CIAO DATE: 01/2012
Volume: 35, Issue: 1
Winter 2012
The Battle for China's Top Nine Leadership Posts (PDF)
Cheng Li
There is no better vantage point for understanding Chinese leadership politics than to analyze the nine individuals who make up the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC). Despite the highly diverse and divergent assessments of elite politics which populate the overseas China-watching communities, the last decade has witnessed a surprisingly strong consensus emerge on the pivotal importance of the PSC. The top Chinese leader, General Secretary of the Party and President Hu Jintao, is now understood to be no more than the “first among equals” in this supreme decisionmaking body. Within the People’s Republic of China (PRC), a new Chinese term, jiuchangwei, was recently created to refer exclusively to these nine political heavyweights. In line with this development, the Chinese authorities have placed increasing emphasis on “collective leadership,” which the 2007 Party Congress Communiqué defines as “a system with division of responsibilities among individual leaders in an effort to prevent arbitrary decision-making by a single top leader.” The composition of the new PSC—especially the generational attributes and individual idiosyncratic characteristics, group dynamics, and the factional balance of power on the committee—will have profound implications for China’s economic priorities, social stability, political trajectory, and foreign relations. Who are the leading candidates? Through what process will they be chosen? How do their political and professional backgrounds resemble or differ from each other? Into which factional alliances or political coalitions are they divided? What political strategies might they adopt to secure one of the nine spots on the PSC in the months leading up to the 18th Party Congress? What economic agenda, sociopolitical initiatives, and foreign policies will each member of this powerful group be likely to promote? Thoughtfully addressing these questions is essential for the United States and other countries, particularly at a time when China has more influence on the world economy and regional security than perhaps ever before.
Russian Foreign Policy: Continuity in Change (PDF)
Andrew C. Kuchins, Igor A. Zevelev
The imminent return of Vladimir Putin to the presidency of the Russian Federation in 2012 raises many questions about the future of Russian foreign and security policy as well as U.S.—Russia relations. To what extent will Putin seek to continue and implement the goals of current President Dmitri Medvedev’s modernization program? Will Putin reform the political system in the direction of decentralization of power and pluralism? Will the ‘‘reset’’ in U.S.—Russia relations endure? Even with these issues up in the air, the return of Putin as president will not significantly alter the course of Moscow’s foreign policy. Some argue that Putin never relinquished authority over foreign policy in the first place, and that may well be true. But even if it is, there are deeper structural reasons involving debates among Russian elites about foreign policy and Russia’s place in the world that are more important in explaining why Putin’s return will not usher in a significant policy shift
Aspirations and Reality: French Foreign Policy and the 2012 Elections (PDF)
Brinton Rowdybush, Patrick Chamorel
This spring, the French will either reelect Nicolas Sarkozy for another five years or, for only the second time since General Charles de Gaulle inaugurated the Fifth French Republic in 1958, opt for a president from the Socialist Party, in this case François Hollande. Sarkozy’s defeat is a distinct possibility in light of his unpopularity, France’s struggling economy, and a widespread sense that the country is headed in the wrong direction and is ready for change. If François Hollande wins the presidential elections, he would impart a less impulsive, less personalized, and more consensual style to French foreign policy, but he is not expected to significantly alter its direction. France’s foreign policy since the founding of the Fifth Republic has been characterized by an essential continuity in goals and objectives, despite fundamental changes in domestic politics and on the international scene. The country’s priorities have consistently been to promote democracy and human rights, international law and multilateral cooperation (UN mandates, proliferation, peacekeeping, terrorism, etc.), development and humanitarian action, and cultural, scientific, and university exchanges. Although France has often been accused of abandoning its principles when circumstances require, its engagement with the European project and relationship with the United States has brought it fairly closely into line with its principal allies on most major issues (the disagreement with the United States in 2002–2003 concerning the Iraq war being one major exception). This policy continuity is linked to geography, history, and the conception of France’s national interests. What has most dramatically changed, however, is the increasing complexity of the international environment—with more actors (both state and non-state) and issues that must now be addressed in a multilateral rather than simply bilateral fashion. In many ways, the greatest test for France in the 21st century concerns whether it can maintain the diplomatic and military means to influence events. Whatever the outcome of the 2012 election, the next president will face the challenge of adjusting French international ambitions to shrinking means in a less Europe-centered world.
A North Korean Spring? (PDF)
Victor D. Cha, Nicholas D. Anderson
Is revolution similar to the Arab Spring possible in North Korea? The answer from most scholars and intelligence analysts has been “no”—that the Pyongyang regime’s stability in the aftermath of the events in the Middle East and North Africa is an “old question” that was answered in the 1990s when the DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, North Korea) faced the most critical test of its life, and survived. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the drastic cuts in patron aid from China, and the onset of famine that killed hundreds of thousands all constituted the ultimate test of DPRK stability, and the regime staggered on through it all. Thus, the assumption is that the Arab Spring has little relevance to the DPRK. The scholarly literature tends to support this assessment. Scholars like Georgetown University’s Daniel Byman have argued that Kim Jong-il has effectively “coup-proofed” himself through an elaborate system of patronage, bribery, and draconian rule. This may be true, but the phenomenal events that have taken place in the Middle East and North Africa have shown us two things. First, in spite of all of the reasons for thinking that things won’t change, they could, and quite suddenly. And second, the mere presence of variables that could spell the collapse of an authoritarian regime tells us nothing about when or if that collapse could happen. Among the ruins of collapsed dictatorships in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, experts have picked out causes that have long existed, yet they cannot explain why they led to collapse in 2011 as opposed to years, or even decades, earlier. Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, and Muammar Qaddafi of Libya had each been in power longer than Kim Jong-il in North Korea. Can we simply assume that events in the Middle East and North Africa have no bearing on the North Korean regime? Political and social dynamics since the 1990s crisis have been moving in opposite directions, and this gap is only being widened by the leadership transition from Kim Jong-il to his son, Kim Jong-eun. Ironically, we should pay less attention to scholars and experts who dismiss the Arab Spring’s relevance, and more attention to Kim Jong-il’s actions in the aftermath of the Middle East tumult, which do not look like the actions of a leader confident that his worst days were left behind some 20 years ago. Does Kim appear to fear the Arab Spring? Absolutely. What does this mean for the future of his regime?
Why China Will Democratize (PDF)
Yu Lin, Dingding Chen
Behind the political stagnation on the surface, signs abound that a fundamental political transformation is taking place in China. In the fall of 2011, an unusually large group of independent citizens launched very vocal campaigns to compete for seats in various local congresses. Around the same time, groups of “netizens” went to a small village in Shandong province to try to visit Chen Guangcheng, a human right activist under house arrest, despite repeated reports about visitors being beaten. In July 2011, a train crash in the city of Wenzhou caused a storm of criticism against the government on “weibo,” micro-blog sites in China that claim nearly 200 million readers. Although these are just three pieces of evidence, they represent a rising independent civil society and illustrate that China’s political regime is increasingly being challenged. Over the last decade, terms typically used by Western academics to describe Chinese politics have included “authoritarian resilience,” “illiberal adaption,” and “rightful resistance,” indicating a pessimistic view of China’s democratic future. However, reality sometimes changes faster than scholars can reckon. China is moving closer to vindicating classical modernization theory, which states that economic development eventually leads to democratization. We argue that there is good reason to be optimistic that China will become a democracy, and forecast that China will embark on democratization around 2020 or so, although how it will happen, how long the process will take, and even whether it is desirable are issues beyond the scope of this article. Our relative optimism stems from four interlinked mega-trends: economic development, cultural change, political leadership trends, and the global environment.
The Pakistan Thorn in China-India-U.S. Relations (PDF)
Harsh V. Pant
At a time when Pakistan is under intense scrutiny about its role in fighting extremism and terrorism, the world has been watching to see how Beijing decides to deal with Islamabad. Despite Pakistan’s growing diplomatic isolation in recent months, China’s support has been steadfast, at least publicly. Two weeks after the May 2011 U.S. raid that killed Osama bin Laden, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani went to China on a four-day visit to celebrate the 60th anniversary of establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries. Of course, there is much to celebrate in a bilateral relationship that Pakistan’s ambassador to Beijing has described as “higher than the mountains, deeper than the oceans, stronger than steel, dearer than eyesight, sweeter than honey, and so on.” China was the only major power that openly voiced support for Pakistan after bin Laden’s assassination, defending Islamabad and emphasizing that the Pakistani government may not have known about bin Laden’s presence on its territory. India has been the main factor that has influenced China’s and Pakistan’s policies vis-à-vis each other. China, viewing India as a potential challenger in the strategic landscape of Asia, has tended to use Pakistan to counter Indian power in the region, while Islamabad has gained access to civilian and military resources to balance Indian might in the sub-continent. The China–Pakistan partnership serves the interests of both by presenting India with a potential two-front theater in the event of war with either country. Each is using the other to balance India as India’s disputes with Pakistan keep India preoccupied, distracting New Delhi from the task of reaching its potential as a major regional and global player. Although some U.S. and Indian voices are asking the Obama and Singh administrations, respectively, to partner with China to restore stability in Pakistan, Pakistan’s utility for China is only likely to increase, particularly as India continues its ascent in the global inter-state hierarchy and pursues a more ambitious foreign policy posture primarily to counter China, resulting in a further tightening of the Sino–Pakistan entente cordiale.
The Myth of "Securing the Commons" (PDF)
Gabriel M. Scheinmann, Raphael S. Cohen
Not since President George W. Bush uttered the words “axis of evil” has a strategic phrase generated as much Beltway buzz as “securing the commons.” One of the few points of agreement between President Obama’s 2010 National Security Strategy, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, the neoconservative Project for the New America’s Century’s “Rebuilding American Defense” report, various NATO research papers, and numerous think tank publications is that they all emphasize the importance of “safeguarding the global commons.” And yet, what does that mean? Herein lies the problem: the term has multiple and often contradictory meanings. For the extreme left, it connotes imperialist designs; while to liberal institutionalists it means good world citizenry. To defense realists, it is synonymous with overreach; while to conservatives it signals proper hegemonic activity. To the World Bank, it means protecting the world from global environmental challenges, while to others it refers to sustaining American hard power in the post-Cold War era. Even the term “commons” is defined by what it is not—namely, owned by any one individual—than by what it actually is. In other words, despite its prevalence in contemporary strategic literature, what “securing the commons” means as a strategy remains undefined. Properly defined as something beyond the scope of traditional national defense, securing the commons should entail protecting maritime trade from non-state actors in and around six strategic chokepoints, while also monitoring and mitigating the effects of natural disasters—in particular volcanoes—on trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific air traffic. It does not involve a space or cyberspace component, as the former lacks a specific threat and the latter involves an area that should be part of a traditional national defense strategy. Redefined in concrete terms, Washington can pursue a global commons strategy that is manageable, beneficial, and necessary.
Iran's Declining Influence in Iraq (PDF)
Babak Rahimi
With the 2003 collapse of the Ba‘athist regime and the ascendency of Iraq’s Shi‘a majority in the country’s economic and political life, Iran and Iraq now seem at their most amicable since the 1955 Baghdad Pact when they signed treaties for greater cooperation and aligned against separatist movements as well as the Soviet threat. With the rapid expansion of economic ties and movement of goods, products, and people, relations between the two countries have improved considerably across the border where many bloody battles were fought in the 1980s. Contrary to the prevailing view in Washington, Iran’s influence over Iraq has less to do with the formation of a Shi‘a alliance and support for militia activities than with intricacies regarding the management of internal divisions, competitions, and factionalism within Iraq’s Shi‘a political parties and the country’s multi-ethnic population. Iran has so far failed to orchestrate these intricacies in its favor. Any assessment of Iran’s influence in Iraq must, first and foremost, focus on Tehran’s changing factional politics and their impact on Iran’s regional policy. How have Iranian politics post-2009 contributed to the decline of Iran in Iraq? How much of this decline is tied to emerging Iraqi politics? And what comes next as U.S. troops leave Iraq and create a new security dilemma in the region?
The Influence and Illusion of China's New Left (PDF)
Wen Jin Yuan, Charles W. Freeman
The 2008 global financial crisis was a wake-up call for China’s leadership about the potential limits of the free market system to achieve optimum development policy outcomes. The 30-year consensus among China’s leadership has been that economic policy should be primarily market-centric and efficiency-first. However, there is now a growing divergence of opinion among Chinese intellectuals on whether China should continue this fundamental course. There are two primary camps in the debate: pro-market and efficiency-first Rightists, who favor a continued emphasis on GDP growth, and the New Left (xinzuopai) camp, which places greater emphasis on building a social safety net and improving social equality. While the debate may appear at times to be academic to the untrained eye, Chinese intellectuals also serve as informal government advisers on policy issues, so their viewpoints can have a strong influence on Beijing. The influence of the New Leftists in particular appears to be growing, as members have published a number of best-selling books. Considering that the underlying goal of both camps is to preserve political and social stability in China, the stakes are high. After the financial crisis, the New Leftists were quick to pronounce the death of the market-centric approach, and proposed with much fanfare the advance of “state capitalism” as a new development model that the Chinese leadership should adopt. Although the market-centric and efficiency-first doctrine has produced some glaring social inequities which require constructive policy attention, the solutions proposed by the New Leftists to strengthen state control over economic life unfortunately will not necessarily resolve the widening income gap and sense of social alienation, felt by many Chinese left relatively behind by 30 years of runaway growth. While their objectives are laudable, the New Left’s proposed solutions may indeed even exacerbate social stability issues. Nevertheless, in addressing social discontent, the incoming Chinese leadership in 2012 may continue to tilt toward the New Leftist proposals and concentrate more on diminishing the income gap by fiat, rather than drawing on market-oriented reforms.
Solving the Statebuilders' Dilemma (PDF)
Ben Rowswell
The international mission to reconstruct Afghanistan may be the most ambitious statebuilding exercise ever undertaken. Since 2009 at least, the country has been the focus of tremendous international political will, extensive development assistance, and overwhelming military power. While the effort has generated real progress in quadrupling GDP, increasing literacy rates, and building up the Afghan National Security Forces, the news coming out of Afghanistan is dominated by stories of corruption, electoral fraud, and the impunity of regional powerbrokers. Although these stories obscure the progress being made both in the statebuilding effort and on the battlefield, the stakes of these accountability failures are not trivial. If the principal goal in Afghanistan is to establish a legitimate state whose population accepts its authority, that goal will remain elusive as long as the population associates the government with abuses of power. Much of the commentary on failures of accountability revolves around the particular personalities of Afghan leaders and the peculiarities of Afghan politics. But what if these issues are not unique to the Afghanistan mission? What if they are a product of the statebuilding effort itself? The lessons learned from the last decade in Afghanistan demonstrate why a new approach to international statebuilding is necessary. This new approach, what could be called a “triple compact,” should commit the international community to both the government and the population of the state being rebuilt in order to help citizens hold their political leaders to account.