Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Erica Frantz

Mimicking Democracy to Prolong Autocracies

Democracy has suffered eight straight years of global decline. This was the finding Freedom House issued in its 2014 report examining the state of global political rights and civil liberties.[1] This downward slide in political freedom has been the longest continuous decline in political rights and civil liberties since the watch-dog organization began measuring these trends over 40 years ago.

Some of this backsliding has occurred in democratic countries like Hungary, where Prime Minister Viktor Orban publicly declared the end of liberal democracy as he continued to undermine the media, the judiciary, and other key institutional checks on executive power following his election in 2010. Or in Turkey where President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has dismantled checks on his power, censured opponents, and limited critical media, particularly in the last two years. However, a good deal of the deterioration globally has occurred within the subset of states we would consider to be non-democracies. From Egypt to Russia to Venezuela to Thailand, autocratic incumbents are expanding their control over the levers of power.

Adding to the respite (and perhaps even the reversal) in the steady march toward democracy that occurred under the "Third Wave"—a term coined by Samuel P. Huntington to describe the third major surge of global democracy from 1974 to 2000[2]—is the decelerating pace of political transitions from autocracy to democracy (see Figure 1).

In the decade following the end of the Cold War (1990–99), there were approximately 3.2 democratic transitions per year. From 2000–12, however, that

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Figure 1. Regime Transitions: 1946–2012



Today's dictatorships are simply more durable than their predecessors.

number fell to just 1.8 per year.[3] While it is true that more autocracies were in power in the immediate post-Cold War period than there are today (57 were in power in 2012, compared to 73 in 1991), the dictatorships of today are simply more durable than their predecessors. From 1946 to 1989, the average duration of authoritarian regimes was twelve years. Since the end of the Cold War, this number has almost doubled to an average of 20 years. Today, the typical dictatorship has been in power for 25 years.[4] As authoritarian regimes become more resilient, global democracy is likely to suffer.

What explains the resilience of today's dictatorships? Ironically, we contend that pseudo-democratic institutions are responsible, at least in part. Although the presence of these institutions in authoritarian settings is not a new phenomenon, an uptick in autocrats' adoption of institutions such as elections, parties, and legislatures has occurred in conjunction with the rising durability of authoritarianism. Moreover, since the end of the Cold War, authoritarian incumbents have *learned* to more effectively manipulate these institutions in ways that enhance their power-prolonging effect.

Previous work on "illiberal democracies," "hybrid regimes," and "competitive authoritarian regimes" has well documented the rise since the end of the Cold War in the number of countries that, according to Fareed Zakaria, "mix a substantial degree of democracy with a substantial degree of illiberalism."[5] Our study builds on this body of work, but departs in an important respect. While it is true that democratic institutions like parties, elections, and legislatures are

defining features of these illiberal or hybrid regimes, they are not unique to this subset of autocracies, as this literature implies, and are actually ubiquitous across modern authoritarian systems. In other words, these institutions are not just features of those regimes that sit closest to democracy on the democracy-autocracy spectrum. They are now almost universal, and the ways in which authoritarian incumbents use them are contributing to the increased durability of contemporary dictatorships.

The findings in this paper underscore the idea that the political dynamics in autocracies have shifted over the last generation. Articulating these shifting dynamics is important because, until recently, there has been a lack of attention paid to understanding how and why post-Cold War autocracies have been so persistent. Better understanding the strategies that modern autocrats rely on to maintain power is critical for effective democracy-promotion efforts. For this reason, we close by identifying several approaches that have the potential to mitigate the ways in which autocrats use pseudo-democratic institutions to prolong their tenures. Mitigating these tactics is likely to increase the potential for these institutions to serve the democratic functions for which they were created.

Learning to Love Institutions

Today's autocracies are a new breed. In the past, dictatorships have relied heavily on overtly repressive methods of control. The regimes of the past, and particularly those prior to the spread of information technology such as social media, were more likely to ban political activities, censor opponents, and limit public manifestations of dissent to maintain power. Modern autocrats, in contrast, are more likely to manipulate pseudo-democratic institutions to serve their own self-interests.

Dictators who use pseudo-democratic institutions are not necessarily less repressive than their institution-free counterparts. Indeed, research has shown that these institutions do not lower overall repression levels, but instead enable autocrats to use repression in more targeted and less costly ways. Dictatorships with multiple parties and a legislature, for example, are more likely to use repression to target and punish specific opponents, but less likely to use it to indiscriminately restrict civil liberties.[6] By increasing incentives to participate in the regime, these institutions provide dictators with an additional form of surgically-targeted political control, enabling them to survive in office longer than their predecessors.[7]

Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between the pseudo-democratic institutions in autocracies and the durability of authoritarian regimes. As a greater proportion of autocrats have adopted parties, legislatures, and elections, authoritarian systems are surviving longer in office. The power-prolonging effect of pseudo-democratic institutions in autocracies is not a new phenomenon.

Figure 2. Pseudo-Democratic Institutions and Autocratic Durability: 1951–2012



Post-World War II authoritarian regimes (from 1951 to 2008) that incorporated multiple political parties and a legislature and held an election at least every six years have lasted on average eleven years longer than those regimes that did not utilize these institutions.[8] What is new, however, is the rise in the prevalence of these institutions in the post-Cold War period and the ability of incumbents to more effectively leverage them in ways that boost survival.

Figure 3 illustrates more specific trends in the presence of pseudo-democratic institutions in autocracies. Although the vast majority of dictatorships have long incorporated at least one political party, the use of multiple political parties, legislatures, and regular elections dipped during much of the Cold War, but is now the norm. In 1970, for example, 72 percent of dictatorships allowed multiple political parties and a legislature, and 59 percent held an election at least once every six years. After the Cold War, there was a dramatic uptick in the adoption of pseudo-democratic institutions that persists to this day. As of 2008, 84 percent of autocracies allow multiple political parties and a legislature, and 83 percent hold an election at least once every six years. These figures underscore the fact that the vast majority of today's dictatorships—whether fully entrenched autocracies or those "hybrid" regimes mixing elements of both systems—utilize elections, multiple political parties, and legislatures in their institutional structures.

Not only are pseudo-democratic institutions more common in today's dictatorships, but regimes appear to be using them more effectively. We contend that today's savvy autocrats are likely to have learned important lessons about the advantages of institutionalization from several of their durable predecessors. In

Figure 3. Percentage of Dictatorships with Pseudo-Democratic Institutions: 1951–2008



Mexico under the PRI (1915–2000), the regime featured regularly-held legislative elections and opposition parties that were not only allowed to compete in them but also to win on occasion. In Egypt, the Mubarak regime's nearly 60-year reign (1952–2011) employed similar tactics. Modern autocrats, who may have initially adopted these institutions to appease international or domestic audiences, have learned from their institutionalized predecessors to more effectively manipulate parties, legislatures, and elections to bolster their rule.

The data support the idea that today's autocrats are now getting more "bang for their buck" out of pseudo-democratic institutions. In other words, the typical "institutionalized" dictatorship of today is even longer lasting than its "institutionalized" predecessor. (For simplicity's sake, in the rest of this study we refer to dictatorships with multiple political parties and a legislature as "institutionalized dictatorships," regardless of how frequently they hold elections. This enables us to avoid making judgments about the frequency with which elections must be held for the regime to be considered to be mimicking democratic institutions.)[9]

Today's autocrats are getting more "bang for their buck" out of pseudo-democratic institutions.

From 1951 to 1989, an autocracy with multiple parties and a legislature lasted about six years longer than one without them (eleven years versus five years, on average). Incorporating regular elections (at least once every six years) extended a regime's life by another year (to twelve). In the post-Cold War period,

however, dictatorships with multiple political parties and a legislature now last fourteen years longer than those without these institutions (nineteen years versus five, on average). Regularly holding elections in addition extends their tenures to 22 years.

Moreover, signs suggest that the prevalence and skillful use of institutions to bolster survival is only increasing. In the 1990s, the chance a dictatorship would collapse in any given year was 7 percent worldwide. Since 2000, autocrats have reduced the odds of failure in any given year to just 4 percent.

Prolonging Their Power

That autocracies use pseudo-democratic institutions despite the risks they create underscores the notion that these institutions must confer benefits to these regimes. After all, elections, political parties, and legislatures do create risk for autocrats. Although infrequently destabilizing, elections *can* create a focal point for mobilizing opposition, and political parties and legislatures *can* enable opponents to establish bases of support and provide a forum in which this opposition can coordinate. The KANU in Kenya, for example, dominated Kenyan politics since 1962, but stepped down from power in 2002 after losing in that year's electoral contest. The same is true of the MMD in Zambia. The incumbent party ruled from 1996 to 2011, when it stepped down after losing elections. Given that elections, multiple political parties, and legislatures can be risky for autocrats, why do so many dictators allow them to function?

The most apparent reason is that these institutions bestow onto their leaders a façade of democracy that enables them to maintain international and domestic legitimacy needed in today's day and age. Authoritarian incumbents have likely viewed the adoption of elections and the legalization of multiple parties as a means of acquiring international legitimacy and, in turn, attracting international aid and investment to keep their regimes afloat. In the post-Cold War period, the West has tended to withhold aid from countries experiencing coups and reward those countries advocating political liberalization, creating incentives for leaders to embrace the façade of democracy. Moreover, the increasing acceptance of the liberal democratic model among citizens around the globe following the fall of communism has likely led many of these regimes to assess adopting these institutions as paramount to maintaining legitimacy among their domestic populations as well.

Western aid has created incentives for leaders to embrace the façade of democracy.

The end of the Cold War also prompted the decline of military regimes, which predominately exclude civilian actors—including in the form of parties

and legislatures—from government. During the Cold War, military governments made up 15 percent of all dictatorships. As of 2010 (the most recent year for which regime type data are available), only 3 percent of dictatorships are led by militaries. An additional reason, therefore, why we see more dictatorships in power with parties, elections, and legislatures today is that we see more dictatorships in power ruled by civilians.

But this answer is incomplete. After all, even during the Cold War many dictatorships utilized parties, legislatures, and elections, suggesting that authoritarian incumbents found these institutions to be useful methods of control even in the absence of pressures to incorporate them. Interpreting the persistence of pseudo-democratic institutions as the result of international pressure to maintain them obscures our understanding of the political dynamics at play in autocracies.

Savvy dictators are aware that institutional manipulation offers greater advantages and fewer liabilities than overreliance on traditional tactics like overt repression, which push compliance with the regime through brute force but risk creating popular discontent and/or focal points for mobilization that can easily be broadcasted to catalyze destabilizing civil unrest.[10] The exclusive use of repression also requires dictatorships to allocate sufficient power to the security services, which may actually pose the greatest threat to their rule.[11] The very individuals hired to protect dictators may turn against them when armed with the means to do so. While repressive strategies can raise the costs associated with challenging a leader, they cannot reduce the latent desire to do so.

Incorporating seemingly democratic institutions mitigates some of these risks by providing a leader with alternative methods of control that increase incentives to participate within the regime in ways which boost autocratic survival.[12] Parties, for example, not only mobilize support for the regime, but they also allow the dictator to credibly commit to sharing power and the perks of the office with those who belong to the party rather than in subversive coalitions.[13] A single party is an effective tool for cooptation, but multiple parties are even more so. Letting more than one party participate in politics gives potential opponents options, allowing them to choose the degree to which they wish to associate with the dictatorship.[14]

Legislatures are also useful cooptation tools. Like parties, legislatures bring opponents into the regime so that they have an interest in its survival.[15] Dictators use legislatures as an arena through which to offer opponents policy concessions and negotiate the terms of these bargains. Through legislatures, dictators can promise elites the perks of office in exchange for their loyalty. In turn, elites can use legislatures as a way to monitor the dictator and ensure that they are living up to their agreements.[16]

Finally, elections enable leaders to manage their elite and demonstrate their dominance within the political system. Dictators use elections to secure elite loyalty and navigate potentially destabilizing divisions within this group. Insights from the electoral process enable dictators to reward those members of the elite who most successfully turned out the vote through perks such as government jobs or redistributing public expenditures.[17] They also enable regimes to deter rivals by signaling their dominance within the system through large victory margins, high voter turnout, and other methods of mobilizing state resources on their behalf, while also helping regimes identify their bases of support.[18] Finally, elections enable regimes to fragment the opposition by buying the support of some while disqualifying others, complicating the opposition's ability to mount a cohesive challenge.

In each of these ways, parties, legislatures, and elections are enhancing the durability of autocracies.

A Double-Edged Sword

Dynamics surrounding the use of pseudo-democratic institutions in autocracies create conflicting expectations about the future trajectory of democracy worldwide. On one hand, not only are pseudo-democratic institutions contributing to the durability of authoritarian regimes, but an increasing proportion of autocracies are coming to power already institutionalized. In Venezuela in 2005 or Bangladesh in 2014, transitions to autocracy placed leaders equipped with political parties, legislatures, and experience running elections at the helm. The rise of institutionalized authoritarian leaders suggests that future autocracies are likely to be particularly long-lasting.

Dictatorships are more frequently entering power with multiple parties and a legislature already in place.

During the Cold War, only 62 percent of dictatorships entered power with multiple parties and a legislature in place, a number that has jumped to 85 percent since 1990. This is, in part, because a greater proportion of dictatorships are seizing power by abusing pre-existing democratic processes than in the past. Rather than taking control via coup—which has historically been the most frequent way that dictatorships have emerged—autocrats are now more likely than ever to seize power by altering existing democratic structures in ways that favor them.[19] More specifically in the post-Cold War period, a growing proportion of autocrats are coming to power through free and fair elections, and then once in office changing the rules of the game to entrench their power. In Ukraine, for

example, Viktor Yanukovych came to power in 2010 in relatively free and fair elections, but eroded political and civil liberties in the country and ultimately won parliamentary elections in 2012 that many observers deemed to have been rampant with fraud. More specifically, the data indicate that 16 percent of Cold War dictatorships came to power via competitive elections. By the 1990s, this proportion increased to 19 percent, and since 2000 a quarter of all autocrats have come to office via competitive elections. The rise of already-institutionalized autocracies is likely to sustain the durability of today's autocracies.

On the other hand, as observers might anticipate, those countries which utilize institutions that mimic democracy are more likely to democratize upon their collapse than those regimes where these institutions are absent. Since the end of the Cold War, 70 percent of institutionalized dictatorships democratized upon their collapse (38 out of 54), compared to 61 percent of those that lacked these institutions (11 out of 18). The correlation between higher democratization rates and institutionalization may exist because regimes keen on initiating democratization are likely to integrate pseudo-democratic institutions as part of that process. For example, Ghana's Jerry Rawlings (1981–2000) legalized political parties and allowed them to compete in national elections in 1992, an action that ultimately paved the way for democratization there in 2000. While cases like Ghana in which leaders adopt institutions as part of their move toward democracy do emerge from time to time, leaders more frequently adopt these institutions as a result of rising pressure or as a strategy for maintaining power.

In Iran, for example, the regime has held regular presidential and legislative elections for the most part since its inception in 1979, with multiple candidates from an assortment of political factions competing in them. The process is far from democratic: the regime has a variety of tools at its disposal to ensure that unfavorable candidates are not victorious, including a strict candidate vetting system, control over the media, and (if needed) fraud. The institutionalization of the Iranian system, in turn, has been touted as one of the reasons for the regime's durability.[20]

Many institutionalized dictatorships democratize upon collapse, but few would argue that democratization was the original intention of establishing these institutions. Moreover, for leaders that inherit these institutions from their predecessors, it is unlikely that democratic development is the reason they allow them to persist. After all, leaders such as Uzbekistan's Islam Karimov and Russia's Vladimir Putin oversee well-institutionalized regimes. Instead, democratization often appears to be an unintended, rather than deliberate, outcome of their use. Regime actors incorporate these institutions to extend their time in office, which frequently has the inadvertent long-term effect of

creating environments amenable to democratization. Though an in-depth discussion of the reasons why these institutions are associated with higher democratization rates falls outside the scope of this study, it is possible that this occurs because they pave the way for the participation (as opposed to punishment) of regime actors in the political system that follows.[21]

What does this mean for the future of global democracy? Although democracy is more likely than not to follow the collapse of an institutionalized autocracy, we have shown that a dictator's use of institutions works to extend the life of the regime. As autocracies last longer, the number of authoritarian regimes in place at any point in time is likely to increase, as some countries inevitably backslide from democracy to autocracy. Although the number of autocracies globally has not risen substantially in recent years and more people than ever before live in countries that hold hold free and fair elections, the tide may be turning. In 2012, for example, there were three instances of backsliding but only one democratization.

Any accumulation of authoritarian regimes, even if initially limited in number, would have the potential to set in motion a wave of de-democratization globally. Because regime type tends to diffuse across borders, particularly among neighboring states, the accumulation of autocracies could create "autocratizing" momentum that would be difficult to reverse. The challenge, therefore, becomes identifying tactics with the potential to counter the power-prolonging dynamics created by pseudo-democratic institutions.

Democracy Promotion in an Age of Institutionalization

We emphasize in this study that dictatorships increasingly feature pseudo-democratic institutions, and, simultaneously, that they have become more proficient in using these institutions to extend their hold on power. The dynamics we highlight above have several implications for democracy promotion efforts.

The Best Offense Is a Good Defense

As we noted earlier, the proportion of dictatorships coming to power through institutionalized means has increased in recent years, raising the possibility that such newly formed autocracies may be particularly resilient. This suggests that strategies aimed at enhancing democratic consolidation in new or fragile democracies to avert the creation of already-institutionalized—and therefore durable—authoritarian systems may be a particularly important approach. Employing tactics in new or fragile democracies that promote democratic consolidation—such as developing political parties that represent meaningful segments of society, strengthening civil society and other alternative centers of

power outside of the executive—and reinforcing inclusive and participatory institutions could help prevent democratic backsliding and the formation of this resilient brand of autocracy.

In those cases in which backsliding has already begun, international pressure has the potential to be particularly effective. Unlike dictatorships that seize power through coup, regimes that gain control by altering democratic processes often still seek to portray themselves as "democrats," making them likely to be more vulnerable to international and domestic criticism that highlights the inconsistency between their behaviors and democratic norms. Moreover, in these settings, civil society or opposition actors have probably not yet been fully disbanded. International attention may embolden these actors, which could enable them to take advantage of the remaining political space to mobilize and impede the entrenchment of autocracy.

Strategically Allocate Resources

Young autocracies are more likely than long-lived regimes to democratize. Institutionalized dictatorships that fall from power during their first decade democratize at a rate of 77 percent. (Even among dictatorships that lack pseudo-democratic institutions, the chance of democratization is significantly higher during the first decade in power (69 percent) than after it (33 percent).) After two decades in office, the chances of democratization fall to 60 percent. The data we presented above suggests this trend could be the result of a regime's more effective use of institutions. As regimes mature, they become more adept at utilizing institutions to undermine alternative centers of power and entrench the elite. This implies that an autocracy like Venezuela, in power since 2005, is likely to be a better bet for democratization than one like Zimbabwe, in power since 1980.

Young autocracies are more likely than long-lived regimes to democratize.

Counteract Incumbent Tactics

Finally, identifying tactics to mitigate the specific ways in which incumbents are using pseudo-democratic institutions can mitigate their power-prolonging effect and reduce the prospects that autocracies will accumulate and trigger a global wave of de-democratization. For example, as highlighted above, authoritarian incumbents are using elections to signal their dominance by spending and mobilizing state resources in the run-up to elections. Encouraging the opposition to participate in sub-national levels of government can enable these individuals to establish bases of support, access to resources, and relationships with current

elite or other members of the opposition which can help overcome an incumbent's resource advantage.

Incumbents also use elections to create rifts within the opposition. Efforts to broker ties between opposition movements in different countries probably would facilitate the spread of novel tactics, which can raise the credibility and unity of the opposition by enhancing their optimism that change is possible. Similarly, facilitating the opposition's access to international or expatriate funding or links between the political opposition and domestic civil society can increase the opposition's confidence they can execute a nationwide campaign, hindering incumbent tactics to drive these groups apart. Finally, in autocracies with fewer media restrictions, efforts to publicize the costs and potentially negative impact of pre-electoral spending on the economy can reduce the effectiveness of government tactics intended to placate the public. In general, better understanding how incumbents use these pseudo-democratic institutions in various contexts would help illuminate policies that can mitigate their effect.

Autocrats Imitating Democratic Institutions

That most dictatorships now mimic democracies in their institutional structures complicates our ability to define and identify political liberalization. The findings in this paper suggest that observers of authoritarian politics should not assume that incorporating elections, political parties, or legislatures is a direct or reliable signal of how "democratic" a regime is. Realizing the paradox that institutionalization is a tool that can be used to increase autocratic resilience presents a reality that is far more complex. Legalizing opposition political parties, allowing them to hold seats in legislatures, and letting them compete in regularly-held elections are more often a sign of autocratic entrenchment than a legitimate move toward democratization.

If fragile democracies unravel at an accelerating pace, global "autocratization" could accelerate.

These dynamics now characterize most authoritarian settings. And while these institutions form the foundation of democratic governance, they are simultaneously prolonging autocracy and slowing the rate of democratic transitions. If today's fragile democracies begin to unravel at an accelerating pace, there is potential that global "autocratization" could accelerate. We suggested that these trends are, in part, a result of today's autocrats having learned to adapt their tactics and more effectively utilize institutions to confront challenges in the contemporary environment. In this evolving

context, how will the West adapt its methods of engagement with these regimes to reduce their longevity?

Notes

1. *Freedom in the World 2014* (Freedom House, 2014), www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2014.
2. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).
3. Data on dictatorships used in this study come from Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz, "Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set," *Perspectives on Politics* 12, no. 2 (2014): 313-331, who code autocratic regime start and end dates from 1946 through 2012. Their data set also includes information on the type of dictatorship, the mode of entry, and the type of transition through 2010.
4. Though we use the term "average" here and throughout, median duration statistics are reported. The latter statistic is for 2012, the most recent year for which there is data.
5. Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," *Foreign Affairs*, (November/December 1997). For a review of this literature, see Natasha Ezrow and Erica Frantz, *Dictators and Dictatorships: Understanding Authoritarian Regimes and Their Leaders* (New York, NY: Continuum Publishing, 2011).
6. See Erica Frantz and Andrea Kendall-Taylor, "A Dictator's Toolkit: Understanding How Co-optation Affects Repression in Autocracies," *Journal of Peace Research* 51, no. 3 (2014): 332-346.
7. For literature on this subject, see Barbara Geddes, "Why Parties and Elections in Authoritarian Regimes?" *American Political Science Association Annual Meeting* (2006); Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski, "Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats," *Comparative Political Studies* 40, no. 11 (2007): 1279–1301; Jennifer Gandhi, *Political Institutions under Dictatorship* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Beatriz Magaloni, "Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule," *Comparative Political Studies* 41, no. 4-5 (2008): 715-741. See Thomas Pepinksy, "The Institutional Turn in Comparative Authoritarianism," *British Journal of Political Science* 44, no. 3 (2014): 631-653, for a discussion of the potential endogeneity of the relationship between authoritarian institutions and survival. The very autocrats who are capable of institutionalization may well be those with a strong bargaining position to begin with.
8. Data on political parties and legislatures come from Jose Antonio Cheibub, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Raymond Vreeland, "Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited," *Public Choice* 142, no. 1-2 (2010): 67-101. For political parties, we use their measure of de facto parties; for legislatures, we do not distinguish between whether a legislature is appointed or elected. The most recent year these data are available is 2008. Data on elections come from the NELDA dataset (see Susan D. Hyde and Nikolay Marinov, "Which Elections Can Be Lost?" *Political Analysis* 20, no. 2 (2012): 191–210). We exclude from these statistics elections that occurred during the first or last year of the regime because they may have been associated with the regime's seizure of or departure from power. The most recent year these data are available is 2010. Though the autocratic regime data are available starting in 1946, the start year for these statistics is 1951 to enable computation of whether a dictatorship held an election in the last six years.

9. In the post-Cold War period, nearly all (92 percent) institutionalized dictatorships have held at least one election while in office, and the vast majority of them (84 percent) have held one at some point in the past six years.
10. Mark Irving Lichbach, "Deterrence or Escalation? The Puzzle of Aggregate Studies of Repression and Dissent," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 31, no. 2 (1987): 266-297; Will H. Moore, "Repression and Dissent: Substitution, Context, and Timing," *American Journal of Political Science* 42, no. 3 (1998): 851-873.
11. Ronald Wintrobe, *The Political Economy of Dictatorship* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
12. Geddes, "Why Parties and Elections in Authoritarian Regimes." *Op. cit.*; Gandhi, *Political Institutions under Dictatorship*. *Op. cit.*; Gandhi and Przeworski, "Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats." *Op. cit*; Magaloni, "Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule." *Op. cit.*
13. Magaloni, "Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule." *Op. cit*
14. Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski, "Cooperation, Cooptation and Rebellion under Dictatorships," *Economics and Politics* 18, no. 1 (2006): 1-26.
15. Gandhi and Przeworski, "Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats." *Op. cit*
16. Carles Boix and Milan Svolik, "The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government: Institutions and Power-sharing in Dictatorships," *The Journal of Politics* 75, no. 2 (2013): 300-316.
17. Lisa Blaydes, *Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak's Egypt* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
18. Geddes, "Why Parties and Elections in Authoritarian Regimes." *Op. cit.*; Boix and Svolik, "The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government: Institutions and Power-sharing in Dictatorships." *Op. cit.*; Ellen Lust-Okar, "Elections under Authoritarianism: Preliminary Lessons from Jordan," *Democratization* 13, no. 3 (2006): 455-470; Beatriz Magaloni, *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Andreas Schedler, *Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Elections* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006); Lisa Blaydes, "Authoritarian Elections and Elite Management: Theory and Evidence from Egypt," *Conference on Dictators: Their Governance and Social Consequences* (2008); Gary Cox, "Authoritarian Elections and Leadership Succession, 1975-2000," Unpublished manuscript (2010); Jennifer Gandhi and Ellen Lust-Okar, "Elections under Authoritarianism," *Annual Review of Political Science* 12, (June 2009): 403-422.
19. This corresponds with recent studies emphasizing the declining occurrence of coups since the end of the Cold War. See, for example, Nikolay Marinov and Hein Goemans, "Coups and Democracy," *British Journal of Political Science* 44, no. 4 (2014): 799-825; Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Erica Frantz, "How Autocracies Fall," *The Washington Quarterly* 37, no. 1 (2014).
20. See, for example, Abbas Milani, "Patience with All Things in Iran," June 17, 2013, *New Republic*; Mohammad Ayatollahi Tabaar, "Iran's Pragmatic Turn," September 12, 2013, *Foreign Policy*; David E. Thaler, Alireza Nader, Shahram Chubin, Jerrold D. Green, Charlotte Lynch, and Frederic Wehrey, "Mullahs, Guards, and *Bonyads*," Rand Corporation, 2009.
21. Wright and Escribà-Folch, "Authoritarian Institutions and Regime Survival: Transitions to Democracy and Subsequent Autocracy." *Op. cit.*