

Breaking the North Korean Nuclear Deadlock: a Global Action Plan

The North Korean nuclear problem has entered a new stage as Pyongyang has developed more robust nuclear capabilities with the successful launch of a long-range missile in December 2012, a third nuclear test in 2013, and further missile tests in June 2014. The United States is now beginning to face the real risk that North Korea could soon develop the capability to directly strike the U.S. homeland. This situation has also raised concern among South Koreans about the credibility of extended deterrence provided by the United States. At the same time, the chances of a North Korean provocation have increased as conventional deterrence becomes less important.

The window of opportunity to solve the already difficult nuclear problem will not be open for long. If North Korea develops its capabilities to directly attack the United States with nuclear missiles, it will never give them up and will demand greater rewards. After a long cycle of agreements and crises, however, the United States and China seem to be experiencing status-quo fatigue, while the situation continues to worsen. Neither country has shown a strong initiative for solving the problem. This is creating an expectation that South Korea should take the initiative, and U.S. and Chinese leaders have recently expressed their

Duk-min Yun is the Chancellor at the Korea National Diplomatic Academy, and Wooseon Choi is an Associate Professor at the Korea National Diplomatic Academy. They can be reached at evergreenyun@gmail.com and wchoi38@mofa.go.kr. The views expressed in this article are those of authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of any organization with which they are affiliated.

Copyright © 2014 The Elliott School of International Affairs
The Washington Quarterly • 37:3 pp. 215–227
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2014.978445>

North Korea could soon develop the capability to directly strike the U.S. homeland.

expectations of South Korea doing so. In a way, too, South Korea has responsibility to take the lead in solving the nuclear problem because it most directly threatens South Korean security and goal of unification.

Several factors have weakened the position of the international community in pushing North Koreans to compromise, making it difficult to probe their real intentions. First, the differences

in interests of concerned countries have weakened international coordination for the denuclearization of North Korea. South Korea has emphasized South–North relations; until recently the United States has concentrated on reconstructing order in the Middle East; China has focused on the stability of the North Korean regime; Japan has been obsessed with the kidnapping issue (explained further below). During the past twenty years, South Korea and other concerned countries have provided more than ten billion dollars of assistance to North Korea.¹ Still, the separate and uncoordinated assistance failed in touching off its change.

Second, the international community has failed to create sufficiently powerful incentives and pressures to force North Korea to choose between having nukes and poverty or having economic development with reasonable security. Thus, North Korea has used negotiations as political theater to buy time, expecting both nuclear and economic development. Third, South Korea, the most directly concerned party, has not yet led the negotiations.

Considering the experience of past failures, a bold and creative initiative is required to pursue a new framework for denuclearization. The global action plan we propose is audacious, to be sure. However, we believe it is within reach. Success will require several specific characteristics, used consistently throughout each phase. First, the plan should consistently apply a two-track approach of “steaks and hammers”—or stronger incentives and stronger pressures—to push North Korea to make a strategic choice. In pursuing the new framework, concerned countries should better emphasize coordination to overcome their different priorities and mobilize those steaks and hammers. Lastly, to be effective, the action plan should comprehensively pursue the goals of deterrence, transformation, and denuclearization. Deterrence should be firmly maintained while denuclearization should be integrated with efforts to induce North Korea to reform and opening. Our global action plan is just one proposal, but we

believe it provides an appropriate framework that balances North Korean action with action on the part of the international community.

The Global Action Plan Itself

Solving the North Korean nuclear crisis will require a bold approach. We propose a plan that involves comprehensive mutual steps and a specific timeline for denuclearization. This plan would involve three basic phases that could be negotiated and coordinated, either fundamentally or in the details of its implementation, through relevant parties.

The first phase takes its basis from the so-called “2.29 Agreement” of February 29, 2012.² After making this agreement to resume the Six-Party Talks, North Korea nullified it by launching a rocket two months later. This and other past behaviors have only increased the strong distrust and political constraints in Washington and Seoul. If the next round of the talks fails again, there will be no hope for another serious negotiation. Thus, North Korea should immediately implement this agreement in order to show its serious intention.

North Korea must put a moratorium on all nuclear and missile programs and activities, including the highly-enriched uranium (HEU) program. Pyongyang should also return to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime—it joined the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state in 1985 but withdrew in 1993—and allow International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors to return while accepting IAEA safeguards measures. Furthermore, it should report all nuclear programs, missile programs, and nuclear weapons.

In this early phase, North Korea should reaffirm existing agreements, such as the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the Joint Statement of September 19, 2005. In the latter, North Korea agreed on its complete denuclearization and return to the NPT in exchange for economic assistance and security assurance.

The international community must offer reciprocation here, providing both humanitarian food assistance and energy assistance. It should also resume the construction of light-water reactors, which are more nuclear-proliferation resistant and had been promised in the Agreed Framework of 1994. (Implementation of the Framework had always been troubled, but it finally broke down completely in 2002–03 after revelations of North Korea’s continued HEU program.) Negotiations on large-scale economic assistance should also commence. It is important that this phase also see the beginning steps of normalization of U.S.–North Korea relations and Japan–North Korea relations.

These measures in the first phase should be completed within five months. By reducing mutual distrust and uncertainty through determined and positive interaction to keep agreements, the concerned countries should be able to significantly institutionalize the implementation of agreements and broaden domestic bases for further steps.

The second phase focuses on dismantlement. In this phase, North Korea should proceed to dismantle all existing nuclear programs while abandoning its long-range missile program. At the same time, it should fully implement the IAEA safeguards measures. This phase should be completed within one year after the completion of the first phase.

The international community has a large responsibility here—it must provide powerful incentives and maintain pressure to preclude North Korean defection from its strategic commitment. In order to achieve this, the United States and Japan should take substantial steps toward normalization by exchanging liaison offices with North Korea and lifting economic sanctions except in financial and military areas. Furthermore, South Korea, North Korea, the United States, and China must sign a peace treaty to replace the armistice that was signed during the Korean War in 1953. It will legally institutionalize peace between the two Koreas (who are still technically at war). The international community must also start providing large-scale economic and social assistance to North Korea. Importantly, South Korea must begin to implement assistance to reconstruct North Korean infrastructure and make large-scale investments for joint projects, including involvement with China and Russia, while helping introduce investments from international organizations and foreign countries. The international community must also start cooperation for development of peaceful space programs of North Korea in exchange for abandoning its long-range ballistic missile program.

The third phase sees the completion of denuclearization. It should take 6 months following the previous phase. In this last phase, North Korea must completely abolish its nuclear weapons—to verify this, North and South Korea should conduct mutual inspections.

On the international front, Phase 3 must involve full normalization of U.S. and Japanese relations with North Korea, including lifting financial sanctions. Further, the international community would make strides to provide large-scale economic and social assistance to North Korea. Importantly, South Korea will move to fully implement its Vision Korea Projects to reconstruct North Korean infrastructure and make large-scale investments for joint projects.³ The international community will bring North Korea into the international trade and financial systems.

In order to organize this three-phase plan more clearly, we have condensed it into a chart:

Roadmap of Global Action Plan

Phase	Measures	
	North Korea	International Community
Phase 1 Institutionalization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Moratorium on all nuclear and missile programs • Resumption of IAEA inspection • Return to the NPT regime • Report of all nuclear and missile programs/activities and nuclear weapons • Reaffirmation of existing agreements 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Humanitarian food assistance • Energy assistance • Resumption of the construction of light water reactors • Start of negotiations on large-scale economic assistance • Start of negotiations on normalization of relations (U.S.–North Korea, Japan–North Korea)
Phase 2 Dismantlement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dismantlement of all existing nuclear programs • Abandonment of long-range missile program • Full implementation of the IAEA safeguards measures 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establishment of liaison offices (U.S.–North Korea, Japan–North Korea) • Lifting of economic sanctions (except financial and military) • Signing peace treaty (2+2) • Start of large-scale economic and social assistance • Start of cooperation for peaceful development of space
Phase 3 Denuclearization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Abolition of nuclear weapons • Conduct of mutual inspection (South and North Korea) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Normalization of relations (U.S.–North Korea, Japan–North Korea) • Large-scale economic and social assistance

Steaks and Hammers to Make it Come True

The global action plan consists of bold and creative incentives paired with powerful pressures. It is based on maintaining effective deterrence. Many elements of the plan will also facilitate the transformation of North Korea. Considering what North Korea has wanted in nuclear negotiations for the past twenty years, the international community can provide it with the following incentives.

First of all, the strongest incentive for North Korea will be to normalize relations with the United States. This would substantially reduce the threat of the United States to North Korea’s survival, while giving it the opportunity to receive much greater economic benefits from the international community. This normalization could touch off further opportunities for North Korea to take a

more balanced and flexible position in its foreign relations, which it actually prefers. Both the sensitivity of North Korea to every move of the United States (such as slight changes in economic sanctions) and the testimonies of people who contacted North Korean leaders indicate that the North is actually very interested in the normalization of relations with the United States.⁴ Nevertheless, it still displays an unrealistic approach by simultaneously desiring to keep the option of developing nuclear capabilities on the table.

Learning from the experiences of the Clinton administration, the United States can provide a stronger incentive for normalization of both by presenting a timetable in exchange for the North's denuclearization and by making some bold early moves such as lifting economic sanctions and establishing liaison offices to assure the North of its will to normalize. The North will not be completely sure about its survival even after normalization. Still, the international community needs to convince Pyongyang that it should take the reasonably low risks by combining normalization with Washington with other measures for reassurance.

Japan's moves to normalize relations with North Korea either before or after its normalization with the United States would reinforce the incentives of North Korea in the grand bargain for denuclearization. Japan has insisted on solving the kidnapping issue as a precondition for normalization. Over the course of six years, from 1977–83, North Korea abducted at least thirteen Japanese citizens from Japan—the North Korean government admits to kidnapping thirteen, Japan maintains it was seventeen, but it could have been many more—allegedly to teach Japanese language and culture at North Korean spy schools. Both sides are currently negotiating this issue. The normalization of relations between Japan and North Korea would be accompanied by reparations for colonial rule, which are expected to be around 10 billion U.S. dollars. The North's normalization of relations with the United States and Japan would finally complete the process of post-Cold War cross-recognition, which began with South Korea's normalization of relations with Russia and China in the early 1990s.

Another important incentive for denuclearization would be the change of the 1953 armistice agreement to a peace regime on the Korean peninsula. The two Koreas, the United States, and China would act as the parties of the peace treaty. This change by itself would not move North Korean leaders in a particular direction. Combined with the actual progress toward normalization of relations with the United States and Japan, however, a full-fledged peace agreement could help assure North Korean leaders that the regional political environment could actually improve their security and economy—although it is still their responsibility to manage their own internal affairs for their survival.

The conclusion of a peace regime would also reduce the chance of military conflict on the peninsula. Importantly, the South Korean Park Geun-hye government presented the Trust-Building Process on the Korean Peninsula in

order to help normalize relations with the North, focused on trust-building measures in economic and security areas as well as firm deterrence.⁵ The trust-building measures can be weaved with progress toward a peace regime to reinforce its effects.

Other economic incentives can prove useful in exchange for the North's actions for denuclearization. They include large-scale economic and energy assistance, acceptance of North Korea into the international economic system, and cooperation for peaceful use of nuclear power and space. The effective and creative cooperation among concerned countries can strengthen these economic incentives, which also can be used for inducing North Korea to reform and opening.

Providing incentives will act as an important component of the global action plan. But these steaks must also come with hammers—the international community must be willing to implement consistent sanctions according to UN resolutions while firmly showing its will to impose stronger sanctions in case of further provocations. In order to achieve this, the United States and South Korea should strengthen their coordination with Japan.

It is also critical to maximize Chinese cooperation. China has become a lifeline for North Korea: about 90 percent of North Korean trade, including its oil and food imports, depends on China.⁶ North Korea also uses China as an important conduit for international financial transactions. Thus, for effective sanctions, Chinese participation is paramount. South Korea can help here by upgrading its political relationship with China. South Korea and China have actually improved their relationship in recent years, while North Korea's relationship with China has been strained due to the nuclear problem. To help, the United States and South Korea need to institutionalize a trilateral strategic dialogue with China as a coordinating channel. The first 1.5-track trilateral dialogue was held in Seoul last year.

Recently, China has been more willing to use tough measures in dealing with North Korea, although it has not been willing to risk destabilizing North Korea. During the June 2013 Sunnyland summit and President Park's June 2013 visit to China, Chinese leaders' attitude revealed that they have begun to realize the importance of effective pressure in pursuing the denuclearization of North Korea. In fact, China has actively participated in the UN sanctions adopted after the third nuclear test of North Korea while holding off on Kim Jong-un's visit to China. The Bank of China cut off doing business with North Korea's primary foreign exchange bank, the Foreign Trade Bank,⁷ and it was further reported that China has stopped its oil

China has been more willing to use tough measures in dealing with North Korea.

export to North Korea since early this year, except for some oil products such as gasoline and kerosene.⁸

This pressure through sanctions should combine with military resolve to strengthen comprehensive deterrence. The United States and South Korea must reinforce their capabilities and show their firm will to punish any North Korean military provocations, but Washington and Seoul must not act provocatively themselves.

The United States and South Korea also need to introduce elements of arms control into the equation of nuclear negotiations for the complete and verifiable elimination of North Korea's nuclear capabilities. The problem of the existing nuclear weapons cannot be solved under the IAEA safeguards system, which focuses on inspections of nuclear materials and activities to check nuclear weapons development. It should be pursued through the framework of arms control negotiations between South and North Korea on the basis of their 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The joint declaration stipulates that both sides object to testing, manufacturing, producing, requisitioning, possessing, reserving, disposing or using nuclear weapons, and that mutual inspections (including those of nuclear weapons) should take place for verification. Thus, in cooperation with the United States, South Korea should pursue the elimination of North Korean nuclear weapons through arms control negotiations with North Korea.

Common Goals and Cooperation

Along with steaks and hammers, any global action plan must have clear goals and intentional international cooperation to meet them. Some of this international cooperation we have already outlined, given that coordination between the United States, South Korea, and Japan with North Korea could create powerful incentives to induce change. The goals, meanwhile, should include deterrence, transformation, and denuclearization—the past approach only focused on the denuclearization of North Korea and was not successful. Encouraging reform and opening of the country should act as an additional piece that international actors can weave throughout the process.

Considering the nuclear armament and recent provocations of North Korea, it remains an urgent task to maintain an effective and comprehensive deterrence. Washington and Seoul should uphold the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence by strengthening its missile defense capabilities and conventional precision-strike capabilities. Through these efforts, the two allies should counter the increasing asymmetric advantages of North Korea in relation to South Korea, which result from Pyongyang's growing nuclear capability.

Without maintaining strong deterrence against the North Korean threat, it is not possible to pursue any bold and effective North Korea policy.

North Korean leaders have considered nuclear armament as an essential safeguard for regime survival while adamantly resisting reform and opening. Thus, efforts to solve the North Korean nuclear problem should be pursued simultaneously with efforts to solve this more fundamental problem. In this regard, there have been some meaningful changes in the regime. The government had previously been a crisis management system. Just before his death, Kim Jong-il initiated a shift from the military-first policy, or *songun*, to a policy for restoring a party-centered governing system for the new young leader Kim Jong-un.

Economically, informal markets have expanded in North Korea as its state economy has deteriorated—now, North Korean people largely depend on informal markets for their living. The North Korean government attempted to reverse this trend to growing markets through measures such as currency reform, but it failed. In order to shift to a more normal communist system, it would be necessary to restore a traditional command economy or to carry out economic reform. However, a command economy is not possible to revive just now, and no real signs of reform have yet appeared. As its economy continues to stagnate due to the fundamental deficiencies, North Korea will likely face growing pressures for reform. Thus, the international community should link the process of solving the nuclear problem with efforts to induce North Korea to reform and opening. The two processes can create mutually positive effects.

The international community should seek the goal of complete and verifiable denuclearization. Crucial for success of the global action plan is international cooperation. South Korea could take the initiative for developing the global action plan with its own plan. To be successful, however, the United States, China, Japan, and Russia should share the goals of deterrence, transformation, and denuclearization, as well as the comprehensive approach to achieve them. Korea and the four powers should prepare a common global action plan, such as the one we suggest here, through close consultations. Importantly, they need to coordinate the incentives and the means for pressure each country will provide.

The United States holds the key to success here. North Korea has insisted on settling issues with Washington—what North Korea has most wanted includes the normalization of relations with the United States and a peace treaty. The denuclearization of North Korea will be worth the political burden that U.S. leaders would have to bear. Still, there is fatigue in Washington concerning

Without strong deterrence, it is not possible to pursue any bold and effective North Korea policy.

North Korea, which has made it difficult to take a strong initiative. Therefore, it makes good strategic sense for Washington to accept the initiative of Seoul and formulate the joint action plan together.

The United States and South Korea should consult on the following issues in formulating and implementing the global action plan. First, both allies should seek measures to strengthen the credibility of the extended deterrence provided by the United States, including their cooperation on missile defense. Second, the United States and South Korea should share the perception that the transformation of North Korea should be linked with its denuclearization. And they should coordinate the assistance they will provide to North Korea to induce it to reform and open. Third, for a grand bargain with North Korea for its denuclearization, the United States and South Korea need to coordinate on issues such as the normalization of relations between the United States and North Korea, a peace treaty, cooperative measures for peaceful use of nuclear power, assistance for peaceful use of space, and lifting sanctions.

As the almost exclusive provider of security and economic assistance to North Korea, China's role is very important for success here. The North Korea policy of the Xi government has changed to a tougher one after the third nuclear test of North Korea. Its emphasis on the stability of North Korea may not change, due to its perception of North Korea as a vital strategic buffer. Recently, however, China has given greater priority to the denuclearization of North Korea. And through a series of summit meetings, the United States, China, and South Korea began to forge a united front for North Korea's denuclearization by further reducing the differences in their approaches.⁹

The United States and South Korea should pursue active policies to garner China's greater cooperation, perhaps via a trilateral strategic dialogue among the three. Perhaps South Korea and China can explore joint projects with North Korea in the special economic zones, such as Rajin-Seonbong and Hwanggeumpyong-Wihwado near the border between North Korea and China. If necessary, China should consider unilateral sanctions such as controlling its oil supply to North Korea. It is also important for South Korea and the United States to coordinate with China in pursuing a 2+2 peace treaty with North Korea.

Japan is another important partner, as already demonstrated, since it too faces a nuclear threat from North Korea. The United States and South Korea must help Japan overcome its domestic pressures resulting from the kidnapping issue, and Japan can help shore up the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence while pursuing bilateral security cooperation against North Korea. Japan can also pursue the transformation of North Korea through joint economic projects. Reparations, mentioned above, accompanied with the normalization of relations between Japan and North Korea can act as economic assistance to the DPRK.

Until North Korea agrees to denuclearization, however, Japan needs to keep pressure on it through sanctions.

Russia can also play a significant role in the global action plan. As it still has significant influence on North Korea, it can contribute to peace on the Korean peninsula by restraining North Korea. Russia has a plan to extend its railroad and gas pipeline to South Korea through North Korea.¹⁰ If arranged properly, this project can encourage North Korea toward international cooperation. Joint economic projects among South Korea, North Korea, Russia, and China can also act as incentives for North Korea to change. At the same time, Russia has to cooperate with other countries in building a system to prevent the outflow of nuclear technology to North Korea while keeping sanctions in place until significant progress is made on denuclearization.

There remains a chance to make serious efforts before the widow of opportunity closes.

A Plan Worth Trying

The goal of denuclearization is certainly hard to obtain. North Korean leaders seem determined to keep developing a robust nuclear deterrent—they believe that nuclear weapons are the only shield they can depend on for their own safety, national security, and economic gains. Reform and opening of the North Korean system also represent potential risks of death if it fails. And both Washington and Seoul, the main outside players, are skeptical about the chances for denuclearization of North Korea, which increases the risks for political leaders to take a bold initiative and makes it less likely.

Nonetheless, there remains a chance to make serious efforts to solve the problem before the widow of opportunity closes. The international community needs to break the vicious cycle of provocation-reward-provocation with North Korea by firmly showing that it will no longer indulge this dynamic. It needs to make North Korean leaders realize that if they continue to resist, they will be forced to change. Pyongyang must see that denuclearization and reform are the only viable choices for their survival, despite the entailed risks which are actually manageable. Any global action plan should be bold enough to demonstrate the great opportunities North Korea would have if they make a strategic choice to become a responsible member of the international community.

The global action plan will require several specific pieces in order to work. It needs international coordination on powerful incentives and pressures, which in turn requires shared goals and intentional cooperation. At this time, we need a

Seoul should take the initiative, but U.S. normalization holds the key to success.

bold and comprehensive approach. This requires the international community to take effective collective action to denuclearize North Korea through a grand bargain, combined with powerful incentives and pressures. Close consultation among South Korea, the United States, and China is especially crucial.

This plan makes strategic sense for all. Significant rewards from the international community will be given only if North Korea makes real progress toward denuclearization. And the whole process for denuclearization should be completed in a comprehensive and compressed way to provide greater and clearer incentives, and to reduce the chance of defection. If this plan succeeds, the North Korean threat will be greatly reduced. Regional stability will significantly increase with the normalization of relations among all former enemies in Northeast Asia. Further, as North Korea becomes more involved in the international community, it will have stronger interest in the existing order, greater strategic flexibility, and chance for change. Thus, the global action plan is worth trying. And given fatigue in other countries, Seoul should take the initiative to start.

Notes

1. South Korea has provided a total of about 5.3 billion dollars in humanitarian assistance to North Korea from 1995 to 2013. See UniKorea [in Korean], <http://www.unikorea.go.kr/content.do?cmsid=1435>; the total amount of assistances to North Korea provided by the United States from 1995 to 2011 is about 1.7 billion dollars. See U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *Foreign Assistance to North Korea*, by Mark Manyin and Mary Beth Nikitin, CRS Report R40095 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, April 2, 2014), pp. 2, 9, <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40095.pdf>; it is estimated that since the early 2000s, China has provided North Korea with assistances of at least 300–400 million dollars per year. See Dongho Jo and Young-sook Nam, *Prospects of China's Political and Economic Changes and the Path Forward For Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation* (Seoul: KIEP, 2013), pp. 52–53; Japan has implemented approximately 1.18 million ton of food aid to North Korea. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan–North Korea Relations,” May 2004, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/relation.html.
2. Steven Lee Myers and Choe Sang-hun, “North Koreans Agree to Freeze Nuclear Work; U.S. to Give Aid,” *New York Times*, February 29, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/01/world/asia/us-says-north-korea-agrees-to-curb-nuclear-work.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
3. ROK Ministry of Unification, “Trust-Building Process on the Korean Peninsula,” September 2013, p. 17.

4. See Joel Wit, Daniel Poneman, and Robert Gallucci, *Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2004), p. 253. For the expressions of interest revealed by Kim Il-sung, Kim Yong Soon, and Kang Sok-ju, see Selig Harrison, *Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 205, 224–225; “Will North Korea and the United State Normalize Relations Without Establishing Liaison Offices?” *Oh My News*, March 7, 2007. For the remarks Kim Gye-kwan made to Henry Kissinger, see “North Korea’s Tightrope Act: Leaning from China to the United States?” *Dong-A Ilbo*, June 23, 2007; Duk-min Yun, “The Next Choice of Kim Jong-il,” *Dong-A Ilbo*, February 27, 2008.
5. ROK Ministry of Unification, “Trust-Building Process on the Korean Peninsula.” *Op. cit.*
6. Jo and Nam, *Prospects of China’s Political and Economic Changes*, p. 42. *Op. cit.*; “Trends of North Korea’s Foreign Trade in 2013,” KOTRA Division of China Business, May 12, 2014.
7. Lingling Wei and Jay Solomon, “China Publicly Cuts Off North Korean Bank,” *The Wall Street Journal*, May 8, 2013, <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323372504578468403543236068>.
8. “China will Resume Oil Export If North Korea Agrees on the Resumption of the Six-Party Talks,” *Yunhap News*, September 14, 2014.
9. See Jackie Calmes and Steven Lee Myers, “U.S. and China Move Closer on North Korea, but Not on Cyberespionage,” *New York Times*, June 8, 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/09/world/asia/obama-and-xi-try-building-a-new-model-for-china-us-ties.html?pagewanted=all>; Jane Perlez, “China and South Korea Affirms Antinuclear Goals,” *New York Times*, July 3, 2014, <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/04/world/asia/presidents-of-china-and-south-korea-reaffirm-push-for-north-korean-denuclearization.html>.
10. Jae-nam Koh, “Prospects for Russia-North Korea Relations during Putin’s Third Term,” IFANS Brief, December 24, 2012.