Itaipú Treaty and by Argentina and Chile in 1984 with the Peace and Friendship Treaty. These initial agreements opened way for future approaches. Among these, one might remember the signature of the "Iguazú Declaration" in 1985 by the presidents of Argentina and Brazil, and the Argentine-Chilean agreements over the *Hielos Continentales* in 1998. See Escudé and Cisneros 2000.

²¹ The most recent evidence of this environment of confidence was the creation of the Union of South American Nations (*Unión de Naciones Suramericanas*, UNASUR, in Spanish), organization that came to solidify almost three decades of interstate cooperation and trust. In the plainly military ambit, the regional cooperation was translated into the creation of the South American Defense Council (CDS) in 2009.

²² This characterization may be interpreted as a result of the fears within military ranks caused by the intervention of the Ministry of Defense in issues that, until Garré's tenure, had remained under the

of the most part of the employees that had accompanied Garré, as well as of the Joint Chief of Staff and the chiefs of the three Armed Forces.

Puricelli's tenure implied ruptures and continuities regarding "military politics". With respect strictly to the "revision of the past", the Ministry of Defense continued to collaborate with the provision of information related to the crimes against humanity committed during the last military dictatorship (1976-1983) to the Justice.

However, a couple of incidents took place after 2011, reflecting the weaknesses of the exercise of the political administration of the defense. Differently from the difficulties detected during Pampuro's tenure, these problems were not associated to a civil "advance" over the once military prerogatives - like what happened between 2003 and 2005 - nor to the construction of new mechanisms directed towards conducting tasks previously "delegated" to the military. On the contrary, the new weaknesses paradoxically had to do more with the performance of political authorities than with any military projection on the themes now under civil responsibility.

The most well-known episode was the embargo on *Fragata Libertad*', that was upheld during the traditional cruise of instruction made by Navy cadets. The instruction boat was retained on October 03, 2012 in the Tema Port, Republic of Ghana, shortly after a Ghanaian court ruled in favor of a group of foreign bondholders. After hearing the news, the Argentine government denounced the illegal character of the measure, which violated the diplomatic immunity established in the Vienna Convention. Without analyzing this controversy - whose technical-juridical aspects exceed our study object - in detail, it is relevant to stress that, in parallel to international claims made by Argentina – finally accepted by the International Sea Court –, the retention of

determining orbit of the Armed Forces. In this sense, the creation of ministerial structures with capability to overlook strategic-military affairs, to establish reforms in military training, to establish criteria for planning and allocating budget, and to deepen "review of the past" policies, among other factors, implied on the end of old military "prerogatives" Military (Stepan 1988). In this regard, see Braslavsky 2009.

the vessel evidenced huge deficiencies in the capability to oversee the military activities²³.

Shortly after, a new conflict in the ministerial tenure took place, when the content of a course organized for civil employees by American experts was made public. The question was developed in the wake of the themes approached: the experts of the Civil-Military Center of the Postgraduate Naval College of the U.S. exposed the planning of "national security" and the so-called "new threats", a hypothesis not encompassed by the normative guidelines of the Argentine Armed Forces (Verbitsky 2012a).

Other episodes that controversially affected the Puricelli's tenure were the shipwreck of the Santísima Trinidad ship, as well as the impossibility of matching the dates established for the development of the Antarctic Campaign (*Campaña Antártica*, in Spanish). This set of incidents made some analysts forecast autonomous tendencies within the Armed Forces (Verbitsky 2013).

The military strategic planning was also characterized by a series of deficiencies during the Puricelli administration. With reference to these weaknesses, it is worth highlighting that the cabinet shuffle happened in the context of a Planning Cycle on course. The Act 1729/2007 had predicted that the first experience of CPDN – initiated in 2007 – was developed in an extraordinary fashion for five years. As a consequence, its finalization was planned for the end of 2011, with the formal presentation of the Plan of Military Capacities (*Plan de Capacidades Militares* – PLANCAMIL – initials in Spanish). Since then, the elaboration tasks for a new Directive for National Defense Policy, whose approval was scheduled for September 2012, should be started.

Hence, the Project for Military Capacities (PROCAMIL, in Spanish) was in the middle of its process of creation – by the Joint Staff – when Puricelli

²³ According to the ministerial documentation that became public after this controversy, the inclusion of the Ghanian port in the itinerary of the Libertad was ordered by the then Director of Organization and Doctrine of the Navy, Commodore Alfredo Blanco, who subsequently informed the Ministry of Defense. In this regard, it is noteworthy that if the retention of the frigate was interpreted by some analysts as a reflection of a "reautonomization" of the Armed Forces (Verbitsky 2012b; 2012c), from our perspective this incident was the result of a weakening in the exercise of civil conduction, and not an advance of the military over the ministerial powers and faculties.

arrived in the Ministry of Defense. This document brings to the political level the “desirable” model of military instruments, with the aim of integrally responding to the missions assigned for the Armed Forces by the National Strategic Level.

The following step consisted on the analysis and supervision of PROCAMIL by the Ministry of Defense in order to begin the tasks related to the creation of PLANCAMIL, a fundamental tool to a new cycle’s start, as soon as possible. Nevertheless, PLANCAMIL did not obtain the official approval by the minister through a resolution even after the documents were completed in the agreed time and structure, the reason why the first CPDN was not formally finalized.

In synthesis, if Puricelli’s tenure presented relative continuities to the “military politics”, in particular regarding the military strategic planning, some deficiencies were present, that prevented the effective consolidation of the process that had been initiated by the previous mandatory. In this sense, the role of civilians was similar to the “deficient civil complacency” (Sain 2010, 48) that characterized the political conduction of this sector during Pampuro’s tenure. However, differently from what happened between 2003 and 2005, the deficient civil complacency developed into a “favorable” context, that is to say, a context that lacked the military autonomous-reactive tendencies experienced in the beginning of the *Kirchnerista* administration.

4. Conclusion

Until now, we have studied the performance of civil tenures in charge of the Ministry of Defense during the period 2003-2013. The analysis focused on conduction of the strategic dimension of the sector, emphasizing the exercise of the responsibilities pertaining to military strategic planning. Bearing these factors in mind, we assessed the ministerial agendas of José Pampuro (2003-2005); Nilda Garré (2005-2010); and Arturo Puricelli (2010-2013).

In order to do this, it is necessary to stress one particular issue: the article considers that in the last ten years the administrations of Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández formulated and implemented – in the defense ambit – a set of unprecedented measures, which resulted in an expansion of the

civilian responsible over the sector. Indeed, the progresses made in these years – which completed regulatory achievements of previous decades – laid the institutional foundations of what we have labeled the "political administration of national defense".

However, as it is clear from the foregoing words, the formalization of institutional mechanisms and the approval of normative tools are necessary, yet not sufficient. Throughout the three analyzed tenures, the process of civil empowerment coexisted with ambiguities and setbacks that demonstrated limits on the progress achieved.

In Pampuro's case, we have stated that significant achievements in military-strategic planning were not achieved, except for some incipient efforts. In an "unfavorable" context, product of reactive-autonomous trends that resulted from the advance of "military politics", strategic aspects (defense policy) occupied a marginal place. Thus, these responsibilities largely continued in the hands of the military. However, the launch of "The National Defense in the Democratic Agenda" cycle allowed laying some groundwork for the start of a new phase of strategic administration of military affairs.

During Garré's tenure, the most significant progresses were registered in terms of effective conducting defense policy. From 2006 onwards, a qualitative leap forward in the strategic aspects of the sector was produced, and numerous initiatives to reverse the "deficient civil complacency" (Sain 2010, 48) were deployed. The most significant measures were the enactment of Act 1729/2007, which established a Planning Cycle – based on the method centered on military capabilities instead of hypothesis of conflict –, entirely led and supervised by the political level. For its part, Act 1714/2009, which approved the Directive for National Defense Policy, established strategic assessments of Argentina over global and regional scenarios, besides instructing the Ministry of Defense, the Armed Forces and their dependents, to adapt its structure, operation and provisions under the necessary requirements.

The two years of management Puricelli exhibited in relation to the achievements of the previous step, some continuities and significant setbacks in the performance of civil management. Regarding the first point, there is the commitment to solving the crimes against humanity committed during the military dictatorship. Meanwhile, setbacks were linked to the dimension that is

the focus of this article, ie, with defense policy and, more specifically-to the effective conduct of military strategic planning.

Chart 2: The military strategic planning during the *Kirchnerista* decade

José Pampuro (2003-2005)	Deficient Civil Complacency in an “unfavorable context”
Nilda Garré (2005-2010)	Political Administration of the Defense
Arturo Puricelli (2010-2013)	Deficient Civil Complacency in a “favorable context”

To recapitulate, the foregoing findings do not neglect the fact that the agenda of the defense showed remarkable achievements in political leadership of the sector between 2003 and 2013. However, the consolidation of these advances – and the overcoming of the experienced setbacks – requires the dedication of efforts more linked to the conduction of strategic-military aspects. It is precisely from the exercise of these responsibilities that it will be possible to characterize the state of the real situation of the defense budget, to define the operational distribution required to meet current requirements and to strategically plan eventual increases of the jurisdiction’s expenditure. Without clear political definitions and precise strategic assessments, budget considerations will fall inevitably in partial and arbitrary assessments.

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ABSTRACT

This paper studies the performances of the Ministry of Defense demarches during 2003-2013. The analysis focuses on the conduction of the strategic dimension of the sector; in particular, on the relative responsibilities of the military strategic planning. In this framework, the demarches of ministers José Pampuro (2003-05), Nilda Garré (2005-10) and Arturo Puricelli (2010-13) are analyzed.

The time framework defined for the study of our object assumes that a set of unprecedented measures were implemented. For the first time since the return of democracy, for example, an effective debate on the conduction of the strategic dimension of the defense policy was addressed. Nevertheless, for reasons that are object of analysis during this article, the empowerment process of the political conduction survived along with ambiguities and setbacks that, during the same period, made the absence of a solid consensus regarding the results of the sectorial agenda evident.

KEYWORDS

Military Policy; Defense Policy; Military Strategic Planning; Argentina; Kirchner

*Received on January 30, 2014.
Approved on September 29, 2014.*

Translated by Pedro Alt

COOPERATIVE SECURITY: CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES WITH BRAZIL IN TIMES OF ARGENTINIAN DEMOCRACY

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1. Introduction

The overcome of the bipolar dynamics between the Soviet and the American bloc has led to an increasing concern about the study of security in regional geopolitical environment. Thus, the Copenhagen School³ proposed new tools to analyze and understand the relations between states within the framework of European security itself, which distinguishes it from the traditional theories of international relations, most of them from North America. The Copenhagen School believes that the phenomena produced by the end of the Cold War and the globalization process are not included or covered by the dominant models on security and there is a need to redefine some of the concepts used so far.

Several contributions to research on security have been made by this school. First, the definition of it as a multidimensional concept, invoking different objects related to security that vary according to context, being in certain circumstances the State, or individuals or social groups in others. Second, the Theory of Regional Security Complexes, which evaluates the very approach to the constituted unit of analysis: a complex refers to a group of

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³ The term "Copenhagen School" was used for the first time by Bill McSweeney in an essay that began an interchange in form of debate between this author and many researches.

states whose perceptions of safety are common and whose list of friends and enemies are shared. Neorealism studied the international system and its dynamics as a basic unit of analysis, but this has been criticized by the Copenhagen School, which put emphasis on the study of the subsystems that were cajoled by the bipolar system for a long time. It also defines the subsystems as complexes of states with certain independence of the overall system due to the intensity of their interactions.

In this sense, this school recognizes the importance of analyzing the dynamics of states not only under systemic actors, but primarily regional, considering that the interdependence of states comprising a region is so profound that one cannot study the security of just one state while ignoring the security of a neighbor (Buzan 1992). The idea of security complexes refers to a set of states that not only form a natural block and a distinct historical and cultural circle, but also have higher security challenges externally than internally. Hence, their security perspectives tend to converge.

As our area of interest comprises the bilateral relationship between Argentina and Brazil, we approach a limited regional subsystem and, in this sense, we believe that the alternative approach of Cooperative Security is the most appropriate since it postulates the progressive integration and development of mutual trust measures⁴ as elements that generate mechanisms for long-term cooperation. Thus, the aim of this article is to review the nuclear cooperation between Argentina and Brazil since the restoration of democracy and to analyze whether it can be considered a process of Cooperative Security. Consequently, the hypothesis guiding this work is based on the generation of a process of Cooperative Security between Argentina and Brazil by the hands of Confidence-Building Measures held between these two countries from the restoration of democracy in Argentina until 2011.

According to Hardy Videla (2003, 3), "Cooperative Security seeks to achieve security through institutionalized consent among international actors

⁴ We understand Mutual Trust Measures not only as bilateral and multilateral measures that intend to prevent crisis and conflicts situations, but also actions that help the communication between actors, generating a comprehensive framework that aims the perception of immediate threats and avoids risks. They are the corollary of a political will of two or more states that attempt to create alternatives to solve a problem, which can be developed into conflict without these measures just through an interpretation error.

involved in the system. [...] It assumes that the securitarian objectives of the partners have been identified as common and compatible, enabling the establishment of cooperation between the parties to achieve them." Firstly, this means to put emphasis on prevention as an enduring dynamics overtime and, secondly, the abandonment of unilateral practices, recognizing the inability of a state to increase its security in isolation. This model is somehow intended as a proposal that overcomes the weaknesses of Collective Security.

The same author states that the concept of Cooperative Security can be also applied bilaterally, as long as the two countries share a vision for future expansion. This is where our research identify a clearer sense, as we refer to the bilateral dynamics between Argentina and Brazil not as an isolated issue, but as part of a process that tends to be spread to other countries in the region.

Fontana defines Cooperative Security as a change of mentality, a transformation in the perception of others and their neighbors, which is based on trust and transparency. "This is not built only by unprecedented mechanisms, but largely on the basis of elements that largely exist, such as agreements, treaties or established routines" (quoted in Milanese 2005, 45). In this sense, Argentina and Brazil are developing a bilateral link on the subject, once incipient under military rule, but that have been deepening over the decades of democracy. The return of democracy was the ideal period to mend ties with countries that became embroiled in a logic of rivalry and distrust throughout the *de facto* administrations.

In this regard, Argentina and Brazil historically went through a situation of rivalry, but their relations found their most tense peak with the start of nuclear development in both countries during the 1950s. It is for this reason that we limited our study on the process of Cooperative Security to Confidence-Building Measures to the strictly nuclear field, since we believe that progresses in this technology generated the moment of greatest tension between the two countries, but at the same time it was the ambit where the first Confidence-Building Measures that would culminate in the consolidation of this process were established.

The aforementioned tradition of rivalry was manifested mainly through two key events during the military regimes. On the one hand, in the La Plata Basin, which presented the shared waters of the Paraná River as a scenario,

where some misunderstandings occurred in the context of construction of the Itaipu (Brazil) and Corpus (Argentina) dams during the 1970s. The kickoff to reverse this situation occurred with the signing of the Tripartite Treaty in 1979. On the other hand, this competition was also evident through the nuclear and arms race, which first took the path of cooperation after the signature of the Bilateral Cooperation Agreement for the Development and Application of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy in 1980. As from the 1980s, this rivalry disappears due to the re-democratization process in both countries that complements the various regional integration mechanisms, especially the MERCOSUR, among other factors.

2. Antecedents of Nuclear Development in Argentina and Brazil

In the 21st century, the importance of nuclear development has increased due to several factors such as the broad technological development, the increasing demands for diversification of energy sources, new threats to international security, among others. In turn, especially for developing countries, the control of this resource is an international symbol of power, and in many cases a bargaining chip before more powerful states. This leads us to make a brief analysis and description of nuclear developments in Argentina and Brazil.

2.1. Argentine Nuclear Development

Regarding Argentina, we can say that progress in the nuclear field is one of the most advanced in the region and the world, a result of sixty years of national efforts. But the Argentine case is also particular due to the use of their own potential, with almost no external cooperation, allowing the development of purely national technology; and in those cases in which Argentina unavoidably had to resort to foreign companies through trade agreements, Argentina actively participated in the execution of the works. However, this exclusive development was driven by events like the distrust generated by nuclear advances, since foreign countries refused to provide technical cooperation and equipment.

According to Ornstein (2010), one can briefly describe the history of Argentine nuclear development in three stages: a first phase, formative, extending from 1950-1958; a second, transitional, spanning 1959-1967; and a

third, of consolidation, from 1968 until the departure of the military dictatorship in 1982; and a fourth and last phase, between the restoration of democracy and the late-1990s. This last stage was added to this section, but will be discussed later.

The first stage takes as its starting point the creation of the National Commission of Atomic Energy (*Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica*, CNEA, in Spanish). With the creation of CNEA in 1950 and the installation of its first laboratories in 1965, an organic evolution of nuclear energy in the country begins. Thus, a first stage that lasted almost until the end of the decade found its beginning, which was mainly dedicated to the training of specialized personnel. To this end, several professionals studied in European and American laboratories and the visit of many foreign specialists was encouraged. From the beginning, it was a policy of CNEA to domestically produce the fuel elements to supply reactors to be built. From 1957 onwards, all fuel elements for research reactors that successively entered operation were designed and manufactured in the CNEA. Undoubtedly, the most significant event of this stage was the construction of the country's first experimental reactor. This reactor was the first of Argentine origin and also the first to operate in Latin America, which was a milestone in the history of nuclear power in the region. This experience allowed the realization of other more complex projects.

Another event that distinguishes this stage of nuclear development began in 1952 with uranium mining. The study of the Argentine territory for the purpose of determining its nuclear mineral wealth was also one of the first concerns of the CNEA. It was how uranium mining began and, additionally, a pilot plant for the production of metallic uranium through calciothermy was built in 1953 (Ornstein 2010). Moreover, the systematic study of uranium mining stocks began in 1955.

In the second stage of transition, CNEA becomes a body in charge of defining the application of nuclear energy programs. Production and research reactors are designed throughout this period, and a plant for the specific production of radioisotopes is built. These initiatives came to cover 90% of the national energy demand in the 1980s and allowed the exports to countries of the region. The successful experience of those years enabled many enterprises, like the export of reactors.

The beginning of the third period starts in 1968 and ends with the end of the National Reconstruction Process (*Proceso de Reconstrucción Nacional*, in Spanish) in 1982. At this stage, Argentina began its activities in the nuclear power ambit, dominating the nuclear fuel cycle and the production of heavy water, which allowed ensuring the supply of these inputs to nuclear power plants. This phase is characterized by the construction of the first nuclear plant Atucha I in 1968, the first nuclear facility in Latin America for the production of electricity. In 1973, the construction of the second nuclear plant Embalse began. The construction of the third plant, Atucha II, started the following year⁵.

In 1977, objectives and policies were defined in order to achieve self-sufficiency in a program that would serve national interests. These interests involved, first, meeting future electricity demand combining hydroelectric and nuclear sources and, on the other hand, obtaining maximum autonomy in the use of this energy source. Thus, in 1979 the government approved the Nuclear Plan, which consisted of the installation of four nuclear power plants and an industrial plant of heavy water production. However, the plan was delayed and later abandoned due to the economic crisis that affected the country. Another factor was the discovery of significant gas reserves and the increase of the supply of thermal energy. The stage that included the military dictatorship (1976-1983) accelerated nuclear development. The fragility of the economy and the Argentine political system did not represent an obstacle for the regime to significantly increase the budget of the nuclear ambit. Apart from this paradox, plans to complete the fuel cycle went ahead regardless of international pressure, especially from the United States. We affirm it because the Argentine plan was carried on throughout an international context marked by a process of corporatization of countries that exported nuclear technology and of reassessment of their strategies from the oil crisis and the Indian nuclear test in May 1974.

⁵ It is worth to mention that the Atucha II plant is not already operational.

While pressures were increasing, CNA and INVAP⁶ launched in 1978 the secret uranium enrichment program. As suggested by Hurtado de Mendoza (2009), we believe that one of the geopolitical motivations of regime was, on the one hand, the 1973 Itaipu Treaty signed between Brazil and Paraguay that allowed the construction of a dam on the Paraná River and, on the other, the 1975 agreement between Brazil and West Germany on technology transfer.

In November 1983, the announcement that Argentina had created a uranium enrichment plant, the Pilcaniyeu Project, was formalized, marking the highest point of the Argentine nuclear program. Here the fourth and final phase begins. While the international arena expected the arrival of Alfonsín and the restoration of democracy would change the country's position on its nuclear program, it quickly went disillusioned. The "nuclear culture" was not wholly owned by the military, but was part of an Argentine tradition manifested in international forums, where the country opposed the discriminatory nature of the nonproliferation treaties. The downturn and budget cuts that CNA received were a result of the economic crisis facing Argentina, and not of a policy of opposition to independent nuclear development.

The 1990s were of an impasse in nuclear activity; most businesses were privatized or closed. Moreover, and in line with the new model of international insertion of the country, Argentina acceded to many international regimes like Missile Control Technology Regime (MCTR); the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom); the Australian Group control of chemical and biological weapons; and joined the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL, in Spanish). Argentina also ratified the Tlatelolco Treaty in 1994 and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) a year later. It disabled its nuclear development. Thus, it leaves behind a historical critical attitude of Argentina diplomacy towards the discriminatory nature of the measures of disarmament and nonproliferation adopted in international forums, as well as its claim for the right to a peaceful nuclear development held since the 1940s.

⁶ INVAP is a high-technology company created in 1976 dedicated to designing, integrating and building plants, equipments and devices in high-complexity areas, like nuclear energy, space technology, industrial technology and scientific and medical equipments.

It is just during the governments of Nestor (2003- 2007) and Cristina Kirchner (2007-2011)⁷ that the Argentine nuclear project seems to be reinvigorated. Since the launching in 2006 of the works of the third Atucha II nuclear plant, until the beginning of the studies for the construction of a fourth nuclear power plant and resuming production of enriched uranium that had been interrupted in the 1980s; interest in advance is demonstrated. In March 2009, a draft bill was sent, and approved months later by the Congress. It granted a special regime for the development of the Argentine Nuclear Plan, aiming reactivation as a strategic issue, nuclear power generation and development of applications and services of nuclear energy in health, industry and scientific activity sectors. Within this context lays the 2006 decree, which decided the launch of Atucha II, and another decree of the same year, which declared the construction and commissioning of the Reactor Prototype CAREM for nuclear power generation as of national interest.

In recent years, the Argentine nuclear project looks outside: the export of nuclear energy constitutes one of the primary objectives of the Argentine commercial foreign policy, and the emphasis on promoting the export of nuclear technology responds to the goal of adding value and diversifying Argentine exports.

2.2. Brazilian Nuclear Development

As in the Argentine case, the history of Brazilian nuclear development can also be divided into four stages, according to the classification made by Cubillos Meza (2008). First, the “independent phase” (1945-1953). Second, the period of “cooperation with the United States” (1954-1966). The third is the “active phase” (1967-1978). And, finally, the “revisionist phase” (1979-2011).

During the first phase, the founding milestone is the creation of the National Council for Research (*Conselho Nacional de Pesquisas*, CNPq, in Portuguese) and the Brazilian Center for Physical Researches (*Conselho Brasileiro de Pesquisas Físicas*, CBPF, in Portuguese). The CNPq was dedicated to scientific and technological research and training for specialists in this type of

⁷ First mandate.

energy until 1956, thus institutionalizing basic research on the subject and marking the end of the first stage.

The second phase, in cooperation with the United States, begins with the signing of a bilateral treaty based on the delivery of three research reactors and in training staff. The link with the Northern country has its antecedent on the allied condition of Brazil during World War II, as well as Brazilian role as uranium exporter. We must remember that a bilateral agreement on financial and technical support for the implementation of projects and the construction and operation of reactors, which was kept secret, had already been signed in 1945.

In this context, Brazil justified its interest on nuclear technology by the growing energy demand, which was boosted by economic growth. So far, we see that during the Vargas government (1951-1954) the Atomic Energy Program was aimed at the creation and the consolidation of a research infrastructure. During the 1960s, its activities were directed to building reactors and developing the fuel cycle.

Much of what has been built ever since is rooted in the Kubitschek administration (1956-1961). Under the “Guidelines for Atomic Energy Policy”, there was the support for the creation of the National Commission for Nuclear Energy (*Comissão Nacional de Energia Nuclear*, CNEN, in Portuguese) on the premise of its peaceful use. The agency was in charge of managing the nuclear program as a whole, since the formation of human resources to the control of materials. From 1956, and for four years, an analysis on the uranium resources possessed by Brazil was put forth alongside the United States. In this context, it is necessary to note that the Latin American country was still receiving research reactors from the United States.

During the governments of Quadros (January-August 1961) and Goulart⁸ (1961-1964), an approach was attempted to obtain a heavy water reactor from France, stepping away from the United States, but this process was interrupted by the 1964 military Coup d'état. After the coup, the National

⁸ Goulart was able to change the national policy on nuclear energy through the Act 4118 of August 27, 1962. The act decreed the monopoly on uranium and nuclear material. For its part, CNEN was consolidated as an autarchic entity in federal level, obtaining administrative and financial autonomy, directly subordinated to the nation's Executive Power.

Security Council was almost entirely composed of military, excluding the scientific considerations from decision-making. In turn, there was an increase in investments for projects to build nuclear power plants.

The arrival of the most active phase of nuclear progress came at the hands of the National Security Doctrine. In 1967, during the Castelo Branco administration, the CNEN was transferred to the Ministry of Mines and Energy. In 1974, U.S. support as nuclear supplier began to erode, generating approaches to other countries. In this sense, an important step was the 1975 agreement with West Germany that finally ended the autonomous development process for the production of nuclear energy. It was due in part to the agreements with the United States, which did not commit this country to the transfer of knowledge on sensitive parts of the fuel cycle, especially enrichment and reprocessing, and this threatened the inauguration of Angra I, whose construction and operation began in 1972 and 1985, respectively.

Figueiredo administration (1979-1985) inaugurated the last stage, characterized by the slowdown in the nuclear program and by a shift of resources to more local research efforts, away from the massive transfer of technology. This break on development was due to financial difficulties, technical problems and the criticism from public opinion. However, we can not ignore the fact that uranium enrichment was conducted secretly in 1978. The decision to continue building the Resende enrichment plant can be seen as a response to the Argentine developments in the control of the nuclear cycle. The project managed to be materialized only in 1982. In 1986, a committee in charge of evaluating the delay of Brazilian nuclear cycle was created, through which some causes, such as a decrease of energy demand and of the national GDP were identified. These difficulties broadened the dependence on external supplies of enriched uranium and prevented the control of the nuclear fuel cycle from being reached.

Thus, the official nuclear program was delayed as a consequence of the agreement with West Germany, initiating a parallel, secret initiative undertaken by the Armed Forces. Unlike Argentina, where the nuclear program was transferred to civilian hands with the return of democracy, this evidences that in Brazil it was the military who were controlling the process of decision-making in this area.

The 1990s came to reverse a fact that had characterized not only Brazil, but also Argentina. Though Brazil uttered its peaceful ends since the beginning of its nuclear development, it refrained from signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It was Cardoso who urged the Congress for approval, stating that it was necessary to review the position of the country, since its refusal would condemn it to international isolation. Thus, Brazil signed the treaty in 1998.

During President Lula da Silva administration, the National Defense Strategy was adopted. It proposed the modernization of the Armed Forces, emphasizing three sectors of strategic importance: space, cybernetic and nuclear. Hence, it was also decided to create the Committee for the Development of the Brazilian Nuclear Program, responsible for establishing its basic lines and objectives, and monitoring its implementation. In recent years, Brazil attempted to increase aerospace capabilities, launched a program for the construction of a nuclear submarine in association with France and signed an agreement for the production of intercontinental cruise missiles with China and Russia. In 2010, it began the construction of Angra III, which is expected to be operational by 2015. With these projects, Brazil seeks to increase its production of nuclear energy and diversify its energy sources. Another key factor in this new phase was the appointment of Nelson Jobim to the Ministry of Defence in 2007, who gave to this ministry a more agile dynamic, reassessing security as an essential agent for international negotiation. A clear example of this policy was the launch of the National Defense Strategy in 2008, which emphasizes progress toward building a defense industry that pushes forward the country's industrial and technological development. In this sense, Brazil began to build a nuclear submarine and to reequip ground and air forces.

Given these events, arises a question that has to do with the constitution of Brazil as a regional power able to hinder the strengthening of cooperative action and the building of mutual trust. Del Pilar (2010) believes that South America, more than a geographical reality, is a Brazilian geopolitical project necessary for the country to exercise the hegemony that was strengthened with the creation of the "South Americanization doctrine of the regional foreign policy of Brazil" during the Lula administration. This very author argues that Brazil has followed three strategic parameters for position

itself in international and regional scenarios. The first involves the formation of strategic partnerships for the military buildup that led the country to sign defense agreements with countries not only in Latin America, but in Europe, Asia and Africa – the objective was the technology exchange to expand its own defense industry. The second responds to the need for exporting military equipment surpassing its own supplying. In order to fulfill this parameter, many companies were created, like AVIBRAS for aerospace industry, IMBEL (Military Equipment Industry of Brazil), EMGEPRON (Management Company for Naval Projects), EMBRAER (Brazilian Aeronautical Company) and CBC (Brazilian Company of Cartridges). The third parameter was to convert military weaknesses into strengths. In order to do it, Brazil invested heavily in the renovation of the Armed Forces. In short, Brazil's transition to regional leadership has used soft and hard power resources. In the first case, we can mention the creation of MERCOSUR and UNASUR, besides the participation in solving regional political crises in neighbor states.

Finally, every nuclear project responds to a national development model that ultimately reveals a model of country inspired by political and economic ideals in force in a determined space-time, local and international context. On our summary of the nuclear dynamics in both countries, we were able to prove that military rules have promoted this activity, but in a climate of rivalry and distrust among neighbors. The return of democracy not only led to the growth of the nation in political terms, but in our case study is generating a process of Cooperative Security to make the work on both sides of the border more transparent.

3. Mutual Trust Measures after the Return of Democracy

In the mark of its foreign policy, Alfonsín administration tried to reverse the country's international image that had been so damaged by the military regime that preceded it. Issues such as external debt, the border conflict with Chile and the Falklands War were major challenges for democratic governance. Based on these legacy issues, the foreign policy goals had to do with the recovery of the external prestige, mechanisms for the protection of democracy and the solution of structural problems of development.

On defense and security, one of the pillars of its foreign policy was the condemnation of the arms race, consistent with the ethical principles of idealism that were manifested through participation in the G6, the transfer of the control of CNEA to civilian hands and the pursuit of nuclear cooperation. However, the external actions in this area were not exempt of contradictions, such as the non-adherence to the Tlatelolco Treaty, the non-ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the continuation of the Cóndor II project.

The return of democracy to the region brought several changes, including increased political and economic cooperation, and also the overcome of old suspicions and misgivings among South American countries, especially Argentina and Brazil. As evidence, 24 protocols were signed between the two countries between 1986 and 1989, covering various areas of cooperation. Also the creation of integration processes, such as MERCOSUR, somehow legitimized political cooperation in the field of security. In this framework, it is possible to detect common positions of member states in terms of security and defense, and definitions of the various threats.

This new phase of nuclear cooperation was acquiring unprecedented political dimension through the presidential visits of Alfonsín and Sarney, and of technical teams to nuclear facilities in each country with the institutionalization of working groups and regular meetings. At the same time, the Nuclear Commissions of both countries underwent a restructuring, an “institutional demilitarization” (Brigagão and Valle Fonrouge 1999, 11). The series of bilateral agreements begins with the **Joint Declaration on Nuclear Policy of Foz do Iguaçu**, signed in November 1985. This agreement is the starting point for a series of political agreements that presents the primary stage of cooperation. According to Milanese (2005), it is the foundational moment of cooperation between the two countries, the first step of a transcendent confidence in bilateral ties. It is a statement that contains multiple axes and enables both states to face difficulties in the international supply of equipment, materials and nuclear fuels. It can be interpreted as an effort toward technological autonomy through the promotion of atomic energy. The Joint Declaration is the first step toward building a cooperative security process.

A second instrument was the **Joint Declaration on Nuclear Policy of Brasilia**, signed in December 1986. Through this instrument, there was an attempt to overcome the obstacles of integration in order to bring transparency through the exchange of views and policy coordination positions in multilateral fora.

A third instrument was the **Joint Declaration on Nuclear Policy of Viedma**, signed in July 1987. This document was the occasion for the visit of President Sarney to the Pilcaniyeu isotope separation plant, which highlighted the construction of an important measure of confidence. This was evident in the words of the president of Brazil to the newspaper Clarin on July 18, 1987 “[...] it is the first in the world that a head of state was invited by another head of state to visit a uranium enrichment plant, which by its nature is a secret facility” (quoted in Milanese 2005, 150. Our translation.).

The **Joint Declaration on Nuclear Policy of Iperó** was signed in the following year. This led to the visit of President Alfonsín to the experimental center Aramar, which belonged to the Brazilian Navy and where a nuclear submarine was being built. On this occasion, a stable and functioning schedule of meetings was set. In November of the same year, Sarney visited the Radiochemical Processing Laboratory of the National Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA) for the fuel production for the Atucha I power plant and the heavy water reactor of Embalse. Result of the visit was the **Joint Declaration on Nuclear Policy of Ezeiza**. Although the reasons for this statement are almost identical to the previous ones and do seem redundant, it served to reaffirm the commitment between the two states for the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy.

The aforementioned set of bilateral nuclear agreements annulled the nuclear issue in terms of obstacles to bilateral ties. This is confirmed by the creation of MERCOSUR, through the Treaty of Asuncion in 1991, which not only definitively eliminated the chances of a strategic conflict, but also extended cooperation in integrating Uruguay and Paraguay to this process.

In the 1990s, Carlos Menem assumed the presidency of Argentina in an external context marked by the end of the East-West confrontation. In this context, the objectives of the Argentine foreign policy proposed overcoming the internal economic crisis, having a high-profile before international financial institutions and private banks, and finding the way for the reintegration into

economic and trade globalization. Under these assumptions, the government adapted its foreign policy to the national interest defined in economic terms. This foreign policy found its theoretical basis in the Peripheral Realism of Escudé, which advised, among other things, not confronting the great powers, actively participating of international regimes, and implementing a policy of disarmament involving the adhesion to certain bilateral and multilateral instruments.

It is in this context that one should understand some decisions on security made by this administration, like the adhesion to international regimes such as MCTR, the CoCom, the Australian Group of control of chemical and biological weapons, and the OPANAL, or the ratification of Tlatelolco and the NPT, among others. This axis of its foreign policy was complemented by participation in international and peacekeeping operations, as well as by the abandonment of policies for autonomous development in sensitive areas, like the Cónдор II project: a sort of demilitarization of diplomacy.

At this time, Brazil sought greater projection in multilateral areas with a more universalist spirit, while Argentina took a more Westernized and north-aligned posture. In this sense, Brazil was presented as the benchmark of an essentially economic alliance. However, many bilateral instruments were implemented in this decade.

The first instrument institutionalized this government was the **Argentine-Brazilian Declaration on Common Nuclear Policy** of Foz do Iguacu signed in November 1990, which established new bases for the definite insertion into the global structure of nuclear material through the establishment of a Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and Installations (*Sistema Común de Contabilidad y Control de Materiales e Instalación Nucleares*, SCCC, in Spanish), whose goal was that both countries developed peaceful activities, raising the need to negotiate amendments to the International Atomic Energy Agency for the entry into force of the Tlatelolco Treaty in both countries.

The establishment of SCCC soon raised the need for a mechanism or institution responsible for its implementation. The latter could be implemented through the **Cooperation Agreement between the Government of Argentina and the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil on the Exclusively Peaceful**

Use of Nuclear Energy, signed in the city of Guadalajara on July 18, 1991. Also known as the Guadalajara Agreement, this instrument allowed the creation of Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Accounting and Controlling of Nuclear Materials (*Agencia Brasileño Argentina de Contabilidad y Control de Materiales Nucleares*, ABACC). It was responsibility of ABACC the administration and implementation of the SCCC.

Another breakthrough was the **Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Argentina and the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil for Consultation and Coordination**, signed in April 1997. Its aim was the establishment of a permanent mechanism for consultation and coordination for the strengthening of bilateral relations in defense and international security. It oversees the examination, evaluation, implementation and monitoring of defense and security issues of mutual interest related to military equipment and training, joint military exercises, among others.

In this sense, one observes the integrating engagement of both countries, which constitutes a security process. Within this process, the arrangements for the peaceful use of nuclear energy were essential, since they were established as the first measures of confidence that helped starting it up. In this context, the frequency of exchanges between institutions, coupled with the high-level political dialogue led to profound and positive changes in mutual perceptions.

Moreover, two treaties of great significance for both Argentina and Brazil are the Tlatelolco Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Both countries adhered these treaties during the 1990s and, therefore, the agreements deserve a separate paragraph. The **Tlatelolco Treaty, or Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean**, was signed in 1967, and its goal is the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the region. To achieve its objective, it proposes outlawing production, storage, introduction or stationing of nuclear weapons in the region, except for the right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Argentina signed the Treaty but its Congress did not ratify it, arguing that the mechanisms of control system established to prevent the proliferation did not ensure an adequate protection for industrial secrets, affecting the national nuclear technologies and “(...) it established distinctions between the signatories, characterizing a position contrary to the principle of legal equality of members states” (Brigagão and

Valle Fonrouge 1999, 13. Our translation.). These arguments contributed to Argentina and Brazil to pass long years without a full and unreserved adherence to the treaty, though they actively participated of the creation of it. The adhesive process began in 1992, when both countries presented a set of subsequently adopted amendments at the conference of the OPANAL, with the aim of enabling the full entry into force of this regional legal regime. Argentina and Brazil, original signers of the Treaty, ratified it in 1994.

On the other hand, the **Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)** guided Argentina and Brazil through different paths and was ratified recently, in 1995 and 1998, respectively. Since its inception, the two countries stood out in international forum for their persistent opposition because of the discriminatory nature of the treaty and its restriction to the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes by developing states that ratified it. This attitude remained unchanged until the 1990s, when both countries would ratify it, although with different paces. According to Waisman (2010), this was because in Argentina civilian control over the military system is greater than in Brazil, where military sectors showed strong opposition to the NPT.

After a decade of a *Menemista* government, the *Alianza* formed by the *radicalismo* and the *Frepaso* came to power. Affirming to be a different model than the precedent neoliberal project, it could not reverse the consequences of those policies. After the assumption of De la Rúa, the country faced a large fiscal deficit, a considerable foreign debt and a huge dependence on international capital markets. Given the critical situation, *Alianza* ended up applying adjustment measures and thus slowing economic recovery. The instability of policies at the domestic level had its counterpart in international politics. According to Miranda (2003), we can characterize the foreign policy of this period through elements such as discontinuation due to confusing and contradictory actions; the inefficiency in handling context changes and adapting; and the instability.

In this period, the government will seek the relaunching of MERCOSUR and the deepening of ties with Brazil. However, we can say that the latter is a misperception by the Argentina government, since Brazil was immersed in their domestic problems and was not interested in consolidating the MERCOSUR, on the contrary, it intended that Argentina only endorsed its

initiatives. Proof of this is the First Summit of South American Presidents, held in Brasilia in 2000, where President Fernando Henrique Cardoso claimed the regional integration through the complementation of MERCOSUR and CAN, proposing a South American free trade area. This fact marks the Brazilian leadership at the time when offering its market to the region in exchange for recognition of its strategic importance, resulting in Argentina's secondary role.

In 2003, Néstor Kirchner took office after winning just 22% of the votes. It was a government with little legitimacy in tune with the crisis of representation of Argentina at that time. During these events, it is not difficult to suppose that foreign policy was used as an instrument to domestic legitimization, at least until 2005. This scenario was transformed when the ruling party won enough votes in the 2005 legislative elections, allowing it to have more popular support. There are several hypotheses about the foreign policy of Néstor Kirchner. Both Llenderozas (2006) and De la Balze (2010) interpret it as a tool for internal legitimacy, while others, like Simonoff (2009) believe it was a double standard policy, where there were rhetorically revindicative purposes, but the necessary concessions were hidden. It is not our goal to develop a detailed analysis of this issue, but we regard as essential to understand that this administration tried to differentiate itself from the others, as we can observe a return to Latin America and a decline in the "carnal relations" with the United States.

In an international context marked by mistrust due to the declaration of default and the indifference of some states in the region due to the political alignment of Argentina to the U.S. Department of State's objectives during the previous decade, a retake of the regional policy was attempted by deepening ties with Brazil. This objective intended to regain some credibility when renegotiating the debt with international financial institutions and private creditors. The relationship with Brazil during the first Kirchner mandate was based on the attempt to deepen MERCOSUR. The bilateral relationship fluctuated between political cooperation supported by permanent consultations and coordination of positions in international forums, and trade conflicts due to nontariff restrictions and export subsidies by Brazil. However, these differences did not dampen cooperation.

On the other hand, the relationship with Brazil allowed Argentina to resume a certain international presence. This is expressed in various fields, like

the agreements on Cooperative Security. In this regard, it should be noted the changing international situation after the 9/11 attacks, which ended “securitizing” the agenda in Latin America due to the influence exerted by the United States. In addition, the new transnational threats put the region on alert and encouraged cooperative agreements on the subject.

When reviewing the bilateral agreements between the two countries during the *Alianza* administration, we are faced with a history linked to the MERCOSUR: the cooperation between Argentina and Brazil regarding to the problem of the Triple Frontier. In the words of Martínez and Tibiletti, the measures carried forward “(...) took away the ghost of a so-called lawless area, which could serve as a pretext for foreign intervention in the region” (2009, 231). With respect to this issue, collaborative spaces were maintained, such as the creation of the Coordination Center of Police Training (*Centro de Coordinación de Capacitación Policial*, CCCP, in Spanish).

Turning to bilateral agreements of strictly nuclear nature, we note that the Joint Declaration that creates the **Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Applications of Nuclear Energy** (*Agencia Argentino Brasileña de Aplicaciones de la Energía Nuclear*, ABAEN, in Spanish), signed on August 14, 2001, opened a new chapter in the relationship of both countries by enhancing cooperation in nuclear applications, such as the nuclear fuel cycle, production of radioisotopes, management of radioactive waste and participation in the development of innovative technology for power generating reactors.

The short and unstable government of Fernando De la Rúa also saw its difficulties reflected on the field of nuclear cooperation with Brazil. After several interim presidents, the arrival of *Kirchnerismo* will strengthen, not without shocks, ties with Brazil, and will extend the bilateral mechanisms directed towards the formation of a process of cooperative security.

There are several agreements on security between the two countries due to the political affinity between both governments. On August 15, 2003 the **Memorandum of Understanding between the Foreign Ministers of Argentina and Brazil** was signed in Asuncion. Its aim was to reaffirm the commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation, the promotion of commercial and non-commercial cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, to initiate consultations with a view to developing joint projects in the framework of space

programs, development of satellites and other common interests, and to deal with the Argentine participation in future activities of the Alcântara Center. Furthermore, it approaches the beginning of consultations aimed at the co-production of aircraft and aeronautical equipment. Under these assumptions, the exchange of scientific, industrial and commercial technical information was developed.

Two years after the Memorandum, it was time for the **Framework Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Defense between Argentina and Brazil** signed in Puerto Iguazú on November 23, 2005, which aims to strengthen political defense cooperation through the exchange of experiences in designing and managing defense policies and actions in the area of planning, budget management, research and development, logistic support and procurement of defense products and services.

On 30 November of the same year, the **Joint Declaration on Nuclear Policy of Puerto Iguazu** is materialized. Both presidents renewed their historic commitment to the Declaration of Iguazú, highlighting the importance of a broad set of new protocols and cooperation instruments, including the Joint Declaration on Nuclear Policy as a highlight.

The need to define potential joint projects led to the **Framework Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Defence between Argentina and Brazil** on February 22, 2008. This agreement includes nuclear cooperation, infrastructure, energy and defense, and it consists of other 17 agreements. It aimed constituting binational subcommittees for strategic projects under the framework of the joint working group in order to undertake actions aimed at developing cooperation in research, development and joint production in the area of defense.

In the 2010 **Declaration of San Juan**, Cristina Fernández and Lula da Silva highlighted the successful independent implementation of comprehensive safeguards by ABACC and the IAEA for more than fifteen years. The heads of state signed a series of agreements, including one on nuclear cooperation to launch a project of reactors, one for each country, for the shipbuilding industry and medicinal uses. Fernandez claimed that both countries are convinced of the right to develop nuclear energy projects under the non-proliferation framework, for peaceful and alternative energy purposes only.

On January 31, 2011, in the context of the official visit of Dilma Rousseff to her counterpart Cristina Fernández, an agreement by which the CNEA and CNEN will jointly build two research reactors was signed. They also ratified the Joint Presidential Declaration on Nuclear Policy signed in San Juan in its entirety and encouraged the political dialogue established in the Standing Committee on Nuclear Policy (*Comité Permanente de Política Nuclear*, CPPN, in Spanish), in order to continue the exchange of information on the status of both countries' nuclear programs, coordination of positions in international forums, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), among others, and the political assessment of bilateral nuclear cooperation and the functioning of ABACC, in order to enhance its role.

On 5 September of the same year, the **Joint Declaration of the Ministers of Defense** Arturo Puricelli of Argentina and Celso Amorim of Brazil was signed. They reaffirmed the importance of the strategic relationship on defense and celebrated the launch of the Vice-ministerial Strategic Political Mechanism for Dialogue (*Mecanismo de Diálogo Político Estratégico Viceministerial*, MDPEVM, in Spanish). Under the purpose of deepening the political-strategic dialogue and cooperation in defense, the maintenance of South Atlantic as a Peace Zone free of nuclear weapons was established. Furthermore, they worked on the coordination of positions on the prospects for the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), on cooperation of the Armed Forces in Peacekeeping Operations, on coordination of positions and actions in the ambit of the UNASUR South American Defense Council and other forums, and on the strengthening of a joint program of exercises. Bearing in mind the intention to cooperate in technology and production, it was considered to advance in terms of shipbuilding, aerospace equipment and computer science. It is clear the multidimensionality of security cooperation.

Once these bilateral agreements were described, it is clear that cooperation is also given in order to avoid an energy crisis. This topic is of great significance for two economies that need to diversify its energy matrix. In the case of Brazil⁹, nuclear energy accounts for 3% of current energy generation, and in Argentina, 7%. But the bilateral cooperation is not enough to achieve

⁹ Today, Brazil relies on hydroelectric energy for 91% of its energy supply.

the “energy goals”, since they depend on other projects and most experienced nuclear partners willing to make a technology transfer.

Another factor to be considered is the growing strategic influence and the opportunity for both countries to become global participants of the nuclear fuel market. From a geopolitical perspective, these circumstances would help Brazil to strengthen its leadership at regional and global levels. The active participation of Brazil in the creation of UNASUR and its proposal for the creation of a South American Defense Council are two indicators of this state’s intention to achieve regional leadership. In addition, Brazil has demonstrated a sustained effort to expand its influence outside the region, either through the campaign for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, their participation in rapidly developing economies (BRIC) along with Russia, India and China, or its intention to partner with selective developed countries in selective international projects on nuclear fusion, such as the ITER (originally, the international consortium for the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor).

The control over sophisticated nuclear technology provides an international prestige aspired by both Brazil and Argentina. The latter has had a Latin American nuclear leadership for a long time, but that leadership was lost due to successive political and economic crisis. Under the circumstances, it seems that Argentina is a very suitable partner for Brazil since it has the know-how, it is not competing for leadership and apparently considers the consortium as a good opportunity to reactivate its decayed nuclear program. This strategic alliance could also turn Brazil and Argentina in global suppliers of enriched uranium and advanced reactors of intermediate power.

From a the non-proliferation standpoint, a bilateral business conducted by two democratic countries without regional conflicts, and operating under the effective control of international organizations such as the ABACC and IAEA offers much more guarantees than independent projects developed in isolation. In any case, nuclear alliances should be based on transparency and be developed under close monitoring by the international community in order to extend this process of cooperative security.

4. By way of Conclusion

The particularities of the different governments in both sides of the border often hampered the consolidation of integration processes, but the bilateral cooperation was overall stimulated during the negotiations analyzed in our work. The government of Raúl Alfonsín, in spite of the many difficulties faced due to the stage after Falklands War, the instability of the political system and the severe economic crisis, could make cooperative gestures to Brazil that can be observed by the number of signed agreements and visits paid by both presidents. These decisions led to the creation of Confidence Building Measures between the two states on security.

The advent of neoliberalism in the region conditioned the regional cooperation to the principles of market economy, although it was not drifted away from the agenda. The various initiatives, including MERCOSUR, were bounded to trade liberalization, isolating any deeper political alliance proposed. However, there was a boost for the adhesion of Argentina and Brazil to the large international regimes governing separate nuclear developments and the utilization of nuclear energy. At different speeds, both countries adhered.

The political and economic destabilization suffered by Argentina in the late-1990s shows its correlation in the scarcity of agreements with Brazil to deepen the process of Cooperative Security, a situation that began to turn during the government of Néstor Kirchner.

This path led to a gradual and cumulative increase in the weight of conflict prevention components, which also greatly expanded the scope of cooperative relations between the two states. Thus, it is possible to appreciate the importance and significance of the experience of bilateral cooperation in the sector, which involved the development of a functional common policy to build mutual trust and a security process, both essential for the construction of a relatively successful integration process and for a healthy consolidation of a democratic regime in the region. Cooperative security is a process that finds its natural habitat in democracy. The recovery of the institutions promoted regional integration in many areas. The economic and trade cooperation, represented by MERCOSUR, along with the various bilateral agreements were pioneer, generating a set of policies and shared visions also reflected in the

ambit of security. A complex ambit, especially between two countries that have a history of distrust and rivalry.

Argentina and Brazil led a transformation process of their relations, from the tension of military rule to the approach in times of restoration of democracy, and then to a political, economic and strategic alliance that began in the 1990s and has been consolidated since 2003, at least from a discursive point of view.

Both Argentina and Brazil were pioneers in nuclear technology in the region, which somehow led to active cooperation with their neighbors. However, the model of autonomous nuclear development that characterized the 1980s was replaced by that of self-restraint and external controls in the 1990s, in response to external pressures. Finally, during the presidential terms of Lula and Kirchner a part of the autonomous margin in nuclear development was recovered, and this has led to some scuffles with international monitoring bodies. Despite the ambitious nuclear program presented by the Argentine president, it is Brazil that carries out the most important developments in the nuclear field in this period.

We believe that Argentina and Brazil have actually started an irreversible path towards Cooperative Security. Besides, they have intensified their bilateral ties in other areas, making regional integration a multidimensional dynamic. Without actions or decisions that build trust and transparency, it is impossible to advance in other agreements. In short, in the words of Brigagão (2011. Our translation.): “Argentina and Brazil created a political, diplomatic and technical architecture through a very good and sophisticated articulated system based on confidence-building cooperation”.

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ABSTRACT

The article applies the Cooperative Security approach to the bilateral relation between Argentina and Brazil through the development of Confidence-Building Measures as elements that generate mechanisms of long-term cooperation. The aim is to review bilateral cooperation in the nuclear field.

KEYWORDS

Cooperative Security; Confidence-Building Measures; Brazil; Argentina.

*Received on August 28, 2014.
Approved on November 07, 2014.*

Translated by Pedro Alt

IN THE SHADOW OF EMPIRE: REFLECTING ON THE POLITICAL STRATEGIC POSITION OF SMALL STATES IN EUROPE AND THE CARIBBEAN BASIN DURING THE COLD WAR

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Introduction

Any evaluation of 20th century international political and socio-economic engagements inevitably draws heavily on the literature depicting the relations between and within the Cold War blocs. Such cognitive benchmarking has become so extensive that even the earth-shattering World Wars, which preceded US-Soviet brinkmanship, have been sewn together to the Cold War so as to produce a meta-narrative as a means of understanding the dynamics of international relations themselves. For instance, WWI has not merely entered the history books for what *it* produced; it has also come to be seen as producing the right conditions for Russia's communist revolution and the US's rise to inherit the position of Western leadership—two necessary prequels to the half century of Cold War. But not before these two ideologically opposed blocs join forces to rid the world of fascism and the German pivot in European affairs. WWII has come to represent three chapters in the story of civilisation: the story of genocide (re: Nazi Germany's quest to exterminate world Jewry), the

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story of non-nationalistic secular ideological struggles and the story of power beyond the pale of power (re: the nuclearisation of power). In other words, WWII has also, largely, been included as a necessary chapter to the Cold War. And certainly it was. Without WWII it is difficult to imagine how, or if, the USSR would have driven west and occupied Central Europe, whether the West European states would not have deployed East, if the US would have deepened its engagements to Europe or any number of dynamics would have unfolded. It is clear that the Cold War is a defining period of international relations history.

Yet, such grandstanding, by its nature, implies the imbalance of global power to the point that only two state-blocs are said to have dominated international political life for the better part of a century. While this may be empirically verifiable in terms of deployments, engagements and projections there are fatal flaws with such generalisations; they tend to overstate the roles of the superpowers and under-appreciate the roles of smaller states and the alliances and competitions that defined their global position and foreign policy orientations. These too were – and are – important and deserve both recognition and exploration.

This work takes a stab at redressing the instinctive neglect of the small states that affected the Cold War system of transatlantic and transpacific competition and has bled over to more recent times. While delving into the dynamics of small states in a world system dominated by superpowers requires exhaustive investigations, this work provides only a modest baby-step. Its intention is to define, conceptually, small states and demonstrate how these have come to occupy the proverbial “shatterbelts” that exist in the “friction zones;” the overlapping spaces of super- and great powers’ spheres of influence. Since the Cold War was (roughly) divided into two main blocs, and given that the flexibility of small states to determine their own foreign policy direction was severely restrained by their bloc-leader, explorations of small state relations during the Cold War are limited to the intra-bloc level. For the purposes of this work, examples are drawn primarily from the superpowers’ immediate geopolitical spheres of influence – the US and Central and South American states and the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries – since this work is concerned with how the small states, in the shadow of empire, determined their relations. These regions are also important since the USSR sought to check US power in the Americas through the sponsorship of communist military,

paramilitary and political activities while the US reinforced anti-communist governments in Western and Southern Europe and spent considerable energies galvanising NATO. In short, the Caribbean was to the USSR what Western (and Southern) Europe was to the US; a pressure point on the geostrategic body of its adversary. Additionally, the geographical, cultural, socio-political and economic differences between the US's and Soviet's spheres render comparison both interesting and stimulating. This work is organised accordingly.

1. Theorising on Small States

The importance of small states in the preservation of a regional or even the international balance of power should not be understated. Just as Belgian neutrality helped preserve the pre-WWI balance of European power, so Georgia's more recent attempts to enter Western security organisations prodded Russian aggression. Large and superpowers go to great lengths to anchor small states into their security architecture and jealously defend the status quo whether the people of such small states agree or not. Democracy is a luxury for states obsessed with their perceived geopolitical survival. With this in mind, it is necessary to define small states and evaluate their specific behaviours vis-à-vis the world's great and superpowers. Since this work is devoted to understanding the political nuances during the Cold War years, attention is paid to the period 1945-1991. Additionally, this section is not exclusively focused on relations between the members of the Soviet's two pincers – the Warsaw Pact states and the “stragglers of the Caribbean” – but seeks to provide a wider understanding of small states.

1.1. What are Small States?

A distinct body of international relations literature focuses on the nature, behaviour and policy orientations of small states and small powers.² This collection of texts provides a solid arch between historic (re: the Republic of Venice) and more contemporary examples of small states (re: The Grand Duchy

² This theoretical section first appeared in: Mitchell Belfer (2014), *Small State, Dangerous Region: A Strategic Assessment of Bahrain*, Peter Lang Publishing, Frankfurt, Germany.

of Luxembourg). However, such treatments tend to be generalisations in that many of their assumptions are time-specific and seldom appreciate changes to the fabric of international relations. In other words, many of the scholars who examine small states tend to act as historians, rather than international relations scholars, and freeze-frame the small states of their investigations. The idea that there are small and medium, large, great and superpowers operating in the international arena is hardly novel; international relations scholarship has been concerned with such distinctions from its inception. Therefore, to determine precisely what a small state is, it is essential to take a theoretical back-step, to the "last year of the Napoleonic Wars. Previously [...] "the assumption had been that all sovereign and independent states were in theory equal, whatever might be their responsibilities or physical strength."³

From this initial point, the assumption was that all states had been considered equal and the principle of non-intervention into the domestic affairs of other states was set as an iron rule. However, such iron rules are typically bent by the raw muscle of great powers, which, in their determination to extend their power-bases and projection capacities often got involved in others' affairs; small and large alike.

Indeed, Rothstein recalls that the

[...] presumed equality of all states did not, of course, prevent the Great Powers from treating weaker states instrumentally. Small Powers threatened by neighbouring Great Powers, or intent on security benefits for themselves in the course of Great Power conflicts, were forced to play a perilous game: moving quickly from the lighter to the heavier side of the balance as soon as an apparent victor in any contest could be discerned.⁴

Such sentiments point to pragmatic leadership as the pillar for national-state longevity since – if small states were treated instrumentally and were forced to quickly shift their alliances – only prudent leaders are able to recognise power shifts and rapidly realign to ensure survival. Yet, small states do not operate from within a political vacuum and they are not blessed with

³ Harold Nicolson (1961), *The Congress of Vienna: A Study in Allied Unity, 1812-1822*, NY: The Viking Press, p. 137, quoted in Robert L. Rothstein (1968), *Alliances and Small Powers*, Columbia UP, p. 11.

⁴ Robert L. Rothstein (1968), *Alliances and Small Powers*, Columbia UP, p. 11.

having only to deal with regional balancing in an effort to defend their interests and ensure their survival. Often, small states are themselves the issue which inspires great power competition and, at times, conflict. Cuba's chapter in communist revolution is a reminder of the intensity great powers may be willing to go in order to project themselves and absorb small states into their spheres of influence; the international community had never before – or since – been closer to nuclear Armageddon as the US quarantined the Island and actively deterred further Soviet expansion. Castro understood how antagonistic his regime was to the US, and made his alignment choices accordingly. However, he could not anticipate the lengths the US was willing to go in order to preserve the regional balance of power—and terror. Castro's pragmatism was less than optimal and Cuba has suffered economically as a result. But yet, it has survived. The same could be said of a later attempt to set up a (claimed) radical communist regime in Grenada following the 1983 assassination of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop. The US's Operation Urgent Fury amounted to the rendering of an independent Grenadine state to the humiliating position of pseudo-puppet of the US. When small states act imprudently and without regard for their role in preserving a regional balance of power, they risk their national sovereignty and survival.

So, small states must not only be concerned with regional balancing, they must also attempt to keep a "low profile" since those small states that "came to the attention of the Great Powers [...] were only noticed when they became an object of desire for a Great Power, or when they intruded too noticeably in the diplomatic game."⁵

For Rothstein, small states are understood to be defined according to three important benchmarks. Firstly, that they are treated instrumentally, that there is an invisible hand which determines their freedom of action and limits the extent of their independence in terms of developing an foreign policy entirely rooted in national interests defined according to the demands of the population and political classes. Secondly, that small states are forced into a perilous game of constant balancing, expending tremendous political and economic energies (and resources) to ensure that they are on the "winning" side of a balance and do not get caught-up in regional and international

⁵ Ibid, p. 12.

competitions beyond their capabilities. And, finally, that small states are specifically restricted in foreign policy making in that larger powers' foreign policies act as the basis for small states' decision-making.

Even a cursory glance at many of the Latin American, Caribbean and Central/Eastern European states – in the shadow of the US and Soviet empires – confirms the validity of Rothstein's observations. The Soviets were less concerned with the Cuban revolution and social justice in that country than they were of off-setting US power in the Northern Caribbean region, just like the US was hardly concerned with the fallout of the coup d'état against Allende and the emergence of the Pinochet regime in Chile.⁶ Such instrumental treatments of allies was hardly confined to Latin America; Central and Eastern European states faced similar conditions as the 1956 Russo-Hungarian conflict and the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia attest. But whereas Rothstein suggested that "an invisible hand" determined small states' freedom to formulate an independent foreign policy, the Cold War superpowers were not subtle; the hand was visible and clenched.

In terms of being "forced into a perilous game of constant balancing [...] to ensure that they are on the 'winning' side of a balance and do not get caught-up in regional and international competitions beyond their capabilities," the level of instrumentalism precluded alliance fluidity among the small states during the Cold War. Sure, both Albania and Romania abandoned the Warsaw Pact, and it is true that France withdrew from military cooperation in NATO, however in no case did such alliance defections threaten bloc political security and, besides, these episodes served more as exceptions than the rule. For the most part, the Cold War was a grand balancing act and the small states were largely locked into it as a result of their instrumental treatment by the superpowers. There were few avenues of recourse. Albania had to tie itself to an invigorating China, Romania had to flirt with the US, France and Italy while France had to remain committed to the US on a bilateral level. In each case of Cold War bloc adjustments, balances were reaffirmed rather than disregarded.⁷

⁶ See: Peter Kornbluh (2003), *The Pinochet File*, The New Press, New York: USA.

⁷ See: Raymond L. Garthoff (1995), *The Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, Issue 5, p. 111.

Finally, that small states are specifically restricted in foreign policy making in that larger powers' foreign policies, act as the basis for small states' decision-making was a very important observation. When the USSR sought inroads into Latin America, it enlisted its Czechoslovak ally since the latter retained (relatively) good relations in the region. Czechoslovakia's acceptance of playing the role of trailblazer had less to do with instinctive Czechoslovak policy preferences and more to do with the fact that foreign policy decisions were increasingly made in, and by, Moscow.⁸

In the heat of the Cold War, Rothstein remarked that "for Small Powers [...] the solution to any 'security-dilemma' must come from an outside source."⁹ In the breakdown of US hegemony this is again a key feature of being a small state, however at this time in history being able to solve a security dilemma is much more difficult owing to the nature of regional competitions, especially in dangerous regions. The Caribbean Basin, Latin America and Central/Eastern Europe were – throughout the 20th century – terribly dangerous. Whether referring to the Maoist Shining Path insurgency in Peru, the incessant interstate conflicts in Central America, notably the famous Postage Stamp War of 1937 between Nicaragua and Honduras, the 1969 Football War between El Salvador and Honduras and the simmering (often erupting) tensions between Costa Rica and Nicaragua over the San Juan River, to name a few, there is a disproportionate level of political violence in and around the southern 3/4^{ths} of the Americas. This is mostly due to the high proportion of small states and their security requirements only able to be fulfilled through the enlisting of large regional or international powers. Hence, while the solution to their security dilemmas must come from an outside source, such exogenous actors may be, at least partially, responsible for the initiation of the security dilemmas in the first place since the exogenous state treats the small state instrumentally; in pursuit of its own interests. Small state conflict may, very well, be the residue of great powers' pursuits of their interests.

⁸ See: Matyas Pelant (2013), 'Czechoslovakia and Brazil, 1945-1989: Diplomats, Spies and Guerrilheiros,' *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies*, 7:3, pp. 96-117. See also: Josef Opatrný (2013), 'Czechoslovak-Latin American Relations, 1945-1989: The Broader Context,' *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies*, 7:3, pp. 12-37.

⁹ Rothstein (1968), p. 24.

Indeed, similar to the pre-WWI/WWII periods,

Small Powers must, therefore, rely on essentially ambiguous external aid for the accomplishment of the basic goal of all states: survival. If they have learned anything from history, it is that external support usually arrives late, and that it is given only in expectation of future benefits.¹⁰

Additionally, there is a "narrow margin of safety which a Small Power possesses. With a small territory (normally), with few resources, and with uncertain friends, it has very little time in which to correct mistakes. Fearing to take risks, caution is enjoined."¹¹ The Hungarian revolution serves as a case in point.¹² While the US and its Western European allies certainly encouraged the Hungarians to rebel against the USSR for the purpose of fracturing the communist presence in Central Europe, there would be no support when Hungary needed it most.¹³ Instead, Hungary had to absorb all the risk and paid for its miscalculations in blood and harsh political and economic restrictions following the Soviet invasion. And, to add insult to injury, it seems that the manner in which the US sought to empower Hungary's more moderate communists, may have directly contributed to the Soviet decision to invade the country and depose Nagy.¹⁴ Meanwhile, by the time the US had mobilised its allies to even agree on lending support to the Hungarians, the war had already been concluded. The West, it seems, was ready to fight the USSR to the last Hungarian.

Small states are not only vulnerable owing to their dependence on unreliable and selfish allies, they are additionally – owing to the size of their territory – made vulnerable based on their geopolitical position and, importantly, the shortened timeframe they are forced to operate from. Political life is simply accelerated because patience is a luxury small states can ill-afford. Indeed, "few Small Powers enjoy the luxury of possessing enough strength to

¹⁰ Ibid, p. 24.

¹¹ Ibid, p. 25.

¹² See: Johanna C. Granville (2004), *The First Domino: International Decision Making During the Hungarian Crisis of 1956*, Texas A&M UP.

¹³ See: Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid, pp. 200-201.

handle all the problems on their political horizons; at best, they may be able to confront and survive the most serious problems, provided they perceive them accurately."¹⁵

So, an additional aspect of small states, recognised as *the* central pillar for their survival rests on leadership and decision-making. It is as though all small states are permanently on war-footing, rapidly altering policy as new information streams in. Foreign and defence ministries, the office of Prime Minister and, basically, the entire spectrum of executive and legislative personnel, are forced to work constantly, and prudently, if their state is to survive. This may, perhaps, offer a partial explanation as to the forms of government adopted in both Central/Eastern Europe and Latin America during the Cold War; strong leadership, cults of personality and raw populism.¹⁶ Often the internal dimensions of policy-making lay beyond the scope of adequate investigation, however, in small states there is a prevailing national feeling of fear that a policy choice is inadequate or that certain regional tides are too strong to resist and "the psychology of fear leads Small Powers in conflicting directions,"¹⁷ which are very difficult to reconcile.

1.2. What Makes a Small State Small? Two Variables.

For all the previous discussion about the intrinsic vulnerabilities, which define small states, it is also important to clearly indicate particular aspects of a state which render it small and hence prone to the vulnerabilities highlighted above. For the purposes of this work, there are two main approaches to understanding what makes a small state small, an *absolute* and a *relative*, both of which are reflected in the interaction of two variables.

¹⁵ Rothstein (1968), p. 25.

¹⁶ For a reading into economic populism in Latin America see: Sebastian Edwards (2010), *Left Behind: Latin America and the False Promise of Populism*, University of Chicago Press. While this work is geared towards explaining the manner in which policy orientations and ideologies have largely plagued Latin American economic growth, it hints at the forms of nepotism and sectoral empowerment that is often a reflection of both paranoid and cultish leaders. For a reading into the cult of personality and leadership in communist Central and Eastern Europe during the Cold War see: Ben Fowkes (1999), *The Post-Communist Era: Change and Continuity in Eastern Europe*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York: USA.

¹⁷ Rothstein (1968), p. 28.

These are:

1. **Population Size:** the total number of residents (citizens and non-citizens alike) of a given state;
2. **National Territorial Area:** the geo-strategic depth of the state and the resources available to it.

These are borrowed (though refined) from East's four variable depiction of the "conventional model" of a small state where he suggests that

This conventional model generally assumes that small states are characterised by one or more of the following: (1) small land area, (2) small total population, (3) small total GNP (or other measure of total productive capacity, and (4) a low level of military capabilities.¹⁸

The decision to omit GNP and the level of military capabilities was made on the basis that GNP refers to the size of a country's economy and not its geopolitical dynamics. At the same time, international relations and security are much more nuanced and the strict criteria of maintaining a low level of military capabilities is not an indication of national size, or power (for that matter). Instead, while not considered a variable, this work recognises the variance of national demands and the capabilities to satisfy them as indicative of a small state since it seems that small states feel national (and sectorial and sub-national) demands much more acutely than larger entities. Owing to the fact that a small state is territorially small and contains a small population, it follows that there will be less demands and more opportunity to satisfy such demands. Or, alternatively, there may be more demands and less opportunity to satisfy them, implying that small states are forced to behave differently than larger entities owing to the inherent internal tensions that are derived from the variance between demands and national capabilities. However, since such situations arise as a symptom of being small and not a cause, demands vs. capabilities are understood as symptomatic.

¹⁸ Maurice A. East (1973), 'Size and Foreign Policy Behaviour: A Test of Two Models,' *World Politics*, 25:4, p. 557.

Variable 1: Population Size

Population size continues to matter in terms of fielding adequate numbers of citizens for political, military, social, diplomatic and economic activities. While using population as an indication of “small” or not small has been the centre of many international relations debates, it is a key determinate deployed throughout this work.¹⁹ Sawyer notes that

Of all national characteristics, size is probably the most obvious—but this makes it no less important. And although population is the most prominent representative of size, such variables as a nation’s energy resources, arable land, and GNP also load highly on this factor.²⁰

This work also recognises that other factors may be considered for the overall understanding of what makes a state small or large (or other sizes for that matter), though maintains that population size is the most relevant since only through the fielding of individuals into a states’ political structures, its armed forces and its economic agents and bodies can national mobilisation occur. Given that small states have a smaller pool of individuals to fill such positions and roles, it stands to reason that small states are characterised by small pools of individuals and hence size does matter; if a state has less politically capable persons to draw on, less soldiers to conscript or enlist, and less economic actors then the entire national apparatus will be affected even if the state in question is wealthy and controls significant natural resources.

It is also useful to note that population size does not positively reflect power – small states may be relatively powerful or weak – it depends on a wide assortment of interacting variables. In this, despite the fact that “merely possessing a larger army, more advanced weapons, or a modern economy does not guarantee the ability to achieve desired ends – the relationship between tangible power and the achievement of national goals has become more and more indirect and obscure.”²¹ So, small states may retain power and large states

¹⁹ For an overview of the population size debate see: Maass (2009), pp. 70-74.

²⁰ Jack Sawyer (1967), ‘Dimensions of Nations: Size, Wealth and Politics,’ *American Journal of Sociology*, 73:2, p. 152.

²¹ Rothstein (1968), pp. 19-20.

may be weak. However, the size of the national entity does impact on the way the state behaves since small states tend to rely on alliances and are more acutely aware of their vulnerabilities than larger states are. Hence, understanding the role that population size plays in national political cultures and behaviours is an important task. Unfortunately, discussion in this section departs from such theorising to return to the task at hand; determining the criteria required to define a state as being small (or otherwise).

The Absolute Approach—looks at the total number of a state's inhabitants – citizens and residents – and if the population size is 1.5 million or less it is considered a small state. This number is not arbitrarily ascribed, it has been selected since the vast majority of recognised national state enterprises consist of populations which number more than 1.5 million and thus states with (or less than) such a population base are in the clear minority.²² Additionally, in states with (or less than) such a population base it may be assumed that less than one million are eligible members of the state's economic, political, social and military life. So, a population of one and a half million, after deducting the number of aged, young and incapacitated, results in a population of roughly one million contributing persons. Although such states are comparatively rare, there are still numerous examples of them, though for the case at hand, these tend to be found in, or proximate to the Caribbean region – both island states and along the littoral – not among the Central and Eastern European states during the Cold War.²³ Consider for example: Anguilla (UK, 12,000), Antigua and Barbuda (73,000), Aruba (Netherlands, 100,000), The Bahamas (310,000), Barbados (270,000), Belize (256,000), Bermuda (UK, 82,000), Cayman Islands (UK, 40,000), Dominica (79,000), French Guiana (France, 178,000), Grenada (80,000), Guadeloupe (France, 440,000), Guyana (765,000), Martinique (France, 393,000), Montserrat (UK, 4000), Netherlands Antilles (Netherlands, 221,000), St. Kitts and Nevis (42,000), St. Lucia (149,000), St. Vincent and the

²² Of the 193 current members of the United Nations General Assembly, 150 have populations that exceed 1.5 million people implying that less than a quarter of all recognised states retain populations smaller than 1.5 million.

²³ It should be remembered that as some of the larger states fragmented, notably Yugoslavia, the succeeding states may have had populations of less than 1 million. For instance, Montenegro's population is just over 600 thousand people.

Grenadines (120,000), Surinam (435,000), Trinidad and Tobago (1.3 million), Turks and Caicos Islands (21,000), Virgin Islands (UK, 21,000) and the Virgin Islands (US, 111,000). These account for roughly half of the international community's absolutely small states.²⁴

So, for a state to qualify as absolutely small it needs to have a population of 1.5 million or less and an active, participating population of between 8 hundred thousand and 1.2 million people. In the Caribbean basin region, the vast majority of the states and territories are absolutely small. Hence, the depiction of small state behaviour (above) may be applicable since few of these states retain adequate means of self-defence and hence are treated instrumentally by the dominant regional power, the US. There were, to be sure, times where some of the more enterprising regional powers such as Cuba and Venezuela have attempted to disrupt the regional balance of power – a.k.a. US regional hegemony – but such attempts were only half-witted and haphazard.

The Relative Approach—is, in contrast, based on a 10 per cent rule, where a state is considered small relative to any one of its territorial neighbours or, in the case of island states, a state sharing the immediate littoral of the body of water surrounding it. This approach offers important insights regarding small states since it is based on relative power assessments derived from a states' demographics which – while not always a fair assessment – allows researchers to hypothesise on capabilities since states with larger populations should (in most cases) be able to enlist greater numbers of its citizens for political assignments, active armed services and economic life. Certainly, there are problems with such an approach since it does not automatically suggest power imbalances; many additional factors must be considered. For instance, large states may be more fractured, less cohesive and have fewer resources available to the state rendering it relatively weaker than a smaller adversary. While such lines of thinking is surely valuable, it is not relevant for the current discussion which narrowly seeks to illustrate what a small state is, not its power capabilities. So, with this approach in mind, when a state retains a population 10 per cent the size of a neighbour it is relatively small. With few exceptions, the states that bordered

²⁴ *Atlas of the World, Reference Edition*, The Times of London, London: UK, (2011), pp. 18-37.

on the US (237 million in 1985) and USSR (277 million in 1985) were often less than 10 per cent their size. In the Caribbean and Latin America only Mexico, Argentina and Brazil retained (in 1985) populations that exceeded the 10 per cent rule. In contrast, during the same period, only Poland was more than 10 per cent of the USSR's total population.

Variable 2: National Territorial Area

As a variable, the national territorial area indicates two key ingredients of capabilities that may render a state small or not: levels of geo-strategic depth and the presence of a sustainable resource base (including resource accessibility, conversion and mobilisation options²⁵). Unlike the manner in which population was treated above – in terms of presenting both the absolute and relative approaches separately – this subsection blends the absolute and relative approaches into the main arguments.

Geo-Strategic Depth—determining the geo-strategic depth of a state is a daunting task since it is an ambiguous variable with few mechanisms of measurement available to social scientists.²⁶ Often, the phrase geo-strategic depth is deployed in a reified manner and no clear definitions offered. This work offers an imperfect definition, though hopes that this endeavour is further developed in other works. For the purposes at hand, geo-strategic depth is considered the amount of territory a state may cede to an invading military force before having to cede ultimate sovereignty. In other words, the percentage of territory that would need to remain under the control of government “A” for that government to legitimately claim to extend sovereign control over country “A.”

²⁵ These sub-variables are borrowed from Jeffery Hart (1976), ‘Three Approaches to the Measurement of Power in International Relations,’ *International Organisation*, 30:2, pp. 289-305.

²⁶ Most scholars tend to view strategic depth as an abstraction rather than a reality of a state's geopolitical thinking. See, for instance, Faruk Yalvac (2012), ‘Strategic Depth or Hegemonic Depth? A Critical Realist Analysis of Turkey's Position in the World System,’ *International Relations*, 26:2, pp. 165-180. While Yalvac certainly contributes to the discipline of international relations through this article, it does not offer many clues as to how geo-strategic depth may be universalised as a concept and deployed in the political orientations of states. At least Yalvac attempts to understand geo-strategic depth; most others simply assume broad knowledge of the theme and omit defining it.

Consider a counterfactual situation to illustrate this point. Imagine that the Nicaraguan civil war occurred at a time of US determination to advance the cause of human rights in Central America and hence brought the superpower in to allay the dangers to the civilian population.²⁷ In the event that the US were to construct a 10 kilometre “humanitarian corridor” within Nicaraguan territory – adjacent to the Costa Rican border – for the sake of offering civilians a safe haven and thereby forcing the Sandinistas 10 kilometres back from their sovereign boundaries. Nicaragua would not cease being an independent and legitimate state as a result of such an intervention. Nicaragua’s geo-strategic depth is greater than 10 kilometres. Alternatively, if the US (in this hypothetical) were to extend its corridor 250 kilometres to include the major part of Nicaragua’s population and its industrial capabilities Nicaragua would cease being Nicaragua in its current form and be forced to adjust to being a smaller entity, say centred around Managua, or seek to regain its lost territories through guerrilla conflict. In either case, the country and its leadership would be deemed illegitimate leaders of Nicaragua, though may still be regarded as the legitimate leaders of Nicaraguans.

In this hypothetical example, Nicaragua’s strategic depth vis-à-vis the US is something around 250 kilometres. Yet even this is not a rule. If, for instance, Honduras would have militarily intervened in our Nicaragua story – to end the inevitable migration of fleeing civilians – it would not require a 250 kilometre occupation zone in order to deconstruct Nicaragua, it would only need to occupy the capital, Managua. If Honduras would successfully do so, the Nicaraguan authorities would either be deposed (killed, arrested, exiled) or forced into the hinterland to carry on the conflict using asymmetric means. In any case, this would imply that Nicaragua’s leaders could not effectively develop or implement policies for the country and hence the state would no longer exist as a unit. From this example it is clear that there are two main determinates of geo-strategic depth. Firstly, a kilometre-based determinate whereby a state’s geo-strategic depth is measured according to how much of its

²⁷ Please note that this is a counterfactual argument. Historically, the US’s support to President Somoza’s dictatorial regime is often cited as a main cause of the 1978/1979-1989 civil war since it empowered one bloc against the country’s civil society, rural classes and the intelligentsia. The civil war only ended with the signing of the Tela Accord of which the US’s role was only marginal.

national territory it must retain in order to remain the same state. Or, how much ground can it lose before it ceases being a state.

The second determinate is based around the control of the state in question's capital city since doing so has tremendous symbolic and practical meaning; it indicates that a government has lost direct control of the state's decision-making apparatuses and institutions and that the state has ceased to exist in its previous form. Consider that the USSR did not have to occupy all of Hungary to force the latter to surrender in 1956; it needed only reach Budapest and exile, kill, imprison or co-opt members of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government. While this may serve as an example of the capital city of a state as a key determinate to its geo-strategic depth, it should also be noted that threats made against a capital city can act as an effective tool in the exercise of power.

The above theorising intended to play with some of the ideas attached to geo-strategic depth. However, these have been limited to large(r) state entities and have, so far, excluded small states. While the general theory being applied here is valid for small states, the point is that retaining a small territorial surface implies retaining a more limited geo-strategic depth. Nicaragua's loss of 10 kilometres would not automatically end its sovereignty. However, if the US would invade 10 kilometres of Grenada (as it did), the latter would cease to exist and be forced to accept US domination (which it also did). For the purposes of this work then, small states naturally have a smaller geo-strategic depth than larger entities, owing to the territorial surface of the state. Hence, small states are intrinsically vulnerable since foreign occupation is made easier by small territorial surfaces and the lack of adequate geo-strategic depth.

For instance, Cuba is a relatively small island state and Czechoslovakia (was) a small territorial state and Quester's remark that chief among the vulnerabilities of such states is that "there is no hinterland for the inhabitant of the island to retreat to, there is no second line of defence, no backup position from which to repulse such foreign aggression"²⁸ is relevant. Islands are even

²⁸ George H. Quester (1983), 'Trouble in the Islands: Defending the Micro-States,' *International Security*, 8:2, p. 161.

more vulnerable than continental small states since there are no porous borders to sneak across for asylum, no safety nets and no safe havens.

Sustainable Resource Base—examines the ability a state has to practise autarky in terms of providing essential resources for the sustainability of its population based on extraction from the national territorial surface. In the contemporary international environment, complex as it is, the necessary ingredients for socio-political survival remain relatively constant. There are five. Firstly, arable land is required for hygienic living spaces and to meet dietary needs such as adequate agriculture and raising livestock for consumption. Secondly, but no less important, people require potable water; the fresh, purified water for consumption, food preparation, enabling agriculture and for ensuring sanitary conditions (cleaning of living spaces and people). Water is also an essential ingredient in modern medicines and industrial activities. Thirdly, access to energy sources adds an important dimension to the list of required resources for any political community. Energy resources may be more archaic, such as lumber. They may be oil and gas or even more sophisticated sources such as biomass. Communities need energy to light and warm their homes, prepare foods, for sterilisation of daily and medical utensils and, in more advanced societies, to power their cities, run the transportation links and provide the luxuries attached to modern living. Fourthly, human resources are required to fulfil the basic operation of a community (no matter the size). People need to be able to field key positions related to public services (police, armed forces, government, farmers, etc.) and sectors related to resource extraction, conversion and mobilisation. Finally, all political communities require adequate living spaces, places where individuals and families may habitat and public spaces where social interactions and exchanges may occur. These are the basic resources required of any community. As societies advance, so do required and desired resources; educational, industrial, commercial and social. In terms of retaining a sustainable resource base, it is clear that small states are (nearly always) at a disadvantage owing to their territorial surface size. While there is no way to determine what makes a state small according to a strict square kilometre assessment, it is possible to hypothesise according to the

blend of relative and absolute understandings of territorial size comparing inhabitants per kilometre to territorial area size.

1.3. Territorial Size as a Determinant of Small States

Population size was deployed as a variable that can be operationalised in order to, partially, determine whether or not a state is small. This section seeks to do the same with the use of territorial size. While the variable itself was explained in some depth above, this subsection presents the absolute and relative approaches required for its operationalisation. Both approaches are more concerned with the actual and potential strategic depth of states rather than a state's sustainable resource base. This selection is based on the premise that even large states may not have adequate resources for national sustainability and therefore engage in international trade to that end. At the same time, small states may, very well, retain sustainable resources for their population's needs. So, while the amount of resources is important, particularly in competitive environments, it is not utilised or further developed in the subsequent section since it may only complicate being able to comprehensively identify a state as being small.

By way of illustration, consider the example of Peru with a population of some 28 million, stretched over more than 700 thousand square kilometres. Despite its size, only a fragment of its territory is arable owing to the Andes Mountains and the protected rainforests. Hence, Peru requires international trade relationships in order to meet the basic needs of its population.²⁹ At the same time, Costa Rica's population is situated at approximately 4.5 million on a minute territorial surface, of which roughly 35 per cent is arable, implying that Costa Rica has sufficient agricultural capabilities.³⁰ This disparity in sustainable resources does not indicate either the absolute or the relative size of Peru or Costa Rica. Instead, it only exposes one dynamic. Therefore, resource sustainability is omitted from further discussion here though accepts the assumption that small states tend to have more acute difficulties in meeting the resource demands of their population. This is a point of reflection rather than a

²⁹ This information is based on the CIA Factbook 2013 (hereafter CIA Factbook) available at: <www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html> (accessed 07 September 2013).

³⁰ CIA Factbook.

rule. The following points then, indicate the absolute and relative territorial size of a state for the purpose of indicating its strategic depth.

Absolutely—small implies that the state in question contains territories smaller than 5000 square kilometres. This territorial determinant was selected due to a maximum 222.5 kilometre depth of the state in question. In other words, being able to enter a state from its frontiers and reach the geographic centre within 222.5 kilometres implies minute strategic depth and therefore indicates that the state is absolutely small. Topographical features may certainly facilitate or impair an invading military and certainly if a state has 5001 square kilometres it is in no better position, however there seems to be a major leap statistically from states that have less than 5000 square kilometres to those that retain 7000 and more. In other words, there are few states with 5000-7000 kilometres and therefore it seemed natural to place the threshold at 5000 square kilometres.³¹ In terms of topography, it should be noted that technological innovations over the past fifty years, particularly in aircraft and missile technologies, implies that territorial obstacles are more easily overcome. In this way, 5000 square kilometres offers next to no protection from air operations since such states can be over-flown in less than 20 minute. Such states are, therefore, absolutely vulnerable. In Central and Eastern Europe all countries have landmasses that exceed the 5000 square kilometre rule. In the Caribbean and Latin America, on the other hand, most of the island states retain significantly less territorial surfaces. For instance, Dominica (751 square km), Saint Lucia (616 square km), Antigua and Barbuda (442 square km), Barbados (430 square km), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (389 square km), Grenada (344 square km) and Saint Kitts and Nevis (261 square km), are all absolutely small states.

Relatively—small states are those with a territorial surface that amounts to 10 per cent or less than any of its neighbours. This 10 per cent “rule” is based on the relative strategic advantages that may be enjoyed by the greater state in terms of strategic depth and relative vulnerability. In a conflictual dyad marked by relative asymmetry in territorial size, the smaller state is less

³¹ CIA Factbook.

capable of threatening the entire larger state than a situation in the inverse. The ability of a relatively small state to occupy a territory (and population) 90 per cent or more its size is nearly impossible. Contrarily, states that are 90 (+) per cent larger than an adversary is more capable of occupying the entire small state. This is because of the relative strategic depth of the actors. Perhaps this explains the more aggressive policies of some small states vis-à-vis larger neighbours where a small state is more likely to embark on a limited aims strategy of buffer-zone building; not to conquer its larger adversary, but to occupy areas of its territory to establish a buffer so that future combat would occur on the conquered territories rather than on the national territory of the small state with its inherent vulnerabilities and lack of strategic depth. In Central and Eastern Europe, none of the members of the Warsaw Pact had a population greater than 10 per cent of the USSR, hence they were all relatively small. At the same time, in the Caribbean and Central America, all the states were less than ten per cent of the US, Brazil, and Mexico while in Latin (South) America, the majority of states are not less than 10 per cent the size of the US; though Ecuador, French Guiana, Guyana, Uruguay and Paraguay do fit the criteria for being relatively small compared to the US (and Brazil).

2. A Summary of Small States

It should be noted that being a small state, no matter whether absolutely or relatively small may be more vulnerable though this does not necessarily indicate weakness; small states can be powerful even if at a demographic or territorial disadvantage.³² However, in the clear majority of cases, small states retain very limited power and hence tend not to be aggressive; they tend to rely on alliances and alliances are, more often than not, restrictive. Or, to use the logic adopted by Aron and echoed by Maass, "small states have to have a defensive "mindset" and focus almost exclusively on their own security [... they are] unable to pursue an agenda vis-à-vis other states – because they lack the power to do so [...]"³³ This is confirmed with the cases of Central and Eastern

³² This is the main line of argumentation adopted by Michael Handel (1981), *Weak States in the International System*, New Jersey: Frank Cass Publishers.

³³ Maass (2009), p. 73.

European and Caribbean and Latin American states during the Cold War. With very few exceptions – and restraints and political violence against internal actors notwithstanding – the Cold War period was one of interstate peace in the regions in question. While some may point to the manner in which the Cold War superpowers reined over the smaller states in their respective blocs, this work argues that the reason for (largely) peaceful relations between small states in the same bloc was the defensive nature of the international system at the time. Rewards for aggression were not worth the consequences of political abortion.

Yet, the point of this work was not to illustrate the capabilities of small states or to highlight the relative importance of such actors but rather to clearly note that

Small Powers are not simply weaker Great Powers [...] they must be defined in terms of something other than their relative power status [...] there is a psychological, as well as material, distinction between Great and Small Powers. The latter earn their title not only by being weak but by recognising the implications of that condition.³⁴

So, small states are still states and not annexes to larger entities, they participate in international economic, diplomatic and political exchanges with others and contribute to their local and regional security environments. In this way, by defining small states according to their capabilities for dealing with domestic and international affairs, emphasis shifts to issues of security whereby the small state or small power cannot greatly affect the internal dynamics of its larger neighbours and therefore opts to focus its political energies on enhancing its own security position.

Hence, for this work, a small state

[...] recognises that it cannot obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities, and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, institutions, processes, or developments to do so; the Small Power's belief in its

³⁴ Rothstein (1968), p. 29.

inability to rely on its own means must also be recognised by the other states involved in international politics.³⁵

And that a small state is

[...] defined by its limited capability to: (1) influence the security interests of, or directly threaten, a great power; and (2) defend itself against an attack by an equally motivated great power.³⁶

These are based on the definition of small states developed above which notes that they are either absolutely or relatively small in terms of population and territorial size.

To be clear, small states are defined according to their demographic and territorial size. Their population size must not be larger than 1.5 million (absolute) or 10 per cent of any one neighbouring state (relative). At the same time, the territorial area of a small state must not exceed 5000 square kilometres (absolute) or be greater than 10 per cent than its neighbours.

Given these parameters, states that are deemed to be small also tend to have certain behavioural and political traits: risk aversion, alliance dependent and retain limited international influence in pursuit of self- and international interests. In short, small states retain limited international power based on limited internal capabilities and the means of projection. The small state recognises its own security vulnerabilities, as do others, and therefore the world is divided into allies (potential or actual security providers) and adversaries (potential or actual security diminishers); there are few international nuances. This may explain the manner in which the states of Latin America, the Caribbean and Central/Eastern Europe adjusted themselves following the demise of the USSR; most quickly realigned to Washington. There was little hesitation. Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic had, within the first post-Soviet decade, done a 180° turn, joined NATO and in 2004, the EU. Then came the others, until the sweeping majority of Europe emerged as a unified political and strategic bloc, a process that had less to do with Euro-Atlantic values and

³⁵ Rothstein (1968), p. 29.

³⁶ Miriam Fendius Elman (1995), 'The Foreign Policies of Small States: Challenging Neorealism in Its Own Backyard,' *British Journal of Political Science*, 25:2, p. 171 (n. 1).

more to do with the tenuous conditions of being small states seeking adequate alliance fixtures to reduce vulnerabilities. In Latin America and the Caribbean as well. The vast majority of states, and the people they contain, have polarised to the US with only Cuba, Venezuela and, recently, Brazil, attempting to resist US influence; but only half-heartedly.

3. Small States in the Shadow of Empire

Small states matter in international relations; they always have. Whether referring to Cuba – a fraction the size of the US and an even slimmer fraction of the former USSR – Grenada, Czechoslovakia or Hungary (etc.), it is clear that dominating small states and governing their ability to exercise control over foreign and security policies has assumed a rite of passage for the world's great and superpowers. The Cold War may have gone down in history as being a standoff between the US and the USSR, between the alliances of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, parliamentary democracy versus centrally planned communism, however, beneath the shroud of ideology and brinkmanship are the actors that enabled and denied the superpowers their international clout. The small states of the Cold War were just as important as the superpowers that claimed to represent them and their interests.

While this work was primarily based on evaluating the nature of small states in the international shatterbelt during the Cold War, its more subtle ambition was to classify the small state intellectually. Certainly, the eclipse of such actors in mainstream discussions and discourses is the natural outcome of having limited roles to play in a world governed by transnational engagements. However, the essence of the Cold War was for the superpower blocs to find ways to dominate small states either directly (occupation) or via proxy. In Latin America, the Caribbean Basin (and littoral) and throughout Central and Eastern Europe, many of the small states assumed international significance as a result. And now, decades removed from that epoch, and international scholarship is only marginally more aware of the impact small states produce in international systems based on the quest for power. This work's contribution then, is to be found in how it viewed the political life of states forced to bask in the shadow of empire.

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ABSTRACT

Revisionist takes on the Cold War have entered public discourses and rendered understanding of the lead-up to, and unfolding of, the long game of brinkmanship between the US and USSR unintelligible. While this work does not seek to redress the meta-problems of current treatments of the Cold War, it does seek to examine some of the undercurrents during that period of international relations history. Specifically, this work presents a theoretical assessment of the small states that comprised the rank and file members of the Cold War blocs. The states of the Caribbean Basin, Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe are used to illustrate the theoretical underpinnings of this work. Ultimately, this work deviates from more conventional understandings of the Cold War by intellectually reflecting on the manner in which small states were treated by their bloc leaders.

KEYWORDS

Small States; Cold War; Latin America; Caribbean; Central Europe; Eastern Europe; Revolution.

*Received on October 20, 2014.
Approved on November 13, 2014.*

INNOVATION AND THE WARLIKE PHENOMENON

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Introduction

War is a human activity responsible for social, political and economic changes. Also, much of our history is meddled with the history of war (Ávila and Rangel 2009). Although it is understood that war is not solely responsible for these changes, it is, nevertheless, one of the phenomena that most directly generate ruptures in these spheres. War is also responsible for several technical and technological changes, and it has generated some significant innovation processes with great impact on the way of life of societies throughout history.

This article aims to contribute to the inclusion of the specific discussion of technological breakthroughs in warfare in the field of innovation, contemporarily dominated by discussions of the management area. Taking World War I (WWI) as case study, we show the impact of innovation in warfare, and vice versa, pointing out how that war, more than others, brought innovations in the various fields of the war phenomenon.

To that end, this article is divided into three sections. In the first section, we discuss the definition of war, its main dimensions, nature and aspects. In the following section, we present a brief evolution of the history of warfare, highlighting some technical and technological changes and disruptions in some of the most important moments in human history. Later, we present

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some of the major innovations introduced by WWI. Finally, in the last section, we discuss the relation of the types of innovation and warfare, in light of the history of World War I.

In this article, the term innovation is generally understood as a complex process that usually starts with a new idea, goes through the solution of a problem and reaches the creation and use of a new good (product or service) of real economic or social value³. In this sense, invention differs from innovation. The former relates to creating something new, not necessarily considering the market, while the latter has to do with change, with doing something differently, or with changing the environment and/or the market where it is inserted, without necessarily having the concern with creating something technologically new.⁴ Challoner (2009, 08) states that "invent is to create something new - something that was not there before. An invention may be an idea, a principle (such as democracy), a poem, a song or a dance." For us, technology "is the practical application of our understanding of the world to achieve what we need or want to do." (*idem*)

Another important aspect to be noted concerning innovation is the degree of novelty involved in it. The innovations can range from just an improvement in one component, for example, which Tidd, Bessant and Pavitt (2008) call incremental innovation, to a total remodeling, advance or improvement in a system or product that changes the way the thing is or is done, which is called a radical innovation. Radical innovations sometimes generate disruptions, discontinuous changes. There are also innovations in architecture, when the mental modes and sources of knowledge are basically remodeled (Tidd, Bessant and Pavitt 2008). In the last section, we revisit in detail the kinds of innovation that these authors indicate.

Many historians, as well as military historians, have devoted themselves to the study of the relation between human evolution and the

³ Tidd, Bessant and Pavitt (2008) separate innovation into four broad categories: 1) Product innovation - changes in the things (products/services) that a company offers; 2) process innovation - change in the way in which products/services are created and delivered; 3) position innovation - changes in the context in which products/services are introduced; 4) paradigm innovation - changes in the underlying mental models that frame what the organization does.

⁴ Lecture note: "Network, Knowledge and Innovation" discipline; Information Science doctoral program, UFMG, 2011.

aspects concerning the war phenomenon, among them: McNeill (1982), Jones (1986), O'Connell (1989), Creveld (1991), Keeley (1996) and Grant (2005). Others have devoted themselves to showing some specific aspects of warfare, and how these issues have evolved in the course of conflicts. Creveld (1977), who focused on the discussion of the evolution of logistics throughout history, and Engels (1980), by discussing the logistics of the wars of Alexander of Macedon, are good examples. There are still good works devoted solely to the technical and technological developments in weaponry, equipment and processes in warfare; among them, those of McNaught (1984), Norris & Fowler (1997) and Dunnigan (2003) are worth underscoring. One author in particular deserves attention for having devoted his entire life to the discussion of technological innovations in a specific conflict (World War I): John Terraine. Terraine has a dozen books on one of the most important conflicts of modern history and, therefore, some of his discussions will serve as examples to the points made in this article. Headrick (2009) is also an author who brings in detail the evolution of technology throughout history, pointing out, like few others, its impact in the war phenomenon, too.

Warfare

Carl Von Clausewitz demonstrates in his work that warfare is an utterly political phenomenon. According to the author, "war is [...] an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will" (1993, 83). This means that war is the use of physical and moral force in order to oblige others to do what we want. The desire would be the goal we want to achieve, while the force would be the means to achieve it.

From this concept of war, it is possible to understand that it has ends (the will, the political objective that is sought) and means (use of force)⁵. However, war itself is a means used to achieve political ends⁶. These purposes,

⁵ "Force, according to the author, encompasses both the physical dimension (attributes) and the moral dimension (willingness to fight)." (Ávila and Rangel 2009, 59. Our translation.)

⁶ It should be noted that there are other mechanisms to achieve what we want, being the war just one of them. Diplomacy has been identified as another mechanism, sometimes in total opposition to war as an instrument of policy. This misconception is demonstrated by Schelling (1967) in his book "Arms and

although varied, are always political in nature. "The use of force would be the *means* in warfare; to impose our will, its *object* (I:1:2:8)."

From this conceptual definition, Clausewitz may derive his theoretical conception of the elements that characterize warfare. One of the most important elements, however, is that of politics, the reason that leads to war. It is this element that determines how much force will be used in war.

According to Clausewitz, the political object will determine the military objective to be achieved and how much effort it requires. As the author points out, the same political object can elicit different reactions from different people, or different reactions from the same people, but at different times (Ávila and Rangel 2009, 61. Our translation.)

Clausewitz also explains that all wars would have two main sides: attack and defense. In general, the side that decides to change the *status quo* is considered the attacker and hence is the side that needs the situation to be modified. In contrast, the side that wants to maintain the *status quo* is considered the defense. For the latter, it is enough for things to remain as they are⁷.

The author also presents, along with the political, the other two dimensions in warfare: 1) tactics, which refers to the use of force in confrontation; and 2) strategy, which refers to the use of confrontations to achieve the purpose of the war. In this sense, when deciding on which weapons to use, number of combatants, and where to act, this is the tactical dimension. When one decides on the sequencing of combats, their order, pauses, advances and retreats, it roughly concerns the strategic dimension.

It is also worth noting that the discussion of Clausewitz leads to what he calls the paradoxical trinity (or strange trinity in the terms of Diniz 2002).

Influence", highlighting what he calls coercive diplomacy, something between soft diplomacy and war itself.

⁷ Clausewitz will demonstrate that attack and defense are not antagonistic poles in a war in the sense that one is the complete opposite to the other. In fact, many times, they have completely opposite goals, but their peculiar characteristics prevent us from saying that one is merely the counterpart of the other. They would be, according to the author, two distinct forms of struggle, while the defense would be the strongest form. For this discussion, refer to the works of Diniz (2002), and Diniz and Proença Jr. (2006).

The trinity comprises three elements in warfare, which are implemented by three different actors and therefore define their roles in the conflict.

According to Clausewitz (1993), war is a strange trinity, composed of primordial violence, hatred and enmity; influenced by the play of chance and probability; and rationally subordinated to politics. The primordial violence, hatred and enmity are linked fundamentally to the people; luck and chance, to the armed forces and their commander; and rationality to the government. These three social instances – the people, armed forces and government – would have the function to produce, i.e. keep the war effort, fight, or face the opponent and decide, respectively (I; 1; 28; 101). (Ávila and Rangel 2009, 61. Our translation.)

It is important to note that the theoretical discussion of Clausewitz is not concerned with the specific determinations about where to fight (land, sea or air), when to fight (past, present or future), and with which weapons to fight. This discussion, and that on where lies the impact of technical, procedural and technological innovations, do not annul and do not directly interfere with the aforementioned theoretical construct. Although they are important, and generate effects during a war or combats, their effects do not alter the nature of war.

It is concluded that, for Clausewitz, war is an instrument of politics. It is politics that defines why we fight. It is politics that, in the exercise of reason, and in accordance with the available means of force, decides for the path of virtue. However, war will not be a nonstop action of violence. There will be breaks. Breaks arising from the asymmetry of force between defense and attack and that allow for the strategic dimension besides the political and tactical ones. In addition, war is an interaction of three social instances (government, people, and armed forces and their commander), each one being influenced more directly by some inherent war element (reason, passion and chance) and with a function in it (decide, produce, combat). (Ávila and Rangel 2009, 62. Our translation.)

In the following section, we will address more specific aspects on how people have fought and, therefore, on where the innovations and technological breakthroughs have greater effect.

Combats

War, as discussed in the previous section, is a clash of forces, each trying to impose itself on the other. Although all wars present the three dimensions proposed by Clausewitz - political, tactical and strategic - these differ from war to war, and even within the same war between the sides that are fighting - attack and defense. One can fight with the objective of conquering a parcel of a territory, the total subjugation of the opponent, or the control of a certain resource; one can fight using sticks, stones, supersonic jets, or submarines; one can fight in the ocean, in the desert, or on a mountain range. These changes obviously impact the three dimensions of war, but they do not withhold them from the analysis.

Innovations in the way of fighting (tactics and strategy) arising from changes in the processes, techniques, technologies and weapons do not change the nature of war, but they can interfere in the course of the conflict. However, and as shown by Diniz, Proença Jr. and Raza (1999, chap. 5), one must be careful when associating technical and technological changes with the victories and defeats in war⁸. The issue is not so simple. One must not be spoiled by a certain determinism generated by the "technological imperative", something that Dunnigan (2003) and the U.S. military doctrine have insisted on defending⁹. Most of the time, innovations in weaponry alone do not produce definitive results in wars, after all; moreover, as the history of war has demonstrated, most of the time, when one side introduces an innovation, either

⁸ The same is held for the impact that a sudden climate change has on war. The effects it produces are experienced in combats and war, but not to the extent of defining their results. A great example of this is the association of the defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte's campaign in Russia with the harsh Russian winter, something that Clausewitz himself proved to be a mistake in his "Campaign of 1812". Or even associating the defeat of the Nazis with the climatic conditions of Russia again, then in World War II. Although weather conditions have their effects, victories and defeats result from multiple variables, being climate, geography, armaments and innovations portions of this set.

⁹ There are innovations that bring benefits to either side in war, but that does not mean that each and every innovation by itself produces such effects.

it is quickly absorbed by the counterpart or mechanisms to minimize the effect of this change in the combats and war are created. It is as if the disruption generated a momentary imbalance and that, in the course of the fight, this rebalancing was resumed. Therefore, victory and defeat in a combat and wars result from a complex combination of multiple variables; to reduce them to one or another aspect incurs a grotesque mistake. Later in the article, we will present some innovations that were significant to the domination of one people over another that, even so, did not represent the technological supremacy over other aspects of warfare (tactical, strategic and political).

Before returning to the debate on the impact of innovations, a brief discussion on how war has been fought is worthwhile.

Traditional forces in war were divided according to the way in which they fought. Either they fought by shock or they struggled through throwing weapons. In general, few innovations have been created since these combat units.

There are four types of units of force in ancient and medieval warfare: 1) light infantry, mainly archers, javelin throwers, stones throwers (through sling), etc. They fought through combat of throwing or, for some, missile fighting. They did not use to wear body armor or protection; 2) heavy infantry, consisting of swordsmen and spearmen. They generally used swords, axes, maces, spears, clubs and shields. They used to wear body armor or protection, which turned them into a combat unit slower than light infantry. This is the case of Greek *hoplites* or Roman legionaries; 3) light cavalry. Knights used bows and arrows and/or darts, fighting through missile combat. They did not wear body protections; and 4) heavy cavalry. The fighters of this unit used swords, shields and spears. They used to wear body protection and some units, like the Iranian knights, put up armor even on their horses. (Ávila and Rangel 2009, 35. Our translation.)

These unit models existed from antiquity to the medieval period¹⁰.

¹⁰ For an interesting discussion on these combat units, their characteristics, as well as which has tactical advantages over which, refer to Jones (1986).

In fact, the existence of cavalry was made possible by the process of domestication of horses, which dates back, according to Grant (2005), to 1700 BCE, the same period in which combat chariots were devised. Still on cavalry, its supremacy while fighting unit, and which would significantly characterize the Middle Ages, only happened in the eighth century CE, when the stirrup was created and alfalfa began to be grown on a large scale (Ávila and Rangel 2009). McNeill (1982) and Creveld (1991) consider the invention of the stirrup as something utterly important in medieval warfare because of the stability it gives the rider, an innovation that greatly changed the relationship between the cavalry, especially the heavy one, and other combat units.

Still on innovations that meant advantage over others, take, for instance, the change of casting technology and use of bronze (3500 BCE) for the casting technology and use of iron (1400 BCE). Both the agricultural tools and the arms themselves, with the introduction of iron, became more resistant, and not only did this impact the production of food but also the war itself. Iron-based weapons and body protection proved decisive in the struggle against people who used bronze-based weapons and protections. In fact, the domination of many Greek people by the Dorians may have been directly related to the mastering of iron by the latter (McNeill 1982).

Agriculture as well as the mechanisms of food-storage were crucial in this period. The dominant civilizations at the time were those whose agricultural capacity was superior to others'; after all, the size of the force depended directly on the productive capacity of the people.

The wars of this period, and especially the duration of campaigns, were directly influenced by the ability that the rulers had to stock up food and fodder for their armies. In other words, the size of the force, as well as its ability to operate in time and space, depended fundamentally on the food resources available for itself (food) and for its animals (forage). As long as there were resources, there would be war. (Ávila and Rangel 2009, 37. Our translation.)

In this sense, as important as anything else, the innovations in agriculture (plow, animal traction, mills and silos) were equally or more important than the invention of an arm or any given war process. Nevertheless,

these innovations do not relate so directly to war. From the ancient period to the medieval age, there were few disruptive innovations that directly affected war. Some, however, stand out: the invention and use of war chariots and compound bow. Both were created around 1800 BCE and had a great impact in ancient warfare.

Another important set of innovations for this historical period were the siege weapons. The rise of cities and the constant harassment they suffered - especially by the nomadic tribes - meant that they needed a more complex system of protection. The solution found was immuring them. In doing so, cities would be less vulnerable to the attacks and could be protected by a smaller number of people. However, the enclosing of cities led to the invention of siege weapons¹¹. As stated above, an innovation on one hand leads to the creation and invention of a counterpart; in the case of walls, the siege weapons.

From these innovations - chariots, compound bows, siege weapons, stirrup - war would remain unchanged for the following 2500 years. It is only at the end of the glorious Greek period, with Alexander the Great, that some innovations would emerge. According to Engels (1980), Alexander was responsible for developing a complex logistics system, something that was very useful and enabled the conquest of much of the known world at the time. In an earlier period, Philip of Macedon, father of Alexander, had already introduced some innovations in the Greek army. They were not disruptive innovations, as were the ones mentioned above, but rather incremental changes that produced devastating effects in the wars of Greeks with the rest of the barbarian world¹².

¹¹ Among the most famous siege weapons are onagers, trebuchets, battering rams and catapults, besides the assault ladders and platforms. To learn about these arms, refer to Griess (1985), and Parker and Cowley (1996).

¹² Among the innovations in the Greek/Macedonian army that allowed Alexander to dominate almost all the known world, there were: the expansion of the Greek spear from 1.8m to 3m, which allowed the Macedonian forces to reach their adversaries before being reached; the introduction of the "sacred band", a heavy infantry unit, deeper than the traditional Greek phalanx, which was positioned in the forces' left and was responsible for breaking the opposing phalanx; the introduction of an intermediate unit between light and heavy infantry, the *peltasts*, which enabled the Macedonians to increase the spaces between their fighters, creating mobility and flexibility, and to break the unity of opposing forces.

After Alexander's death, world history focused on the rise of the Roman world. Rome had one of the largest and best-trained armies of all time, and it dominated the history of the West for nearly 700 years. However, the great Roman innovations did not occur on the battlefield. The Romans were skilled engineers and builders, making bridges, roads, fortifications and aqueducts. In war, Romans tried to enhance the known armaments, such as siege weapons, and improve the processes of casting metals.

From the fall of the Roman world through the end of the medieval era, only one innovation would bring profound, yet not immediate, changes in the way people fought: gunpowder. In the interim, however, the creation and introduction of the beast had a significant impact in war in this period.

The Medieval Era was characterized by the dominance of heavy cavalry. Knights established themselves as the supreme fighting unit, assisting the consolidation of certain fiefs and their overlords.

The invention of the crossbow was remarkably significant because it broke the military and political order of the time; after all, knights were the superior "caste" and, with the crossbow, they could be killed by any citizen, something inconceivable hitherto. "This weapon, by rendering vulnerable the condition of knights, who were mainly members of the nobility, could create conditions for a political and social upheaval from the plebs, so the church decided to ban its use against Christians (1139 CE)." (Ávila and Rangel 2009, 46)

The great innovation that changed the way of making war in the turn from the medieval period to the modern era was gunpowder. It must, however, be remembered that gunpowder was invented in the fourteenth century CE in China, but its employment in war, in total substitution to other weapons such as the crossbow, for example, would happen only centuries later. In fact, gunpowder took some time to become the crucial element in warfare.

Associated with the invention of gunpowder, some innovations are also noteworthy and gradually turned firearms into the most important on the battlefield: improvement in the metal casting processes (which enabled the forging of lighter cannons); creation of the recoil system (which allowed the gun to shoot and remain relatively steady for the second shot); development of different types of ammunition (with different functions and effects). "War, as designed in the fifteenth century, would last until the mid-nineteenth century."

(Ávila and Rangel 2009, 49). After cannons, European fortifications underwent significant modifications.¹³ Heavy and very difficult to transport, cannons had rapid employment in naval forces, which would be decisive for the European conquest of new territories. Thus, upon the disruptive innovation that was gunpowder, several incremental innovations developed during these centuries, until the predominance of firearms on the battlefields in the mid-nineteenth century. It is worth noting that there were five centuries from the appearance of gunpowder on the battlefield until its supremacy in warfare.

Another important innovation, in terms of organization rather than product or process, was the establishment of professional military institutions.

Between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in general, there was the development of the commercial/military complex, as well as the bureaucratization of the military administration, organizing its forces in a modern way. The units began to professionalize decisively, creating an *esprit de corps* and an increasingly complex chain of command to respond to. (Ávila and Rangel 2009, 50. Our translation.)

The armed forces became of exclusive control of states, and soldiers became fully professional. Industrialization, a process that would significantly change all aspects of the relations of human communities, also changed the way of making war.

The forces, which were composed more of warriors than soldiers for part of history, would then be composed of men understood as parts, replaceable as cogs in a machine. Men who could be quickly trained in the basic tasks of a force: dig for trenches; march and shoot. (Ávila and Rangel 2009, 50. Our translation.)

With the improvement of firearms, combat units changed. Only three arms remained: infantry, cavalry and artillery. As a tactical simplification took

¹³ See chapter 03 of Paret (2001) about Vauban, one of the greatest architects in the history of military fortifications. See also, about the history of the innovations of artillery and fortifications in Brazil, Mori (2003).

place, armies became increasingly numerous. "To cope with such huge forces, maps, telescopes and even the stopwatch were developed." (Ávila and Rangel 2009, 51). In addition, the logistics system was developed.

Another "innovation" of the period was the full participation of the nation in the war effort. The people, who often stayed away from wars, became fully incorporated. War became total by then. Either the people took part as a fighting force, and, indeed, armies could reach the houses of hundreds of thousands, or the people (...) was a key element in the war effort through its productive capacity. (Ávila and Rangel 2009, 52. Our translation.)

In the mid-nineteenth century, some innovations would shape how the war would be fought in the following century. Although some of these innovations had nothing to do with war, they would bring direct impacts to it. The first change of the wars of the eighteenth to the nineteenth century, and which would have its peak in the twentieth century, was the inclusion of the whole nation in the war effort, which allowed building an army of masses, as previously exposed. The industrial logic created by England would soon be incorporated into the armed forces.

The way the world economy was industrializing and mass-producing showed that war could follow the same principle. And so it did. The First World War is thought of as the culmination of the logic of mass production, for even soldiers were regarded as pieces. (Ávila and Rangel 2009, 52. Our translation.)

The invention and development of railroads, which could carry this mass of soldiers, besides being able to carry supplies of food and ammunition in distant theaters of operations, also significantly impacted warfare. Moreover, the emergence of machine guns and repeating rifles, as well as larger, lighter and more lethal cannons (which started to shoot indirectly and therefore needed mathematical and statistical calculations), quickly transformed the tactical aspects of war. Soldiers, to defend themselves, would need to entrench themselves. Upon that, new artillery ammunitions were either improved or created (the howitzer was created, projecting a more angled shot, unlike guns,

which projected straighter shots). In the nineteenth century, it was first seen the use of poison gas on the battlefield (See Norris and Fowler 1997).

At the turn of the twentieth century, new weapons would emerge, such as submarines, aircraft and tanks, something that we will see in detail in the following section. It is worth noting, however, that the wars throughout history either were responsible for creating or improving products (weapons), processes (manufacture of gunpowder) or organizations (military academies), for example, or incorporated the inventions of other spheres into its purpose (rail, ballistic engineering, etc.). In the next section, the emphasis will be on the war that witnessed the debut of the largest number of inventions and innovations in human history, World War I.

World War I (1914-1918)

The First World War was a conflict that brought together dozens of countries at various locations on Earth and that lasted four years, from 1914 to 1918. Its outbreak happened with the episode of the assassination of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, as an excuse. However, the reasons that led to the confrontation between the major European powers at the time are many others. The most important aspect was undoubtedly the questioning of the *status quo* by Germany, which did not have the same powers and prerogatives that, for example, France and England did. Germany, the emerging power that was developing the most in Europe, began to fight politically for greater political and economic integration into the international arena, but its rivals systematically restrained it. A complex system of alliances was established so that the entry of a country in conflict would lead to the entry of all others. And this was exactly what happened¹⁴.

This alliance system, which had been forming since the late nineteenth century, had two major parties at the beginning of the war - the Triple Alliance, originally composed of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy,

¹⁴ As previously noted, John Terraine is a leading expert in World War I. Altogether, there are 11 books devoted to this conflict. Two of them will be addressed in this section: *White Heat: The New Warfare 1914-1918* and *The Smoke and the Fire: Myths & Anti-Myths of War 1861-1945*.

having the latter moved to the other side in 1915; and the second party being the Triple Entente composed of Britain, France and Russia. (Ávila 2005, 17. Our translation.)

According to Terraine (1982), the main feature of this war was its scale. At the very beginning of the conflict, six million combatants were already on the battlefield. This large-scale mobilization was associated with various technological developments outlined above and that had been taking place since the mid-nineteenth century (Terraine 1982, 21-43).

The deployment and positioning of forces were facilitated by the large number of railroads. These railroads linked the producing centers to the battlefronts. They allowed, thus, rapid movement of forces throughout the theater of operations, in addition to their supplying. The wired telegraph, in turn, allowed communication between forces and, therefore, the relocation of the parts in the theater of operations. (Ávila 2005, 18-19. Our translation.)

The increased cargo capacity via maritime shipping was also key to the logistics of WWI. According to Headrick (2009), ships' cargo capacity has increased fourfold with the advent of steamships from the late nineteenth century through the early twentieth. According to the author, much of the growth was due to the increase in the size of ships: around the 1870s, a ship of two thousand tons was considered large. In 1912, the Titanic, the largest ship in the world until then, weighed forty-six thousand tons. Headrick (2009, 112) states that "what made the vast extension of railroads and shipping possible was steel", an innovation brought by the British in the late nineteenth century. The cheapening of steel made possible the construction of bridges, new types of weapons and even the storage of canned food.

It is also WWI that featured the full use of artillery, with dozens of different capsules and ammunition, in addition to the machine gun¹⁵. Moreover,

¹⁵ The machine guns will put an end to the traditional war cavalry, for a machine gun could decimate tens of knights mounting in charge attack. Horses would still be used in World War II (1939-45), but only to pull carts in the absence of trucks or for the displacement of small units.

this was the first war to witness the massive use of chemical weapons in an attempt to break the deadlock produced by the use of trenches (Ávila 2005). The leap made by chemical innovations after the war led to the development of products such as synthetic rubber, nylon, polyethylene, aspirin, vitamins and hormones (Headrick 2009). Other attempts to end the inertia generated by the trenches were bombing by airplanes (an instrument invented some years earlier and which initially had no military purpose yet was fully incorporated into the war); war tanks (introduced during the conflict, and which proved initially totally inadequate to break the lines of trenches¹⁶); the tactics of infiltrating trenches by soldiers with light equipment.

Besides these innovations, this war saw the large-scale introduction of land mines, something forbidden by the international Geneva conventions of the late nineteenth century, grenades, mortars, and even rockets. The fuel on which these war machines ran, due to the internal combustion engine, became petroleum-derived products, especially diesel and gasoline, over steam.

According to Terraine (1982), WWI was the war that observed the motorization. Cars, buses, motorcycles and trucks were employed, in addition to the train. In naval warfare, the innovations that served the purposes of this conflict were the wireless telegraph, water mines, torpedoes and torpedo boats, the submarine, and of course, the huge armored ships. None of this would have been possible without the advent of the combustion engine, about which Headrick (2009, 119) says, "no technology has had a greater impact on human life and the environment in the twentieth century than the internal combustion engine". Created by Italian-Irish Giacomo Marconi, wireless telegraph was made with the purpose of being sold to the Royal Navy and merchant ships. Developments upon this technology enabled, as far back as 1915, the landline telephone call between New York and San Francisco, and by radio telephone between New York and Paris (Headrick 2009).

Completing the scenario, with regard to aerial warfare, in addition to airplanes, balloons and dirigibles were employed on a larger scale. Prior to

¹⁶ The first tanks were extremely slow and noisy and, therefore, became easy targets for the enemy cannons. The tank would be an extremely important weapon in World War II, by associating speed, mobility and firepower.

WWI, the Zeppelins - inflated with hydrogen until then - already carried passengers in Germany, so, during the conflict, they were used for bombings in France and the United Kingdom (Headrick 2009). It was also during this period that the parachute was invented (Terraine 1982).

As previously mentioned, many of these innovations had already been seen in previous wars (1861-1865 American Civil War, 1898-1902 Boer War, 1905 Russo-Japanese War), but they were only employed at an industrial scale in the First World War. The American Civil War witnessed, albeit in a rudimentary form,

repeating rifles, trenches and barbed wire, even machine guns; rifled cannons, mortars, explosive ammunition, flamethrowers, gas (...); balloons, armored trains, landmines, mines, signal lamps and flares, and the field telegraph; armored ships, rotating turrets, torpedoes, and even submarines (Terraine 1982, 11).

As mentioned before, even though some innovations had influenced war, they alone would not be responsible for the victory/defeat. O'Connell (1989) discusses that the emergence of an arm can generate two types of response patterns: a counter-response and a symmetrical response.

The mechanisms which drive weapons proliferation, unlike most forms of natural reproduction, offer alternatives. Generally known as threat-response patterns, they can be reduced to two basic types. First, an adversary weapon can be met with a *counter-response*, an item of military hardware designed specifically to oppose the threat (...). On the other hand, there is the possibility of acquiring a weapon basically equivalent to the one held by the adversary. This can be termed a *symmetrical response*. (14. Emphasis in the original.)

There are two noteworthy examples of the use of a particular artifact and its countermeasures.

It is known that WWI witnessed the intensive use of poisonous gases, such as mustard and chlorine gases. Initially, the use of these weapons generated much turmoil in the trenches, facilitating the taking of some of them.

However, the initial physical and psychological impact of these weapons was supplanted by the adoption of some countermeasures, such as deepening the system of trenches, building shelters and bunkers, as well as by the introduction of gas masks and, subsequently, protective clothing and antidotes. Finally, as shown by Norris and Fowler (1997), despite its systematic use, the number of deaths by gas attacks during the four years of WWI did not exceed 91 thousand deaths (being 1.2 million the number of soldiers contaminated), something far inferior to the instant deaths caused by the atomic bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 (somewhere around 200 thousand deaths).

The other major innovation introduced in WWI and that, according to experts, would be largely responsible for the victory in the conflict was the tanks. As pointed out Terraine (1980), the expectation with the introduction of tanks, a kind of mobile and armored artillery, was that the system of trenches would quickly become obsolete. Tanks would terrify the soldiers, for their strength and firepower, and would be able to overcome the defense systems of the enemy. Their debut, at the Battle of Cambrai in 1916, had dubious results. Most tanks were destroyed by the end of the combat and the gains of land were insignificant. In 1917, according to Terraine (1980, 153-154), one hundred seventy-nine tanks were deployed, while 56% of them were quickly destroyed or immobilized.

The failure of this new weaponry was due to flaws of the equipment itself (armor, speed, damping system, immobility of the cannon), as well as the adoption of countermeasures and anti-tank weapons and techniques.

Terraine (1980, 173) summarizes the major social and technical changes of WWI, for being the first war: 1) of aviation; 2) with real submarine warfare; 3) of the internal combustion engines; 4) of mechanics; 5) of wireless telegraphy; 6) of artillery; 7) of effectively chemical warfare; 8) of mass production.

Consequently, during this period were developed metallurgy (especially steel), the chemical industry, electrical machinery, radio communications, turbines, the fuel industry, the optical science and hydraulic machines, for example (McNeill 1982, 292).

The other innovations presented throughout the text were enhanced in WWI or in its subsequent period and had significant use in the conflict that would follow, the Second World War (1939-1945).

Types of Innovations and World War I

Finally, it is worth advancing here the discussion on the innovations presented in the previous section in light of the types and categories of innovations outlined by Tidd, Bessant and Pavitt (2008)¹⁷. According to these authors, there are basically four major types of innovations, namely: 1) *incremental innovations*, which include improvements made on the design or quality of products; improvement in layout or processes; new logistic and organizational arrangements or new supply and sales practices [usually resulting from a process of internal learning]; 2) *radical innovations*, which break with what exists, inaugurating a new technological path; they are usually the result of R&D (Research and Development) and have discontinuous character in time and in different sectors of activity; 3) *innovations that generate changes in the technological system*, which occur when a sector or group of sectors is deeply transformed by the emergence of a new technological field. Such innovations are often accompanied by changes in the way of doing business, in the organizational structure of the companies, as well as in their relations with their markets; 4) *innovations that generate changes in the technical and economic paradigm*: they involve innovations not only in the technology used, but also in the social and economic fabric in which they are inserted. Obviously, some of the conceptual elements outlined above relate to administrative matters and the management area. However, we can make some inferences based on them for the case analysis.

Regarding the first, that is, *incremental innovations*, there were several examples in WWI such as cannons and howitzers, which had been improved since the fourteenth century; the tactics of trenches infiltration, which reorganized how to attack the fixed positions; the single-engined airplanes that evolved into twin-engined ones. Other examples are the development of land mines from the water mines and protective equipment against gas attacks.

The development of underwater communication technologies, which would evolve into the creation of the sonar and, later, the radar, were *radical*

¹⁷ Although the authors' discussion is mainly applied to innovation in business, it is believed that such a discussion can be transposed to the present debate.

innovations made possible by the First World War. Another example in the communications sector was the development of radio and field telephone, which would allow the evolution into the development of cellular devices.

With regard to *innovations that generate changes in the technological system*, the petrochemical industry and the chemical industry in general, which develop and improve respectively fuel and weapons of mass destruction may be included in this type of innovation.

Finally, and unfortunately, *innovations that generate changes in technical and economic paradigm* were not found in WWI. The creation of the General Staff and military structures, which changed how the armed forces are created, maintained, and used, and that even significantly shaped how the bureaucratic structures of states are established, could represent an innovation in this category, but they are nineteenth-century constructs. The development of the computer, which also falls in this category, is an invention linked with World War II.

Final Considerations

War generates changes in social, political and economic order, as well as in technical and technological dimensions. It is part of human history and, on several occasions, has shaped its course. War is also a political phenomenon and most of the paths it takes are due to the choices of decision makers in this sphere.

This article explained what war is in light of the theoretical conception of Clausewitz. It showed its fundamental characteristics - the political, strategic and tactical dimensions, attack and defense, as well as the strange trinity. It further argued that, although technical and technological changes happen in society, and which are later incorporated into the war dimension, or innovations in warfare that later come to be used socially, there is no change in the nature of the phenomenon. Innovations and technical changes can affect tactical and strategic dimensions, but they do not exclude them from the analysis of the war phenomenon. It is understood that it is dangerous to infer that technological changes alone can have direct relations with the victory and/or defeat in war. This approach, understood here as "technological imperative", has attracted

some great scholars. The phenomenon is much more complex and should be treated as such.

We also presented some innovations that have occurred throughout the history of war, many of which taking years to be fully incorporated from its invention, its improvement and into its military use. Among them, some were radical, other incremental; some referred to products, to processes and others to organizations that relate to the war phenomenon.

Even if we have treated the evolution of the "art of war" from antiquity through the twentieth century, we gave some prominence to the period from the mid-nineteenth century through the early twentieth century, a time when war changed significantly in technical and technological terms and when significant changes happened. It is likely that the way we still fight today has its main characteristics established in this period and, therefore, we made such analytical delimitation. It is noticeable, perhaps more in WWI than in other conflicts, the connection between the war phenomenon and investment in technology. Although such products, says Headrick (2009), bring great comfort for humanity in times of peace, their use in wartime brings frighteningly harrowing results.

Nothing illustrates better the idea that power over nature gives some people power over others than the military consequences of the new technologies of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. [...] From 1914 to 1918, the industrial nations turned their weapons on one another. To kill each other's citizens more efficiently, they devoted resources to new scientific research, accelerating the process of innovation. [...] Despite the heavy industry that stood behind them, soldiers on the front still had to walk across coils of barbed wire into a hail of bullets and clouds of poison, and they died by the millions. (Headrick 2009, 123-124)

We hope that this article has helped to demonstrate the relationship between the area of innovation and those of war, administration (management) and history of international relations. The connection between innovation and the war phenomenon has existed since the dawn of humanity - which is not necessarily a reason of which to be proud.

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ABSTRACT

This article seeks to demonstrate the connections between the history of the war phenomenon, or simply war history, with the debate on innovation. In this sense, this article presents some technical and technological developments and which were their impacts in wars and human history itself. The discussion was divided into three moments. First, the most relevant theoretical elements of warfare in the light of the work of Clausewitz were presented. Second, we briefly addressed the evolution of the war phenomenon throughout human history, focusing on some technical and technological changes of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. World War I was the object of analysis in a greater depth. Third, it was discussed how the analyzed innovations relate to the categories proposed by Tidd, Bessant and Pavitt.

KEYWORDS

Warfare; Technology; Innovation; Strategic Studies.

*Received on June 07, 2014.
Approved on September 30, 2014.*

Translated by Airton Gregório Martins

ARGENTINA FACING THE PALESTINIAN- ISRAELI QUESTION: A STUDY ON THE POSITIONS ADOPTED BY THE ALFONSÍN ADMINISTRATION (1983-1989)

Ornela Fabani¹

Introduction

Different actors and even geographical areas with which Argentina has prioritized its ties can be traced overtime. However, the Middle East has never had a special place in the agenda of external relations of the country. On the contrary, it has been a marginal area with regard to its relations both in political and economic terms. This can be explained by the geographical gap between those territories; also, by the lack of shared idiosyncrasies, such as religion, and social and cultural terms, since the South American country is markedly different from the states comprising the space that has been called the Middle East – an area in which, moreover, coexist different ethnic and religious groups, as well as different political regimes, and which has become internationally notorious internationally for its high number of conflicts.

In fact, this area has been the stage of some of the major conflicts that have taken place in recent times. Among them, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has kept the region on the edge for decades because of its serious regional

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implications and the large number of actors, statal or not, directly or indirectly involved in the dispute.

Overtime, Argentina has adopted an equidistant position about the Palestinian-Israeli question. Also, many administrations have chosen to support conciliatory resolutions adopted within international organizations.

Indeed, Argentina has defended the peaceful settlement of the conflict, urging the parties to comply with the resolutions emanating from the United Nations Security Council. In this regard, it has supported the search for a stable and lasting peace based on the recognition of the right of Palestinians to form an independent state with its own territory, and also exercise their inalienable right to self-determination. As well as the right of Israel to live in peace within secure and internationally recognized borders, in accordance with the provisions of Resolutions No. 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) of the UN Security Council.

Considering the aforementioned factors, the aim of this study is to analyze Argentina's foreign policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during the Raúl Alfonsín administration (1983-1989). The article is based on the assumption that the search for a solution to this conflict was not amongst the themes of primary interest to the Argentinean government under this *Partido Radical's* administration. On the other hand, we sustain that the Alfonsín administration embraced the traditional equidistance policy historically adopted by Argentina towards the Israeli-Palestinian dispute as a hypothesis. Finally, the chosen period, extending from December 1983 to July 1989, is justified by the shortage of studies that address this theme during these years.

In addition, it is important to specify a set of concepts that are central to the analysis: foreign policy, Israeli-Palestinian conflict, equidistance, change and continuity in foreign policy.

Thus, when referring to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, we approach the dispute between the people of Israel and the Palestinian people, also as part of an even larger dispute, the Arab-Israeli conflict, involving the State of Israel and its Arab counterparts.

In order to situate ourselves in time and space, it is important to stress that the conflict has a long history, although it is still relevant in the agenda of international politics nowadays. In fact, although there is no consensus about its origins, many analysts agree to point out that the beginning of the conflict happened in 1947, when the United Nations opted for the partition of the

Palestinian territory, as stipulated in Resolution 181/11 of the General Assembly.

On that occasion, Argentina was one of the countries that abstained from voting. In this regard, there have been various studies that attempt to explain the motives that guided the country to choose that position (Rein 2007; Botta 2011). Initial motivations aside, the truth is that such position was the starting point of what would become the Argentinian equidistance pattern that has prevailed in respect to this conflict.

As already stated, the country has tended to embrace for years this equidistance policy, based on the concern of various administrations to balance any gesture or action that could be interpreted as a gap in the equal treatment of the leading protagonists of the dispute (Mendez 2009, 89) and has been in line with the will to preserve good relations with both sides presented by successive national administrations.

Under this logic, the search for compensation of favorable gestures to one or another actor is explained by the Argentine will to avoid assuming internal and external costs that would come along with aligning with one of the parties, especially considering the limited relevance of this dilemma within the agenda of Argentina's foreign policy.

On the other hand, since this is an article about Argentina's foreign policy, it should be mentioned that it is conceived as a public policy (Ingram and Fiederlein 1988), which is expressed in a set of decisions and actions taken by authorities of a state, in response to certain demands and conditions, both internal and external. These decisions are calculated to change or to preserve the conditions of the international context, always aiming to promote the interests and values of the state in the international system (Perina 1988, 13).

The Alfonsín administration's foreign policy did not evince a change that could be translated into a break of that equidistance pattern—understanding “change” as the abandonment of one or more of the foreign policy orientations and the variations in the content or ways of putting that policy into practice. On the contrary, the administration has primed for the continuity of traditional position concerning the conflict—the idea of “continuity” being the maintenance without interruption of certain guidelines

in one or more areas of foreign policy issues and in the basic dynamics of decision-making (Russell 1991, 10-11).

The main axes of the Alfonsín administration foreign policy

Raúl Alfonsín came into the presidency of Argentina on December 10, 1983 after the completion of the first democratic elections in the country after ten years.

Domestically, right after years of a cruel military rule, the president had to face strong demands of the population, then centered on the respect for civil liberties, human rights and the punishment for crimes committed under the previous order. He also had to take charge of a complex economic situation characterized by fiscal deficit, external debt, capital flight and high inflation.

With reference to the external ambit, Alfonsín found an internationally isolated country. Violations of human rights, the rejection of the arbitral award on the Beagle issue and the subsequent escalation of the conflict with Chile, which led Argentina to the brink of war with the Transandinean country, as well as the Falklands War, all resulted in the loss of credibility and foreign confidence in the state.

Regarding the international scenario in which the new administration took power, the first half of the eighties was characterized by renewed tensions between the two superpowers in the context of the Cold War. In fact, the Reagan administration outlined his foreign policy based on the perception of a Soviet advance in the Third World during that period.

Meanwhile, the conflicts in Central America and the debt crisis that affected the whole of Latin America cannot be overlooked in the regional level. The first installed the fear that the domestic condition of Nicaragua and El Salvador could escalate and endanger the democratic transitions in other Latin American countries. The second, linked to the strong financial flows that entered the region during the previous decade and the subsequent increase in international interest rates, was particularly hard to Argentina, which stopped receiving external funding after the Mexican default declaration along with other states of the region.

After this brief description of the context in which the new government came to power, this article will start to work on the main lines of its foreign

policy taking as a source for analysis the inaugural address to the Legislative Assembly of December 10, 1983 .

In terms of principles, the new president stated during the speech that “[we will] sustain in foreign policy the principles of national sovereignty, self-determination of peoples, non-intervention, equality of sovereign states and Latin American solidarity” and that “[we will] support the aspirations of developing countries, the universal observance of human rights and non-alignment”. Then, Alfonsín added: “we will accommodate national tradition in favor of peaceful settlement of disputes” (Alfonsín 1983, our translation).

On the other hand, from a broader approach the head of state highlighted that “our policy [would] be one of independence, in harmony and friendship with all members of the international community, and based on the recognition of ideological plurality and on the decisive rejection of every form of imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism.” He also emphasized that “from a position of strict non-alignment, an action in support of the distension between blocks must be made effective” (Alfonsín 1983. Our translation).

Regarding the relations with the United States, they were described as “difficult” and it was asked that this nation could change its behavior in Central America, arguing in favor of the principle of nonintervention.

On other subjects, the new administration announced it would give priority to emphasize links with developing countries and it affirmed its goal of maintaining an active participation in international forums that were an expression of it, such as the case of the Non-Aligned Movement and the G77.

Accordingly, the need to prioritize relations with the Latin American republics was stressed. Afterwards, it was highlighted that it was imperative to intensify cooperation with Asian and African countries.

Other topics that were also emphasized were: the importance of curbing the arms race, the Central American crisis, the claim over the Falkland Islands and the defense of a reorganization of international economic relations.

Finally, regarding the issue promptly relevant here, President Alfonsín also referred in his speech to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. With reference to this topic, the head of state embraced the traditional Argentinian position on the case to plead in favor of “respect for the existence of Israel, whose people have the inalienable right to live in peace without the constant concern of

hostile acts” and also the “respect for the aspiration of the Palestinian people to freely architecting their destiny in their own land” (Alfonsín 1983. Our translation). This statement is listed by Méndez (2008, 112) as the most open manifestation of the traditional principle of equidistance supported by the Argentinian government about the case.

As understood after the aforementioned declarations, the *Radical* administration formulated a conceptual framework in order to start this new phase of external relations. This framework then established that “Argentina [was] a Western, non-aligned and developing country”. In the words of Foreign Minister Dante Caputo (1986. Our translation): “those are the three basic elements of our national reality from which we build our relationship with the world”. To which the aspiration to be a moral power was added: “[...] not just a country in which human rights are respected, but from now also a country that raises its voice against any violation of these rights in any part of world” (Alfonsín 1984. Our translation).

In this context, the Alfonsín administration outlined as the main objective of its foreign policy to achieve the international reinsertion of Argentina. According to Russell (1994, 7), the basic pillars of the foreign policy that pursued these objectives were: the development of a mature relationship with the United States; the active participation towards problems that were part of the North-South issue; the strengthening of relations with Latin America; and the narrowing of political and economic relations with Western Europe.

Thus, the reinsertion was thought as based on a multilateral framework and was not restricted to a special relationship with the hegemonic power, as it was the case during the Menem administration. On the contrary, it intended to expand the number and range of partners partners that Argentina had in the international level, in order to broaden its margins of autonomy (Simonoff 1999, 80).

Regarding the link with the Middle East, as mentioned, it was one of the areas in which Argentina maintained a low profile relation, which in some ways is evinced by finding that Alfonsín visited only two states in the region during his whole administration: Algeria (1984) and Saudi Arabia (1986). It is worth mentioning that a trip to Israel, which would transform the *Radical*

leader into the first Argentinian representative to visit the Jewish state, was also planned, but it was postponed.

It is important to add that during this period the region went through a particularly complex situation due to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, the confrontation between Iran and Iraq and, of course, the ongoing conflict between Palestinians and Israelis, which was far from reaching a solution. However, in spite of this scenario, there was no foreign policy framework for this region. Quite the opposite, routine and punctual actions based on specific interests prevailed (Lechini 2006).

On the other hand, the democratic regime parted itself from its predecessor and highlighted the similarities and not the differences between Argentina and Southern nations, based on their condition of underdeveloped countries (Lechini 2006, 40). Thus, the region was considered as a part of the South-South Cooperation strategy which implementation was meant to help Argentina to come closer to other Third World countries seeking joint solutions to common problems concerning the North. So, the implemented agenda for the region particularly sought to gain support for Argentina's claim to the Falkland Islands and also to a political approach to the problem of external debt, among other issues (Carrancio 1994, 279). In fact, the Arab vote was important not only to the Malvinas issue but also for the election of Chancellor Caputo for the presidency of the UN General Assembly during its 43rd session in 1988. Moreover, although this issue will not be studied in this work, the sales of military equipment to Iran continued, as well as the deepening of scientific-technological cooperation regarding knowledge exchange and joint work in the nuclear ambit with other countries of the region.

With reference to the specific conflict here analyzed, as evinced below, Argentina continued to embrace the policy that became the traditional pattern of the country concerning this dispute: equidistance.

After this first approach to the subject, the following sections aim to analyze the link between the Argentinian government, Jewish communities and local Arabic and their respective countries/reference entities. The country's position on the conflict in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and in the United Nations (UN), the main multilateral arenas chosen to treat this subject, are also going to be approached.

The relation between the *Radical* government, the Jewish local community and the State of Israel

The link between the new Argentinian government, the State of Israel and the Jewish community began to be constructed right after the *Radical* administration took office. The presidential inauguration ceremony was attended by a delegation sent by State of Israel, in which David Kimche, Director General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, took part. However, as discussed below, while the relationship with the local community seemed to consolidate daily, once the final balance of the administration is made, the relations with Tel Aviv were not equally positive. Although the relations between the two states did not necessarily deteriorated, that link was not up to the relationship the Argentinian government had with the local Jewish community.

During the first phase of the Alfonsín government, accordingly to the difficult domestic situation and the aforementioned demands concerning the punishment for crimes committed under the previous regime, the Argentina-Israel relations were strongly characterized by the eagerness of both parties to establish the fate of Jews that had disappeared during the military dictatorship. Therefore, a fact that both Tel Aviv and the local Jewish community regarded as very positive was the appointment of two Jews² to join the National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons (CONADEP, initials in Spanish), whose formation was driven during the first months of the *Radical* administration.

A correlated fact, Israel sent a parliamentary delegation to Argentina in March 1984 in order to request information to CONADEP. The members of the delegation were received by the Minister of the Interior, Antonio Troccoli, in the context of a meeting at which the Israeli Ambassador in Argentina, Dov Schmorak, asked Buenos Aires to use his position in the Third World to avoid constant condemnations of Israel in international forums (JTA 1984a). Thus, this order becomes a clear example of the pressures that the *Radical*

² Gregorio Klimovsky, part of the Latin American section of the World Jewish Congress, and Rabbi Marshall Meyer, leader of the spiritual congregation Beth El.

administration suffered along its entire management from both the government of Israel and the local and international Jewish communities, aiming the adoption of favorable attitudes to their interests by Argentina. However, Buenos Aires did not reply to that request, since becoming a partner of one of the parties involved would surely have higher costs than benefits for a country with no vital interests at stake in the conflict. This was especially important in a time when, as aforementioned, Argentina struggled to achieve its international reinsertion and aspired to expand the number and range of its external linkages, including the Arab countries.

Later, President Alfonsín and Chancellor Caputo received in Buenos Aires Nathan Perlmutter, National Director of the Anti-Defamation League and of B'nai B'rith, as well as other members of the League's Department of Latin American Affairs. Another example of the broad political contacts that were held with senior officials of the Jewish community worldwide was the arrival of the President of the World Jewish Congress, Edgar Bronfman, in September 1984. The latter met the first Argentine president at a meeting when Alfonsín expressed its rejection of the association between Zionism and racism, and even proposed to contribute for an approach that would serve to address the issue of Soviet Jews (JTA 1984b). Afterwards, in another sign of goodwill towards the community and the State of Israel, Alfonsín sent a draft law to the National Assembly punishing discrimination based on race or religion, in which special reference to discrimination against Jewish citizens was made, accompanied by a message that emphasized the commitment of the democratic government to respect for and promotion of human rights.

Besides, a very present subject during Alfonsín administration that generated a strong concern in Tel Aviv and among members of the local Jewish community was the possibility that the Argentine government would grant permission for the establishment of a delegation from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in the country. At that time, the Jewish community press highlighted the heavy advertising that began after November 29, day of solidarity to the Palestinian people, and statements by senior officials of the Arab community that held it was very likely that the government could make something about it (JTA 1985a). Indeed, even the traditional daily Argentine Financial Field mentioned the pressures from the Arab and Jewish

communities, for and against that permission, which the national government was under (JTA 1985c). In this context, DAIA requested a meeting with national authorities in order to express their resentment to the granting of such authorization, particularly bearing in mind the Argentine solidarity with the Third World, especially in a time when the country's nomination for the presidency of the Non-Aligned Movement was under consideration. However, President Alfonsín pledged "no support to any initiative that could be detrimental to national unity" during the meeting (JTA 1985d).

The stance adopted by the government when addressing this issue is easily understood if one considers, first, the limited support, both international and regional, held by the PLO at that time and, second, the good relations between the local Jewish community and the national government. In fact, the fact that this community had affirmed strong support for the Alfonsín campaign during the previous elections, to such extent that the Latin American branch of the World Jewish Congress quoted itself of the fiercest defenders of such administration, cannot be overlooked (JTA 1985d).

In line with the thriving relations held with the local Jewish community, in mid-1985 Alfonsín participated of a Jewish teleological seminar, where he even received an award for his contribution to human rights and religious pluralism. Moreover, in another gesture well received by such community, and also largely a response to the efforts made, the list of candidates in the province of Buenos Aires for the legislative elections that year was headed by a Jew, Marcelo Stubrin. Indeed, a hallmark of this government applauded by the community, which for years had been kept out of the political sphere, was the widespread presence of Jews in high public offices³. A slogan then implemented by sectors of the opposition when referring to this characteristic was the "radical synagogue". Either way, this should not lead to infer a privileged Jewish presence in the political arena if one bears in mind that at that time there was also a large number of members of the Arab community who held occupied high positions. At one time during the Alfonsín

³ Among the Jews who occupied high positions in office, we can name: Marcos Aguinis, Culture Secretary; Cesar Jaroslasky, Chairman of the *Radical* bloc in the Chamber of Deputies; Bernardo Grinspun, first Minister of Economy in the Alfonsín cabinet; Leopoldo Portnoi, president of Central Bank; and James Fiterma, Secretary for Public Works of the City of Buenos Aires, just to name a few.

administration, nearly a third of the governors of the Argentine provinces were descendants of Arabs.

Despite the excellent relationship built with the Jewish community, it must be stressed that the link with Israel did not present the same intensity after a series of decisions adopted by Argentina, in line with its traditional stance of equidistance. These decisions were not well received by Tel Aviv. For example, Buenos Aires criticized the actions of Israel in Lebanon and the *Radical* administration rejected the Israeli response to the Intifada until the last moments of the Alfonsín government. In fact, some argue that the frustrated Alfonsín's visit to Israel, which also led to friction between the parties, was suspended because the Argentine government judged that it would be inappropriate to arrive at that country during the period of the Intifada and the subsequent repression by the Israeli army to Palestinians. Obviously, the first democratic government in Argentina after years of the bloodiest of military regimes, an administration that raised the banner of human rights and that intended to become "a moral power" was not willing to visit a country whose action was being heavily criticized by the international community at that particular moment. Another point of friction between the two governments took place after Argentina not only condemned Israeli actions in the Palestinian territory at the United Nations, but also defended the right to self-determination of the people from Palestine (JTA 1985d). Moreover, the rejection of Argentina to the move of the capital of Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem did not favor deepening the bond between the two countries. Regarding this issue, Argentina maintained its stance even after calls and efforts of Israel and the attitude of other Latin American countries that established diplomatic missions in the holy city. However, Argentina remained firm in its position, according to which a high impact action, like transferring its embassy in Israel, would be counterproductive and contrary to the policy of equidistance. For a decision of such features would have undoubtedly affected the relations with some Third World countries, and particularly with other states in the Middle East with which Argentina was also interested in preserving their ties, as old as those held with the State of Israel. Furthermore, Argentina traded with Iran not only grains, but also weapons, scientific and technological cooperation was advancing at the nuclear level with this and other countries in

the region, and the Latin American also support needed these countries's support in international forums. This support was especially needed when dealing with subjects that, unlike the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, had a leading role in Argentina's foreign policy agenda, as was the case of Malvinas and the political negotiation of debt, at a time when the country was facing a serious crisis economic.

On the other hand, despite of the aforementioned disagreements, the national government strongly condemned the attack on a synagogue in Istanbul in mid-1986 and the Argentine president met with former Israeli president Ephraim Katziren during the Latin American Conference of Friends of the University of Tel Aviv. It is also worth to mention the signing of an agreement between the National Council of Scientific and Technical Research (CONICET, initials in Spanish), the National Institute of Industrial Technology (INTI, initials in Spanish), and the Faculty of Physics and Science of the Universidad de Buenos Aires with the Weizmann Institute, as well as the visit of the deans of the Universidad Nacional de Rosario and Universidad del Salvador to Israel in 1987. Moreover, it is particularly important to note that before the uprisings of Easter, the Foreign Affairs Minister of Israel sent a message of support and encouragement to the Argentine government (Singer 1989, 273). These actions show that although Israel did not perceive the relations with Argentina greatly, they remained friendly.

To conclude this section, a brief consideration for the competing positions that arose within the Jewish community after the approval of the *Obediencia Debida* and *Punto Final* acts must be added. Although some sectors defended the need for the introduction of such legal instruments in order to advance a process of democratic consolidation and national reconciliation, others harshly criticized the policy adopted by the *Radical* government, including David Goldberg, then president of DAIA (Singer 1989, 273). It can definitely be argued that the local Jewish community institutions manifested a strong support for the democratic regime that went hand in hand with some criticism to the adoption of the aforementioned laws.

Claims made by the incipient pro-Palestine organizations

With regard to the Arab community in Argentina, the third most relevant in the country, institutional development has a long history, having begun in the late nineteenth century. However, the most important institution acting on its behalf, FEARAB Argentina, a tertiary institution that gathers various provincial federations, was created in 1972 and has generally maintained a friendly relationship with the diverse national administrations ever since.

A feature of the Alfonsín administration that has to be highlighted is that it coincides with the very institutional development of the Palestinian community in Argentina. A few months before *Radicalismo* came into power the foundations of what would later become the Argentine-Palestinian Federation were being laid. This institution, the first to finally represent this small community in the country, was mobilized by a group of Chilean exiles of Palestinian origin who left the neighboring country and settled in Argentina after the coup of General Pinochet.

In 1984, this group formed a theater company that generated a space of interchange for Argentine people of Palestinian origin. This was the starting point to try to reunite the Palestinian community in Argentina and also to create instruments to publicize the situation of the Palestinian people in the country (Montenegro and Setton 2009, 6). The Argentine-Palestinian Sanaud Cultural Center (*Centro Cultural Argentino Palestino Sanaud*, in Spanish) was also created that year, with the mission to raise awareness of the history, culture and political of those territories.

In the year of 1987, the Argentine-Palestinian Federation was created. Its structure implied that the Palestinian community had the support of an institution that still today defends their interests and gives publicity to their claims, previously transmitted through representatives of other organizations of the Arab community as a whole, like FEARAB.

With respect to the entity that emerged as the sole representative of the Palestinian people internationally, the Palestinian National Authority, it should be mentioned that still did not exist in the 1980s. Hence, Argentina did not recognize the PLO in this period.

In this context, in the early-1980s the Argentine Committee of Solidarity with Palestinian People was created, from which the Palestinian

Information Office in Argentina was originated in 1985. In the words of a person who was both its director and Secretary-General, Suhail Akel, the group searched for “the vindication of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian People, the publicization of the Palestinian question, the remembrance of key dates for our people” and particularly “the defense of the recognition by the Argentine government of a future diplomatic office of the Palestinian Liberation Organization” (Diario Rio Negro 1989).

In any case, months before the establishment of such diplomatic mission and very particularly after the commemoration of the Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian people, the Jewish community explained its dissatisfaction with a strong campaign for the Argentine recognition of PLO, as aforementioned. Without going any further, the event organized by the Argentine-Arab Foundation, which took place on November 29, 1984, was attended by national government authorities, parliamentarians of the *Partido Justicialista* and the Director of International Organizations of the Foreign Ministry, Ambassador Julio Barbosa. In this context, the possibility that Parliament would require Alfonsín to recognize the PLO was suggested (JTA 1985a). Furthermore, the president of the Argentine-Arab Foundation said shortly after that the Argentine government was giving positive samples in their attitude toward the Palestinian cause (JTA 1985b).

It is worth to mention that the efforts for the recognition of the PLO in the country were also supported by the then representative of the organization in Brazil, Farid Suwwan, which at that time repeatedly traveled to Argentina to support this cause (JTA 1985d). Indeed, the head of the PLO Political Department Farouk Kaddumi also tried to visit Buenos Aires, but his visit was always discouraged (Mendez 2008, 113).

In 1985 and 1987, in line with the previously mentioned ideas, the Committee lobbied for the recognition of PLO, as well as for the establishment of a Palestinian diplomatic office in the country, by the Argentine government through various documents. In 1987, it also happened through a letter directly written to President Alfonsín and signed by many social organizations and

political parties (La Capital 1987)⁴. However, it appears that despite the good relationship that existed with the Arab community as a whole, the *Partido Radical* did not observe the adequate conditions for the required progress. Particularly in a moment that, as already mentioned, the PLO was viewed with suspicion by an important part of the international community and it was even perceived by the United States as a terrorist organization under its Terrorism Act (1987).

In any case, despite the position taken against the recognition of the PLO and the opening of a diplomatic mission in Buenos Aires, the Alfonsín administration tried to maintain good relations with the Arab community in general and Palestinians in particular by organizing an event in commemoration of the *Nakba* and also allowing the realization of a seminar organized by the UN Committee for the Defense of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People (Mendez 2008, 113).

It should not be overlooked that it is important for every Argentine government to maintain a good relationship with both the Arab and the Jewish communities, for ultimately both hold a broad historical and social importance in the country centered on the migration flows of the late-nineteenth century. In fact, these communities contributed to the process of nation-building and they were eventually integrated into the Argentina society in such ways that preserving ties with them becomes a priority.

To conclude this section, it should be mentioned that the claim for recognition and the opening of diplomatic PLO office in Buenos Aires spread

⁴ Comité Argentino de Solidaridad con el Pueblo Palestino; Servicio de Paz y Justicia de América Latina; Movimiento Ecueménico por Derechos del Hombre; Partido Comunista; Partido Justicialista; Movimiento al Socialismo; Frente por los Derechos Humanos; Madres de Plaza de Mayo; Partido Intransigente; Bloque de Concejales Justicialistas de la Ciudad de Rosario; Juventud de la Liga Argentina por los Derechos del Hombre; Juventud Radical Bloque de Concejales Peronistas para la Victoria; Juventud Peronista Renovadora; la Agrupación Chile Democrático; Partido Socialista Auténtico; Juventud Demócrata Cristiana; Agrupación 17 de Octubre; Unión de Estudiantes Secundarios; Partido del Trabajo y del Pueblo; Peronismo Revolucionario; Juventud Universitaria Peronista; Familiares de Detenidos y Desaparecidos por Razones Políticas y Gremiales; Partido Socialista Popular; Bloque Intransigente del Consejo Municipal de Rosario; Partido Obrero; Partido Demócrata Cristiano; Juventud Socialista del MAS; and Centro de Estudiantes de Odontología, Humanidades y Artes, Derecho y Ciencia Política de la UNR.

throughout the 1980s. However, in this case, the pressures of external and even domestic actors were not enough for Argentina to act in this direction.

The methods used by the PLO, regarded as a terrorist organization by some countries, the distance that other states, with which Argentina sought to preserve good relations – United States and also European and Latin American countries –, kept from this organization, as well as the aforementioned pressures imposed by local and international Jewish communities, refrained the inauguration of a diplomatic office of the PLO in Argentina. In fact, there were advances in this direction during the Menem administration⁵, under which much closer ties with the PLO were established, in a much more favorable context than the one faced by Alfonsín, particularly after the Madrid Summit, when the reciprocal recognition of the parties and the signing of the Oslo Accords were consolidated.

In short, a country that sought international reinsertion should act moderately, avoiding to materialize actions like, for example, the authorization of a diplomatic office of the PLO in Buenos Aires, or receiving PLO representatives at a time when the organization was harshly criticized by important partners at the global level. It does not mean that the country, according to its historical procedure, stopped defending the rights of the Palestinian people in multilateral forums, as it can be observed in subsequent sections.

After the analysis of the nature of the relations with Palestinian and Jewish communities in Argentina, as well as with some of the features of bilateral relations with related countries/entities, the article is going to assess the positioning of Buenos Aires in the conflict that is object of study in international forums.

⁵ After being named the PLO representative in Argentina in 1989, Akel installed the first Palestinian Office in Buenos Aires in 1990, still with no official recognition of the Argentine government. In any case, the contacts, meetings and commitments with Argentine senior officials gave results when, in the mid-1990s, the official inauguration of the Palestinian delegation to Argentina was accepted. Argentina then established bilateral relations with the Palestinian National Authority.

The Argentinian position regarding the conflict in the NAM framework

In regard to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the organization became a space in which the Argentina sought to promote the objectives and guiding principles of foreign policy as stated by the Alfonsín administration. It was also one of the multilateral forums in which Argentina chose to express its stance regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The *Radical* government was led by an idealist-ethic perception of international politics, but also by a pragmatism that impeded it to ignore national interests. Also, the reform of the country's participation in NAM was sought to distance itself from the image that was previously associated to the country during the military regime (Saavedra 2004, 78). Hence, the government worked towards recovering its founding principles, associated with preventing superpowers from exporting their own dispute to territories that did not adhere to any of them. Of course, it also sought to reaffirm the rights of Argentina over the Malvinas. In order to achieve these purposes, Argentina sought to be within the group of moderate countries, but with the strengthening of its actions.

Consistent with this more active and greater political commitment, the possibility of Argentina to submit its candidacy for the presidency of the movement was considered during the first stage of the chancellorship. However, it was judged that the country did not present the required conditions to advance its candidacy, since it did not demonstrate an important level of commitment and activity for long periods of time. Moreover, regarding the subject of this article, it had not associated itself to some of the great political issues of NAM, as it was the case of the situation in the Middle East (Saavedra 2004, 80). In fact, Argentina maintained ties with Israel and was generally characterized by avoiding the resolutions extremely critical of Tel Aviv, which contained recommendations for actions against this country. Besides, Argentina had distanced itself from national liberation movements, making clear reservations about the legitimacy of armed struggle. In this sense, it can be added that the start of the presidential race would have implied that Argentina made adjustments in its foreign policy, which political costs the leadership was unwilling to deal with (Saavedra 2004, 79).

As part of the movement, Argentina sought to give priority to those issues emphasized by other members, but that also did not imply clashing with

its own interests (Saavedra 2004, 89). In this context, whereas Argentina opted to sustain its traditional stance of equidistance and ruled out changes in both its relations with Israel and its position on the conflict that this country had with the Palestinians, the article do not share the opinion of authors who claim, without delving into the issue, that the Argentine government sided with the Arabs claiming that “the thirdworldism of Alfonsín twinned with whom affirmed the Israeli domination was perceived as a foreign power” (Melamed 2000, 24). By contrast, the balance between the parties in dispute became a shelter for the Argentine capacity of international insertion at that stage.

During his term in office, President Alfonsín only participated in one of the NAM summits, the VIII Summit Conference, held in Harare in 1986. The draft of the final statement of this summit had been previously prepared at a meeting in Zimbabwe and included the explicit endorsement of the movement to the acceptance of a Palestinian State at the United Nations. On the other hand, it also expressed the opposition of this group of States to Israel's participation in the United Nations Regional Commissions, making the NAM pro-Arab stance evident.

Taking this into consideration, within the framework of the VIII Summit Alfonsín recognized the right of the Palestinian people to establish an independent state within its own territory and to make use of self-determination. Also, trying to be fair to both sides, he defended the right of Israel to exist within secure and internationally recognized borders in front of an organization that still did not recognize this state. Moreover, Argentina presented reservations to those paragraphs of the final declaration in which Zionism was described as a form of racism and expressed its disagreement with the paragraph that expresses the movement's opposition to the admission of Israel as part of any economic regional commission of the UN. In fact, Buenos Aires not only disagreed with this point but also unveiled its reservation to the declaration on the grounds that this conflicted with the principle of universality of the organisms contained in the Charter of the United Nations (Saavedra 2004, 127).

This position evinces that despite the criticism that Argentina directed towards Israel for its actions in the Palestinian territories, the country valued this state when recognizing its existence and trying to avoid the sanctions and even the segregation that was somehow promoted by some NAM members.

Thus, in line with the policy of equidistance, it chose to defend the rights of both peoples, while still recognizing the concerns raised by the situation on the territory.

Finally, despite a position that sought to be balanced – yet regarded by some Arab countries as lukewarm –, the defense of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people regarding this dispute and some changes that the country made in foreign policy, as was the case of the severance of diplomatic relations with South Africa, were sufficient for the country to introduce in the final declaration of Harare a paragraph in which members of the movement emphasized strongly support for the Argentine rights over Malvinas, exhorting the parties to resume negotiations within the framework of the United Nations.

The Argentinian position on the conflict in the United Nations framework

Regarding the Argentine position on the conflict at the United Nations, Chancellor Caputo affirmed in his speech to the 40th General Assembly (1985) that the Palestinian issue was of great concern to his government, and then added: "the essential aim [...] is that the Palestinian people exercise their inalienable right to self-determination and independence, to establish their own national state and have their legitimate representation in negotiations that have to be established for this purpose" (Caputo 1985). Also, the Argentine representative asked for the respect to the right to existence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries in the region, among them Israel, as well as their right to enjoy internationally recognized safe borders.

A year later, when appearing before the 41st General Assembly, the Argentine Foreign Minister again stressed:

Argentina supports the need for the Palestinian people to finally see their right to become an independent state in its own territory recognized, governing with the authorities they freely elected and making use of their full self-determination. Similarly, we reaffirm the right of all states in the region, including Israel, to live within secure and internationally recognized borders. For the same reasons, we condemn all actions that threaten the existence of these rights, like with the occupation of territories by force,

and acts of terrorism and violence that blight lives, destroy families and maim children and the youth. (Caputo 1986a, Our Translation)

From these speeches, it is possible to understand the continuity of the traditional Argentine policy of equidistance that the country once again presented for a balanced approach recognizing the rights of each of the parties on the disputed territory and condemning any violation thereto. Thus, a follow-up was given to the policy adopted by previous efforts at a time in which the balance was judged as the most reasonable choice to embrace. Especially considering that this conflict was alien to Argentina, which then had to face serious internal problems linked to the economic crisis and to demands for justice that enraged Argentine people, as well as significant external challenges, like its quest for international reinsertion.

That said, as a non-permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations during the biennium 1987-1988, Argentina had to position itself facing the crisis that sparked the first Intifada⁶. Then, at the beginning of the 97th session of the UN Security Council, in early December 1987, Argentina supported the proposal presented by the delegate from UAE to invite the Palestinian representative to participate of discussions on the situation of territories occupied by Israel. In this regard, it is important to emphasize that this attitude proved that the country did not ignore the role of the organization as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, although it was reluctant to strengthen ties bilaterally with the organization, in an international context that was not judged favorable at the time.

However, given the clashes that happened at that time, a draft resolution was submitted by non-permanent members of the Security Council, including Argentina. The document, adopted unanimously as resolution No. 607, affirmed: “the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War [...] is applicable to Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem”. Moreover, “Calls

⁶ It is worth to remember that this event had its origins in December 1987 as a spontaneous uprising of the Palestinean people in the occupied territories, which was manifested through economic boycott, resistance to the payment of taxes and also stoning of Israeli forces that were located within the territories.

upon Israel to refrain from deporting Palestinian civilians from the occupied territories.”

Days later, Security Council Resolution No. 608, the result of another draft resolution also filed by non-permanent members, called upon Israel to rescind the order to deport Palestinian civilians and to ensure that those already deported could return immediately and safely to the occupied Palestinian territories.

It is worth to add that this group of Third World states that worked as non-permanent members presented various draft resolutions in which Israeli actions in the occupied territories were repudiated throughout 1988. However, except for the aforementioned resolutions, the other drafts were not approved because of the negative votes of the United States. Still, a feature of such instruments of which Argentina was co-author is that while they denounced Israeli actions, the drafts did not propose any sanctions that, on the other hand, were not supported by the South American country. As already mentioned, Buenos Aires tried to preserve its historical ties with both Israel and with the main supporters of the Palestinian cause among Arab countries during that period.

Finally, another highlight with regard to the Argentine participation in United Nations is that the Argentine foreign minister was elected to the presidency of the General Assembly during the 43rd session in 1988. It was a particularly important stage of the Middle Eastern dispute, which coincided with the proclamation of independence of the Palestinian State, in Algiers. Besides, the United States decided to deny a visa to Yasser Arafat so that the PLO leader could not attend the session of the General Assembly to be held in mid-December 1988.

In this context, the Argentine foreign minister sided with the Secretary-General of UN to promote this meeting at the UN headquarters in Geneva, a movement that allowed Arafat to address the Assembly. During this encounter, two important resolutions were approved: on one hand, Resolution No. 43/176, which urged the organization of a peace conference in the Middle East under the auspices of UN. The resolution – which was adopted with one hundred thirty-eight votes in favor, two votes against and two abstentions – had the endorsement of Argentina, in line with one of the guiding principles of the

Alfonsín administration and also with the traditional position of the South American country, which has always favored a peaceful settlement of the conflict. On the other hand, Resolution 431/177, which acknowledged of the proclamation of a Palestinian state, received the positive vote of Argentina, one of the ten Latin American countries that supported the resolution⁷. However, it must be highlighted that this did not involve the formal recognition of it. The recognition was conceded only by two Latin American countries, while Buenos Aires was inclined to wait for a more favorable international context. Nonetheless, the country judged the Algiers Declaration as an important contribution to the search for a solution to the dispute (Saavedra 2004, 129).

Conclusion

As pointed out in the beginning of the article, the situation in the Middle East in general, and particularly in the Palestinian-Israeli Question, did not occupy an important place in the Argentine foreign policy's agenda during the period between December 1983 and July 1989. On the contrary, the Alfonsín administration gave priority to the approach of other themes and to links with other geographical areas.

In the internal plan, however, a very close relation with the Jewish local community, which was a strong supporter of the *Radical* government, was maintained. On the other hand, the maintenance of the link to the Arab community was attempted. In this sense, while the relations with the first group were cordial in general, they were far more turbulent with the small local Palestinian community. As of the relations with Israel, they had not been at the level that the Middle Eastern country had desired due to the critical position adopted by Argentina after Israeli actions in Lebanon and Palestine, though political contact was productive. Regarding the relations with PLO, suspicions made clear by important partners of Buenos Aires towards the political group, as well as the fact that some of them considered these Palestinians a terrorist

⁷ The other nine countries of the region were Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama and Peru.

organization, among other reasons, made Argentina evaluate that there were no proper conditions to establish closer relations with the organization.

As of the Argentine positions regarding this question in the framework of international organizations, Buenos Aires presented some initiatives favorable to the protection of the people involved in the conflict during its tenure as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. Within the General Assembly, however, it supported a peace conference, added to other resolutions favorable to strengthen the dialogue between the parties involved.

Likewise, it is important to highlight that both in the United Nations and the Non-Aligned Movement, accordingly to the traditional Argentinian position on the case, the country adopted a balanced position, defending the right of the Palestinian people to organize an independent state, with its own territory, exercising its inalienable right to self-determination, as well as the Israeli right to live in peace with safe and internationally recognized boundaries. Furthermore, it is important to stress that the *Radical* government condemned the human rights violations of both Tel Aviv and radical Islamic groups, in line with its position favorable to topics related to human rights.

Finally, the equidistance policy resulted coherent for a country that was unrelated to the dispute and for a government that had to face many serious internal problems, as well as important external challenges, and that evaluated that the most profitable action would be to show no innovations, and to bet on the balance between the parties.

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ABSTRACT

The Middle East has been the stage of some of the major conflicts that have taken place in recent times. Among them, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has kept the region on edge for decades. The aim of this paper is to analyze Argentina's foreign policy towards the Palestinian-Israeli conflict during the administration of Raúl Alfonsín (1983-1989).

KEYWORDS

Argentine Foreign Policy; Palestinian-Israeli Conflict; Alfonsín.

*Received on December 02, 2013.
Approved on November 11, 2014.*

Translated by Pedro Alt

PARTNERS

NERINT

The Brazilian Centre for Strategy and International Relations (NERINT) was the first center dedicated to the study and research in International Relations in Southern Brazil. It was established in August 1999 at the ILEA/UFRGS aiming the argumentative and innovative study of the main transformations within the post-Cold War international system. Since 2014, it is located at the Faculty of Economics of UFRGS (FCE-UFRGS). In parallel, NERINT has sought ways to contribute to the debate on a national project for Brazil through the understanding of the available strategic options to consolidate an autonomous international presence for the country, from the perspective of the developing world. Brazil's choice of an "active, affirmative, and proactive diplomacy" at the beginning of the 21st century has converged with projections and studies put forward over numerous seminars and publications organized by NERINT.

An outcome of its activity was the creation of an undergraduate degree on International Relations (2004), ranked the best in Brazil according to the Ministry of Education (2012), and a graduate level program, the International Strategic Studies Doctoral Program (2010). Two journals were also created: the bimonthly *Conjuntura Austral* and the biannual and bilingual *Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations*. Thus, besides ongoing research on developing countries, NERINT is also the birthplace of undergraduate and graduate programs, not to mention its intense editorial activities.

PPGEEI

The International Strategic Studies Doctoral Program (PPGEEI) started in 2010, offering Master and Doctorate degrees, both supported by qualified professors and researchers with international experience. It is the result of several developments on research and education at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS).

Its roots can be traced to the Brazilian Centre of Strategy and International Relations (NERINT), a centre established in 1999 which conducts research, seminars, and edits two journals. Other main partners are the Centre for Studies on Technology, Industry, and Labor (NETIT/FCE) and the Centre for International Government Studies (CEGOV), located at the Latin American Institute for Advanced Studies (ILEA/UFRGS). In 2004, an undergraduate degree in International Relations was created at the Faculty of Economics/UFRGS; in 2005 the Center for Studies on Brazil-South Africa (CESUL), recently renamed as Brazilian Centre for African Studies (CEBRAFRICA), was created. All those actions together enabled the rise of an independent line of thinking propped by specialized bibliography.

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In March 2012, CESUL was expanded into CEBRAFRICA in order to cover the whole of Africa. At the same time, the South Africa series, which published five books, was transformed into the African Series, with new titles. The centre's main objectives remain the same as before: to conduct research, to support the development of memoirs, thesis and undergraduate works, to

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