

Decoding Turkish Foreign Policy Hyperactivity

Ever since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) initially assumed power in 2002, soon after the September 11, 2001 attacks, international media has devoted more attention to developments in Turkey. For domestic observers, the conservative Muslim AKP's emergence and subsequent landslide victory in 2007 evoked fears about eroding secularism in the country. For foreign observers, as the threat of militant Islamism became the lens through which to view events in the Muslim world, the AKP's electoral victories stoked worries about the West "losing" Turkey. Although the AKP's record-breaking eight years in office have cooled much of the hysteria about Turkey's domestic orientation, recent Turkish foreign policy activity has unleashed a brand new wave of handwringing about Ankara.

Much of the commentary on the country, however, is littered with a lack of understanding of Turkey's domestic context or of the surrounding environment from Ankara's perspective. Many pundits ask the wrong questions, which lead to the wrong conclusions. The main question is *not* whether Turkey is giving up ties with the United States and the EU in exchange for closer ties with questionable countries, like Iran and Syria, and non-state actors in the Islamic world. Instead, for a variety of historical and contemporary geopolitical reasons, Turkey has pursued a more proactive engagement policy since the early 2000s in both regional and global affairs, seeking greater influence in the Middle East and consequently gaining a respected place at the high table of leading countries in the world. The key question is: has this fresh Turkish zeal led Ankara to

Ziya Meral is a London-based Turkish analyst, writer, and a doctoral candidate at the University of Cambridge. He can be reached at ziya_meral@yahoo.com. Jonathan S. Paris is a London-based foreign affairs analyst, senior fellow with the South Asia Center of the Atlantic Council, and associate fellow with the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation at Kings College, London. He can be reached at jonathansparis@yahoo.com.

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The Washington Quarterly • 33:4 pp. 75–86
DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2010.516613

miscalculate its influence, punch above its weight, and risk greater losses to Turkey's potential stabilizing role and its interests?

The Myth of Domestic Islamization

The key to understanding the direction of Turkish foreign policy is first to understand its domestic socio-political context. The AKP's success signifies not an Islamization of the country, but rather a deepening democratization process and the emergence of a vibrant society seeking to pragmatically advance Turkish interests beyond passé politics of Islamists versus secularists. In fact, domestic surveys done on religiosity in the country have found no fundamental change in the place of Islam in society. On the contrary, a 2009 study done by Sabanci University in Istanbul as part of the International Social Survey Program found that the number of Turks who want *sharia* laws in Turkey actually fell to 10 percent from 26 percent in 1999.¹ Something else is happening in Turkey.

By 2002, Turkish society was showing signs of discontent with a ruling elite based in the northwestern cities of Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir, which had distanced itself from that society. This discontent was a product, ironically, of economic reforms that spurred industrial and commercial development in central and eastern Anatolian cities and a *nouveau riche* Anatolian constituency. Neither welcomed nor integrated into the established secular political elites, the rising Anatolians could not find a political outlet reflecting their entrepreneurial pragmatism and cultural conservatism. They wanted a stable Turkish economy that was free and integrated into the global markets. At the same time, they did not want Turkey to lose its cultural or religious values and assimilate liberal Western cultures.

Parallel with the rise of this new Anatolian wealth, a brand new cosmopolitan generation envisioned Turkey as a less rigidly controlled and more multicultural, as well as democratic, country that would be a full member of the EU. These two emerging sets of Turks were, therefore, neither interested in the usual center or center-right political candidates—from the well-known political parties like the Motherland Party (ANAP), True Path Party (DYP), Democratic Left Party (DSP), and the Republican People's Party (CHP)—nor were they interested in radical Islamist or leftist revolutionary candidates.

The AKP emerged as a conservative Muslim party with a fresh voice and new faces, a new language, a different attitude, and importantly, a pro-EU and pro-reform agenda. In its first elections in 2002, the AKP went from not existing to winning a majority government. The same election literally erased once-prominent parties, such as the ANAP, DYP, and DSP, leaving only the CHP behind as a diminished voice.

By 2007, the AKP had achieved remarkable success with an entrepreneurial pragmatism that appealed to a large constituency, receiving a record-setting almost 47 percent of the vote in that year's general elections.² Attempts by the armed forces and nationalist movements to discredit the AKP not only failed to elicit mass reactions against the party, but actually backfired, enhancing the party's image as a victim of anti-democratic elements. Meanwhile, the armed forces and rigidly secularist elites lost substantial credibility and respect.³

Domestic surveys have found no fundamental change in the place of Islam in society.

In 2008, the chief prosecutor of the Supreme Court officially accused the AKP of seeking to de-secularize the country, but these accusations were clearly political without any hard evidence aside from a few public speeches by AKP officials. The Constitutional Court found the AKP not guilty and rejected the prosecutor's demands for closure as well as a political ban on the AKP leadership. On the other hand, noting that the AKP was becoming a center for "anti-secular activity," the court mandated that the financial support the party received from the treasury be cut in half. The closure case drama even caused strong reactions from the EU and the United States in support of the AKP, urging the judiciary to remain faithful to the rule of law and to resist giving politically-motivated decisions against the emerging party.⁴

Recently, however, there are signs of turbulence in the AKP's rising star. In the March 2009 local elections, the party won only 38 percent of the votes, while the combined votes of the MHP (Nationalist Movement Party), with 16 percent, and the CHP, with 23 percent, surpassed that of the AKP. Some of the dissatisfaction stems from an over-confident attitude of Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan, when he began to use his increasing party votes as a justification for ostracizing anyone who criticized him, including the Dogan Media group, the leading media conglomerate in Turkey with investments in nine different countries. These high-handed responses caused serious concerns in the business world and alienated members of Erdoğan's own party as well as the general public. The AKP also slowed down its EU membership drive, creating disillusionment in many quarters of Turkish society. In other words, the AKP looked like it was fast becoming like the parties it had defeated in 2002.

To counter this drift, the AKP has sought to regain its reformist momentum on several issues including EU accession, long-promised constitutional change, and two initiatives to help the Kurds as well as the Alevi religious minority, estimated at around 12 million people with a long history of suffering discrimination. To date, however, it is evident that the AKP has failed

significantly in all of these attempts. The only way the AKP has been able to maintain power is through reform and EU accession. When it slackened its momentum for reform, Turkish voters reacted harshly.

Yet, the AKP is still the only Turkish party that has adapted to the deep changes in the country. As opposition parties continue to fall back on old discourses of nationalism and protecting the Turkish state from imagined enemies, the AKP remains the only viable option for a significant portion of the country. Although the recent change in the CHP's leadership and failures of the AKP to deliver on Kurdish and Alevi issues will likely reduce its votes in 2011 elections, it is expected that the AKP will maintain either a powerful majority or at least the upper hand in a coalition with a weaker party.

Beyond the AKP

Understanding the domestic context is the key to grasping the internal forces that have been pushing the AKP to take bold economic and diplomatic steps. Although the AKP's appetite to assert Turkey as a key regional actor in the Middle East and maximize economic ties with its neighbors have been read as a return of neo-Ottomanism, it has little to do with a coherent ideology fueled by mild Islamism and Turkish nationalism.

Previous Turkish governments, especially under the late Foreign Minister Ismail Cem, had also envisioned a more proactive Turkey in the Middle East and normalization of contentious relations with Armenia, Greece, and Syria. In hindsight, the Turkish foreign policy momentum, now so apparent, began not with the rise of the AKP, but with the emergence of three crucial external pressure points prompting a reevaluation of Turkish foreign policy: 1) stagnation in Turkish-EU relations, 2) the changing political landscape of the Middle East, and 3) growing tensions over energy supplies in Turkey's neighborhood.

Disillusionment with the EU

Turkey's bid for membership in the developing European economic and political structures started with its official application to join the European Economic Community in 1987. Eventually, Turkey was welcomed into the EU Customs Union, which harmonizes common custom tariff and import and export rules for EU countries. The EU finally decided to formally start negotiation talks with Turkey on membership in 2005.

Membership of a candidate country to the EU is assessed by the Copenhagen Criteria, which require a country to align itself with EU structures, rules, regulations, and obligations; to share the political and economic vision of the EU; and to have democratic governance, rule of law, respect for human rights, and a stable market economy. EU negotiations include chapters on these areas through which a country is assessed, challenged, and given deadlines and

requirements. Since 2005, only 13 out of 35 chapters have been opened for negotiation with Turkey and only one of them has been successfully closed.

Various EU states do not want to open the remaining chapters until it is clear whether Turkey is being offered a full membership or a “privileged status.” The privileged status relationship is promoted chiefly by France and supported by Austria and Germany as an

alternative to full membership. Anything less than full membership is, not surprisingly, unacceptable to Turks, who see privileged status as Europe’s way of squeezing the best out of Turkey without providing anything in return. The opening of chapters is also affected by Cyprus, an EU member state, who has tried to maximize its negotiating position over the ongoing dispute over the island by assisting in blocking EU accession talks.

The AKP made a concerted commitment to EU talks and reforms early in its first term in 2002–2004. In recent years, however, prolonged talks without tangible success and other priorities for the AKP have resulted in “accession fatigue.” The swift membership of other states, such as Bulgaria, was not well received by the Turkish public, especially as Bulgaria continues to fall dramatically short of Copenhagen Criteria standards. The AKP has also felt betrayed by the EU for not keeping its promises to lift the embargo on the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as a quid pro quo for the “yes” vote given by the Turkish Cypriots to the so-called Annan peace plan for Cyprus in 2004.

The slowdown and disillusionment with the EU has convinced more and more Turks that the EU project may not work out in the end, leading Turkey to diversify its investments beyond the EU in case Turkey’s bid for EU membership completely collapses. This possibility runs parallel with new concerns over the European economy, its internal political turmoil, and lack of a unified, coherent, and effective foreign policy. Turks rightfully wonder whether, after years of struggling to become a member, all that effort will turn out to be a bad investment in a weak EU organization without much to offer to Turkey.

Turkish foreign policy momentum began, before the rise of the AKP, for three reasons.

Turmoil in the Backyard

The U.S.-led coalition that invaded Afghanistan and Iraq has caused undesired geopolitical ramifications, especially by bringing Iran greater power in the Gulf region, in Iraq, and in Lebanon, at the same time as the Syrian regime’s regional influence appears to be ascending. Yet, regional dynamics have also provided brand new opportunities for Turkey, not only by opening up lucrative new markets, such as the reconstruction of Iraq, but also by providing opportunities

for Turkey to fulfill its hitherto latent desire to be the key regional negotiator and peacemaker.

Turkey has also found itself under pressure to rethink its engagement in the Caucasus, as Russia's renewed desire to expand its regional political power has created worrying tensions with Europe and with Belarus, Georgia, and Ukraine. The ongoing energy tensions between suppliers and consumers offer Turkey an opportunity to turn itself into a neutral energy route as it seeks ways to achieve energy stability by diversifying energy needs and relationships.

All of these developments demanded a radical shift in Turkish foreign policy. Ankara had to pursue the EU as it was still in its strategic interest, yet it had to diversify its economic and political ties to strengthen its own hand, especially in energy. It had to seek stability in its neighborhood and emerge as a neutral economic and diplomatic bridge between parties in conflict. Ultimately, Turkey has had to become more proactive in order to avoid being crushed by turbulent global developments.

A Professor with a Vision

The AKP has had both the domestic support to radically rethink Turkish foreign policy and the intellectual depth to do so under Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, who started as chief advisor to Erdoğan in 2003 and has been foreign minister since 2009. Davutoğlu has argued that Turkey needs to have “zero conflict” with all of its neighbors and must develop “strategic depth” in all of its relations by using soft power and the historical legacy of the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East.⁵ This means that while Turkey should pursue EU membership

and continue its ties with United States and NATO, it will also talk to Middle Eastern states, as well as non-state actors like Hamas, to solve all regional disputes including the never-ending Armenia and Cyprus issues. The foreign minister envisions a proactive Turkey that will be a mediator, guarantor, and stabilizing force in the region.

In early 2010, Davutoğlu said that unlike the Cold War, when Turkey was part of the

frontline of the Western alliance against the Soviet Union, it is now at the center of a variety of regional constellations.⁶ Such a pivotal location, in Davutoğlu's view, means that Turkey can, and must, play a more active role in forging global stability.

During his first year as foreign minister, Davutoğlu undertook 100 foreign visits: 28 to Europe, 27 to the Middle East, 18 to the Balkans, 9 to Asia, and 8 to the United States. He is not only a man of deep intellectual vision, but also a

A proactive Turkey seeks to be a mediator, guarantor, and stabilizing force.

tirelessly hard worker. In a limited amount of time through mind-boggling hyperactivity, Davutoğlu has positioned Turkey in the center of events, ranging from engaging Serbia for peace in the Balkans, to negotiating between Sunni and Shiite factions in Iraq, to attempting to make peace between Syria and Israel, to boosting regional economic engagement by signing free customs agreements with Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, to reaching nuclear and natural energy deals with Russia, to normalizing relations with Armenia, Greece, Iraqi Kurdistan, and Syria. His energy, strong will, and intellect have won deep respect around the world, as well as fame as being a hard man to deal with. Some, however, see him as an overzealous academic with visionary ambitions beyond Turkey's actual foreign policy capacity.

Warranted and Unwarranted Worries

The new Turkish foreign policy paradigm has understandably caused significant concerns in Europe and the United States. Within a short amount of time, Turkey, which had kept a quiet and reserved profile in its relations with Middle Eastern and North African countries, has now started to pursue rapprochement with governments and organizations shunned by the West. These include high-level visits to Sudan by Turkish officials, and welcoming President Omar al Bashir of Sudan to Istanbul in 2008. The fact that there is an arrest warrant for Bashir did not help Turkey's international image. Similarly, when the Middle East Quartet shunned Hamas, preferring to engage with the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority, Davutoğlu met with Hamas officials, who were also welcomed to Ankara. Turkey has also undertaken initiatives toward Syria, recently waiving visa requirements for Syrian nationals visiting Turkey in addition to signing various economic engagement protocols.

As disturbing as each of these moves has been for the West, Turkey's proactive engagement with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his government in Tehran has caused the most serious concerns. Turkey and Iran have long enjoyed strong relations in trade, energy, and security concerns. Both countries have fought armed conflict with their Kurdish minorities. The fall of Saddam's regime in Iraq brought Turkey and Iran initially closer, as neither country wanted an independent Kurdistan to emerge in their backyard. This initial joint interest slowly began to change when Ankara decided to pursue diplomatic and economic relations with the Iraqi Kurds, and when it became clear that Iranian backing for Iraqi Shiite power and support for terrorism against coalition forces were ultimately undermining Turkey's own interests.

Turkey sees Iran as an important "balancing supplier" for oil and gas in the face of unrest in the Caucasus and fickle Russian policies on energy. This is understandable, and even European countries, such as Germany, actually have

more trade and energy relations with Iran than Turkey has with Iran. Erdoğan's public backing of the controversial second election of Ahmadinejad, however, and his regular comments on Iran's right for peaceful nuclear energy have caused concern in the West over the ill effects of Turkish–Iranian rapprochement.

Relations with Israel

In the process of expanding new relations, Turkey has put its old friendly relations at risk. This is particularly true for relations with Israel and the United States. The 2006 Lebanon campaign and subsequent January 2008 military campaign in Gaza have damaged Israel's popularity in Turkey, which as a Muslim country has always shown sympathy toward Palestinians. Anti-Semitism has been and remains a growing concern, even though the Ottoman Empire was traditionally a refuge for Jews fleeing persecution in Europe, all the way back to the Spanish Inquisition of 1492. Unknown to larger sections of the Turkish

public, Turkey has enjoyed strong economic and diplomatic ties with Israel since the 1990s including joint military exercises, modernization of military equipment, intelligence sharing and arms trade, in addition to investment in Turkish civilian enterprises.

When Erdoğan stormed off the stage at the World Economic Forum in January 2009, following remarks on the Gaza war by President Shimon Peres of Israel, it was clear that Turkish and Israeli relations were

entering a turbulent new phase.⁷ Israel's refusal to allow Davutoğlu to visit the Gaza Strip on an official visit to Israel in September 2009 caused strong Turkish reactions. In retaliation, Ankara canceled the participation of the Israeli Air Force in an October 2009 international air exercise, which Turkey hosts annually with Italy, the United States, and other NATO forces. The United States ended up calling off the entire exercise as a result.⁸

In January 2010, Deputy Foreign Minister Daniel Ayalon of Israel summoned the Turkish ambassador to Israel to protest an anti-Semitic episode of a popular television drama in Turkey. This event turned into a diplomatic crisis as Ayalon insulted the Turkish ambassador by placing him on a lower chair, and requesting the media take pictures of them sitting, as well as the fact that the only flag on the small table was an Israeli flag. Turkey threatened to summon the ambassador back to Ankara, which led to an official apology from Israel.⁹

Relations between the two countries reached a new low in the May 2010 flotilla crisis, during which nine Turkish citizens were killed and numerous Israeli

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soldiers were wounded. Popular attitudes in both countries have pressured both governments to take hard-line attitudes. Turkey is threatening a complete breakdown of relations if Israel does not offer an official apology and provide compensation to the families of killed Turkish citizens. Israel insists that its soldiers acted in self-defense and that Israel has nothing to apologize for.¹⁰

Beyond these public demonstrations of a frayed relationship, bilateral defense trade has been in steady decline. Israel's Ministry of Defense has commented recently that, from now on, every Turkish contract will be assessed on its own terms and will not receive blanket approval as it has since the late 1990s. Turkey has closed its airspace to Israeli military planes and substantial bookings of Israeli tourists have been canceled by Israeli tour operators. The diplomatic rows between the two countries and Turkish relations with countries like Iran, Syria, and groups like Hamas and Hezbollah are forcing Israel to see Turkey as a potential adversary. From the Turkish point of view, negative domestic attitudes toward Israel are finding their way through official outbursts of a conservative Muslim government, which is redefining Turkey's relations in the region.

From a purely rational calculation, it is in both Israel's and Turkey's interest to maintain their ties and increase their strategic exchanges. With Davutoğlu's "zero conflict with neighbors" policy, and desire to be a peace broker in the Middle East, Israel remains a key neighbor. Even at the highest point of tensions, Turkey signaled its desire to continue its defense trade with Israel, particularly in purchasing unmanned drones and upgrades for its jets and tanks.¹¹ This demonstrates that, although it will take time for Turkish-Israeli relations to return to the levels of the early 2000s, the two countries will continue to engage strategically, albeit somewhat coldly.

Relations with the United States

Over seven years later, U.S.–Turkish relations still have not fully recovered from the refusal of the Turkish Parliament to allow U.S. troops to use Turkey for the March 2003 Iraq campaign. The reaction of the Turkish Parliament accurately reflected Turkish public opinion toward Iraq's invasion. Although the current soft power policies of the Obama administration and President Barack Obama's choice of Turkey as the site for his first foreign visit to a Muslim country have improved relations between the countries, the current adventures of Turkish foreign policy and efforts at the U.S. House of Representatives to officially acknowledge the 1915 massacres of Armenians under the Ottoman Empire as genocide have strained them once again.¹²

Careful diplomacy played by the White House and the U.S. Department of State in meeting Turkish interests on the genocide resolution, on Iraq, on the Kurdistan Worker's Party (which has been labeled a terror organization), and in U.S. backing for Turkish efforts to normalize relations with Armenia as well as to

enter the EU have all helped to win the trust of Turkey. Still, the Turkish fallout with Israel has caused serious domestic difficulties for the Obama administration. Turkish rapprochement with Iran, the Tehran research reactor uranium enrichment deal signed by Brazil, Iran, and Turkey,¹³ and the subsequent Turkish “no” to the UN Security Council’s June 2010 vote on further sanctions on Iran have brought Turkey into conflict with vital U.S. strategic interests.¹⁴

Despite these bilateral tensions, neither Turkish–Iranian relations nor Turkish desires to have stronger links with Russia represent ideological shifts away from the United States or the West. What has become obvious is that the bipolar alliances of the Cold War era are no longer sustainable. The United States cannot assume that Turkey will seek a special alliance only with it, and refuse rapprochements from other powerful countries, such as China, or economically rewarding engagements with lucrative energy sources such as Iran.

Washington is likely to continue to treat Ankara sensitively, perhaps offering new incentives and assurances to refresh Turkey’s bond with the United States. Given the non-ideological and practical nature of Turkish–Iranian relations, it will probably not be too long before Turkey realigns itself with the United States, provided that it is convinced that to do so will be in its interests. The bottom line is that as long as U.S. foreign policy does not pose a major threat to Turkish national interests, and as long as positive U.S. cooperation on economic, security, and diplomatic issues is communicated effectively to the Turkish public, there is no reason to anticipate the end of the historical alliance between Turkey and the United States.

A Changing Turkey

All of these dramatic changes in Turkish foreign policy could lead to both positive and negative outcomes. On the positive side, a strong NATO country with G-20 membership, relatively strong U.S. and EU ties, and one of the largest armies in the world will only increase its value as a stabilizing force in an unstable region. On the negative, none of the Turkish attempts to establish peace in the region have yet borne fruit. Although Middle Eastern and Caucasus states see Turkey as a strong country that needs to be befriended and not offended, no country sees it as the ultimate bridge or trusted negotiator in the long-standing conflicts of the region. Actual Turkish power in the region is nowhere close to that of the United States.

While Turkey’s “zero conflict” policy is struggling on Armenia and Cyprus, its strategy of rapprochement with Iran, Russia, Sudan, and Syria, along with Hamas, is creating unrest, mistrust, and backlash in relations with the EU, Israel, the United States, and even Arab countries such as Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, as well as the Palestinian Authority. It is becoming increasingly likely

that the current “strategic depth” that Davutoğlu is seeking might backfire, resulting in shallow and insubstantial engagements with a few new countries and non-state actors at the expense of missed political and economic opportunities with others.

The current “strategic depth” that Turkey is seeking might backfire.

This, however, does not mean an inevitable crisis or a complete move of Turkey away from its Western allies. What drives the AKP is not an ideological realignment but a rational and pragmatic attempt to maximize Turkish national interests. In fact, the primary achievement of the AKP’s foreign policy has been its record-breaking increase of Turkish trade volume with the Middle East and Russia, as well as attracting substantial amounts of foreign investment into the country from Europe and the sovereign funds of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. The International Monetary Fund continues to forecast a steady advancement of Turkey, now boasting the eighteenth largest gross national product, in the ranks of G-20 countries.

The AKP faces strong domestic pressure to remake Turkey into a vibrant global actor with an enhanced economy, and *not* to take on an ideological reorientation. This public input has forced the AKP to adopt a pragmatic and rational foreign policy to maximize Turkish interests. Although this means that Turkey will inevitably clash with the EU, the United States, and other regional actors, it also means that solutions will be sought more through rational calculations of cost and benefit than ideological animosity. It is clear that, with a fast growing economy and an appetite for a bigger share in the world, Turkey will continue to attempt to pursue projects beyond its comfort zone. What is not clear is whether Turkey is ready to handle such a demanding and complicated future.

Notes

1. “Türk halkına göre ‘dinsel eşitlik’ teori düzeyinde kaldığı sürece sorun yok!” [According to Turkish people there is no problem as long as ‘religious equality’ remains at theory level.], *Radikal*, November 18, 2009, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/Default.aspx?aType=HaberYazdir&ArticleID=964940>.
2. For a detailed breakdown of the results, see “2007 Türkiye Genel Seçim Sonuçları” [2007 Turkey General Election Results], *Hürriyet*, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/secimsonuc/default.html>.
3. See Ipsos KMG, “Türkiye’yi Anlama Klavuzu -2010” [A Manual for Understanding Turkey-2010], January 16, 2010, http://www.ipsos-kmg.com/T%C3%BCrkiyeyi_Anlama-K%C4%B1lavuzu_2010_Yay%C4%B1nland%C4%B1.

4. See “Q&A: Turkey’s Ruling Party on Trial,” BBC News, July 28, 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7490653.stm>.
5. See Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik derinlik: Türkiye’nin uluslararası konumu* [Strategic Depth: Turkey’s International Position] (Istanbul: Globe Publications, 2001).
6. See Ahmet Davutoğlu, “New World Geopolitics: How Turkey is Contributing to Global Peace and Security as a Member of the UN Security Council” (speech, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, January 29, 2010), <http://www.iiss.org/recent-key-addresses/turkish-foreign-minister/watch-the-speech/>.
7. See Katrin Bennhold, “Leaders of Turkey and Israel Clash at Davos Panel,” *New York Times*, January 29, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/30/world/europe/30clash.html>.
8. See Julian Borger, “Turkey Confirms it Bars Israel from Military Exercise Because of Gaza War,” *Guardian*, October 12, 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/oct/12/turkey-israel-military-gaza>.
9. See “Turkey Accepts Apology from Israel for Insult to Ambassador,” *Hurriyet*, January 13, 2010, <http://www.hurriyetaidailynews.com/n.php?n=turkey-to-recall-ambassador-if-israel-makes-no-apology-2010-01-13>.
10. See Barak Ravid, “Lieberman to Turkey: Israel Won’t Apologize for Gaza Flotilla Raid,” *Ha’aretz*, July 5, 2010, <http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/lieberman-to-turkey-israel-won-t-apologize-for-gaza-flotilla-raid-1.300128?localLinksEnabled=false>.
11. See Suzan Fraser, “Israel says Turkey Ties Warm after Defense Minister Visits Ankara but Analysts are Skeptical,” Associated Press, January 17, 2010, <http://blog.taragana.com/politics/2010/01/17/israel-says-turkey-ties-warm-after-defense-minister-visits-ankara-but-analysts-are-skeptical-13696/>.
12. See Gilles Whittell, “Turkey Recalls Ambassador after US Vote on Armenia ‘genocide,’” *Times*, March 5, 2010, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article7050439.ece.
13. For more on the deal, see “Iran Signs Nuclear Fuel-Swap Deal with Turkey,” BBC News, May 17, 2010, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8685846.stm>.
14. See Janine Zacharia, “Spat over Iran May Further Strain Relations Between Allies U.S., Turkey,” *Washington Post*, May 24, 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/23/AR2010052303882.html>.