

# Congress's Efforts to Defeat Joseph Kony and the Lord's Resistance Army: NGO Activism, Terrorism and Evangelism

By Ryan C. Hendrickson

On October 14, 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama informed congressional leaders that approximately 100 American military personnel would be deployed to four African states: the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, and Uganda in an effort to eliminate the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) led by Joseph Kony. Some of these troops, who were sent with "appropriate combat equipment," had already been deployed. Obama noted that these forces "will not themselves engage LRA forces unless necessary for self-defense." The President added that he was informing Congress of these actions "as part of my efforts to keep the Congress fully informed, consistent with the War Powers Resolution," and that he was carrying out Congress's legislative desires by fulfilling the expectations of the Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009.<sup>1</sup>

The legislative process that led to the passage of this Act was unique and, in many respects, contrasts sharply with Congress's traditional roles in American military and security policy formation. By playing a much more assertive role than it traditionally has, Congress pushed President Obama to develop a comprehensive strategy to eliminate the LRA, which included the potential for the president to provide military support to African militaries. This paper examines the legislative and political process that led Congress to support the passage of this Act. Apart from Congress demonstrating a rare degree of foreign policy assertiveness, this issue is especially interesting since it dealt with a region where American strategic interests are arguably perceived as less clear. Thus, the policy formation is unique and especially interesting for understanding why Congress became so active for a human rights concern that impacts so few Americans and has limited strategic interests to the United States.

While the findings presented here provide some support for the previous scholarship on congressional assertiveness in foreign policy, this paper also notes a number of case-specific political variables that were significant in the passage of this particular legislation. Among these factors, the multiple roles played by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), Kony's identity as a "terrorist", and the

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**Ryan C. Hendrickson** is Professor of political science at Eastern Illinois University.

legislative process used to pass this Act, all are central to understanding why Joseph Kony and the LRA generated so much congressional attention. Finally, this article addresses the extent to which the United States will likely use force in future humanitarian conflicts, especially those in Africa, as well as the extent to which NGOs and Congress will shape military decisions abroad.

## CONGRESSIONAL FOREIGN POLICY ACTIVISM

In the making of American military policy and the decision to deploy American forces abroad, most of the existing research focuses on the President as decision maker. Since World War II, Congress has frequently played a secondary role in the decision to use force, as the president has asserted increasingly broad powers as commander in chief, despite the array of enumerated constitutional military powers given to Congress which includes the power to declare war.<sup>2</sup> This legislative deference to the president was especially true for the recent Bush administration.<sup>3</sup> Mann and Ornstein maintain that the decreased number of committee hearings, the truncated floor debates in Congress, and the overall absence of interest in its oversight duties during much of the Bush presidency rendered Congress quite weak vis-à-vis the president and feeble by historical comparison.<sup>4</sup> Nonetheless, within the wider scope of American foreign policymaking research, analysts have established a more active presence for members of Congress, which may help to better understand why Congress so actively targeted the Lord's Resistance Army and pushed the president for a new strategy. Within this scholarship three bodies of research, some of which overlap, address why Congress may engage in the foreign policymaking process.

Among the principal motivations for policy activism is the desire to get reelected. Mayhew most famously maintained that everything members of Congress do is aimed at securing electoral victories.<sup>5</sup> A number of recent studies that have followed suggest members direct their foreign policy interests to issues that will be attractive to their constituencies and that have electoral benefits and rewards.<sup>6</sup> A second body of foreign policy scholarship examines the influence of partisanship on congressional behavior, which also may overlap with a member's electoral interests. Though considerable debate exists within this body of research, many studies have found that a member's party affiliation is an important predictor for congressional foreign policy stands. Much of this research also points to an increasingly partisan Congress since the Vietnam War.<sup>7</sup>

Other research highlights the significant role that a member of Congress's personal policy interests may have in driving their foreign policy activism.<sup>8</sup> Members of Congress may have especially strong interests in specific trade issues, unique American bilateral relationships, or perhaps have a proclivity for a similar set of issues like American foreign policy and human rights. For example, some research finds strong correlations with the personal policy interests of Senators Jacob Javits (D-NY), Christopher Dodd (D-CT) and Edward Kennedy (D-MA) and their

decisions to challenge presidents to adopt different foreign policy stands.<sup>9</sup> It can be difficult analytically, however, to separate a member's personal policy interests from their electoral and district-level pressures. Research on membership in Congress's Human Rights Caucus, for example, finds evidence for both personal policy interests, as well as a member's district preferences to explain their membership in this caucus.<sup>10</sup>

Though important differences remain in the research on congressional foreign policy involvement, especially on the degree of influence these factors exercise on a member of Congress, much research suggests that electoral incentives, partisan politics, and personal policy interests offer useful insights for understanding why members of Congress engage in foreign policy. Thus it is fair to hypothesize that in explaining Congress's foreign policy activism towards the LRA, one would find the presence of each of these factors. The findings presented here provide support for personal policy preferences and electoral incentives, but less evidence for partisan politics. In addition, a number of case specific factors including the effectiveness of NGOs, the issue-linkage to terrorism, and the actual legislative process, all suggest a confluence of different political pressures that resulted in the passage of this legislation.

## ELECTORAL PRESSURES

At first glance, it seems counter-intuitive to argue that electoral pressures drove members of Congress to address the human rights violations carried out by the LRA

**IN CARRYING OUT SUCH ATROCITIES, KONY MAINTAINS THAT HE IS GUIDED BY THE HOLY SPIRIT, CARRYING OUT HIS OWN VISION OF CHRISTIANITY.** and Joseph Kony. To be sure, few question the notion that the LRA and Joseph Kony represent evil in the minds of many. Created in 1987, the LRA formed in response to a government coup in Uganda, led by Yoweri Museveni. Kony's group was created when another government opposition movement in northern Uganda, led by his alleged relative, Alice Lakwena, was defeated by Museveni's forces. Kony's forces are known for their brutality as they slaughter villagers and kidnap children. The LRA also pressed children to commit atrocities against their own families if they wish to remain alive or to avoid mutilation. In addition, sexual slavery among the children is a common facet of Kony's group. In carrying out such atrocities, Kony maintains that he is guided by the Holy Spirit, carrying out his own vision of Christianity. Though the group is seen as having no more than 200 "core combatants," the LRA is estimated to have caused the internal displacement of 465,000 people and killed approximately 2,400 in the Central African region in 2011.<sup>11</sup>

However, from a strictly nationalistic American perspective, the LRA represents a limited strategic threat to the United States. The LRA has not killed Americans, and

barely threatens close American allies in the region. Though the International Criminal Court called for the arrests of Joseph Kony and other LRA leaders in 2005, and the United States included the LRA on its “Terror Exclusion List” in 2001, Kony and the LRA’s reach is localized to only portions of Central Africa. Moreover, the last major deployment of American troops to Africa, which occurred in Somalia in 1992, resulted in military disaster for the United States and deep political costs to the Clinton administration.<sup>12</sup> Though the United States has the highest military expenditures in the world and one of the most professionalized military forces, American military analysts maintain that the military is stretched quite thin with too many deployments and few preferences for more military action abroad.<sup>13</sup> Thus, despite the clear and compelling humanitarian reasons for taking action against Kony, strong strategic arguments exist for remaining disengaged from this Central African problem. Evidence suggests that even with strategic and political arguments for letting African governments resolve this issue alone, members of Congress faced considerable public pressure to take action against Kony due to the electoral incentives provided by a mobilized electorate.

In this case, the importance of the NGO Invisible Children is critical for understanding the grassroots pressure on members of Congress. Formed in 2003, this small group, initially led by three university film students from California, sought to bring attention to the plight of Ugandan children who were victims of the LRA. In making their case to the public, this group used a short film, “Invisible Children: Rough Cut” to educate Americans on political conditions in northern Uganda.<sup>14</sup> By 2008, Invisible Children had shown this film and other short documentaries to some “550 churches, 1,250 colleges and 1,100 high schools,” and in the process, reached out to their audiences and encouraged political activism. Through these efforts, Invisible Children connected with thousands of young Americans, who joined in the cause.<sup>15</sup>

Other evidence regarding the strength of Invisible Children’s political support was illuminated when hundreds of its advocates came together in Washington D.C. to lobby for their cause. In coordination with other NGOs, including Resolve Uganda and the Enough Project, Invisible Children supporters met during “Lobby Days” to protest together and lobby members of Congress.<sup>16</sup> Its supporters were also able to mobilize in states and congressional districts. In one notable event, supporters camped out in an eleven day “sleep out” at Senator Tom Coburn’s (R-OK) Oklahoma City office, after he raised concern over financing the bill.<sup>17</sup> After that, some members of Congress feared being “Coburned” or became more comfortable supporting the bill once Coburn agreed not to stand in its way, and thus had more incentives to back the cause.<sup>18</sup>

When discussing the reasons for supporting the bill to further address Joseph Kony, many members of Congress explicitly pointed to the presence of young people who lobbied members to act. One of the bill’s most ardent supports in the House of Representatives, Ed Royce (R-CA) stated:

*This legislation has made it this far is really a tribute to a group of young people, young professionals, who have come up here on their own time and gone to universities around this country to organize in order to make people aware of the plight of these children in Africa.*<sup>19</sup>

Royce also wrote: “Frankly, without advocacy NGOs, this would be a forgotten conflict.”<sup>20</sup>

In sum, the evidence presented here suggests an active, well-organized foundation of support, which applied pressure on members of Congress in their home states, as well as in Washington. Invisible Children was especially well organized in conservative leaning states, which likely speaks to their ability to reach conservative members of Congress. Perhaps it was also events like the targeted lobbying against Senator Coburn, which produced disincentives to oppose the bill, knowing that a protest outside of a congressional district office could generate unwanted political and media attention. Electoral pressures are not the only factor involved in explaining why this legislation passed, but a solid body of evidence suggests that this NGO activism, which included political lobbying from constituents in Members’ districts and states, “contributed overwhelmingly to the passage of this Act.”<sup>21</sup>

## **PERSONAL POLICY PREFERENCES**

Analytically, it is very difficult to separate the influence of constituency pressures on a member of Congress from the member’s personal policy preferences. For example, a sustained liberal voting record on human rights could simply be a reflection of a member’s district or state constituency demands and not necessarily a member’s deep ideological commitment to the advancement of human rights. However, what seems evident in this case is the presence of members of Congress who consistently, and over extended periods of time, expressed interest in capturing Joseph Kony. In the examples discussed below, their legislative activism included sustained efforts that take considerable time and lobbying efforts for which there are far fewer electoral rewards. In these cases the members went beyond simple co-sponsorship of legislation which allows a member of Congress to claim credit for a bill’s legislative success, and they actually did the legislative work necessary to ensure its passage, demonstrating the member’s personal policy preferences.

The original co-sponsor of the legislation was Senator Russ Feingold (D-WI), who had served on the Senate’s Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs and had a long-standing interest in the protection of human rights. In this sense, his efforts to push Congress squared closely with his voting patterns and personal ideology.<sup>22</sup> Feingold was the lead voice in often calling for the United States to do more to address the atrocities Kony and the LRA committed and appealed on a number of occasions to ensure that this legislation passed.<sup>23</sup> After his 2007 visit to Uganda, Feingold returned to the United States with a heightened interest for addressing the atrocities caused by the LRA.<sup>24</sup> In one of his addresses to the Senate,

Feingold noted that he had “visited the displacement camps in northern Uganda and saw first-hand the impact the violence orchestrated by the LRA has had throughout the region.”<sup>25</sup>

Another key member of the Senate who was a strong supporter of this legislation was Jim Inhofe (R-OK). With Inhofe, there is a mix of personal religious motivations, his personal dislike of Joseph Kony and his own perceived expertise on Africa that helps explain his interest in this issue. With strong evangelical tones, Inhofe stated in 2002, “I’m planning to meet with nine presidents in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire. My focus here will be to meet in the spirit of Jesus.”<sup>26</sup> Since the onset of his interest in Africa, Inhofe has traveled often to Africa, which has led him to argue that “I know Africa better than anyone else certainly in the United States Senate.”<sup>27</sup> Due to his personal religious identification with African issues, coupled with his own personal knowledge of Africa and the LRA, Inhofe has pushed aggressively for Kony’s capture, which is evident in statements made on the Senate floor as well as in Senate committee hearings.<sup>28</sup> Among NGOs who actively supported this legislation, Inhofe was identified as a key supporter of capturing Kony. One additional role that Inhofe carried out was through his personal lobbying of Senator Tom Coburn (R-OK).<sup>29</sup> Thus, like Feingold, Inhofe demonstrated a sustained interest in capturing Kony, and made independent political initiatives to help this bill move forward.

Congressman Ed Royce (R-CA), like Senator Feingold, had also long expressed concern over the human rights violations in Africa, and had demonstrated a sustained interest in the atrocities committed by Joseph Kony and the LRA.<sup>30</sup> Through this and other lobbying efforts Royce was viewed as an important ally to the advocacy NGOs due to the Congressman’s commitment to the cause and his bipartisan support of the issue.<sup>31</sup> Royce has also forged a close relationship with the founders of Invisible Children and has continued to advance their cause.<sup>32</sup> In addition, Royce’s staff worked closely with Senator Feingold’s staff to insure the successful passage of this legislation.<sup>33</sup> While a researcher can never speak with certainty regarding the personal motivations of a politician, the cases presented here suggest some evidence for a number of congressional members’ ongoing and sustained interest in capturing Kony.

## **PARTISANSHIP**

Despite what much of the research on Congressional foreign policy behavior and partisanship suggests, the legislative process for this bill was largely devoid of partisan politics. A number of factors help explain why this legislation was so bipartisan. First, from the onset of this legislation, the bill had bi-partisan cooperation with original co-sponsors from both parties. In the Senate, Russ Feingold (D-WI) and Sam Brownback (R-KS) introduced the legislation; in the House, James McGovern (D-MA), Ed Royce (R-CA) and Brad Miller (D-NC) served as the original co-sponsors. Brownback and Feingold both served on the Senate Foreign Relations African Affairs subcommittee and formed an early partnership on

this issue that brought an immediate bipartisan identity to the bill, especially given that these two senators often opposed each other across an array of other issues. Eventually, 65 Senators and 202 members of the House signed on as co-sponsors.

Another political factor that helped remove partisanship from the debate is Joseph Kony's status in the United States as a terrorist. In 2001, under the Patriot Act, Joseph Kony and the LRA, along with 38 additional organizations, were placed by President George W. Bush on the "U.S. Terror Exclusion List," which identified groups and individuals that the United States sought to bar from entry into the United States.<sup>34</sup> In 2008, the U.S. State Department also identified Kony as a "Specially Designated Global Terrorist."<sup>35</sup> Few issues unify Americans more than their nearly uniform disdain for "terrorists." In 2009, when the Kony legislation was

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first introduced, 59 percent of Americans indicated that terrorism was their top international concern.<sup>36</sup> Thus, when a number of members of the House went to the floor to note their support for this legislation, Kony's status as a terrorist played a prominent part in justifying their backing for this bill. Ed Royce (R-CA) noted that Kony was "perhaps the most wanted man in Africa. He is an indicted war criminal. He is a designated terrorist."<sup>37</sup> Congressman Eliot Engel (D-NJ) stated that the legislation was intended to end the "LRA's reign of terror."<sup>38</sup> Even though the threat to Americans was essentially non-existent, a number of members chose to use the language of terrorism to justify their support, which helped to reach a broad congressional constituency, and thus increased the attractiveness of going after Kony.

Another factor that may have helped create support for the bill was the ostensible natural policy evolution of the proposed legislation, which simply called upon the president to develop a new strategy to capture Kony and other LRA leadership. Such a step followed suit with other recent actions in the Bush administration. In 2008, Bush had authorized "Operation Lightning Thunder" which involved approximately 17 "advisers and analysts" from the U.S. Department of Defense's African Command who worked with the Ugandan military to wage a military offensive against the LRA. The mission failed and likely resulted in a counter-offensive by the LRA that killed some 900 civilians.<sup>39</sup> Thus, the call for a new strategy after this failed operation, coupled with Kony's status as an indicted war criminal and "terrorist," was not a radical policy development for the United States.<sup>40</sup> Furthermore, the ambiguity of the newly proposed legislation did not necessarily commit a member of Congress to anything specific, just a "new" strategy.<sup>41</sup> If the president developed a strategy that a member of Congress later opposed, the

member could always argue that the legislation never intended for the president to take such an action.

Moreover, another aspect of this ambiguous legislation that likely helped eliminate partisan attack is the manner in which members voted. In the Senate, the “Unanimous Consent” procedure was used, which is commonly utilized to pass legislation, especially when the number of cosponsors is so high. Yet this procedure does not require a member of Congress to actually record a vote in favor or opposition to a bill in question, and in this sense, provides some political protection against future developments that may not square with a member’s electoral, partisan, or personal preferences. The House of Representatives very similarly used a “voice vote” procedure on the bill, rather than an actual recorded vote, which again protects a member of Congress from a policy direction gone sour. In addition, a member who is not comfortable with the legislation, but does not wish to openly oppose the bill, can simply abstain from any involvement. Thus, when the actual bills were brought to the Senate and House floors, no voices of opposition were raised. These measures were quickly introduced and then advanced.<sup>42</sup>

However, when President Obama announced his decision to send 100 troops to Africa to carry out the legislation, Republican opposition to his actions reached its political apex. One of the most immediate to criticize the decision was conservative radio talk-show personality, Rush Limbaugh, who argued that Joseph Kony and the LRA were Christians who were doing good by warring with Muslims in South Sudan. When confronted with information regarding Kony’s human rights record, Limbaugh added that he would do more research on the issue.<sup>43</sup> Another critic, Republican president candidate, Congresswoman Michelle Bachmann (R-Minn.) noted, “I don’t think that we should have gone in – I don’t think the president should have committed those troops in Uganda.”<sup>44</sup> Senator John McCain (R-Az.), who has nearly always argued for a commander in chief with unlimited constitutional powers to determine when and how American forces are used abroad, argued about President Obama’s decision, “I’m very disappointed, again, that the administration is not consulted with members of congress before taking such action.”<sup>45</sup> With the exception of Senator Coburn’s earlier fiscal concerns, almost all opposition to any policy development related to Joseph Kony came after President Obama’s announcement. The originally introduced legislation allowed the bill to move forward without meaningful or partisan opposition but also invited possible complaints once the president announced what the strategy would be, which is precisely what happened in this case. Due to the bipartisan identity, the variety of non-partisan reasons for addressing Joseph Kony, and the legislative approval process utilized, the bill experienced few partisan debates.

## **NGO ACTIVITY AND POLITICAL ACCESS**

The final political element examined here, which is not directly captured by the research on members of Congress’s electoral benefits, personal policy preferences, or partisan behavior, is the specific roles played by NGOs in the legislative process.



In this case, the role of Peter Quaranto, a NGO staffer for Resolve Uganda who later became a governmental employee, appears to have some relevance in the legislative process.<sup>46</sup> Resolve Uganda was founded in 2007 after three university students, which included Peter Quaranto, took study abroad trips to Uganda and learned about the atrocities committed by the LRA. Like Invisible Children, much of Resolve's focus is devoted to addressing human rights abuse in Uganda and ending the atrocities committed by Joseph Kony.

The influence of resolve is important to consider for a number of reasons. In August 2008, after working for a year to help found Resolve, Quaranto took a position as a legislative assistant to Senator Russ Feingold (R-WI)—the initiator of this legislation. By a number of accounts, Feingold's staff was critical in generating political support from senators and their staffs for the bill. Resolve cofounder and Quaranto's former colleague Michael Poffenberger noted that it was "helpful" to have Quaranto in Feingold's office.<sup>47</sup> In this respect, the NGO movement had an "in-house" advocate for the cause who similarly shared Senator Feingold's as well as these NGOs' passion for this legislation.

Feingold's staff also actively courted Resolve's and Enough's policy expertise and insights on the actual legislation. Such a practice was common for Senator Feingold's office, who reached out to NGOs for their input.<sup>48</sup> Thus, some degree of political symbiosis was present in this legislation as Resolve, Enough and Feingold's offices worked and coordinated closely to advance the bill. Though it cannot be concluded that Quaranto's presence in Feingold's office was essential to the bill's passage, it is clear that the NGO community had a deeply committed individual employed by Feingold who worked with his former NGO colleagues as well as other senate staffers to help pass this legislation.

Apart from the political access provided to NGOs, a high degree of NGO coordination between Invisible Children, Resolve, and the Enough Project helped to consolidate political pressure and bring each group's strengths together to place pressure on Congress. These three groups all served as cosponsors of the "Lobby Days" protests, which brought supporters to Washington D. C. to rally for the cause, and lobby members of Congress. In addition, each NGO had unique political skills. Invisible Children was critical in generating widespread grassroots support for the cause and was essential in building a national movement. Resolve used their legislative expertise to help advance the issue within Washington and therefore understood Washington politics well. The Enough Project worked with both groups, and its director, John Prendergast, was able to generate various kinds of media attention to the issue. He was very active in highlighting the LRA's human rights abuses, which by some accounts served as a "legitimizing" function to the cause.<sup>49</sup> In sum, NGO access to senate staff and their coordinated political pressure is an important component of this legislative history.

## CONCLUSION

President Obama's decision to send 100 U.S. troops to Central Africa was

prompted by the actions of members of Congress. In doing so, Congress played an active part in shaping the decision to utilize the American military abroad. This research supports some of the previous literature on congressional foreign policy activism and also identifies case-specific and rather unique political factors that help explain the legislative history of the efforts to capture Joseph Kony and leaders of the LRA.

Members of Congress can be motivated by their constituents to take action. As demonstrated here, the political pressure implemented by the NGO, Invisible Children, was considerable across a number of congressional districts. This movement was especially well organized in politically conservative regions of the United States which likely helped conservative members of Congress respond more favorably to an issue that would generally be viewed as a traditional liberal human rights concern. This case also found evidence that supports the idea that members of Congress will work hard to advance issues that have especially strong personal appeal. Senator Feingold (D-Wi.) and Congressman Royce (R-Ca.) fit this characterization especially well. This issue also entailed a Christian evangelical element, in that members of Congress who see their roles in an evangelical spirit felt a special responsibility to address the atrocities committed by Joseph Kony. This issue was largely devoid of partisan politics because the issue involved atrocities committed

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against children by a declared terrorist. In addition, political access is another facet of this case; NGOs coordinated their lobbying activities and had strong advocates for this issue within the Congress, who worked hard to advance the legislation.

One may conclude that a “perfect storm” of political variables came together to help pass this legislation through constituency pressure, terrorism, violations of children’s human rights, bipartisanship, and deeply committed members of Congress. But it is critical to appreciate the significance of Invisible Children in setting a political grassroots foundation in place. Years of advocacy, combined with these political forces, helped to generate political support for this issue which eventually resulted in the deployment of American military personnel to Central Africa.

The case, however, is unlikely to serve as a model for future humanitarian deployments. The Kony case required highly motivated members of Congress coupled with the presence of a sustained grassroots movement led by Invisible

Children, which had a uniquely non-partisan character. In addition, most research on American public opinion and the use of force abroad indicates that the public will have little tolerance for military deployments that are primarily “humanitarian” in nature, and rather are far more supportive of deployments that address American “strategic” interests.<sup>50</sup> In this respect, Invisible Children benefitted from Kony’s and the LRA’s designation as a “terrorist” organization. It seems very unlikely that another humanitarian NGO like Invisible Children will wield such influence on American foreign policymakers. Similarly, unless the United States faces a strategic threat to its national interests, the United States will avoid troop deployments to Africa, where the strategic stakes are less clear, despite the presence of profound humanitarian suffering.

### Notes

<sup>1</sup> Barack Obama, “Letter From the President to the Speaker of the House or Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate Regarding the Lord’s Resistance Army,” Office of the Press Secretary October 14, 2011, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/10/14/letter-president-speaker-house-representatives-and-president-pro-tempore>.

<sup>2</sup> Louis Fisher, *Presidential War Powers*, 2nd ed. (Lawrence, KS: University of Press of Kansas, 2004); Ryan C. Hendrickson, *The Clinton Wars: Congress, the Constitution and War Powers* (Nashville TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2002); Gordon Silverstein, *Imbalance of Powers: Constitutional Interpretation and the Making of American Foreign Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); John Hart Ely, *War and Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its Aftermath* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1990); Michael J. Glennon, *Constitutional Diplomacy* (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1990).

<sup>3</sup> Thomas E. Ricks, *The Gamble* (New York: Penguin Press, 2009), 150; Louis Fisher, “Deciding on War Against Iraq: Institutional Failures,” *Political Science Quarterly* 118, no. 3 (2003): 389-410; Erika N. Cornelius and Ryan C. Hendrickson, “George W. Bush, War Powers and U.N. Peacekeeping in Haiti,” *White House Studies* 8, no. 1 (2008): 57-70; Frédéric Gagnon, “Dealing with Hegemony at Home: From Congressional Compliance to Resistance to George W. Bush’s National Security Policy,” in Charles-Philippe David et David Grondin eds., *Hegemony or Empire? The Redefinition of US Power under George W. Bush*, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 87-114; David Gray Adler, “George Bush and the Abuse of History: The Constitution and Presidential Power in Foreign Affairs,” *UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs* 12 (2007): 75-144; Karl K. Schonberg, “Global Security and Legal Restraint: Reconsidering War Powers After September 11,” *Political Science Quarterly* 119, no. 1 (2004), 115-142.

<sup>4</sup> Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, *The Broken Branch: How Congress is Failing American and How to Get it Back on Track* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). See also Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, *It’s Even Worse Than It Looks: How the American Constitutional System Collided With the New Politics of Extremism* (New York: Basic Books, 2012).

<sup>5</sup> David Mayhew, *The Electoral Connection* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974).

<sup>6</sup> Trevor Rubenzer, “Campaign Contributions and US Foreign Policy Outcomes: An Analysis of Cuban-American Interests,” *American Journal of Political Science* 55, no. 1 (2011): 105-116; Ellen A Cutrone and Benjamin O. Fordham, “Commerce and Imagination: The Sources of Concern about International Human Rights in the US Congress,” *International Studies Quarterly* 54, no. 3 (2010): 633-655; Mark Souva and David Rohde, “Elite Differences and Partisanship in Congressional Foreign Policy, 1975-1996,” *Political Research Quarterly* 60, no. 1 (2007): 113-123; Bryan W. Marshall and Brandon C. Prins, “The Pendulum of Congressional Power: Agenda Change, Partisanship and Demise of Post-World War II Foreign Policy Consensus,” *Congress and the Presidency* 29, no. 2 (2002): 195-212.

<sup>7</sup> Ralph G. Carter and James M. Scott, *Choosing to Lead: Congressional Foreign Policy Entrepreneurs* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009); C. James Delaet, Charles M. Rowling and James M. Scott, “Partisanship, Ideology and Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Post-Cold War Congress: The Chemical Weapons and Comprehensive Test Ban Cases,” *Illinois Political Science Review* 11 (2007): 2-34; Robert David Johnson, *Congress and the Cold War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); David Auerswald and Forrest Matlzman, “Policymaking Through Advice and Consent: Treaty Considerations by the United States Senate,” *Journal of*

*Politics* 65, no. 4 (2003): 1097-1110.

<sup>8</sup> Barry C. Burden, *Personal Roots of Representation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).

<sup>9</sup> Ralph G. Carter, James M. Scott and Charles M. Rowling, "Setting a Course: Congressional Foreign Policy Entrepreneurs in Post World War II U.S. Foreign Policy," *International Studies Perspectives* 5 (2004): 278-299.

<sup>10</sup> James M. McCormick and Neil J. Mitchell, "Commitments, Transnational Interests, and Congress: Who Joins the Congressional Human Rights Caucus?" *Political Research Quarterly* 60, no. 4 (2007): 579-592; Susan Webb Hammond, *Congressional Caucuses in National Policy Making* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).

<sup>11</sup> Alexis Griffie and Lauren Ploch, *The Lord's Resistance Army: The U.S. Response* (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, April 11, 2012), 4-5. See also Jeroen Adam, Bruno Decordier, Kristof Titeca, Koen Vlassenroot, "In the Name of the Father? Christian Militantism in Tripura, Northern Uganda, and Ambon," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 30, no. 11 (2007): 963-83; Susan McKay, "Girls as 'Weapons of Terror' in Northern Uganda and Sierra Leone Rebel Fighting Forces," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 28, no. 5 (2005): 385-97; Adam Branch, "Neither Peace Nor Justice: Political Violence and Peasantry in Northern Uganda, 1986-1998," *African Studies Quarterly* 8, no. 2 (2005): 1-31; Anthony Vinci, "The Strategic Use of Fear by the Lord's Resistance Army," *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 16, no. 3 (2005): 360-81.

<sup>12</sup> David Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals* (New York: Scribner, 2001), 265.

<sup>13</sup> Charles D. Allen, "Assessing the Army Profession," *Parameters* (Autumn, 2011): 75; Andrew J. Bacevich, *Limits to Power* (New York: Henry Holt, 2009); Richard N. Haass, "The Age of Nonpolarity," *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 3 (2008): 44-56.

<sup>14</sup> See the video <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kLHOH-9f8xI>.

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