

Time for Sober Realism: Renegotiating U.S. Relations with Pakistan

Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, the United States has sought to help Pakistan transform itself into a stable, prosperous, and democratic state that supports U.S. interests in the region, is capable of undermining Islamist militancy inside and outside its borders, commits to a secure Afghanistan, and actively works to mitigate prospects for further nuclear proliferation. Washington has also hoped that Pakistan, along with India, would continue to sustain the beleaguered peace process to minimize the odds of a future military crisis between them. Between fiscal years 2002 and 2008, the United States has spent more than \$11.2 billion, presumably to further these goals. The FY 2009 budget request includes another \$1.2 billion.¹

Despite this largesse, the United States has failed in large measure to achieve all but minimal progress toward most of these objectives. Pakistan is more insecure, not less, since the onset of U.S.-Pakistani reengagement in 2001. Pakistanis appear to be more distrustful of the United States than they are of al Qaeda.² Indeed, about 80 percent of Pakistanis recently polled said that al Qaeda's principle aim is standing up to the United States, and 57 percent support that goal. In that same survey, more than 52 percent blamed the United States for the violence wracking the country, compared to 15 percent who blamed various militant groups.³ Fewer than one in two Pakistanis believed that al

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Pakistan is more insecure since U.S.–Pakistani reengagement in 2001.

Qaeda and the Taliban operating in Pakistan pose a serious problem, and wide swaths of Pakistanis embrace negotiating with the raft of militant groups savaging their country and oppose military action to eliminate them.⁴ Since joining forces with the United States, albeit reluctantly, Pakistan continues to lurch from one crisis to another, be it economic, political, or military.

Pakistan's intentions and security perceptions, not the amount or modalities of U.S. aid, are the crux of Pakistan's problem. Given these apparent, divergent perceptions and interests, how, if at all, can the United States cajole, persuade, or compel Pakistan to cease and desist from engaging in policies, such as supporting some forms of militancy, that are inimical to U.S. interests? Can the United States help Islamabad pursue policies that will secure Pakistan's future as a successful, democratic state at peace with itself and with its neighbors, capable of providing for its citizenry? There are no elegant or even probable solutions for the myriad problems riddling Pakistan. Indeed, the path for the United States is very narrow but must be pursued, given the far more harrowing alternatives. This will require a significant change in policy from what has been pursued over the last seven years. This new course must focus more resources and attention to rebuilding and professionalizing Pakistan's civilian institutions including the police and justice systems, the federal and provincial assemblies, and the political parties while undertaking efforts to encourage civilian control over the military and intelligence agencies. Pakistan, and its citizens, must be a partner for change not merely objects of policy if such an approach is to succeed in any measure. While hoping for the best, Washington must also prepare for the worst case scenario that Pakistan, despite reconfigured assistance and cooperation, remains unable or unwilling to act to secure its future and that of the region.

Disappointing Returns to U.S. Investment Thus Far

There are numerous reasons for the U.S. failure to date in mitigating Pakistan's various crises. For Washington's part, some \$5.9 billion, more than one-half of the \$11.2 billion to Pakistan, is from the Coalition Support Fund (CSF) program, which is strictly designed to reimburse countries for costs incurred in support of the global war on terrorism. The funds were never intended to build capacity within the armed forces of Pakistan, so recent criticisms of the failure of these transfers to transform the Pakistani military into an efficacious counterinsurgency organization are misplaced.

Yet, the funds appear to have been misused in various ways. Critical inquiries into the program have found irregular billing, reimbursements on extremely lucrative terms, poor substantiation of costs incurred, or nonreplicable determination of costs invoiced. Proponents of the CSF program argue that these glitches could be due to poor budgetary systems in Pakistan, but opponents dismiss these excuses as unacceptable. Clearly, the program was poorly managed, and the United States likely did not get its money's worth in a narrow sense.⁵ U.S. legislators are struggling to find a means to secure better alignment between Pakistan's actions and U.S. goals, more accountable reimbursement procedures, and greater visibility into how the funds are utilized once they become sovereign Pakistani funds. For example, some have suggested moving some activities currently reimbursed under the CSF program into foreign military financing programs or other such mechanisms that require greater coordination and permits more oversight into resource utilization.

In a broader sense, however, the program has achieved other important though less often stated aims. Until 2008, when several convoys of fuel, equipment (e.g., Humvees) and other supplies came under increasing attacks, U.S. logistical supplies for the war in Afghanistan continued to move from Karachi up through Pakistan to Torkham at the Pakistani-Afghan border and to Bagram.⁶ In the early years of Operation Enduring Freedom, Pakistan granted the United States access to bases and overflight rights and provided other logistical support.⁷ In addition, Pakistan has maintained a deployment of 80,000 to 120,000 troops from the paramilitary Frontier Corps and regular army units along the Pakistani-Afghan border. (Note that there is no transparent accounting of the actual number or kind of Pakistani troops arrayed, most of which are ordinarily garrisoned in this theater.) Proponents of the CSF program argue that the United States benefits in some measure from having those troops there, and that the incremental costs of maintaining these deployed troops is a bargain considering that a comparable deployment of U.S. troops would be more costly and nearly impossible. Although some reimbursement mechanism will be needed as long as Pakistan remains engaged, opponents and proponents alike believe that the program needs better oversight, revised rules, and tighter adherence to the rules.

A second reason for Washington's failures has been its perplexing approach to the varied militant groups operating from and within Pakistan, including the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban ensconced in Pakistani territory. In the early phase of the global war on terrorism, the United States focused its cooperation with Pakistan on efforts to eliminate al Qaeda but did not insist that Pakistan shut down its support for all militant groups including the Taliban and those groups operating in India and Kashmir. Washington only episodically insisted on action against the so-called Kashmiri groups and usually did so only in response

to particularly outrageous attacks in India (e.g., the 2001 parliament attack, the 2002 Kaluchak massacre, and the 2008 Mumbai attack). Washington did not aggressively insist that Pakistan act against the Afghan Taliban entrenched in its territory until 2007 even though the Taliban have maintained high levels of violence, including suicide attacks, since 2005. Not surprisingly, Pakistan did not remand a high-value Taliban asset until the summer of 2007 and did so only reluctantly and after sustained pressure from Washington in light of mounting Afghan, NATO, and U.S. casualties in Afghanistan.

When Pakistan has acted with alacrity, it has done so against foreign elements such as Arabs and Uzbeks and those groups targeting the Pakistani state in Bajaur, Swat, and North and South Waziristan. To date, Pakistan has not launched massive offensives against the Afghan Taliban in Pakistan. Notably, the Taliban leadership council, aka the Quetta shura, located in the Pakistani city of Quetta, remains unmolested and free to act. Increasingly, numerous militant groups that used to focus on India and Kashmir have begun operating in and from Pakistan's tribal areas. Now, groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) are operating against NATO and U.S. troops in Kunar and Nuristan.⁸ Some Indian observers have warned that the Kashmir insurgency is heating up again,⁹ and Indian leadership is convinced that the LeT terrorists who executed the November 2008 Mumbai attacks "must have had the support of some official agencies in Pakistan."¹⁰

Another reason for Washington's failures is the focal point of its assistance. About \$8.1 billion, more than one-half of the total U.S. outlays, supported the military through assistance or reimbursement while only \$3.2 billion in the last seven years has been devoted to economic programs.¹¹ U.S. generosity toward the Pakistani military was intended to bolster President Gen. Pervez Musharraf and to appease his primary constituent, the Pakistan army, thereby securing Pakistan's continued cooperation in the war on terrorism. Unfortunately, Musharraf's ability to lead began to wane in 2004 when he reneged on promises to resign as the army chief, signaling a preeminent interest in remaining in power at all costs.¹² This act hastened the decline of his rapidly diminishing credibility among Pakistan's polity and military alike as he simultaneously sought to appease numerous and disparate stakeholders. Musharraf's political crises discouraged Washington from demanding greater accountability for its investments given Washington's preeminent interest in bolstering Musharraf.

In focusing on the army, the United States subsidized the army's penetration of the state and aided and abetted the army's efforts to undermine civilian institutional capacity and political leadership. Thus, when civilians did return to power in February 2008, albeit with the army looking over their shoulder, the country's capacity for civilian governance was weaker than it was when Musharraf seized power in October 1999. Washington justified this focus on

the army because it believed that the army would deliver progress on the war on terrorism whereas venal and divisive politicians would not. Unfortunately, the army did not deliver as hoped, and in the end, Washington failed to anticipate or even recognize Musharraf's steady decline. The United States now hopes that the new chief of army staff, Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani, will deliver where Musharraf failed.

Another problem with U.S. assistance is the way in which it is delivered. Washington generally pursues a strategy of supply-driven aid by which it pumps large sums into Pakistan's coffers with few meaningful accountability requirements. Pakistan has resisted such scrutiny, asserting that, once monies go into Pakistan's exchequer, they become sovereign funds. Better governance has not been a top priority, much less a precondition, for spending U.S. resources in Pakistan. Unfortunately, many countries are reluctant to make better governance a precondition for aid and a goal of aid programs because of the "Samaritan's Dilemma." Funders fear that imposing accountability will drive the recipient away from the program, forfeiting opportunities for strategic influence in the country.¹³

Development economists concur, however, that such supply-driven aid rarely provides salutary impacts. The United States, like other supply-driven donors in Pakistan, tends to define its output as funds disbursed or things built, such as schools and clinics, rather than services delivered, such as quality of education provided or quality of medical care delivered. As a result, U.S. officials can boast about the number of schools built but cannot speak about the quality of the education provided. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), like its counterparts in other countries, has limited means, is unable to analyze the impacts of its programming before, during, or after the "intervention," and cannot genuinely ascribe outcomes to their efforts. Finally, most aid agencies rely on a cascade of contractors, which funnel resources back into the donor countries, leaving little investment in the receiving country. As one USAID interlocutor estimated (albeit without justification), for every dollar spent in a country, perhaps as much as 90 cents go back to the United States.¹⁴

The accumulating consequence of these well-known shortcomings has been a steady and critical chorus that the United States has not struck a useful bargain with Pakistan. Complaints chiefly have centered on the state's ongoing support for some militant groups, especially the Afghan Taliban and so-called Kashmiri groups, even while the state battles other militant groups such as some groups within the Pakistani Taliban and foreign fighters associated with al

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Qaeda. Some prominent analysts have argued that the United States should set conditions on aid or fall back in some measure on some variant of a sanction regime drawing from a series of UN resolutions as well as U.S. law. (Proponents for such an approach suggest that aid should be conditional on no future nuclear or missile proliferation, civilian governance, cessation of support for all militant groups, and rigorous and verifiable prosecution of Pakistan's own war on terrorism.)¹⁵ Others have argued that such an approach would alienate Pakistan, without whose support, victory, howsoever defined, is impossible to achieve in Afghanistan. Congress has put forward an intermediate path, the Biden-Lugar plan, which conditions U.S. military assistance to Pakistan on civilian control, although it permits waivers if U.S. security interests are at stake, and demands greater transparency on how U.S. funds are spent while expanding civilian aid. The underlying logic is that Pakistani cooperation can be bought or leveraged through additional U.S. aid, but proponents have yet to explain why new programs would succeed where the previous \$11.2 billion in allurements have failed.

Perhaps the most deleterious and more contentious reason for Washington's limited successes is that the main U.S. programs misdiagnose the various problems they seek to affect. The biggest hindrances to "saving Pakistan" are the intentions, interests, and strategic calculations of the Pakistani state itself, in addition to the extremely limited capacity to affect the kind of change the United States and the rest of the international community demand. For example, the United States has forged various plans to develop Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).¹⁶ Unfortunately, all of these plans assume that the Pakistani state is prepared to embrace such a transformation.

For some six decades, the country has benefited from FATA being a "black hole" from which it could launch operations into Afghanistan and train militants operating in Afghanistan, Kashmir, and the rest of India. In fact, the government has willfully made successive decisions not to invest in the area or engage in a modicum of political liberalization apart from permitting adult franchise in 1996. Pakistan's political parties are still not allowed to operate there legally, but religious parties with access to mosques and madrassah have not been hampered, giving them a considerable advantage over the other parties in parliamentary elections.¹⁷ FATA residents are still governed by a colonial-era dispensation (the Frontier Crimes Regulation) that permits collective punishment and denies citizens due process and other legal practices that Pakistan's high courts have ruled to be illegal under the Pakistani constitution.¹⁸

Even if Pakistan wanted to effect change in FATA, how can it provide good governance in FATA when it has failed in those parts of Pakistan where the penetration of the state is strongest? Similarly, the United States has offered to invest in the Pakistan army's ability to fight counterinsurgency better in

recognition of the army's inability to wage such operations effectively. Unfortunately, the army chief has repeatedly said that the army will not retool from being a conventional (read India-focused) army toward one that is counterinsurgency oriented.¹⁹ U.S. programs are unlikely to achieve anything but modest success without the support of Pakistan's strategic elites and citizenry.

There are no elegant or even probable solutions for the myriad problems riddling Pakistan.

Alternative Paths to Influence Pakistan: Dead Ends?

Policymakers and analysts grapple with how the United States can persuade Pakistan to comprehensively abandon militancy as a tool of foreign policy and work steadily to eliminate all militant groups operating on its soil. In recent months, analysts have proposed a number of approaches that may increase the alignment of Pakistani and U.S. security perceptions in hopes of securing greater Pakistani cooperation. Three of these prominent arguments are described below.

Mitigating the Trust Deficit

Pakistan watchers generally agree that the United States will fail to secure greater alignment between Pakistani and U.S. interests unless and until it can mitigate "the trust deficit."²⁰ From Washington's perspective, Islamabad has a long history of saying one thing and doing another. Pakistan denied the presence of paramilitary and regular army troops in the Kargil-Dras sectors of Indian-administered Kashmir in 1999 and blamed the mujahideen for seizing Indian territory. Pakistan has also consistently denied supporting the Taliban and other militant groups despite mountains of insurmountable evidence to the contrary. Pakistan's nefarious history of missile and nuclear technology proliferation, which began with Abdul Qadeer Khan's state-blessed commercial espionage, is yet another source of dubiety.²¹

For its part, Islamabad has numerous complaints against Washington which also span decades. Washington's "original sins" include providing arms to India during its war with China in 1962 and cutting off arms to India and Pakistan during their wars in 1965 and 1971. As Pakistan was reliant on U.S. weapons systems, arms cutoffs hurt Pakistan considerably more than it did India, which was more reliant on Soviet systems. Pakistanis complain that the United States abandoned it with a dangerous mujahideen presence and proliferating narcotics and small arms traffic when the Soviets finally pulled out of Afghanistan. Pakistan's security elite and citizenry therefore consider the United States an

unreliable partner and believe that the United States will abandon Pakistan again when Washington's security interests change.

In fairness, the United States largely did abandon the region once the Soviets formally withdrew from Afghanistan. Pakistan, however, rarely acknowledges the benefits that it accrued during the 1980s. Pakistan was able to continue pursuing its nuclear weapons program without penalty until 1990 while securing enormous funds and military material to enhance its capabilities to fight India. Furthermore, Pakistan does not generally acknowledge the role it played in undermining its own security by backing various Pashtun Islamist militants in Afghanistan throughout the 1990s, including the Taliban. (Pakistanis often opine that the CIA created the Taliban.)²²

Another well-rehearsed Pakistani complaint is that Pakistan has been punished disproportionately relative to India for its nuclear weapons program. Pakistan correctly notes that India was the first to proliferate in South Asia. India has had a vigorous nuclear program since the 1950s, and in late 1965, Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri approved the Subterranean Nuclear Explosive Project. In 1974, India conducted so-called peaceful nuclear explosions. Due to the failures of those tests, India exploded several nuclear devices in 1998, prompting Pakistani reciprocal tests a few weeks later. As the revisionist and weaker state, Pakistan could not escape the compulsion to acquire nuclear weapons. Against the backdrop of India's own program and the devastations of the 1971 war in which Pakistan lost East Pakistan due to India's intervention, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto committed Pakistan to acquire its own nuclear program by whatever means necessary.²³ The bitterest invective is reserved for the 1985 Pressler Amendment, which Pakistanis claim was written to punish Islamabad for its nuclear program and note, with some vexation, was invoked only in 1990 after Pakistan was no longer useful to U.S. interests. The reality is more complex.

U.S. congressional nonproliferation efforts were spawned in large measure by India's 1974 test as well as misgivings about the Ford administration's response to India's abuse of Canadian- and U.S.-supplied civilian nuclear assistance. Congress was also increasingly concerned about Pakistan's acquisitions of nuclear items abroad. Congress passed two nonproliferation provisions to the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act (FAA): the 1976 Symington Amendment and the 1977 Glenn Amendment. Together, these provisions prohibit U.S. military and economic assistance to countries that reject full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards for all nuclear facilities and materials; transfer, acquire, deliver, or receive nuclear reprocessing or enrichment technology; or explode or transfer a nuclear device. Congress, wary of Indian and Pakistani intentions, passed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act (NNPA) of

1978 that prohibited the sale of U.S. uranium fuel to countries that refuse “full-scope” IAEA safeguards and inspections.²⁴

In response to the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the United States chose to subordinate its nonproliferation policies to other regional interests. Then–national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski reportedly told President Jimmy Carter that the United States will need to secure Pakistan’s support to oust the Soviets and that this will “require... more guarantees to [Pakistan], more arms aid, and, alas, a decision that our security policy cannot be dictated by our nonproliferation policy.”²⁵ In spite of full knowledge of Pakistan’s nuclear program, Congress added Section 620E to the FAA, which granted the president a qualified authority to waive sanctions for six years, allowing the United States to fund and equip Pakistan for the anti-Soviet jihad. Congress next appropriated annual funds for a six-year program of economic and military aid that totaled \$3.2 billion.²⁶ Despite continued warnings about its nuclear program, Pakistan continued developing a weapons capability. Pakistan’s military leader, Zia ul Haq, asserted that it was Pakistan’s right to do so.²⁷

In 1985, the Pressler Amendment was passed. It made U.S. assistance to Pakistan conditional on an annual presidential assessment and certification that Pakistan did not have nuclear weapons. The amendment allowed the United States to continue providing assistance to Pakistan even though other parts of the U.S. government increasingly believed that Pakistan had crossed the nuclear threshold, meriting sanctions under various U.S. laws. Pakistan was not a passive observer of this congressional activity. Husain Haqqani, now Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States, has explained that the Pressler Amendment was passed with the active involvement of Pakistan’s foreign office, which was keen to resolve the emergent strategic impasse over competing U.S. nonproliferation and regional objectives on one hand and Pakistan’s resolute intentions to acquire nuclear weapons on the other.²⁸ In 1990, when U.S. interests in the region lapsed after the Soviet Union left Afghanistan, the president declined to certify Pakistan, and the sanctions came into force. Even though Pakistanis revile the Pressler Amendment as unfairly punishing Pakistan, it was drafted perversely to allow the United States to continue funding Pakistan despite the nonproliferation concerns rising to the fore within certain U.S. institutions.

Once the Pressler sanctions came into force, Pakistan could not take possession of the 28 F-16s for which it had made payments until 1993, some three years after the sanctions commenced. Pakistan paid the Lockheed Corp.

The U.S. will fail to better align with Pakistan unless it can mitigate “the trust deficit.”

\$658 million for the planes,²⁹ and some reports suggest that Pakistan continued making payments based on Pentagon assurances that continued payments would ensure eventual delivery. Pakistan did not get the planes and was assessed storage and maintenance costs of \$50,000 per month for the planes that sat, becoming evermore obsolete, in the Arizona desert. Under threat of a Pakistani lawsuit, President Bill Clinton resolved the issue in late 1998. Pakistan received \$464 million, mostly in cash, which was the remaining amount of the claim. Clinton also agreed to send Pakistan an additional \$60 million worth of wheat. New Zealand ultimately purchased the F-16s on a 10-year lease-purchase deal that totaled \$105 million.³⁰

Washington clearly needs to demonstrate that it is a reliable security partner for Islamabad. Arguably the onus goes both ways. The United States, on a number of occasions, has tried to negotiate a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Pakistan, which symbolizes U.S. long-term military engagement with a country. Unlike Iraq, which vigorously negotiated the terms of the SOFA, the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs leaked the terms of the SOFA to notorious establishment commentators who proceeded to mischaracterize the agreement and its implications for Pakistan.³¹ Pakistani interlocutors defended this move, arguing that Washington's approach to securing a SOFA was insensitive to Pakistani equities. One of the more sensitive issues of the SOFA pertains to the jurisdiction for U.S. soldiers who may break Pakistani law. Many Pakistanis, in light of Abu Ghraib, Bagram Air Force Base and various events in Iraq, and Guantanamo, doubt that justice would be meted to offenders. Conversely, given the state of Pakistan's shambolic justice system, no U.S. official would grant Pakistan first jurisdiction. Although Pakistan undoubtedly had legitimate concerns, if it truly seeks an enduring relationship with the United States, it should have engaged in a good faith negotiation process even if that process ultimately failed. Its choice not to engage could be construed as *prima facie* evidence that Pakistan merely seeks to extract rents by decrying its doubts of U.S. reliability rather than engaging in a meaningful process to secure a strategic relationship over time.

Unless Pakistan and the United States forthrightly clear the past and establish an understanding of a shared, forward-looking vision, U.S.–Pakistani relations will continue to flounder. Given the persistent and expanding narrative of perfidy on both sides, prospects for mitigating the very real distrust are dim.

Addressing Pakistan's Regional Security Concerns

Unable to change the status quo through military, diplomatic, or political means, Pakistan has cultivated numerous militant groups for decades to attack Indian targets in Indian-administered Kashmir and in the India hinterland, while also relying on various militant groups to secure its interests in

Afghanistan. In many but not all ways, Pakistan's security threats in Afghanistan are derived from its concerns toward India. Afghanistan was the sole opponent to Pakistan's admission to the United Nations and has always enjoyed closer ties to New Delhi than to Islamabad. Pakistan has long feared a two-front war, with borders with Afghanistan (Durand Line) and India (Line of Control) in dispute. For this reason, Pakistan has always sought a friendly government in Kabul that would deny access to New Delhi and would provide Islamabad with strategic depth in the event of a conflict with the former. Despite its varied efforts, which tended to focus on supporting militant groups rather than helping Afghanistan's polity, Pakistan has largely failed to secure a friendly government in Afghanistan. Although the Taliban did not recognize the Durand Line, they offered some modicum of success: they kept the Indians out of most of Afghanistan.

The task is not how to resolve Pakistan's borders, but how to secure a primordially insecure state.

The December 2001 Bonn conference was, in many ways, a conference of Pakistan's defeat. With U.S. military assistance, the Northern Alliance, which had long enjoyed the support and assistance of India, Iran, Russia, and other countries, wrested Kabul from the Taliban. The United States had promised Pakistan that this would not happen. The U.S. decisions to rely on the Northern Alliance in the early years of Operation Enduring Freedom and to retain a light footprint discomfited Pakistan, which feared the emergence of a pro-India Afghanistan. Renowned journalist Ahmed Rashid has argued that these early actions conditioned Pakistan's decision to retain its contacts with the Taliban to thwart the emergence of a hostile Afghanistan aligned with India.³²

Pakistan's fears are not completely ill founded. India seeks to establish its influence in Afghanistan because it seeks to isolate Pakistan politically, diplomatically, and militarily. Equally important, India fears a reemergence of a Taliban-like government because the Taliban and other Islamist militants in the region galvanize India's own militarizing Hindu right, which seeks to rend India's secular democratic commitments in favor of an overt Hindu state identity. Consequently, India has seized numerous opportunities in post-Taliban Afghanistan to exert its influence. India has reestablished historical consulates from which it oversees its popular aid programs, supports its expatriate business community working in Afghanistan, and engages in consular and other activities.³³

Increasingly, analysts argue that Pakistan continues to support the Taliban mainly because of its fears about India. Proponents of this view advocate

Meaningful civilian governance is unlikely to emerge in Pakistan.

approaches to ameliorate Pakistan's security concerns to enable Pakistan to abandon its reliance on the Taliban and other militant groups operating in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Such analysts suggest greater bilateral and international efforts to hasten a resolution of the Kashmir impasse. Similar policy prescriptions include Kabul being more proactive in managing India's presence in

Afghanistan and discouraging India from taking provocative steps such as building schools on Pakistan's border, as it is doing in Kunar; employing the Border Roads Organization (BRO, which is akin to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers) to build sensitive portions of the Ring Road connecting Herat, Qandahar, and Kabul; or using the Indo-Tibetan Police Force or Indian special forces to guard BRO personnel. Proponents of this view also argue that greater efforts are needed to encourage Kabul to accept the Durand Line as the international border with Pakistan. This suite of prescribed policies is animated by the belief that once Pakistan's territorial disputes are resolved, it will no longer require militant proxies and will be more inclined to eliminate those groups it nurtured for so long.³⁴

Indeed, Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan should resolve their differences for many reasons. It is extremely unlikely, however, that any country, much less the United States, has the requisite influence to achieve a resolution of Pakistan's borders in the policy-relevant future. Furthermore, it is not obvious that resolving Pakistan's borders will address Pakistan's security perceptions in a fundamental way, much less motivate the state to abandon a tool of foreign policy that it has used since the inception of the state.³⁵ Pakistan's fears about India are historical, neuralgic, and deeply existential. The Pakistan army cannot imagine a future wherein its very existence is not imperiled by India. Although India's conventional advantages over Pakistan are often overstated, Pakistan believes that it will be at a conventional disadvantage with India in any future conflict.³⁶ India's security ties with Israel, Russia, and the United States; the enormity of the Indian economy; the availability of resources for defense modernization; and the emergence of India as a global power all fuel Pakistan's security concerns. None of these are likely to be assuaged by resolving Pakistan's territorial concerns.

The real task for the international community, therefore, is not how to resolve territorial disputes involving Pakistan's borders, but rather how to secure a primordially insecure state. Given the enduring nature of the trust deficit, Pakistan is unlikely to accept any good faith effort to do so.

Civilianizing a Militarized State

Pakistan analysts have long argued that the most likely path to a stable Pakistan is one that secures civilian dominance over Pakistan's military and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate, which have been the architects of Pakistan's militant policy and other foreign policy misadventures. Since the spring of 2007, Washington begrudgingly came to embrace the need for democracy because Pakistan's restless polity was increasingly demanding it and because Musharraf's self-serving policies seemed to be plunging the country deeper into instability.

At first blush, the army does appear to be the most obvious culprit in a range of misdeeds at home and abroad including nuclear proliferation, militant organization support, war precipitation with India, and democracy suppression at home. Yet, the army does not operate alone. Time and again in recent history, it has come to power by co-opting civilian institutions, in collaboration with political leaders and with the acquiescence of Pakistan's civil society, which at first welcomes a reprieve from the corrupt regime of the civilians. The judiciary has used the doctrine of necessity—"That which otherwise is not lawful, necessity makes lawful"—to justify every military takeover.³⁷ Once in power, the military is able to create its own patronage networks to mitigate resistance to military governance, such as co-opting elements of the existing "mainstream" parties through threats and inducements. Musharraf's Pakistan Muslim League-Qaid (PML-Q) was cobbled together with defectors from the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), and others. Having established their political proxies, military regimes hold inevitably flawed elections and govern with the assistance of a pliant parliament. Therefore, the Pakistani army does not govern without the acquiescence of Pakistan's civilian institutions and leadership.

When the military does not govern directly, it exerts power and influence indirectly with the complicity of the political parties. When in opposition, parties use the military to undermine sitting governments in an effort to secure early elections. For this reason, no parliament ever remained in power for its entire five-year term until the 2002 parliament elected under Musharraf. The military is willing to play this role of power broker in many cases because it fosters the belief that it is the sole institution capable of governing the fractious state.³⁸

Pakistan's enduring civil-military problem has been due, in some measure, to its repeated failure to promulgate an enduring commitment to constitutional rule of law. Pakistan's fifth and most recent constitution was drafted in 1973 and calls for a parliamentary system with a prime minister and a comparably weak president. Military rulers ul Haq and Musharraf significantly altered the constitution in form and substance. Notably, both overturned its prescribed

Washington must secure alternative partnerships to reduce its dependence on Pakistan.

parliamentary form of democracy for a system with a strong president and a weak parliament. Civilian leadership, after returning to power, has been unable or unwilling to reverse these changes. Pakistan's ability to forge an enduring constitutional democracy is roiled by fundamentally different preferences among Pakistan's military, civilian leaders, and civil society, which encompasses Islamists. They have not agreed on the balance between federal and local power, whether or how the state should incorporate areas such as FATA, and whether Pakistan should be a

parliamentary or presidential system. Civilian and military elites disagree where the balance of civil-military power should reside. Virtually all actors are undecided about the appropriate role for Islam in the state.³⁹

Even if Pakistan's elites are able to secure the constitutional rule of law and civilian control over the military, it is not obvious that civilians would pursue policies that substantially differ from those of the military. Previous civilian governments tolerated and even supported some militant enterprises. Key civilian leaders have engaged in political deals with the anti-Shi'a Sipah-e-Sahaba-e-Pakistan (SSP) and other Islamist parties with ties to militant organizations. Pakistan provided extensive military, financial, and political support to the Taliban during Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's second term in office (1993–96). General Nasrullah Babar, her minister of the interior, shaped Pakistan's clandestine activities in Afghanistan in her father's government (Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto served as president (1971–73) and as prime minister (1973–77)). Pakistan's pro-Taliban policy continued during Nawaz Sharif's second term as prime minister (1997–99). Civilian governments have also generally supported the so-called Kashmir jihad, which has entailed supporting numerous militants, many if not most of whom are not Kashmiri, to operate in Indian-administered Kashmir and the Indian hinterland. Because civilian leaders are even more vulnerable to public sentiment than are military governments, they may be less likely to move decisively against the Taliban or other militant groups unless popular sentiment against these groups increases. Moreover, popular sentiment toward controversial policies, such as fighting terrorism, may even harden in response to U.S. actions in Pakistan and elsewhere, undermining any efforts of Pakistan's civilian government to build support around these initiatives.

Perhaps civilian leaders have supported various militant groups and movements in the past to minimize military interference in their domestic

programs and to avoid the appearance that civilian governments are *ipso facto* inimical to the army's preferred policies or even pusillanimous toward Pakistan's traditional foes. It is possible that civilian leadership, in the absence of feared military intervention, would pursue policies that are friendlier toward economic growth (e.g., normalization of relations with its neighbors), shut down all militant groups, invest more in human development, and generally be more responsive to citizens' demands. Nevertheless, without serious efforts to increase party discipline, reduce patronage and corruption, and agree to contest powers within the constitutional framework rather than instrumentalizing the army to undermine opponents, meaningful civilian governance is unlikely to emerge in Pakistan.

Reframing the Problem: Long Shots for Progress

The urgent task before the international community is to help Pakistan understand that shutting down all militant groups in its territory is in its core national security interests. Until Pakistan's strategic managers and citizenry alike embrace this belief, Pakistan will not strategically renounce militancy as a tool of foreign policy. The 2008 Mumbai attacks, along with the countless suicide and other attacks within Pakistan itself, demonstrates the capacity of Pakistani militant groups to undermine regional security. Despite the clear danger they pose, there are few facile means to eliminate them. India has few military options at this juncture because of the specter of nuclear escalation inherent in any conventional conflict with Pakistan. (For this reason, India has sought to develop a limited war doctrine called Cold Start to neutralize the advantages afforded to Pakistan.)⁴⁰

Pakistan has limited capacity to eliminate the militant groups even if it had the requisite will to do so. Arguably, cutting all ties to the militant groups may make them more dangerous as the Pakistani state loses visibility into their activities and forgoes opportunities to gradually rein them in. The international community is reluctant to isolate Pakistan over its ongoing support for militant groups, including the Taliban, because it needs continued access to and assistance from Pakistan for the war in Afghanistan, wants to secure Pakistan's continued actions against al Qaeda, fears proliferation, and seeks greater visibility into the emerging command and control structures over Pakistan's arsenal as well as greater understanding of the dynamics within Pakistan's armed forces.

For these and a myriad of other reasons, the United States and its partners should reframe the problem as one of compellence.⁴¹ Rather than seeking to influence Pakistani behavior through allurements alone, the United States must persuade Pakistan to abandon problematic policies by reconditioning Islamabad's

The U.S. needs a different relationship with Pakistan, relying on different means of influence.

cost-benefit assessment of those policies. To be successful, this campaign will require several elements: a clear demand with reasonable timelines; the induction of positive inducements (“carrots”) as well as effective negative inducements (“sticks”); robust monitoring and verification efforts; and the political will to deploy sticks when needed.⁴²

Such an approach has risks, but adhering to the status quo may be riskier. The current policy likely will breed more violence in Pakistan and beyond, and will increase tensions emerging between Pakistan and the United States as well as Pakistan and its neighbors. Unable to affect change in Islamabad’s policies, dubious of its commitment to the war on terrorism, and fearing collaboration with some elements of the Taliban, Washington has expanded its use of unilateral strikes in the frontier. These strikes are not integrated into a comprehensive, multiagency strategy for Pakistan that engages all U.S. interests in the country. Although few large-scale protests have erupted in Pakistan over these strikes, they have no doubt spawned greater anti-U.S. sentiment among the Pakistan army and polity, which undermines the very cooperation that Washington has sought. A number of actions follow that the new administration may consider as it navigates a new relationship with this important but problematic partner.

First, the United States must insist forthrightly and clearly that Pakistan abandon militancy as a tool of its foreign policy. Working with Pakistan, it should establish reasonable timelines and clear objectives with regular reviews of progress made. Washington must exhibit strategic patience while firmly insisting upon progress. Without an unambiguous demand, Pakistan’s policymakers are unable to respond decisively or, worse, may conclude from other contradictory U.S. actions and statements that the stated need for Pakistan to renounce militancy is intended for domestic or international political purposes.⁴³ With the exception of the post-September 11 demarche to Musharraf, the United States has demurred from presenting Pakistan with such a stark choice on this or other issues.

Second, Washington must secure alternative partnerships to reduce its exposure to and dependence on Pakistan. Washington has had little political will to condition aid; cut off military assistance; target militant infrastructure outside of FATA, such as in Baluchistan; or forthrightly insist that Pakistan abandon the use of militants because Washington, along with NATO, remains dependent on Pakistan’s logistical assistance for the war in Afghanistan. There has been recent progress on this front. Motivated by increasing Pakistani attacks on convoys carrying supplies for the war in Afghanistan, the United States and

NATO are seeking new logistical supply routes. In April 2008, Russia and NATO agreed on land transits for nonlethal freight through Russian territory to NATO forces in Afghanistan.⁴⁴ Yet, Russia's relations with NATO and the United States are still tense due to Russia's invasion of Georgia, and Russia does not share a border with Afghanistan. The United States and NATO need to redouble their efforts to secure agreements with the numerous countries through which potential new routes will pass. Russian help will not mitigate the requirement to move lethal goods, which will increase with the planned infusion of more troops into Afghanistan. While these can be airlifted, this is a costly option.

Pakistan may be the preferred partner for success in the war on terrorism, but clearly Washington could choose to work with other regional partners if it adopted a less ideological stance. Washington's resistance to engaging Iran, even on the limited issue of stabilizing Afghanistan, is rooted to its contemporary concerns about Iran's nuclear proliferation and support for terrorism in addition to historical antipathy stemming from the hostage crisis and Iran's views toward Israel.⁴⁵ It is difficult to argue, however, that Iran's misdeeds in the arenas of proliferation or militancy exceed those of Pakistan. While the United States and NATO are looking to Central Asian states for new supply routes, India's ties with Iran could be leveraged to move supplies into Afghanistan. India is already working with Iran on a set of projects in Afghanistan.⁴⁶ Moreover, Iran and the United States did cooperate early in Operation Enduring Freedom because Iran fundamentally supported the U.S. effort to oust the Taliban. Iran was subsequently included in the "axis of evil" and has since worked to undermine international efforts in Afghanistan. U.S. willingness to dramatically reorganize relations in the region will telegraph the seriousness of its intentions to Islamabad, which has thus far relied on the belief that the United States needs Pakistan more than it needs the United States.

Third, the United States should be more proactive in engaging with states that Pakistan takes seriously, particularly China and Saudi Arabia. Pakistan considers these states as backups when its lucrative security ties with the United States sour. In reality, neither can provide Pakistan the assistance it needs to remain competitive with India. The United States should work more closely with these important states to forge some consensus on how best to help Pakistan navigate toward the path of contributing to regional security rather than undermining it.

Fourth, while working to mitigate Washington's reliance on Islamabad, the United States should put forward a meaningful assistance package that is better configured to meet U.S. objectives. The United States should use military assistance to help Pakistan become a capable counterinsurgency and counterterrorism force. Strategic systems should be offered as a reward for demonstrated

The U.S. must be willing to consider Pakistan an ill-suited recipient of U.S. generosity.

performance rather than as an inducement for actions Washington hopes Islamabad will undertake.

At the same time, the United States, working with multilateral agencies and its partners, must undertake a comprehensive effort to support the development of genuine democracy in Pakistan. The United States should focus on building civilian institutions including judicial reform, improving civilian police and intelligence

capabilities, enhancing the capabilities of parliament and the provincial assemblies, professionalizing the various political parties, and seeking to build local government capacity if possible. Whereas everyone discusses expanding international military education and training for Pakistan's officers, no one speaks of a similar effort to build Pakistan's civilian capacity. Pakistan's parliament can learn much from other parliamentary democracies about setting up secure defense committees in which they can monitor military activities and hold them accountable. Genuine assessment of program efficacy must be undertaken throughout the varied interventions.

The United States should be willing to be experimental, expanding programs that work and jettisoning programs that do not. Transparency and accountability of U.S. funds must be a prerequisite. This effort will likely entail expanding the U.S. mission in the country and accepting more risk to achieve U.S. objectives. It must involve Pakistani counterparts who are responsible for designing interventions and implementing them. Washington should move away from supply-driven aid that offers few positive impacts and encourages corruption. Better governance should be the prerequisite for, and the goal of, U.S. programming. The United States should coordinate with other bilateral and multilateral investors. Otherwise, Pakistan will seek out funders who demand less accountability to circumvent U.S. efforts.

The United States needs to work to empower Pakistan's citizenry through direct assistance to Pakistan's various civil society organizations, including the vibrant new media, or through multilateral agencies or other partners. Musharraf's downfall was achieved through a galvanized Pakistani civil society. Perhaps over time, Pakistan's citizens can place greater demands on their system for reform.

While Washington develops a set of positive inducements, it must develop an accompanying suite of negative inducements. In the context of Pakistan, such negative inducements could include severely restricting military assistance, severely conditioning or even completely ceasing strategic weapons systems sales and resupply of spare parts, declaring individuals and groups to be supporters of

terrorism and subject to sanctions, and declaring Pakistan to be a state that supports terrorism, among other admittedly unsavory options. The most obvious activities to precipitate the use or threat of use of such instruments concern ongoing support for terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and civilian control over the military, all of which are addressed in U.S. law and by various UN resolutions.

Admittedly, such an approach risks strengthening the army while further undermining civilian governance and may further alienate Pakistan's wary citizenry. Although using sticks is highly undesirable, the past seven years demonstrate that carrots alone do not precipitate positive change. Quite the contrary. The only time in recent history when Pakistan agreed to the most expansive of U.S. demands was in September 2001 when Musharraf agreed to abandon the Taliban following a clear exposition by Secretary of State Colin Powell that Pakistan is "either with us or against us." It is clear from Musharraf's own account of that choice that the prospect of coercive force was real and decisive. After what he described as a "shockingly barefaced threat," he "war-gamed the United States as an adversary" and concluded that Pakistan could not "withstand the onslaught."⁴⁷ By the same token, broad sanctions levied between 1990 and 2001 harmed U.S. interests more than they curbed Pakistani behavior. This relocates the onus of political will and creativity from Islamabad to Washington.

The Need for Sober Realism

The United States needs to chart a different relationship with Pakistan, relying on different instruments of influence. It needs to lessen its dependence on Pakistan so it can be bolder in applying negative as well as positive inducements to shape Pakistani behavior. It needs to develop a suite of assistance that strengthens Pakistan's governance capacity and the country's ability to wage counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations effectively. And it needs to support Pakistani civil society as it debates the kind of country it wants to become and seeks to hold its government to account for its crimes of commission and omission. In the end, despite continued U.S. and international support and assistance along these lines, Pakistan may remain unwilling or unable to relinquish support for militant groups within its territory or in the region. In this case, the United States must be willing to consider Pakistan an ill-suited recipient of U.S. generosity and be willing to deploy punitive measures if need be.⁴⁸ Indeed, a credible U.S. threat to apply these sticks may encourage the state to undertake needed steps to secure its own security and that of its neighborhood in the first instance.

Although this may seem untenable at first blush, the alternatives are even worse. If the international community cannot save Pakistan, and if it cannot save itself, then the United States and its partners will have to reorient their efforts

toward containing or mitigating the various threats that emanate from Pakistan. This will be a daunting task. The enormity of such efforts should motivate Washington to adopt a realistic policy approach that mobilizes all aspects of U.S. national power to secure a Pakistan at peace with itself and its neighbors.

Notes

1. K. Alan Kronstadt, "Pakistan-U.S. Relations," *CRS Report for Congress*, RL33498, August 25, 2008, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498.pdf>.
2. Data on Pakistanis' views of al Qaeda are difficult to interpret. Many survey participants in Pakistan often decline to answer questions about al Qaeda, sometimes out of fear of repercussions or doubts that al Qaeda exists in terms attributed to it. Many Pakistanis who accept al Qaeda's existence and Osama Bin Laden as its leader find it difficult to believe that bin Laden is a terrorist and cling to the belief that he is a good Muslim and because good Muslims do not kill innocent persons, bin Laden could not have done what is alleged. For an example of how Pakistani respondents' survey participation differs from other countries, see Steven Kull et al., "Muslim Public Opinion on U.S. Policy, Attacks on Civilians and al Qaeda," *WorldPublicOpinion.org*, April 24, 2007, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/apr07/START_Apr07_rpt.pdf.
3. Terror Free Tomorrow (TFT), "New Poll of Pakistan Before June 2008 By-Elections," 2008, <http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/upimagestft/PakistanPollReportJune08.pdf>.
4. See C. Christine Fair, Clay Ramsay, and Steve Kull, "Pakistani Public Opinion on Democracy, Islamist Militancy, and Relations With the U.S.," *USIP Working Paper*, February 2008, http://www.usip.org/pubs/working_papers/wp7_pakistan.pdf; "IRI Index: Pakistan Public Opinion Survey, January 19–29, 2008," International Republican Institute, <http://www.iri.org/mena/pakistan.asp>; TFT, "New Poll of Pakistan Before June 2008 By-Elections."
5. CSF funds are received by 27 countries in total, and Pakistan is the largest recipient. For critiques of the program, see U.S. Government Accountability Office, "Combating Terrorism: U.S. Oversight of Pakistan Reimbursement Claims for Coalition Support Funds," GAO-08-932T, June 24, 2008, <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-932T>; U.S. Government Accountability Office, "The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan to Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas," GAO-08-622, April 2008, <http://nationalsecurity.oversight.house.gov/documents/20080417120235.pdf>; Craig Cohen, *A Perilous Course: U.S. Strategy and Assistance to Pakistan* (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 2007); Craig Cohen and Derek Chollet, "When \$10 Billion Is Not Enough," *The Washington Quarterly* 30, no. 2 (Spring 2007): 7–19; Greg Miller, "Pakistan Fails to Aim Billions in U.S. Military Aid at al Qaeda," *Los Angeles Times*, November 5, 2007, p. A1.
6. In 2008, convoy movement and security emerged as a significant factor. In March 2008, some 40 fuel trucks destined for Afghanistan were attacked. Kathy Gannon, "Attacks on Khyber Trucking Threaten U.S. Supply Line," *USA Today*, May 20, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-05-20-455816233_x.htm. In September, the NWFP government denied NATO fuel trucks access to Torkham in likely protest to unilateral attacks on Pakistani territory. Bill Roggio, "Pakistan Closes Torkham Border Crossing, Shuts Down NATO's Supply Line," *Long War Journal*, September 6, 2008, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/09/pakistan_closes_tork.php; "Hijackers in

- Pakistan Seize Supply Convoy,” *International Herald Tribune*, November 11, 2008, <http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/11/11/asia/AS-Pakistan.php>; Riaz Khan and Fisnik Abrashi, “U.S. Supply Line Threatened by Pakistan Truck Halt,” Associated Press, November 16, 2008, http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20081116/ap_on_re_as/as_afghanistan.
7. C. Christine Fair, *The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation With Pakistan and India* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004).
 8. In addition, numerous U.S. intelligence and military officials have attested to the role of Pakistan’s tribal areas as sanctuaries for these groups. J. Michael McConnell, “Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Armed Services Committee,” testimony before the Senate Armed Forces Committee, February 27, 2008, http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20080227_testimony.pdf; John D. Negroponte, “Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence,” testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, January 11, 2007, <http://intelligence.senate.gov/070111/negroponte.pdf>; Carlotta Gall, “Afghan Rebels Find a Haven in Pakistan, Musharraf Says,” *The New York Times*, August 12, 2007, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/12/world/asia/12cnd-afghan.html>; Kathy Gannon, “Pakistan Militants Focus on Afghanistan; Jihadist Groups Are Increasingly Attacking U.S., NATO Forces in Afghanistan,” Associated Press, July 14, 2008, <http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=5366235>.
 9. Mandakini Gahlot, “Antony Warns of Increase in Infiltration Bids,” *IndianExpress.com*, May 14, 2008, <http://www.indianexpress.com/news/antony-warns-of-increase-in-infiltration-bids/309331> (comments by Indian defense minister).
 10. For a test of the dossier, see <http://www.hindu.com/nic/dossier.htm>. See also “Terror Evidence in Indian Dossier Credible: U.S.,” *Times of India*, January 7, 2009, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Terror_evidence_in_Indian_dossier_credible_US/articleshow/3947694.cms.
 11. Immediately after the September 11 attacks, Congress enacted the 2001 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Recovery From and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States, which appropriated \$600 million in cash transfers under Economic Support Funds (ESF) for Pakistan. See *2001 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Recovery From and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States*, Public Law 107-38, 107th Cong., 1st sess. (September 18, 2001). Congress also authorized Islamabad to use the fiscal years 2003 and 2004 ESF allocations to cancel nearly \$1.5 billion in concessional debts to the U.S. government. Between FY 2005 and FY 2009, the administration agreed that Pakistan would receive about \$200 million of its ESF as “budget support,” which amounts to about two-thirds of the total allocation. In principle, Islamabad was to use these cash transfers to increase public expenditures on education, enhance macroeconomic performance, improve the quality of and access to health care, and complete the “Shared Objectives,” which are derived from Pakistan’s own Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, which guides the work of the international donor community. See “Pakistan: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper,” *IMF Country Report 04/24* (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, January 2004), <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2004/cr0424.pdf>. Both the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) maintain that the funds were used in accordance to the shared objectives and were closely monitored. Yet, criticisms regarding the fungibility of those funds, which could be redirected by the Pakistani government to support other programs, remained. Finally, in December 2007 the State Department announced that budget support for Pakistan will henceforth be “projectized to ensure the money is targeted at the most urgent priorities.” Kronstadt, “Pakistan-U.S. Relations.”

12. After securing Musharraf's agreement to step down as army chief by December 2004—a demand advanced most strongly by the MMA—the national assembly passed the seventeenth amendment to the constitution in December 2003, which legitimized Musharraf's decrees since he seized power in 1999, including the LFO. Zaffar Abbas, "Analysis: Musharraf Sidelines Parliament," *BBCNews.com*, August 21, 2002, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/>; K. Alan Kronstadt, "Pakistan's Domestic Political Developments," *CRS Report for Congress*, RL32615, September 19, 2005, <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/54312.pdf>.
13. Clark C. Gibson et al., *The Samaritan's Dilemma: The Political Economy of Development Aid* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
14. Indeed, many USAID employees interviewed by this author about programs in Afghanistan and Pakistan suggest this conclusion. Independent verification of these assessments is not easily available. According to the 2005 testimony of Roger Bate of the American Enterprise Institute, "[a]lthough exact figures are unclear, USAID spends a significant percentage of international development funds on domestic goods and services. Data from USAID's Buy American Report, the best available assessment, indicates that over the last decade, between 70 and 80 percent of funding appropriations were directed to U.S. sources." Roger Bate, "The Blind Hydra: USAID Policy Fails to Control Malaria," testimony before the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, and International Security, May 12, 2005, http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.22508/pub_detail.asp. See Rubén Berríos, *Contracting for Development: The Role of For-profit Contractors in U.S. Foreign Development Assistance* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2000).
15. Frederic Grare, "Rethinking Western Strategies Toward Pakistan: An Action Agenda for the United States and Europe," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 2007, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/grare_pakistan_final.pdf.
16. The most developed and optimistic of such efforts was forged by Daniel Markey at the Council on Foreign Relations. Unfortunately, Markey's well-considered plans either have been overtaken by events or assume a level of commitment by Pakistan that is simply untenable. Daniel Markey, *Securing Pakistan's Tribal Belt* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2008), http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Pakistan_CSR36.pdf. See Joshua T. White, "Pakistan's Islamist Frontier: Islamic Politics and U.S. Policy in Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province," *Religion and Security Monograph Series*, no. 1 (2008), [http://www.pakistanstudies-aips.org/English/PDF/Islamist%20Frontier%20\(summary\).pdf](http://www.pakistanstudies-aips.org/English/PDF/Islamist%20Frontier%20(summary).pdf).
17. Pakistan has declined to extend the political parties act to FATA, which is the legislation that regulates the activities of political parties.
18. See C. Christine Fair and Peter Chalk, *Fortifying Pakistan: The Role of U.S. Internal Security Assistance to Pakistan* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace (USIP), 2006); Seth G. Jones et al., *Securing Tyrants or Fostering Reform? Evaluating U.S. Internal Security Assistance to Selected Repressive and Transitioning Regimes* (Washington, D.C.: RAND, 2006), pp. 125–160.
19. Ahmed Rashid, "Pakistan's Worrisome Pullback," *Washington Post*, June 6, 2008, p. A19.
20. David O. Smith. "Facing Up to the Trust Deficit: The Key to an Enhanced U.S.-Pakistan Defense Relationship," *Strategic Insights* 6, no. 4 (June 2007), <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Jun/smithJun07.asp>.
21. Richard P. Cronin et al., "Pakistan's Nuclear Proliferation Activities and the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission: U.S. Policy Constraints and Options,"

- CRS Report for Congress, RL32734, May 24, 2005, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL32745.pdf>.
22. To achieve a reasonably stable Afghanistan whose leadership was positively disposed toward Islamabad, Pakistan supported a Pashtun militant faction, Hizb-e-Islami, led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. When Hekmatyar failed to deliver, Pakistan shifted course and threw its support behind the Taliban.
 23. Stephen M. Meyer, *The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986).
 24. See Robert Hathaway, "Confrontation and Retreat: The U.S. Congress and the South Asian Nuclear Tests," *Arms Control Today*, January/February 2000, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_01-02/rhchart.asp; Barbara LePoer et al., "India-Pakistan Nuclear Tests and U.S. Response," CRS Report for Congress, 98-570, November 24, 1998; Jeanne Grimmett, "Nuclear Sanctions: Section 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act and Its Application to India and Pakistan," CRS Report for Congress, 98-486A, October 5, 2001, https://www.policyarchive.org/bitstream/handle/10207/628/98-486_20011005.pdf?sequence=2. In addition, both the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group came into being in response to India's test. See http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/inventory/pdfs/zang.pdf.
 25. Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001* (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), p. 51.
 26. Cronin et al., "Pakistan's Nuclear Proliferation Activities and the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission."
 27. Ibid.
 28. Husain Haqqani, "Pakistan Crisis and U.S. Policy Options" (speech, Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C., November 27, 2007), <http://www.heritage.org/Press/Events/archive.cfm?startdate=12/31/2007&days=364>.
 29. In 1995, Congress made a one-time modification to the Pressler Amendment that allowed Pakistan to receive non-F-16-related military equipment. This reduced Pakistan's claim to \$463.7 million. Thomas W. Lippman, "U.S. Pays Pakistan for F-16s Withheld Over Nuclear Issue," *The Washington Post*, January 1, 1999, p. A17.
 30. Much of the settlement (\$324.6 million) came from a fund maintained by the U.S. Department of the Treasury to pay litigants who succeeded or would probably succeed in court claims against the U.S. government. Utilizing these funds allowed the administration to avoid asking for an appropriation from Congress, which likely would have refused the request because many lawmakers believed that Pakistan created the problem by providing false assurances on its nuclear program and by continuing to pay for the planes with full knowledge of U.S. law. Lippman, "U.S. Pays Pakistan for F-16s Withheld Over Nuclear Issue." Other accounts report somewhat different figures. *Arms Control Today* reported that the "United States agreed to pay Islamabad \$326.9 million, almost all of which will come from the Treasury Department Judgment Fund (used to settle legal disputes), and provide goods worth another \$140 million, including \$60 million in wheat. Washington had earlier reimbursed Islamabad \$157 million for the fighters New Zealand announced on December 1 that it would purchase, through two consecutive five-year leases, the 28 fighters previously sold to Pakistan. The proposed deal is estimated at between \$105 [million] and \$125 million." "U.S. to Repay Pakistan for Undelivered F-16s," *Arms Control Today*, November/December 1998, <http://www.armscontrol.org/node/3191>.
 31. Shireen Mazari, "Islamabad Rejects New Demands," *The News*, March 8, 2008, http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?ld=13430.

32. See Ahmed Rashid, *Descent Into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia* (New York: Viking, 2008).
33. Many Sikh and Hindu families from Afghanistan have moved to India.
34. For an example of such a view, see Barnett R. Rubin and Ahmed Rashid, "From Great Game to Grand Bargain: Ending Chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistan," *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 6 (November/December 2008), <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20081001faesay87603/barnett-r-rubin-ahmed-rashid/from-great-game-to-grand-bargain.html>.
35. In 1947 the nascent Pakistani army trained and facilitated a tribal militia to invade Kashmir in an effort to take it by force, culminating in the first India-Pakistan war in 1947.
36. John H. Gill, "India and Pakistan: A Shift in the Military Calculus?" in *Strategic Asia, 2005–06: Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty*, ed. Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2005).
37. Ayesha Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defense* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Stephen P. Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2004), pp. 57–58; Zulfikar Khalid Maluka, *The Myth of Constitutionalism in Pakistan* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
38. See Shuja Nawaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008); Ayesha Siddiqi, *Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy* (London: Pluto Press, 2007).
39. Paula R. Newberg, *Judging the State: Courts and Constitutional Politics in Pakistan* (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Maluka, *Myth of Constitutionalism in Pakistan*.
40. Walter C. Ladwig, "A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine," *International Security* 32, no. 3 (2008): 158–190.
41. For a discussion of compellence, also sometimes called coercion, see Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996).
42. Steven Greffenius and Jungil Gill, "Pure Coercion vs. Carrot-and-Stick Offers in Crisis Bargaining," *Journal of Peace Research* 29, no. 1 (1992): 39–52. They found that that carrot and stick offerings produce more accommodation than coercion alone when the target has already demonstrated resolve.
43. See Alexander L. George, *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War* (Washington, D.C.: USIP, 1991).
44. Russian News and Information Agency, "Russia, NATO Agree on Transit of Non-Lethal Cargo to Afghanistan," April 4, 2008, <http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080404/103017125.html>.
45. Iran has its own litany of contemporary complaints (e.g., U.S. military presence on nearly every border, U.S.-led efforts to retard Iran's nuclear program, commitments to regime change) and historical concerns over U.S. interference in Iranian governments, most notably the 1953 overthrow of Iran's democratically elected government under Prime Minister Muhammad Mosaddeq.
46. C. Christine Fair, "India and Iran: New Delhi's Balancing Act," *The Washington Quarterly* 30, no. 3 (Summer 2007): 145–159.
47. Pervez Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006), p. 201.
48. Pakistan Policy Working Group, *The Next Chapter: The United States and Pakistan* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, September 2008), http://www.usip.org/pubs/ppwg_report.pdf. The author was a participant in this group.