

Migration and the Demographic System in East Central Europe

by Albert F. Reiterer

Complex modern democratic societies formed in the wake of the Second World War face the task of securing three public goods—legitimacy, economic welfare, and a viable sense of collective identity.¹ However, not all people living in such societies are entitled to benefit from these public goods or even engage in the national pursuit of happiness. Indeed, not all humans are considered as belonging to the collective identity of a state, and not all people who cross the borders of a state feel obliged to conform to the expectations of the target country. Thus, while migration is a necessity and an unavoidable phenomenon, it may lead to a host of unintended problems.

So the question arises, “who can claim to partake in these public goods?” Simply put, membership within a state and the privileges it awards are reserved for the citizens of that state. Although some migrants desire citizenship, it is not granted automatically on the basis of physical migration. In fact, many would-be migrants are denied entrance into the society of their choice because of their socio-economic status. And even if entrance is accepted, some migrants may not participate in the society or political decision-making on an equal footing. Instead of becoming citizens they are forced or prefer retaining the status of denizens. It remains that much of immigration policy depends upon the origins of the migrant as a condition for citizenry, and not upon his or her professional skills.

In contrast, it is remarkable what happens when rational criteria become salient in immigration policy. In Canada, for example, “the establishment in 1967 of a point system for entry based on skills and reunion of families has not only increased the volume of immigrants but also diversified their places of origin.”² Immigration policy in Europe also seems to reflect a new set of rational criteria. While national identity and belonging in Europe have depended in the past on linguistic similarity and assimilation into the indigenous body, it seems that in the near future, the single most important condition will be skill and productivity. However, more intangible characteristics may also play a role in the integration processes.

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A Conceptual Clarification: Who is a Migrant?

In order to analyze the effects of regional and international population movements, we must first define the term *migration*, which as a result of its conflicting definitions, has become a highly debated term. Compared to its more technical definition in statistics, migration within the scope of social science encompasses a more broad-based context. In statistical terms, migration includes all those who migrate for the purpose of permanent living—also known as mobility.

WHILE NATIONAL IDENTITY AND BELONGING IN EUROPE HAVE DEPENDED IN THE PAST ON LINGUISTIC SIMILARITY AND ASSIMILATION INTO THE INDIGENOUS BODY, IT SEEMS THAT IN THE NEAR FUTURE, THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT CONDITION WILL BE SKILL AND PRODUCTIVITY.


On the other hand, migration, as it is defined in the social sciences, is understood as a change that results from leaving the world to which one is accustomed. A geographical movement from one nation to another usually accompanies a change of such magnitude; therefore, a migrant is someone who leaves the world in which he or she has spent the formative years of his or her life. A migrant tries to enter a society that perceives him or her as a stranger. Along those lines, the migrant cannot automatically lay claim to all the rights and privileges that society reserves for its accepted members. In addition, membership on a national level must be deserved. Although the word *deserve* may sound a bit emphatic, in most modern democracies, membership comes with certain conditions.

Demographics of Central and Southeastern Europe

Demographic studies reveal the effects of regional mobility and migration on population numbers. Rather than treat migration solely as an international phenomena, statistics also focus on population movements within a state. In addition to mobility, demographics demonstrate how fertility and mortality rates change over time, leading to fluctuating population numbers. The period following the break-up of communist states formerly under the Soviet banner is of particular interest to this analysis.

The collapse of the Soviet sphere of influence began in 1989 with many political and socio-economic changes in Europe. Although economic and structural changes were implemented over time, changes in the demographics of Central and Southeastern Europe occurred very rapidly. The transformation of political, economic, and social systems in Central and Southeastern Europe led to significant changes in the demographic trajectories of former Soviet countries. This “second demographic transition” was characterized by social modernization, in which fertility rates decreased significantly due to a shifting paradigm. Immediately after the fall of the communist regimes in the region, people began to pursue a more individualistic lifestyle typical of Western societies. Birth control became more prevalent, resulting

in lower fertility rates.



NMS-10 (EU-10): Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria; the Baltic states³

Lower fertility rates were not the only factor that contributed to diminished population size in Central and Southeastern Europe. Emigration was also significant to the shift in demographics. Accelerated out-migration occurred as a result of the hardships associated with transformation in many of these states. Since the majority of these emigrants belonged to the younger and better-educated generation, a rising number of emigrants was, and still is, seen as a hindrance to further demographic, economic, and political progress in Central and Southeastern Europe.

The demographic fate of Central and Southeastern Europe will depend on the region's ability to successfully confront the challenges presented by the new world order, whereby accelerated globalization will heavily impact demographic patterns in the future. This transformation will not only determine the fate of the countries of Central and Southeastern Europe, but it will also influence the social, economic, and political organs of Western Europe. Because Eastern Europe has become a main supplier of labor to Western Europe, and, because immigrants from Eastern Europe represent a reproductively active segment of the population in target countries, it is important to compare the population trajectories of the two regions.

WESTERN AND EASTERN EUROPE: THE DEMOGRAPHY OF EU-15⁴ AND OF EU-10⁵

EU-15

For the purposes of this analysis, the demography of Western Europe will be explored by sectioning it into two distinct areas Northwestern Europe and Southern Europe. Since Ireland exhibits significantly different population characteristics than these two areas, it will be examined separately.⁶

Fertility rates in Northwestern Europe were moderately high after World War II. The total fertility rate (TFR) was about two and a half. In the following years, fertility rates increased until the mid- to late-1960s. Then, the TFR decreased to scantily more than half of the post-war rate, as just mentioned, in most countries. The second demographic transition had begun. The TFR did not increase again until 1990, and then only in selected countries (France, Scandinavian states) and moderately. This trajectory represents the general picture of Western Europe's fertility path. Nevertheless, the variation was rather low in Western Europe. It has gone further down at present.⁷

The fertility trajectory of southern European countries such as Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal differed from the trajectory of the northwestern European countries. These Mediterranean countries had greater fertility rates after World War II than the Northwestern European countries, and their rates started to decrease a decade later than in northwestern Europe. But then it plummeted to a lower level. In addition, fertility rates in the region did not begin to recover until recently, unlike some northwestern countries which saw some recovery begin in 1990.⁸

Ireland, on the other hand, had a higher fertility rate following World War II than both the northwestern European countries and the southern European countries, and the rate increased for some years. Eventually, the fertility rate decreased, though not quite as much as in the rest of Western Europe. At present the fertility rate in Ireland stands at replacement level.

The mortality rate of a country can be measured by the crude death rate or by life expectancy at birth (LE0). The latter, however, better illustrates the mortality trajectory of a society. The national trajectories show us a drastic increase in life expectancy, that is, a decline in the mortality rate, and an almost complete convergence. This is significant for Western Europe politically and socially. Even more characteristic is the path of migration.

Until the mid-1960s, there was some out-migration from Western Europe to overseas. However, in the time thereafter, a completely new phenomenon emerged—Western Europe, with the exception of its southern portion, became a haven for immigrants. The net immigration from Southern and South Eastern Europe and the Middle East (primarily Turkey) stopped for some years after an economic crisis in mid-1970s. By the end of the century immigration had continued. Since then, the flow of migrants has originated from all over the world, a trend that

will likely continue, leading to an influx of migrants from outside Europe. Southern Europe, formerly the source of most European emigrants, became a main target for immigrants coming from developing countries.

Youths made up the greatest fraction of the age structure in Western Europe after World War II. Then, the share of youths progressively decreased and the percentage of people aged 65 and over doubled. This percentage will double again in the next half century, with this age bracket coming to represent nearly a third of the population. The size and the share of the economically active population—those aged 20 to 65—grew. This share is now nearly two-thirds of the population. While population numbers, due to immigration, will not decrease very much, the share of the active population will. In 2050, those aged 20 to 65 will constitute only half the total population.⁹

NMS-10 (EU-10)

The trends in Central Eastern and Eastern Europe, with respect to age structure and rates of fertility and mortality, are rather different than the trends in Western Europe. For this analysis, the countries in this region will be split into three different groups: the Central Eastern countries of the Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania constitute the first group; the former Yugoslavia (with the exception of Slovenia) constitutes the second, and the former Soviet republics constitute the third.¹⁰

There was rapid population growth in Eastern Europe in the two decades following World War II. The ten countries inducted into the European Union in 2004 and 2006 (the EU-10) had a combined population of 77 million people in 1950. Between 1950 and 1990, the population of the EU-10 increased to 106 million. This represents an increase of nearly two-fifths of the 1950 population, and marks the demographic peak in this region. The population began to decline, however, with the onslaught of political transformation. After 1990, the population growth rate became negative to -0.23 percent. In 2005, the population of the EU-10 was 102 million. The share of the country aggregate today is 21 percent of the total population in the European Union (EU-27).

Eastern Europe had relatively high fertility rates after World War II. The average number of children per woman was greater than three. However, the variation in rates between the countries in this region was essential. Fertility decreased slowly and touched replacement levels only at the end of the communist era. The patterns of reproductive behavior in Eastern Europe were quite different from those in Western Europe. This was in large part due to the better opportunities in Eastern Europe for women to reconcile labor market participation and fulfilling traditional familial duties. Rapid demographic change in Eastern Europe began at the start of the political transformation in the mid-1980s. During this time, fertility rates decreased rapidly and to a considerable degree below Western European rates. In less than a decade, Eastern Europe experienced their second demographic transition. At present, there are no signs of recovery for fertility rates in this region.

Mortality rates decreased considerably after World War II. However, soon rates stabilized with no marked increase or decrease. After 1990, there was a significant increase in the mortality rate in all Eastern European countries; life expectancy started to increase again in Central Eastern Europe only after the mid-1990s.

Fertility rates in the former Soviet republics decreased to replacement level in the beginning of the 1990s and decreased even more later in the decade. Life expectancy in this area was greater after World War II than in Eastern Central Europe, and there was little variation between the republics of the Union. By the end of the 1960s, the life expectancy in the former republics was relatively stable. With the break-up of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, however, all the former republics experienced a marked increase in mortality rates. Within this decade, life expectancy decreased; the loss was approximately two years of expected life in most countries. While the Baltic States recovered soon after and are now experiencing slightly higher life expectancy than at the time of independence, life expectancy in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus continued to decrease. Russia's population lost an average of four years of life expectancy. The Yeltzin era is considered as costly in human lives as the Stalin era of the 1930s.¹¹

There were converging trends from the 1950s to the 1970s in all Eastern European countries. This convergence continued for fertility until present times. Mortality rates and life expectancy converged until the 1980s. After this time, they diverged. Thus, Western and Eastern Europe do not follow the same demographic path. This is significant for the EU as a whole, as most of the countries previously discussed are now member states, and others, such as Croatia and Macedonia, are candidates for membership.

While growing in absolute numbers, the younger share of the population decreased in the old system. Due to the decline in fertility rates after 1990, their share diminished, and even absolute numbers receded to two-thirds of the values in 1990. The share of the elderly was about 6.5 percent of the population in 1950, nearly 50 percent below the EU-15 level. Then, the number of people in this age bracket more than doubled, and the share now stands at 14.3 percent of the population. The share will double again by 2050. The younger generation's share of the population, on the other hand, will shrink furthermore, although not dramatically.

Eastern Europe's economically active population increased dramatically in absolute numbers. Its share increased as well, although at a slower rate. The share of the economically active population remained at around 56 percent until 1975. Since then, this share has steadily increased and has even jumped up two points in recent years. This is due exclusively to the dwindling share of the younger population, which decreased from 18.2 percent in 2000 to 15.7 percent in 2005. This year, the economically active population's share of the population stood at 62.3 percent and is expected to continue growing. However, regardless of recent growth, population projections indicate an eventual decline of the economically active population's share of the population, as well as its absolute numbers. It is estimated that the share will decrease to 59.5 percent by 2025 and will reach a low level of 52.4 percent by 2050.


As the economically active share of the population dwindles, this group becomes increasingly indispensable to Eastern Europe. Thus, Western Europe can no longer expect to garner immigrants among Eastern Europe's economically active population in the long run. Today, many Europeans fear over immigration; however, there may be competition for immigrants in a few decades.¹²

MIGRATION

Fluctuating population numbers and the demography of Eastern and Western Europe have a direct effect on migration. We will now focus on migration in Europe and the causes of significant population movements. Some differences must be mentioned that exist between Western and Eastern Europe. In Western Europe, people have been migrating in and out, but most of them did not stay permanently in the region. This was different in the case of Eastern Europe prior to 1989. Out-migration to Western countries from Eastern Europe was notoriously difficult and uncommon. As late-starters of industrial development, the Eastern countries retained an adequate labor force reserve within their agrarian population. Therefore, most countries in the region were not in need of foreign labor until the 1980s. However, at that time, labor became scant in some countries, and immigrants started arriving in Eastern Europe in order to bolster the local labor force. The German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary attracted Vietnamese immigrants to its labor markets, but the numbers were not too substantial.

Some other exceptions exist concerning permanent migration in Eastern Europe. During World War II, millions of Germans lived in countries such as Poland and Czechoslovakia. An overwhelming majority of these Germans fulfilled the subversive role of a fifth column, supporting Hitler's military and political aims from within their respective countries. After World War II, the accords of Potsdam legalized and stimulated the expulsion of the German speaking population in those countries. Immediately after the war, migration to Germany was undesirable because of Germany's devastated economy and infrastructure. Later, the improved economic trajectory of the Federal Republic of Germany (*Wirtschaftswunder*—the economic miracle) proved migration to be more attractive. In the 1960s and 1970s, most of the German speaking populations in Eastern Europe were eager to leave for Germany and Germany was ready to accept them as co-nationals. The Soviet Union and Poland first hesitated to allow emigration to Germany, but eventually permitted it.

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Net migration in Eastern European countries, in 1,000¹³

The Case of Germany and Austria

Several other cases illustrate the increasing trends of emigration from Eastern Europe. In Romania, Nicolae Ceausescu made a bargain with the German-speaking population, allowing them to emigrate for cash paid by the Federal Republic of Germany. The Jewish populations of the Soviet Union and Poland began migrating to Israel and the United States. Then in 1950, and again in the 1980s, Bulgaria expelled the part of its Turkish population that refused to assimilate and become Slavic Bulgarians. Thus, there was a steady but low-level outflow of people from Eastern Europe in the years after World War II. This flow of steady migration was only interrupted by a significant wave of Hungarian emigration in 1956.

In the 1980s, the Polish population's lurking rebellion against the nomenclature resulted in another wave of emigration. For the involved countries, this proved to be the start of a huge wave of emigration that occurred in the 1990s. The only exception to this wave of emigration was the case of Hungary as Hungarian-speaking immigrants flooded in from Romania. Despite the population losses these countries experienced, population levels were restored in the 1980s.

Migration trends are easier to recognize when examining individual countries. Since Germany and Austria experience frequent cross border migration, an analysis of the relationship between both of these states will be helpful. In addition, we will look at the influx of immigration into these states from other parts of Europe.

The Federal Republic of Germany annexed the Former German Democratic

Republic in 1990 as part of the re-unification process. This historical event meant the entry of an Eastern European country into Western Europe. If population growth and migration are significant indicators of relative national welfare, then Germany did not benefit from re-unification as expected; indeed, economic growth rates slowed down. Fertility rates have approached very low levels and, more recently, net migration became negative (2008: -56,000). Negative net migration can partly be explained by Germany's decision to no longer welcome people of German ancestry into its borders.

As one of the wealthiest nations in Europe, Austria has become a primary target of migrants from Eastern Europe. Interestingly enough, Austria greets relatively more Eastern European immigrants than Germany. Although Germany is one of the oldest members of the European Union, only a trivial amount of westward migration goes to the Federal Republic of Germany.

Historically, Austrian migration to West Germany clearly outnumbered German migration to Austria. However, this relationship has been reversed since more than a decade—twice as many Germans have been migrating to Austria rather than the historical inverse. Two factors are responsible for this shift in migration balance. First, Germany has incorporated a part of Eastern Europe into its sovereign borders. This has resulted in increased immigration from former East Germany first to the Western part of Germany and then to Austria. Second, common language and culture make Austria a very attractive destination for Germans. German migration to Austria actually accounts for a substantial portion of the total net migration coming from Western Europe. The balance of migration to Austria from Eastern members of the EU is of similar size (2008: +11,693). However, German migrants tend to remain in Austria, whereas Eastern European migrants come and go (“rotation”).

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The traditional sources of in-migration, especially from the former Yugoslavia, are becoming less significant. In addition, the share of migration from Eastern Europe is declining even while a clear pattern of coming and going remains. Thus, re-direction of migration flows is occurring frequently, similar to what is known as “trade diversion” in economics. The term “fortress Europe”—a closed-border EU but without internal restrictions—may well be justified. Many Germans and Austrians fear confronting a deluge of immigrants coming from the Third World. The decreasing balance of migration from East Europe should help placate these concerns. However, this decline is mostly the result of the very restrictive immigration policy implemented by the EU.

A Look at Eastern European Migration

For this section we will focus on population migrations in Eastern European countries and how these affect their Western European counterparts. The Czech Republic is the only Eastern European state that may truly be considered an immigration country. In 2005, there were officially around 60,000 immigrants, and in 2007 that amount climbed to 104,000. At the same time, emigration decreased from 24,000 to 20,500 people. Emigrants from the Czech Republic moved preponderantly to Germany, the UK and Austria while immigrants to the Czech Republic came from Ukraine, Slovakia (formerly joined to the Czech Republic), Vietnam, and increasingly also from Russia.

Slovakian immigration, as well as emigration, constitutes only a fraction of the Czech case, although there are doubts about the official data. Slovakian emigrants long to move to Germany, its former partner, the Czech Republic, the UK, and Austria. Immigrants are coming into Slovakia from neighboring Ukraine, Vietnam and Russia.⁹

People from Poland are immigrating in huge numbers to Germany and in considerably lower amounts to the UK. Austria and Spain are a distant third and fourth as destinations for Polish immigrants. There is almost no migration to Poland. Interestingly, immigrants to Poland are coming mainly from the USA, Germany, and the UK. This could very well be a case of remigration. However, there are also some immigrants moving to Poland from the Ukraine.

OVERALL, THE BALTIC STATES ARE NOT HOMOGENOUS IN THEIR CHOICE OF IMMIGRATION DESTINATIONS.

Romanian emigration is, to a large extent determined by linguistic similarity and points in large numbers to Spain and Italy as target countries. However, Germany is also a target country, and to a minor extent, Austria. Immigration to Romania is nearly non-existent. However, it is not quite clear how

people immigrating to Romania are registered.

Meanwhile, Bulgarian emigrants are primarily moving to Spain, Germany, and Italy, but there is almost no immigration to Bulgaria. Additionally, Hungarian emigrants prefer Germany and to a minor extent Austria, the Netherlands, and Spain, while immigrants to Hungary are coming from the East, especially from Romania.

Overall, the Baltic States are not homogenous in their choice of immigration destinations. They are oriented in the following manner: Latvians look to immigrate to Germany and the UK while Lithuanians immigrate to Spain. Estonians, for reasons of language, are oriented towards Finland and to a lesser extent towards Germany.

In conclusion, the only countries which are truly attractive to the outside world are the Czech Republic and to a minor extent, Hungary. There is a gradient in material welfare in Europe from Southeast and East, to Northwest and West. People are migrating from the marginal states to the comparatively wealthier ones. The Ukraine and Russia may consider the Central Eastern European countries as a first

step to assimilation in the West. The Eastern European states like Poland and the Baltic states seem to profit mostly from remigration of successful emigrants who left during the Soviet era, and also from emigrants of more recent date.

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL IMPACTS OF DEMOGRAPHY AND MIGRATION

How do demographic trends and population movements in Europe impact society? First, we must look at how demography impacts political ideology.

Ideological Impact

Demography has always been an ideologically-ridden matter of debate. The size of national populations, by some, is considered a proxy for power. Furthermore, population growth has usually been seen as an indicator of historical progress or decay. In the more distant past, up until the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Europe, the paradigm of History as an involution, a getting worse for mankind, was dominant. According to this logic, population size as an indicator for welfare and power in ancient Hellas and Rome should have been considerable. However, some learned men refuted strongly the idea that population size was bigger in Hellas and Rome than in recent times. David Hume argues this very point in central part of his voluminous work, *Essays: Moral, Political and Literary*.¹⁰

Like Hume, Malthus was also concerned with the classic notion that an increased population size would result in more relative power for the state. As an eager ideologue belonging to the parasitic upper class, Malthus was afraid of overpopulation brought on by unconstrained proliferation of the lower class. If left uncontrolled, this overpopulation could shift the balance of power from the upper class to the lower class.¹⁶ Surprisingly and contrasting with his immediate success, Malthus' ideas had little influence on the nationalist politics of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Politicians of the era were fascinated with consolidating power and they recognized power as being related to population size. However, some of these politicians feared the population growth of supporters of their political rivals through the empowerment of the lower class as well as the strength of their national enemies.¹⁷

Today, the fear of heavy immigration ("overimmigration") is still prevalent in the countries of Western Europe. With this fear comes the concern that overimmigration will contribute to a loss of the nation's national identity. This is by no means exclusively a right-wing ideology. In Germany, this view is repeatedly shared by the conservative mainstream. The most prestigious conservative daily newspaper, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ)*, and its editor, Frank Schirrmacher, propagates on the one side a fear of extinction of the Germans, and on the other side this paranoia of overimmigration and how population loss affects a nation's political might. In addition, even certain demographers would further defend this position.

Most Eastern European politicians are even more nationalist than their Western confrères. However, this sense of nationalism leads to a fear of under-population

rather than overpopulation. Although driven by enmity for the former elite, most politicians and a considerable share of the population as well, feel that the period of

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self-assertiveness of Eastern European nations. Politicians are now primarily concerned about fertility rates and how they affect population growth.¹⁸ Since emigration helps stabilize the domestic labor market with its tendencies to unemployment, politicians are unconcerned with the outflow of citizens. However, immigration is seen with mistrust because of its impact on national identity.¹⁹ Right-wing politicians are afraid of *Überfremdung*, or the “foreignization” of the nation, an idea held by the remnants of the *lingua tertii imperii*.²⁰ According to this ideology, immigration contributes to the loss of national identity as foreigners with different cultures and identities diverge from the homogeneity of the state, and emigration is a loss.

1989 and beyond represented a historical defeat for their nations. This is because of the steady population increase that occurred during the communist era and the population squeeze thereafter. Population decreases since the fall of the communist bloc have dealt a blow to the

Structural Impact

Just as demography has a profound impact on political ideology, migration has an equally important impact on the structure of society. The population migrations of today constitute in fact a permanent loss of human capital for countries in Central and Eastern Europe. When compared to the average worker, it is clear that the majority of people emigrating from these countries are more qualified and skilled than those who remain in the country. Furthermore, these emigrants possess a higher level of education than immigrants arriving from materially disadvantaged areas such as Ukraine, Russia, the Caucasian states, and Vietnam. If this proves true, then the population movements in Central and Eastern Europe could contribute to a shortage in workers who are both qualified and educated and politically motivated. Furthermore, education is not independent from the needs of a regional economy. That is to say, the skills needed for laborers in Ukraine might not be the same as those demanded in the Czech Republic.

Migrants need some time to integrate into the target society. This involves spending time learning the language and finding their place in the job market of the target country. As a result, emigrants and immigrants who are better qualified for the position may lose out to those less educated in the country they are longing for. Seen from the perspective of the country from which emigrants leave, money is wasted in educating emigrants who are unable to find a good job in the target country. In addition, businesses are faced with the difficulty of filling the vacancies left by emigrants.

Migration may also have a political impact on the region. Since most immigrants

from Eastern Europe are concerned with personal success rather than political participation in the target country, civil society may experience a loss in political engagement. Moreover, migrants must first gain rights as a citizen before participating in elections or joining the political debate. Some migrants wait almost a decade before they are endowed with certain political rights. It may be speculative, but not completely absurd, to attribute the problems in the political culture of Greece, Italy, and Spain to their history of migration. The younger and more active ones, those more ready to participate in democratic life, were more inclined to emigrate. Those who were rooted in the clientelism and in corrupt traditional networks of their respective countries stayed there.

Another consequence of population migrations is that immigrants bring with them the vestiges of their countries' lagging political culture. This could prove to have negative effects on the political culture of the target country depending on the political ideology of the immigrants in question. Authoritarian trends in the Ukraine and Russia could influence how immigrants from those countries perceive democratic institutions in Western Europe.

FUTURE CONCERNS

Issues associated with ethnic hatred and nationalism constitute a multifaceted problem of their own, which could affect migration in the future. Eastern Europe started late in the process of modernization, causing regional development to lag far behind that of the West. During the Soviet era, collectivism rather than nationalism was encouraged. New elites sought legitimacy by opposing the old-fashioned notion of ethno-nationalism. However, the fall of communism has contributed to a renewed sense of nationalism in Eastern Europe. Despite the rise in nationalism in recent years, disciplinary pressure from Brussels has succeeded at softening its effect. Rights for Russians living in Estonia and Latvia have improved since the Baltic governments were urged to mitigate their strict policies against persons of Russian origin in their respective countries. As a minority, Bulgarian Turks are now allowed representation in the government due to a recent agreement. Currently, the Hungarian government is changing its policy and is seeking to reconcile with immigrant Hungarians who have fled to neighboring countries.

Outside the EU, however, there is much more need for concern in the area of migration. The case of beleaguered Macedonia and the conflict between Cyprus and Turkey present obstacles to future population movements. Turks seeking to migrate to the northern part of the island of Cyprus will continue to face opposition.

Is there a chance that ethnic or national tensions will be stoked by migration? I do not believe this is the case. Migrants—if they are not refugees—are seldom fanatical nationalists. The majority of migrants are ready to adapt and assimilate completely into the mainstream of the target society. People in host societies are often very reluctant to accept newcomers, especially when these people belong to a socio-economic class that is lower than theirs.

We have to discuss similar problems linked to migration more thoroughly, for

restricting these issues either to labor market or to populist ideology means to dispense with problems crucial for our future.

Notes

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- ² Caroline B. Brettell and James F. Hollifield, *Migration Theory: Talking across Disciplines* (New York – London: Routledge, 2000) 1.
- ³ Eurostat, *Analysis and Forecasting of International Migration by Major Groups* (Part III), (Luxembourg, 2003).
- ⁴ EU-15: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
- ⁵ NMS-10 (EU-10): The ten Central European countries that joined the EU following the collapse of the Soviet Union: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania.
- ⁶ Eurostat, *National Reports on the Demographic Situation in 12 Central European Countries, Cyprus and Malta in 2000* (Luxembourg, 2002).
- ⁷ Albert F. Reiterer, “Demographische Strukturen in Europa. Zentren, Subzentren und Peripherie,” in *Scheibe, Jürgen, Hg., Tagungsband 22. Internationales Wirtschafts- und Sozialforum*, (Bremen, 2009).
- ⁸ Juha Alho, “New Forecast: Population Decline Postponed in Europe,” in *Stat. J. of the UN ECE* 23, (2006), 1-10; United Nations *World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision* (New York: UN Population Division, 2005); United Nations *World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision* (New York: UN Population Division, 2007).
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- ¹³ United Nations *Long Range Population Projections* (New York: UN Population Division, June 30, 2003).
- ¹⁴ Jozef Brezák, *Úvod do štúdia demografie (An Introduction into Demography)*, (Bratislava-Nitra: LU?, 2005).
- ¹⁵ David Hume, “On the Populousness of Ancient Nations” in *Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary*, ed. Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1987).
- ¹⁶ Thomas Robert Malthus, *An Essay on the Principle of Population* (New York: Cosimo, 2005).
- ¹⁷ (Clemenceau: “20 million Germans too many”).
- ¹⁸ Vladimir Nikitović, *Kakva je demografska budućnost Srbije? (What is the Demographic Future of Serbia?)* *Bela kuga, Naše teme 1* (Beograd: Sluzbeni glasnik, 2006), 28-39.
- ¹⁹ Alain Parant, *Migrations, Crises et Conflits Récents dans les Balkans* (Volos, Greece : University of Thessaly Press, 2005), 27-29.
- ²⁰ Victor Klemperer, *The language of the Third Reich: LTI - Lingua Tertii Imperii: A Philologist's Notebook* (London: The Athlone Press. 2000).