Are Markets Good for Girls? The World Bank and Neoliberal Education Reforms in Developing Countries

by Jane Arnold Lincove

As human capital plays an increasingly important role in global economies, the World Bank has given more attention to the education sector. The World Bank is now the self-proclaimed largest financier of international education,[1] and debates about the legitimacy of World Bank policy and influence are ever present in the education sector. Academic literature on education policy highlights two key conflicts that reflect broader concerns about neoliberal ideology. First, there is a conflict between market-based policies and efforts to reduce inequality. Second, there is a conflict between the World Bank's generic approach to education policy and the need for local, context-specific policy adaptation. This article summarizes debates about the World Bank's role in the education sector and advances these discussions by examining how individual countries balance the competing demands of efficiency and gender equity in the context of World Bank-funded projects.

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This article proceeds in three sections. The first section summarizes general theories of the role of neoliberal markets in education and the effects on gender equity. The second section describes the role of the World Bank in education financing, and the third section examines implementation of neo-liberal education strategies in the developing world and how World Bank strategies interact with policy innovations to promote gender equity.

Section I: Neoliberal Education Reform

There is a general consensus that the numerous social benefits of education justify a role for government. To achieve these benefits, governments typically provide public financing for schools, and beyond financing, education bureaus also regulate quality through control of staffing, curriculum, and facilities. Beginning

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with Milton Friedman,[2] neoliberal critics expressed concerns that this approach creates inefficient, homogeneous schools that are unresponsive to local preferences and have little incentive to improve quality. From a public choice perspective, the education sector is inefficient due to bureaucratic control, monopoly production, and rent-seeking behavior.[3] A neoliberal approach assumes market reforms will improve the quality of education by freeing schools from the restrictive control of bureaus and creating incentives to innovate through market competition. Importantly, creating market-like institutions in education requires both the devolution of control over budgets and decentralization of control over instruction to allow schools to innovate.[4] Supply-side competition rewards schools that can innovate to improve quality with more students and greater funding. In theory, inefficient schools will lose students and be forced to improve or shut down. These potential cost savings and quality improvements are attractive to developing countries that need to expand education with limited resources.

Neoliberal education reforms are controversial because markets can have profound distributional effects [5] Using markets to distribute education limits the government's capacity to use education as a tool to promote opportunities for social mobility.[6] Critics of neoliberal education policies argue that these costs in terms of equity outweigh benefits from gains in efficiency.[7] Because neoliberal policies reward schools for providing education at the lowest cost, it is argued that this creates a perverse incentive to attract low-cost students and no incentive to provide high quality services for students who are more costly to educate.[8]

A second criticism centers on the efficacy of decentralized control over school quality. The neoliberal approach assumes the appropriate judge of quality is the child's parent.[9] The role of the government is reduced by decoupling public financing and the provision of education. This creates a tension between the government's need to promote the national interest through education and the drive for efficiency.[10] This is particularly problematic for developing countries, where national education goals are an important tool for building equal opportunity and national identity.[11] Instead, markets can accentuate preexisting inequalities in resources and capabilities.[12] Relying on parent preferences can result in less schooling when parents have a low demand for education due to poverty, high opportunity costs, and perceptions that education does not provide pay-offs in terms of wages and job opportunities.

Girls' education is a particularly important development strategy associated with outcomes including reduced fertility, improved child health, and women's entry into labor markets.[13] However, there is reason to suspect that education markets will not improve gender equity. Girls often face high opportunity costs in pursuit of an education due to domestic labor and low returns from labor markets characterized by gender discrimination. At the same time, girls may be more expensive to educate than boys if parents demand a higher standard of school safety or teacher quality for daughters.[14] Bureaucratic control enables government to implement system-wide changes to increase girls' enrollment. Market institutions, on the other hand, will make adjustments in quality only if there are private benefits for parents and providers.

In practice, neo-liberal education reforms create quasi-markets, which are a hybrid of bureaucratic and market structures in new institutional arrangements.[15] Generic policies that aim to promote quasi-market reforms in education come in three forms: competitive grants, school choice, and privatization. Competitive grants create supply-side competition for school funding and incentives to achieve specific outcomes. School choice creates competition between publicly financed schools for students and funds that are attached to enrollment counts. Privatization extends competition for students and public funds to privately owned and managed schools, adding a profit-incentive to the school market. Empirical research suggests that implementation of these three generic policies results in complex quasi-markets with differing degrees of central control.[16]

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Importantly, regulation of quasi-markets creates the opportunity to remedy gender inequity by adding incentives for schools to provide high-quality girls' education and incentives for parents to consume high-quality education for daughters. Thus, the specific design of institutions and incentives of neoliberal education reforms may determine the equity effects of neoliberal reforms.

Research on the impact of neoliberal education reforms confirms concerns that education markets can lead to inequities by race, by income, and by class.[17] There is also evidence that low-income students are less able to take advantage of school choice programs due to costs of transportation and information.[18] There is little research on the equity effects of neoliberal policies when implemented in countries with large gender gaps, but experience in countries with racial inequities suggests that neoliberal reforms can and should be combined with incentives to promote equity.

Section II: Education Financing at the World Bank

The World Bank, an international leader in education policy, has set a goal to help countries provide "education for all."[19] Support for education has grown considerably since the 1960s when the World Bank first adopted educational expansion as a strategy to promote economic development.[20] As the self-proclaimed "world's largest external financier of education," the World Bank now invests more than $1 billion per year in research, expansion, and improvement of education in developing countries.[21] The education of girls is central to the World Bank strategy and marketed as a pathway to accelerated development outcomes.[22]

Observers have expressed concerns that the World Bank uses its financial influence in the education sector to promote a broad neoliberal policy agenda. Unlike other international organizations that provide education funding through local non-governmental organizations, World Bank education funding is given directly to central governments and education ministries. This funding structure potentially enables the bank to leverage macro-level government reforms and impose a neoliberal agenda.[23] Many argue that this agenda leads to de-emphasis on equity, despite its centrality to the goal of education for all.

The World Bank's neoliberal policies, which focus on reducing government spending and promoting structural adjustment, can conflict with the need to expand and improve education. There is a fear that this will lead to a harmful focus on quantity at the expense of quality.[24] Other critics worry that spending cuts will reduce equity by cutting education for the most needy,[25] and argue that the World Bank's commitment to gender equity comes in the form of "altruistic platitudes" instead of implementable solutions.[26] Another set of criticisms focus on the policy homogeneity that results from the World Bank's influence. This approach argues that World Bank policy diminishes local control and innovation in favor of generic policy strategies with the consequence of making education less responsive to local needs[27] and limiting national sovereignty over the education agenda.[28]

In terms of implementation, there is some ambiguity in the World Bank approach, which favors both universal access and gender equity, and market-provision and government devolution.[29] Empirical research reveals that these ambiguities play out in the education policies of developing countries both within and beyond World Bank-funded projects.[30] Evidence from structural adjustment programs suggests that neoliberal macroeconomic policies result in reduced educational investments in girls and cuts in social services that increase the likelihood that girls can attend school. There is less information about whether the World Bank imposes specific neoliberal education reforms that are popular in the West–such as private schools, imposing competition on public schools, or making schools compete for funding–as components of a broad neoliberal policy agenda.

Section III: Empirical Evidence from World Bank Project Documents

The ambiguity in the World Bank's approach to education creates the opportunity to investigate policy innovation and the tension between market and centralized control of education in the context of gender issues. To examine how countries balance markets and gender equity in education reforms, this study looks at education reforms funded by the World Bank from 2002 through 2004. The objective is to determine if neoliberal strategies are being promoted in developing countries, and how these strategies interact with policy innovations to promote gender equity. Data derived from World Bank project descriptions are combined with country-level data concerning gender equity and the status of female education to identify how policy design differs in countries with a specific need for improvements in girls' education.

All World Bank projects are summarized in a Project Information Document (PID), which is publicly available at the World Bank's website. The PIDs are written by the recipient country, typically by the ministry of education. Previous researchers have observed that the World Bank negotiates project design with countries prior to approval, providing technical assistance and information about policy options. Thus, an approved project reflects a negotiated compromise between the preferences of the recipient country and preferences of the World Bank.[31] Each PID includes a background statement summarizing education sector needs, a statement of project objectives, a description of project components, and an implementation plan. Countries are also required to offer a rationale for Bank involvement, which typically links the project to broader Bank goals and objectives.

There are a total of 95 projects in the World Bank project database listed under the theme of Education for All from 2002, 2003, and 2004. Forty projects were excluded from this study because they were found to be multi-sector poverty reduction strategies instead of education sector projects, and three were excluded because they dealt exclusively with higher education. The remaining fifty-two education projects address reforms and expansion in pre-primary, primary, and secondary education. PIDs for these 52 projects were subjected to content analysis to identify: 1) neoliberal education reforms, 2) local innovation, and 3) strategies to promote gender equity. The results are presented by country, rather than by project, because neoliberal reforms typically involve central changes to the education sector that are not limited to governance of a single project.[32]

It is important to note that a PID describes a project as it is intended to be implemented; it does not measure actual implementation. Therefore, the results of this study reflect only the intent to implement a certain reform strategy and should not be taken as evidence of actual implementation. It is impossible to determine if the World Bank was the impetus for a specific reform, or if the country sought World Bank funding for a project it would have implemented anyway. Thus, the results here do not describe a causal relationship between World Bank funding and the selection of neoliberal strategies but general trends in the diffusion of these policies.

Table 1 summarizes the neoliberal reforms identified in the description of each education project and lists statistics for the status of women and girls in each country. Twenty-six of the fifty-two projects include at least one neoliberal reform strategy. Of these twenty-six projects, twelve projects also include strategies to promote gender equity. Of the twenty-six projects that do not include neoliberal education strategies, only seven include strategies to promote girls' education. The most frequently cited strategy is competitive grants to schools, which is being implemented in fourteen countries. Only two countries are implementing school choice or vouchers, and twelve countries are using private schools to increase supplies. Analysis of these generic neoliberal policy strategies reveals several innovative ways to address gender equity in education markets.

Competitive Grants

Sixteen projects in fourteen countries include some form of competitive grants to achieve national goals. The most comprehensive strategy ties grant funding to measurable student achievement outcomes to create an incentive to improve quality. For example, Bangladesh offers "incentive grants" for school performance and student achievement and India has proposed "outcome-based financing" to schools based on reaching achievement goals. This strategy of rewarding schools for student achievement and performance can be harmful for gender equity, because it creates a disincentive to enroll students who are perceived to be low achievers. Girls may be perceived to be more difficult to educate due to gender stereotypes and the fact that they have traditionally been excluded from school. Competition based on quality can also harm equity by privileging high-quality schools at the expense of low-quality schools. However, both Bangladesh and India addressed these issues in the project design. In Bangladesh, schools are accountable specifically for the performance of female students. India's grant recipients are held accountable for both performance measures and equity goals. In addition to these supply-side incentives to promote equity, these PID's also propose stipends to overcome the high costs for families to enroll daughters in school.

All of these countries acknowledge existing access problems for girls and use school accountability to create financial incentives to promote increased access.

As an alternative to performance outcomes, some projects include competitive grants that reward innovation, rather than performance. Countries such as Azerbaijan, Bhutan, Colombia, Mexico, Nigeria, and Serbia offer competitive grants for school improvement projects based on an innovative proposal, rather than the outcome of the project. This strategy rewards schools that are motivated to improve quality and have the capacity to develop new projects. The proposal from Nigeria, which has female enrollment of only 60 percent and a gender parity ratio of 0.82, combines grants for innovation with incentives to design projects that promote enrollment of underserved groups—including girls—through support for alternative schools, "girl centers," and other non-traditional schools. A side-effect of competitive grants can be negative consequences for students at schools that lack innovative capacity. This critique is explicit in the PID from Kyrgyzstan, which depicts officials rejecting competitive grants in favor of a bureaucratic selection process:

> *Schools would be selected for participation based on performance and poverty criteria. A competitive process is not proposed for selection of schools because schools which are most in need of assistance are typically the least capable of assessing their needs and developing a credible plan to address them.*[33]

Other countries use competitive grants as a tool to directly promote girls' education. Nepal has both low girls' primary enrollment and low gender parity and offers performance grants to schools that improve female enrollment and promotion rates and schools that employ female or minority teachers. Afghanistan ties funding for school construction to commitments to build schools that will enroll girls.

Kosovo and Tajikistan, two countries with inequities in schools by gender and ethnicity, include grant programs that target schools where gender, income, or ethnicity influence enrollment. In these countries, schools compete for funding by proposing a plan to improve access. All of these countries acknowledge existing access problems for girls and use school accountability to create financial incentives to promote increased access.

A final approach is to use competitive grants to promote governance reform and specifically to decentralize control of school administration. Nepal's plan includes offering "incentive grants" for communities to take over school control from the Ministry of Education. Azerbaijan promotes parental involvement by offering competitive grants to Parent Teachers Associations (PTA). Peru promotes community involvement by offering financial incentives to schools that create a community oversight council. This approach has ambiguous effects on equity. While the central government is relinquishing control over national equity goals, local involvement may lead to innovative solutions that promote increased access.

School Choice

Public school choice programs are cited in Nicaragua and Lithuania. Both countries have achieved gender parity in education, although there is still room to increase girls' enrollment from current levels of 85 percent in Nicaragua and 91 percent in Lithuania. In Nicaragua, autonomous schools governed by elected school councils compete for per-pupil funding from the Ministry of Education. Nicaragua includes safeguards to promote quality under school choice by establishing oversight by the central education ministry, including standardized testing and audits of enrollment. Dissemination of school quality data is the only safeguards to promote equity. Lithuania's school choice project includes subsidies for both transportation to school and information for parents. Like Western countries, both Nicaragua and Lithuania have decided to maintain control of a national curriculum while allowing schools more control over budgets.

Private Schools

There are no examples of World Bank projects that include private school voucher programs to expand parental choice. Instead, developing countries use private markets to increase supply in areas where there are no public schools. Private schools are mentioned in thirteen projects in twelve countries, with significant variation in the structure of public subsidies. Eritrea, Niger, and Bhutan propose a minimal strategy of simply reducing regulatory barriers to private schools. Private schools are viewed as a strategy to complement public efforts to increase supply. Eritrea has girls' primary enrollment of only 42 percent and gender parity of 0.86 indicating that gender equity is a serious problem. There are no program components that address ways to encourage private schools to enroll girls. Niger has an even lower girls' enrollment of only 31 percent and a gender parity of only 0.69. The Government of Niger has expressed concern about this problem, but limits the use of private schools to secondary school and higher education. Niger also complements privatization with targeted scholarships for girls and free textbooks to reduce the private costs of educating daughters. In Bhutan, gender data is not available, but the government appears to be concerned about the tendency of private markets to create inequity, although not gender equity specifically:

> *While the government is willing to lower the barriers to entry, there remains a genuine concern in the country that private schooling does not lead to a dual system for the haves and have-nots, and create stark differences between rural and urban areas.*[34]

Other countries promote private markets more aggressively with public subsidies. In Chad and Lesotho, teachers are deployed to private schools and paid with public funds. These governments acknowledge a trade-off between quantity and equity that is inherent in subsidizing private schools. For example, the Government of Lesotho expresses concerns about providing public subsidizes to religious schools if the government has no ability to regulate fees.[35] The Government of Chad expresses concerns that subsidies to private, religious schools provide public funds for a system that "tends to cater to socially privileged and urban families, who are seeking both religious teaching and better performance in national exams."[36] Chad has a severe gender equity problem with girls' primary enrollment of 51 percent and gender parity of 0.68. However, education reform in Chad does not balance private subsidies with any strategies to promote gender equity, despite awareness of equity problems.

A second type of subsidy, applied in Republic of Congo and Jamaica, is to purchase private school slots with public funds. These countries do not discuss private subsidies as a tool to increase parental choice, but rather as a strategy to increase supply as quickly as possible. These countries view private schools as a way to bypass the high start-up costs of expanding school supply such as infrastructure and staffing. The Republic of Congo has low female primary enrollment of 53 percent, but gender parity is relatively high at 0.96 indicating that the current supply of schools provides equitable access. It is unclear if expansion of private supply will serve boys and girls equally and there are no components of this project to support gender equity. Jamaica has less need for specific strategies to promote gender equity and a smaller need for expanded supply. Gender parity in Jamaica is 1.04, and female primary enrollment is 95 percent. It is notable that two countries with such different educational and development needs will both rely on private supply to fill enrollment gaps.

The experience of Tanzania, where girls' primary enrollment is 81 percent, points to limits on this strategy to overcome barriers to building new schools. Due to these obstacles, Tanzania prefers government and community provision because private markets are inhibited by high start-up costs and limited ability to pay among parents:

> *Private schools face major constraints to increase their enrollment due to restricted access to investment resources and limited affordability by households. As a result, the bulk of future*

> *increases will likely come from the public sector through increased support of "community schools" in which communities contribute to the provision of building while the Government finances teachers and some operating costs.*[37]

The strategies to subsidize inputs at private schools and to purchase private school slots depend on the existing market for private school. A third approach is to use NGOs to provide non-traditional education services. One project in Bangladesh uses NGOs to provide non-traditional educational services for disadvantaged children. NGOs are given autonomy over the use of grant money. The Dominican Republic's project uses NGOs to provide education and social services for pre-school aged children in traditionally underserved rural areas. In Nepal, scholarships are offered for girls and ethnic minorities to attend non-formal educational programs run by community-based organizations. In Niger, education expansion plans include the use of NGOs and other private providers to educate rural women and youth. Implicit in these projects is the assumption that NGOs are better at reaching hard-to-serve populations with innovative programs. This form of private education is the only strategy within the generic policy category of privatization that targets the goal of educational equity.

Although there may be one source of policy diffusion, a review of projects has revealed a great deal of diversity and innovation regarding the specific forms of implementation.

Discussion

Evidence from World Bank project descriptions suggests that neoliberal education reforms are present in the developed world with variations of generic policies being implemented through World Bank education projects. However, there is no evidence that the World Bank is imposing a uniform approach to education reform. Although there may be one source of policy diffusion, a review of projects has revealed a great deal of diversity and innovation regarding the specific forms of implementation. Several countries receiving World Bank funding continue to focus on bureaucratic institutions. It is promising that many countries are using innovative strategies to promote gender equity within the framework of neoliberal reforms. However, this approach has not circulated to most countries with severe gender equity problems.

One dimension of variation is the degree to which central governments attempt to maintain authority while introducing competition across schools. Countries that are willing to devolve funding are frequently unwilling to decentralize control over curricula. Literature on decentralization and development suggests that the degree to which decentralization is beneficial can vary with context. For example, a uniform curriculum is recommended for newly independent countries that need to cultivate unity and nationhood.[38] Some centralized fiscal control is also needed to promote gender equity in countries with large disparities across schools in terms of quality and access, because local control will not advance the interests of woman and minorities if local processes are subject to political control by elites.[39] Analysis of

World Bank education projects reveals several strategies to promote gender equity goals in a neoliberal framework including financial incentives to enroll girls, rewards for improving girls' achievement, and contracting with non-profits to create alternative education strategies for girls. Each of these strategies has been shown to be effected in external evaluations of implementation in developing countries with gender gaps.

An area in which developing countries differ from developed countries is in the use of private schools. The literature on neoliberal education reforms focuses on voucher programs which transfer per-pupil funding to private schools with the intent of expanding parental choice beyond public schools. Developing countries continue to use private schools primarily to increase supply rather than choice, but there is variation in the degree to which private markets are believed to be a solution to problems of low supply. James found that use of private schools is much higher in low-income countries where there is less likely to be competition from free public schools.[40] Colclough argues that private schools play very different roles across developing countries, making it impossible to predict the generic effect of private schools on supply or equity.[41] In addition, the degree to which private schooling cuts government costs varies based on the extent of public subsidies for teachers, curriculum, and infrastructure. This study confirms that countries vary in the use of public subsidies ranging from tuition payments, to teacher salaries, to curriculum development. As described above, some countries explicitly state in their PIDs that they are concerned that a reliance on private schools will create inequity and undermine efforts to promote universal enrollment. To counter these effects, some countries are using demand-side scholarships and stipends to enable parents to enroll daughters. However, there are no safeguards in place to encourage private providers to enroll girls.

Despite questionable results, these reforms are now being replicated in developing countries where policymakers hope that potential cost savings can fund educational expansion.

Most important to this analysis is the degree to which neoliberal education reform is coupled with efforts to promote or protect equity. Typically, countries that acknowledge equity problems also implement safeguards. Some countries use market-based incentives to pressure schools to provide high-quality education for girls. Other countries complement supply-side competition with demand-side strategies to promote equity such as scholarships, stipends, free supplies, and other forms of assistance to students and families. There are also several countries that neither acknowledge nor address equity safeguards in the context of neoliberal education reform. In fact, only nineteen countries (out of fifty-two) have equity goals (see last column of Table 1). Of great concern is the drive to build private education markets with no added incentives to include girls in countries such as Chad and Eritrea where girls' education is very low. Clearly, attention to gender equity is not a prerequisite for World Bank financing.

A final issue of interest is that many countries receiving World Bank funding do not implement neoliberal reforms at all. Countries undergoing political transitions, such as Sierra Leone and Iraq, express the need for central governments to plan and implement a national education program. Other countries, such as China and Jordan, simply express an ideological preference for non-market strategies. Officials in Jordan, for example, argue that a national curriculum for both public and private schools is needed to develop an internationally competitive economy. Similarly, China's project aims to use education to help the country transition to a socialist market economy and become a middle-income country.

Conclusion

Neoliberal education reforms spread through the developed world in the 1980s and 1990s. Despite questionable results, these reforms are now being replicated in developing countries where policymakers hope that potential costs savings can fund educational expansion. An important difference is that developing countries are using private markets to increase the supply of schools, while developed countries use private markets to improve quality and choice where the supply is already fully developed. These strategies have profound implications for equity. Many developing countries have severe problems with inequitable access to education, and these inequities can create profound obstacles to economic development. Critics worry that international neoliberal organizations will encourage developing countries to implement market-based education reforms with little regard for the consequences in terms of equity.

This study of World Bank education projects suggests that neoliberal education reforms are diffusing throughout the developed world. This trend can be less damaging to gender equity if institutions are developed to protect and promote girls education. It is promising that this study finds some innovation in adapting generic policies in ways that address gender equity. Of particular interest is the use of competitive grant processes to create an incentive for schools to enroll previously excluded groups and the use of cash benefits for parents to enroll daughters. When coupled with neoliberal strategies to reduce costs, this approach to educational governance may be a path to equitable and universal access. Without these safeguards, neoliberal education reform could undermine the goal of universal primary education by failing to address obstacles to girls' education. At this time, it does not appear that the World Bank is actively promoting gender equity as a component of neoliberal education reforms.

Table 1: Summary of Projects

Country	Project(s)	HDI	GDI	Female Primary Enrollment (%)	Ratio Female: Male Primary Enrollment	Neoliberal Strategies C=Choice, G=Competitive Grants, P=Private Schools	Promotes Gender Equity
Afghanistan	Education Quality Improvement	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	G – subsidies tied to equity goals	YES
Armenia	Education Quality & Relevance	0.759	0.756	93	0.98	NONE	YES
Azerbaijan	Education Sector Development Project	0.729	0.725	79	0.97	G – subsidies tied to innovation	NO
Bangladesh	Programmatic Education Sector Adjustment Credit	0.520	0.514	86	1.04	G- subsidies tied to performance	YES
	Reaching Out of School Children Project					P – subsidies for NGO schools	YES
	Primary Education Development Project II					NONE	YES
	Female Secondary Assistance Project					G – subsidies tied to performance	YES
Bhutan	Education Development Project	0.536	n/a	n/a	n/a	G – subsidies tied to innovation P – lower barriers to entry	YES
Brazil	Pernambuco Quality Enhancement in Basic Education	0.792	0.786	91	0.93	NONE	NO
	FUNDESCOLA 3					NONE	NO
	Bahia Education Project					NONE	NO
Burkina Faso	Basic Education Sector Project	0.317	0.311	31	0.73	P – subsidies for NGO schools	YES
Chad	Education Sector Reform Program	0.341	0.322	51	0.68	P – subsidized teachers at private schools P – subsidies for NGO schools	NO

Table 1: Continued

Country	Project(s)	HDI	GDI	Female Primary Enrollment (%)	Ratio Female: Male Primary Enrollment	Neoliberal Strategies C=Choice, G=Competitive Grants, P=Private Schools	Promotes Gender Equity
China	Basic Education/Western Provinces	0.755	0.754	n/a	n/a	NONE	YES
Colombia	Education Quality Improvement	0.785	0.780	87	0.99	G – subsidies tied to innovation	NO
Republic of Congo	Support to Basic Education Project	0.512	0.507	53	0.96	P – subsidies for private school tuition	NO
Dominican Republic	Early Childhood Education Project	0.749	0.739	94	0.95	P – subsidies for NGO schools	NO
Eritrea	Education Sector Improvement Project	0.444	0.431	42	0.86	P – lower barriers to entry	NO
Ghana	Education Sector Project	0.520	0.517	53	0.81	NONE	NO
India	Elementary Education	0.602	0.586	85	0.94	G – subsidies tied to performance G – subsidies tied to equity goals	YES
Iraq	Emergency Textbook Provision Project	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	NONE	NO
Jamaica	Second Reform of Secondary Education Project	0.738	0.736	95	1.00	P – subsidies for private school tuition	NO
Jordan	Education Reform for the Knowledge Economy	0.753	0.740	93	1.02	NONE	NO
Kenya	Free Primary Education Support Project	0.474	0.472	66	1.00	NONE	NO
Kosovo	Education Participation Improvement Project	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	G – subsidies tied to equity goals	YES
Kyrgyz Republic	Investment Loan	0.702	0.700	88	0.96	NONE	NO
Laos	Second Education Development Project	0.545	0.540	82	0.93	NONE	NO

Table 1: Continued

Country	Project(s)	HDI	GDI	Female Primary Enrollment (%)	Ratio Female: Male Primary Enrollment	Neoliberal Strategies C=Choice, G=Competitive Grants, P=Private Schools	Promotes Gender Equity
Lesotho	Second Education Sector Development Project	0.497	0.487	89	1.07	P – subsidized teachers at private schools	NO
Lithuania	Education Improvement Project	0.852	0.851	91	1.00	C – school choice with subsidized transportation	NO
Macedonia	Education Modernization	0.797	0.794	91	1.00	NONE	NO
Mexico	Basic Education Development Phase II	0.814	0.804	100	1.01	G – subsidies tied to innovation	NO
	Basic Education Development Phase III					NONE	NO
Nepal	Education for All Project	0.526	0.511	66	0.88	NONE	YES
	Community School Support Project					G – subsidies tied to governance P – subsides for NGO schools	YES
Nicaragua	Education Project	0.690	0.683	85	1.00	C – school choice & autonomy	NO
Niger	Basic Education Project	0.281	0.279	31	0.69	P – lower barriers to entry	YES
Nigeria	Universal Basic Education Project	0.453	0.439	60	0.82	G – subsidies tied to innovation	YES
Pakistan	National Education Assessment System	0.527	0.508	50	0.74	NONE	NO
	Punjab Education Reform Adjustment Credit					NONE	YES
Paraguay	Secondary Education Reform	0.755	0.742	89	1.00	NONE	NO
Peru	Rural Education Project	0.762	0.745	100	1.00	G – subsidies tied to governance	NO

Table 1: Continued

Country	Project(s)	HDI	GDI	Female Primary Enrollment (%)	Ratio Female: Male Primary Enrollment	Neoliberal Strategies C=Choice, G=Competitive Grants, P=Private Schools	Promotes Gender Equity
Romania	Rural Education Project	0.792	0.789	88	0.99	G – subsidies tied to equity goals	NO
Serbia	Serbia Education Improvement Project	0.841	0.837	89	0.99	G – subsidies tied to innovation	NO
Sierra Leone	Rehabilitation of Basic Education Project	0.298	0.279	n/a	n/a	NONE	YES
St. Kitts & Nevis	OECS Education Development Project	0.834	n/a	n/a	n/a	NONE	NO
St. Lucia	Education Development Project	0.772	n/a	100	1.01	NONE	NO
Tajikistan	Education Modernization Project	0.652	0.650	91	0.94	P – sanctioned privatization G – subsidies tied to equity goals	YES
Tanzania	Secondary Education Development Project	0.418	0.414	81	0.98	NONE	NO
Turkey	Basic Education II	0.750	0.742	94	0.94	NONE	NO
Uruguay	Third Basic Education Quality Improvement Project	0.840	0.836	91	1.00	NONE	NO
Vietnam	Primary Education for Disadvantaged Children	0.704	0.702	92	0.94	NONE	NO
Yemen	Basic Education Development Program	0.489	0.448	59	0.71	NONE	YES

Notes

[1] World Bank, *Opening Doors: Education and the World Bank* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2004), 8.
[2] Milton Friedman, "The Role of Government in Education," in *Economics and the Public Interest*, ed. Robert A. Solo (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1955), 123-144.
[3] John E. Chubb and Terry M. Moe, *Politics, Markets, and America's Schools* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, 1990): 35-60.
[4] Howard Glennester, "Quasi-Markets for Education?" *The Economic Journal* 101 (1991): 1268-1270; Julian R. Betts. "The Economic Theory of School Choice," in *Getting Choice Right* eds. Julian R. Betts and Tom Loveless (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), 16-22.
[5] Sudeshna Ghosh Banerjee and Michael C. Munger, "Move to markets? An empirical analysis of privatization in developing countries." *Journal of International Development* 16 (2004): 213-240; Gil & Booker, 2008.
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