Liberalism and the Collapse of the Oslo Peace Process in the Middle East

by Jonathan Rynhold

The end of the Cold War signaled the triumph of liberal democracy and thus 'the end of history,' according to Fukuyama.[1] In Central and Eastern Europe, the iron curtain came down and was replaced by a peace grounded on liberal mechanisms for peace building: regional institutions, economic integration, democratization, mutual recognition of national rights, and the development of mutual trust. The end of the Cold War initiated the Middle East peace process with the 1991 Madrid Conference and the 1993 Oslo Accords signed by Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Here, too, attempts were made to use liberal peace building mechanisms, albeit without democratization.

When the Oslo process collapsed, many liberals argued that this was primarily due to an improper implementation of the liberal peace building model. Neo-conservatives argued that the failure of the Oslo process was inevitable, as the democratization of the Arab world is a precondition to a stable Arab-Israeli peace.[2] In contrast to both of these explanations, I argue that the Oslo process failed because the realist preconditions necessary for liberal peace building were absent. In the absence of key realist factors detailed below, liberal mechanisms were overburdened and consequently the Oslo process collapsed.

This article begins by outlining realist and liberal approaches to war and peace. It then presents the liberal approach to the Oslo process and the liberal explanation for its collapse. Subsequently, the liberal explanation is critiqued and a realist explanation is provided.

LIBERALISM, REALISM, AND PEACE

The liberal school of international relations emphasizes the importance of absolute material gains in generating peace, and this emphasis leads to a prescription of free markets facilitated by open borders. Within this framework, trade is a more efficient means of extracting resources than military force, giving states fewer reasons to use force, thereby promoting peace. In addition, institutional and economic integration leads to interdependence, which discourages conflict by raising

Jonathan Rynhold is a Senior Research Fellow at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA) and a senior lecturer in political science at Bar-Ilan University.

the opportunity cost of war in terms of lost trade and investment. Liberalism further posits that democratic states are unlikely to wage war against other democracies, a concept known as 'democratic peace' theory. As the theory states, democratic institutions require the approval of the public to go to war, yet the public will not support war lightly as it would bear most of the cost. Moreover, the public would be especially reluctant to go to war against other democracies, which are perceived as being more legitimate and less threatening than non-democracies. Finally, democratic states also share political norms, including the ideology that individuals ought to be free to pursue their interests without undue coercion. Liberals, therefore, oppose the coercion of other democratic states that follow similar norms.

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Within the field of peace research, underlying liberal axioms of a humanist-idealist nature have led to the view that dialogue and social interaction generate mutual trust. This trust enables parties in a conflict to overcome their mutual fears and resolve their differences peacefully.[3] These liberal approaches emphasize the importance of such processes in transforming the way conflicting parties define their requirements. This, in turn, makes a conflict 'ripe' for resolution by transforming the conflict from a zero-sum game to a positive-sum game.

On a normative level, liberalism has traditionally supported the rights of all nations to self-determination. It also views mutual recognition of such rights as central to conflict resolution. However, liberalism's tendency toward cosmopolitanism and individualism incline it against the idea of political separation and statehood on the basis of ethnicity. Consequently, liberals prefer that the political expression of ethno-national identities take place within some sort of federal or consociational context.[4]

In contrast to liberalism, realism tends to focus on managing conflict, rather than resolving it. It views insecurity, which results from both human nature and anarchy within the international arena, as the central dilemma of international politics. This drives states to seek relative gains and not absolute gains. Within this view of the world, cooperation is driven by security concerns; that is, states decide to cooperate primarily to check the power of another state or coalition of states that pose a common threat. Against this background, realism tends to fear that open borders provide opportunities for instability, such as infiltration and sabotage. Furthermore, realists tend to assess economic integration not in terms of common interests, but in terms of the uneven political leverage, or room for manipulation, that it provides to parties. Given the intense difficulty in developing trust between states under anarchy, realism prefers a clear delineation of borders that minimizes the chances of misunderstandings and opportunities for meddling, thereby contributing to stability. In a similar vein, the realist theory of ethnic conflict argues that the experience of war hardens ethnic identities and that this experience causes an irrevocable breakdown of trust between groups. In such instances, realism prescribes

physical and political separation between ethnic groups, in order to prevent chronic conflict and instability.[5] Despite its commitment to these seemingly stringent prescriptions, realism does not necessarily rule out the potential for liberal mechanisms, such as mutual recognition, confidence building measures, and economic cooperation to help mitigate conflict; however, such factors are always viewed as secondary to the national interests of power and security.

LIBERALISM AND THE OSLO PROCESS: THEORY AND PRACTICE

Ripeness and Mutual Recognition

In many ways the Oslo process was driven by liberal prescriptions for building peace. The Oslo Accords signed in September 1993 included an agreement of mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO. It was argued that the development of mutual trust in informal Track 2 workshops between various Israeli and Palestinian academics, peace activists, and professionals encouraged this move,[6] and that mutual recognition made conflict resolution possible.[7] In the latter half of the 1990s, the Beilin-Abu Mazen draft framework for a permanent status agreement was held up as proof that the conflict was ripe for resolution. Again at Taba, in formal negotiations during January 2001, the parties were on the brink of a framework for a permanent status agreement, but they were denied by the continual violence and the defeat of the Israeli Left in the 2001 elections.[8]

Building Peace

While liberals declared mutual recognition as pivotal to 'ripeness', they argued that this was insufficient, in and of itself, to implement conflict resolution. Consequently, they developed a broader strategy for building peace based on numerous elements of liberal theory. First, they continued informal Track 2 negotiations that led to a series of draft agreements. The aim of these discussions was to continue building trust between political elites and to generate the necessary domestic support for implementation by demonstrating to mainstream political leaders and the public on both sides that conflict resolution was possible. Second, the implementation of grass roots programs was an aim of these discussions. These grass roots programs would generate higher levels of social trust and understanding of the other's narrative, in order to facilitate a willingness to make the most difficult concessions.[9] Third, the liberal integrationist model of peace building that was successful in Western Europe after 1945 was applied to Israeli-Palestinian relations. Shimon Peres, the current President of Israel and former Prime Minister, termed this plan the 'New Middle East'. Economically, the 1994 Paris Accords formalized Israel and the Palestinian territories as a single economic zone with a common currency. In 1995 the Oslo II interim agreement led to the creation of joint Israeli-Palestinian units, mirroring the post 1945 Franco-German model of institutional and economic integration that included the foundation of a joint military unit. Politically, the same agreement divided Israeli and Palestinian rule in terms of different degrees of

functional authority rather than in traditional terms of territorial sovereignty.

According to the liberal strategic vision, mutual economic gains would create support for the peace process. Economic gains would insulate the peace process from extremist attempts at derailment and provide a basis for obtaining at least the acquiescence of public opinion for the major compromises that would be required regarding permanent status issues. In other words, material gains would generate political ripeness, while mutual trust would serve as a source of political capital in the negotiations.

LIBERALISM AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE OSLO PROCESS

From a liberal perspective, it has been argued that the collapse of the Oslo process was not a failure of liberal strategy, but rather a failure to implement that strategy properly.[10] First, liberals argue that mutual trust broke down due to the 'autistic' leadership and negotiation style of Israeli and Palestinian leaders and the consequent failure to implement the confidence building measures implicit in the initial agreement. Amongst other things, Israel is criticized for allowing settlement construction to continue thereby damaging Palestinian confidence in Israel's willingness to make sufficient territorial concessions. It is also argued that the tough 'bazaar' negotiating style of Ehud Barak, Israeli Prime Minister from 1999-2001, undermined Palestinian trust further, as did the discourteous and condescending way in which he personally treated Yasser Arafat, the PLO leader.[11]

Second, liberals argue that mistakes by the leadership were responsible for the failure to garner a high level of public support for Oslo. Arafat is scolded for allowing incitement to continue and for not doing enough against Palestinian terrorists. Both factors undermined Israelis' confidence in Palestinian willingness to live in peace, thereby weakening support for concessions. On the other side, it is argued that the failure to garner support for the peace process among the Palestinian public was greatly effected by Israel's policy of closures in response to terrorism. Against this background, the economic situation of Palestinians in the territories worsened from 1993-96, only recovering to pre-1993 levels in 1999-2000.[12]

Third, Steinberg argues that reconciliation was not truly pursued by Arafat, as incitement continued in the Palestinian Authority (PA) against Israel.[13] Finally, the grass roots programs were not formally institutionalized in Annex 6 of the 1995 Interim Agreement, nor implemented on a wide enough scale for them to have any chance of success. Indeed, the majority of the Oslo Accord's annexes that dealt with civilian cooperation and civil society were not implemented.[14]

REALISM AND THE FAILURE OF THE OSLO PROCESS

According to realism, the changes in Israeli and Palestinian policy that led to the rise of the peace process in the 1990s were primarily generated by changes in the balance of power. Three main factors produced this shift: the First Intifada, a

Palestinian uprising that began in December of 1987, the 1991 Gulf War, and the end of the Cold War.[15] The rise of the peace process and actual conflict resolution are not the same thing, as is explained below.

Ripeness, Mutuality, and Destructive Ambiguity

From a realist perspective, shifts in the balance of power gave the parties a strong interest in negotiations and in developing ways to manage the conflict and to change the status quo. However, ripeness for negotiations is not the same as ripeness for conflict resolution. Although Israel and the PLO were ready for negotiations, there remained large gaps in how they conceived a permanent settlement.

According to realism, the key issue is not the act of recognition alone, but how parties translate its meaning into a practical definition of their interests. Liberals assumed that mutual recognition mandated a negotiable solution, because the core needs of the two sides had become theoretically compatible. Liberals further assumed that mutual recognition nullified the zero-sum character of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This would, in turn, reassure the parties regarding each others ultimate intensions, and consequently would establish the mutual trust necessary to negotiate conflict resolution. However, despite this liberal optimism, the Oslo process contained a destructive ambiguity which masked large gaps in each side's conceptualization of what mutual recognition meant in practice. Rather than providing reassurance that the zero-sum game was over, destructive ambiguity heightened the sense of threat to the core objectives of both sides and thus contributed to the development of a 'spiral of insecurity'[16] based on mutual suspicion rather than mutual trust.

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In the 1993 Oslo Accords, Israel formally recognized the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and the Palestinians formally recognized the State of Israel. However, the Palestinians did not recognize Zionism as a legitimate national movement, and Israel did not formally commit to the principle that the Palestinians had a right to statehood. For the majority of Israelis, support for the peace process was not about Palestinian rights, but rather about security and the need to protect Israel's identity as a Jewish and democratic state.[17] This led many Israelis to be insensitive to the fact that continued settlement led Palestinians to fear that they would not get a viable contiguous state, but rather a series of Bantustans. While this fear was justified regarding the intensions of the Israeli Right, the reluctance of Yitzhak Rabin and Ehud Barak to stop settlement construction contributed to Palestinian fears regarding what would emerge in practice.

Meanwhile, on the Palestinian side, the dominant narrative continued to view Zionism as a colonial movement. This meant that peace, rather than being associated with justice, was associated with capitulation or, at best, a pragmatism which

recognized that given Palestinian military and diplomatic weakness, the peace process was the best way to make political gains. It left open the legitimate option that Jews should eventually depart or lose their right to self-determination.[18] In the meantime, political campaigns aimed at demonizing and de-Judaising the State of Israel continued. When such conceptions found practical expression in the negotiating positions proposed by each side, they revealed a lack of ripeness, particularly regarding the issue of Palestinian refugees.

On the one hand, there was overwhelming Israeli opposition to the 'right of return' for Palestinian refugees and the immigration of more than a few thousands Palestinian refugees in practice. On the other hand, the Palestinians continued to demand at least a right of return for refugees. Even if they were prepared to make some compromises regarding implementation, this position meant that Israel's existence as a Jewish state was subordinate to the right of Palestinian refugees to choose their ultimate place of abode. This created the impression that the long-term aim of the Palestinians remained the removal of Israel, only now in demographic terms. Long time moderate Palestinian leader Faisal Husseini effectively endorsed this position in one of his final public statements before he died in 2001.[19] In fact, track 2 informal workshops indicated that the refugee issue was still unresolved, but the organizer did not think it would prove a major obstacle given the general context of recognition and reconciliation.[20]

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The 1995 Beilin Abu-Mazen draft agreement appeared to provide a basis for an agreed compromise on the issue; however, Abu Mazen refused to stand behind the plan in practice. In fact, Abu Mazen denied for several years that the plan had anything to do with him. Meanwhile, according to Abu Ala, Abu Mazen did not actually agree with many of the compromises made in the documents by two Palestinian academics working under his auspices.[21] This would explain his refusal to promote the document as a framework for a permanent status agreement in 1999-2000, prior to Camp David. Meanwhile, in January 2001, Arafat rejected the Clinton Parameters for a Permanent Settlement. In direct contradiction to the framework, Arafat demanded an explicit right of return, while opposing an international force in the Jordan Valley and refusing any compromise regarding the Temple Mount.[22] It has also been claimed that the two sides were close to an agreement at Taba in 2001. However, key participants on both sides argued that little progress was made and that Arafat did not grant Palestinian participants the authority to make a deal.[23]

The problem was not at the leadership level alone. Polls consistently demonstrated widespread Palestinian opposition to giving up on what they term the 'right of return' for refugees and their descendents to Israel.[24] When it came to the real permanent status negotiations of 2000-2001, Palestinian negotiators were constrained by public opinion from adopting previously mentioned compromises on

the refugee question.[25] Meanwhile, 68 percent of Israelis were opposed to allowing refugees into Israel, while 16 percent were only prepared to accept a few thousand. Israelis perceived the so-called 'right of return' as a serious threat to their most stable consensus political value–the existence of Israel as a Jewish state, in demographic terms.[26] For Israeli Jews, support for separation and a Jewish and democratic state is not only a matter of protecting a certain identity, it is also a matter of personal and national security. The majority of Israeli Jews and Israeli Arab citizens for that matter, believe that Israelis and Palestinians cannot live peacefully side by side in a single state.[27]

The failure to establish a framework for a permanent status agreement during the interim period eroded mutual trust and negotiations regarding the interim settlement. The aim of the interim period was to allow time for liberal processes to generate sufficient ripeness for a conflict resolution. However, in the absence of a permanent status agreement, the interim period generated mistrust as each side sought to maneuver itself into a better position for either permanent status talks or the collapse of the process. In addition, the lack of a clear resolution to permanent status issues provided continued legitimacy for rejectionists on both sides. This made it very difficult, in terms of domestic politics, for the respective leaderships to consistently take actions that would have built trust and support for the process, such as a major settlement freeze and a serious crackdown against terrorist infrastructure. In other words, the lack of ripeness generated mistrust, not the other way around.

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Moreover, the attempt to negotiate compromises on the core identity and symbolic issues prior to clear signs of ripeness among the public, allowed rejectionists to mobilize the public to violence. This was evident regarding the contested status of the Temple Mount/Haram al Sharif in Jerusalem. In September 2000, against the background of Ehud Barak's willingness to reach a compromise on this issue, the Likud leader Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount to indicate his opposition to such a move. This visit provided the opportunity for the incitement of violence. Even though, Palestinian security chief Jabril Rajoub had indicated to Israel that the visit would not cause problems so long as Sharon did not enter the mosques, which he did not.[28] Other Palestinian elements within the PLO, such as the Tanzim, portrayed this visit as a threat to the holy Al Aqsa mosque, which is situated on the Temple Mount. This allowed them to mobilize popular support for violence, and so the Second Intifada, known to Palestinians as the 'Al Aqsa Intifada', began.[29]

Lack of a Common Threat

As noted above, the lack of true ripeness heightened the parties' sense of threat to core interests. It might have been possible to mitigate this situation had both sides

been confronted with an overbearing external security threat, which would have forced them to put aside their differences and cooperate, as per realist theory. For example, in Western Europe, the existence of a common threat in the form of the Soviet Union was an important factor that facilitated cooperation and integration between former adversaries.[30] Shimon Peres thought that the threat of Islamic fundamentalism could provide such a common enemy for Israelis and the secular Palestinian leadership.[31] However, the Palestinians continued to define the conflict and the security threat primarily in terms of Israel. The Palestinian Authority's (PA) relationship with the Islamic opposition was ambivalent, but the preference was for cooptation, not confrontation. Thus, the lack of a common threat represented a barrier to the successful implementation of the Oslo Accords.

Integration and the Disintegration of Support for the Oslo Process

Liberals argued that the lack of economic integration, especially Israel's policy of closures, undermined support for Oslo among Palestinians.[32] However, from a realist perspective, the problem was too much integration, rather than too little. Integration actually intensified the security dilemma and the political conflict, thereby decreasing support for the peace process. Following the Six-Day War, Israel adopted policies with regard to the territories that led to greater ethnic integration, due to the construction of settlements and the opening of the Israeli labor market to Palestinians.[33] Israeli hegemony in 1967-1987 produced economic gains for both sides. After the collapse of Israeli hegemony following the first Intifada, the economic gains disappeared. Simultaneously, the costs of integration became more apparent leading to the intensification of ethnic conflict politically and militarily.[34]

Integration created important political facts that severely constrained policymakers' ability to develop the levels of trust required to construct a Liberal peace. Open borders increased the power of 'spoilers', terrorists, and settlers, which then resulted in decreased mutual trust, and therefore damaging the credibility of the peace process. Thus, integration allowed the settlers to build up and strengthen their position in the territories, and it made the task of removing them difficult, as they could always return with relative ease. At the same time, integration made the Palestinian economy a hostage of terrorism, enhancing militants' ability to attack the credibility of the peace process in Israeli eyes. Overall, integration increased friction.

According to Pundak, the Oslo Peace process need not have been a hostage to terrorism had Israel not resorted to the policy of closures.[35] However, Israel's closure policy cannot be dismissed as a sop to public opinion. Terrorism aims to demoralize the public, undermining its belief that the state can defend its citizens and bringing about its collapse. Therefore, the political pressure on Israel to respond to terrorism was of strategic importance. If Israel had simply ignored the violence, it would have contributed to demoralization. Israel's options were thus defensive or offensive. However, any offensive action would lead to a direct deterioration of the peace process. Therefore a defensive action, such as closure, was the only viable alternative. The tactical defensive value of separation has proven itself in the battle against

terrorism with the construction of the separation barrier, which greatly helped to reduce Israeli casualties.[36]

In addition, the idea of integration was inappropriate for Israel and the Palestinians. In Western Europe, integration had positive political effects because it occurred between states at similar levels of economic and social development. This similarity was vital to the creation of social trust. Generally, social trust and social capital can only be generated across horizontal social relations.[37] In the case of Oslo, Israel's GDP was twenty times that of the Palestinians and its overall GNP was equal to the combined GNP of all its bordering Arab states.[38] In other words, the socio-economic relationship was vertical. While these conditions can produce absolute economic gains for all, they cannot produce widespread social trust. Integration promotes a sense of relative deprivation by increasing the social gap. Consequently, in the Israeli-Palestinian context, it is the relative material gains emphasized by realism that count in political terms, rather than absolute material gains, emphasized by liberalism. In any case, this type of integration produces dependency, not development, which is why the World Bank came to oppose full economic integration of Israel and the Palestinian Authority.[39]

A 'Realist' Regional Strategic Environment

The regional strategic environment heavily constrained the idea of building and implementing a liberal peace between Israel and Palestine. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict does not exist in a regional vacuum. Rather, it is situated within the Middle East, a region that is violent and unstable in character. Regional instability is not simply a function of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but of many other unrelated conflicts that challenge the legitimacy of state boundaries and threaten the internal coherence of various states.[40]

First, there were radical actors in the region like Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah who greatly intensified their terrorist activities after the signing of the Oslo Accords. They did this because they were ideologically opposed to peace with Israel and because peace would weaken their regional strategic position and domestic political standing. The perpetration of terrorist attacks by Palestinian rejectionists and the heating up of the Lebanese border by Hezbollah, both with active support from Iran, played an important role in the defeat of the Israeli Left in the 1996 Israeli elections.[41]

Second, even among the regional Arab 'moderates' there was equivocation about the peace process. The cold peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors, such as Egypt, is based on a pragmatic recognition of state sovereignty, rather than on any deep underlying acceptance of Jewish national rights. By the 1990s, many Arab states in the region recognized that they had a strong interest in preventing the outbreak of another Arab-Israeli war. However their commitment to conflict management did not extend to conflict resolution. Thus, Egypt actually played a negative role by discouraging the Palestinians from making compromises regarding Jerusalem prior to Camp David.[42] The Arab foreign ministers, meeting in January 2001, insisted that

the right of return of Palestinian refugees to Israel was sacred.[43] Arab states feared
that actively supporting compromises on symbolic permanent status issues would

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expose them to great domestic criticism, which could
threaten their regimes' internal stability.[44] As a result,
important states like Saudi Arabia played a double game.
The Saudis attended the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference,
but generally took a backseat role regarding support for the
peace process. However, the Saudis also funded Hamas.[45]
Aside from such equivocation, most Arab states viewed the
liberal idea of regional economic integration—the 'New
Middle East'—as highly undesirable and even threatening, despite the real prospect
of material gains.[46]

The problem with attempting to build an Israeli-Palestinian peace along liberal
lines was that it meant the relationship between Israel and Palestine would have to
be better than the general character of interstate relationships in the region. If
problems occurred for any reason, the parties involved in the peace process could
not be at all certain that regional actors would not try and exploit the situation to
their detriment. Thus, the regional environment made mutual trust too fragile a basis
for the major risk taking involved in conflict resolution. This contrasts with
Northern Ireland, where the peace process was bolstered by the fact that it occurred
inside a robust Liberal region, with strong norms and institutions.

Democratization?

Neo-conservatives argued that the Oslo process failed because of the absence
of democracy in the Arab world.[47] According to the data of Freedom House and
Polity, the Arab Middle East is the least democratic region in world.[48] Certainly, the
dictatorial regimes in the region, albeit to different degrees, feared that real peace
would increase demands for domestic reform which could see them lose power.
They also feared that regional economic integration and liberal free market reforms
would weaken their grip on power. Indeed, the demonization of Israel and the
continuation of the conflict, albeit on a low flame, helped to keep these dictatorial
regimes in power. Israel provided a convenient scapegoat for domestic ills including
economic stagnation and political repression, as well as a ready excuse for not
initiating reform; anyone who claimed otherwise could be labeled a traitor.[49]

Yet, as the 2003 Iraq War has demonstrated, democratization is nowhere near as
easy to impose in the Middle East as the neo-conservatives asserted. Meanwhile,
local dictatorships have been very adept at maintaining power and preventing
reform. Even if there is revolutionary change, it is unlikely to be in the direction of
liberalism. Liberals in the Arab Middle East are a small and weak group, with the
main opposition to the regimes being Islamist. Even if democratization were to take
place, it would be unlikely to assist peacemaking. In general, Mansfield and Snyder
have demonstrated that the early stages of democratization actually increase the
prospects of war, especially when the democratizing state is engaged in some form

of ethnic conflict.[50] In the 1990s, the Arab governing elites were actually more moderate in their views on the peace process than Arab public opinion.[51]

CONCLUSION

The sight of historic enemies, Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat, shaking hands on the White House lawn in September 1993 upon the signing of the Oslo Accords raised great hopes that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, one of the most intractable conflicts of the twentieth century, was on the verge of resolution. It appeared to be a vindication of the liberal approach to international relations. One of Oslo's architects, Yossi Beilin, even argued that it demonstrated that no conflict, be it in Northern Ireland or in Kashmir, was truly insoluble.[52]

When the Oslo process collapsed, liberals explained this situation primarily as a failure of implementation. However, according to the realist approach adopted here, the Oslo process did not collapse because of botched implementation, but rather because the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was not ripe for resolution. The agreement on mutual recognition was hollow because its practical meaning revealed large gaps in how the parties defined their core interests. This destructive ambiguity led to mutual distrust. Against this background, economic integration failed to generate support for the peace process. Economic integration actually increased friction and placed additional political obstacles in the way of compromise by empowering terrorists and settlers. Under these conditions, the liberal processes designed to secure conflict resolution were overburdened, leading to the collapse of the Oslo peace process, ultimately exacerbating the conflict.

The paradigmatic example of successful liberal peace building took place in Western Europe after 1945, successfully expanding into Central and Eastern Europe after 1990. However, a close examination of this case by Ripsman and Miller reveals that realist factors, including ethnic separation and the balance of power, constituted a necessary prerequisite for the successful implementation of liberal peace building processes.[53] This article has advanced a similar argument that the failure of liberal peace building in the Middle East was due to the lack of those same realist prerequisites. Therefore, it is only through the prior adoption of a realist strategy of separation and conflict management that a liberal strategy of conflict resolution can be subsequently implemented for the long term.

Notes.

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