CIAO DATE: 02/2008
Volume: 6, Issue: 5
August 2007
South Africa from the Perspective of WMD Supply Networks: Indications and Warning Implications (PDF)
Stephen F. Burgess
South Africa dismantled its nuclear weapons program in 1991, chemical and biological warfare program in 1993, and missile program in 1994 and became a "disarmament trendsetter" in bringing to signature an "African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone" in 1995 and compromise in Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conferences in 1995, 2000, and 2005. Despite the South African government's continuing commitment to WMD nonproliferation and arms export controls, several issues related to WMD proliferation remain. This paper examines proliferation problems and transnational networks that are tied to South Africa's history as a developer of weapons of mass destruction and other weapons during the apartheid era (1948-1994). The problem of nuclear proliferation is examined through the lens of the recent A.Q. Khan case and involvement by a South African network. The problem of biological weapons proliferation is illustrated through the recent case of Dr. Daan Goosen—a key scientist in the 1980s biological warfare program (Project Coast) and the former director of the Roodepoort Research Laboratories. The problem of terrorism and transnational networks is examined using evidence of al-Qaeda activities and those of related groups in South Africa. Links are drawn between WMD proliferation supply and terrorist networks and indications and warning of WMD terrorism emanating from South Africa are examined.
Bioweapons, Proliferation, and the U.S. Anthrax Attack (PDF)
Leonard A. Cole
For much of human history the toxic nature of certain biological substances was not seen as essentially different from that of toxic chemicals. Little if any distinction was made between the harmful effects of inanimate materials such as arsenic, biological toxins like snake venom, or "poisoned" air and other emissions from a plague victim. All were generally considered poisons and were sometimes used for hostile purposes. But the discovery in the 19th century that bacteria can cause disease led to their categorical distinction. The potential of living microorganisms to be used as weapons was formally recognized in the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which not only prohibited the use in war of poison gas but also of "bacteriological methods of warfare."[1] The prohibition of "bacterial" methods was later understood to apply as well to other biological agents such as viruses, fungi, and yeasts.
Andrea Plebani
Five years after the 9/11 attacks which struck the heart of the western world, radical Islamist organizations remain the major threat facing the international security system. The operations conducted by the U.S. and its allies on the economic, political and operative level managed to inflict serious damage on these organizations—especially in the case of al-Qaeda—but still today we have to face an enemy which seems able to adapt to any scenario and that has, on several occasions, shown us that it is capable of acting on a global scale with exceptional effectiveness.
The Biological Weapons Proliferation Threat: Past, Present, and Future Assessments and Responses (PDF)
Catherine Rhodes, Malcolm Dando
It has been argued that there have been many instances of the use of biological weapons in the historical record. However, when assessed against a realistic set of criteria few of these examples are credible (Wheelis 1999). On the other hand, as soon as the scientific analysis of infectious diseases began to be clarified in the latter part of the 19th century states began to examine and apply this new knowledge for hostile purposes. Indeed it is reasonable to suggest that the series of large-scale state offensive biological weapons programmes of the 20th century progressively utilised the developing understanding of microbiology: bacteriology in the First World War; aerobiology in the Second World War; industrial production and virology in the early Cold War; and, genetic engineering in the late Cold War (Dando 1999). Moreover, it is becoming ever clearer that after the Second World War the victorious states considered biological weapons to be as serious a threat as nuclear weapons and that it was only as nuclear weapons became available to states that the biological weapons programmes declined in importance (Wheelis et al 2006). In the Soviet Union, of course, a massive enhancement of the offensive programme began in the 1970s and at least two other states—Iraq and South Africa—are known to have had offensive biological weapons programmes late in the 20th century.
The London Ricin Cell (PDF)
Glen Segell
Few would challenge that terrorism, warlordism and organized crime—also known as the Deadly Trinity—could exhibit many similar characteristics but would they in any way be associated or even linked in a global proliferation network of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)? The case of the London Ricin Cell gave rise to cause for concern that it was such a WMD proliferation network. This chapter will address this topic using specific questions: 1) how many people would constituent a cell or a network; 2) if such a network existed then what type of substance would constituent the capability to inflict mass destruction; 3) is it necessary for ideological or religious elements to be present in a WMD proliferation network; 4) at which point would terrorism, warlordism or organized crime implement a WMD proliferation network with or without ideological or religious elements and 5) does existing legislation permit prosecution based on evidence of latent intent and capability but without the presence of an actual biological or chemical weapon. This is a salient topic given that there currently 60 people awaiting trial in the UK for terrorist-related offences; three further terrorist attacks since 7 July 2005 have been disrupted; and over 1,200 people have been identified as being activists the security service believe are engaged in acts of terrorism at home and abroad.[1] The structure of the chapter is to relate the event of the Ricin Cell as a narrative as well as evaluate how the event unfolded as a discourse within the context of the Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003). This is be undertaken under the headings: The Event of The London Ricin Cell; The Deadly Trinity (warlordism, organized crime and terrorism); The Grey Area Phenomena; Escalation of the Deadly Trinity and The London Ricin Cell; and The Limitations of Domestic Law.
Bruno T ertrais
Much has been written about the A.Q. Khan network since the Libyan "coming out" of December 2003. However, most analysts have focused on the exports made by Pakistan without attempting to relate them to Pakistani imports. To understand the very nature of the network, it is necessary to go back to its "roots," that is, the beginnings of the Pakistani nuclear program in the early 1970s, and then to the transformation of the network during the early 1980s. Only then does it appear clearly that the comparison to a "Wal-Mart" (the famous expression used by IAEA Director General Mohammed El-Baradei) is not an appropriate description. The Khan network was in fact a privatized subsidiary of a larger, State-based network originally dedicated to the Pakistani nuclear program. It would be much better characterized as an "imports-exports enterprise."
Terrorism, Organized Crime, and WMD Smuggling: Challenge and Response (PDF)
Phil Williams
Contemporary threats to United States security are characterized by high levels of synergy. Although intelligence collection and analysis is still stove-piped in ways that treat these threats as separate and independent, in practice, they can no longer be demarcated from one another. The WMD proliferation threat, the threat posed by global jihadists and the threat from transnational organized crime overlap and intersect in important ways.[1] The nightmare scenario is that these intersections will result in a WMD being brought into the United States and used to inflict large-scale casualties that would dwarf those of September 11, 2001. Consequently, this analysis focuses on the possible smuggling of an improvised nuclear device (IND) into the United States. In considering this threat several distinct stages of activity need to be identified:
Organized Crime, Terrorism and Nuclear Trafficking (PDF)
Lyudmila Zaitseva
The merging of international terrorist organizations with transnational organized crime is one of the most serious threats that our society faces today. The debate about these emerging alliances has been ongoing for some time now.[1] Experts agree that there are clear overlaps between international terrorist and organized crime networks. In her Congressional Testimony delivered in September 2005, Glenn E. Schweitzer stated that organized crime had 'entered a new phase of complicity' with terrorist networks:
Terrorist and criminal organizations rely on the same global transportation, communication, and financial infrastructures for illegal ploys. They take advantage of the same breakdowns in authority and enforcement in states under siege. They both seek increasing shares of the fortunes generated from narco-trafficking and other crimes.[2]
Understanding Iran's Motivations in Iraq: The Cost Calculus of External Support (PDF)
Ryan Carr
Insurgent conflicts are conspicuously at the center of today's international security landscape. After decades of neglect, the U.S. military has spent the last few years feverishly trying to relearn some of the counterinsurgent lessons from its past. Arguably the most discussed lesson concerns the ultimate "prize" in insurgent conflicts—winning the hearts and minds of an indigenous population. In Iraq, increasing attention has focused on how to improve our politico-military policies in an effort to garner the support of Iraqis. However, Iraq also reminds us of another critical lesson from our past—the role and impact external supporters can have vis à vis successful insurgencies. As Jeffrey Record of the U.S. Air Force's Air War College points out, during the Vietnam War the North Vietnamese, "among the most tenacious and skilled enemies the United States has ever fought, could hardly have prevailed unarmed, which is how they would have had to fight absent the massive Soviet and Chinese assistance they in fact received."[1] He goes on to note that, North Vietnam, the political and military engine of the Communists war in Indochina, had no arms industry; it had to import even small arms and small-arms ammunition from the Soviet Union, China, and other Communist Bloc countries…Had the Vietnamese Communists been isolated from external assistance, as were their fellow Communist insurgents in Malaya and the Philippines in the latter 1940s and early 1950s, they almost certainly would have suffered the same fate: defeat.[2]
Project 2008: Notes on the Russian Succession (PDF)
Stephen Blank
Since President Vladimir Putin will leave office in 2008, Russia is undergoing a succession scenario. Such scenarios are the Achilles heel of its political system. But they also have implications beyond the question of who rules at home. Indeed, the course and outcome of this succession have profound repercussions for foreign policy and for Russia's further institutional development, not least as it applies to the relationship between the state and its multiple instruments of force or power structures. And from what we can already see a comprehensive strategy of internal consolidation that entails portraying Russia being a besieged fortress threatened by enemies from within and without, as well as moves towards an ever greater scope of a police state is taking shape.
Edward G. Anderson Jr.
Over recent years, insurgencies (also known as asymmetric, low intensity, or guerilla conflicts) have re-emerged in the world's political consciousness. Part of this is due to the multiple insurgencies occurring in Iraq, which are interfering with attempts by the United States to reestablish an effective government within that nation. However, many other insurgencies are also extant world wide. A partial list of nations suffering from insurgencies would include the Philippines, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Kashmir, Yemen, Djibouti, Columbia, Sri Lanka, and Congo-Zaire (Kaplan 2005, Economist 2005a, Economist 2005b, Economist 2006a, Economist 2006b, New York Times 2006). Many of these insurgencies have religious or ethnic overtones, although some do not (O'Neill 1990). For example, drug trafficking appears to drive the insurgency in Columbia (Kaplan 2005).
India's Nuke Dance Over Iran (PDF)
PR Kumaraswamy
If India's policy toward Iran and its suspected nuclear ambitions continue to cause concern and anxiety in Washington, it was largely New Delhi's own making. From the very beginning, India was unable to understand the American preoccupation with the ayatollahs. Indeed, Washington's concerns vis-à-vis Iran and its nuclear program did not figure prominently in Indian calculations when it started negotiating the civilian nuclear deal with the Bush administration.