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How External Intervention Made the Sovereign State

Ja Ian Chong [a]
[a] National University of Singapore

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JA IAN CHONG

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From post-World War II decolonization to establishing order in war-torn polities today, external intervention can play an important role in fostering sovereign statehood in weak states. Much attention in this regard emphasizes local reactions to outside pressures. This article augments these perspectives by drawing attention to ways that foreign actors may affect the development of sovereignty through their efforts to work with various domestic groups. Structured comparisons of China and Indonesia during the early to mid-twentieth century suggest that active external intercession into domestic politics can collectively help to shape when and how sovereignty develops. As these are least likely cases for intervention to affect sovereign state making, the importance of foreign actors indicates a need to reconceptualize the effects of outside influences on sovereignty creation more broadly.

What role does foreign intervention play in sovereign state formation? Much work examining the role of external intercession in state making tends to focus on colonialism and its legacies for governance.[1] Studies on sovereign state creation often interpret outside involvement in domestic politics as a

Ja Ian Chong is assistant professor of political science at the National University of Singapore.

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[1] Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson, "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," *American Economic Review* 91, no. 5 (December 2001): 1369–1401; Jeffrey Herbst, *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*

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force against which nationalist forces mobilize.[2] Such emphases leave open questions about other effects that foreign intervention has on the establishment of sovereign statehood. Hence, I contend that concurrent outside intervention can actually foster sovereignty in weak polities.

Conceptualizing how foreign intercession affects sovereign state formation in fragile polities is useful for understanding a persistent phenomenon in world politics. From Cold War liberation and independence movements to contemporary Afghanistan and Iraq, it is clear that outside actors can have a profound effect on the development of sovereignty. In this essay, I focus on the establishment of domestic political centralization and external autonomy—sovereign state creation—rather than state building, changes in state capacity, or development.[3] My emphasis on intervention seeks to underline its importance in understanding sovereign state making, especially in weak states, rather than to detract from other explanations.[4]

Consistent and widespread foreign support for a particular local group can help a fragile polity acquire sovereign statehood. Conversely, it may be difficult for a weak state to develop sovereignty if one or more key external actors do not back consolidation or autonomy. A polity may experience fragmentation or the persistence of outside domination depending on how such outside actors interact. This perspective highlights how foreign intervention may foster sovereign statehood and augments the effects of nationalism and self-determination norms, war, and institutional commitments.

To illustrate my argument, I consider China and Indonesia during the early to mid-twentieth century. I examine why sovereign statehood only developed in both polities toward the end of the 1940s. This occurred despite the fact that both localities had highly robust nationalist movements and that international backing for self-determination norms existed since the end of World War I. Constant security concerns and social dislocation during this time also created many opportunities for sovereignty-enhancing internal reforms and institution building. Yet, until the late 1940s, China was a fractured

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(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); David Kang, *Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Joel Migdal, "Introduction: Developing a State-in-Society Perspective," in *State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World*, ed. Joel Migdal, Atul Kohli, and Vivienne Shue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 1–30.

[2] Chalmers Johnson, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962); Shigeru Sato, *War, Nationalism and Peasants: Java under the Japanese Occupation, 1942–1945* (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1994); Anthony Smith, *Theories of Nationalism* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1983).

[3] I take the relationship between state formation and these other processes as non-linear. See Hendrik Spruyt, *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems Change* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 20–25; Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990* (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 30. For more on such distinctions, see Tuong Vu, "Studying the State through State Formation," *World Politics* 62, no. 1 (January 2010): 148–75.

[4] A weak state is a polity where governance and political authority is under-institutionalized and unstable even if it enjoys legal domestic or international recognition.

state and Indonesia was under at least partial colonial domination. From their different starting points, they both moved to approximate sovereign state-hood by the start of the 1950s. Foreign intervention can help account for the emergence of sovereignty in China and Indonesia as well as the timing of these developments.

My approach underscores the effects of international politics on sovereign state making, particularly the more competitive aspects of this relationship. It pays special attention to the influence of external actors and interactions with local rivalries and the shaping of political authority in weak states. By examining twentieth-century China and Indonesia, I also introduce new historical evidence against which to consider the processes through which outside forces may affect sovereignty in weak polities. These cases guard against a truncation of data that can occur when exploring de-velopments that have yet to unfold fully. As such, this treatment combines insights about state formation with those about how intervention can affect conflict, post-conflict, and post-colonial environments.[5]

EXTERNAL INTERVENTION AND SOVEREIGN STATE MAKING

To begin, I present an argument about intervention and sovereign state formation. Focusing on organizational, rather than normative attributes, a sovereign state has high degrees of administrative consolidation and out-ward autonomy.[6] These correspond to sovereignty's internal and external aspects.[7] Consolidation is the extent to which a single authority in a polity can proscribe domestic developments. External autonomy is the degree to which the polity's outward relations are not subject to direct foreign vetoes. Sovereign state making is the process through which a policy acquires high consolidation and high autonomy. I apply Charles Ragin's "most like" ap-proach to measure a polity's approximation of an ideal-typical substantive consolidation and autonomy of a sovereign state.[8]

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[5] On intervention and reconstruction, see Richard Caplan, *International Governance of War-Torn Territories: Rule and Reconstruction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); David Chandler, *Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-Building* (London: Pluto Press, 2006); Roland Paris and Timothy Sisk, eds., *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations* (London: Routledge, 2008); Dominik Zaum, *The Sovereignty Paradox: The Norms and Politics of International Statebuilding* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Robert Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, Inter-national Relations, and the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

[6] Max Weber, "The Nation State and Economic Policy," in *Weber: Political Writings*, ed. Peter Lassman and Harold Spiers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 1–28; Max Weber, "The Profession and Vocation of Politics," in *Weber*, 309–69; Zaum, *The Sovereignty Paradox*.

[7] Stephen Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 9–25; Jackson, *Quasi-States*, 21–31.

[8] Charles Ragin, *Fuzzy-Set Social Science* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 189–202.

Sovereign statehood tends to emerge in a fragile polity when the combined behavior of key outside actors in effect supports the ability of one indigenous political group to veto domestic developments and external affairs, all else being equal. Such backing does not require the intent of encouraging sovereignty; it may be financial, military, organizational, political, or some combination of these factors. Foreign intervention can bolster a domestic group's competitiveness relative to its adversaries. Such conditions enable a favored local faction to assume a stronger role as a central government by raising consolidation and autonomy when domestic order was previously unstable and under-institutionalized. This means that intervention interacts with security concerns, institutional commitments, economic and social shocks, as well as nationalist mobilization to affect the timing and development of sovereign statehood.

A weak state may make less progress toward sovereignty if the behavior of one or more key foreign actors undermines consolidation or autonomy. Consolidation will be more difficult if outside actors continuously shore up the economic, military, and political positions of rival factions. This spurs fragmentation even if foreign sponsors cannot veto the outward relations of their indigenous partners. Similarly, any external oversight of a polity's foreign relations erodes external autonomy even if broad backing for consolidation exists. Such situations are typical in many colonial arrangements.

The explanatory variables I focus on are whether foreign actors' actions concur in support for consolidation and autonomy. Convergence on both fronts fosters sovereignty. Lack of foreign consensus about consolidation and autonomy in a non-sovereign weak state inhibits the development of sovereign statehood. Such dynamics can diminish or intensify the influence of nationalist mobilization and self-determination norms.

To evaluate whether outside actors concur in backing consolidation and autonomy, I consider patterns of political, military, and economic support. When foreign assistance consistently helps one indigenous actor prevail over its local adversaries, this indicates a coalescence of external support behind consolidation. When foreign backing does not involve provisions that allow outside sponsors to overrule the actions of their local partners, this indicates common support for external autonomy. The presence of both conditions indicates collective outside support for sovereign statehood. This may be the case even if intervening foreign actors do not purposefully seek to promote greater consolidation and autonomy. Table 1 summarizes my argument.

The under-institutionalization and political instability typical of fragile polities make concentrating and accumulating capital and coercion hard to sustain. This is the case even when there is consciousness about nationalism and self-determination. Groups with nationalist and self-determination agendas also require money and even arms to spread their messages, address collective action problems, overcome opponents, and impose control. Acquiring such capabilities from domestic sources on a large scale can be

TABLE 1 Patterns and Outcomes of Outside Support for Autonomy and Consolidation

	Political Consolidation	
	No/Divergent Outside Support	Convergent Outside Support
External Autonomy		
Convergent Outside Support	High Autonomy; Low Consolidation ***De jure statehood***	High Autonomy; High Consolidation ***De jure & de facto statehood*** **[Sovereign Statehood]**
No/Divergent Outside Support	Low Autonomy; Low Consolidation ***(Semi) Colonization***	Low Autonomy; High Consolidation ***De facto statehood***

difficult, so support from rich and powerful external partners may be particularly useful.

Local political groups are willing to accept foreign assistance even on inequitable terms since they are price-takers in the market for external support. Indigenous actors in a weak state compete with one another for control and a favorable distribution of the polity's surpluses. In such contentious environments, local groups must rapidly acquire the ability to hold their own or risk elimination. Foreign assistance provides an opportunity for indigenous groups to quickly become competitive.

Moreover, indigenous groups in weak states have an incentive to compromise with external sponsors because they face a commitment problem. In a weak state, contenders for power tend to outnumber potential foreign interveners, so outside actors can switch support away from uncooperative local partners and toward their rivals more easily than indigenous groups can change sponsors. This compounds competitive pressures on local groups, encouraging them to accept outside help under terms stipulated by the external backer even if it means serious compromise.

I consider a state, or polity, to be an arrangement of political structures that allow the consistent exercise of coercion over a given space and population at a particular time.[9] Within these bounds, the polity possesses prominence but not necessarily predominance in social, political, as well as economic activity. This approach facilitates examining a state as a distinct analytical unit while permitting variation on political consolidation and external autonomy. The focus is then on the state itself as an arena for contention with changes in organizational characteristics as the result.[10]

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[9] This follows Tilly, *Capital, Coercion, and European States*, 1–3.

[10] Charles Tilly, *Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons* (New York: Russell Sage, 1984), 20–26. My focus differs from examinations of state-society interactions in different arenas. See Joel Migdal,

Note that my discussion centers on understanding the relationship between intervention and sovereign state formation in weak states, or fragile polities, where domestic politics are volatile and institutions poorly developed. Similar forces may affect stronger states, state-society relations, as well as institutional development and state death, but those discussions are outside this essay's scope. This paper also does not argue the motivations of intervening actors. Rather, I concentrate on the aggregated effects of external actor behavior on sovereign state creation.

CASES AND METHODS

China and Indonesia in the early twentieth century offer good cases for evaluating my argument given the varying patterns of intervention at the time. This is especially evident when comparing the polities between the end of the World War I peace process and the start of World War II as well as in the immediate post-World War II period through the conclusion of the San Francisco Conference. The first segment translates to 1923–37 in China and 1923–41 in Indonesia; the second spans the years 1945–52 for both polities. In the earlier period, actors intervening in China backed a variety of local groups with a range of conditions; in Indonesia, external actors in effect supported Dutch domination. The latter period saw a collective shift in the policies of foreign actors toward both states in the promotion of consolidation and autonomy.

Indonesia and China during much of these periods also experienced the chronic domestic instability and under-institutionalization characteristic of weak states. Both polities had underdeveloped formal mechanisms for governance across their territory as well as a range of nationalist groups, militarists, and collaborationist actors vying with each other during the periods I consider. In this sense, mid-twentieth century Indonesia and China are broadly representative of weak states, even today. Note that I omit World War II from my analysis here, since systemic war may represent an anomalous exogenous shock. The table below summarizes the variation on external intervention and possible outcomes .

Moreover, comparing China during 1923–37 and 1945–52 as well as Indonesia in 1923–41 and 1945–52 permits me to control other key variables. During both periods, there was international support for self-determination in the form of post-war settlements after the two world wars. The global security environment provided external pressures that could force domestic changes in the accumulation as well as the concentration of capital and coercion. Wartime devastation, post-war rebuilding, and the Great Depression

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State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

TABLE 2 Patterns and Outcomes of Outside Support for Autonomy and Consolidation in China and Indonesia, 1923–1952

	Political Consolidation	
	No/Divergent Outside Support	Convergent Outside Support
External Autonomy		
Convergent Outside Support	China, 1923–1937 China, 1945–1948	China, 1949–1952 Indonesia, 1950–1952 **[Sovereign Statehood]**
No/Divergent Outside Support	Indonesia, 1948–1949	Indonesia, 1923–1942 Indonesia, 1945–1947

all encouraged the emergence of new institutional bargains in both polities in both periods. Internally, the two polities saw substantial nationalist mobilization and the persistence of strong regional differences. Since the number of interveners in Indonesia and China differed, these cases also help control for this factor.

The Indonesian and Chinese cases enable me to observe the effects of intervention through variation-finding comparisons looking at diachronic within-case and synchronic across-case divergence.[11] According to Charles Tilly, this can help researchers studying large processes to "establish a principle of variation in the character . . . of a phenomenon by examining systematic differences among instances."[12] Exploring the effects of changing intervention patterns on the rise of sovereign statehood allows me to examine relationships that may exist between the explanatory and dependent variables. If sovereignty had developed in either state before World War II, or if it appeared in neither polity between 1945 and 1952, this would challenge my analysis.

To investigate the effects of intervention on the development of sovereignty in Indonesia and China, I subject the evidence to a series of standardized, general questions.[13] Hendrik Spruyt notes that such focused, structured comparisons are "appropriate when the number of cases is limited and many explanations appear possible."[14] This is suitable here given the multiple explanations for why the sovereign Chinese and Indonesian states emerged in the mid-twentieth century.

Note that I use the maximal claims for both de jure and de facto sovereignty as the baseline for comparison in both polities. This means that

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[11] Tilly, *Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons*, 116–24.

[12] Ibid., 82.

[13] Alexander George, *Case Studies in Theory Development: The Method of Focused, Structured Comparisons* (New York: Free Press, 1979), 60.

[14] Hendrik Spuyt, *Ending Empire: Contested Sovereignty and Territorial Partition* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 34–36.

a central government should wield veto power in domestic politics and external affairs across a polity's entire asserted physical expanse. For China, this territorially includes Taiwan, Tuva, Mongolia, and regions controlled by the People's Republic of China today.[15] Indonesia's geographic claims cover all of the East Indies formerly under Dutch rule.

ADDING TO ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNTS

I aim to add to existing theoretical accounts about state formation by high-lighting the role of outside intercession in sovereign state formation. Current explanations discuss many major components of this process but continue to under-emphasize important elements of sovereign state formation. This is the case, whether such perspectives focus on nationalism, self-determination, the pressure of war, or institutionalized commitments. Such issues are apparent when looking at empirical developments in weak states such as China and Indonesia in the first half of the twentieth century.

I am not faulting existing perspectives, ignoring their nuances, or accusing them of mono-causality. Instead, I draw attention to how greater attention to intervention can help illuminate the process of sovereign state formation. This section considers common explanations of sovereign state formation and underscores areas that tend to be overlooked. This may suggest what a consideration of external intervention can bring to such conversations.

Nationalism and State Making

Nationalism is a popular explanation for sovereign state making. Its logic is that a shared identity motivates people to seek exclusive political control over a defined territory.[16] This often means expelling, subjugating, or assimilating those who do not share the same identity—whether racial, linguistic, cultural, civic, or some mix thereof. The goal of such movements is the creation of a politically consolidated and externally autonomous polity run by those claiming to represent the dominant national group however construed in the popular mind. Such dynamics were at work in Indonesia and China during the early twentieth century, if not before, but state sovereignty did not immediately follow. This suggests that the presence of nationalism and nationalist movements alone may not automatically translate into the development of sovereign statehood.

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[15] M. Taylor Fravel, *Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China's Territorial Disputes* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

[16] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991); Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 39–62.

Indonesian nationalism was clearly on the rise in the 1910s with the formation of groups like *Budi Utomo* and *Sarekat Islam*. These organizations advocated indigenous political rights based around imagined linguistic, cultural, historical, and even religious commonalities.[17] The period from the 1920s through the early 1940s saw a further proliferation of nationalist groups with a collective membership at least in the high tens of thousands.[18] Early twentieth-century Indonesian nationalist groups included the *Partai Nasional Indonesia* (PNI), *Partindo*, *Gerindo*, and the Islamic-oriented *Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia*. There were also left-leaning nationalist groups like the *Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia*, *Partai Sosialis*, and the *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (PKI). In 1926–27, the PKI even launched a broad, but ultimately abortive, revolt against Dutch rule that saw the arrest of more than 13,000 party members and affiliates.[19]

Nationalist ferment around a shared Han Chinese identity was similarly evident in China since the end of the nineteenth century, coming to a head between the 1910s and 1940s. Nationalist uprisings from the late-1890s culminated in the 1911 revolution that ended the Manchu-ruled Qing dynasty. The period from the mid-1910s to the late 1920s saw various anti-monarchical, anti-imperialist campaigns as well as the rise of the pro-nationalist Kuomintang (KMT).[20] Also punctuating the era were popular nationalist protests such as the 1919 May Fourth Movement and the 1925 May Thirtieth Movement. Capping nationalist mobilization at this time was vocal societal opposition to the Japanese occupation—beginning with the 1931 invasion of Manchuria—through the mid-1940s.

Nonetheless, the Chinese and Indonesian experiences suggest that nationalist mobilization does not entirely explain the timing and formation of sovereign statehood. If nationalism was the main force behind the establishment of state sovereignty in China and Indonesia, why did this change take place in the mid-twentieth century and not earlier? After all, nationalist mobilization was well underway in both polities by the early twentieth century. Even explanations stressing the need for nationalist movements to gather

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[17] Akira Nagazumi, *The Dawn of Indonesian Nationalism: The Early Years of the Budi Utomo, 1908–1918* (Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies, 1972); Partij Sarekat Islam, "Report of the meeting of the Partij Sarekat Islam held on 26 January 1928, to commemorate its fifteen years of existence," in *Indonesia: Selected Documents on Colonialism and Nationalism, 1830–1942*, ed. C.L.M. Penders (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1977), 257–61; Amry Vandenbosch, *The Dutch East Indies, Its Government, Problems and Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1941), 315–20.

[18] George Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952), 60–100; Ruth McVey, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965).

[19] William Frederick, *Visions and Heat: The Making of the Indonesian Revolution* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1989), 5–6; Harry Benda, "The Patters of Administrative Reforms in the Closing Years of Dutch Rule in Indonesia," in *Continuity and Change in Southeast Asia*, ed. Harry Benda (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), 284–87.

[20] Edward McCord, *The Power of the Gun: The Emergence of Modern Chinese Warlordism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 205–44.

momentum must account for other factors that may accelerate or hinder such developments.

Nationalist mobilization, especially in weak states, often focuses on resistance against some external threat. Yet, many nationalist groups in such situations draw on external political, diplomatic, military, and financial backing even at the expense of supposedly fundamental national interests. Nationalist groups in China and Indonesia in the early to mid-twentieth century too were party to such interactions. This indicates a need to look more closely at how the interplay between foreign intervention and local collaboration augments nationalist pressures in fomenting sovereignty.

Self-Determination and Sovereign State Creation

Explanations emphasizing the role of self-determination norms tend to see sovereign state creation as having both international and domestic dimensions. Widespread beliefs about the desirability of self-determination encourage indigenous elites to pursue state sovereignty as a fundamental political right.[21] Broad international support for self-determination undercuts the legitimacy of outright foreign domination and promotes sovereignty in instead. This can underpin the development of sovereign statehood even in areas where governance may be tenuous.[22]

Accordingly, self-determination perspectives often detail how such norms assist the development of sovereignty in weak polities. As seen in local support for nationalist and anti-imperialist movements of the time, self-determination had enjoyed significant popularity appeal in Indonesia and China since the 1910s. Moreover, just as Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points promoted the right of self-determination, the 1922 Nine Power Treaty formally affirmed China's sovereignty and territorial integrity.[23]

Before the early 1950s, however, China lacked the consolidation characteristic of sovereign statehood even if it had significant autonomy; colonial Indonesia did not enjoy autonomy although at times it had considerable consolidation. This raises questions as to why self-determination norms took such a long time to drive sovereignty creation in China and Indonesia, especially when such dynamics were arguably key for sovereign state formation in Europe from the 1920's on.

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[21] See John Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations," *International Organization* 47, no. 1 (Winter 1993): 139–74; Friedrich Kratochwil, "Of systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality: An Inquiry into the Formation of the State System," *World Politics* 39, no. 1 (October 1986): 27–52; John Meyer, John Boli, George Thomas, and Francisco Ramirez, "World Society and the Nation-State," *The American Journal of Sociology* 103, no. 1 (July 1997): 144–81.

[22] Jackson, *Quasi-States*.

[23] Akira Iriye, *Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American-East Asian Relations* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1967), 144–45.

Furthermore, although self-determination perspectives are sensitive to the roles external actors play in relation to global norms, they tend to focus less on political consolidation. Robert Jackson notes that self-determination norms tend to push autonomy over consolidation, leading to the emergence of "quasi-states" that have external autonomy but little consolidation.[24] China until 1949 and Indonesia immediately after its proclamation of independence in 1945 fit this picture. Yet, the post-war histories of South Korea, Japan, and Europe suggest that foreign assistance can contribute significantly to consolidation. Such variation implies a need to examine further foreign support for self-determination and its relationship with consolidation.

Bellicism and Capitalized Coercion

Bellicist views see changing configurations of capital and coercion as critical to the development of sovereign statehood.[25] Such changes often stem from the pressure of external security threats, which were certainly present for Indonesia and China during the early twentieth century. However, evidence also suggests that sovereign Chinese and Indonesian states emerged at particular moments rather than as a culmination of the generations-long processes proposed by many bellicist theories. That China's and Indonesia's experiences diverged from the standard bellicist progression implies that it may be worthwhile to consider how other factors may mediate the control of capital and coercion in fragile polities. A fuller account of foreign intervention may help refine bellicist arguments on sovereign state formation by illustrating how such forces may affect the configuration of capital and coercion in weak states.

Institutionalized Commitments

Institutionalized commitment perspectives deem a reformulation of societal bargains over surplus distribution to result in sovereign statehood. Structural economic or social transformation can upset the existing distributional arrangements that shape a polity and empower new segments of society.[26] As various indigenous rivals seek to prevail in the face of such exogenous shocks, they try to establish stable organizational bargains with other groups

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[24] Jackson, *Quasi-States.*

[25] Victoria Hui, *War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Gianfranco Poggi, *The State: Its Nature, Development, and Prospects* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990); Tilly, *Capital, Coercion, and European States*; Michael Mann, *States, War, and Capitalism: Studies in Political Sociology* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988).

[26] Perry Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State* (London: NLB, 1974); Spruyt, *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors*; Joseph Strayer, *On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); Migdal, *State in Society.*

either to harness or suppress the influence of other social segments. Insofar as such institutional commitments promote high levels of political consolidation and external autonomy, they can foster the establishment of state sovereignty.

Political, economic, and social instability in fragile states may make stable, consistent domestic relationships hard to initiate and maintain. The fortunes of various groups may change quickly and dramatically, so promises to institutionalize commitments may lack credibility. This hampers collective efforts by local actors to address the challenges posed by rising new social segments and corresponding recalibrations of surplus distributions. China and Indonesia provided evidence enough to suggest that their classes, social groups, and even ethnic groups tended not to settle into regularized relationships with particular political groups before the mid-twentieth century. Institutional commitments may simply work less effectively under the volatile conditions seen in many fragile states.

With a sense of where existing state formation explanations leave off, I will now examine what an explicit consideration of outside intervention can add to understandings about the establishment of sovereignty in weak states. To do so, I turn to my empirical cases.

CHINA, 1923–37: LOW CONSOLIDATION, HIGH AUTONOMY

Divergent Support for Consolidation, Convergent Support for Autonomy

External actors active in China from 1923 to 1937 fell into two broad categories. One group had policies that restrained political consolidation. Its members made highly robust and intrusive efforts to intercede in China's domestic politics, sponsoring substantive local and regional autonomy at the expense of the central government. Among these actors were Japan, the Soviet Union, and France.

Japanese leaders of the 1920s attempted to consolidate their hold over parts of China already under Tokyo's sway.[27] This gave them a veto over local developments in much of Manchuria and Shandong, as well as in Fujian and Taiwan. For example, they sponsored Zhang Zuolin's Manchuria-based Fengtian Clique, as well as Li Houji and Xu Shuzheng in Fujian, and stepped-up cooptation of local elites on Taiwan.[28] When Zhang Zuolin appeared too

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[27] 7 Michael Barnhart, *Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919–1941* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 27–29; Iriye, *Across the Pacific*, 172–74; SHEN Yu, *Riben dalu zhengceshi, 1868–1945* (Beijing: Shehuikexue wenxian, 2005), 257–95, 716–21.

[28] Michael Barnhart, *Japan and the World since 1868* (London: Edward Arnold, 1995), 82–85; MIZUNO Akira and ZHENG Liangsheng, *Dongbei junfa zhengquan yanjiu: Zhang Zuolin · Zhang Xueliang zhi kangwai yu xiezhu tongyi guonei de guiji* (Taipei: Guoli bianyiguan, 1998), 151–57; Shen, *Riben dalu zhengceshi*, 257–58; Leo Ching, *Becoming "Japanese": Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation* (Berkeley: University of California Press 2001); Edward Chen, "Formosan Political

independent, Japanese leaders used his assassination as a means to retain influence over Manchuria.[29] Likewise, when Zhang's son and successor, Zhang Xueliang, seemed to tack too closely to the new KMT-led central government in Nanjing, Tokyo invaded and installed the collaborationist Manchukuo regime.[30]

For most of the Interwar period, Stalin's Soviet Union invested in asserting its ability to oversee affairs in Tuva, Xinjiang, and Inner and Outer Mongolia.[31] Moscow extended military, financial, and political support to Khorloogiin Choibalsan's leftist Mongolian forces; Feng Yuxiang's Inner Mongolia-based *Guominjun*; and the dominant warlord in Xinjiang, Sheng Shicai, in return for loyalty.[32] Moscow also encouraged the revolutionary activities of the KMT and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to distract successive Chinese central governments and their foreign supporters from challenging the Soviet presence in North and Northwest China.[33] Moscow pursued this policy despite promises to respect Chinese territorial integrity made in the 1919 Karakhan Manifesto and by Soviet diplomats.[34]

Such external efforts to sponsor local partners often cut across ideological lines as well. Moscow cooperated with Feng and Sheng despite each leader's dubious revolutionary credentials. Stalin similarly continued to aid the KMT following Chiang Kai-shek's 1926 coup against the party's left wing and its CCP allies, as well as after Chiang's 1927 purge of the Communists.[35] Efforts to hold sway over South and Southwest China similarly drove French leaders to aid local warlords such as Tang Jiyao in Yunnan and Lu Rongting in Guangxi.[36]

Movements under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1914–1937," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 31, no. 3 (May 1972): 477–97.

[29] Barnhart, *Japan Prepares for Total War*, 30–33.

[30] Iriye, *Across the Pacific,* 173–74, 207; Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 114–15.

[31] Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, *Russia and the World, 1917–1991* (London: Arnold, 1998), 31; Teddy Uldricks, *Diplomacy and Ideology: The Origins of Soviet Foreign Relations, 1917–1930* (London: SAGE, 1979); Allen Whiting, *Soviet Policies in China, 1917–1924* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954).

[32] Chinese assessor to the Commission of Enquiry of the League of Nations China *Waichiaopu* and League of Nations Commission of Inquiry, memoranda, April-August l932 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1932), 326–28; James Sheridan, *Chinese Warlord: The Career of Feng Yü-hsiang* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966), 165–69, 197–202; Allen Whiting and Shih-t'sai Sheng, *Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot?* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1958); File 0623.20/4412.01-02, Academia Historica (AH), Taipei (hereafter cited as AH with file number).

[33] Bruce Elleman, *Diplomacy and Deception: The Secret History of Sino-Soviet Diplomatic Relations, 1917–1927* (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1997), 55–76; LI Yu-chen and M.L. Titarenko, *Liangong, gongchanguoji yu Zhongguo* (Taipei: Dongda, 1997); YANG Kuisong, *Zhonggong yu Mosike de guanxi, 1920–1960* (Taipei: Dongda, 1997), 15–67.

[34] Elleman, *Diplomacy and Deception*, 24–27.

[35] Henry Wei, *China and Soviet Russia* (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1956), 52–55, 86–102; Ai-ch'en Wu, *China and the Soviet Union: A Study of Sino-Soviet Relations* (New York: J. Day, 1950), 195–97; Yang, *Zhonggong yu Mosike de guanxi*, 69–122.

[36] Anthony Chan, *Arming the Chinese: The Western Armaments Trade in Warlord China, 1920–1928* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1982), 55–63, 83–84, 102–104; File

A second set of outside actors pursued policies that consistently bol-
stered consolidation in China between the early 1920s and the late 1930s.
This group included Britain, the United States, and Germany under both
the Weimar and Nazi regimes. The actions of these governments buttressed
political consolidation efforts by particular local groups.

Regardless of their political leanings, British and American leaders gen-
erally supported central government rule in China through economic and
political assistance in exchange for guarantees of equal economic treatment
across the polity. For London, this approach was to maintain Britain's declin-
ing, but still leading, economic position in China.[37] To preserve opportunities
for American businesses, U.S. administrations from Harding to Roosevelt sim-
ilarly backed central government control to safeguard "Open Door" market
access.[38]

Accordingly, London and Washington were quick to transfer diplo-
matic, economic, and military support, along with the offer of concessions,
to whichever indigenous actor they believed most likely able to establish
consolidated rule. This meant redirecting opportunities for sovereign loans,
official arms sales, and revenue remittance from foreign-run government
agencies like the Maritime Customs. The switch in recognition from the
Fengtian-run Beijing government to the KMT—once the latter seemed likely
to prevail in the 1926–28 Northern Expedition—exemplified the British and
American approaches.[39]

Policy makers in the Weimar and Nazi regimes worked through ac-
tors controlling China's central government to secure access to the polity's
markets and raw materials that they saw useful for German economic and
military development. Germany's leaders saw Chinese tungsten as especially
valuable in circumventing post-World War I restrictions on rearmament; fur-
thermore, Chinese demand for heavy machinery and weapons could boost
German industrial redevelopment.[40] To overcome the physical distance and
the demands of more pressing needs in Europe, Weimar and Nazi leaders

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03/20/039/04/011–012, Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica (IMHAS), Taipei (hereafter cited IMHAS
with file number); IMHAS 03/20/039/04/014-018; IMHAS 03/18/101/01; IMHAS 01/21/056/03.

[37] Then, China accounted for roughly 3 percent of total British trade and outward investment, less
than half that of India. Angus Maddison, *The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective* (Paris: Development
Centre of the OECD, 2001), 99; B.R. Mitchell, *Abstract of British Historical Statistics* (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1962), 315–27.

[38] Iriye, *Across the Pacific*, 201–26; T. Christopher Jespersen, *American Images of China, 1931–1949*
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 108–25; WANG Yongxiang, *Ya'erda miyue yu Zhong-Su Ri-Su
guanxi* (Taipei: Dongda, 2003), 201–19.

[39] Austen Chamberlain, "Foreign Office Memorandum of January 8, 1930, on British Policy in China
[F 6720/3/10]," in *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939* (London: H.M. Stationery Office,
1946), 12–22; Iriye, *Across the Pacific*, 178–98; Peter Lowe, *Britain in the Far East: A Survey from 1819 to
the Present* (London: Longman, 1981), 132–35; File 18/3268, Second Historical Archives of China (SHAC),
Nanjing, Jiangsu, China (hereafter cited as SHAC with file number); SHAC 1032/648, 651.

[40] CHEN Renxia, *Zhong-De-Ri sanjiao guanxi yanjiu, 1936–1938* (Beijing: Sanlian, 2003), 78–87;
William Kirby, *Germany and Republican China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984).

also relied on the cooperation of an effective central government in China to safeguard economic opportunities.[41] Ensuring this meant supporting the local actor that seemed most likely to establish and sustain its rule over the entire polity. Between the mid-1920s and mid-1930s, this actor seemed increasingly likely to be the KMT, thus the period saw heavy German economic and military assistance to the KMT government in Nanjing.[42]

In contrast to this varying support for consolidation, there was generally consistent outside backing for Chinese autonomy in external affairs between 1923 and 1937. Foreign governments mostly accepted an independent Chinese role in external affairs despite domestic regime changes. China received broad international support to join the League of Nations and to participate fully in diplomatic processes.[43] Tokyo held a veto over Manchukuo's external relations, but few foreign governments recognized the Japanese-backed regime.[44] Likewise, other governments largely ignored Japan's claim to be the final arbiter of China's foreign relations in the 1934 Amau Declaration, even if they moderated their actions to avoid direct confrontation with Tokyo.[45]

Limited Consolidation, Substantial Autonomy

Efforts to consistently channel political, economic, and military support to China's central government bolstered political consolidation. This remained the case whether the central government was under the Fengtian Clique through much of the 1920s or subsequent KMT control.[46] Simultaneous efforts by outside actors trying to entrench their influence through local proxies, however, generated fragmentary forces.[47] With foreign military and financial assistance, local regional actors could resist central government authority.

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[41] John Fox, *Germany and the Far Eastern Crisis, 1931–1938: A Study in Diplomacy and Ideology* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982); MA Zhendu and QI Rugao, *Jiang Jieshi yu Xitele: Minguo shiqi de Zhong-De guanxi* (Taipei: Dongda, 1998), 41–99.

[42] Chen, *Zhong-De-Ri sanjiao guanxi yanjiu*; Kirby, *Germany and Republican China*; Ma and Qi, *Jiang Jieshi yu Xitele*.

[43] TANG Qihua, *Beijing zhengfu yu Guoji Lianmeng* (Taipei: Dongda, 1998).

[44] Warren Cohen, *America's Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations*, 4th ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 109–12; Iriye, *Across the Pacific*, 173–75.

[45] Dorothy Borg, *The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933–1938: From the Manchurian Incident through the Initial Stage of the Undeclared Sino-Japanese War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964), 46–99; Li Shide, *Yingguo yu Zhongguo de waijiao guanxi, 1929–1937* (Taipei: Guoshiguan, 1999), 232–37; Shen, *Riben dalu zhengceshi*, 451–57; SHAC 18/989, 1311, 1343.

[46] Hsi-sheng Chi, *Warlord Politics in China, 1916–1928* (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1976); Lucian Pye, *Warlord Politics: Conflict and Coalition in the Modernization of Republican China.* (New York: Praeger, 1971); Sheridan, *Chinese Warlord*; Arthur Waldron, *From War to Nationalism: China's Turning Point, 1924–1925* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

[47] Donald Gillin, *Warlord: Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi Province, 1911–1949* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), 30–58, 79–117; C. Martin Wilbur, "Military Separatism and the Process of Reunification under the Nationalist Regime," in *China in Crisis*, vol. 2, ed. Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 204–21.

Official recognition from Britain, the United States, and Germany opened
the way for economic aid, guaranteed revenue streams, and military assis-
tance to whichever regime seemed likely to run the central government.
Notably, London and Washington backed an increase in customs tariffs dur-
ing the 1926 Tariff Conference, raising remittances to the Fengtian regime in
Beijing from surplus customs revenues.[48] The British and Americans shifted
these benefits to the KMT in Nanjing once the KMT seemed a more likely
candidate after 1928. Moreover, London started returning monies from the
British share of the Boxer Indemnity to Nanjing in 1931 and helped the cen-
tral government overcome a major financial crisis between 1936 and 1937.[49]
German assistance to the KMT beginning in 1927 was essential to the major
development projects of the Nanjing decade and to the modernization of the
KMT army in the 1930s.[50]

Foreign backing also aided attempts by regimes at the centre to bring
domestic rivals to heel. Greater financial and economic clout helped maintain
the Fengtian Clique's dominance over North China during the mid-1920s
just as it helped pay for the Nanjing government's constant wars against
opposing KMT factions and other adversaries. These rivals ranged from the
Hu Hanmin-led faction of the KMT to the New Guangxi Clique, Feng Yuxiang's
Guominjun, and Yan Xishan's Shanxi Clique. Of course, German-trained KMT
troops played critical roles in Chiang Kai-shek's victories in the *Jiang-Gui*
and Central Plains Wars of 1929–1930, the destruction of the Jiangxi Soviet,
and the opening stages of the Sino-Japanese War. [51]

Concurrently, foreign support and oversight enabled various regional
actors to control significant territories and populations beyond central gov-
ernment control. Japanese sponsorship of first the Fengtian Clique and then
the Manchukuo regime denied the central government a role in Manchuria

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[48] "Tariff Conference," special issue, *The China Weekly Review* (1 November 1925); George Finch,
"The Chinese Customs Tariff Conference," *The American Journal of International Law* 20, no. 1 (January
1926): 124–27; His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Peking to Representatives of the Washington Treaty
Powers, British memorandum on China, 16 December 1926, together with the text of His Majesty's
Chargé d'Affaires at Peking to the United States Embassy in London, British memorandum on China,
28 May 1926, in *Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs* 6, no. 1 (January 1927): 62–68,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3014984; SHAC 18/1927; SHAC 1039/648, 650, 653; *Han* 4960, 5148, 5276,
Kuomintang Party Archives (KMTPA), Taipei (hereafter cited as KMTPA with collections name and number);
KMTPA *Zheng* 1/2.3-2.4, 8.3; AH 0645/8800.01-01/157; AH 0645.20/1035.02-02/165; AH 0645.20/2760.01-
01/40; AH 0645.20/3460.01-01/165/1401-1429; AH 0645.20/8431.01-01, 01-02; AH 0645.30/4460.01-04; IMHAS
03/20/079.

[49] Chamberlain, "Foreign Office Memorandum of January 8, 1930," 12–22; Lowe, *Britain in the Far
East*, 132–35, 150–54; Li, *Yingguo yu Zhongguo de waijiao guanxi*, 279–323; Arthur Young, *China's
Nation-Building Effort, 1927–1937: The Financial and Economic Record* (Stanford: Hoover Institution
Press, 1971), 216–38.

[50] Chen, *Zhong -De-Ri sanjiao guanxi yanjiu*, 78–87; Fox, *Germany and the Far Eastern Crisis*,
53–78, 108–45; Kirby, *Germany and Republican China*, 126–38, 190–32; Ma and Qi, *Jiang Jieshi yu
Xitele*, 135–44, 388–99, 417–33; Frederick Liu, *A Military History of Modern China, 1924–1949* (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1956), 90–102.

[51] Fox, *Germany and the Far Eastern Crisis*, 53–78, 108–45; Kirby, *Germany and Republican China*,
126–38, 190–32.

in the 1920s and 1930s, just as Tokyo's support for Fujian militarists in the 1920s curtailed Beijing's reach there. Similarly, Moscow's hand in running Outer Mongolia and Tuva from the 1920s consistently kept these areas beyond central control. The persistence of foreign leasehold territories through the 1930s cut against consolidation too.

Apart from limiting central government control, external assistance was also critical in enabling regional actors to resist central rule. Japan's Kwantung Army was surely behind Manchuria's separation from the rest of China in 1931, and Japanese assistance helped Yan Xishan and his supporters maintain the province beyond KMT control into the 1930s.[52] Besides enabling oversight of Outer Mongolia and Tuva since the 1920s, Soviet arms, training, and financing helped Feng Yuxiang's *Guominjun* and Sheng Shicai control Northwest China and Xinjiang, respectively, into the 1930s.[53] Moscow's military, political, and financial aid enabled the KMT to secure Guangdong and launch the Northern Expedition when it was still a regionally based movement in the 1920s, just as it shored up various CCP soviets in the 1930s.[54] Long Yun and Tang Jiyao similarly limited central control over Yunnan in the 1920s and 1930s with economic and military support from the French in Indochina.[55]

Broad and consistent foreign backing for Chinese autonomy allowed the central government to engage in external affairs without being subject to any external veto and even accorded various regional regimes substantial freedoms in their outward relations. Respect for China's foreign-policy independence allowed both the Fengtian and KMT-led central governments to negotiate over tariff autonomy without having to answer to any higher authorities.[56] Following its establishment in 1928 the KMT government persisted in its attempts to eradicate "unequal treaties," demonstrating its high degree of outward autonomy.[57] Some of the foreign-dominated governments and regional regimes in China seemed to exercise a degree of external autonomy

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[52] Gillin, *Warlord*, 108–19, 208–18.

[53] Elena Boikova, "Aspects of Soviet-Mongolian Relations, 1929–1939," in *Mongolia in the Twentieth Century: Landlocked Cosmopolitan*, ed. Stephen Kotkin and Bruce Elleman (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1999); Bruce Elleman, "The Final Consolidation of the USSR's Sphere of Interest in Outer Mongolia," in *Mongolia in the Twentieth Century*; Sheridan, *Chinese Warlord*, 163–79, 191–25; Chan, *Arming the Chinese*, 100–102; KMTPA *Zheng* 6/60; KMTPA *Zheng* 6/60.1; IMHAS 03/32/485; IMHAS 03/32/204.

[54] Yang, *Zhonggong yu Mosike de guanxi*, 15–67, 333–90, 436–65; John Garver, *Chinese-Soviet Relations, 1937–1945: The Diplomacy of Chinese Nationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 128–30, 145–77; Li and Titarenko, *Liangong, gongchanguoji yu Zhongguo*; Elleman, *Diplomacy and Deception*, 55–76.

[55] Chan, *Arming the Chinese*, 102–104; CHEN Cungong, *Lieqiang dui Zhongguo di junhuojinyun: minguo 8 nian—18 nian* (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan, 1983), 206–7.

[56] "Tariff Conference," special issue, *The China Monthly Review* (1925); Frank Su and Alvin Barber, "China's Tariff Autonomy, Fact or Myth," *Far Eastern Survey* 5, no. 12 (October 1936): 115–22; Finch, "The Chinese Customs Tariff Conference"; SHAC 1039/650.

[57] LIU Daren and XIE Mengyuan, *Zhonghua Minguo waijiao xingzheng shilue* (Taipei: Guoshiguan 2001), 131–36; Donald Peters, "Extraterritoriality and Tariff Autonomy in Sino-American Relations, 1921–1931" (PhD diss., University of Southern California, 1949), 193–233.

as well. The Soviet satellite Mongolian People's Republic and the Japanese-backed Manchukuo administration, for instance, could conduct their own external relations, albeit subject to their sponsors' approval.[58]

The following map provides a sense of the various regional jurisdictions in China going into the late 1930s.

CHINA, 1945–52: TOWARD HIGH CONSOLIDATION AND AUTONOMY

Converging Support for Consolidation and Autonomy

The post-World War II period initially saw continued divergence in external backing for consolidation and autonomy in China before an eventual convergence appeared. Early Soviet post-war policies promoted autonomy and consolidation south of the Great Wall but not in areas further north. Attempts by the United States and, to a lesser degree, Britain to prop up the KMT-led central government right after the war involved limited support for both consolidation and autonomy. By the late 1940s, however, major power policies in China effectively fostered political consolidation and outward independence under the CCP.

Immediate post-war Soviet policy toward China supported autonomy and consolidation under the KMT south of the Great Wall. To the north, the Soviet government backed the establishment of CCP control over Manchuria as well as the formal separation of Outer Mongolia and Tuva.[59] This was consistent with the understandings the Soviets had with the United States and Britain at the 1945 Yalta Conference. Consequently, Moscow forced the KMT government to accept Mongolian independence and the Soviet Union's absorption of Tuva in the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty.[60] In return, Stalin promised to recognize KMT rule over the rest of China and end support for the CCP.

Concurrently, Moscow helped the CCP create a base area in Manchuria, a region it forcibly wrested from Japan at the end of World War II. In 1945 Stalin cajoled the CCP to relocate from its original base in northwest China to Soviet-occupied Manchuria, where Moscow could provide a secure rear area in Siberia, freeing the CCP from the threat of KMT encirclement.[61] Here,

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[58] Prasenjit Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), 51–79; Boikova, "Aspects of Soviet-Mongolian Relations"; Rana Mitter, *The Manchurian Myth: Nationalism, Resistance, and Collaboration in Modern China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).

[59] Elleman, "The Final Consolidation," 130–32; Garver, *Chinese-Soviet Relations*, 182–30; Wang, *Ya'erda miyue yu Zhong-Su Ri-Su guanxi*, 265–431.

[60] AH 0641.10/5044.01-01.

[61] Steven Levine, *Anvil of Victory: The Communist Revolution in Manchuria, 1945–1948* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); WANG Yuyan and HE Ming, *Sulian chubing Dongbei shimo* (Beijing: Renmin, 2005); Odd Arne Westad, *Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War, 1946–1950* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 83–86.

FIGURE 1 Militarist and Other Jurisdictions in China, c.1926.

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the Soviets also transferred captured Japanese armaments and equipment to the CCP, encouraging the CCP to entrench itself in the area.[62] Moscow even delayed handing over Manchuria to the KMT well into 1946.[63] This bought time for the CCP to establish itself in Manchuria and erode the already stretched logistic capabilities of KMT forces trying to encircle the region. Such Soviet efforts enabled the CCP to neutralize the KMT's military strengths and helped lay the foundations for the Communist victory.

Moreover, Moscow extended open support for the CCP's seizure of the central government from 1948.[64] Even though this started when KMT defeat seemed imminent and direct U.S. participation in the Chinese Civil War remote, Moscow's assistance helped ensure most of China's consolidation and autonomy under CCP rule. Soviet backing also brought the conclusion of the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty, securing the transfer of the financial, technical, and military aid that helped shore up CCP rule after 1949 and through the Korean War.[65] Nonetheless, Stalin continued to shirk away from supporting the liberation of Taiwan for fear of provoking Washington yet stressed the separation of Tuva and Mongolia as well as Soviet special rights in Manchuria.[66]

The Truman administration limited post-war U.S. commitments in China to what was necessary to convince Congress to backing the Marshall Plan and the Cold War build-up.[67] This meant doing the minimum to help the KMT reclaim areas south of the Great Wall, but not beyond. Doing otherwise could overstretch limited KMT logistic capabilities and provoke Moscow by going against arrangements made at the Yalta Conference.[68] As such, Washington supported neither a rapid KMT advance into Manchuria nor efforts to exert control over Tuva and Outer Mongolia.

Anti-communist rhetoric, the China Lobby's supposed influence and proclaimed policy aside, U.S. aid to the KMT from 1945 to 1950 was less than 1 percent of commitments to rebuilding and defending Western Europe

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[62] Levine, *Anvil of Victory*; Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, *China Confidential: American Diplomats and Sino-American Relations, 1945–1996* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 21–22; Westad, *Decisive Encounters*, 83–86.

[63] Wang and He, *Sulian chubing Dongbei shimo*, 285–328, 380–419; Yang, *Zhonggong yu Mosike de guanxi*, 519–70; AH 0632.97/5011.01-02/400; SHAC 18/2318, 3049.

[64] Yang, *Zhonggong yu Mosike de guanxi*, 607–60; Westad, *Decisive Encounters*, 49–50, 216–19.

[65] Kennedy-Pipe, *Russia and the World*, 98–100; Hakjoon Kim, "The Soviet Role in the Korean War," in *Russia in the Far East and Pacific Region*, ed. Il Yung Chung and Eunsook Chung (Seoul: Sejong Institute, 1994).

[66] Elleman, "The Final Consolidation," 130–32; Garver, *Chinese-Soviet Relations*, 182–230; Wang, *Ya'erda miyue yu Zhong-Su Ri-Su guanxi*, 265–431.

[67] Thomas Christensen, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947–1958* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 58–96; Cohen, *America's Response to China*, 117–66.

[68] SHAC 18/3050; Ronald Spector, *In the Ruins of Empire: The Japanese Surrender and the Battle for Post-war Asia* (New York: Random House, 2007), 36–65; Wang, *Ya'erda miyue yu Zhong-Su Ri-Su guanxi*, 201–19; John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History* (New York: Penguin Press, 2005), 48–68.

and Japan. U.S. aid to the KMT from 1945 to 1949 totaled US$645 million as compared to Marshall Plan aid of US$17 billion and a defense budget that topped US$50 billion.[69] This is despite the fact that the KMT—amid a civil war—was trying to control an area and population larger than Western Europe and Japan combined. This area excludes Tuva, Outer Mongolia, and Manchuria, which Washington accepted as part of the Soviet orbit at the 1945 Yalta Conference.

By early 1949 Washington was tacitly ready to accept a consolidated and autonomous CCP government that the U.S. government could work with at some point in the future.[70] Washington was even ready to see a CCP takeover of Taiwan until the outbreak of the Korean War increased the strategic and political value of keeping the island under KMT control.[71] More broadly, American leaders were largely willing to accept CCP control over Mainland China's domestic and foreign relations, even to the extent of preventing provocative actions by the KMT from Taiwan.

British leaders from the end of the Sino-Japanese War to the Korean War constantly sought to lock in British economic interests in China as well as Britain's position in Hong Kong with minimal investment. This meant cooperating with whoever controlled the central government by supporting autonomy and consolidation in Mainland China. At the same time, London also accepted the prerogatives of the superpowers over Outer Mongolia, Tuva, Manchuria, and Taiwan.

Movement to Sovereign Statehood

China's consolidation and autonomy between 1945 and 1952 tracked changes in external intervention patterns. China's shift toward sovereignty came as outside support coalesced around political centralization by an independent, Communist-led central government in the late 1940s. Until then, persistent external support for different local actors continued to divide China, even if broad international recognition for an outwardly autonomous China existed throughout the period.

So long as foreign support continued to go toward different local political actors, political consolidation in China remained limited. Despite the legal myth that the KMT governed all of China after World War II, large areas of the polity remained outside its direct oversight. The KMT was able to start absorbing formerly occupied areas of South, Central, and North China as the

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[69] Christensen, *Useful Adversaries*, 58–96; Harlan Cleveland, "Economic Aid to China," *Far Eastern Survey* 18, no. 1 (November 1949): 1–6; Grace Hawes, *The Marshall Plan for China: Economic Cooperation Administration 1948–1949* (Cambridge: Schenkman, 1977); Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, *Patterns in the Dust: Chinese-American Relations and the Recognition Controversy, 1949–1950* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983); SHAC 18/2960, 3541.

[70] Christensen, *Useful Adversaries*, 77–79, 106–09, 128–31; Tucker, *Patterns in the Dust*, 17, 57–79.

[71] Christensen, *Useful Adversaries*, 133–39, 160–76; Iriye, *Across the Pacific*, 281–300.

Tokyo-sponsored indigenous regimes in these areas now lacked a backer. American logistic support, military aid, financial assistance, and diplomatic insistence between 1945 and 1948 were particularly helpful in advancing the KMT's reach into these areas.

However, heavy Soviet local involvement and the major powers' agreement at Yalta stalled KMT attempts to extend itself into Manchuria, Outer Mongolia, and Tuva, areas previously under Chinese jurisdiction. Arrangements secured at Yalta included Washington and London recognizing Moscow's formal absorption of Tuva, oversight of governance in Outer Mongolia, as well as the protection of special Soviet interests in Manchuria.[72] Absent major power support in this regard, the KMT had to formally accept the Soviet position in Outer Mongolia and Tuva in the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty. Neither was the KMT in a position to oppose Moscow's delay of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Manchuria, thereby abetting the solidification of the CCP's hold over that region.

Soviet assistance ultimately proved fundamental in setting up the CCP's takeover of Mainland China, even though this outcome was originally unintentional on Moscow's part.[73] The transfer of Japanese equipment and weapons, training, logistic support, and securing of Manchuria as a staging area greatly enhanced CCP combat capabilities. Such assistance, along with the prolonging of Soviet occupation in Manchuria, strained already stretched KMT logistic and fighting capacities. This neutralized the advantages of American aid to the KMT.

Nonetheless, what helped finally set the stage for autonomy and consolidation under the CCP was the emerging major power consensus on effectively accepting, if not supporting, CCP rule over the Mainland. Between 1948 and 1949, Washington and London were effectively readying themselves to deal with a new Communist government rather than to continue backing the KMT. Since the strong foreign support of World War II was not forthcoming, the KMT found survival in China untenable given the myriad problems it faced.

Moscow simultaneously increased materiel, logistic, and political support to the CCP with the latter's growing success.[74] The Soviet Union ultimately formalized assistance to the CCP in the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty. This arrangement fostered the strengthening of CCP control on the Mainland even through

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[72] Kathryn Weathersby, "Stalin, Mao, and the End of the Korean War," in *Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945–1963*, ed. Odd Arne Westad (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Centre, 1998); Westad, *Decisive Encounters*, 35–50; Yang, *Zhonggong yu Mosike de guanxi*, 520–669; SHAC 18/1923, 3268, 3428; File 109-000020-01(1), PRC Foreign Ministry Archives (PRCFMA), Beijing (hereafter cited as PRCFMA with file number); AH 0641/5044.01-01/123; AH 0632.97/5011.02-01; AH 0641.10/5044.01-01.

[73] Sergei Goncharenko, "Sino-Soviet Military Cooperation," in *Brothers in Arms*, 142–45; Levine, *Anvil of Victory*; Westad, *Decisive Encounters*, 35–64, 175.

[74] Weathersby, "Stalin, Mao, and the End of the Korean War"; Westad, *Decisive Encounters*, 35–50; Yang, *Zhonggong yu Mosike de guanxi*, 520–669; SHAC 18/1923, 3268, 3428; PRCFMA 109-000020-01(1); AH 0641/5044.01-01/123; AH 0632.97/5011.02-01; AH 0641.10/5044.01-01.

the pressures of simultaneously constructing a new state and fighting in the Korean War.

Notably, areas where foreign attempts to assert direct influence went unchecked remained beyond the reach of China's new central government, even past 1952. This dynamic lay behind continued Soviet domination of Tuva and Outer Mongolia, British control of Hong Kong, and American oversight of Taiwan after the start of the Korean War.[75] British and U.S. acquiescence likewise permitted Moscow to supervise affairs in Manchuria into the 1950s despite CCP claims of full sovereignty in areas under its formal jurisdiction.[76]

The maps below depict variations in consolidation from 1945 to 1952 .

In comparison, consistent outside backing for an outwardly independent China after World War II allowed for high levels of autonomy from 1945 on. Since there were no realistic outside attempts to direct China's foreign affairs, the KMT and CCP pursued their own foreign policies. Washington stayed out of direct negotiations between the KMT government and Moscow before 1949, just as Moscow did not try explicitly to manage CCP relations with the KMT and Washington through to the Korean War. This freedom did not mean, however, that Chinese foreign policy was free from obstacles. American refusal to recognize the CCP government and its exclusion from the United Nations constrained Beijing's outward autonomy, just as the conditions of Soviet aid forced active CCP involvement throughout the Korean War.

INDONESIA, 1923–41: HIGH CONSOLIDATION, LOW AUTONOMY

Convergent Support for Consolidation, Divergent Support for Autonomy

Compared to China, Indonesia received convergent outside backing for political consolidation between 1923 and 1941 but little foreign support for autonomy. Before World War II, there was general international acceptance of longstanding Dutch rule over the East Indies and oversight of the archipelago's outward relations. This was something The Hague hoped to continue. Some, like Japan, wished for Indonesia greater independence in foreign policy but did not openly challenge the Dutch position.

The colonial government offered financial and political support to indigenous groups willing to subordinate themselves to Dutch rule and indirectly help run the archipelago. This led to Dutch backing of local ruling

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[75] Kit-ching Chan Lau, *China, Britain and Hong Kong, 1895–1945* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1990), 327; Christensen, *Useful Adversaries*, 133–76; Elleman, "The Final Consolidation," 130–32.

[76] KUO Jung-Chao, *Meiguo Ya'erda mi yue yu Zhongguo: jiantao yi Ya'erda miyue wei zhongxin de Meiguo dui Hua zhengce* (Taipei: Shuiniu, 1967), 419–505; Yang, *Zhonggong yu Mosike de guanxi*, 609-69; PRCFMA 109–000020-01(1).

FIGURE 2 Pre-1893 Qing Boundaries and Post-1949 Jurisdictions.

houses, businesses and professionals, as well as religious leaders. The colonial government in Batavia incorporated most of them into various local, regional, and colony-wide assemblies.[77] Local elites accounted for around 40 percent of assembly seats by the mid-1920s, although the Dutch effectively controlled these advisory bodies.[78]

The Dutch also recruited members of the indigenous population into the colonial administration. Employment within the colonial bureaucracy provided financial stability and upward social mobility even if participation in colonial governance helped perpetuate Dutch rule.[79] In fact, locals overwhelmingly staffed the colonial army, police, and intelligence services responsible for the effective pre-war suppression of various nationalist groups.[80]

Apart from overseeing foreign policy for the East Indies, The Hague took an active role in managing its colony's external economic relations. This was apparent during the Great Depression, when Holland employed protectionist measures in the East Indies to secure Indonesian markets and raw materials for Dutch businesses.[81] Moreover, colonial policies ensured that Dutch businesses dominated the lucrative oil, rubber, sugar, coffee, and tea industries even though The Hague allowed foreign commercial activity.[82]

Despite the fact that British-held Malaya, North Borneo, and Australia bordered Indonesia, London abided by previous Anglo-Dutch agreements

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[77] Bernhard Dahm, *History of Indonesia in the Twentieth Century* (London: Praeger, 1971), 45–51; Steven Drakeley, *The History of Indonesia* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2005), 66–68; Vandenbosch, *The Dutch East Indies*, 45–51.

[78] Frederick, *Visions and Heat*, 1–28; Dahm, *History of Indonesia in the Twentieth Century*, 45–51, 70–71; Bernard Vlekke, *The Story of the Dutch East Indies* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1945), 185.

[79] Benda, "The Patters of Administrative Reforms," 236–52; Netherlands Government-in-Exile, "Declaration of the Netherlands Government in Exile in London, 27 January 1942," in *Indonesia: Selected Documents*, 141–49.

[80] The Royal Netherlands Indies Army was four-fifths local. Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, 60–63; Harry Poeze, "Political Intelligence in the Netherlands Indies," in *The Late Colonial State in Indonesia: Political and Economic Foundations of the Netherlands Indies, 1880–1942*, ed. R. B. Cribb (Leiden: KITLV, 1994), 235–37.

[81] Anne Booth, "Foreign Trade and Domestic Development in the Colonial Economy," in *Indonesian Economic History in the Dutch Colonial Era*, ed. Anne Booth, W.J. O'Malley, and Anna Weidemann (New Haven: Yale University, Southeast Asia Studies, 1990), 279–93; Gert Den Baker and Theo Huitker, "The Dutch Economy 1921–39: Revised Macroeconomic Data for the Interwar Period," *Review of Income & Wealth* 36, no. 2 (June 1990): 190–93; Anne Booth, "The Evolution of Fiscal Policy and the Role of Government in the Colonial Economy," in *Indonesian Economic History*, 228–29; Amry Vandenbosch, *Dutch Foreign Policy since 1815: A Study in Small Power Politics* (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1959), 235–23, 293–309.

[82] M.C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1300* (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1993), 152–53; Bernard Vlekke, *Nusantara: A History of the East Indian Archipelago* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1943), 291–97; Vlekke, *The Story of the Dutch East Indies*, 166–68; Frances Gouda and Thijs Brocades Zaalberg, *American Visions of the Netherlands East Indies/Indonesia: US Foreign Policy and Indonesian Nationalism, 1920–1949* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2002).

and did not challenge Dutch rule over the archipelago.[83] Japan and the United States—the other two major powers with interests in Southeast Asia—likewise did not seek to undermine Dutch control between 1923 and 1941. Like Britain, they accepted restrictions imposed by Holland on their economic relations with the Netherlands Indies, including conditions on trade and investment that privileged Dutch companies.[84] To ensure continued supplies of Indonesian oil and rubber, Tokyo limited its East Indies trade even during the Depression.[85] Tokyo also did not immediately challenge the Dutch ability to restrict Japanese access to war materiel produced in Indonesia through 1941.

Substantial Consolidation, Limited Autonomy

Consistent foreign backing for consolidation matched with an absence of foreign support for opposition to Dutch rule kept Indonesia under colonial control from 1923 to 1941. In the 1920s and 1930s, there were only about 240,000 Dutch and Dutch Eurasians in Indonesia among a population that grew from 48.3 million in 1920 to 59.1 million in 1930.[86] Holland's political control rested heavily on the local administrative and security services, which were overwhelmingly local. Dutch-sponsored local elites like Javanese *priyayi*, East Sumatran *rajas*, Minangkabau *penghulus*, and Acehnese *uleëbalangs* were also critical in enforcing The Hague's writ, albeit often indirectly.[87]

Through these local partners, the colonial authorities successfully suppressed various anti-Dutch movements. On the one hand, this involved the penetration and co-optation of moderate nationalist and religious movements such as *Budi Utomo* and *Sarekat Islam*.[88] On the other hand, the colonial government crushed the more radical groups.[89] Of particular note was the quashing of an archipelago-wide uprising planned by the PKI in 1928. The

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[83] Niall Ferguson, *Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2004), 245–302; Nicholas Tarling, *The Fall of Imperial Britain in South-East Asia* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1993), 108–10.

[84] Andrew Roadnight, *United States Policy towards Indonesia in the Truman and Eisenhower Years* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 55–102; Malcolm Caldwell and Ernst Utrecht, *Indonesia, An Alternative History* (Sydney: Alternative, 1979), 37–38.

[85] Frederick Field, *Economic Handbook of the Pacific Area* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1934), 448–51; Jean Taylor, *Indonesia: Peoples and Histories* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 313–14.

[86] Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, 155–73, 188–95; Vandenbosch, *The Dutch East Indies*, 223–24; and Angus Maddison, "Dutch Colonialism in Indonesia: A Comparative Perspective." In *Indonesian Economic History in the Dutch Colonial Era*, 322–25.

[87] Netherlands Government-in-Exile, "Declaration of the Netherlands Government," 141–49.

[88] Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, 64–70; Nagazumi, *The Dawn of Indonesian Nationalism*, 51–150; Partij Sarekat Islam, "Report of the meeting of the Partij Sarekat Islam," 257–61; Vandenbosch, *The Dutch East Indies*, 315–20.

[89] Takashi Shiraishi, *An Age in Motion: Popular Radicalism in Java, 1912–1926* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 113–16, 203–15, 309–38; Poeze, "Political Intelligence in the Netherlands Indies,"

absence of foreign support disadvantaged opposition groups by denying them the political, financial, and military support needed for changing their circumstances quickly.

Moreover, The Hague could regulate the Indies' oil and rubber industries as well as domestic markets to benefit Dutch business at the expense of foreign interests.[90] In the oil industry, Dutch policies supported the dominant position of Royal Dutch Shell, forcing American and Japanese oil firms to play secondary roles.[91] Depression-era protectionist policies enabled Dutch exports to grow from 13 percent to 22 percent of Indonesia's total imports between 1934 and 1938, or from less than 8 percent of Holland's total exports to just below 12 percent.[92] Correspondingly, Japan—the top exporter to Indonesia in the 1930s—saw its share of imports to the archipelago fall from 32.5 percent in 1934 to 25.4 percent in 1936 and 14.4 percent in 1938.[93]

The Netherlands government similarly exercised full oversight of Indonesia's external relations up to the Japanese Occupation in 1942. Much of this was because outside tests of The Hague's management of East Indies external policy for much of the 1923–41 period was virtually nonexistent. A challenge eventually did come from Japanese pressure to secure control of Indonesian oil, rubber, and tin from the colonial government in 1941.[94] Nonetheless, Batavia continued to follow the instructions of the Dutch government-in-exile in London to restrict Japanese access to war material and resisted diplomatic pressure from Tokyo.[95]

229–32; Harry Benda and Lance Castles, "The Samin Movement," in *Continuity and Change in Southeast Asia*, 269–301.

[90] Frederick, *Visions and Heat*, 1–28; Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, 62–63; Gouda and Zaalberg, *American Visions*.

[91] Vlekke, *Nusantara*, 296–97; Vlekke, *The Story of the Dutch East Indies*, 166–68; Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, 152–53.

[92] Den Baker and Huitker, "The Dutch Economy 1921–39," *Review of Income & Wealth* 36, no. 2 (June 1990): 18; Field, *Economic Handbook of the Pacific Area*, 448–51; Vandenbosch, *Dutch Foreign Policy*, 235–43.

[93] Muhammed Abdul Aziz, "Japan's Colonialism and Indonesia" (PhD diss., Leiden University, 1955), 101–104; Booth, "Foreign Trade and Domestic Development," 279; Indonesia and Netherlands Regeeringsvoorlichtingsdienst, *Ten years of Japanese Burrowing in the Netherlands East Indies. Official report of the Netherlands East Indies Government on Japanese Subversive Activities in the Archipelago during the Last Decade* (New York: Netherlands Information Bureau, 1942), 36–45; Sato, *War, Nationalism and Peasants*, 4–5.

[94] Netherlands Government-in-Exile, "Declaration of the Netherlands Government," 149; Aziz, "Japan's Colonialism and Indonesia," 105–42.

[95] Nicholas Tarling, *A Sudden Rampage: The Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia, 1941–1945* (London: Hurst, 2001), 66–68; Vandenbosch, *Dutch Foreign Policy since 1815*, 405–11.

INDONESIA, 1945–52: TOWARD HIGH CONSOLIDATION AND AUTONOMY

Converging Support for Consolidation and Autonomy

As in China, outside support for consolidation and autonomy began to co-alesce toward the late 1940s after a period of divergence immediately after World War II. The end of the Japanese occupation left Indonesia with a number of pro-independence mass organizations and paramilitary groups that did not previously exist.[96] These added to a domestic context already populated by traditional local elites and pro-Dutch elements that survived the war. It was against this more divided domestic setting that Dutch re-colonization efforts and the Indonesian struggle for independence would take place.

The post-war years saw the Dutch—under American pressure—at first try to reimpose colonial rule only to eventually support a sovereign Indone-sia in the late 1940s. After failing to convince the Indonesian Republicans to succumb, The Hague initially tried to crack down on opponents with both Dutch and indigenous troops while using cooperative local elites to recolonize the archipelago. However, American threats to cut critical post-war assistance after 1948 forced Holland to support an autonomous and consolidated Indonesia under the Republicans. This forced The Hague to scale back its demands for privileged economic access, even though it suc-ceeded in transferring US$1.13 billion in Netherlands Indies debt to the new government.[97]

Contrary to its pre-war recognition of Dutch rule, the U.S. government be-gan the post-war period with greater ambivalence. American leaders largely felt that the Dutch were diverting Marshall Aid meant for rebuilding Hol-land into a stable West European ally to recolonizing the East Indies.[98] The Truman administration, however, initially did not force The Hague's hand on the issue, given wider concerns about the developing Cold War and the reconstruction of Western Europe. Washington was also unsure about the political leanings of the Indonesian Republicans. Consequently, limited and

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[96] Harry Benda, "Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation, 1942–1945," in *Continuity and Change in Southeast Asia*; Harry Benda, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation, 1942–1945* (The Hague: van Hoeve, 1958), 103–94; Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), 6–26; Tarling, *A Sudden Rampage*, 174–92, 226–31.

[97] George Kahin, "The United States and the Anti-Colonial Revolutions in Southeast Asia," in *The Origins of the Cold War in Asia*, ed. Yonosuke Nagai and Akira Iriye (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 352–55; Roadnight, *United States Policy towards Indonesia*, 55–77; Spruyt, *Ending Empire*, 173–75; Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*, 15; Herbert Feith, *The Wilopo Cabinet, 1952–1953: A Turning Point in Post-Revolutionary Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958), 1.

[98] Gouda and Zaalberg, *American Visions*; Roadnight, *United States Policy towards Indonesia*, 26–77; Spruyt, *Ending Empire*, 173–75.

half-hearted efforts to get the Dutch and Indonesian Republicans to seek a negotiated solution characterized U.S. policy toward Indonesia until the late 1940s.

After 1948, though, Washington began to play a more active role in pushing for both consolidation and autonomy under indigenous rule. Republican suppression of the PKI during the 1948 Madiun Incident convinced the Truman administration that Indonesian nationalists could help stem Communist influence in both Indonesia and Asia more broadly.[99] This seemed important to Washington given Communist gains in China and the sharpening of Cold War tensions in Europe at the time. Moreover, the Dutch government had become more politically secure by the late 1940s, and the costs of recolonization seemed to detract from reconstruction in Holland.[100]

Washington consequently started to compel The Hague to end recolonization by threatening to withhold aid and backing the Republicans' international position at the United Nations and elsewhere.[101] To further shore up the Republicans' domestic and international position, U.S. leaders extended substantial aid to the new Jakarta central government in 1950. This included a long-term, low-interest US$100 million loan.[102] Allied purchases of Indonesian raw materials during the Korean War further buoyed the economic position of the new Republican government.[103]

The immediate post-war years also saw a period of substantial British involvement in Indonesia. Louis Mountbatten's South-East Asia Command was responsible for the archipelago following the Japanese surrender. In this capacity, British military administration of Indonesia from 1945 to 1946 aimed to solidify Allied control over the archipelago and ultimately return it to Dutch control.[104] As such, the British military suppressed Indonesian nationalists who opposed this outcome, a policy that culminated in the 1945 Battle of Surabaya.[105]

British policy began to move toward disengagement from the archipelago by 1946 and eventually gravitated toward limited support for full

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[99] Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, 256–331; Anthony Reid, *The Indonesian National Revolution, 1945–1950* (Hawthorn, Victoria: Longman, 1974), 59–102, 121–47; Ann Swift, *The Road to Madiun: The Indonesian Communist Uprising of 1948* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1989).

[100] Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, 225–231; Spector, *In the Ruins of Empire*, 274.

[101] Kahin, "The United States and the Anti-Colonial Revolutions," 352–55; Roadnight, *United States Policy towards Indonesia*, 55–77.

[102] Audrey Kahin and George Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia* (New York: New Press, 1995), 30–45; Feith, *The Wilopo Cabinet*, 57–63.

[103] Feith, *Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*, 173.

[104] Richard McMillan, *The British Occupation of Indonesia, 1945–1946: Britain, the Netherlands and the Indonesian Revolution* (London: Routledge, 2005); Yano Toru, "Who Set the Stage for the Cold War in Southeast Asia?" in *The Origins of the Cold War in Asia*, 338–40.

[105] Christopher A. Bayly and Tim N. Harper, *Forgotten Wars: Freedom and Revolution in Southeast Asia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 158–89; Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, 141–45; McMillan, *The British Occupation of Indonesia*, 10–12, 85–106, 131–37.

Indonesian sovereignty by the late 1940s. The British government even tried to broker a negotiated settlement between The Hague and the Indonesian Republicans by the time it was trying to extricate itself from the archipelago in 1946.[106] This was to allow Republican control over Java, Sumatra, and Madura alongside some Dutch oversight in external affairs. Nonetheless, growing Cold War concerns and American pressure in the late 1940s led London to diplomatically back full consolidation and autonomy under the Republicans.[107]

Movement to Sovereign Statehood

Sovereign statehood emerged in Indonesia once outside actors backed consolidation and autonomy for the polity under the Indonesian Republicans in the late 1940s and early 1950s. This is distinct from the years 1945–49, when the absence of joint external support for consolidation and autonomy stalled the development of sovereignty. In fact, the end of Japan's occupation and Allied efforts to assert authority undermined existing governance institutions and made the politics of the mid-1940s far more divisive and contentious than during the pre-war years.

Foreign involvement in Indonesia from 1945 to 1947 effectively supported the reestablishment of colonial rule domestically; this meant external oversight of external affairs and control of domestic politics. Without real opposition from other foreign powers, both Britain and Holland were successively able to foil indigenous attempts to wrest total control of Indonesia and the polity's external relations. This was despite the fact that the Indonesian Republicans could draw on the organizational and military foundations inherited from the Japanese.[108]

Following the British suppression of nationalist resistance, the Netherlands forcibly seized much of the archipelago with the help of its many local partners.[109] Two major Dutch "police actions" eventually limited Republican -held areas to Aceh and the interior of Central Java and even led to the capture of top Republican leaders.[110] This also allowed The Hague to oversee much of Indonesia's outward relations.

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[106] Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, 216–26; Spector, *In the Ruins of Empire*, 169–214; Nicholas Tarling, *Britain, Southeast Asia and the Onset of the Cold War, 1945–1950* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 87–105, 160–73.

[107] Spector, *In the Ruins of Empire*, 169–214; Tarling, *The Fall of Imperial Britain in South-East Asia*, 192–93.

[108] Reid, *The Indonesian National Revolution*, 19–39.

[109] Feith, *Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*, 9–11.

[110] Kahin and Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy*, 32–33; Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, 213–16, 235–47, 332–445; Reid, *The Indonesian National Revolution*, 112–14, 149–53; Spector, *In the Ruins of Empire*, 274; Adrian Vickers, *A History of Modern Indonesia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 99–111.

However, strong American support for the Indonesian Republicans after the 1948 Madiun Incident brought a more stable division of the archipelago into Dutch- and Republican-administered areas for a time. American insistence on Dutch-Indonesian negotiations helped slow Dutch reconquest and enabled the Republicans to buy time for consolidation.[111] Consequently, Holland and its local partners were unable to incorporate fully Republican-dominated areas even after capturing the top nationalist leaders. This left the colonial and Republican authorities in charge of internal and external policy in regions of Indonesia that they respectively held.

Indonesia's move toward sovereign statehood came as external support converged more decisively around consolidation and external autonomy under Republican leadership in the late 1940s. Growing U.S. backing for the Indonesian Republicans made Dutch recolonization efforts increasingly difficult.[112] The United States made continued Marshall Plan aid to Holland conditional on Indonesian independence, in particular, making the recolonization of the archipelago seem significantly more costly to The Hague. There also was growing sympathy for the Republicans at the United Nations due to American lobbying. Such pressures convinced Dutch leaders to support Indonesia's consolidation and autonomy under a Republican-led government by late 1949.[113]

Broad outside support for autonomous, consolidated rule further abetted Jakarta's attempts to consolidate the sovereign Indonesian state into the early 1950s.[114] Without the sustained foreign economic and diplomatic support enjoyed by the Republican leadership in Jakarta, regional regimes were defeated or isolated after 1949.[115] These included the semi-autonomous local authorities in West Kalimantan, South Sulawesi, Ambon, and East Sumatra left over from Dutch rule, an indigenous regime in Aceh, as well as religious militants in West Java.[116] Foreign backing, especially in the form of economic aid, gave Jakarta a crucial advantage in imposing oversight over both domestic and external affairs.

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[111] Gouda and Zaalberg, *American Visions*; Spruyt, *Ending Empire*, 172–73.

[112] Kahin, "The United States and the Anti-Colonial Revolutions," 352–55; Roadnight, *United States Policy towards Indonesia*, 55–77.

[113] Kahin and Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy*, 30–45; Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, 336–445; Feith, *Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*, 11–15.

[114] Benedict Anderson, *The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia, and the World* (London: Verso, 1998), 278–80; H. E. Elson, *The Idea of Indonesia: A History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 149–98.

[115] Reid, *The Indonesian National Revolution*, 162–68; Roadnight, *United States Policy towards Indonesia*, 78–102; Feith, *Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*, 47–71; Feith, *The Wilopo Cabinet*, 3–11.

[116] Audrey Kahin, *Regional Dynamics of the Indonesian Revolution: Unity from Diversity* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985); Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, 428–69.

A FEW PARTING BLOWS

Comparisons of China and Indonesia in the 1923–37, 1941, and 1945–52 time-frames suggest that the emergence of sovereignty would be difficult without convergent external support for both consolidation and autonomy. The two polities differ substantially in geographic, demographic, social, economic, and cultural terms. Indonesia started as a colony and China a fragmented polity. Factors usually regarded as key to sovereign state making—war, nationalism, and self-determination norms—were common to both states throughout the periods considered but did not fully explain the development of sovereignty in either place. It was when foreign backing coalesced around consolidation and autonomy of a polity under one local group that sovereign statehood emerged, perhaps as this pattern of intervention unleashed the full force of other sovereignty-enhancing dynamics.

Given the potential role external forces can play in shaping order and political authority in weak states, there is a need for more systematic thinking about outside intervention. Conceptualizing how different levels of external financial and military assistance to various domestic groups can affect politics in a fragile state may be especially important. In polities with frail institutions and intense domestic political competition, such intercession may advantage certain groups and types of governance over others even if that is not the intention of the intervening actors. These dynamics played out in varying degrees in situations ranging from the American Revolution to Cold War competitions in Africa, Latin America, and Asia. Appreciating such pressures can help illuminate the conditions surrounding contemporary externally led efforts to establish order and governance in areas from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia to Kosovo and Nagorno-Karabakh.

The results of this analysis further imply that it is possible, albeit very difficult, for individual outside actors to influence governance in weak polities, including the fostering of sovereign statehood. Achieving desired outcomes in a target state requires that an intervening power consider not only its own concerns and local conditions but also account for all other external players interested in the polity. An intervening actor may then try to marginalize adversaries, negotiate and buy its way to success, or seize opportunities opened up by exogenous shocks. Even so, intervening to shape political institutions in a weak polity remains constraining, expensive, messy, and highly risky.

A final issue highlighted by this essay is the potentially non-linear effects of nationalist and self-determination ideals on sovereign state formation. In the process of striving for sovereign statehood amid sharp domestic political competition, indigenous groups, including nationalist ones, may be ready to work under foreign sponsorship against each other. This dynamic indicates a willingness to avoid dogmatism over principles in order to prevail. It also suggests that rivalries and collective action problems can plague nationalist

coalitions as much as any other group, even to the extent of dampening the effects of nationalism and self-determination.

Hence, nationalist sentiments and self-determination norms alone might not be enough to advance sovereign statehood in weak states. To the extent that different interpretations and applications of these ideals exist, they could even undermine the development of sovereignty. Appeals to nationalist and self-determination ideals may be more effective as a tool for mobilizing a population to advance state capacity after one actor consolidates control and monopolizes information. The roles of nationalism and self-determination norms in sovereign state creation, though fundamental, may be less encompassing than commonly supposed.