CIAO DATE: 04/2011
Volume: 34, Issue: 2
Spring 2011
Moving into a Post-Western World (PDF)
Simon Serfaty
The ‘‘unipolar moment’’ that followed the Cold War was expected to start an era.1 Not only was the preponderance of U.S. power beyond question, the facts of that preponderance appeared to exceed the reach of any competitor. America’s superior capabilities (military, but also economic and institutional) that no other country could match or approximate in toto, its global interests which no other power could share in full, and its universal saliency confirmed that the United States was the only country with all the assets needed to act decisively wherever it chose to be involved.2 What was missing, however, was a purposea national will to enforce a strategy of preponderance that would satisfy U.S. interests and values without offending those of its allies and friends. That purpose was unleashed after the horrific events of September 11, 2001. Now, however, the moment is over, long before any era had the time to get started.
Why America No Longer Gets Asia (PDF)
Evan A. Feigenbaum
In the fall of 2006, as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Central Asia, I wandered through a bazaar in Kara-suu on the Kyrgyz—Uzbek border. The bazaar is one of Central Asia’s largest and a crossroads for traders from across the volatile Ferghana ValleyKyrgyz, Uzbeks, Tajiks, and many others. But most remarkably, it has become home to nearly a thousand Chinese traders from Fujian, a coastal province some 3,000 miles away, lapped by the waters of the Taiwan Strait. For a thousand years, this was pretty much the natural order of things. Asia was deeply interconnected. Goods, capital, technologies, ideas, and religions, including Buddhism and Islam, moved across Silk Road caravan routes and over well-trafficked Asian sea lanes. But between the 17th and 19th centuries, Asia fragmented. Maritime trade swamped continental trade. ‘‘The caravel killed the caravan’’ as it became less expensive to ship goods by sea. China weakened. Tsarist armies arrived in Central Asia. And many of India’s traditional roles in Asia were subsumed within the British empire.
Can China Defend a "Core Interest" in the South China Sea? (PDF)
Toshi Yoshihara, James R. Holmes
De´ja` vu surrounds reports that Beijing has claimed a ‘‘core interest’’ in the South China Sea. High-ranking Chinese officials reportedly asserted such an interest during a private March 2010 meeting with two visiting U.S. dignitaries, Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg and the senior director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council, Jeffrey Bader.1 Subsequently, in an interview with The Australian, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton disclosed that Chinese delegates reaffirmed Beijing’s claim at the Second U.S.—China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, a gathering held in Beijing in May 2010.2 Conflicting accounts have since emerged about the precise context and what was actually said at these meetings.3 Since then, furthermore, Chinese officials have refrained from describing the South China Sea in such formal, stark terms in a public setting. The ambiguity and controversy recall a similar incident 15 years ago, as the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis reached its crescendo. On that occasion, a Chinese general reportedly told Ambassador Chas Freeman that U.S. leaders ‘‘care more about Los Angeles than they do about Taiwan.’’ His statement was widely interpreted as a veiled nuclear threat.4 Subsequent Chinese disavowals and backpedaling obscured the exact nature of this unofficial conversation. Nevertheless, these incidents together show that Beijing commonly draws red lines around issues it considers paramount to its well-being. They also comprise a cautionary tale about taking Chinese statements at face value.
Building Trust and Flexibility: A Brazilian View of the Fuel Swap with Iran (PDF)
Diego Santos Vieira de Jesus
In May 2010, Brazil and Turkeythen non-permanent members of the UN Security Councilventured into unchartered waters by brokering an agreement to deal with the controversial Iranian nuclear program. Iran, in order to show its willingness to use its nuclear material for peaceful purposes, agreed to have its uranium enriched outside its territory, specifically in Turkey. The deal called for Iran to send 1,200 kilograms of 3.5 percent-enriched uranium to Turkey in exchange for 20 percent-enriched nuclear fuel to use in a scientific reactor in Tehran that produces medical isotopes. Although a nuclear weapon might require uranium enriched to a higher level, the 20 percent-enriched material could help Iran achieve that level quicker. The United States specifically criticized the agreement because it did not address the continued production of uranium enriched to 20 percent inside Iranian territory (other members of the Security Council also criticized the agreement, but the United States was the most vocal). At the time the deal was announced, the international community was also working on a sanctions package to pressure Iran to suspend its enrichment activities and increase the transparency of its nuclear program. In fact, the day after the announcement, the permanent members of the Security Council forwarded a draft resolution for sanctions on Iran to the other members.1 The push for sanctions persisted even though Iran had ignored previous resolutions from 2006—2008, and other diplomatic initiatives had also failed.
A Truly Regional Economic Strategy for Afghanistan (PDF)
Andrew C. Kuchins
Two events in the past year have shifted the focus of efforts to stabilize Afghanistan as President Obama’s July 2011 deadline for beginning a drawdown of U.S. forces approaches. The first was the Kabul Conference, held July 20, 2010, where Afghan President Hamid Karzai announced that Afghanistan would take full responsibility for its sovereignty and security by the end of 2014. The November 2010 NATO conference in Lisbonthe second eventconfirmed this benchmark for full transition to Afghan sovereignty as well as a longer-term commitment to a ‘‘strong partnership’’ beyond 2014. While there are certain caveats about ‘‘conditions-based’’ decisions regarding these benchmarks, this timeframe should guide the strategic planning of the Afghan government, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and regional partners. The timeframe was then confirmed in the December 2010 summary of the Obama administration’s annual review of Afghanistan and Pakistan, declaring: ‘‘This review also underscores the importance of a sustained long-term commitment to the region . . . [with] the goal for Afghans to assume the lead for security across the country by 2014, and NATO’s enduring commitment beyond 2014.’’1 The review pointed out some of the successes of the counterinsurgency strategy implemented in 2009, in concert with the surge in forces, but noted that these gains remain fragile. It also documented the improvement in U.S.—Pakistani relations and the role the Strategic Dialogue between the two countries has played in promoting ‘‘development objectives important to the people of Pakistan.’’
Confronting the Stalinist Past: The Politics of Memory in Russia (PDF)
Thomas Sherlock
Attempting to reverse the decline of the Russian state, economy, and society, President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin have paid increasing attention over the past two years to the modernization of Russia’s socioeconomic system. Aware of the importance of cultural and ideological supports for reform, both leaders are developing a ‘‘useable’’ past that promotes anti-Stalinism, challenging the anti-liberal historical narratives of Putin’s presidency from 2000—2008. This important political development was abrupt and unexpected in Russia and the West. In mid—2009, a respected journal noted in its introduction to a special issue on Russian history and politics: ‘‘turning a blind eye to the crimes of the communist regime, Russia’s political leadership is restoring, if only in part, the legacy of Soviet totalitarianism.. . .’’1 In December 2009, Time magazine ran a story entitled ‘‘Rehabilitating Joseph Stalin.’’2 Although the conflicting interests of the regime and the opposition of conservatives are powerful obstacles to a sustained examination of Russia’s controversial Soviet past, the Kremlin has now reined in its recent efforts to burnish the historical image of Josef Stalin, one of the most brutal dictators in history. For now, Medvedev and Putin are bringing the Kremlin more in line with dominant Western assessments of Stalinism. If this initiative continues, it could help liberalize Russia’s official political culture and perhaps its political system.
Did the State Department Get the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review Right? (PDF)
Brian M. Burton, Kristin M. Lord
On December 15, 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton unveiled the first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), billed as an ambitious effort to bolster ‘‘civilian power’’ and reform the State Department as well as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The report aims explicitly to set priorities, inform budgets, and persuade Congress to invest more in diplomacy and development. In announcing the QDDR in July 2009, Secretary Clinton evoked the Defense Department’s Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), remarking: I served for six years on the Armed Services Committee in the Senate. And it became very clear to me that the QDR process that the Defense Department ran was an important tool for the Defense Department to not only exercise the discipline necessary to make the hard decisions to set forth the priorities, but provided a framework that was a very convincing one to those in the Congress, that there was a plan, people knew where they were headed, and they had the priorities requested aligned with the budget, and therefore, people were often very convinced that it made good sense to do whatever the Defense Department requested. Well, I want to make the same case for diplomacy and development. . . This will provide us with a comprehensive assessment for organizational reform and improvements to our policy, strategy, and planning processes. And this will help make our diplomacy and development work more agile, responsive, and complementary.1
Managing and Engaging Rising China: India's Evolving Posture (PDF)
Sujit Dutta
India’s relations with China are uneasy in the best of times, but over the past few years the spectrum of differences between the world’s two largest countries has steadily widened, with the relationship becoming more complex as a result. The Chinese ambassador in New Delhi acknowledged this state of affairs during an interview just before Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited India in December 2010 for damage control, characterizing relations as being in a ‘‘fragile’’ state that needed care.1 Little visible progress, however, has been made in resolving a series of issues which have become politically unpredictable and made India’s diplomatic relations with China tenuous. Thus, Wen’s statement during the visit that ‘‘we are partners not competitors,’’2 was made more in the spirit of hope than describing the current reality. There has indeed been some cooperation in economic ties and in areas of global significance such as climate change. But the list of issues pending resolution which bedevil the relationship has been growing. The constructive partnership envisaged in 2005, when the two countries announced the India—China Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity,3 remains unfulfilled and has proven difficult to attain.
The Pragmatic Challenge to Indian Foreign Policy (PDF)
Deepa Ollapally, Rajesh Rajagopalan
Asubversive pragmatic vision is increasingly challenging some of the key foundations of India’s traditional nationalist and left-of-center foreign policy, diluting the consensus that shaped the policy, and raising new possibilities especially for India’s relations with the United States and global nuclear arms control. This debate between two centrist foreign policy perspectives is not yet settled. The two are described here as ‘‘traditional nationalist’’ and ‘‘pragmatist,’’ with the former representing the established and dominant perspective, and the latter as the emerging challenger.1 Actual Indian policy mostly splits the difference, mouthing traditional nationalist (hereafter referred to as simply nationalist) slogans while following pragmatist prescriptions. One major result has been the widening of political space for closer relations with the United States, even without a stable consensus. These taxonomies are ideal types: it is very unlikely that those characterized as either nationalist or pragmatist would agree with or accept every tenet of these categories. The categorizations are designed to provide an outline of the competing lines of argumentation about Indian foreign policy, rather than identify nationalists or pragmatists per se. It also is important to note that it is difficult right now in India to associate these perspectives with particular political parties, think tanks, or ministries. Thus, these perspectives are individualistic and do not correspond to particular organizations. They do, however, represent the views of important public intellectuals, policy analysts, academics, journalists, diplomats, and government officials.
Is India Ending its Strategic Restraint Doctrine? (PDF)
Stephen P. Cohen, Sunil Dasgupta
One of the most remarkable attributes of India as an independent state has been its reticence to use force as an instrument of policy. From the delay in sending troops to defend Kashmir in 1947 to the 24-year hiatus in testing nuclear weapons before 1998, Indian decisions on military force have come as an unwelcome last resort, and with rare exception, have been counterproductive, solidifying the wisdom of restraint. India’s rapid economic growth, ambitious military modernization particularly the 1998 nuclear testsand rapprochement with the United States have raised the prospect of India’s rise to great-power status, including an end to the country’s enduring strategic restraint.1 With more options available, will India finally abandon its long-standing international political— military posture? The consequences of an end to restraint could be revolutionary, but the doctrine’s strong rootsand its survival despite failures, including against China and Pakistansuggest that it will endure.
Under the Shrinking U.S. Security Umbrella: India's End Game in Afghanistan? (PDF)
C. Christine Fair
On December 24, 1998, five Pakistani terrorists associated with Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI)a Pakistani jihadist organizationhijacked an Indian Airlines flight in Kathmandu with the goal of exchanging three Pakistani terrorists held in Indian jails for the surviving passengers. Pakistan’s external intelligence agency, the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), facilitated the hijacking in Nepal. After a harrowing journey through Amritsar (India), Lahore (Pakistan), and Dubai (United Arab Emirates), the plane landed at Kandahar Air Field in Afghanistan, then under Taliban control. Under public pressure, the Indian government ultimately agreed to the terrorists’ demands to deliver the three prisoners jailed in India.1 Both the hijackers and the terrorists who were released from prison transited to Pakistan with the assistance of the ISI. Masood Azhar, one of the freed militants, appeared in Karachi within weeks of the exchange to announce the formation of a new militant group which he would lead, the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JM). This incident dramatically underscores why New Delhi cannot take its eyes off of Afghanistan and the Taliban. JM quickly became one of the most vicious terrorist groups operating in India, and is one of many groups active in India that has long had ties to Afghanistan and the Taliban (it also has enjoyed support from the ISI),2 threatening vital Indian national security interests.
The Ties that Bind? U.S.–Indian Values-based Cooperation (PDF)
Daniel Twining, Richard Fontaine
In his November 2010 speech before the Indian Parliament, President Barack Obama cited shared values as a key element in the U.S.—India relationship. Pointing to a ‘‘final area where our countries can partner strengthening the foundations of democratic governance, not only at home but abroad,’’ Obama emphasized an issue that has long received short shrift from those focused on building a new, robust bilateral relationship. Despite deep skepticism among many experts about the prospects for U.S.—Indian cooperation to advance universal values, the president told India’s Parliament, ‘‘[P]romoting shared prosperity, preserving peace and security, strengthening democratic governance and human rightsthese are the responsibilities of leadership. And as global partners, this is the leadership that the United States and India can offer in the 21st century.’’1 The president’s remarks constituted perhaps the most prominent call for bilateral cooperation to promote universal values, but they were not the first reference to the unique nature of relations between the world’s two largest democracies. In 1998, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee declared that India and the United States were ‘‘natural allies,’’ a term that has since been adopted by leaders of both parties in both countries.2
The Focus Now Shifts to 2012 (PDF)
Charles E. Cook, Jr.
It is hardly unusual for the party holding the White House to incur midterm election losses; indeed, such defeats for the president’s party are the norm, having lost congressional seats in 15 out of 17 post-World War II midterm elections. The only exceptions were in 1998, after the ill-fated attempt to impeach and remove President Clinton from office, and in 2002, the election 14 months after the 9/11 tragedy. But when the majority party of the U.S. House suffers the greatest loss of congressional seats by either party in 62 years, the most in a midterm election in 72 years, plus net losses of six U.S. Senate seats, six governorships, and almost 700 state legislative seatsthe largest decline in state legislative seats in more than a half centuryobviously something big was going on. Voters were trying to say something. The 2010 midterm elections were complicated and somewhat bifurcated. In the high visibility races like U.S. Senate and governor, the Democratic losses were large but hardly historic. After all, Republicans lost six Senate seats in 2006 and eight in 2008. But in the lower visibility contests like U.S. House and the state legislative elections, the results were truly historic. What appears to have happened is that in the lower profile races, it was almost a parliamentary electionvoters casting their ballots on the basis of party more than anything else. In the higher profile senatorial and gubernatorial contests, where candidates are better defined and the elections tend to get more news coverage, the strengths and weaknesses of individual candidates and their campaigns mattered more, and voters were more discriminating in their choices of who they threw out and who they retained.