CIAO DATE: 02/2008
Volume: 49, Issue: 4
Winter 2007
Abolishing Nuclear Armouries: Policy or Pipedream?
Michael Quinlan
There is a widespread global commitment, at least in terms of political rhetoric, to the eventual abolition of all nuclear armouries. With a few notable exceptions, however, the subject for long periods attracted curiously little examination at a level that could be regarded as of truly serious objectivity. There has been a wide divergence between two polarised extremes: what might be called 'righteous abolitionists' pointed to the commitment and demanded that countries possessing these weapons should get on with disposing of them; 'dismissive realists' asserted that complete abolition is fanciful dreaming, and that the world must concentrate on managing their existence. There is broad and serious analytical work to be done, upon which widely different viewpoints could initially converge. The aim would be not to establish or advocate a programme of action, but simply to lay a better foundation of understanding upon which debate about prospects and options might be advanced.
Winning the Right War
Philip H. Gordon
More than six years after the start of the 'war on terror', America's strategy is failing because the Bush administration chose to wage the wrong war. It has misdiagnosed the most important origins of the problem, put too much faith in military force and tough talk, needlessly alienated friends and allies, wrongly assumed the existence of a single 'enemy', and failed to understand the ideological nature of the struggle. Until the administration changes course or, more likely, leaves office, the United States will risk creating more enemies than it eliminates. A new administration would benefit from thinking about the 'war on terror' like the Cold War, a conflict won not when the United States defeated its enemy on a battlefield, but when the ideology its adversary was ostensibly fighting for was proven bankrupt and lost its once-considerable support.
America's Quagmire Mentality
Dominic Tierney
Americans usually perceive nation-building missions as failures even when they succeed on the ground. In interventions such as Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, win or lose, America will be seen to lose. Four factors underlie this 'quagmire mentality': American ideals, elite rhetoric, memories of Vietnam, and media manipulation. The quagmire mentality undermines public approval for nation-building, thereby limiting the United States' capacity to carry out such operations, and it also influences the ways in which Americans learn from past missions.
The Iraq War and Iranian Power
Ted Galen Carpenter, Malou Innocent
By deposing Saddam Hussein, the war in Iraq has shifted the balance of power in the Persian Gulf decisively in Iran's favour. Even before the invasion, Iran possessed a budding nuclear programme, the region's largest population, an expansive ballistic-missile arsenal, and direction over various terrorist organisations, which allowed it to extend its geopolitical reach. Regrettably, the Bush administration overlooked these assets, and America's removal of Iraq as the principal strategic counterweight to Iran paved the way for the expansion of Iran's influence. The critical issue now facing the United States is what it can do to mitigate potential threats to its interests if Iran succeeds in consolidating its new position as the leading power in the region. The best available option is a hedging accommodation strategy that would accept Iran's position as the new leading power in the Gulf region while providing some military aid to the major Arab states to help foster a new regional balance of power.
On the Consequences of Failure in Iraq
Christopher J. Fettweis
Policymakers accept with surprisingly little scrutiny predictions that chaos will sweep across the Middle East in the wake of a US withdrawal from Iraq: Sunnis and Shi'ites will form battle lines and fight a genocidal final battle; al-Qaeda, safely out of the reach of justice, will be able to attract recruits by the thousands and go on the offensive; war will spread throughout the region and beyond, arriving eventually at America's shores. Fortunately for a nation on the edge of defeat, however, none of these catastrophes is terribly likely. Fears of unprecedented and unlikely disasters should not be allowed to drive current policy in the Gulf.
The Evolution of Sanctions in Practice and Theory
Rose Gottemoeller
The United States has come full circle from its harsh criticism of the 1990s sanctions regime against Iraq, relying on UN Security Council sanctions as the major means of pressuring Tehran over its nuclear programme. Other members of the Security Council, especially Russia, have been less enthusiastic. Experience with North Korea indicates that the major powers might be placing too much emphasis on the Security Council process and not enough on improved instruments of sanctions policy represented by new US financial laws and procedures after 11 September, which have done much to improve banking due diligence and other measures in pursuit of the fight against terrorism. The United States and Russia might be more willing to work together in the realm of anti-terrorism financial measures to pressure Iran than they have been at the UN Security Council.
Why the US-India Nuclear Accord is a Good Deal
T.V. Paul, Mahesh Shankar
The March 2006 US–India nuclear accord has been criticised for its likely adverse effect on the nuclear non-proliferation regime, especially the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Without such an accord, however, India, as a rising power, will remain outside the regime and remain less than fully integrated, strategically, politically, economically and technologically, in the international system. The damage critics envision to the non-proliferation regime from the US–India accord pales in comparison to the damage that can be done by India's actions and rhetoric as a dissatisfied state. But in fact the deal upholds and strengthens rather than undermines the regime. Attempts by the United States to integrate India into the non-proliferation regime as a lead actor augur well for the longevity of both the non-proliferation regime and the international order, and suggest to other rising powers that the system is flexible enough to allow for inevitable changes in the global distribution of power.
The EU Campaign against the Death Penalty
John R. Schmidt
The EU campaign against the death penalty shows that the United States no longer enjoys a monopoly on moralising in international affairs. The architects of the EU, influenced by the US precedent and anxious to define what the EU was for, fastened on the death penalty as a way to seize the moral high ground. The death-penalty campaign is not simply a target of opportunity but broadly consistent with an emerging EU moral consensus that renounces violence and seeks to resolve conflict through engagement and negotiation. This worldview, very different from the more hard-boiled US approach, has already generated transatlantic frictions on issues ranging from the International Criminal Court to Iraq, and is likely to foreshadow even more.
The Return of Net Assessment
Yee-Kuang Heng
'Net assessment' of the East–West balance once posed pressing concerns for strategists. Such concerns faded with the Soviet Union, and net assessment faced obsolescence. But its basic premises remain a sound guide to policymaking; it is malleable enough to address new challenges and, with new frameworks, can be re-deployed to understand the proliferation challenge from threatening states. The cognitive lens through which such net assessments are filtered can affect subsequent policy choices, as well as the process of net assessment itself. The dangers of doing strategy based on worst-case scenarios, as tragically played out in Iraq, provide a timely reminder of the continuing importance of net assessment's underlying philosophy: balanced, impartial, rational analysis.