CIAO DATE: 10/2013
Volume: 36, Issue: 3
Summer 2013
Drone Wars (PDF)
Peter Bergen, Jennifer Rowland
At the National Defense University (NDU) on May 23, 2013, President Barack Obama gave a major speech about terrorismarguing that the time has come to redefine the kind of conflict that the United States has been engaged in since the 9/11 attacks. Obama asserted that ‘‘[w]e must define the nature and scope of this struggle, or else it will define us.’’1 Thus, the President focused part of his speech on the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), which Congress had passed days after 9/11 and which gave President George W. Bush the authority to go to war in Afghanistan against al-Qaeda and its Taliban allies. Few in Congress who voted for this authorization understood that they were voting for what has become the United States’ longest war, one that has expanded in recent years to countries such as Pakistan and Yemen.
Bringing Them All Back Home? Dollar Diminution and U.S. Power (PDF)
Jonathan Kirshner
U.S. power is facing new macroeconomic constraints. They derive from a basic and generally underappreciated shift in U.S. engagement with the global macroeconomic order, which also complicates international politics. Since before WWII, the international monetary and financial system had served to enhance U.S. power and capabilities in its relations with other states. From the turn of the twenty-/first century, however, underlying economic problems threatened to turn this traditional (if implicit) source of strength into a chronic weakness. The 2007—/08 global financial crisis has increased this risk. The United States will likely face new constraints on its power from the crisis and from new complications managing the dollar as a global currency. Moreover, the unfamiliarity of U.S. elites and citizens in facing such constraints will play a crucial role in determining how severe they will be in practice.
Leading on the Cheap? French Security Policy in Austerity (PDF)
Bruno Tertrais
Who would have predicted in early 2011Ñ/just before the Libya operation was decidedÑ/that cash-/strapped, inwardly-/focused, soul-/searching France would embark over the next two years on a flurry of military operations and bold strategic moves? These included a de facto regime change in Libya, ousting former President Gbagbo in Ivory Coast, recapturing Northern Mali and destroying a jihadist sanctuary, and supporting the Free Syrian Army, not to mention other minor operations such as reinforcing its presence in the Central African Republic. Even in France, many of those who supported continuing a strong interventionist policy were surprised. How can one explain this phenomenon? Can France really afford to remain a global power at a time when the Hollande administration is imposing some of the heaviest cuts ever in budgetary expenses?
Is Hamas Winning? (PDF)
Daniel Byman
Hamas members are ‘‘ants,’’ declared Yasser Arafat, the father and long-/time leader of the Palestinian national movement, during a private speech in 1990. Its cadre, he went on, should cower in their holes lest they be crushed by Arafat’s Fatah forces.1 Arafat’s swagger seemed justified. Fatah had ruled the roost for decades, and after Hamas emerged in December 1987 as the first intifada erupted, the Islamist organization was on the ropes. After a few unimpressive attacks, Israel had quickly arrested over 1,000 Hamas members, including its top leadership.2 In 1989, less than three percent of Palestinians in Gaza, where Hamas would later prove strongest, supported the organization.3 Journalist Zaki Chehab claimed Hamas’ military wing only had twenty machine guns as the intifada wound down.4 Fatah, it seemed, would remain the dominant force in the Palestinian National Movement.
The Sum of all Fears: Israel's Perception of a Nuclear-Armed Iran (PDF)
Ehud Eiran, Martin B. Malin
Thucydides’ ancient logic still governs: uncertainty (over Iran’s nuclear intentions) and the fear this inspires (in Israel) increases the risk of another war (in the Middle East). Even if Israel’s response to the Iranian nuclear program does not lead the region into a war, Israel’s fears will be crucial in shaping Middle Eastern politics and will help to determine the stability of the region in the years ahead.
The BRICS Fallacy (PDF)
Harsh V. Pant
The term BRICSÑ/referring to the association of emerging economies of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South AfricaÑ/dominated the headlines in March 2013 as Durban hosted the annual group summit. South African President Jacob Zuma suggested that the nascent organization’s leadership has ‘‘firmly established BRICS as a credible and constructive grouping in our quest to forge a new paradigm of global relations and cooperation.’’1 The meeting resulted in a much-/hyped proposal to create a joint BRICS development bank that would finance investments in developing nations.
Will Scotland Sink the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent? (PDF)
William Walker, Malcolm Chalmers
For over sixty years, the possession of nuclear weapons and practice of nuclear deterrence have been important to the United Kingdom’s defense policy, self-image, and international standing. It was a partner in the Manhattan Project and had acquired its own weapons by the mid-1950s, its program thereafter assisted by cooperation agreements with the United States. Its nuclear capability has long been assigned to the NATO alliance, and it is one of the five nuclear weapon states recognized by the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Double Trouble: A Realist View of Rising Chinese and Indian Power (PDF)
Eric Heginbotham, George J. Gilboy
Washington sees Indian power as part of the solution to the challenges posed by the rise of China. But an objective assessment of Chinese and Indian national interests and international actions suggests it is far more likely that each will pose significant challenges to U.S. interests, albeit of different kinds. India will be no less likely than China to pursue vigorously its own interests, many of which run counter to those of the United States, simply because it is a democracy.
Five Myths about India's Nuclear Posture (PDF)
Vipin Narang
For a democracy that otherwise leaks secrets like a sieve, India’s entire nuclear journey has been shrouded in remarkable secrecy. It is therefore unsurprising that India has closely guarded the details of its nuclear posture since it became an overt nuclear weapons state in 1998. For a relatively mature democracy with a vibrant political culture, the level of opacity surrounding India’s nuclear posture is extraordinary, and held tightly by just a handful of senior civilian officials, scientists, and officers in a dedicated Strategic Forces Command (SFC). Widely held conventional wisdoms about the nature and disposition of India’s nuclear postureÑ/its forces, deployment patterns, and envisioned employment modesÑ/date back to authoritative studies from the early and mid-/2000s by Ashley Tellis, George Perkovich, Bharat Karnad, and Rajesh Basrur.1 The core of these precepts is that, first, India’s nuclear posture and doctrine are driven by an aim of ‘‘building and maintaining a credible minimum deterrent’’;2 second, India keeps its forces in a disassembled state to maximize safety and civilian control;3 and third, India has an unequivocal no-/ first-/use policy, meaning a pledge to only use nuclear weapons in retaliation for nuclear use against India.4
Pakistan and Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Déjà Vu? (PDF)
Shashank Joshi
In October last year, the world marked the fiftieth anniversary of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. But for policymakers in South Asia, the commemoration was less a cautionary tale than an occasion for self-/satisfaction. When India and Pakistan conducted nuclear weapons tests in 1998, they received near-/universal condemnation, even from established allies. They were warned thatÑ/as poor countries with weak institutions and small, vulnerable arsenalsÑ/ dangerous instability would plague their nuclear relationship.1 Nascent nuclear powers were simply less reliable stewards than their Cold War counterparts.