

NATIONAL ARMY AND STATE-BUILDING IN AFRICA: THE BRAZILIAN APPROACH IN THE CASE OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

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Introduction

This article aims to discuss the role of the technical cooperation, Brazil's participation in the peacekeeping missions and the international projection of Brazilian companies as elements that, once deliberately conjugated, can produce a particular model of international insertion of Brazil. It is understood that these three elements may be present, though in an embryonic way, in the case of the interaction between Brazil and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Such interaction has the potential for assisting in the tasks regarding the formation of the National Army in the latter, something directly related to the difficulties that are present in the DRC and Sub-Saharan Africa in the state-building process.

The National Army is fairly recent, dating back to the nineteenth century, and is the fusing result of two historical accumulations: the Industrial

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Revolution and the political revolutions. In the case of the formation of Sub-Saharan Africa armies, the Africans were not able to benefit from any of these accumulations. First, because the system of African states emerged under the auspices of the UN Charter, which forbids using the war of aggression as an instrument of foreign policy. In addition, the regime of the Organization of African Unity gave stability to the national borders inherited from the colonial time (Herbst 1989; Herbst 2000). Second, because the political emancipation of the African countries was followed by a deliberate movement of the metropolises to conserve the dependence of their former colonies (neocolonialism). There would certainly be other countless elements to be inventoried. However, both elements here enrolled are enough to explain why, in the case of Africa, the National Army was not capable of structuring itself, bringing about the formation of the national economy through the means of defense, nor to establish the guardianship of order or to organize political participation, as it had happened in the cases of Europe and Latin America.

Moreover, under several different pretexts, Africans have been denied the military technology (which has civil production implications due to its dual technology) and political institutions (which usually result from the competition process between states and other forms of association). While early justifications came from Cold War ideological confrontation or neocolonialism, they now stem from the concept of human security and power-sharing³. But in both cases, although arguments are diametrically opposed, the profile of technical cooperation of central countries remains intact: they keep on denying access to technology and the right for Africans to engender their own history and institutions.

This text is divided into four major thematic parts. The first part investigates the historical role of the army in the construction process of states. Army's historical contribution went beyond its primary end (internal and external security); it also supported the formation of both economic

³ *Power-sharing* concerns political arrangements of distribution of power between contender groups. It can be applied as both a principle of political-electoral rules of democratic regimes and in processes of intrastate armed conflict resolution. This text focuses on the second case, in which the state sovereignty is clearly weakened and/or is little effective.

bureaucracy (productive capacity) and political institutions. After that, the different trajectory of the African armies is evaluated and discussed, in addition to their brief ascension and the reasons of their disruption upon the arrival of the 1990s. This phenomenon is related with the limits of the technical cooperation programs and the adoption of the human security concept.

The second part of the article argues how Africa's armed conflicts resolution only contributed to the continuity of this disruption process of the states. This occurred in various cases where palliative measures (peace negotiations based on power-sharing mechanisms) were privileged. Such mechanisms were privileged to the detriment of long-term resolutions, linked with the Security Sector Reform (SSR) process and the International Technical Cooperation (ITC)⁴.

The third part assesses the possibility of Brazil's contributing for the overcoming of this reality. It argues the hypothesis that there is a model, under construction, of international insertion that may offer more sustainable solutions to the African problems. In this sense, Brazil signals a new disposition to act in the conflict zones of the international system by means of a particular concept of human rights and the promotion of ITC programs.

The fourth part of this text focuses on a case study. It suggests that Brazil's embryonic model of international insertion could be tested in its relations with the DRC. It looks into the possibility of supplementing the role Brazil currently possesses in the pacification of the country, through the command of General Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz in the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

⁴ ITC is a specific type of International Cooperation that composes the host of Official Development Assistance. It concerns a "cooperation centered in the exchange of technical and management knowledge, in order to increase the capacities of institutions and people to promote their own development" (Gutiérrez 2000). It is worth underscoring that there is a close relation between technical cooperation and development, since "the development process involves either new combinations of existing factors at a given technical level or the introduction of technical innovations" (Furtado 1961, 90). Further, ITC favors the construction of state capacities, inasmuch as "the crucial role of organizing the development effort is a state duty" (Souza 2005, 10). As the text will attempt to exemplify, the technical cooperation differentiates, however, in its form: from the vertical processes (inheriting the concept of international assistance between capitalist and developing countries) to the horizontal ones (projects between developing countries, therefore less asymmetrical).

(MONUSCO). This participation could be extended to ITC programs in the security area, a sector where the partnership between both countries is—compared to other African cases—still scarce.

In conclusion, it recommends the possible creation of an institutional structure that guides and co-ordinates the Brazilian ITC, and that may organize the ministerial structure in order to guarantee the coherence between this cooperation and the guidelines of Brazil's foreign and security policy.

The National Army in State-Building

The army is the basic element of the coercive capacity of the states and was in the base of its historical creation. According to Robert Nisbet,

There is no known historical instance of a political state not founded in circumstances of war, not rooted in the distinctive disciplines of war. The state is indeed hardly more than the institutionalization of the war-making apparatus; its earliest function everywhere is exclusively military; its earliest rulers, generals and war lords. (Nisbet 1982, 103)

Charles Tilly aligns with this perception that the states were created as war camps in times of peace; that is, one of the different historical forms of organization and monopolization of violence (Tilly 1985, 171). Assuming a Weberian concept of state⁵, this author claims it has three minimum, essential activities: the creation of the state (control of the territory), war making and protection (Tilly 1996, 158). It is understood, by logical association, the role of the National Army toward these activities.

However, the importance of the army is not limited to its ultimate activity (external and internal coercion). Its transformative capacity extrapolates (and it has historically done so) such function and intervenes in other correlate processes in state-building. There have been at least three activities in which the army has had its greatest importance: the formation of

⁵ The Weberian concept defines the state as a compulsory political organization that controls a territorial area where the bureaucracy successfully withholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order (Weber 2000, 525).

the bureaucracy, the incentive to the national economy (productive capacity) and the support to the development of citizenship and political institutions.

With respect to **bureaucracy**, the logic is clearer. The army is the most primitive example of bureaucracy created by the state, generating the first basic senses of order, hierarchy and rationality. Although its structure includes elements of the traditional and charismatic political domination, it is one the first organizations of the state to assume some sort of rationality – hierarchy, specialized knowledge and professional administration of violence (Luckham 1998, 21; Lasswell 1941). The military education in the National Armies was a basic factor in this process because, through the knowledge element, it relates directly to the formation of ranks for the bureaucracy⁶. Moreover, by means of the institution of the armies, there was a clear incentive from the state for the construction of bureaucracies related to extractive capacities, since it is important for the state to draw “from its subject population the means of state making, war making, and protection” (Tilly 1996, 158).

Concerning **national economy**, it matters to note that in a broad sense the military preparation influenced the economy (productive capacity), while the opposite is true as well, generating historical feedbacks. The army was always a construction instrument of the most basic infrastructural capacities of the state (public works and construction and maintenance of roads and communications system). Under the form of conscription, the advent of the National Army also rendered the base for education (literacy), formation and teaching of a body of future workers of the national economy.

Moreover, the technological development linked with the military use (necessities imposed by the competition of warfare) had always been in the

⁶ The association between bureaucracy and knowledge is not new at all. Hegel had already associated the bureaucracy with the condition of “universal class” exactly for being the depository of the technical scientific knowledge and the administrative practices of his time (Hegel 1997, para. 205). Not much differently, Weber associates bureaucracy with the accounting rationality and wordly asceticism, a characteristic of capitalism itself. The bureaucracy in Weber inherits the universal class of Hegel, since it is the depository of not only knowledge, rather of very source of rationality, a characteristic of the correspondent form of administration, the only one that, for Weber, is capable of developing capitalism and practicing the (democratic) parliamentary government. If for Hegel bureaucracy appears as the bearer of knowledge, for Weber it becomes its source of production and reproduction as a social practice (Bendix 1986, 327-332).

cutting edge of the technological transformations that led to the development of productive capacities. This rationale is well visible, at least since the permanent armies of the absolutism, which influenced through the military necessities (bronze cannon and gunpowder) new production technologies (bronze fusion and manufacture), though there are much older historical instances (McNeill 1984, 24-62). Further, related to this aspect and under initial pressure of the artillery innovations, war making became increasingly industrial, incorporating corps with these characteristics, the corps of engineers for instance (Engels 1981, 153).

In the core of these changes emerged the National Army, not simply as a war-making means, but rather as an instrument of assimilation, enthronement and dissemination of knowledge under the shape of technology. This, in turn, brings new productive capacities that improve the country's position in the international competition. The classic case is that of the United States of America (U.S.), which won the international competition not by fighting but allowing others to do it for them, while they were dedicated to the military preparation and the multiplication of productive capacities (Arrighi 1996, 38). In fact, in both world wars, which originated the U.S. hegemony, the country distinguished itself for supplying the victorious belligerents rather than for its campaigns. In this way, if the productive capacities matter for worldwide hegemony, they are certainly decisive to break through the delay of walls of underdevelopment and poverty from which the African countries suffer.

The role of the National Army is also relevant in the process of building **citizenship** and **political institutions**. It is known that a large part of the “revolutionary essence of the state” is in its capacity “to establish rights for segments of the population that had never had them” (Nisbet 1982, 109). The institute of conscription that based the emergence of the National Army is one of the parts that guarantee that this gear functions.

Long before the advent of the National Army, back in the fifteenth-century Renaissance, when assessing the case of Rome, Machiavelli interprets the army as being a device of *virtu*, which can overdue and master the cunningness of fortune. Only the army of conscripts would ensure the empowerment of the peasants, who would be implicitly, by bearing weapons, qualified to enforce their rights – social reform and land concession (Maquiavel 1994). Likewise, Montesquieu, back in the Enlightenment eighteenth century, advocates for a

state of balance among the monarch, the noblemen and the people. The latter would be organized in a people's army based on conscription, in charge of public works and with political powers. *Legal* enforcement would be a duty of its. These popular army's officer corps would emanate from the troop (as the Germanic military democracy), who eats, sleeps and works with the people (Montesquieu 2002, 174). Both Machiavelli and Montesquieu had realized that the citizens' army was the path for building rights and political freedoms and the way to face patrimonialism.

Centuries later, Tilly argued that “the core of what we now call 'citizenship,' indeed, consists of multiple bargains hammered out by rulers and ruled in the course of their struggles over the means of state action, specially the making of war.” (Tilly 1996, 164). For Giddens, “the nation-state and the mass army appear together, the twin tokens of citizenship within territorially bordered political communities.” (Giddens 2001, 250)

There seems to be a common thread among the National Army, bureaucracy and political institutions (democracy). If “democracy advancement is the history of the state deprivatization” (Bresser-Pereira 1995, 87), the role of rationalizing politics (formation of the national bureaucracy) can be perceived as upholder and guarantor element of political freedoms. This sense is directly related with Dahl's perception that polyarchy presupposes guarantor institutions of the participation and competition rules (Dahl 1997, 27) and with that of Tilly (2007, 77-8, 164), who assumes that State Capacity is a precondition for democracy. For the latter, the process of building political institutions presupposes coercion capacities for “elimination or neutralization of autonomous, coercion-controlling power centers”, which consists of one of the fundamental duties of the army (Tilly 2007, 78).

In sum, at the same time that one rejects the idea of “military-as-regime” and its capacity as such of implementing stability, security and modernization (Luckham 1998, 26), one cannot deny the idea of “military-as-institution” (National Army), capable of bringing economic, social and political benefits—in addition to being the basic source of the idea of security, defense and sovereignty. Nevertheless, the army's potential for contributing to the productive process and serving as base of the national (bureaucratic and political) institutions is hardly seen in regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa.

There, the International Technical Cooperation does not seem to have yet reached its potential to contribute to the construction of National Armies.

Army in Africa: beyond the coercive sphere

This section discusses the role accomplished by the army in the Sub-Saharan Africa. First, it is necessary to answer to which extent the Sub-Saharan army differs from its counterparts around the world. It is worth acknowledging that, unlike others, the African armies were not the offspring of the Industrial Revolution nor national revolutions. It means they did not appear under the flow of technological transition that rendered the National Armies nor do they represent the institutionalization of political participation as a result of national revolution processes like those the U.S. and France underwent in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

There are two aspects that must be underscored to explain, at least partly, this distinction. The African states system was created already under the auspices of the United Nations (UN) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) systems, which explicitly condemn warfare as a device of foreign policy and guarantee the territorial sovereignty stability – borders (Herbst 1989, 683-5). The situation in Sub-Saharan Africa differs reasonably from that of the Middle East, where warfare had, and might still have, a role in border redefinition. Second, as the political emancipations took place mostly in a controlled way to maintain metropolises' influence over their former colonies, there are rare cases of successful popular revolutions in Sub-Saharan Africa.

However, it does not mean war making is strange to Sub-Saharan Africa. On the contrary. Nonetheless, the pooling of the preceding factors led to the formation of a new type of war, based more on proxy forces than on the holding of conventional military capacities. The demand that this type of conflagration infringes is distinct in terms of scale. To foster guerilla warfare, or to fight them, light forces are enough, which do not justify even own production of ammunition, let alone weapons. It also does without combined arms, military schools, establishment of technical corps and everything else that is related to the national economy and bureaucracy.

It is a fact that the military achieved privileged ascension in African post-independence politics. It is due to their differentiated historical formation

and their importance as forces that could suppress the threats of disruption and secession of the new states (Hutchful and Bathily 1998, v-vii; Chazan et al. 1999, 13, 51). However, this ascension was marked by its ties with the neocolonialist structures and the rationale of the Cold War alliances (Tilly 1985, 186)⁷. The military ascension in politics was connected to the circulation of the elites and the training in military schools abroad, and resulted in military technical cooperation agreements with traditional powers. Such agreements were limited to the training and equipment purchase, without involving processes of technology transference or broader programs that could enable greater autonomy of the African armies and states.

Two elements were crucial for the deterioration of the army's role in the African states. First, in addition to the minimalist projects of military technical cooperation, it was the availability of foreign forces. Many times, these substituted for the local armies in the duties of external defense and internal security⁸. The second element was the recurrent disruption of the Armed Forces by the rulers (generally, military) that aimed to keep their power base and establish the “formal monopoly on political power that tolerated no competitors” (Herbst 2000, 176). These competitors were often the very national military organizations. As a result, the political militarization in Africa became an “important ingredient in the decay of the state and the disintegration of the military institution itself” (Hutchful and Bathily 1998, iv). Military leaders, as Idi Amin (Uganda), Bokassa (Central African Republic), Siad Barre (Somalia) and Mobutu Sese Seko (Zaire, later the DRC), “who have laid waste to their bureaucratic machines in their pursuit of personal power, have in the end destroyed their very capacity to govern” (Luckham 1998, 26).

⁷ Under this perspective, Benot stated, as far back as 1968, that “in total, the African armies took power in ten countries, but they kept it only in eight. In seven out of these eight countries the military dictatorship translates into a reinforcement of the neocolonialism” (Benot 1981, 89-90). The author claimed that “before any military coup took place, [...] it was already known in Paris about such coups”; which resulted in the “signing of the military agreements with France that the ousted government had refused to sign” (Benot 1981, 77-8). This situation was analogous to those occurred with other Western powers, such as Great Britain and the United States.

⁸ In the case of France, from 1960 to 1997, eight defense agreements and twenty-four technical and military assistance agreements were signed between the European country and the Africans. Still in the same period, thirty-four French military interventions took place in the continent, some of them using the service of mercenaries (Renou 2002, 10).

As an aggravating factor, by the late 1980s, the adoption of neoliberalism by the third world countries involved significant cuts in government expenditures—which included, primarily, the military sector. Consequently, the African Armed Forces had their combat capacity drastically deteriorated upon the arrival of the 1990s (Thom 1995, 3). This situation favored the sprouting of warlords, directly linked with the informal economy that ascended due to the economic crisis (Luckham 1998, 15; Reno 1998, 4,12).

A generalized crisis of the African state coercive, extractive and administrative capacities was verified in the 1990s, possibly related to the disruption of National Armies. Adebajo recalls:

As the Cold War ended [...], the two superpower blocs [...] abandoned autocrats like Zaire's Mobutu Sese Seko, Somalia's Siad Barre, and Liberia's Samuel Doe who had served as reliable Cold War clients. Even as the foreign aid that sustained Cold War proxies in power was cut off, their trading networks came under increasing challenges from armed rebellions, which frequently replaced military coups as the main method for replacing sitting regimes. Economic reforms mandated by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) further eroded the control of African autocrats, urban riots and social instability accompanied enforced cuts in health and education and the removal of government subsidies on food and fuel. In an increasing number of states, African governments could no longer exercise normal state functions of providing security, order, and social services to their citizens, and lost control over the monopoly on violence and state bureaucracies. (Adebajo 2010, 25)

The human security⁹ concept popularization contributed to the process, by bringing the normative argument that the national armed forces of the developing countries had no relevant role to fulfill in terms of defense in a neoliberal and peaceful world (end of history). The human security concept contributes to two additional pernicious logics. The first was the loss of the

⁹ The human security concept opposes the collectivist approach of the national security or the state security. The former adopts the valuation of the micro (individual) level of threats. The content of security is widened and extends to the countless threats suffered by individuals, social groups and the nature. Critical analyses concerning this conceptual redefinition are made by Cepik (2001) and Ayoob (1995).

institutionalization mechanisms. The security focus became the imminent threats (securitization), acting in a palliative way. The value of institutionalized procedures of deliberation and governmental management of defense subjects was lost. The second pernicious logic was the loss of priority. The concept expanded the range of questions considered as matter of security. Thus, it changed the focus from the primary tasks of the states, as the establishment of the coercion monopoly (defense, security and protection), to other areas. Hence the range of necessary defensive and informational instruments in search of security increased (Cepik 2001). Graver still, the idea of contraposition between human rights and sovereignty/state capacity became popular, as if the state security itself did not involve, basically, the defense and protection of lives (Zacarias 1999, 13). In consequence,

In 1994, African countries had on average only 57 percent as many soldiers per thousand citizens as the average developing country (2 versus 3.5). [...]African governments cut defense spending disproportionately when they were forced to reduce spending. (Herbst 2000, 105)

Accordingly, in the 1990s, the difficulties in organizing armies in the African countries increased. The capacity of supporting the process of building the states, the national bureaucracy, the productive capacity and the political institutions was overcast. This situation was further worsened by the continent's armed conflicts that proliferated in this period. Since the *lost decade* (1980s), the economic liberalization has assisted in the reproduction of the poverty trap: a logic of double causality in which poverty generates conflicts and the conflicts generate poverty (Thomas 2008, 254). The 1990s signaled this process continuity and brought aggravating elements along. These are armed conflicts settlement mechanisms, aligned with the normativity of human security and based on the idea of power-sharing.

Power-Sharing mechanisms: immediate and insufficient settlements

This section discusses the limits of adopting power-sharing settlements for armed conflicts in Africa, for their pacification postponement and the reproduction of the difficulties in forming the armies within the state-building

process in the region. Power-sharing mechanisms in conflict resolution processes are characterized by the distribution of power/ranks in the army, bureaucracy and political system among the belligerent groups.

There is a great debate in literature between those who believe that the negotiated peace (included in the category of power-sharing) is the best settlement for civil wars and those who claim that the military victory contributes more directly to peace sustainability. In the first case, in which one can find most analysts, policymakers and the international public opinion, the work of Matthew Hoddie and Caroline Hartzell should be cited (2003). The authors depart from the presupposition that, if power of voice is given to the old combatants in the political, economic and social directions of the country, the renewal of violence can be prevented. The authors conclude that, out of sixteen peace agreements signed from 1980 to 1996, those that had adopted the military power-sharing¹⁰ between the combatant groups had greater chances to keep the peace.

Opposing this vision, there are (i) critics to the power-sharing normativity as the conflict settlement instrument and (ii) the authors who claim that the military victory begets deeper post-conflict stability.

In the first case, Jack Snyder (2000) sustains that ethnic conflict settlements that consider pre-democratic identities as fixed may crystallize enemy and exclusivistic subnational identities, as well as existing divisions in the country. Collier and Sambanis (2005) claim that power-sharing arrangements imposed by foreign powers upon societies coming from conflicts are less likely to endure and render sustainable peace agreements. In Africa, moreover, Western efforts to build power-sharing peace agreements may encourage other rebel leaders to resurge seeking inclusion in similar agreements (Tull and Mehler 2005, 393).

Empirically, various power-sharing mechanisms for armed conflict settlements became indeed fragile elements for the conflict forces pacification in

¹⁰ *Military power-sharing* relates to the civil war settlements that operate through the “distribution of the state's coercive power among the combatant parties” (Hoddie and Hartzell 2003, 320). In practical terms, it concerns the “provisions allowing antagonists to remain armed or retain their own armed forces” (Jarstad 2006, 7).

the region. This phenomenon was observed in the First Liberian Civil War, Third Tuareg Rebellion, Casamance Conflict, Burundi Civil War and Fourth Tuareg Rebellion – in which significant post-conflict instabilities occurred. The First and Second Congo Wars also fit into such case, as it will be explained ahead (Arnold 2008, 65–69, 208–217; Castellano da Silva 2012, 36–37).

In the second case (authors who defend the military victory in conflicts), Edward Luttwak (1999) and Robert Wagner (1993) sustain that allowing wars to reach their natural termination increases the likelihood of a lasting peace and an effective post-war reconstruction. Wagner argues for the deeper stability of civil wars ended by victories, rather than negotiated peace, due to the reduced capacity of the losing side to restart the armed conflict (Wagner 1993). One may say that these authors have history on their side. Roy Licklider demonstrates that, out of forty-six civil war cases that had been finished for more than five years, war recurred in 15% of the military-victory cases and in 50% of the negotiated-peace ones. That is, half of the analyzed civil wars that were settled by what we here call power-sharing restarted (Licklider 1995, 685). Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis (2005) demonstrated that, in 40% of the cases in which there is no military resolution of the conflict, war recurred within a decade. On the other hand, civil wars that ended in military victory are 2 to 3 times less likely to recur, since one of the parties is sufficiently dissuaded from resuming armed confrontation (Toft 2010; Wagner 1993; Regan 2002).

Out of the four wars with more than half million killed in Africa (First Sudanese Civil War, Nigerian Civil War, Second Sudanese Civil War and Second Congo War), only the war of Nigeria and Biafra (1967-1970) had a military victory to end the conflict. It might not be just coincidence that it was the only case featuring post-conflict stability in these large scale wars. The negotiated peace of the First Sudanese War (1956-1972) led to the Second War (1963-2005) and the current state collapse and implosion; and regarding the Second Congo War (1998-2003), the military victory absence engendered the nearly immediate recurrence of war (State of Violence). Nigeria's contrast to Congo and Sudan contributed to call into question the role of power-sharing.

At the boundaries of power-sharing as a conflict resolution tool, some alternatives arise and may integrate the Security Sector Reform (SSR), as an

army formation element, and the possibilities of International Technical Cooperation (ITC).

More sustainable solutions? Security Reform, Army and International Technical Cooperation

In the context of settling African armed conflicts, SSR mechanisms, though marginalized, may contribute to post-conflict stability. As an instrument of armies' reconstruction, they may succeed through ITC.

Facing the debate presented in the previous section, Monica Toft (2010) proposes the resolution of the theoretical and empirical impasse over which is the most effective and desirable option (negotiated peace or military victory). She demonstrates that arguments for civil wars termination by negotiated peace take for granted that it reduces the number of fatalities compared with those of the military victory. There are, however, two faults in this logic of reduced fatalities. The first is that negotiated peace may serve as an opportunity for groups to recover and rearm—increasing the likelihood of deaths in the long term. The second problem concerns the idea that the lives supposedly saved by the negotiated peace will enjoy greater political and economic freedoms. According to the author, negotiated peace arrangements are related to higher authoritarianism levels in the long term—despite the tendency to democratization in the immediate aftermath. That occurs in that, on the one hand, opposition political groups arise and expand and, on the other hand, the government hardens its policies, based on the traumatic war memories, hoping to avoid new conflagrations. Furthermore, economic growth does not seem to be strongly linked with any specific type of conflict settlement any longer.

On the other hand, Toft (2010) evidences that military victory still brings very high costs, though relatively lower than those rendered by the negotiated peace in the long run. Both the negotiated peace and the military victory destroy lives, properties, cultural treasures; are more or less unstable; do not beget political freedoms in the long run; and do not necessarily produce the needed economic conditions for the country's rebuilding.

The resolution suggested for the impasse would be expanding the negotiated peace short-term lower-cost qualities into the long term. The adopted way would be the implementation of agreements that did not only

guarantee rights to the former combatants, rather used checks and balances (carrots and sticks). One of the practical manners for that is the provision, in the peace agreement itself, of practical means and methods to reset and re-institutionalize the state security forces through the Security Sector Reform (SSR). Indeed, one of the negotiated peace shortcomings is the fact that the SSR theme generally rests in a peripheral position in the peace negotiations.

Lack of attention to SSR can have devastating consequences. Following negotiated settlements, for example, a military is left to fend for itself. What often follows is the reemergence of multiple sets of militaries/militias/rebel organizations ready to do the bidding of any political leader who can provide (or has provided) resources to sustain their vision of how to win. (Toft 2010, 33)

Depending on its scope, SSR can bring the benefits of military victory into the negotiated peace structures, including those already established. That is because, while it guarantees the long-term dissolution of insurgent forces integrated in a power-sharing model, it institutes the state monopoly on coercive power and, thus, aims to block the intentions of resuming armed struggle by former insurgents and instituting it through new groups. It consolidates, in practice, state capacities as a precondition for the success of negotiated peace arrangements.

The SSR resolution may represent, depending on how each case develops, the very process of the National Army formation, which, as argued before, is capable of bringing various benefits for the state-(re)building. The case of Angola's civil conflict termination in 2002, for instance, demonstrated the capacity of National Army reform processes of bringing an end to armed conflicts. In this case, the peace agreements guaranteed the integrity of the national bureaucracy and army (Brown and Zahar 2008). It was about attributing a fundamental role in the pacification of war to the National Army.

It also depends on the profile of the ITC programs that sustain SSR: its scope, the technology transference character and the symmetry between the parties. At this point, it is worth discussing the potential that Brazil, which seems to be in a construction process of a particular international insertion model, has to contribute to this reality by through ITC programs that support army-building. This model seems to bind greater commitment to (i) the

international order challenges, (ii) a particular perception of human rights, and (iii) the prioritization of South-South Cooperation through technical cooperation programs, as the following sections will discuss.

The onus of the international order: rethinking Brazil's international insertion

This section argues that Brazil's international insertion became in the last decade more aligned with ideas that collaborate with state-building in developing regions, such as Africa. Therefore, it can assist in the defining elements of both revolutions that led to the emergence of National Armies, namely the technical-productive capacity and the political institutions. The technical cooperation in broad areas (including military) can aid this process. Then, this section studies the case of the DRC and the current and future contributions that have been (and might yet be) generated by the Brazilian technical cooperation.

Brazil has been building in the last decade a particular model of international insertion that innovates in terms of contribution possibilities for the developing regions that suffer from severe armed conflicts. This model is based upon three complementary aspects, namely the international order onus enthronement, the authenticity proposal in international law and the South-South solidarity.

Brazilian foreign policy current objective of collaborating to the reform of the multilateral institutions of governance involves the increasingly latent responsibility of bearing the **onus of the international order**. This responsibility has been adopted by the Brazilian diplomacy in the last decade, especially when it comes to the participation in peacekeeping missions of multilateral scope (Diniz 2006).

The UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), established in 2004, was the milestone of this attitude. First, in quantitative terms, MINUSTAH has represented Brazil's most intense military effort in peacekeeping missions. Besides ensuring the change in the Brazilian effectives' profile in such missions – more troops than observers or police officers (Rezende 2013, 172), the mission has historically been that with the highest number of Brazilian military. Second, in qualitative terms, the mission has involved Brazil's unprecedented commitment to the stabilization of countries in conflict,

taking the lead of a mission with responsibilities regulated by Chapter VII of the UN Charter (concerning missions with efforts of peace enforcement and use of force).

Moreover, Brazil's performance on the field has since involved military operations practical tasks. The situation evidences the acknowledgment that armed conflicts stability involves, in a complementary way, military tasks. This new commitment signed with peacekeeping missions, achieved in Haiti, was reaffirmed in the recent documents that comprise the Brazilian Defense normative framework. In its 2005 National Defense Policy and 2008 National Strategy of Defense (END, in Portuguese), the country adopts as one of its strategic guidelines,

To expand its projection into the world concert and reaffirm its commitment to the peace defense and cooperation among the peoples, Brazil shall intensify its participation in humanitarian and peacekeeping operations under the aegis of multilateral organizations. (BRASIL 2005a; BRASIL 2008a)¹¹

A new model for Brazil's international insertion? Authenticity in international law

The Brazilian authenticity and normativity proposal towards international humanitarian law also points to the path of building a particular model for international insertion that has been toughened in recent years. It is possible to affirm that, since 1985, Brazil has adopted a particular perception in the human rights debates at multilateral fora. Its actions have, ever since, contributed to crafting an original and expanded concept of human rights that also includes elements that go beyond the idea of first-generation human rights

¹¹ Such policy was institutionally achieved by the 2005 creation of the Brazilian Army's Peacekeeping Operations Instruction Center (CiOpPaz, in Portuguese) and deepened as of its transformation in 2010 into the Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center (CCOPAB, in Portuguese), which gathers the Armed Forces, Military Police and Fire Department—adapting to the multidimensionality profile of the peacekeeping missions, as it will be shown later in this article (BRASIL 2012, 67).

(liberal). It encompasses an additional central axis with the commitment to the right to development and health (access to medicines)¹².

Brazil's action on human rights has continued and intensified, mainly regarding normativity. In this context, it is worth underscoring the Brazilian demarcation proposal concerning the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) concept, based on the creation of a new concept, namely the Responsibility while Protecting (RwP). The R2P concept resulted from the development of the notion of the right to intervene, emerging since the 1980s in multilateral forums, consolidated in the documents of the sixtieth UN General Assembly (2005) on three pillars: (i) the responsibility of the states to protect their populations in cases of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity; (ii) the task of the international community to encourage and help states exercise this responsibility; and (iii) the responsibility of the international community to act collectively, through the UN, in case the national authorities cease to protect their populations (MRE 2012b). For obvious reasons, Brazil has always feared the lack of major norm regulations, which became evident as of NATO's 2011 intervention in Libya's conflict, authorized by the UN Security Council under the R2P argument.

Given the abuses committed by NATO troops in the name of R2P (then used in an elastic way to change the regime), Brazilian government took a critical but proactive attitude, aligned with its recent stance in human rights-related foreign policy. President Dilma Rousseff suggested the adoption of the RwP concept, highlighting the responsibility of those in charge of peace

¹² In the first case, the government sustained the "linking between human rights enjoyment and social welfare conditions reached by economic development" (Cervo and Bueno 2008, 467), being active in multilateral fora concerning the building of mechanisms to relief hunger and poverty and to promote employment and income. In the second case, it defended processes of social inclusion and pursuit of equity, by the strengthening of the countries' health systems. It defended the primacy of public health in the TRIPS negotiations at the WTO and had a leading role in the process that culminated in the 2006 creation of the International Purchase Facility for Drugs against HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis (UNITAID). More than that, as a developing country that had a successful democratic transition process, "Brazil has worked for the conceptual evolution of human rights and to breach the thematic cleavage that divides developing countries—as economic, social and cultural rights defenders – and developed ones – as civil and political rights promoters" (Amorim 2009, 70).

promotion tasks. In the opening statement of the 2011 General Assembly, President Dilma Rousseff sustained:

The world suffers today from the painful consequences of interventions that aggravated existing conflicts. They allowed terrorism to penetrate into places where it previously did not exist, gave rise to new cycles of violence and multiplied the number of civilian victims. Much is said about the responsibility to protect; yet we hear little about responsibility while protecting. These are concepts that we must develop together. (Rousseff 2011)¹³

It was an "invitation to a collective debate on the way of guaranteeing, when the use of force is considered as a justifiable alternative and is duly authorized by the Security Council, that its enforcement is responsible and legitimate" (MRE 2012b). Currently, the concept has gathered supporters and has potential for Brazilian diplomacy investments (Benner 2013, 39-44).

South-South Solidarity: the role of interregional technical cooperation

Concerning **South-South Solidarity**, Brazil has practiced it mainly through the International Technical Cooperation (ITC), and particularly within the scope of Technical Cooperation between Developing Countries (TCDC)¹⁴. ITC has

¹³ The basic principles Brazil then suggested for the RwP notion were as follows: (i) the primacy of the prevention and exhaustion of all peaceful means for the protection of civilians under threat of violence; (ii) the use of force must be authorized and limited in operational and temporal terms by the UNSC or GA and in legal terms by the international humanitarian law and international law of armed conflicts, producing stability under as little violence as possible (judicious and proportionate action, limited to the UNSC mandate); and (iii) the UNSC must be able to monitor, assess and ensure the accountability of those responsible for the use of force (UN 2011, 3-4).

¹⁴ In the scope of South-South cooperation, TCDC is complementary to, yet essentially different from, vertical cooperation. The former involves less asymmetry, verticality and political cost to the recipient countries than what has been historically the case in the cooperation between central and peripheral countries. In light of the vertical technical assistance associated with the dependence reproduction (rather an instrument of neocolonialism), TCDC is the resulting movement for more horizontal ITC processes. Following the Bretton Woods system collapse in the 1970s, peripheral and semiperipheral countries sought the establishment of regulatory benchmark for TCDC and the strengthening of cooperation mechanisms. Notwithstanding, only after the 1990s neoliberal rule did emerging countries like Brazil, China and India begin to possess higher capital reserve and, then, be considered "key countries" by the UN High-level Committee on South-South Cooperation (Iglesias Puente 2010, 80).

become a relevant instrument of Brazil's foreign policy, especially since it developed substantially in qualitative and quantitative terms in the 1990s.

In qualitative terms, it is worth highlighting ITC institutional restructuring and its centralization within the Ministry of Foreign Relations (MRE, in Portuguese). Brazil's ITC sector restructuring began with the establishment of the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) in 1987 (Decreto No. 94937/87). Though ABC first worked inside MRE's Alexandre Gusmão Foundation (FUNAG), it was expanded in 1996 and promoted to the status of an agency integrated directly under MRE's General-Secretariat (Decreto No. 2070/96). Increasingly important in Brazil's foreign policy, ITC ended up being "incorporated into the country's foreign policy as one of its permanent variables" (Cervo 1994, 37). By the 1980s, Brazil had advanced greatly concerning technical knowledge and was modifying ITC structures, from recipient to provider (TCDC), which gradually became ABC's main focus (Iglesias Puente 2010, 110–3).

In quantitative terms, the increase in project resources since 1998 is remarkable.

In the late 1990s Fernando Henrique Cardoso Administration, despite operational difficulties, increased TCDC actions and enlarged their scope, international geographic penetration and thematic areas, encompassing larger projects, especially in the professional training sector. (Iglesias Puente 2010, 111)

Starting in 1998, the projects grew and expanded, especially thanks to higher financial resources obtained together with the UNDP and as parliamentary amendment to the national budget, mainly to fund technical cooperation actions with the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP)—the main action focus in Africa (Iglesias Puente 2010, 169). Besides, "since Lula Administration [...] TCDC activities have gained more emphasis due to instructions from MRE's Chief Office" (Iglesias Puente 2010, 113).

In this perspective Africa has become a more important Brazilian partner in TCDC. Since 1997, the continent has been the main destination for Brazil's TCDC resources, keeping an average higher than 50% (Iglesias Puente 2010, 313; IPEA/ABC 2010, 57; IPEA/BM 2011, 46). In qualitative terms, Brazil has established long-term benefits cooperation with various African

countries. Brazil has created policies for (i) food security, opening up Embrapa offices in the continent; (ii) biofuels, with studies for the establishment in Africa of a productive unit of sugarcane articulated with an ethanol pilot-plant; (iii) agriculture development, mainly linked with cotton produce, with the implementation of model-farms in Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad and Benin; and (iv) public health, showing results with the opening, in Mozambique, of a Fricruz office and a plant of generic and antiretroviral drugs. General efforts for technical cooperation have generated agreements at the ministerial level within the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), Brazilian Trade and Investment Promotion Agency (APEX), Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (Fiocruz), Brazilian Company for Agricultural Research (Embrapa) and the Brazilian Industrial Development Agency (ABDI).

It is worth underscoring that the ITC in the African continent has ended up involving technical military cooperation programs—moving away even from the Portuguese-speaking axis in recent years. In the last decade, Brazil has signed technical cooperation agreements in the realm of defense with seven African countries (South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria and Senegal) and broadened its actions into four main areas. In **military training**, Brazil has expanded training supply to countries such as Guinea-Bissau (creation of the Security Forces Training Center, with Brazilian investment worth US\$ 3 million, establishment of the Brazilian Mission of Technical and Military Cooperation – MBCTM, and support of US\$ 750 thousand for SSR), Namibia (support for the creation of the Marine Corps, with approximately 600 military) and Benin (sending instructors to the Demining and Depollution Action Training Center). In the **technical sphere**, Brazil has supported Atlantic countries with the identification of the continental shelf (Namibia and Angola), besides carrying out joint technology development projects with South Africa (A-Darter air-to-air missile and dealings for the development of cargo aircraft, surface-to-air missile and UAVs). Within **multilateral cooperation**, the country has participated in the preparation of a common strategy for the CPLP oceans and integrated the relaunch of the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS), since 2005, creating four working groups, among which the one on "peace maintenance and peace supporting operations" (MRE 2011a; MRE 2011b, 92; Fellet and Kawaguti

2013). In the context of **military equipment**, Brazil has sold patrol boats and ships for the Namibian Navy, six Super-Tucano aircrafts to Angola (and others to Senegal, Burkina Faso and Mauritania) and a Barroso class corvette to Equatorial Guinea. The country has made donations to the Namibian Navy, to the Coast Guard of São Tomé and Príncipe (four floats and 260 uniforms) and to the Armed Forces of Guinea-Bissau (uniforms).

Such projects can render mutual benefits by promoting political articulation in order to generate higher bargaining conditions and international institutions reform opportunities. This cooperation is clearly important as a means to sustain Brazilian industrial development (raw material sources and industrialized products consumer markets) and the incremental insertion possibility for Brazilian companies. It concerns tasks related to the structural challenges of qualifying exports and be favorably inserted in the technological transition (Martins 2013, 196). Though the possibility of gains is proper to ITC, it does not repeat the vertical profile of North-South cooperation. That is because it involves ample technology transference programs, knowledge and experiences exchange, and a process with no conditionality (opposed to the tied aid). In Africa, the presence in trade (exports) and of Brazilian companies (internationalization) followed these cooperation projects¹⁵, being concentrated, in the first case, on countries as South Africa, Nigeria and Angola, and, in the second case, in Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and South Africa. Nevertheless, such presence is still restrict in figures, areas and companies, hence able to be expanded (IPEA/BM 2011, 88). In addition, this ITC effort remains as a discontinuous policy among different Brazilian state structures and agencies. The effectiveness of the ITC offered by Brazil to the African states still demands a qualitative coordination, linked directly with the Republic Presidency, which allows the best management and employment of these resources, incorporating ITC as a state policy.

Finally, after the Cold War there has been an increasing connection of the three aforementioned themes (peacekeeping operations, expansion of the

¹⁵ As a matter of fact, the flow of trade between Brazil and Africa increased more than 400% since the beginning of Lula administration, reaching the level of US\$ 26 billion in 2008 (PEB 2009).

human rights idea and ITC). In this sense, it is important to highlight the integrative role of peacekeeping operations that came to acquire multidimensionality and broader cooperation possibilities (UN 2003, 1; Bracey 2011, 322). Brazilian engagement in missions as UNAVEM III (Angola), UNTAET (East Timor), MINUSTAH (Haiti) and UNMIS (Sudan) has involved such profile of complexity and multidimensionality, and enabled the country to carry out, besides military and policing, civil protection and reconstruction actions, in the areas of health, education, agriculture, justice management, elections, sports and highway network recovery (Seitenfus 2008, 47–8). Such multidimensional character has been underscored by the Brazilian White Paper on National Defense (BRASIL 2012, 33).

More than internal stabilization mechanisms (incurring operational costs related to troops deployment), multidimensional peacekeeping operations have become mechanisms for the increase in technical cooperation programs. This furthers the possibility of long-term ties foundation and the emergence of business opportunities in the areas of construction, infrastructure and military equipment—promoting the internationalization process of Brazilian companies. In the case of Haiti, there have been many technical cooperation programs arising from the mission, including security, with bilateral efforts to organize a new security force in the Caribbean country. According to Brazil's Defense Ministry, the force shall have an army profile (not as a "president's personal militia"), committed and capable of dealing with the local security and defense issues (Portal Brasil 2012; Defesa Net 2012).

In sum, Brazil tries to regulate its new willingness to bear the onus of the international system by a human rights perception that underscores the commitment to development and sovereignty. Besides, the country aims to integrate within this scope medium- and long-term instruments that allow the strengthening of state capacities in crisis situations. This task may contribute to the case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), a country that has suffered under one of the longest and deadliest Africa's armed conflicts, marked by the disruption of the army and the national state.

The case of the Congo: historical approximations

After the attempt of Lumumba, who wanted a unitary and democratic Congo, being called into question by an intervention of a U.S.-subject UN, never again has this country, harassed and sold, deprived of its best rulers and featuring a large number of political parties though not a truly national political organization, been able to find, for a single moment its unity and balance. (Benot 1981, 79)

Congo's decolonization crisis (1960) led to the ascension of military trained and financed by the West (the U.S. and Belgium) in 1965. General Mobutu Sese Seko's regime resorted to nationality and implemented the plan of turning the country, then the second African economy, into an "African Brazil". The project involved the strengthening of the National Army and the establishment of military schools. These, with the support of technical cooperation programs with the U.S., France and Belgium, ended up becoming a center of excellence in the continent.

However, the cooperation agreements were restricted to the military area (with no public services and education) and did not involve the transference of technology and productive capacities. Moreover, disputes between military groups for the political power led the president to a deleterious cycle of personalization of power in the mid-1970s. Mobutu suppressed possible competing forces within the army and gave out policies of theft of national wealth and deconstruction of the state capacities. The situation engendered not only the political and economic crisis (worsened by the foreign debt and neoliberal reforms) but also the scrapping of the Army (reduced to twenty thousand men to defend then second largest country in the Sub-Saharan Africa) and the national coercive capacity.

By the 1990s, this reality, added to the regional interstate rivalry, and by the strategic/economic role of the region, led to a severe cycle of armed conflicts that resulted in the fall of Mobutu, the rise of Laurent Kabila (backed by Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi) and the attempt of his ouster by part of his supporters in what became known as the Second Congo War, or the Great War of Africa (the deadliest conflict since World War II). The solution for the complex armed conflict that involved nine countries and various interstate

armed groups was the mechanism of power-sharing and integrating the combatant forces.

However, since 2003, the conflict's formal end has not resulted in its pacification. Groups dating back to the Second Congo War have not yet been disarmed (FDLR)¹⁶, new groups have entered into Congolese territory—which lacks protection (LRA, ADF)¹⁷ – and other already integrated groups have risen again from the core of the armed forces, seeking political gains (CNDP and the recent M23)¹⁸. The local UN mission, in act since 1999 (MONUC then, MONUSCO now), has sought to contribute to the stabilization of the bellicose region of eastern Congo and support, along with other sponsors, the processes of building national institutions (elections) and reforming the security sector (army, police and judiciary).

However, the new Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC, in French) have been throughout the period unable to suppress the armed groups and establish internal and external security (since some of the armed groups are funded by neighboring countries and foreign organizations). An emblematic moment occurred in November 2012, when neither the FARDC nor MONUSCO (since 2003 the largest UN peacekeeping mission) was able to cope with the occupation of Nord Kivu's capital, Goma, by the M23. The controversy has generated international pressure to establish a force of offensive intervention that would act more incisively in the support of disarming the groups operating in the eastern DRC.

Brazil fights in the Congo: the role of General Cruz

Thus was created in March 2013 the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB). The importance of FIB to Brazil is central. As of FIB's establishment in April, its command, as well as MONUSCO's, was handed to Brazilian Divisional General Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz. The general's credibility derives precisely from the work he conducted as MINUSTAH's commander between

¹⁶ *Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda* (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda).

¹⁷ Lord's Resistance Army and Allied Democratic Forces, respectively.

¹⁸ *Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple* (National Congress for the Defense of the People) and *Mouvement du 23-Mars* (March 23 Movement), respectively.

2006 and 2009 and the experience the Brazilian army has carried in coping with irregular threats, especially in complex environments (like the jungle).

FIB features important particularities. It operates with more than three thousand men from South Africa, Tanzania and Malawi. They are deployed in Goma under the direct command of MONUSCO Force Commander (General Cruz), divided into three infantry battalions, one artillery unit, one Special Forces unit and a reconnaissance company, and feature new South African military equipment (e.g. Oryx helicopters). FIB has a one-year mandate (resolution 2098 of 28 March 2013) to conduct offensive operations either unilaterally or jointly with the FARDC (UN 2013). The main objective is to prevent the expansion of all armed groups in the eastern Congo (so-called negative forces), neutralize and disarm them (paragraph 12-b). After the resolution publication, commentators argued it was UN's first offensive combat force. Despite a number of missions based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter since its foundation, indeed, such a clear mandate is unprecedented by explicitly mentioning offensive operations against insurgent forces.

The performance of the Brazilian general was incisive already in the operation's first months. After offensives started on October 25, joint combat operations with the FARDC (80km north of Goma), at the same time as negotiations developed at the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region in Kampala, led the M23 group to surrender on November 5, 2013 (Mail & Guardian 2013a; Mail & Guardian 2013b). Thus, FIB has acted in an exemplary manner and contributed to foster stabilization hopes in the eastern Congo.

It is important to ask, however, what will come after FIB? At this point, the importance of reconstructing the National Army in the country emerges. The current SSR projects are too atomized and their programs are disconnected from the social role of the National Army.

There are several processes of DRC's Security Sector Reform (SSR) whose aim is the country's autonomy in carrying out internal and external security (defense) and, more important, dissuading the actions of armed groups. As a matter of fact, the UN resolution that established FIB underscores the necessity of the DRC to create a Rapid Reaction Force to take on, in the future, FIB's current duties. However, such SSR projects, besides having to cope with a force composed of various rebel groups that were integrated into the army

over time, have several flaws. Mainly for representing atomized programs and actions in different fronts (various sponsors), they end up not contributing to the emergence of cohesive security forces in terms of command and control (C2), unity and doctrine. In practice, the FARDC were eventually a destabilization factor for the country, with battalions acting in an autonomous way and being an instrument of aggression against local populations and of illegal exploitation of natural resources. Projects that could be implemented include broader, structural cases for making a National Army that is source of identity among the population, of training for the incipient bureaucracy and of employment and income alternative. Brazil could, in fact, contribute to this process. In this sense, the possibility of expanding the Brazilian action in the country could be very fruitful. To make it possible, however, it seems imperative that the decentralization process of the military and civil technical cooperation be subject to a supraministerial governing body for these policies.

Brazil and the DRC: historical partnership and current possibilities

The relations between Brazil and the DRC are vital for Brazil's African foreign policy – which has increasingly acquired centrality in the country's South-South policy in the last decade¹⁹. The Congo relates to the three priority cores that have demonstrated continuity in the Brazilian partnership with Africa since the 1960s, namely the Portuguese-speaking countries, the Southern Africa and the South Atlantic regions. Concerning the first core, the DRC is Angola's neighbor and priority in the country's foreign and security policy (bearing in mind Angola's constant participation in the DRC's armed conflicts since 1997, besides being one of the major stability guarantors in Kinshasa since 1998). Regarding the second core, it is important that Central Africa Great Lakes conflicts became part of the security scope of the entire Southern Africa, since the DRC's inclusion in the SADC, this organization's intervention in support of Laurent Kabila, and the active participation of South Africa since 2002 for the

¹⁹ For further analyses on Brazil's African policy, please refer to Visentini (2010; 2011), IPEA/BM (2011), Saraiva (1996; 2010), Rodrigues (1964) and Ribeiro (2007).

peace and reconstruction of the DRC (South Africa is today FIB's main leader). Within the third core, the DRC is formally part of the ZOPACAS, whose relevance is central to Brazil's foreign and defense policy, since the latter considers "its projection through South Atlantic boundary and the bordering countries of Africa" as its strategic environment (BRASIL 2005a; Oliveira 2013, 22).

As an example of importance, Brazil recognized the independence of then *République du Congo* on August 17, 1960, and soon after began considering it a key country to Brazil's foreign policy. This occurred mainly within the UN – when Brazil played a major role in UN's first mission in the country (United Nations Operation in the Congo – ONUC, in effect from July 1960 to June 1964). Almost 200 officers from the Brazilian Air Force (FAB) were deployed, who acted in real warfare situations, seeking to ensure the sovereignty and self-determination of Lumumba's government.

Concerning Brazil-DRC recent relations, after the Brazilian Embassy in Kinshasa was closed in 1997 and Brazil's omission regarding both wars in the South Atlantic country, the emergence of Lula administration enabled the re-establishment of the country's mission (with the embassy reopening in 2004) and the increase in bilateral cooperation (projects in the areas of health, standardization, agroecology and family farming, coffee growing, human resources training, cooperation between diplomatic academies, and culture).

In the security sphere, with an important precedent (Brazil's participation in the ONUC), there was recently the rapprochement attempt between both countries and Brazil-Congo ties have acquired an unprecedented character. It is worth pointing out that this very rapprochement in the twenty-first century was first instituted within the security scope. Even before Lula's first trip to Africa in November 2003 and the missions that resulted in the reopening of the embassy in Kinshasa, Brazil had contributed with two C-130 Hercules transport aircraft and crew for UN's Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) in Bunia (Legislative Decree N. 328, 2 July 2003). The aircraft contributed to IEMF's logistic capacity (transport of troops and equipment) in support of MONUC's Uruguayan battalion. They were integrated into the force on July 8 under the coordination of Brazil's and France's Defense Ministries (MRE 2003, 272).

Moreover, thenceforth, the Brazilian government has issued in a constant basis notes and statements about the serious situation in the DRC, which demonstrated an unprecedented concern²⁰. Such statements had their milestone in 2010, when the Ministry of External Relations issued, on September 6, a note condemning the mass rape of women and children by rebels in the eastern Congo between July 30 and August 3 (MRE 2010a; MRE 2010b). The note had a more practical effect in late October, when the Brazilian government provided humanitarian assistance worth US\$ 1 million in donations to the DRC, through the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). The pioneer humanitarian aid sought to reinforce the "mechanisms for reparations and access to justice for victims of sexual violence in the country" (MRE 2010b).

Bearing in mind the symbolic relevance of Brazil in the Congo's pacification process (the command of the first operation that led a relevant armed group to surrender since 2009), Brazil's possibilities for action in projects involving medium- and long-term reforms in the security sector (even counting on Angola's partnership²¹) may bring mutual benefits in both sides of the Atlantic. In the case of the Congo, it is worth underscoring the possibility of support by (Brazilian) Armed Forces structured within the logic of an army of citizens, which has always guaranteed services that go beyond defense and security. Brazil sees the possibility of a further step in the implementation of its insertion model into developing regions marked by armed conflicts, strengthening itself and its presence in the South Atlantic, in cooperation with the neighboring countries as "a force for peace, stability and prosperity in its own region and even beyond it" (Rousseff 2011). This presence could even support the increase in trade links and the industrialization process of Brazilian companies for the African continent²². This opportunity can help increase the

²⁰ For instance, throughout 2004, the Ministry issued notes of concern and support for the DRC in the speeches of President Lula in events linked with Africa (MRE 2004a, 347; MRE 2004b, 333).

²¹ Until recently, Brazil and Angola had acted together in the efforts of stabilization in Guinea-Bissau and the reforms in defense and security sectors, especially through the ECOWAS-CPLP Road Map to the Defense and Security Sector Reform of the country (MRE 2011b, 90; MRE 2012a, 131).

²² Public and private companies have been increasing since the 1980s their participation in the continent, mainly in infrastructure, energy and mining sectors. These traditional agents (Andrade Gutierrez, Camargo Correa, Odebrecht, Petrobras, Queiroz Galvão and Vale) have contributed, with the support

industrialized products participation in Brazil's exports²³ and diversify trade sources and investments for the African partners.

Nevertheless, in the security sector, the Brazilian government initiatives went along with the characteristic atomization of most international initiatives for the DRC and were marked by short-term solutions. In fact, there were significant and unprecedented Brazilian efforts and repeated manifestation of MONUC's importance for the country's stabilization and of the perception that there is a direct relationship between the current reality and the difficulties in the process of building a National Army – responsible for the "insubordination of some armed groups and the still manifest tensions" (BRASIL 2005b, 5). However, Brazil-DRC cooperation has not been established as a priority in security-related areas—as Technical and Military Cooperation or clearer efforts within the UN. Although it has been signaled during the period the cooperation in the areas of infrastructure (which would cooperate in DRC's current logistic challenges) and restructuring of the national economy (which would provide opportunities for the populations seeking to break away from the cycle of armed conflicts), there have not been more structural initiatives from Brazil in the security sector that act directly in the stabilization of the war in the country. This situation seems to adjourn the Brazilian objective of "guaranteeing that South Atlantic and the South American and African continental areas are zones of peace and prosperity" (Oliveira 2009, 31). Accomplishing such tasks, raised by the newfound

of the Brazilian government, for hiring local labor (an alternative for employment and income) and for the development of capacities (training) (IPEA/BM 2011, 87). There is, however, a large concentration of Brazilian presence in the activities of these companies (the Marcopolo company could also be included here). Although APEX undertakes efforts to support foreign trade and internationalization of Brazilian companies, and the construction of a "favorable business environment in Africa", there are still few cases of internationalization of small- and medium-sized Brazilian companies in the African continent (IPEA/BM 2011, 91).

²³ Brazilian exports to African countries are characterized by the predominance of manufactured goods, accounting for 80% of exports in 2010 (IPEA/BM 2011, 96). This scenario differs from the reprimarization process of the Brazilian exports, which started with the commercial liberalization in the 1990s and had a milestone in 2008 as the values of basic and semi-finished products (US\$ 100 billion) surpassed those of manufactured products (US\$ 92 billion) in the exports of Brazil (IPEA 2013).

international protagonism of Brazil, seems to require a redesign of its contents in the structure of the state and the Federal Public Administration.

Final Considerations

This article discussed the role of the army and conflict settlement mechanisms in the incipient process of building the African states. The poor building of the African armies and the continuity of fragile settlement of armed conflicts reflect a reality marked by social, political and security challenges related to the absence of state capacities. This situation has gained increasing attention in Brazil, mainly due to the centrality of Africa in the Brazilian foreign policy in the last decade.

The aim was to address, preliminarily, the possibility of a particularly Brazilian embryonic model of international insertion based on the concatenation of three spheres: coercion, production and institutions. These three elements are directly related to the benefits arising from the process of building the National Armies. In the particular case of the DRC, besides Brazil's participation in MONUSCO, International Technical Cooperation (ITC) may favor these processes. In this case, the Brazilian participation in the command of the UN mission is significant and changes the balance of power toward the long-delayed conflict pacification. Moreover, in the long term, the international technical partnerships will matter more than the power projection or military deployment in the name of international order. Gradually, the international order assimilates the idea that security issues, similarly to internal order, cannot have just a military or police response.

The technical cooperation is not important to Africa and the DRC only. ITC matters to Brazil in order to ensure scale for the military-academic-industrial complex, for which South America itself is insufficient. In this case, the interregional relations in the south-south axis, where the role of African countries is highlighted, become essential. The interregional partnership is transformed into an instrument for the consolidation of regional integration objectives, particularly, the construction of the Defense Industrial Base.

Certainly, a number of questions remain open, ranging from more abstract aspects (understanding of the current role and function of the state) to

the materialization of an associate management among national and local governments, UN peacekeeping forces and companies. In the first case, there should be further studies able to better elucidate the relation between the national state and the eventual advent of the region state or the possibility, as van Creveld points out (2004, 595), of other government mechanisms rather than the state. In addition, it is quite thought-provoking to study the possibility for mechanisms similar to those in Brazilian Federal Law 11.107/2005 (which regulates public consortia) to be adopted in countries that are subject to UN interventions, generating consortia that can improve the cooperation among the UN, national and subnational governments, and companies.

Meanwhile, in order to optimize a decentralized technical cooperation, in administrative terms, there should be a political centralization mechanism able to articulate the action in foreign policy with the necessary domestic interministerial articulation in Brazil. Furthermore, for Brazil's international projection, it is necessary to consider conjugating the organized civil society, Brazilian companies (private sector), subnational entities such as state and municipal governments (public sector), and the third sector itself²⁴. This requires a redefinition of roles of the National Defense Council and the constitution of a political operator, capable of combining the public consortia internally with the International Technical Cooperation. In the U.S., the interministerial action has long been articulated with ITC thanks to the issuing, in 1950, of the NSC 68 report (National Security Council Report 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security). In light of the globalization, the U.S. itself understands the contingency of reorganizing such effort for the state complexity in the information age and discusses its reediting, as "NSC 68 the second". This position may be called International Security Advisor. However, more than a position, it is about creating a mechanism to

²⁴ One of the possible paths for this combination could be the Union Houses. They are the result of a formulation emerged in the Union Houses Seminars, promoted by the ISAPE (South American Institute for Policy and Strategy), of which we authors are part. The main goal of the Union Houses is to promote a specialized structure for the formation of public partnerships and consortia, both combining federal, state and municipal governments, and combining the Federal Entities and the private initiative. The aim is promoting national development and expanding public services.

associate the National Strategy of Defense – END – (BRASIL 2008a), important for having the technological basis for the country's development pattern, with the economic growth strategy of the Growth Acceleration Programs (PAC), placing the END agenda in the center of the transition from a consumption-based growth model to another model based on development. Only then will the President have the mechanism to fulfill his or her institutional mission of, effectively, coordinating the security and foreign policy concerning both national mobilization – Decree N. 6592/2008 (BRASIL 2008b) – and ITC.

After this political centralization mechanism, the decentralized technical cooperation could indeed contribute to this process, including Brazilian states and municipalities within the logic of cooperating with developing countries and organizing the participation of small- and medium-sized companies in a business model in services that take into account the ethical content of cooperation. This possibility has gained constant regulation efforts by the federal government and the federated entities (SAF-SRI 2013). An advancement in this sense was the statement in the South-South Decentralized Technical Cooperation Program (2012), established by the Federative Affairs Division of the Secretariat for Institutional Relations (SAF/SRI) and ABC, that "private sector institutions, non-governmental organizations, universities, sponsoring agencies, and both Brazilian and foreign international organizations will be able to take part in the projects as associate/secondary entities [...]" (SAF-SRI/ABC 2012, 3). This may serve as a trigger for a benchmark in regulating the establishment of public consortia of international operations aiming to integrate the state (at its different levels), society, market and academia within projects to promote development.

In sum, just as the National Army existed in the imagination and work of Machiavelli and Montesquieu centuries before coming to existence in the nineteenth century, Brazil's international insertion model might derive from a combination of Brazilian military and diplomatic experience abroad and the artifice of human consciousness that seeks to find generalities and define within the associate management a way of converging its distinct practical aspects (ITC, participation in UN peacekeeping operations and foreign projection of

companies). Albeit in a limited way, as Demiurge, consciousness has the potential to create reality.

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ABSTRACT

This article argues how Brazil can contribute for the formation of the National Army and construction of the African states by means of an embryonic particular model of international insertion, based on a specific concept of human rights and on the International Technical Cooperation. This possibility can be extended in the case of the Congo.

KEYWORDS

National Army; Brazil; Africa; Democratic Republic of Congo.

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