

# Managing Population Movements: The Challenge for Diplomacy in Southeast Europe

by Vladimir Grečić and Slobodan Janković

In the last decade of the 20th century, political, economic, and social changes together with conflicts and globalization induced stronger labor and human mobility in the region of the South East Europe during the first decade of the 21st century. Current financial and economic crises caused a major decline in migration and resulted in significant unemployment among immigrants in OECD countries. These developments have had positive and negative implications for both origin and destination countries. In order to maximize the positive effects and minimize the negative impact, states need to engage in migration management, negotiating relations between origin and destination countries, even regionally.

Decolonization and the latest wave of industrialization in most developing countries coincided with the first significant immigration into Europe during the 1960s, resulting in a strong demand for unskilled labor. A growing worldwide urbanization, an unprecedented rise in population, and a widening of the global divide between the North and South, particularly the quality of life, triggered new migration of poorer peoples from the South. The deindustrialization in the West since the 1970s brought studies of migration along with increased tensions over immigration because of the shrinking capacity to absorb the migrants, declining fertility among the domestic population, and cultural differences between them and African, Asian, and Latin American immigrants. New migration after the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe was followed by strong migration flows to the West, this time from societies demographically and culturally similar to the countries of destination. However, migration from the South has never stopped.

These developments demanded new migration policies for bilateral and multilateral management of the legal and illegal flows of people. “Migrants filled nearly two-thirds of all new jobs in European OECD countries in the period 1995-2003.”<sup>1</sup> Negotiations are under way in GATS on Mode 4, which regulate the trade of services and labor, the outcome of which will impact global migration regulation.<sup>2</sup> Compliance with regional trade agreements (CEFTA in Southeast Europe) will affect

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national legislation on migration.

Contemporary Europe is facing challenges caused by demographic trends, such as aging populations and declining birth rates, which burden the ratio of workers to dependents. Over 80 percent of the population growth in the EU in 2008 derived from migration. "For the wider EU region, the number of young persons (aged 0–14) will drop by 18 percent by 2050. The working age population (15–64) will fall by 48 million, or 16 percent, whereas the elderly population (aged 65+) will rise sharply, by 58 million or 77 percent."<sup>3</sup> One study indicates the need for 25 million immigrants in continental Europe annually to preserve the current percentage of dependents. "According to demographer David Coleman, this high rate of migration 'would treble Europe's population by 2050 from 754 million to 2.35 billion, and so on at an accelerating rate.'"<sup>4</sup>

Advanced societies of Western Europe are also facing growing social and economic problems over the issue of immigrant integration from the Third World countries. The low or semi-skilled occupational profile is needed less and less in places like Switzerland. Some of the immigrants staying in the host country are becoming jobless, eventually exposed to informal work for even lower pay and standards of protection at work. In Italy documented immigrants who lose their jobs risk expulsion and are more vulnerable with respect to demanding legal, social, and health security from their employers. Once employed as informal workers they represent unfair competition on the labor market. This status presents challenges in preventing xenophobia and fears of foreign workers "stealing" jobs from domestic nationals.

Along with demographic challenges, advanced European states are facing rising economic competitiveness from old and new economic contenders, such as: the US, Japan, China, India, Russia, and Southeast Asian economies. The EU is almost incapable of addressing the mass, cheap production of the East, forcing it to invest in new technologies. As a result, the EU is proposing a new program called Blue Card, to attract up to 20 million highly skilled persons.<sup>5</sup>

The financial crisis is already affecting labor markets in OECD countries, where according to the latest data, unemployment among immigrants is double that of domestic populations in Spain, Ireland and the US.<sup>6</sup> This trend does not necessarily mean that immigration will stop; rather this trend suggests different patterns and quality of immigration from developing and under developed countries. GDP is expected to fall by 4 percent in both the EU and the Euro area in 2010, having repercussions on negative employment.<sup>7</sup>

Of particular interest is the issue of migration in and out of Southeast Europe. In this study we will present positive, negative, and challenging aspects of migration to and from Southeast Europe (SEE), the Balkans (SEE except Romania and Moldova), Slovenia, and the Western Balkans: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia.

## MIGRATION TO AND FROM SOUTHEAST EUROPE (SEE)

Migration policies tend to regulate behaviour and influence the development of a society. As a general historical trend, states receiving migrants (states of destination) were and are economically more advanced (such as the US, Norway, Australia, Canada, and EU). Countries of origin usually were and mostly are underdeveloped and developing. Declining rates of birth per woman on the global and regional scales and social and economic processes at the end of the last century

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and at the beginning of the 21st century induced migration from developing countries characterized by low fertility and growth rates around zero percent. Although, wage rates can also be an explanation for migration, “later studies have observed that emigration from poor countries increases as economic development takes place in the country of origin.”<sup>8</sup> Although SEE countries had significant economic growth in absolute and relative terms, migration did not stop.

Migration may undermine economic recovery and growth in regions like SEE. In particular, wartime periods in the West Balkans caused strong migration flows inside and outside the broader region. From 1991 to 2004, 1.3 million people from the former Yugoslavia sought asylum in developed countries.<sup>9</sup> Apart from these 1.3 million, approximately 2.5 million were internally displaced in 1993, seeking for refuge internally or in other republics of the former Yugoslavia.<sup>10</sup> Serbia hosted the largest number of refugees and IDPs, more than a half million refugees and 200,000 IDPs from its southern province Kosovo and Metohija. Total amount of expatriates from Serbia and Montenegro together amounted to 2,298,352, the second highest number in the region (see table 1 and 2). Although former Yugoslav countries are mostly generating immigration, Slovenia and in minor measure Croatia are receiving an indicative number of immigrants. On the other hand, no war caused the migration of 2–3 million Romanians to EU countries, which represents 10–15 percent of the overall population being employed outside the country in 2007, and according to this research exceeds the sum of migrants from Serbia and Montenegro.<sup>11</sup> Massive emigration also made Romania a destination country. For example in April 2007, 670 Chinese workers were hired for a clothing factory in Romania’s textile centre Bacau, after the owner did not manage to attract locals despite offering double the average minimum wage.<sup>12</sup>

Low fertility, bad economy, lack of industrial production, and lack of a strong service sector influence current migration flows from the region. Brain drain and, as in the case of Romania and Bulgaria, mass migration of youth created dire perspectives for the society and economy of these countries. SEE is integrated in the EU, yet Romania and Bulgaria—who suffered from the mass emigration and economic condition in the West Balkans—threaten to burden its fragile economies

if the young, skilled population is offered more opportunity to settle in the EU. Youth migration in the region where the population growth is around zero (see table 1)—with the exception of Albania, Bosnia and Turkey (annual growth of 1.5 percent)—represents obstacle for manageable welfare policies.

Regional migration from the Balkans could be differentiated regarding the medium and long-term prospective of migration. Societies with low fertility rates can hardly threaten the EU with massive flows that could not be absorbed. But Turkey is a separate case: “The country is an exception to the overall trend for the wider region, experiencing strong population growth and has the youngest population in the region, with over one-third of the population under 25. This youth bulge is expected to peak around 2030 before beginning to decline.”<sup>13</sup> Regulation of transitory migration and migration from Turkey represents another set of challenges. Today, Turkey boasts the highest population out of all SEE countries including Greece. The fact that Turkey’s Islamic population represents 99.8 percent of its more than 75 million inhabitants is also an obstacle for the EU integration.

Excluding Turkey, other countries in the region—Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, FRY Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Romania and Serbia—will have, in 2010, according to UN estimates, 65,267,000 inhabitants with the population growth around zero.<sup>14</sup> On the other hand, Turkey is estimated to reach the next year population of 75,705,000, more than all the SEE countries combined. Without radical positive changes in birth rates, it is highly unlikely that migration flows from SEE will represent a significant part of the overall migration in the EU, as continued disparity in employment opportunities and lack of adequate wages and stability beset the region.

Regulation of transitory migration and migration from Turkey represents another set of challenges. Today, Turkey boasts the highest population out of all SEE countries including Greece, although the region as a whole is set to have a zero population growth rate. Without radical positive changes in birth rates, it is highly unlikely that migration flows from SEE will represent significant part of the overall migration in the EU, as continued disparity in employment opportunities and lack of adequate wages and stability beset the region.

*Given that 24.7 million people live in the Western Balkans, the 21% of people in the region aged 15 years or older willing to leave their countries would mean a maximum of 4.34 million migrants. Of the potential migrants, only 17% stated that they would certainly or probably have left their country in the year following the survey: this amounts to a total of 720,000 Western Balkan residents with short-term migration plans, of which only 120,000 were certain that they would leave.*<sup>15</sup>

## DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES IN THE REGION REGARDING MIGRATION

Diplomatic initiatives of the SEE countries aimed at managing the migration coincide and are largely induced by the process of EU integration. These measures are internally motivated because of intraregional migration, IDPs, and refugees. The

Western Balkans is among three regions with the highest degree of migration worldwide for the past two decades. After the Thessaloniki summit, the EU adopted a program “For financial and technical assistance to “third countries” in the areas of migration and asylum (AENEAS).”<sup>16</sup> This program aims at “improved management of migratory flows, especially certain aspects of migration such as the emigration of highly skilled nationals and the movement of refugees between neighbouring countries, is also a matter of major concern for the development of some countries.”<sup>17</sup> AENEAS fits into the concept of integrated border management in order to prevent irregular migration. In the framework of this program, regional countries organize regional data on the subject, such as on the readmission experiences and integrated border management.<sup>18</sup>

In April 2009, the Czech presidency of the EU, prepared the conference “Building Migration Partnerships” with ministers responsible for migration from European and former USSR countries. They agreed “to strengthen co-operation in migration management, to explore and develop agreed principles and elements for close migration partnerships between our countries, following a comprehensive, balanced, pragmatic and operational approach, and respecting the rights and human dignity of migrants and their family members, as well as of refugees.”<sup>19</sup>

Regional countries formally responded positively on such incentive and supported a following initiative on the matter. Existing regional programs and initiatives regarding migration issues are:

- (a) EU members at the EU-Western Balkans summit in Thessaloniki invited regional countries to European integration. EU representatives, representatives of Balkan countries, and the Office of the High Representatives (OHR) from Bosnia and Herzegovina agreed on ten points, of which three concerned migration (points 5, 6 and 7). Point 5 addresses the issue of refugees and internally displaced persons, while 6 and 7 tackle the issue of illegal migration.<sup>20</sup>
- (b) Establishment of the *Migration, Asylum, Refugees Regional Initiative* (MARRI) in 2003, merging two initiatives was one of the regional achievements in line with EU migration and border management policies. This initiative resulted in the creation of one regional centre in Skopje, charged for practical cooperation and activities and MARRI Regional Forum, which provides political and framework support to the Initiative.
- (c) The *Budapest Process* and similar initiatives embrace the region but have wider impact covering several regions and forty-nine states.
- (d) The *Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe* is a Western backed initiative which, among other activities, promoted integrated border management and new migration policies in this region. It has been replaced in February 2008, by the Regional Cooperation Council (seat in Sarajevo) that is indirectly related to migration issues. Yet, it strengthened its involvement in the promotion of migration management policies by signing “a Memorandum of Understanding on development of an effective regional cooperation on

issues of migration, asylum, refugee return, visa policies and border management” with MARRI in September 2009.<sup>21</sup>

The process of EU integration requires agreements of readmission between accession countries and EU and EU member states. Readmission agreements advanced by the EU and EU members are the result of the bargaining between David and Goliath. Therefore, SEE countries signed these agreements. Serbia signed the first agreement of this kind with Germany in October 1996. The first readmission agreement between EC and a country outside the EC was with Poland in 1991. Since then, bilateral agreements became a must for the candidate and accession countries. Today, SEE countries, including Moldova signed readmission agreements with EU, and bilaterally with many EU members. Turkey still refuses to sign these agreements maintaining the “geographical limitation” for persons from Asia and Africa.<sup>22</sup> EU countries are thus imposing measures on candidate countries that can produce a buffer zone for unwelcome immigration for aspiring future or new members. Namely, the readmission agreements regulate the return, most notably the forced return of migrants with irregular status and those with non accepted requests for asylum, which according to Catherine Phuong puts them at odds with the international humanitarian law, in particular with the obligation of non-refoulement.<sup>23</sup>

## MIGRANT INTEGRATION ISSUES

Unlike Australia, Canada, the US, and countries built on the territory of European colonies with an autochthonous population marginalized numerically, socially, and economically, European nations, just like traditional Asian nations with statehood tradition, have different quality impacts on migrant integration issues. Even Australia, Canada, and the US—traditionally immigrant countries—have persistent housing segregation, which reflects an overall psychology of us vis-à-vis, the others.<sup>24</sup> Migrants in EU countries, as in Southeast Asian nations, in particular

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those of different cultural and racial origin versus the domestic population, tend to live in ghettoized communities. In order to create a multicultural and multiracial environment and to assure the integration of all races, many policies adopted in the US are race-oriented. For example, the decisions in Seattle and in Jefferson County to adopt a policy of racially profiled school-assignment program that would guarantee certain percentage of African Americans in the school (and

assume certain percentage of Whites). These programs, popularly known as *racial balancing* programs, were challenged in the Supreme Court. Adoption of these programs were justified as follows: "Administrators say that unless they ensure integration, the district's schools will mirror the separation of Whites and Blacks in housing patterns across Jefferson County."<sup>25</sup>

Even though some US schools are changing and restructuring their diversity policies, the Integration Report of February 2008 states that "research [is] suggesting that a return to uncontrolled choice is strongly associated with increasing levels of racial segregation."<sup>26</sup> Therefore separation persists and people are basically forced to imitate integration after four decades of desegregation policies.

Although European schools may not represent the racial division, ghettos are present all over the continent. Riots in France and Belgium in 2005, in non-European immigrant or immigrant origin ghettos indicated the ethnic and racial separation and tensions. Given the situation in European and North American societies it is hardly to expect that eventual impact of the flow of immigrants from culturally and/or racially different societies will not create ghettos and intercultural tensions.

Regional migration in the Western Balkans, more than other regional immigrants, given the recent ethnically motivated conflicts may create tensions in some host states. Yet, with the exclusion of the return of refugees and eventual return of IDPs to Kosovo and Metohija, strong immigration is less likely to occur due to a similar grade of economic development and high unemployment rates. Depopulation, in the context of the high rates of unemployment, will affect the sustainability of the welfare policies and eventually the retirement age in all countries of the SEE region except for the UN administered territory of Kosovo (and Metohija).

SEE intraregional migration from Albania to Greece is significant because historical relations between the two ethnicities resulted in the creation of an atmosphere of linking the migration with organized crime, a process that initially occurred in the US a century ago. According to the Greek census in 2001, there were 433,500 Albanians in Greece, excluding ethnic Greeks from Albania, whose number is unknown.<sup>27</sup> Field studies and data of different public bodies in Greece suggest that there were at least an additional 250,000 illegally residing Albanians in Greece.<sup>28</sup> Some authors (Baldwin and Edwards) even tend to theorize peculiar Balkan immigration based on the negative perception of the Albanian immigrants in Greek public discourse, as of people linked to criminality. However, these conclusions clearly miss the general perception of particular ethnic and cultural groups in advanced countries domestic population as linked to criminality.

The prospect of economic development could probably attract migrants from Turkey. This eventuality, Turkish emigrants in Greece, because of the traditionally rival policy and long history of inimical relations could provoke a manifestation of xenophobia in Greece and create further obstacles for the good political climate on the bilateral level.

Other significant intraregional migration is from Moldova to Romania, which

represents a different quality than that of Albania to Greece, because it relates to the migration of members of the same ethnic group. Ethnic migration from Bulgaria to Turkey occurred in 1989, with some 220,000 members of Turkish community migrating to the motherland. Additional 750,000 Bulgarians left the country from 1989 to 2004, but outside the region (for more accurate number see tables 1 & 2).<sup>29</sup>

Intraregional migration can be facilitated or limited because of similarities in language. Slavic populations in Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro speak more or less the same language and the majority of them are able to use two alphabets (Cyrillic and Latin). Albanian migration in territories of Kosovo and Metohija, Western Macedonia, and Albania, is facilitated by the official use of Albanian language, similar to the situation with Romanians in Moldova and Romania. Common history and sometimes culture may have a positive effect on intraregional migration and integration, like in the case of Serbs in Serbia, Bosnia, and Montenegro, but also the Serbs, Montenegrins, and Romanians for Greece. Development of Euro regions in the Balkans and SEE will probably augment the opportunity for cross-border employment, encouraging intraregional migration.

## HOW TO MANAGE SEE MIGRATION

All SEE countries are countries of origin and some are also countries of destination (Greece, Turkey and in minor measure Romania). Estimates say that Romania will lose up to 1.2 million people by 2020.<sup>30</sup> If EU restrictions on the mobility of Romanian labor force will be lifted, as expected, in 2014, this number could increase even more. Bulgaria already faced large depopulation like Romania. Studies suggest that the part of the working age population (age 15–60) willing to migrate has dropped from 25 percent (in 1996) to 16 percent (in 2001).<sup>31</sup>

Brain-drain, as a process of the migration of highly skilled population with their education and partly skills completed and acquired in the country of origin, also affects this region.<sup>32</sup> The portion of the highly skilled among SEE immigrants to OECD countries was in 2000 from 6.9 percent (Turkey) to 22.7 percent (Romania), with the rest of the countries ranging from 11 to 14 percent (Table 6).

Overall depopulation with the above mentioned exceptions and the prospect for further emigration could suggest that immigration from third countries is needed, as stated for Bulgaria: “Bulgaria needs immigrants.”<sup>33</sup> Similar assertions fail to address migrants as persons, studying them as goods or capital in socio-economic calculus.<sup>34</sup> Cultural heritage, history of interethnic, intercultural relations, and peculiarities of each society challenges this and other simplistic reasoning. Otherwise states would simply regulate import and export of people just like other goods.

Depopulation can be confronted with a range of mechanisms, some of which have been already applied in a few advanced countries: birth politics, and the rise of the retirement age. Ratio between workers and dependents is not simply burdened by the ageing population and immigration but by high unemployment in the Western Balkans. Of course, migration never stops; it is changing in scope and quality. We could state, bearing in mind a number of factors, immigration in Bulgaria and



Romania may increase and become significant. However to assume this we have to keep in mind a number of variables, of which the availability of employment is probably the most important. Intraregional migration could help enhance circulatory migration which is far more positive for the country of origin, than regular, usual emigration.

The need for the development of new technologies to respond to the economic competitiveness requires a lot of investing both in education and in costly production. The Brain-sharing concept, proposed in Malaysia in October 2009, would best suit the needs of the SEE countries.<sup>35</sup> This concept occurred spontaneously throughout the history of the region, but has never been regulated by the state and supported on a long-term basis. SEE highly skilled nationals with expertise in different fields of science and industry could teach and pass their experience to professionals, researchers, and students in the region through visits or work exchanges.

Aside from brain-sharing, the return of highly skilled persons with acquired expertise abroad, experienced in the most recent technologies is another channel providing a chance for passing on new skills to the locals. Miodrag Stojković, one of the leading embryologists or “clone expert” in the UK, returned in Serbia and opened a private hospital with research center, while continuing his work in Valencia, Spain. This is one of the examples of transforming brain-drain into brain-gain, through return.

The promotion of the exchange of scientists, students, in particular the doctoral students, would further the research and development in the countries of the region and contemporarily contribute to the developed countries by offering them expertise of highly skilled temporary migrants. Highly skilled migrants thus will contribute with their engagement to advanced countries twofold: a) by using their skills without settling on a permanent basis, hence minimising the social burden; b) developing third countries, on the return. Current Third World development policies produced mainly larger and continually rising disparities. The sharing, return, and circulation of experts would essentially help these countries and their societies and indirectly alleviate the migration pressure on the advanced states.

Finally, remittances from the Diaspora represent strong input in economies of all the regional countries, in particular in 2008 for Romania (\$9,395 millions), Serbia (\$5,538 millions), and Bosnia (\$2,735 millions). According to the World Bank data, remittance flows to SEE countries reached \$27 billion in 2008. This amount reflects flows through formal and informal channels. Therefore, the remittances are larger than official aid and of foreign direct investment flows to this region. Remittances are the largest source of external financing in many of these countries. Total remittances in the region grew from \$8.7 billion in 1999, to \$27 billion in 2008 (see Table 5). In the time of relatively high unemployment, immigration to advanced states, which consisted of former Yugoslavia, mainly in a low or semi skilled working force, had much more positive aspects, for alleviating the pressure on the labor market and for the remittances.

Today in the Western Balkans, depopulation, high rates of unemployment, partnership of the state, and Diaspora could bring more direct investments, augment and diversify the labor market. In order to achieve this and to transform the brain-drain into brain-gain and brain-sharing, new legislation and initiative by the SEE countries is needed.

## CONCLUSION

Global patterns of migration are reflected partially on regional migration in and out of the SEE countries. Immigration from the region has a scarce impact on the EU because of its relatively small population and stock of emigrants, if not taking into account Turkey, which, for its demographic potentials and cultural heritage, has a different impact on EU societies and eventually on their migration policies. World financial and economic changes are developing in the present moment and the outcome remains unclear. EU integration is crucial or one of the crucial factors for the design of regional economic policies and relations induces higher degree of cooperation and opens a framework for lifting some of the restrictions for the movements of people.

Bearing in mind demographic challenges—interethnic and intercultural relations in the region, difficulties for integration in the region, prospects of the in, out, and intra-regional migration, brain-drain, brain-gain, and the brain-sharing processes and potentials, levels of employment; inadequate legislation in some of the countries; existence of Euro regions, and same or similar languages in more than one state—we could make SWOT analysis diagram for the cross-border or the intraregional migration as in Table 7. Depopulation will necessarily set the issue of migration high on the list of the policies in the regional countries, and the prospects for its management are better in the regional framework. Positive and negative consequences of migration are both present in the region. Yet, the development of new policies out of new concepts like brain-sharing and circular migration can have very positive results.

## ANNEX—TABLES

**TABLE 1—SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE: POPULATION, POPULATION GROWTH AND STOCK OF EMIGRATION**

Country	Population (in millions 2006)	Population growth (annual percentage, 1997-2006)	Labor force (in millions 2006)	Stock of emigration as percentage of population	Stock of emigrants 2005
Albania	3	0.1	1	27.5	860,485
Bosnia and Herzegovina	4	1.4	2	37.7	1,471,594
Bulgaria	8	-0.8	3	12.1	937,341
Croatia	4	-0.1	2	16.0	726,031
Cyprus	0.765	1.5	0.381	19.2	160,728
Greece	11	0.4	5	11.0	1,218,233
Macedonia	2	0.3	0.869	18.2	370,826
Moldova	4	-1.2	2	16.8	705,533
Montenegro*	..	--	..	..	..
Romania	22	-0.5	10	5.7	1,244,053
Serbia*	8	-0.6	..	21.9	2,298,352
Slovenia	2	0.0	1	6.8	133,965
Turkey	73	1.5	27	6.0	4,402,914
Total	141,765		54.25		14,530,055

*State Union Serbia and Montenegro until 2006 (not calculating the population of the UN administered Kosovo and Metohija).*

*Source: World Bank Data, available at <http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPRO SPECTS/0,,contentMDK:21352016~pagePK:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSite PK:476883,00.html>*

**TABLE 2—DEVELOPING COUNTRIES OF SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE: STOCK OF EMIGRANTS (2005) AND TOP 10 DESTINATION COUNTRIES**

Country	Number of emigrants	Top 10 destination countries
Albania	860,485	Greece (350,265), Italy (257,961), Macedonia FYR (91,891), United States (44,053), Germany (16,257), Canada (6,707), Turkey (3,495), France (2,940), United Kingdom (2,572), Austria (2,257).
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1,471,594	Croatia (503,214), Germany (220,954), Austria (165,372), United States (110,740), Slovenia (84,402), Sweden (55,936), Switzerland (49,032), Canada (27,992), France (24,752), Australia (23,988).
Bulgaria	937,341	Turkey (507,172), Spain (59,696), Germany (52,991), Moldova (46,210), United States (39,734), Greece (33,721), Romania (19,852), Italy (13,644), Israel (13,183), Canada (10,215).
Croatia	726,031	Germany (310,947), Australia (52,215), Austria (47,751), United States (46,400), Canada (42,351), France (31,536), Italy (30,763), Slovenia (26,689), Switzerland (25,475), Bosnia and Herzegovina (14,300).
Macedonia	370,826	Germany (77,780), Switzerland (43,856), Australia (43,783), Italy (39,926), Turkey (33,242), United States (21,035), Austria (17,162), Slovenia (15,978), Croatia (11,384), France (10,163).
Moldova	705,533	Russia (279,909), Ukraine (218,830), Romania (39,292), United States (22,811), Israel (19,243), Germany (16,430), Kazakhstan (7,875), Italy (6,927), Greece (5,511), Spain (5,010).

*Source: World Bank Data, available at <http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPROSPECTS/0,,contentMDK:21352016~pagePK:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:476883,00.html>*

**TABLE 3—HIGH-INCOME COUNTRIES OF SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE: STOCK OF EMIGRANTS (2005) AND TOP 10 DESTINATION COUNTRIES**

Romania	1,244,053	Israel (164,783), Hungary (153,148), United States (154,018), Spain (130,771), Italy (125,160), Germany (122,398), Canada (65,553), Austria (48,041), France (27,414), Greece (23,025).
Serbia and Montenegro	2,298,352	Germany (871,805), Austria (176,046), Switzerland (167,061), United States (128,896), Turkey (118,581), Croatia (95,699), Sweden (77,865), Italy (72,702), Canada (69,884), Australia (55,691).
Turkey	4,402,914	Germany (2,706,232), France (197,819), Netherlands (184,424), Austria (153,836), United States (100,325), Saudi Arabia (95,752), Bulgaria (95,248), Greece (66,402), Switzerland (61,861), United Kingdom (60,110).
Total	13,017,129	

Source: World Bank Data, available at

<http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPROSPECTS/0,,contentMDK:21352016~pagePK:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:476883,00.html>

**TABLE 5—MIGRANT REMITTANCE INFLOWS TO SOUTH EASTERN COUNTRIES, 1990-2008 (MILLIONS US\$)**

Immigration to OECD	Country									
	Albania	B&H #	Bulgaria	Croatia	FRY Macedonia	Former Yugoslavia	Moldova	Romania	Serbia and Montenegro	Turkey
Number of expatriates	524.9	536327	605.8	422277	149014	2,474.0	/	1,008.4	1064580	2,086.7
Percentage of which highly skilled	9	11.5	14.5	14.0	11.5	11.4	/	22.7	11.9	6.9

Source: World Bank staff estimates based on the International Monetary Fund's Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook 2008., available at [http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1110315015165/RemittancesData\\_Nov09\(Public\).xls](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1110315015165/RemittancesData_Nov09(Public).xls)

**TABLE 6**  
**IMMIGRATION\* TO OECD (AS OF JANUARY 2008)**

Year	Country								
	Albania	B&H	Bulgaria	Croatia	Macedonia	Moldova	Romania	Serbia and Montenegro	Turkey
1990	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	3,246
1991	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	2,819
1992	152	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	3,008
1993	332	...	...	230	...	...	...	...	2,919
1994	307	...	...	376	...	...	11	...	2,627
1995	427	...	...	544	...	1	9	...	3,327
1996	551	...	42	668	68	87	18	1,295	3,542
1997	300	...	51	617	78	114	16	662	4,197
1998	504	2,048	51	625	63	124	49	1,033	5,356
1999	407	1,888	43	557	77	112	96	948	4,529
2000	598	1,595	58	641	81	179	96	1,132	4,560
2001	699	1,521	71	747	73	243	116	1,698	2,786
2002	734	1,526	1,177	885	106	324	143	2,089	1,936
2003	889	1,749	1,718	1,085	174	487	124	2,661	729
2004	1,161	2,072	1,723	1,222	213	705	132	4,129	804
2005	1,290	2,043	1,613	1,222	227	920	4,733	4,650	851
2006	1,359	2,157	1,716	1,234	267	1,182	6,718	4,703	1,111
2007	1,468	2,700	2,132	1,394	345	1,498	8,539	5,377	1,209
2008a	1,495	2,735	2,634	1,602	407	1,897	9,380	5,538	1,360
Total	12,673	22,034	13,029	13,649	2,179	7,873	30,180	35,915	50,916

*For some countries data relates to a year 2000*

*\* Not including Italy and Japan as destination countries.*

*\*\* In the document Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Since May 2006, Serbia and Montenegro are two independent states.*

*# since OECD in January 2008, published data in Database on Immigrants in OECD countries (DIOC), for the territory of Former Yugoslavia, we offered data on today sovereign states from the table of 2000, and the aggregated data for the Former Yugoslavia, as of January 2008, in a separate column.*

*Source: OECD, January 2008, available at,  
[http://www.oecd.org/document/51/0,3343,en\\_2649\\_39023663\\_40644339\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_1,00.html](http://www.oecd.org/document/51/0,3343,en_2649_39023663_40644339_1_1_1_1,00.html).*

**TABLE 7**

<p><b>STRENGTHS</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Remittances</li> <li>-Euro regions</li> <li>-Intercultural relations and common history</li> <li>-Language skills</li> <li>-Regional trade agreement (CEFTA)</li> </ul>	<p><b>WEAKNESSES</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Depopulation</li> <li>-Ageing population</li> <li>-Unemployment (particularly Western Balkans)</li> <li>-Intercultural and interethnic history of relations</li> <li>-Inadequate legislation</li> </ul>
<p><b>OPPORTUNITIES</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Brain-sharing</li> <li>-Brain-gain</li> <li>-Economic development</li> </ul>	<p><b>THREATS</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Brain-drain</li> <li>-Xenophobia</li> <li>-World financial and economic crisis</li> </ul>

**Notes**

<sup>1</sup> William Lacy Swing, “Building Migration Partnerships,” *International Organization for Migration*, April 28, 2009, <http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/media/all-speeches/cache/offonce;jsessionid=A364B44CDC7785B%206DC38F84814A2F2E5.worker01?entryId=24830>, (accessed January 31, 2010).

<sup>2</sup> “A new round of multilateral services negotiations began in 2000, as foreseen in Article XIX of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). With the launch of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) in November 2001, services became part of a broader negotiating round. Mode 4 is defined in Article I.2(d) of the GATS as ‘the supply of a service...by a service supplier of one member, through presence of natural persons of a member in the territory of another member’ (i.e. a person who is a service supplier, such as a banker or an architect, is present in a foreign country to provide the service). A ‘natural’ person is a human being as opposed to a merely legal entity, such as a business. Mode 4 is an important component of the negotiations on services and has been identified by a number of World Trade Organization (WTO) Members, particularly developing countries, as one of the areas where they seek improved market opening commitments. The main improvements to Mode 4 commitments offered concern additional categories of natural persons not associated with a commercial presence abroad (e.g. self-employed service professionals); greater clarity in the application of ‘labour market tests’ or ‘economic needs tests’ and/or reduction in their scope of application; removal of discriminatory measures, such as nationality or residency requirements; and extended periods of stay.”

See Gervais Appave, *Introduction to World Migration 2008: Managing Labour Mobility in the Evolving Global Economy* (International Organization for Migration: International Organization for Migration, 2009), 6-7.

<sup>3</sup> Global Risk Network of the World Economic Forum, *Europe@Risk: A Global Risk Network Briefing* (Geneva: PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008): 10.

<sup>4</sup> David Coleman, *Europe’s Demographic Future: Determinants, Dimensions, and Challenges* (New York: Population Council, 2005).

Quoted in Jennifer Dabbs Sciubba, “The Defense Implications of Demographic Trends,” *Joint Force Quarterly* 48, (1st Quarter 2008): 122, [http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq\\_pages/editions/i48/27.pdf](http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i48/27.pdf)

(accessed January 31, 2010). Most of the data offered in the text may be approximate because the institutions gathering them are not sure of their veracity. The latest example is the training on the migration of labor in the Western Balkans, organized in Belgrade, October 19-23, 2003, by the ILO and IMO. Representatives of both organizations, as well as representatives of the public institutions in Serbia: National Employment Agency, Ministry of Labour and Social Policy and of the Ministry of Economy and Regional Development, admitted that their data may not be reliable. However, lacking the trusted data does not seem that they indicate trends, based on which we may analyze and eventually forecast.

<sup>5</sup> "The Blue Card" aka Blue European Labor Card is an approved EU-wide work permit (Council Directive 2009/50/EC) allowing high-skilled non-EU citizens to work and live in any country within the European Union, excluding Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom."

<sup>6</sup> "Keep Doors Open to Migrant Workers to Meet Long-term Labour Needs, Says OECD" *OECD*, [http://www.oecd.org/document/39/0,3343,en\\_2649\\_33931\\_43195111\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_37415,00.html](http://www.oecd.org/document/39/0,3343,en_2649_33931_43195111_1_1_1_37415,00.html) (accessed January 31, 2010), 0.

<sup>7</sup> European Commission. Economic and Financial Affairs, "EU Interim Forecast: Coming Out of the Recession but Uncertainty Remains High," [http://ec.europa.eu/economy\\_finance/thematic\\_articles/article15857\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/thematic_articles/article15857_en.htm) (accessed January 31, 2009).

<sup>8</sup> Maria Concetta Chiuri, Giuseppe De Arcangelis, and Giovanni Ferri, "Crisis in Countries of Origin and Illegal Immigration into Europe via Italy," *Global Migration Perspectives*, no. 53 (2000): 4.

<sup>9</sup> "Međunarodni naučni skup migracije, krize i nedavni ratni sukobi na Balkanu," *Komunikacija* (Belgrade: 2005): 150, [http://www.komunikacija.org.rs/komunikacija/casopisi/stanov/XLIII\\_1-4/11/download\\_ser\\_lat](http://www.komunikacija.org.rs/komunikacija/casopisi/stanov/XLIII_1-4/11/download_ser_lat) (accessed January 31, 2010).

<sup>10</sup> Međunarodni naučni skup migracije, krize i nedavni ratni sukobi na Balkanu," 2003: 150.

<sup>11</sup> "Focus Migration Romania," *Country Profile: Romania*, no. 9 (2007):1-10, [http://www.focus-migration.de/typo3\\_upload/groups/3/focus\\_Migration\\_Publikationen/Laenderprofile/CP\\_09\\_Romania.pdf](http://www.focus-migration.de/typo3_upload/groups/3/focus_Migration_Publikationen/Laenderprofile/CP_09_Romania.pdf) (accessed January 31, 2010); Ramona Frunza, Gabriel Mursa, Liviu-George G. Maha, "Reasons and Effects of the Romanian Labour Force Migration in European Union Countries," working paper (Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, 2008), available at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1376313> (accessed on January 31, 2010).

<sup>12</sup> Media Eghbal, "Romanian Migration Raises Concerns Over Labour Shortage," *Euromonitor International*, September 3, 2007, [http://www.euromonitor.com/Articles.aspx?folder=Romanian\\_migration\\_raises\\_concerns\\_over\\_labour\\_shortage&print=true](http://www.euromonitor.com/Articles.aspx?folder=Romanian_migration_raises_concerns_over_labour_shortage&print=true) (accessed January 31, 2010).

<sup>13</sup> "A Global Risk Network Briefing," *World Economic Forum*, 2008.

<sup>14</sup> "World Population Prospects," United Nations, available at <http://esa.un.org/unpp/p2k0data.asp>, (accessed February 10, 2009).

<sup>15</sup> "Focus on: The Impact of Migration," Gallup Balkan Monitor, Insights and Perceptions: Voices of the Balkans (2009): 3, [http://www.balkan-monitor.eu/files/090626\\_Gallup\\_Balkan\\_Monitor-Focus\\_On\\_Migration.pdf](http://www.balkan-monitor.eu/files/090626_Gallup_Balkan_Monitor-Focus_On_Migration.pdf) (accessed January 31, 2010).

<sup>16</sup> "Regulation (EC) No 491/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2004," *Official Journal of the EU*, (2004): 80/1-80/5, available at: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:080:0001:0005:EN:PDF> (accessed January 31, 2010).

<sup>17</sup> "Regulation (EC) No 491/2004," *Official Journal of the EU*, 80/1.

<sup>18</sup> "Report on the activity of the Ministry of Interiors of the Republic of Croatia for the EU integrations." Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Interior, available at: <http://policija.hr/mup.hr/UserDocsImages/ministarstvo/kabinet08/aktivnostiMUP-a%20za%20eu-ozujak.pdf>.

<sup>19</sup> "Building Migration Partnerships Prague Ministerial Conference Joint Declaration" (paper presented at the 17th OSCE Economic and Environmental Forum, Part II, Athens, Greece, May 5, 2009), 4, [http://www.osce.org/documents/eea/2009/05/37502\\_en.pdf](http://www.osce.org/documents/eea/2009/05/37502_en.pdf) (accessed February 3, 2010).

<sup>20</sup> "EU-Western Balkans Summit," press release, European Commission, 23 June 2003, [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement\\_process/accesion\\_process/how\\_does\\_a\\_country\\_join\\_the\\_eu/sap/thessaloniki\\_summit\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accesion_process/how_does_a_country_join_the_eu/sap/thessaloniki_summit_en.htm) (accessed February 3, 2010).

<sup>21</sup> "RCC, MARRI to promote rule of law principles in South East Europe," *Regional Cooperation Council* 16, September 2009, 2, [http://www.rcc.int/index.php?action=news\\_archive#28](http://www.rcc.int/index.php?action=news_archive#28) (accessed February 3, 2010).

<sup>22</sup> Ercan Yavuz, "Turkey to Lift Limitations for Asylum Seekers," *Today's Zaman* (August 3, 2009), <http://www.todayzaman.com/tz-web/news-182825-turkey-to-lift-limitations-for-asylum-seekers.html> (accessed February 3, 2010).

<sup>23</sup> Catherine Phuong, "Asylum and Immigration in the Context of Enlargement," *European Union Law for the Twenty-First Century: Constitutional and Public*, eds. Takis Tridimas and Paolina Nebbia (Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2004), 394.



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- <sup>25</sup> Joan Biskupic, "Justices to Weigh School Diversity," *USA Today* (November 14, 2006), [http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/judicial/2006-11-14-deseg\\_x.htm](http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/judicial/2006-11-14-deseg_x.htm) (accessed February 3, 2010).
- <sup>26</sup> "The Integration Report," *The Civil Rights Project*, (2008), <http://theintegrationreport.wordpress.com/2008/02/25/issue-04/> (accessed February 3, 2010).
- <sup>27</sup> Georgios A. Antonopoulos, "Are the 'Others' Coming?: Evidence on Alien Conspiracy from Three Illegal Markets in Greece," *Crime, Law and Social Change*, (2009), 475-493.
- <sup>28</sup> Martin Baldwin-Edwards, "Albanian Emigration and the Greek Labour Market: Economic Symbiosis and Social Ambiguity," *South-East Europe Review for Labour and Social Affairs*, (2004), 53.
- <sup>29</sup> Rossitsa Rangelova and Katya Vladimirova, "Migration for Central and Eastern Europe: the Case of Bulgaria," *South-East Europe Review for Labour and Social Affairs*, (2004), 7-30.
- <sup>30</sup> Media Eghbal, "Romanian Migration Raises Concerns Over Labour Shortage."
- <sup>31</sup> Rossitsa Rangelova, "Migration from Central and Eastern Europe: the Case of Bulgaria," 12.
- <sup>32</sup> "Emigration rates of the university-educated tend to be higher than for the general population in developing countries. This is even greater for scientists, engineers, and members of the medical profession." See Andrew Burns and Sanket Mohapatra, "International Migration and Technological Progress," *Migration and Development Brief 4* (Development Prospects Group, Migration and Remittances Team, 2008), 1, [http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1110315015165/Migration&Development\\_Brief\\_4.pdf](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1110315015165/Migration&Development_Brief_4.pdf) (accessed February 3, 2010); "However, the negative effects of the brain drain phenomenon in the new global market may be mitigated with proper policies to bring benefits to both the 'sending' country and the region. Indeed, scholars now recognize the beneficial impact that brain drain can have, and even strengthen socio-economic development over the long term. It is thus of great importance to know more about the movements of highly skilled people in SEE in order to create specific policies that can turn the loss of talent into an exchange of knowledge."; See Vedran Horvat, "Brain Drain. Threat to Successful Transition in South East Europe," *Southeast European Politics*, (2004), 76-77, [http://www.christophesoloz.ch/links/doc/2004\\_horvat.pdf](http://www.christophesoloz.ch/links/doc/2004_horvat.pdf) (accessed February 3, 2010).
- <sup>33</sup> Themba Lewis and Diana Daskalova, "Legal dimensions of immigrant access to employment in Bulgaria: a contextual analysis," *South-East Europe Review*, (2008), 82, [http://www.boeckler.de/pdf/seer\\_2008\\_1\\_lewis\\_daskalova.pdf](http://www.boeckler.de/pdf/seer_2008_1_lewis_daskalova.pdf) (accessed February 3, 2010).
- <sup>34</sup> d.Artis addresses them as "innovative capital" in: D.Artis Kancs, "Migration in the SEE and Integration with the EU: A Policy Perspective," (working paper, *Series of the Research Network*, 1989) 2, [http://www.hks.harvard.edu/kokkalis/GSW8/Kancs\\_paper.pdf](http://www.hks.harvard.edu/kokkalis/GSW8/Kancs_paper.pdf) (accessed February 3, 2010).
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