CIAO DATE: 04/2012
Volume: 35, Issue: 2
Spring 2012
The 21st Century Force Multiplier: Public–Private Collaboration (PDF)
Evelyn Farkas, James Stavridis
For about the last decade, the U.S. government has been recruiting private business and non-profit collaborators to volunteer expertise, exchange information, and even operate together to enhance national security, provide humanitarian assistance, or promote economic development around the world. The main objective of such collaboration is to improve effectiveness. The federal government has worked to harness expertise it doesn’t have—in the cyber arena, for example, by working with industry experts to help the U.S. government, its NATO allies, and the business community itself improve their cyber defenses. In the development field, Uncle Sam tapped into the operational experience of multinational businesses to bring clean water to poor communities in developing countries. With the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) leading the way, the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, and State, among others, have been steadily increasing collaboration with private entities. Indeed, the most recent National Security Strategy calls on the executive branch to work with the private sector, repeatedly referring to public–private partnerships.
Transparent, fair relationships between the government and private sector entities can harness non-governmental know-how, resources, and patriotism to help address the complex national security and foreign policy challenges of the day. To be most effective, however, the government needs to decide where it needs private sector assistance most and focus on those areas. It will also have to work to clarify the legal, regulatory, and policy parameters of such interactions. Agencies will need to improve the internal processes for organizing and implementing public–private collaboration. Finally, measures of effectiveness will need to be developed, improved, and used to inform ongoing efforts. If these tasks are accomplished, public–private collaboration can be a particularly timely variant on decades-long efforts to improve the functioning of the U.S. military and government agencies.
How to Deter Terrorism (PDF)
Matthew Kroenig, Barry Pavel
For more than 50 years during the Cold War, deterrence was a cornerstone of U.S. strategy. The United States aimed to prevent the Soviet Union from attacking the West by threatening to retaliate with a devastating nuclear response. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, however, many observers argued that deterrence was irrelevant to the U.S.-led war on terror. Analysts claimed that unlike the Soviet Union’s leadership, terrorists were irrational, willing to incur any cost (including death) to achieve their goals, and would be difficult to locate following an attack. For these reasons and others, it was thought that threats to retaliate against terrorists would be inherently incredible and insufficient to deter terrorist action.
These early views shaped the U.S. government’s initial strategy to address the terrorist threat. The deterrence approach remains a poorly understood and underutilized element of U.S. counterterrorism strategy. It holds, however, great potential for helping to thwart future terrorist attacks. We argue that, unlike in state-to-state deterrence, deterrence against terrorism can only be partially successful, and that it will always be a component—and never a cornerstone—of national policy. Nevertheless, as long as states can deter some terrorists from engaging in certain types of terrorist activity, deterrence should be an essential element of a broader counterterrorism strategy.
Bombs Away? Being Realistic about Deep Nuclear Reductions (PDF)
James Acton
There are about 22,000 nuclear warheads in the world today. Reducing that number—eventually to zero—is a major element of U.S. President Barack Obama’s foreign policy. To date, his administration’s progress toward this goal has been modest, even with agreement on a new round of U.S.–Russian cuts with the New START treaty. Nonetheless, opponents of his agenda, particularly in Congress, worry that any further arms control will pitch the United States down a slippery slope toward zero. Simultaneously, supporters increasingly complain that Obama has not been bold enough. Their frustration, which is felt in capitals across the world, risks compromising the willingness of key states to support important U.S. foreign policy objectives, especially those related to nonproliferation.
Neither these fears nor these frustrations are fair. Skeptics and supporters tend to ignore the practical realities of deep reductions. Nuclear-armed states will only agree to deep reductions if at least three demanding conditions are met: arms build-ups in China, India, and Pakistan must be stabilized; nuclear-armed states—especially Russia and China—will have to be convinced that arms control will not undermine the survivability of their nuclear forces; and nuclear-armed states will have to be satisfied that reductions will not exacerbate existing imbalances in conventional forces.
To Keep the Peace with Iran, Threaten to Strike (PDF)
Michael Singh
While Iran’s nuclear program has been on America’s foreign policy agenda for the last twenty-plus years, one gets the unmistakable feeling that the issue is finally coming to a head. After several years of slowly ratcheting up sanctions while seeking to shield the Iranian people and their own economies from harm, the United States and the European Union have gone for the economic jugular by targeting Iranian oil exports. On December 31, 2011, President Obama signed into law sanctions, passed overwhelmingly by the U.S. Congress, that impose penalties on any foreign bank—including any central bank—that conducts petroleum transactions with Iran. The European Union took an even more dramatic step, imposing an embargo on the purchase of Iranian oil by its member states.
With these sanctions, the decades-old conflict between Iran and the West has entered a new and more dangerous phase in 2012. The Iranian regime’s immediate reaction to the new U.S. sanctions was to threaten to close the Strait of Hormuz, through which much of the world’s oil passes and upon whose safe operation global oil prices, and thus the global economy, depend. That Iran would be driven to such threats is predictable. Oil exports comprise about 65 percent of its budget revenues, and the new measures—much more than previous sanctions—threaten the regime’s economic foundation. With their bellicose rhetoric, Iranian leaders are telling the West that they are able to repay any economic pain inflicted upon Iran. They are also, however, revealing their anxiety about the new sanctions.
So will these new, robust sanctions be the means by which the United States finally achieves its goals of compelling Iran to suspend its enrichment of uranium and enter into serious talks aimed at quelling international concerns over Tehran’s nuclear activities? Despite Iran’s on-again, off-again talks with the so-called P5+1 powers— China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States as well as Germany—the United States currently seems unlikely to meet these goals. It is not merely the toughness of sanctions or the sincerity of American overtures that will determine the outcome of U.S. efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Rather, success depends on whether key allies—notably China and Israel—deem supporting the U.S. approach to advance their national interests, and whether Iran sees continuing its confrontational policies as potentially disastrous to its own. The current U.S. strategy is therefore incomplete. To achieve its goals, the United States must clearly articulate what its red lines are in terms of Iranian behavior and credibly threaten Iran with military action should it cross those lines.
The Real Problem in U.S.-Israeli Relations (PDF)
Dov Waxman
Of all the foreign relationships of the United States, perhaps none is as closely watched and incessantly scrutinized as its relationship with Israel. Like a couple in counseling, U.S.–Israeli relations are the subject of endless analysis. Both supporters and critics are forever on the lookout for the slightest signs of tension or unease, with the former anguishing over them, and the latter celebrating. While there was little to pay attention to during the years of the Bush administration, given its tight and largely uncritical embrace of Israel, the tenure of the Obama administration has provided ample opportunities for U.S.–Israel watchers to speculate on the troubles between Washington and Benjamin Netanyahu’s government. By now, the nature of this debate is entirely predictable—on one side are those who decry President Obama’s alleged failure to resolutely support Israel, and on the other are those who defend the president’s pro-Israeli record.
Both sides, however, are focusing on the wrong issue. The real debate is not over whether Obama is pro-Israel enough. The real debate we should be having is: how much do U.S. and Israeli interests in the Middle East really overlap today? Put simply, the fundamental problem in U.S.–Israeli relations is not a matter of individuals, however important they may be, but increasingly divergent interests.
Egypt's Troubled Transition: Elections without Democracy (PDF)
Khaled Elgindy
With the convening of the country’s first post-revolutionary parliament in late January 2012, Egypt’s troubled transition has entered a new phase. As the battle over Egypt’s future shifts from Tahrir Square to the newly elected People’s Assembly, Egyptians may be facing their most difficult challenges yet. The country’s interim rulers, the Supreme Council for the Armed Forces (SCAF)—a 20-member body representing all four branches of the Egyptian military (similar to an expanded U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff)—have laid out an ambiguous and problematic roadmap. With presidential elections and the drafting of a new constitution scheduled to take place by July 1, the transition is imperiled by an ever-present threat of popular unrest as well as an economy teetering dangerously close to collapse. Yet, it is increasingly clear that the most formidable threat to Egyptian democracy comes from the ruling military council itself, through its manipulation of the political process, growing repression, and desire to remain above the law.
Meanwhile, recent events have reconfigured the delicate power balance among the country’s three main centers of power—the military, the Islamists, and those who started the January 2011 uprising. While the ruling military council retains its virtual monopoly on power, its legitimacy has been greatly eroded by its own gross mishandling of the transition. Recent elections handed the Islamists a decisive parliamentary majority, giving the once-banned Muslim Brotherhood an electoral mandate by which to challenge military rule. Meanwhile, the revolutionary youth groups that launched the uprising in Tahrir Square as well as other pro-democracy forces continue to be marginalized by regime repression and a political process that has passed them by.
While Egyptians and well-meaning outsiders continue to hope that recent elections will open the way for a better transition and facilitate the military’s exit from power, parliamentary politics alone may not be enough to reverse the damage done over the previous year or quell the revolutionary fervor simmering just beneath the surface. While a democratic outcome may still be possible in the long run, it will require major changes in how, and by whom, the transition is being managed.
A Strategy of "Congagement" toward Pakistan (PDF)
Zalmay Khalilzad
A better way to conceptualize the Pakistani challenge is to recognize that Pakistan fits into a category of states that are both things at once: ally and adversary. The national interests of these states, as defined by key elites and policymakers, are consistent with some U.S. goals but opposed to others. Conceptions of the national interest may differ between competing institutions within the state. The policies they pursue are malleable to varying degrees, and the extent to which they support or oppose the United States can vary by issues and the circumstances. Unlike genuine allies, the United States shares with these states only some common interests and only limited strategic like-mindedness. Their goals, outlooks, and policies often come into conflict. Such states have incentives to cooperate with the United States—at least on a tactical level—on some issues. But the relationship is not founded on a clear and genuine basis of understanding, and relations can degenerate into periods of tension or crisis.
Pakistan fits neatly into this category of states. On a spectrum of allies and adversaries, Pakistan falls somewhere in the middle, alongside states such as China and Russia. In such cases, the key to developing an effective U.S. strategy is to understand the motivations informing the conduct of these states. Pakistan’s strategic motivations are shaped in large part by its fragmented polity and the parochial outlook and interests of its military institutions. Pakistan sees violent extremist groups as vital instruments of an ambitious imperial policy. Perpetuating a climate of insecurity allows the military to justify its disproportionate claim on national resources.
Engagement alone has proven insufficient to alter Pakistan’s strategic calculus. Accordingly, the United States should shift to a new paradigm of “congagement,” applying a mixed arsenal of methods to contain Pakistan’s dangerous and destabilizing policies but also to engage Islamabad to sustain existing cooperation and incentivize it to move toward more.
Reassessing China: Awaiting Xi Jinping (PDF)
William Overholt
In the Hu Jintao era (2002–2012) China’s politics, economics, and national security policies have changed almost beyond recognition. The ongoing transformation has been largely obscured by images that dominate many Western minds: Manichean democrats see a jasmine revolution waiting to happen; hedge fund managers see a gigantic bubble waiting to burst; national security executives see China as having perfected an enduring, dynamic state capitalism with Leninist political management that threatens to overwhelm us. These contradictory images share one thing: lacking roots in Chinese reality, they project the hopes and fears of their respective believers. Two decades ago, when writing The Rise of China, I could confidently predict Chinese success based on Deng Xiaoping’s emulation of similar policies in South Korea and Taiwan. After three decades of that success, China’s future is far less certain today
The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and U.S.-China Strategic Rivalry (PDF)
Leszek Buszynski
The risk of conflict escalating from relatively minor events has increased in the South China Sea over the past two years with disputes now less open to negotiation or resolution. Originally, the disputes arose after World War II when the littoral states—China and three countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, as well as Vietnam which joined later—scrambled to occupy the islands there. Had the issue remained strictly a territorial one, it could have been resolved through Chinese efforts to reach out to ASEAN and forge stronger ties with the region.
Around the 1990s, access to the sea’s oil and gas reserves as well as fishing and ocean resources began to complicate the claims. As global energy demand has risen, claimants have devised plans to exploit the sea’s hydrocarbon reserves with disputes not surprisingly ensuing, particularly between China and Vietnam. Nevertheless, these energy disputes need not result in conflict, as they have been and could continue to be managed through joint or multilateral development regimes, for which there are various precedents although none as complicated as the South China Sea.
Now, however, the issue has gone beyond territorial claims and access to energy resources, as the South China Sea has become a focal point for the U.S.–China rivalry in the Western Pacific. Since around 2010, the sea has started to become linked with wider strategic issues relating to China’s naval strategy and America’s forward presence in the area. This makes the dispute dangerous and a reason for concern, particularly as the United States has reaffirmed its interest in the Asia Pacific and strengthened security relations with the ASEAN claimants in the dispute.
Reversing Pakistan's Descent: Empowering its Middle Class (PDF)
Xenia Dormandy
Pakistan is not, today, a failed state. However, for the first time since I started focusing on South Asia, in the past eight or so years, there is a real possibility that it could become one. Pakistanis must take full responsibility for this state of affairs. Their unwillingness to do so, and attempts to shift blame to the United States, India, and others, is evident. The United States does hold some of the blame; its actions have at a minimum permitted, and perhaps even promoted, Pakistan’s deterioration. Still, Pakistan has the resources, both natural and human, the experience, and the background to lift itself up if it chooses to do so. Its friends, including the United States, need to implement policies to help.
The solution to reversing affairs in Pakistan is, first and foremost, that both Pakistanis and Americans need to recognize that Pakistan needs to take responsibility for its own problems. This needs to be reinforced not just by words but by deeds on the part of the United States and other friends of Pakistan. The United States needs to support and encourage those within Pakistan who hold similar aims and objectives as the United States. A strategy to do so will require the United States to fundamentally rethink its policies, priorities, and partners in Pakistan, in the course of which—most importantly—it must turn to the middle class.
Defining U.S. Indian Ocean Strategy (PDF)
Michael Green, Andrew Shearer
In the past few years, the Indian Ocean has emerged as a major center of geostrategic interest. The Pentagon’s 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) set the tone by calling for a more “integrated approach to the region across military and civilian organizations” and asking the rest of the U.S. government for an assessment of “U.S. national interests, objectives and force posture implications,” which the National Security Council is now undertaking in preparation for the next National Security Strategy report, expected in 2012. Key U.S. allies have also elevated the Indian Ocean in their strategic planning documents. Australia’s 2009 Defence White Paper, for example, noted that “over the period to 2030, the Indian Ocean will join the Pacific Ocean in terms of its centrality to our maritime strategy and defence planning.” Japan’s 2011 National Defense Policy Guidelines stipulated that “Japan will enhance cooperation with India and other countries that share common interests in ensuring the security of maritime navigation from Africa and the Middle East to East Asia.”
It is not enough to note that the Indian Ocean region is becoming more important or that multiple transnational challenges exist. The 2010 QDR was right to move this debate forward by asking the rest of the U.S. government to begin with an assessment of U.S. interests, objectives, and force posture implications in the Indian Ocean region; U.S. allies would be wise to do the same. To that end, what vital U.S. interests really are at stake in the Indian Ocean region today? What strategy and resources are required to protect and advance those interests?
Have President Obama's Re-Election Prospects Brightened? (PDF)
Charles Cook Jr.
Have the 2012 elections reached an inflection point? It’s far too soon to say that the trajectory of this election has changed directions, but we are beginning to see enough indicators to suggest that the presidential race may have shifted from uphill for President Obama to something more likely to be a very close fight and a more evenly-balanced contest. Simply put, the political environment for Republicans is not quite as favorable as it appeared three or four months ago.