

Managing Migration for Development: Is Circular Migration the Answer?

by Ronald Skeldon

Migration policy has long been considered the prerogative of the receiving state, and that state alone is responsible for selecting who comes within its borders. For the United States, where immigration has been an integral part of state building, immigration policy fashioned a “nation by design.”¹ Today, a more nuanced approach to migration policy has emerged: the idea that population migration can be managed, not just for the benefit of the destination state, but also for the origin states and the migrants themselves. Such an approach brings immigration and development policy into an uneasy dialogue. Officials from State Departments, Home Offices or Ministries of the Interior find themselves in discussions with representatives from development and aid ministries or departments. Migration no longer remains a unilateral matter but emerges as a matter of foreign policy through bilateral and multilateral negotiation among states.

The change in the policy environment needs to be placed in the context of new patterns of migration, demography, and economy. Changes in the technologies of transportation and communication have meant that increased numbers of people can move further and faster than ever before. We are certainly in an age of mobility, if not migration. In 2009, only 214 million people or 3.1 percent of the world’s population crossed international borders, a relatively constant percentage over recent decades.² More importantly, pressures are building in two specific areas to allow increased numbers of immigrants into countries. First, there is a demand for highly skilled workers to service a globalizing economy, particularly in information technology and finance. A global competition for talent has emerged among the developed economies of the world that the recent financial crisis did not extinguish.³ Second, the aging population of the developed world generates a demand for medical personnel that is not met locally. The result of these two pressures is an exodus of talent that is seen to be essential for the development of the countries of origin of the migration. A simple causation between the exodus of skilled migration and a lack of development is difficult to sustain, as the situation is more complex and cannot be pursued here.⁴ The majority view, that there is a drain of talent from the

Ronald Skeldon is a Professorial Fellow at the University of Sussex, Brighton, UK, and Senior Research Fellow at the United Kingdom Department for International Development, London.

developing world with negative consequences, helps to explain why policies need to be implemented to manage this flow.

To this competition for talent, one further point must be added: the growing realization that many of the skilled, as well as less-skilled migrants to destination countries, are not coming permanently.⁵ The global economy provides opportunities for migrants to move on to other areas in a competitive market as well as part of global company networks. People are more “footloose” given the new economy and the nature of the demands for health. However, as will be suggested below, migration may have maintained

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its status quo even as today’s technological developments in transportation allow more rapid turnover. Migration policy is only now adjusting to some of the realities integral to all systems of population movement, namely the recognition of the importance of return and onward migration. While the management of migration covers more than the impermanence of much of current population movement, circular migration has emerged as one of the areas of policy concern.⁶

Circular migration, according to one authority, has become the rage in international policy circles. It was identified by a leading policy institute as being one of the top ten migration issues of 2008.⁷ It appears to offer a solution to apparently intractable problems in the migration policy area. Circular migration offers a way out to the governments of destination countries as migrants will circulate back to their home areas. Labor can be introduced to undertake essential functions but it will not remain and become a permanent part of the population. Hence, migration can be “sold” to the populations of democracies on the basis that the migrants will go home. The return of migrants will be appreciated by their countries of origin, as the migrants will not only send back remittances during their stay abroad but they will not be irretrievably “lost” to their home economies as a brain drain that will prejudice the potential for development. Migrants will come home to contribute to development. At the same time, the destination countries can no longer be blamed for poaching the best and brightest of the developing world. Lastly, the migrants themselves will benefit from their experience abroad, not only by increasing their earnings but also by learning new skills and absorbing new ideas that can then be applied in their home countries.

The above might suggest that circular migration provides a “silver bullet” for migration management.⁸ However, when a policy prescription seems too good to be true, it probably is, and some more dispassionate examination is required as to its real development potential. The emergence of circular migration towards the top of the foreign policy agenda changes the way policy makers view migration. So much of policy and current thinking on migration remains centered round the idea that a migration is a permanent movement from origin to destination. Circular migration

brings a much more realistic approach to the issue even though it is not conceptually new. In fact, it was implicit in the early formulation of generalizations or “laws of migration postulated by the father of modern migration studies, EG Ravenstein, in the late nineteenth century. His fourth law stated that each current of migration produced a compensating counter-current, which would include return movements.⁹

ANTECEDENTS AND DEFINITIONS

The idea of migration as a permanent movement seems to fit the type of mass migrations across the Atlantic to the Americas as millions of Europeans sought a new life during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Yet the historical record indicates otherwise. Many—perhaps the majority—expected to return. Dudley Baines cites rates of return of 20 percent for Scandinavians between 1860 and 1930, under 40 percent for English and Welsh between 1861 and 1913, and 40-50 percent of Italians in the early twentieth century.¹⁰ Walter Nugent cites rates of return from Argentina between 1857 and 1914 as 43.3 percent and from Brazil between 1899 and 1912 at about 66 percent.¹¹ Nugent also reports rates of return from the United States between 1908 and 1914 as 52.5 percent, although Zolberg gives figures for departures as 35 percent of arrivals between 1908 and 1923.¹² Considerable variation by groups existed, with Italians as high as 50 percent and Jews, mostly from Russia, at 15-20 percent, declining to just over 4 percent after the Russian pogroms of 1905-06. The majority of returnees were young men along with smaller numbers of women and children. Italy received about \$60 million annually in remittances between 1901 and 1914 and its shipping companies, protected from competition, thrived as a result.¹³

Quite apart from the Chinese Exclusion Acts, restrictionist sentiment in the United States resulted in piecemeal and contentious legislation, which was prevalent from the early 1890s. Truly effective controls were not implemented until the 1920s with the introduction of national quotas. Immigration during this pre-1920s period of mass migration was occurring, if not within an entirely open system, in one with relatively few restrictions. To term return and short-term migration across the Atlantic at this time as circulation would fit with its more general use in the migration discourse. Circular migration, as it first came into the migration literature, mainly referred to internal migrations, which again operate with relatively few restrictions.¹⁴ That said, it must also be recognized that, in certain countries at certain times, restrictionist policies towards rural to urban migration have been implemented.¹⁵ Some of these internal policies could be as restrictive as any between countries, with perhaps China in the pre-reform era providing one of the best examples.¹⁶

CIRCULAR MIGRATION HAS BECOME THE RAGE IN INTERNATIONAL POLICY CIRCLES.

The idea of circular migration operating in an environment of minimal policy intervention requires careful assessment. One of the difficulties of using the term circular migration is to know exactly what it means and how it is to be distinguished

from other types of temporary migration. The Dutch geographer, Annelies Zoomers, makes the important point that “circular migration means that migrants are free to come and go, whereas the others [temporary, cyclical or contract migration] are more or less forced and managed forms of temporary residence.”¹⁷ This suggests that the management of circular migration would be a contradiction in terms, that attempts to manage circular migration will simply turn it into a form of temporary labor migration. This contradiction needs to be stressed if policy makers are to consider circular migration as a separate form of migration in the debate on managing migration. Stephen Castles already raised the question whether we are currently seeing a resurrection of guest worker or temporary migrant worker programs.¹⁸ Is circular migration simply one of the new “guises” among these programs or is it something distinct in its own right? Before going on to consider this question in more detail, it is worth pausing to examine the role of circular migration in development.

CIRCULAR MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT

The first issue is whether the impact of circular migration on development can in any way be separated from the impacts of other forms of migration. Intuitively, circular migration should make a greater impact. Regular circulation between origins and destinations is a conduit, not just for money and material goods, but also for ideas and ways of doing things, often called *social remittances*.¹⁹ These can transform communities of origin in such different ways as spreading the idea of small family norms or reinforcing a sense of belonging to larger polities such as the state. Clear evidence to support the case tends to be elusive because of the difficulty of separating the role of migration from those of other state instruments, such as family planning programs, and the extension of education into rural areas. Migration in general and circular migration in particular can be seen to facilitate the dissemination of new ideas and practices, even if it is not the root cause of the transformation.

Most of those studying circular migration have shown that the expanding circuits of mobility of rural households allow the incorporation of alternative niches into the resource base of the household. Thus, this mobility extends access and also reduces exposure to risk. These ideas are at the heart of the new economic theories of migration and fit with livelihood approaches to development as well as theories of the peasant household.²⁰ Thus mobility strategies are an integral part of both survival and improvement strategies of rural households.²¹ These different strategies can be embedded in opposing interpretations of change in peasant societies. Some societies seek to preserve what they have lost through their mobility, while others attempt to improve their lot through incorporating elements of the capitalist system to their advantage through local entrepreneurship.²² The factors that determine the outcome of the impact of mobility on local societies are still a matter of debate among development specialists but are likely to vary given accessibility, local resource base, and cultural values.

More generally, internal systems of mobility are associated with poverty reduction, the first and most important of the Millennium Development Goals.²³ The huge migration in China since the reforms of 1978, the “largest peacetime movement of people in history,” has been associated with decreasing inequality within villages and increasing household income per capita, with poorer households benefitting most.²⁴ These findings support other World Bank surveys which show that households with migrants are more likely to keep their children at school and to have improved children’s health than those households without migrants, even if the improvement is often quite modest.²⁵ However, the difficulty with using more macro-level surveys is that changes in development variables, such as poverty reduction and improved education and health status, may have been stimulated by longer-term migrants, not just by circular migration. In China, however, it might be assumed that the majority of internal migrants could be classified as circular or “floating” migrants (*liudong renkou*). As the livelihood strategy approaches show, it is those rural households that have access to non-farm sources of income, which have the best chance to move out of poverty.

An important question exists about the sustainability of these systems of circular migration. One of the weaknesses of current policy formulation in the area of migration is that it seeks to identify or even create a type of population mobility, assuming that it will not change. Systems of circular migration evolve, and their linkages with development change. The ways in which systems of circular migration come into being are various and complex. Suffice it to say that state or capitalist institutions for recruitment are among the more important means of establishing the systems. Once these systems become established they tend to be self-reinforcing. However, the system does not perpetuate indefinitely. I argue elsewhere that over time circular migrants progressively spend longer periods at destinations as they become more established, perhaps finding a marriage partner or more likely, satisfying an employer with his or her services.²⁶ Circulation migration patterns progressively shift from village to city. The early circular migration acts as a support for the community of origin as community members “cultivate” destinations for the benefit of the home households. However, with progressive leakage and circular migrants staying longer at destinations, the longer-term migration acts to undermine the community of origin. Younger, reproductive, and more dynamic members are siphoned off to cities, resulting in gradual rural depopulation.

Although this process might be seen as the decline of the village, at a macro level, the concentration of population in urban centers may provide the foundation

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for more advanced development.²⁷ The process of urbanization, through which populations are increasingly concentrated in towns and cities, is an apparently inexorable transition and associated with rising living standards. No highly developed society is primarily rural. Migration does not cause transition to an urban society. Although it facilitates the transfer of population, it is the proximate rather than the root cause; underlying economic and political forces are more important. In this sense migration is an integral part of development, however defined, and circular migration plays an important and temporary role in this transition. How temporary will vary from area to area, with some arguing that it is an “enduring mode of behaviour” in the rural sectors of developing economies.²⁸ United Nations estimates of future urbanization, which find the proportion of the world’s population in urban areas doubling between 1950 and 2030 from 29 to 59.9 percent, might suggest otherwise.²⁹ Of course, the transition to an urban economy does not see the end of circulation. It continues in a variety of forms but is centered on urban residences, primarily around the journey to work and other urban-based activities.

THE COMPLEXITIES OF INTERNATIONAL CIRCULAR MIGRATION

The above discussion has important implications for current attempts to manage migration. Clearly, circular migration can have important developmental roles and in varying ways. At the micro level, it can support and improve the welfare of populations in communities of origin. However, once circulation becomes more permanent, the resultant redistribution of population allows economies to be more productive. If policy focuses only on the circular migration part of a mobility transition, other types of mobility may be ignored. When we are dealing with migration across an international boundary and multiple political jurisdictions are involved, other complications are introduced. Legal entrants to a destination must be classified and channelled accordingly as: “students, temporary labor migrants, skilled workers, entrepreneurs, family migrants, refugees” and so on.³⁰ Many of these will return voluntarily or because their visas have expired. However, the idea of a regular and voluntary movement back and forth between origin and destination, as described above for circular systems of internal migration, is missing from the current classification.

We return to Zoomers’ idea that circular migrants are free to move back and forth which distinguishes circular migration from other forms of temporary movements. However, the employers of migrants brought into a country to undertake a specific task are not going to favor any policy change that will allow the migrants to return at will. Similarly, programs to attract some of the best and brightest are going to be seen to have failed if the migrants immediately move on or return home. Circular migration is likely to be most effective where there is free migration across borders. However, where borders are open, mass migrations are unlikely to occur. The example of Europe is instructive, where members of the European Community are free to move throughout the Community area, though most do not. The total migrant population of the European Union is 43 million.

Only 14 million come from other parts of the EU, a relatively small proportion of the total population of the EU of 491 million, or 2.8 percent.³¹ Where freedom of movement exists, the number taking advantage of such a right is quite small. On the other hand, border control is tightening around the EU, the southern United States, Australia, and most developed economies in East Asia. Despite entreaties to “think the unthinkable” and move towards open borders to “let their people come,” democracies instead respond to electorates who are fearful for their jobs and changing community compositions.³² Considerable evidence exists that migrants make positive economic contributions to destination countries, as well as to their families and for themselves.³³ Policy makers in the developed world ultimately respond to public opinion. The current political climate is unlikely to see significant shifts towards freer movement of people in situations where allegations of losing control over the border can so easily be made and the ideal must be discarded.

It is in this climate that circular migration has come to be viewed as a magic bullet: migrants can be brought in as long as they go home again. The situation is quite different from the internal migrations and movement across the Atlantic of a hundred years ago discussed above. The critical question is whether we can keep the concept of circular migration distinct from other forms of temporary migration in a world of bureaucratic entry requirements. Two approaches are suggested here: the first applies in situations where long-term settlement and entry for eventual citizenship are permitted. Here, policies of entry need to be modified to allow immigrants to return, should they wish to do so, by ensuring that they do not prejudice their re-entry. This would mean that they could return to assist with developmental work in their countries of origin without losing their right to residence or eventual citizenship. Without a stimulus package, migrants are unlikely to return to their home country unless there already exists something for them to return to. For example, as the economies of eastern Asia developed, increasing numbers returned to participate in the new prosperity. However, in this case, the return was generally not part of a circulation but rather a longer-term return migration to take advantage of increasing opportunities. In other cases where these opportunities are not yet apparent, some kind of stimulus package will be required to encourage people to return. Such a package should not only guarantee a salary more on expatriate than local terms but also involve tax agreements as well as some kind of consular protection. Salary scales, taxation and legal residence status must be included in the stimulus package so the migrant feels secure in circulating between his or her new home in the destination and the country of origin. The MIDA program (Migration and Development in Africa) promoted by the International Organization for Migration for shorter and longer-term returns to Africa provides

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one example of such a package.³⁴

The second approach would be to institutionalize a circular migration program as a variant of a temporary work program but of shorter duration—generally less than one year. Unlike the first approach, in which the locus of circulation is assumed to be the destination country, the second approach assumes that the migrant circulates from the country of origin. No provision to bring the migrant's family could be made as that would imply right to residence and deny the circular nature of the program. The difference between such a program and a rigidly enforced temporary work program seems more semantic than real and more an example of smoke and mirrors than a magic bullet. The downside is that a destination country would be taking into its borders a group of people without a right to settle, even if all appropriate legislation on migrant protection were enforced. These people would essentially make up an underclass within a democratic society.

INTERNATIONAL CIRCULATION AND DEVELOPMENT

It will be exceedingly difficult to separate any development contribution by circular migrants from those of all migrants. The regular returns of those who would possess some skill envisaged in the first of the two scenarios should be a factor in promoting development in poor countries of origin. In the second approach, the families of the migrants should benefit economically, although the social costs of regular absences may be detrimental and it is difficult to envisage more macro-level growth prospects being stimulated through such programs. The long-term impact of internal migration on communities of origin was to undermine the demographic composition of home villages. Migration rarely remains unchanged except in the immediate short term and leakage from circular systems can be anticipated, which shifts villagers towards longer-term movements.

Nevertheless, a constant circulation of migrants between origins and destinations gives substance to the idea of a transnational community or diaspora that stretches across two or more states. The flows of physical capital back to home areas in the form of remittances and of human capital in the form of skills show how the diaspora can be leveraged for the development of home areas.³⁵ Migrants to developed countries, such as Ghanaians in the Netherlands, prefer to circulate back to their home communities in Ghana in order to have a “double engagement” in their homeland as well as in their country of residence that does not prejudice their integration into Dutch society.³⁶ Nevertheless, whether such dual locality can be maintained over time, and particularly into the second generation, remains unknown. The evidence from studies of internal migration is hardly supportive as origins are progressively abandoned. The lives of migrants, as well as children, become increasingly focused on urban destinations and village origins lose their demographic capability with the loss of young adults, becoming but recreational niches in an urban economy.

Capital flows from international migration may also not have as widespread a developmental impact as is often assumed. As I have shown elsewhere, the origins

of international migration are highly concentrated in home countries and thus the remittances are also concentrated rather than distributed broadly throughout a country.³⁷ For example, about 57 percent of households receiving remittances in Peru from international sources are found in the capital, Metropolitan Lima, and only 5 percent of the households are in rural areas.³⁸ Also, skills learned in the economies of the developed world may not be easily transferable to the realities of the developing world. Perhaps most importantly, diasporas are usually highly heterogeneous with not all migrant groups working for the benefit of home governments. Nevertheless, the circulation of skilled migrants back home for longer or shorter periods of time, either spontaneously through their own volition or through a program such as MIDA, could provide significant assistance. Training programs in hospitals and universities, for example, could be strengthened through the regular participation of skilled circular migrants from residents based in the developed world.

Another vehicle considered a source for the provision of both material and non-material development assistance within the diaspora has been the home-town association, which is created by migrant groups in destination areas. Advocates of such mechanisms at the international level, however, rarely examine the roles of the associations set up by internal migrants in the main cities of countries in the developing world.³⁹ Once seen as a means of developing home communities, their role, like that of circular migration as a whole, varies and changes through time. These associations act primarily as a means to help new migrants in the city by providing a means of social protection. While they may intend to help develop home villages, factions within the associations often prevent effective interventions that were, in the case of Peru, primarily directed towards more decorative projects, such as the construction of a fountain or the paving of the central square. Most importantly, however, the associations acted as a source of prestige for urban-based residents as well as providing a place for recreation. As the volume of migration from any community increases, the role of the association appears to shift from social protection through a home-town developmental role to a phase of urban-oriented concerns as the migrants become further established in the city.⁴⁰

CONCLUSION

While the role of internal and international migrants in improving household conditions, such as reduced poverty and increased consumption, seems well-founded, the evidence for the promotion of development more widely in terms of economic growth seems more elusive. In the discussions of the transatlantic migrations, migration was not considered to have been a significant factor in the development of European countries of origin. Migration has been considered as an escape valve for growing populations, but the roles of remittances, return migration, or the human circulation back and forth across the Atlantic were never deemed to be critical factors in Europe's development. It is curious that, in the early twenty-first century, migration is thought to play an important role in the development of

countries of origin. Certainly, the resultant redistribution of populations may help to improve the developmental potential in destinations and origins, as well as improving the situation of the migrants themselves. However, whether migration can be managed to achieve certain developmental ends seems much less clear.

This article urges caution in seeing circular migration as a silver bullet in any migration-development nexus. While it can contribute to an improvement in conditions in home communities, particularly in the context of internal movements and again particularly in the early phases in the evolution of a migration system, it changes in nature over time. Migration is never caught in a situation of permanent stasis and longer-term shifts to destination societies are likely to emerge from circular migration. The existence of barriers, as one finds in international migration, militates against the ready circulation of populations and the design of entry channels, essentially forcing migrants into one category of migration. The potential confusion in terminology means that circular migration has emerged almost as an exercise in smoke and mirrors to adumbrate shades of meaning among circular, temporary and return migrations. I argue that circulation is a natural part of all migration, irrespective of category whether free or managed. It is incumbent upon policy makers to recognize the existence of circular migration, to realize that large numbers of migrants stay only short periods before either moving back or moving on. Migration policy should be designed considering this fact. A failure to do so, as Newland points out, may push into permanent migration those who moved intending merely to circulate.⁴¹

If certain groups can be identified as circular migrants, then some developmental role may be promoted. This article suggested ways in which this objective may be achieved based upon circulation from destinations and from areas of origin. From the point of view of destination countries, it would seem more appropriate to design immigration policies that are clear, transparent and simple, in which circular migration is accepted as a given that varies over time.

Ultimately, the significance of the incorporation of circular migration into the current policy discourse on international migration may lie in two distinctly different areas. First, circular migration operates most effectively in areas where population movements are relatively free and primarily in internal migration. Hence, a focus on circular migration in the international arena can draw attention to the close linkages between internal and international migrations, linkages that are both conceptual and practical. For example, shifts in international migration can cause and be caused by shifts in internal migration in a number of complex ways. Policies designed for international migration may have ramifications for internal migration within an integrated migration system, for example.⁴² Given that the vast majority of those who move do so within the boundaries of their own countries, this aspect has important policy implications. The second area of significance lies in circular migration reinforcing the bi-polar and multi-polar nature of migration. No longer can international migration be considered as a matter simply for destination countries and migration policy needs to adjust to this reality. Migration management

needs to move from unilateral policy making to incorporate dialogue with origin and, where relevant, transit countries. The effective management of migration will only be achieved through bilateral and multilateral agreements and collaboration. Migration management will then become an integral part not just of domestic policy or even development policy but of diplomacy and international relations.

Notes

¹ Aristide R. Zolberg, *A Nation by Design: Immigration Policy in the Fashioning of America* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2006).

² United Nations, *International Migration 2009* (New York: Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2009).

³ Ronald Skeldon, "The race to attract mobile talent," *Current History* 108, no. 717 (2009): 154-158.

⁴ See, for example, Michael A. Clemens, "Skill flow: a fundamental reconsideration of skilled-worker mobility and development," *Human Development Research Paper 2009/08* (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2009) and Ronald Skeldon, "Of skilled migration brain drains and policy responses," *International Migration* 47, no.4 (2009): 3-29.

⁵ See the discussion in Kathleen Newland, "The paradox of permanency: an incentive-based approach to circular migration policy in the European Union," paper presented at the Swedish EU Presidency Meeting on Labour Migration and its Development Potential in the Age of Mobility, Malmö, October 15-16, 2009.

⁶ Two sources looking at the management of labour migration in general: Philip Martin, Manolo Abela and Christiane Kuptsch, *Managing Labor Migration in the Twenty-first Century* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006); Philip L. Martin, Susan F. Martin and Patrick Weil, *Managing Migration: The Promise of Cooperation* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006).

⁷ Steven Vertovec, "Circular migration: the way forward in global policy?" *Working Paper No. 4* (Oxford, International Migration Institute, 2007); "Warming up to circular migration: issue No. 9," *Top 10 Migration Issues of 2008* (Washington, Migration Policy Institute 2008), <http://migrationinformation.net/>.

⁸ Frans Bieckmann and Roeland Muskens, "Circular migration: creating a virtuous circle," *The Broker: Connecting Worlds of Knowledge*, April 1, 2007, www.thebrokeronline.eu/en.

⁹ David B. Grigg, "E. G. Ravenstein and the 'laws of migration,'" *Journal of Historical Geography* 3, no. 1 (1977): 41-54.

¹⁰ Dudley Baines, *Emigration from Europe 1815-1930*, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991).

¹¹ Walter Nugent, *Crossings: The Great Transatlantic Migrations, 1870-1914* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1992).

¹² Nugent, 35; and Zolberg, 205.

¹³ Zolberg, 203.

¹⁴ For some relatively early research on circular migration see Murray Chapman, "On the cross-cultural study of circulation," *International Migration Review* 12, no. 4 (1978): 559-569; Murray Chapman and R. Mansell Prothero, "Themes on circulation in the Third World," *International Migration Review* 17, no. 4 (1983): 597-632; Graeme Hugo, "Circulation in West Java, Indonesia," in R. Mansell Prothero and Murray Chapman (eds.), *Circulation in Third World Countries* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985), 75-99; Richard D. Bedford, "A transition in circular mobility: population movement in the New Hebrides," in Harold C. Brookfield (ed.), *The Pacific in Transition: Geographical Perspectives on Adaptation and Change*, (London: Edward Arnold, 1973), 187-227; John Connell, "Copper, cocoa, and cash: terminal, temporary and circular mobility in Siwai, North Solomons," in M. Chapman and R. Mansell Prothero (eds.), *Circulation in Population Movement: Substance and Concepts from the Melanesian Case*, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985), 119-148; and Ronald Skeldon, "Circulation: a transition in mobility in Peru," in R. Mansell Prothero and Murray Chapman (eds.), *Circulation in Third World Countries*, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985), 100-120; Recent reflections by one of the original exponents of circular migration will be found in Richard Bedford, "Circular migration: reflections on an enduring debate," paper presented at the Swedish EU Presidency Meeting on Labour Migration and its Development Potential in the Age of Mobility, Malmö, October 15-16, 2009.

¹⁵ For a useful review of such policies, see *Population Redistribution Policies in Development Planning, Population Studies No. 75* (New York: United Nations, Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, 1981).

¹⁶ Frank N. Pieke and Hein Mallee (eds.), *Internal and International Migration: Perspectives from China* (London: Curzon, 1999).

¹⁷ Bieckmann and Muskens, 3.

¹⁸ Stephen Castles, "Guestworkers in Europe: a resurrection?" *International Migration Review* 40, no. 4 (2006):

741-766.

¹⁹ Peggy Levitt, "Social remittances: a local level, migration-driven form of cultural diffusion," *International Migration Review* 32, no. 3 (1998): 926-949.

²⁰ Douglas S. Massey, et al, *Worlds in Motion: Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millennium* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998); Frank Ellis, Livelihoods approach, in David A. Clark (ed.), *The Elgar Companion to Development Studies* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2006), 345-349; and S. Harvey Franklin, *The European Peasantry: The Final Phase* (London: Methuen, 1969).

²¹ See, for example, Graeme Hugo, "Migration as a survival strategy: the family dimension of migration," in *Population Distribution and Migration* (New York: Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1998), 139-149 with a general summary of the debate in Ronald Skeldon, *Population Mobility in Developing Countries: A Reinterpretation* (London: Belhaven, 1990).

²² James C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976); Samuel L. Popkin, *The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).

²³ See Ronald Skeldon, "Linkages between migration and poverty: the Millennium Development Goals and population mobility," in *International Migration and the Millennium Development Goals* (New York: United Nations Population Fund, 2005), 55-63.

²⁴ Rachel Murphy, *How Migrant Labor Is Changing Rural China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 1; Alan de Brauw and John Giles, "Migrant labor markets and the welfare of rural households in the developing world: evidence from China," *Policy Research Working Paper 4585* (Washington: The World Bank, Development Research Group, 2008).

²⁵ The surveys are summarized in Pablo Acosta, Pablo Fajnzylber and J. Humberto Lopez, "The impact of remittances on poverty and human capital: evidence from Latin American households," in Çağlar Özden and Maurice Schiff (eds.), *International Migration, Economic Development and Policy* (Washington: The World Bank, 2007), 59-98.

²⁶ These arguments are developed in Ronald Skeldon, *Population Mobility in Developing Countries*.

²⁷ *Reshaping Economic Geography, World Development Report 2009* (Washington: The World Bank, 2009).

²⁸ R. Mansell Prothero and Murray Chapman (eds.), *Circulation in Third World Countries* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985).

²⁹ *World Urbanization Prospects: The 2005 Revision* (New York: United Nations Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2006).

³⁰ It is accepted that circulation across international boundaries can occur in places where single ethnic groups straddle a normally very permeable or poorly policed frontier and members of those groups continue to move within traditional ethnic networks. Such cross-border mobility has more in common with internal systems of migration than with other forms of international migration discussed in the following paragraphs.

³¹ From data presented in Rainer Münz, "Shaping migration policies for economic recovery," presentation at Tracking Migration Trends in Europe During Recession and Recovery, London, Policy Network, 7 July 2009, www.policy-network.net.

³² Philippe Legrain, *Immigrants: Your Country Needs Them* (London: Little Brown, 2006); Lant Pritchett, *Let Their People Come: Breaking the Gridlock on Global Labor Mobility* (Washington: Center for Global Development, 2006); Nigel Harris, *Thinking the Unthinkable: The Immigration Myth Exposed* (London: I. B. Taurus, 2002); and Teresa Hayter, *Open Borders: The Case against Immigration Controls* (London: Pluto Press, 2000).

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