

Talking with Insurgents: A Guide for the Perplexed

Talking with insurgents is often a necessary first step toward defeating them or reaching an acceptable compromise. These talks must often be done even as insurgents shoot at U.S. soldiers, and they in turn, shoot at them. Iraq represents perhaps the most recent and notable case where diplomacy triumphed: U.S. efforts to reach out to Iraqi Sunni tribal groups, many of which were linked to various insurgent organizations, eventually paid vast dividends as these tribes “flipped” and began to work with the coalition against al Qaeda in Iraq.¹ In Shi‘a areas, both direct and indirect talks helped facilitate a ceasefire that has done much to keep Iraq’s fragile peace intact.

Not surprisingly, U.S. policymakers have looked to negotiations as a possible answer to the other major counterinsurgency challenge facing the country today, namely the Afghan insurgency against the Karzai government. Like the Iraqi insurgents, the Afghan insurgency is fractious, consisting of six main groups, most of which have divisions within them that could be exploited to convince some insurgents to abandon the overall insurgency and perhaps others to even join against their former allies. Unlike the Iraqi insurgents, however, the Afghan insurgency enjoys considerable support from a neighboring state, Pakistan.

Yet, talks are not cheap. They often fail and can even backfire. Talks provide legitimacy to the other side, a concession that some insurgent groups desperately seek. Talks may discredit those who have long called for peace, rewarding the use of violence. At times, cynical insurgent groups simply use the lull in fighting to rearm and regroup, becoming more deadly as a result of the negotiations. When done unilaterally, talks may also anger allies, who may be unable to negotiate for

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political reasons.² Moreover, talks and the use of force usually go together rather than being seen as alternatives. As a result, insurgent groups are more likely to negotiate if they believe they have little chance of success on the battlefield.

There are indeed costs involved when engaging with insurgents. Some successful attempts, however, indicate that sometimes the advantages may outweigh the costs.³

Can the lessons drawn from the successes in the past be applied in Afghanistan? If so, what are the consequences for Afghanistan and U.S. counterinsurgency strategy?

Getting Engagement Started

Initiating talks with insurgents is difficult. Governments often hope to defeat insurgencies outright, and the decision to begin talks usually requires a government to admit that there is no immediate hope for that outcome, which is a politically and bureaucratically difficult step. Moreover, it is the unusual insurgent group that does not attack civilians and use terrorism as one of its tactics. Having spent years demonizing the insurgents for their bloody misdeeds and having tried hard to create popular support for fighting them makes it difficult for government leaders to suddenly embrace, even from a distance, those they also are trying to kill. Not surprisingly, at the very least leaders on both sides may want gestures of good faith from the other before talks begin. To minimize the chance that an offer of talks might be turned down in an embarrassing way, or viewed as “soft” by one’s own side, governments have resorted to a host of methods for beginning engagement short of open and official talks.

One way to talk without talking is simply to issue a series of declarations. This approach can be done in a less grandiose way, with officials granting interviews or otherwise encouraging media reports that convey their message on the conditions for negotiations. For example, the French government of Charles de Gaulle made several rhetorical offers to FLN (*Front de Libération Nationale*) in Algeria, promising considerable concessions from the start of his return to power in 1958. Using declarations rather than direct negotiations offers governments a political advantage as they can claim they are condemning violence even as they hold out the possibility of talks. The declarations, of course, often are necessarily vague and are difficult to use for delicate discussions of any *quid pro quo*.⁴

An alternative to the public but distant approach via declarations and the media is to rely on trusted intermediaries who, discreetly, will pass messages to

insurgent groups. Governments may quietly use members of a foreign government or dependable members of a community to convey messages. Such individuals can be more easily disavowed given their lack of links to the government in question. A more official but still discreet method is for governments to use intelligence officers or other deniable but official individuals as interlocutors. When such a back channel is leaked, it can prove embarrassing to governments that claimed not to negotiate with insurgents, but the use of intelligence officials is less politically risky than formal ties. At times this contact can be disguised by claims that the talks will focus on narrow “tactical” issues such as the treatment of prisoners and hostages or reducing civilian casualties. Because they are not deniable, diplomats or other senior officials can convey the seriousness of a government’s commitment to talks more convincingly than other interlocutors.

As the above examples suggest, governments have a range of options when they are considering talks with insurgents. Some offer more legitimacy to the insurgents than others and the political risk varies with each.

Potential Rewards of Engagement

Talks can convince insurgent leaders and cadre to reject violence or, if that ambitious goal should fail, foster dissent within the insurgent group’s ranks, which in turn may lead the group to implode.⁵ Talks can foster these general conditions through a variety of specific mechanisms.

One of the most important means of influencing an insurgency through talks is to change the opinions of the group’s real and supposed constituents. An offer of talks may not convince insurgent leaders to change course by itself, but their publics, who hope that talks might lead to peace and other benefits, may become less supportive of violence. This increases pressure on the group to hold off on violence for fear of losing recruits, money, shelter, intelligence, and overall sympathy.⁶

Ironically, over time, bringing insurgents into a government through talks may turn its constituents against the group. Some insurgent organizations enjoy a level of popularity because they are not tainted by politics, a particularly valuable claim in regions such as the Middle East and South Asia where corruption is rampant. By allowing or encouraging groups entrée into politics as part of engagement, some group members are likely to put their hand in the till, not deliver on grandiose promises, fail to stop crime, or otherwise tarnish their ostensibly pure image.

Just as talks can change the opinions of constituents, they can also strengthen more moderate elements within an insurgent group, which in turn increases the chances of successful negotiation. Talks are even more likely to affect the

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perceptions of less committed sympathizers, who may favor a group's cause but prefer peace if possible. So even if talks do not succeed in gentling the entire group, they may create divisions within it. Insurgent groups that enjoy widespread support often are vulnerable to fissures, as the members' goals and commitment levels are likely to vary considerably. Talks that lead to an offer of concessions can create fractures

within a movement. When the Algerian government began offering amnesty to various Islamist militants who had fought it bitterly in the 1990s, some of the anti-government movements surrendered while others split.

Talks also serve key intelligence purposes. Talks can provide additional information on an insurgent group's true priorities, while shedding light on members with the most influence. Intelligence rewards may grow even larger if moderate constituents linked to a group can be wooed. When the Egyptian government began offering concessions to the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood in exchange for its rejection of the more violent Egyptian Islamic Jihad, it was better able to gain information on the radicals.

If the talks show even partial success, they can produce tremendous intelligence benefits. Since different movements battling for similar causes often draw from similar constituents, former fighters are ideally positioned to give government counterinsurgency forces the information they need. If part of a movement begins to cooperate with the government, it can help identify fellow fighters, reveal lines of supply, explain communication methods, or otherwise reveal a range of vital tactical information. In western Iraq, the U.S. intelligence picture changed almost overnight, with information from now friendly tribal forces enabling much more effective operations against foreign jihadists.

Finally, there are risks of not negotiating. Insurgency is not static. A refusal to engage in talks may strengthen extremists by showing that nonviolent means offer no hope. In addition, some insurgent organizations spring from moderate movements that encountered only government repression. A refusal to talk may thus discourage new leaders who might otherwise have preferred peaceful means of change. Hamas and other Islamists, for example, historically gained more support when peace talks were foundering.⁷ Similarly, a massive insurgency in Algeria began after the military government refused to recognize that Islamists had won elections and thus deserved power.

Risks Involved

Talks with insurgents also have many risks, ranging from political embarrassment to encouraging more violence and even strengthening the group's capacity for bloodshed. Not surprisingly, these concerns make governments particularly leery of even the prospects of negotiations with insurgent groups.

The most commonly cited objection to talks with insurgents is that talking actually formally recognizes the insurgency, and may lead to the misconception that there are rewards for using violent methods. Many insurgents crave legitimacy, and even if talks involve no concessions on the part of a government, recognizing insurgents as worthy interlocutors can be seen as a victory by potential followers and other states. Other insurgents and would-be insurgents may believe that continued or even increased violence may lead to eventual recognition.

Paying the price of recognition might be worthwhile if there was a guarantee of success in the end. Alas, most talks are likely to end in failure, or at least the initial rounds do. The conditions for ending long-standing conflicts are often difficult or impossible to meet, and terrorism in particular needs only a small group of people to continue. Putting a government's credibility on the line, both at home and overseas, is thus risky while those advocating talks on both the government and insurgent side risk looking foolish.

Even success, when it comes, often is incremental rather than complete. Success is a challenge that increases the political price of talks. Some groups may accept a ceasefire or other conditions for talks, but engage in activities that suggest a change of heart remains far off. Hamas has repeatedly declared ceasefires. Some it has broken, and others were broken by Palestinian groups that Hamas claimed it did not control.

Government efforts to split a movement and wean the moderates away sometimes succeed, but enough hardcore members remain that at least some violence will continue, and there may be a shift to more terrorism. Many members of M-19 in Columbia turned away from bloodshed, but a violent fringe remained.⁸ This partial success, while far from ideal, can still reduce the scale of violence and make it easier to gather intelligence on the perpetrators. Nevertheless, while insurgency presents more of a political threat than terrorism, many citizens find the possibility of terrorism in previously safe cities more daunting than the reality of a bloodier guerrilla war near a remote border or faraway province.

An engaged movement itself may reject violence, but new groups may form from rejectionist remnants. The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, the dominant fighting organization when the insurgency in Kashmir first broke out, has been willing to embrace peaceful methods over time. More radical groups,

An offer of talks may change the opinions of the group's constituents or strengthen moderates.

mostly Islamists who usually worked with Pakistan, rejected peaceful methods, and so the fighting continues. Such new players may actually increase their use of violence in order to derail promising peace talks.⁹

Even if splinters do not emerge as rival movements, “spoilers” within the group are a constant problem for any attempt to end a conflict. Insurgent groups are particularly likely to produce what Stephen Stedman

has labeled “total spoilers,” or factions that seek total power and cannot be swayed by limited concessions.¹⁰ An insurgent leadership faces a dilemma when it cannot completely control all its own members, even if the leadership itself has genuinely embraced peace. By 1998, Gerry Adams and the Provisional IRA were well on the way to abandoning violence. The Real IRA splinter group, however, conducted a car bombing in Omagh that killed 29 people in an effort to derail the peace process. For Adams, this bombing posed a dilemma, as condemning the violence would weaken his credibility among militants. Pretending continued control, moreover, would leave him open to charges that he deliberately incited the violence. Admitting a lack of control, however, would discredit him as a negotiating partner, as he could not claim to end the violence.

Some groups may enter talks and even proclaim a ceasefire with no intention of permanently renouncing violence. Because insurgent groups often win by demonstrating their staying power, simply buying time in the face of an aggressive government counterinsurgency campaign can be immensely valuable to them. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam repeatedly used ceasefires to rearm and regroup for the next offensive in northern Sri Lanka.

The entry of insurgents into talks can also transform the political scene. If insurgents are allowed to participate in politics, they will be able to challenge moderate but weak political leaders and thus may radicalize peaceful opposition or even take control of the government. In Lebanon today, Hizballah's successful entry into politics has not led it completely away from anti-Israeli violence. Its political successes, however, have given veto power over Lebanese government decisions and control over such key facilities as the Beirut airport. Moreover, they can use their peaceful political organizations to feed money and recruits into their radical wing, a process that can prove particularly devastating should the group go underground again.

Governments will also pay a price if they talk to insurgent groups that are active against an ally. A U.S. decision to talk to insurgent groups in Pakistan,

for example, is likely to anger the Indian government. Israeli spokesmen have similarly protested any talks with Hamas, declaring that they are “a recipe for Hamas to continue terrorist attacks to destroy the state of Israel.”¹¹ Such talks, even low level informal ones such as the ones that Hamas and Israel conducted on the access of goods into Gaza after Hamas seized power there in 2007, infuriated moderate Palestinians who had for many years tried to negotiate a peace. In their eyes, Israel was rewarding the use of violence and discrediting those who had urged restraint.

Asking the Right Questions: Eight to Consider

Whether engagement succeeds or fails depends on many factors, most of which are outside the control of the government in question. U.S. policymakers and analysts should consider several questions as they decide whether a particular group should be engaged:

What Can the United States Offer?

An obvious question with no consistent answer is whether the United States can put enough on the table to make the insurgent group even consider changing its behavior. In some cases, the United States can convey a tremendous degree of legitimacy. For nationalist groups, talks with Washington are part of the recognition they hope will eventually lead to their being granted a state, or at least greater autonomy. In other instances, Washington can exert considerable influence over the local government in question. In Iraq, the United States was able to offer nationalist insurgents money and firepower if they turned against al-Qaeda in Iraq. At the same time, the occasional U.S. inability to restrain the Maliki government from working with anti-Sunni Shi'a militias called into question the value of cooperation with the United States.

But U.S. influence is not uniform. The United States is peripheral to many conflicts around the globe because its interests in the country have historically been limited. Washington, for example, has kept its distance from the civil war in Algeria, in part because the regime there was suspicious of the United States and because U.S. interests in the region were limited. In such cases, the “reward” of talks with the United States would be limited for Islamist insurgent groups.

Can the Insurgent Group Win Outright?

Insurgents are more likely to engage in talks without preconditions if they believe a victory through arms is unreachable. Indeed, there is an entire literature on the “ripeness” of various civil conflicts and when they are ready for resolution.¹² The PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) was willing to talk to the Turkish government and make significant concessions in the late 1990s because

it had lost its sanctuary in Syria, its leader was arrested, and the organization in general seemed to be on the run. On the other hand, if an insurgency is losing, the government's incentives to engage in talks diminish, as outright victory seems possible. Anti-colonial groups such as the Algerian FLN could make far more demands as a precondition for talks because violence was demonstrably producing political results in France.

Who Wins a Fair Election?

Insurgents are more likely to renounce violence if they believe they can win at the ballot box. Insurgents crave power. UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) returned to rebellion after UN-brokered elections in 1992 failed to bring it to political power. Elections also offer nonviolent moderates a chance at power, and this poses a risk for an insurgency's control over its own community. Much depends then on a group's political prospects. The African National Congress, for example, could be confident that engaging the government with the promise of entering politics would eventually lead to electoral victory, a hope that less popular groups like the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) would not share.

What is a Group's Political Position?

Insurgent groups are more likely to consider talks or other dramatic changes when they risk losing influence to rival groups. Iraqi insurgents from tribal groups were willing to cooperate with the United States not only because of a newfound U.S. willingness to work with Iraqi tribal groups, but also because the jihadists in Iraq had mounted a full-scale assault on tribal authority. Combined, these pressures made the movement more amenable to working with the United States.

How Strong is the Movement's Leadership vis-à-vis its Internal Rivals?

From a group's point of view, talks are also politically risky. Weak movements are more prone to splinters and are unable to control their existing members who may continue to use violence despite the leadership's wishes. In Algeria, various insurgents have embraced the government's amnesty plan or otherwise surrendered their arms, but new (if often smaller) ones splinter or new groups arose to take their place. Hizballah, in contrast, proved able to shut down radicals on its flanks who sought to continue more revolutionary policies in the mid-1990s.

Are the Insurgent Leaders Ideologically Rigid?

Highly ideological insurgents are less likely to make the concessions that are necessary for successful engagement. If the insurgents truly reject the other side's very right to exist, for example, talks are not likely to do much other than allow

the insurgents breathing space.¹³ The Armed Islamic Group of Algeria (GIA), for example, was bloody minded and rejected not just the Algerian government but also much of Algerian society as *kuffar* (or apostates). The GIA, therefore, was not a credible partner for negotiations, as it sought a revolutionary transformation of the society, not concessions from the government.

Talks can produce tremendous intelligence benefits.

How Capable is the Insurgent Leadership?

Some leaders are more willing and able to shift their organization from peace to war. Former chairman of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) Yassir Arafat, infamously, never made this transition, leading to distrust among Israeli and U.S. leaders, and also among Palestinian elites and Arab rulers. As a result, the peace talks collapsed. Former president of South Africa Nelson Mandela, in contrast, controlled his own movement and was willing to reach out to white moderates, averting the massive bloodshed and migration that characterized many African transfers of power.

What Do People Think at Home?

Success is facilitated when the government's decision to reach out to the group has strong support across the political spectrum and can weather the ups and downs inevitable in even a successful process.¹⁴ Inevitably, charges will arise that the talks reward violence. Until time demonstrates a reduction in violence, a government can only defend its policies by noting a hope for change, about which it itself is probably skeptical (a skepticism almost surely to be expressed in repeated leaks to the media).

Lessons for Afghanistan

The above general observations offer several lessons when considering whether or not to talk to anti-U.S. insurgents in Afghanistan. First, U.S. policymakers need to determine who the potential partners are. Some of the opposition, particularly the foreign jihadists who make up a small but very bloody part of the insurgents, will not talk to the United States and, if they did, would yield nothing. Fortunately, there are other parts of the insurgency. RAND analyst Seth Jones points out that, in addition to foreign fighters, the insurgency in Afghanistan consists of Taliban members, Hezb-i-Islami, the Jalaluddin Haqqani network, local tribes, and criminal networks.¹⁵ Some of these factions would be difficult to talk with. Hizb-i-Islami, for example, has long been hostile to Western influences, and the promises of its duplicitous leader, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, have little value. Other components of the insurgency, however, are more promising. Tribal

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groups usually are less ideological but want more autonomy and power and could be removed from the insurgency's ranks. Criminal networks can be bought off.

Second, U.S. policymakers need to figure out how to deal with the Taliban, who are the largest portion of the insurgents. Part of the movement is composed of diehard anti-Western forces committed to jihad. Other

parts, particularly outside the top leadership ranks, have more local goals such as reducing unemployment, avenging the death of a family member who is fighting coalition forces and the government, or other non-ideological goals. Some of these individuals are alienated most by coalition or Afghan counterinsurgency practices, such as house searches.¹⁶

U.S. efforts to flip insurgent groups in Afghanistan, a la tribal groups in Iraq, also could weaken the Karzai government even as it weakens the overall insurgency. In essence, the United States would be recognizing local actors despite their independence from, and opposition to, the pro-U.S. regime in Kabul. In the short term, as in Iraq, this might fracture the insurgency. In Iraq, however, the growth of well-armed militias not under central government control remains a long-term risk for overall U.S. efforts to build a strong and stable central government, and this will probably arise in Afghanistan as well.¹⁷ Working with local insurgents may also create friction with the Karzai government and make it less amenable to other U.S. efforts.

Assuming the Obama administration is willing to pay this price in Afghanistan, it must also recognize a potential price at home. In essence, the United States would be cutting deals with groups and individuals who killed Afghan civilians and coalition soldiers. This political price should be paid given the potential benefits. Talks paid dividends in Iraq, after all. The administration, however, must recognize that the talks may fail or produce limited benefits, and the political price will still have to be paid. For a new president who was criticized for not being tough enough on U.S. enemies, this is a risk.

To break off some of these elements of the insurgency, a range of concessions would be on the table. The biggest is local autonomy. Tribal leaders in particular would want to control more resources and have less government intrusion in exchange for their help. Money always helps, whether to buy off individual commanders or to enable them to show their followers tangible rewards for cooperation in the form of hospitals and consumer goods. Learning the demands of individual warlords and tribal leaders (as coalition forces have been doing in Iraq) is vital, as generic arrangements are unlikely to satisfy many particular commanders.

The Afghan insurgents are far from united, and many of the different factions also have internal divisions. On one hand, this poses a severe constraint on the degree of success that could be achieved through negotiations alone. Some, probably most, of the insurgents must be fought. On the other hand, some elements of the insurgency may be more likely to embrace talks, particularly as it may strengthen their position vis-à-vis their rivals. Even these elements may have splinters who reject negotiations, but the intelligence benefits, to say nothing of reducing the number of fighters in the field, still makes a deal worthwhile.

Today, the conditions for talks are acceptable but not ideal. In recent years, the insurgents have been growing in strength. While outright victory remains far off, they are not negotiating from a position of weakness. Some may even believe that an ultimate battlefield victory is a question of time. In order to convince some aspects of the insurgency to truly embrace negotiations, military progress, therefore, is necessary.

If the talks lead to more insurgent participation in local elections, the United States and its allies should expect some of them to be victorious due to their strong organization, ability to intimidate rivals, and at times genuine popularity. This will change the nature of the challenge. Rather than opposing the United States violently from outside the system, they may use the levers of government itself to inhibit coalition actions or allow other insurgents more freedom of action.

The human rights implications of successful negotiations are even more daunting. Many of the Taliban and tribal leaders favor exceptionally conservative social policies. Women's rights, including girls' education, are a tremendously sensitive subject. If the Taliban gained political power in some areas, schools there would close completely and other repressive social policies would likely be implemented.

Successful negotiations with Afghan insurgents would benefit tremendously if Pakistan can be brought on board, or at least become less supportive of the insurgencies. Pakistan allows many insurgent groups freedom to operate, and individuals from Pakistani intelligence and other government agencies help wounded fighters, sponsor training camps, provide financial support, and otherwise offer invaluable assistance.¹⁸ How to get Pakistan on board is beyond the scope of this article, but a failure to do so greatly limits the incentives of various insurgent factions to talk. Threatening or inducing these groups is far more difficult as coalition forces are less able to influence many key group functions. Indeed, groups know their leadership is secure, their logistics are in place, and that they are unlikely to be defeated outright as long as they enjoy a sanctuary outside of Afghanistan.

Efforts to flip insurgent groups in Afghanistan could also weaken the Karzai government.

Conclusions

Talks with insurgents are politically costly, usually fail, and can often backfire. Nevertheless, they are often necessary to end conflicts and transform an insurgent group into a legitimate political actor or wean them away from violence. Policymakers and analysts alike must recognize that the conditions for success are elusive. This should make them cautious about initiating talks in general, but also eager

to seize on potential opportunities should the stars align and the insurgent groups become ready to make a fundamental change and move away from violence. Pouncing on such an opportunity requires both political dexterity to do what was once unthinkable and a long-term view that accepts both the possibility of real change as well as the risks of failure.

Notes

1. For details on Iraq's Anbar Awakening see, John McCary, "The Anbar Awakening: An Alliance of Incentives," *The Washington Quarterly* 32, no. 1 (January 2009): 43–59, http://www.twq.com/09winter/docs/09jan_McCary.pdf.
2. For similar work see, Daniel Byman, "The Decision to Begin Talks with Terrorists: Lessons for Policymakers," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 29, no. 5 (2006): 403–414. Terrorist groups and insurgent groups overlap tremendously in practice. The primary differences are due to the greater size and capabilities of insurgent organizations. Almost all insurgent organizations use terrorism as a tactic, but they also use guerrilla warfare and conduct extensive political mobilization. Some groups are too small or weak to use these methods and thus rely almost exclusively on terrorism. Usually those groups seek to become insurgencies and use terrorism as a tool to do so. Thus, many of the insights that apply to talking with terrorist groups apply to talking with insurgent movements. Some groups are on the borderline between insurgencies and terrorist groups like Hamas, the Fatah movement, and the Provisional IRA.
3. For interesting works on this subject, see Peter C. Sederberg, "Conciliation as Counter-Terrorist Strategy," *Journal of Peace Research* 32, no. 3 (1995): 295–312.
4. See Kristen Sparre, "Megaphone Diplomacy in the Northern Irish Peace Process: Squaring the Circle by Talking to Terrorists through Journalists," *The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics* 6, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 88–104.
5. Martha Crenshaw notes that these are the two primary reasons for a terrorist group's decline. See Martha Crenshaw, "How Terrorism Declines," *Terrorism Research and Public Policy* 3, no. 1 (Spring 1991): 69–87, "How Terrorism Ends," *United States Institute of Peace Special Report*, no. 48 (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, May 25, 1999), pp. 2–4, <http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr990525.pdf>.
6. Crenshaw, "How Terrorism Declines," p. 86.

7. Sara Roy, " Hamas and the Transformation of Political Islam in Palestine," *Current History* 102, no. 660 (January 2003): 17.
8. Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response* (Oxford: Taylor & Francis, 2005), p. 90.
9. Sederberg, "Conciliation as Counter-Terrorist Strategy," p. 308.
10. Stephen John Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," *International Security* 22, no. 2 (Fall 1997): 10–11.
11. Ewen MacAskill, "UK Ponders Taking with Hamas and Hizbullah," *The Guardian*, May 20, 2005, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/may/20/israel.foreignpolicy>.
12. See, I. William Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
13. Sederberg, "Conciliation as Counter-Terrorist Strategy," p. 306.
14. Wilkinson, *Terrorism versus Democracy*, pp. 90–91.
15. Seth Jones, *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), pp. 37–66, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG595.pdf.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 41.
17. Steven Simon, "The Price of the Surge," *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 3 (May/June 2008), <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87305/steven-simon/the-price-of-the-surge.html>.
18. Jones, *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan*, pp. 54–61.