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The year 2014 will prove crucial for Afghanistan. The presidential elections will shape the country’s political future, both who will govern and how much the process of democratic consolidation will have advanced. On the military front, by the end of the year, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission is expected to withdraw all combat troops from the country. While the United States and other Western countries are planning to stay engaged in Afghanistan after 2014 through the presence of training and counterterrorism forces, in late 2013 and early 2014 the difficulties in finalizing a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) between the United States and Afghan governments led to calls for a “zero option”—a complete departure of all foreign troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2014, leaving the country alone to manage its security, train its armed forces, and fight extremist groups. Against the backdrop of troop withdrawal, Western countries have encouraged Afghanistan’s regional neighbors to find regional solutions to stabilize the country. However, the progress of regional initiatives like the Istanbul Process—a series of meetings of regional countries interested in Afghanistan initiated by Turkey in 2011—has been slow due to tensions and mistrust among regional states and numerous conflicts among key actors in South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East. Among the regional states surrounding Afghanistan, an often overlooked but potentially essential partner for the West is India.1 Over the past years, India has quietly expanded its influence in Afghanistan, becoming its fifth-largest bilateral donor and engaging in a range of major infrastructure and capacity-building projects. In 2011, India was the first country with which Afghanistan signed a strategic partnership agreement. This agreement, however, has not led to a substantial upgrade of India’s engagement in Afghanistan, since New Delhi has been extremely reluctant to cooperate in the field of security. If the West wants to harness the potential of cooperating with India, it needs a better appreciation of India’s engagement and motivations, as well as of New Delhi’s assets and concerns about Afghanistan’s future. India’s Engagement and Its Motivations Since 2001, India has greatly expanded its activities in Afghanistan. While not helping to provide security,2 India has substantially contributed to the country’s reconstruction.3 Overall, India has pledged US$2 billion for Afghanistan, with about half already disbursed. The main projects involve infrastructure,4 including the Delaram-Zaranj highway connecting Afghanistan’s main highway, the Ring Road, to the Iranian border. This will allow easier transport of goods through Afghanistan to the Iranian port of Chabahar, and in whose expansion India is planning to invest.5 This port is expected to play a central role in India’s trade with Afghanistan, especially since it bypasses Pakistan. Partnership with Iran is incredibly valuable to India in this regard—a driving force of India’s Afghanistan policy is the desire for access to Central Asia and its vast energy resources.6 India recognizes Afghanistan’s potential as a bridge and a trade corridor, and has tried to tie Afghanistan more closely to South Asia by promoting its accession to the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) since 2007. At the same time, Indian policymakers are quite aware of the limitations inherent in geography, given India’s lack of direct access to Afghanistan and Pakistan’s obstructionism. Pakistan does not allow Indian goods to be transported to Afghanistan through its territory, while Afghan goods can transit to India according to the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA) of 2010. The Iranian port of Chabahar and good relations with Iran are therefore high priorities for New Delhi: that route is the only realistic option for India to develop reliable commercial ties with Afghanistan and, through it, with Central Asia.7 Further highly visible Indian infrastructure projects in Afghanistan are the parliament building in Kabul, electricity transmission lines for the capital, and the Salma Dam power project in Herat province. Beyond that, the Indian government has been active in providing humanitarian assistance, such as food aid as well as free medical services through “medical missions” set up by India in five Afghan cities. While infrastructure projects account for 42 percent of India’s development cooperation, 25 percent is devoted to government administration expenses, 24 percent to food aid, and only three and two percent to health and education, respectively.8 The largest part of India’s total assistance comes in the form of grants in response to requests by the Afghan government—something Kabul highly appreciates.9 Several capacity-building programs entailing hundreds of scholarships for Afghan students and civil servants round out the picture, making India’s presence highly visible in Afghanistan.10 Beyond development assistance, India has in recent years tried to build up an economic presence in Afghanistan. An Indian consortium led by the state-owned Steel Authority of India won a bid for three iron ore mines at Hajigak, in Bamyan Province.11 Moreover, India agreed to play a leading role in two of the international confidence-building measures (CBMs) agreed upon in 2012 through the Istanbul Process: those on Chambers of Commerce and on Commercial Opportunities.12 In 2012, an international investment summit on Afghanistan took place in Delhi,13 and the Indian government as well as the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) have tried to promote private-sector activities and investment in Afghanistan. (Just to cite an example, FICCI organized a conference on doing business in Afghanistan in November 2013.) This prioritization of economic relations has recently found emphasis in statements by Indian government officials.14 However, due to the still poor security situation in Afghanistan, the interest of the Indian business community has not yet translated into a substantial economic presence of the private sector in Afghanistan. Because of these involvements in Afghanistan and the uncertain security situation there, the Indian foreign policy establishment is still concerned about future events in the country. Since President Obama’s 2009 announcement of the planned withdrawal of ISAF troops, India’s policy circles have intensely debated the future of Afghanistan, with the ghost of the “zero option” further heating up that debate. Indian policymakers and analysts are aware that further instability in Afghanistan would inevitably mean stronger terrorist networks operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan, groups that would almost certainly carry out attacks on Indian territory. The shock of the 2008 terrorist attack in Mumbai still runs deep and has exposed India’s vulnerability to Pakistan-based terrorist groups. India’s declared goal is to have a “strong, united, stable, peaceful and prosperous”15 Afghanistan—something Indian experts describe as the opposite of what Pakistan would want, which is a weak Afghanistan under Pakistan’s influence. The tense relationship with Pakistan plays a dual role in shaping India’s policies in Afghanistan. On one hand, India has a clear, inherent interest in preventing Afghanistan from falling prey to Pakistan and becoming a proxy. On the other hand, the need to avoid provoking Pakistan has played a major role in preventing India from becoming more active in Afghanistan over the past decade. While Pakistan tends to see every Indian move in Afghanistan as a direct threat to its own security,16 from an Indian point of view, irritating Pakistan seems to have become more of a welcome side effect, or as one Indian scholar put it, there is “a lot of Schadenfreude in irritating Pakistan with our investments, but…no intention of railing [the Pakistanis].”17 Over the past years, the Indian government has tried to promote a normalization of relations with nuclear-armed Pakistan and has displayed considerable restraint in dealing with it—despite serious provocations like the Mumbai attacks and sustained calls from the Indian media as well as from hardliners in the security establishment for a tougher stance on Pakistan. Popular Goodwill, but Limited Political Leverage India’s engagement in reconstruction and development activities in Afghanistan has contributed to reinforce an overall positive image of India among the Afghan population. According to an opinion poll conducted in 2010, India was the foreign country of which the Afghans had the most favorable perception— 29 percent of respondents viewed India in “very favorable” terms and 42 percent in “somewhat favorable” terms (compared, for example, to 8 and 43 percent for the United States).18 Indian and Afghan experts highlight the long common history and cultural similarities between the populations of both countries, and love to mention the Kabuliwala, a famous story by Bengali poet Rabindranath Tagore that deals with an Afghan merchant based in Calcutta. Despite the close cultural ties and India’s positive image among the Afghan population, India has only been able to make limited use of its huge potential influence. This is related, first of all, to the gap between the expectations of the Afghan government and New Delhi’s ability as well as willingness to meet them. The signing of the 2011 strategic partnership agreement seemed to herald a major shift in India’s policy, from an attitude of restraint on security matters and an exclusive focus on development to a greater security engagement. Besides a range of other measures, in fact, the agreement envisages India’s assistance in “training, equipping and capacity building programmes for Afghan National Security Forces.”19 However, India has been extremely hesitant in contributing to the provision of security in Afghanistan. It is certainly true that around 1,000–1,500 Afghan soldiers are trained in India—not on Afghan soil—every year, and an additional 200 ANSF officers receive training at India’s National Defense Academy. Moreover, India has provided or agreed to provide some logistic equipment— helicopters, among other things—to the Afghan armed forces, but it has refused to provide weapons.20 Nevertheless, President Karzai has repeatedly visited New Delhi over the past years, bringing his “wish lists” that reportedly included all kinds of items, from tanks to artillery and attack helicopters, but regularly leaving empty-handed or with commitments not fulfilling his expectation.21 Indian government officials argue that India simply does not have the capabilities to provide Karzai what he wants, but India’s constant balancing between the need to not provoke Pakistan and the desire to support Afghanistan is a more likely explanation. In Afghanistan, some scholars view India’s reluctance critically. As an Afghan diplomat put it, “We have asked India to play a more active role, [to change] from a donating friend to a strategic friend [but the Indians] are taking their time.”22 In a recent development, according to news reports, India and Russia reached an agreement in April 2014 in which India will pay for the provision of Russian weapons to Afghanistan. The agreement reportedly concerns the provision of light artillery and mortars, support to restart an old weapons factory near Kabul, and possibly refitting old Soviet military equipment.23 For India, itself a large importer of Russian weapons, this cooperation would have several advantages. This includes a low visibility of India’s military aid, which will allow New Delhi to keep its image as a primarily developmental partner and avoid the embarrassment of potentially having Indian-made weapons fall into the hands of militants.24 While we can expect that the new Indian government will proceed with the implementation of the agreement, at the time of this writing it is too early to assess its impact since so little is known about its actual scope. India has other problems in harnessing its soft power potential. For instance, the Indian government has relatively limited influence on Afghanistan’s domestic political actors. Karzai, who did his postgraduate studies in the north Indian town of Shimla, and has long been portrayed as a close friend of India, has frequently proved to be an erratic partner. Karzai’s ambivalent attitude toward Pakistan and his efforts to hold peace talks with the Taliban have been of particular concern to India. With the end of the Karzai era, New Delhi might face even greater difficulties in making its voice heard in Kabul. While India keeps emphasizing the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention, both the past and present contain numerous examples of India entangling itself in the domestic affairs of South Asian countries.25 Another reason for India’s limited influence on Afghan politics is that the oft-cited close historical and cultural links with Afghanistan might be more tenuous than assumed. Over the decades, India lost its contacts and influence among the Pashtuns, the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan. Together with Iran, Russia, and Tajikistan, it supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban in the late 1990’s, thereby expanding its support base among the non-Pashtun population. According to my interviews with Indian experts and foreign observers in New Delhi, India has over the past few years tried to build up linkages to all political forces and social groups in Afghanistan, including non-Taliban Pashtuns. In order to reach out to the Pashtun population, India has carried out several of its small grassroot development projects in the predominantly Pashtun south and east of Afghanistan.26 As a result of these initiatives, India is nowadays considered to be better off than in the 1990s in terms of its networks in Afghanistan. However, these contacts do not reportedly run deep. The goodwill among the population is still in place, but it does not necessarily extend to the elites. As one Indian businessman active in Afghanistan told me, “What’s the goodwill of the Afghans for India for? It’s not useful for them, nor [is it] for us.”27 Many Worst-Case Scenarios, No Contingency Plans Ahead of the end of the ISAF combat mission, Indians have debated the situation in Afghanistan and its possible implications for India, generally developing a broad range of scenarios, all of which are perceived to be potentially harmful to India.28 The most pessimistic observers believe that “the worst is yet to come in Afghanistan. The true face of Islamist terrorism is yet to come.”29 They foresee a rapid deterioration of the security situation and a spread of terrorist networks supported by Pakistan and linked to al-Qaeda, in a context of political fragmentation and low-to-nonexistent state capacity.30 Others consider Taliban takeover or, more generally, the formation of a fundamentalist Sunni regime to be the worst-case scenario, even though few believe that the Taliban could regain control over the whole country in the near future. Some anti-Pakistan hardliners in the Indian establishment even point out that a return of the Taliban would prove more detrimental to Pakistan than to India itself: since a return would destabilize Pakistan in the first place and keep Pakistan’s security forces busy, it would not be an immediate reason to worry for New Delhi. But these are rather isolated views. Indian government officials are much more optimistic about the future of Afghanistan. They argue that Afghan troops are doing a good job and will be able to handle the situation in the coming years—provided that the international community stays engaged and continues to support the Afghan security forces with weapons and money.31 What worries Indian government officials most is an inordinate and hasty withdrawal, and possibly a fading interest and commitment on the part of the United States and other international actors during the “transformation decade.” A lack of international commitment would force India to enter the fray itself to protect its huge investments and interests in country. In this case, again, India would face serious limitations to its room to manoeuver for several reasons. In fact, the only point on which almost everybody in the Indian strategic community agrees is the “no boots on the ground” principle for Afghanistan. The memory of the dismal failure of India’s peacekeeping mission in Sri Lanka is still alive: after three years of useless fighting, India had to withdraw its troops in 1990, and one year later the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) killed former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in a suicide attack as vengeance for the peacekeeping mission. India’s own traditional stand on non-intervention, which has guided Indian foreign policy since the times of the country’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, is often used as justification for not getting militarily engaged in Afghanistan.32 The historical as well as current examples of external powers becoming militarily entangled in Afghanistan are further deterrents that make the dispatch of Indian troops to Afghanistan entirely unlikely. Moreover, India is aware that any new foreign intervention would provoke strong opposition among the Afghan population and elites, thereby undermining any advantages India has built up in popular goodwill. Even though members of the Indian strategic community know that India will need to step up its provision of training if international support fades, India’s approach continues to be reluctant.33 During President Karzai’s visits in May and December 2013, India did make some concessions, like increasing the numbers of Afghan soldiers trained in India,34 but any more extensive security engagement would most likely meet huge domestic opposition in India. The recent agreement on India’s payments for Russian weapons supplies to Afghanistan is certainly an indicator of a new willingness on the part of New Delhi to contribute to the strengthening of Afghan security forces. It also reveals, however, India’s reluctance to engage directly and more actively. Among the possible scenarios for post-2014 Afghanistan’s stability, the more optimistic ones foresee a continuation of the status quo. According to some analysts, the exit of ISAF troops could even have positive side-effects for India since it would reduce Pakistan’s leverage on the United States, and would provide New Delhi with a window of opportunity to expand its role in Afghanistan and contribute to the country’s stabilization—if a friendly president is elected.35 But even the most positive scenarios entail dangers for India. If the absence of foreign troops deprived Islamic extremists of their raison d’être, extremists would most probably seek new targets—and find them in India. According to Indian government officials, there are already first indications of battle-hardened Jihadis moving from Afghanistan to Kashmir to fight the Indian state.36 While it is too early to say which scenario will materialize in Afghanistan, the Indian government does not seem to have developed any serious contingency plans to deal with a possible deterioration of the situation in Afghanistan after 2014. This was not just related to the weakness of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) coalition in India, who formed the government between 2004 and 2014, but reflects a more general “status quo-ist” attitude in Indian foreign policy. When asked about the development of any contingency plans on the part of their government, most experts interviewed in 2013 answered that they did not know of any, except perhaps the evacuation of “India’s friends”—that is, of members of the Afghan elite that had been close to the Indian government. In other words, “[t]here is a complete bankruptcy of ideas in the government of India on contingency plans.”37 On the peace process in Afghanistan and any reconciliation with the Taliban, India has also been reluctant. Initially, Delhi was totally opposed to any kind of talks, arguing that finding a distinction between “good” and “bad” Taliban was impossible. This attitude slowly shifted as India realized that it was being increasingly marginalized by the international community. The current position is that India supports “an Afghan led, Afghan owned, and Afghan controlled process that will help reconcile and mainstream members of armed opposition groups,” if these are ready to give up terrorist tactics and to accept the Afghan constitution.38 Beyond that, however, Indian policymakers are skeptical. In particular, they are afraid that making concessions to the Taliban would undermine the democratic progress that has been so painfully achieved in Afghanistan over the past decade. Moreover, they consider the U.S. approach to negotiations as too simplistic given the difficulties in identifying the right interlocutors in Afghanistan. Today’s Taliban are mostly described as hard to define, or as “a generic term describing proxies from Pakistan,”39 while other groups like the Haqqani Network do equally represent a major problem. India itself has therefore not contributed to initiatives aimed at promoting reconciliation in Afghanistan. In November 2013, former Taliban leader Abdul Salam Zaeef was invited to a conference in Goa that was attended, among others, by India’s Finance Minister P. Chidambaram. For some Indian analysts, this revealed a new readiness on the part of India to talk to at least former Taliban—or even an indication of possible broader backchannel communication between India and Afghan insurgents.40 At the same time, the outcry that Zaeef’s presence in Goa provoked among Indian commentators reveals India’s uneasiness with negotiations and its reluctance to engage more in this field.41 Can India Help in Afghanistan? Why then is India—this reluctant, status quo-oriented, inward-looking South Asian giant—a potentially important partner for the West in Afghanistan? And what would the West need to do to induce India to cooperate? First of all, and quite simply, India’s goals for Afghanistan are broadly the same as those of the international community. India has a genuine interest in transforming Afghanistan into a stable country with strong institutions able to prevent the spread of terrorist networks. Beyond that, India would obviously favor a democratic regime in Kabul, but has more limited expectations than the West on the actual features of this regime. Secondly, India enjoys a positive image among the Afghan population, even though its political influence is still limited. This could change if New Delhi displayed a greater readiness to fulfill some of the Afghan government’s wishes— and there are first indications that this is happening, for example through increased training and possible support for the provision of Russian weapons. Finally, India has the potential to play a leading role in more successful attempts to find “regional solutions” for Afghanistan. These could be of a commercial nature, for example through improved trade and infrastructure links, or of a political nature, including better coordination in the fight against terrorism or a more substantial inclusion of Afghanistan in regional organizations. Of course, the potential for Indian involvement in any regional solution remains just that—potential—since Pakistan always looms large and is clearly opposed to any form of stronger Indian engagement. At the same time, India has the unique advantage of having good relations with all the other relevant countries: it has always had an excellent relationship with Russia, and it has, to different degrees, expanded its ties to the Central Asian states (Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan). Even China, which has huge investments but no political role in Afghanistan, has approached India to talk about the developments in Afghanistan, despite the generally tense bilateral relations between Beijing and New Delhi.42 More than this, India has become a trusted partner of the West, thanks to its solid democratic credentials, and has substantially strengthened its ties to the United States with the signing of the 2008 nuclear deal. In a fine balancing act, India has even maintained good relations with Iran despite pressure from the United States. That India is seeking to cooperate more closely with Iran on Afghanistan is no wonder: Iran is the only viable access for India to Afghanistan and, by extension, to Central Asia. And while the Islamic Republic might look suspicious to some convinced secularist Indians, Iran’s claims that international isolation toward it is unjust does not fall on deaf ears in India. The new openness to dialogue with the United States by Iranian President Hassan Rouhani was met with great relief in India, since it enables New Delhi to more easily handle relations with both the United States and Iran. New Delhi is not interested in challenging the United States on issues like relations with Tehran, but it does have a genuine need for cooperation with Tehran, both in terms of oil imports and its Afghanistan policy. In its search for regional partners to help stabilize Afghanistan, the West should therefore consider India. But it would need to recognize and take into account India’s perceptions and its disillusionment with past Western policies. In fact, India’s reluctance to engage in Afghanistan stems not only from its own fear of provoking regional neighbors, but also from the pressure exercised on New Delhi by the United States over the past decade. Washington, which was highly dependent on Pakistan’s support for its operations in Afghanistan after 9/11, listened to Pakistan’s objections and forwarded them to New Delhi. In a nutshell, the United States prevented India from playing a more active role in Afghanistan in order not to alienate Pakistan.43 The Indian strategic community is deeply disaffected with Washington’s attitudes toward Pakistan—or as one retired diplomat put it, its “love affair” with Pakistan.44 The impression prevails that Pakistan has a power to veto any Western decision on Afghanistan, and that Islamabad has been blackmailing the United States for years. In the context of ISAF withdrawal, Pakistan’s cooperation is particularly important for Washington since the land route to Pakistan’s port of Karachi is the cheapest route out of Afghanistan—and it might become even more important if U.S.–Russia relations further deteriorate over the Ukraine crisis and make the Northern Distribution Network, which depends on Russia’s cooperation, impractical.45 More generally, the United States seem to have no exit option from their traditional policy of support and funding for Pakistan since an interruption of assistance would dangerously destabilize Pakistan and the whole region.46 All this has led to deep disenchantment in India, and New Delhi feels that in the context of ISAF withdrawal the West has only increased its tolerance toward Pakistan. Beyond accusations and disaffection with Western policies, Indian decision-makers are simply puzzled by Washington’s oscillating attitude—which over the past years has entailed a rapprochement with New Delhi and even calls for deeper Indian involvement in Afghanistan, at the same time as it has become continuously more reliant on Pakistan. In short, a great confusion about Western diplomatic strategy and tactics reigns in New Delhi.47 Integrating Indian Cooperation Thus, if the West wants to engage India and to gently prod it toward taking a more cooperative role in regional solutions for Afghanistan, the United States will need to take a clear stance on relations with Pakistan. This does not necessarily mean stopping aid flows or cutting off ties with Pakistan, which are entirely unrealistic options. It could mean, however, taking a tougher stance on Pakistan’s support for extremist groups or, at a minimum, limiting Pakistan’s influence on Washington’s policies and positions on South Asian affairs. A more consistent approach of this kind would help reassure India. Moreover, the West will have to understand the deep security concerns that India is facing. The threat of terrorism is real, and Afghanistan is just a few hundred kilometers away from New Delhi. Initiatives like the January 2014 meeting between representatives of U.S. and Indian intelligence services—where members of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence’s office met with India’s Joint Intelligence Council chief to talk about the situation in Afghanistan—are important steps in the right direction.48 India’s reactions to past episodes, in which it was sidelined by the international community on issues related to Afghanistan, such as at the 2010 London conference, reveal the sensitivity of Indian policymakers and commentators.49 India wants to be taken seriously, and can only be convinced to cooperate if it is given a say. Finally, the West should realize that India’s desire to cooperate with Iran does not stem from balancing ambitions, but from the desperate needs of a huge energy-hungry country. If India could be convinced that this can help it increase its international profile, the United States might even think about letting India play some intermediary role between itself and Iran on Afghanistan. Breaking India’s reluctance will require a lot of cajoling and persuasion, but it could be worth the effort. Notes 1. The field research for this paper was carried out in New Delhi in October–November 2013 and is informed by previous fieldwork in 2008 and 2009. 2. This is frequently perceived as free-riding. See C. Christine Fair, “Under the Shrinking U.S. Security Umbrella: India’s End Game in Afghanistan?” The Washington Quarterly 34, no. 2 (Spring 2011): pp. 179–192. 3. For more extensive accounts of India’s engagement and interests in Afghanistan, see C. Christine Fair, “Securing Indian Interests in Afghanistan Beyond 2014,” Asia Policy 17 (January 2014): pp. 27–32; Jorge Heine and Partha Ghosh, “The Elephant in the War: India and the Afghan-Pakistan Link,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 17, no. 1 (March 2011): pp. 50–61; Harsh V. Pant, India’s Changing Afghanistan Policy: Regional and Global Implications (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2012); Gautam Mukhopadhaya, “India,” in: Ashley J. Tellis and Aroop Mukharji (eds), Is a Regional Strategy Viable in Afghanistan? (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010), pp. 27–38. 4. On India’s development cooperation, see Indian Development Cooperation Research, “IDCR Report: The State of Indian Development Cooperation,” Centre for Policy Research (Fall 2013). See also Gareth Price, “India’s Policy Towards Afghanistan,” Asia ASP 2013/04 (London: Chatham House, 2013), http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Asia/0813pp_indiaafghanistan.pdf. 5. For more details on Chabahar port, see Aryaman Bhatnagar and Divya John, “Accessing Afghanistan and Central Asia: Importance of Chabahar to India,” (New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation, 2013), http://orfonline.org/cms/export/orfonline/modules/issuebrief/attachments/specialreport4_1383913002765.pdf. 6. See K.M. Sethi, “India’s `Connect Central Asia Policy’,” The Diplomat, December 13, 2013, http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/indias-connect-central-asia-policy/. 7. See Meena Singh Roy, “India and Iran Relations: Sustaining the Momentum,” Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), 2013, http://www.idsa.in/issuebrief/India-IranRelations_msroy_200513. 8. See Rani D. Mullen, “The India-Afghanistan Partnership,” Centre for Policy Research, May 16, 2013, http://idcr.cprindia.org/blog/india-afghanistan-partnership. 9. Author interview with Afghan diplomat, New Delhi, November 27, 2013. 10. See Rani D. Mullen, “The India-Afghanistan Partnership.”. 11. See “Afghanistan allows SAIL-led team to develop Hajigak assets in phases,” The Hindu, August 23, 2013, http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-business/afghanistan-allows-sailled-team-to-develop-hajigak-assets-in-phases/article5050616.ece. 12. See Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, “Doing Business with Afghanistan: Harnessing Afghanistan’s Economic Potential,” United Nations, December 13, 2013, http://sswa.escap.asia/resources/doing-business-afghanistanharnessing-afghanistan %E2%80%99s-economic-potential-november-2013. 13. “Delhi Investment Summit on Afghanistan,” June 28, 2012, at Hotel Taj Palace, New Delhi, http://dsafghan.in/. 14. See Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, “Speech by External Affairs Minister at the meeting of International Contact Group (ICG) on Afghanistan in New Delhi,” http://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/22755/Speech+by+External+Affairs+Minister+at+the+meeting+of+International+Contact+Group+ICG +on+Afghanistan+in+New+Delhi. 15. Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, “Visit of President of Afghanistan to India, December 12–15, 2013,” http://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/22648/Visit+of+President+of+Afghanistan+to+India+December+1215+2013. 16. And, in fact, there are indications that India’s engagement in Afghanistan might not be entirely benign. See Fair, “Under the Shrinking U.S. Security Umbrella.” 17. Author interview, New Delhi, November 26, 2013. 18. See Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR), for ABC News, BBC and ARD, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/11_01_10_afghan poll.pdf. 19. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “Agreement on Strategic Partnership between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Republic of India,” http://mfa.gov.af/en/news/3867. 20. Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “India promises military helicopters to Hamid Karzai,” The Economic Times, December 14, 2013, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/ 2013-12-14/news/45191145_1_karzai-and-singh-bsa-afghanistan. 21. See Praveen Swami, “Karzai to renew request for lethal military aid from India,” The Hindu, December 10, 2013, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/karzai-to-renew-request-for-lethal-military-aid-from-india/article5444871.ece; Arvind Gupta and Ashok K. Behuria, “President Karzai’s visit to India: Leveraging Strategic Partnership,” Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, IDSA Comment, May 23, 2013, http://idsa.in/idsacomments/PresidentKarzaisvisittoIndia_agupta_230513; Indrani Bagchi, “Wary of Pakistan, India hesitant over Karzai wish list for military hardware,” The Times of India, May 23, 2013, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Wary-of-Pakistan-India-hesitant-over-Karzai-wish-list-for-military-hardware/articleshow/20225781.cms; Sanjeev Miglani, “India turns to Russia to help supply arms to Afghan forces,” Reuters, April 30, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/30/us-india-afghanistan-arms-idUSBREA3T0 J320140430. 22. Confidential author interview, New Delhi, November 27, 2013. 23. See Miglani, “India turns to Russia.” Op. cit. For a criticism from a Pakistani perspective, see Ahmed Rashid, “Viewpoint: India risks destabilising Afghanistan,” BBC News Asia, May 6, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-27258566. 24. See Kabir Taneja, “From Delhi to Kabul, Via Moscow,” The Diplomat, March 1, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/from-delhi-to-kabul-via-moscow/. 25. On India’s role in Nepal see, for example, Sandra Destradi, Indian Foreign and Security Policy: Regional Power Strategies (Abingdon/New York: Routledge, 2012), pp.107–117. 26. Author interview with Indian scholar, November 26, 2013. According to a survey, Afghan respondents identified India as a donor country most frequently in the east, southwest, and southeast of the country. See Afghanistan in 2012: A Survey of the Afghan People (The Asia Foundation, 2012), http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/Surveybook2012web1.pdf, pp. 78–80. 27. Author interview, New Delhi, November 8, 2013. 28. For an excellent overview of different positions, see “Afghanistan Post 2014: India’s Options,” Indian Foreign Affairs Journal 8, no. 3 (July-September 2013): pp. 239–291. 29. Author interview with Indian scholar, New Delhi, November 12, 2013. 30. For different negative scenarios, see Satish Chandra, “Coping with Afghanistan’s Uncertain Future,” Indian Foreign Affairs Journal 8, no. 3 (2013): pp. 242–247. 31. Author interviews with government officials, New Delhi, November 2013. 32. Author interviews, New Delhi, October-November 2013. On the ambivalence in India’s attitude towards non-intervention, see C. Raja Mohan, “India, Lybia and the principle of non-intervention,” ISAS Insights, no. 122, April 13, 2011. 33. See Harsh V. Pant, “India’s shambolic Afghan policy,” The Japan Times, January 14, 2014, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2014/01/14/commentary/indias-shambolic-afghan-policy/#.Uu_NnbQ5vHo. 34. The numbers were stepped up from less than 600 soldiers in 2012/13 to over 1,000 in 2013/14. See Rajat Pandit, “US exit: India steps up Afghan army training,” The Times of India, July 13, 2013, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-07-13/india/40553601_1_indian-army-russian-origin-mi-35-helicopter-gunships-afghan-national-army. 35. Author interview with Indian expert, New Delhi, October 18, 2013. 36. Author interview, New Delhi, November 26, 2013. 37. Author interview with Indian scholar, New Delhi, November 26, 2013. 38. Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, “Speech by External Affairs Minister.” Op. cit. 39. Author interview with Indian government official, New Delhi, November 26, 2013. 40. Author interview with Indian expert, New Delhi, November 15, 2013. 41. See, for example, Brahma Chellaney, “Chidambaram meeting Taliban leader shows India hasn’t learnt from its mistakes,” The Economic Times, November 14, 2013, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-11-14/news/44075501_1_taliban-mullah-abdul-salam-zaeef-pakistan-pm. 42. See Harsh V. Pant, “China Reaches Out to India on Afghanistan,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS Issue Perspective 3, no. 2, http://csis.org/files/publication/130503_ChinaReachesouttoindia.pdf. 43. See Sumit Ganguly, “India’s Role in Afghanistan,” Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB), Policy Research Project, 2012. 44. Author interview, New Delhi, November 20, 2013. 45. See Ankit Panda, “How Ukraine spillover could complicate the US withdrawal from Afghanistan,” The Diplomat, March 6, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/how-ukraine-spillover-could-complicate-the-us-withdrawal-from-afghanistan/. 46. See Daniel S. Markey, No Exit from Pakistan: America’s Tortured Relationship with Islamabad (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 47. See, for example, “`India crucial for economic future of Afghanistan’,” The Hindustan Times, February 27, 2013, http://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/india-crucial-for-economic-future-of-afghanistan/article1-1018088.aspx. 48. See Praveen Swami, “Intelligence meet breaks India-US diplomatic ice,” The Hindu, January 14, 2014, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/intelligence-meet-breaks-indiaus-diplomatic-ice/article5575348.ece. 49. See Arvind Gupta, “The London Conference: It is time for India to reassess its Afghan Policy,” IDSA Commentary, February 1, 2010, http://idsa.in/idsacomments/TheLondonConferenceItistimeforIndiatoreassessitsAfghanPolicy_agupta_010210; Sandeep Dikshit, “U.K. allays Indian fears over Taliban,” The Hindu, February 16, 2013, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/uk-allays-indian-fears-over-taliban/article4419783.ece.