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JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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European Integration, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Stability in the Western Balkans: A New Strategy

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Abstract

The February 2014 protests in Bosnia-Herzegovina have shown clearly that Bosnia-Herzegovina is still- 20 years after the signing of the Dayton Accords- the key country for security in the Western Balkans. These protests have also shown the limits of the influence of EU policies in the region, and have again sparked local and international discussions about the future role of the international community in general, and the EU in particular. Besides the discussion about quick and large-scale change to the Dayton Constitution, some observers and students of Balkan politics have pointed to the need for partial reforms, while others favour the idea that the international community should stop meddling in Bosnian affairs. The early reactions of EU officials to the events in Bosnia-Herzegovina have prioritised socio-economic measures rather than constitutional reforms. The following article stresses the importance of an increased EU commitment to Bosnia-Herzegovina under a revised and comprehensive strategy. The new strategy should include improving the economy as one of its priorities; however, the EU should also increase its efforts for constitutional reforms and assume more responsibility to make the Bosnian state functional. The article also highlights that recent events in Bosnia-Herzegovina have illustrated the urgency for a more decisive enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans and argues that the integration of the Western Balkans and Turkey with the EU are not rival processes but complementary. The article first examines the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Balkans in the post-Dayton period and then makes suggestions to improve security and stability in the Western Balkans.

Key Words

Bosnia-Herzegovina, Western Balkans, Euro-Atlantic Integration, economy, security, stability.

Introduction

The early 1990s witnessed regime changes in the communist Balkan countries as well as the collapse of the state of Yugoslavia. The collapse of Yugoslavia resulted in several wars between Serbia and the former republics in the country that had promoted their independence. A war between Slovenia and Serbia in 1991 was followed in the same year by another war between Serbia and Croatia. In 1992 the Bosnian War broke out, claiming the lives of more than 100,000 people. The

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Bosnian War continued until the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995. It was US leadership and not European that put an end to this European war. The declaratory diplomacy that was used in European foreign policy failed.[1] The lack of political willingness and unity among the European countries was one of the most important factors contributing to the indecisiveness of the EC/EU during these wars, preventing European countries from taking the lead in international efforts to stop them.

Security and defence have traditionally been considered taboo in the European integration process.[2] However, the failure to address the crisis in the Balkans contributed to a reform aimed at strengthening European political and military capabilities.[3] The Franco-British St. Malo Declaration in December 1998 marked the first important step towards a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).[4] The ESDP was then agreed by the Amsterdam Treaty of 1999 and was established by the European Council in Cologne in June 1999. Step-by-step the EU has built up its political and military capabilities, becoming a central player in the Balkans in the areas of conflict prevention and management.[5]

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Strengthening the military and police responsibilities of the EU in the Western Balkans has not meant a departure from its traditional emphasis on soft power.[6] The EU has continued to pay attention to values which have been considered fundamental elements of European identity since the Copenhagen summit of 1973, such as respect for human rights, the principles of representative democracy, the rule of law and social justice.[7] EU soft power is being exercised through the influence it exerts on the neighbouring countries by promises of association and possible accession to European institutions.[8]

Despite the EU's increasing role in conflict prevention and management in the Western Balkans, the EU's efforts have not always been successful and have produced mixed results. That the common security and defence policies fall within the EU's inter-governmental category, and hence that the member states dominate the decision-making process, is one of the most important factors responsible for this. Moreover, the presence of other international organisations in the region and the regional policies followed by countries such as the USA and Russia are other important factors influencing the results

of EU projects in the Western Balkans. Finally, in the Western Balkans, the EU has faced a more challenging political scenario and has had to deal with post-conflict countries dominated by deep-rooted ethnic tensions. In this context, Bosnia-Herzegovina, with its fragmented society and complicated state structure, is still the most fragile country in the region.

The establishment of the "Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe" (SPSEE) in 1999 and the "Stabilisation and Association Process" (SAP) in 2000 were turning points in the approach towards the Balkans that was adopted by the international community in general and by the EU in particular.

The February 2014 protests in Bosnia-Herzegovina led once again to a questioning the functionality of the Dayton constitution and have intensified the voices favouring changes. Another subject central to the discussions triggered by these protests was the future role of the EU in Bosnia. As is the case with the Dayton issue, there is no consensus among international observers about the mission of the EU in the region. In contrast to calls to stop the international community's intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina, this article stresses the need for a more active EU policy, supported by a stronger economic strategy towards this country. Given that peace and stability in Bosnia-Herzegovina is interconnected with peace and stability in the Western Balkans as a whole, the article not only focuses on Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also argues that the EU should follow a more decisive enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans and Turkey.

The Euro-Atlantic Integration of the Balkans in the Post-Dayton Period

Since the end of the Bosnian War the EU has introduced a number of projects aimed at strengthening the role of the Union as a political actor in the Balkans. The EU launched the "Royaumont Process" under the French presidency in December 1995 to facilitate the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords. This process focused on promoting regional projects in the field of human rights, culture and civil society.[9] In April 1997, the EU General Affairs Council adopted the "Regional Approach (RA)" and established economic and political conditions for the development of bilateral relations with Macedonia, Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Albania. The RA covered regional cooperation,

market economy reforms, the protection of minorities, the rule of law and respect for human rights. This process excluded Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia, which were assigned to a different category as all three had signed European agreements and lodged membership applications in the period 1993-96. The RA outlined the borders of the future Western Balkan grouping, established the conditionality regime linked to the 1993 Copenhagen criteria without making explicit reference to accession and made the regional cooperation a prerequisite for inclusion into European institutions and policies.[10]

As far as NATO is concerned, its interest in the Western Balkans can be traced back to 1992 and the first deployment of its military assets in support of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) during the Bosnian War. Later on, in 1995-96, a NATO-commanded multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) was deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina to help police the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords. NATO sent further troops to Kosovo as part of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) after the coercive air campaign which ended Serbian control of Kosovo in 1999.[11] Like the EU, NATO developed its own regional cooperation policy in the mid-1990s under its Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. The PfP envisaged collaborative activities with third countries, such as joint exercises and exchange of military personnel. The PfP,

like the EU's enlargement policy, formed a bilateral platform involving individual partner governments and NATO. It became an important tool in the Euro-Atlantic integration of the countries in the region. In this context, PfP also led to a range of confidence-building measures between the armies of the Republika Srpska and the Bosnian-Croat Federation.[12] Today, all the countries in the region are members either of NATO, such as Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia and Albania, or of the PfP, such as Montenegro, Serbia, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

With the end of the Kosovo conflict in 1999, the Balkans entered a new era regarding Euro-Atlantic integration. The establishment of the "Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe" (SPSEE) in 1999 and the "Stabilisation and Association Process" (SAP) in 2000 were turning points in the approach towards the Balkans that was adopted by the international community in general and by the EU in particular. With these projects, the West moved away from its traditional policy of containment and intervention. Although the process was not absolutely clear, European integration of the Balkans seemed to be the new aim of the EU. The admission of Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia to NATO in May 2004; the granting of full EU membership to Slovenia in 2004 and to Romania and Bulgaria in 2007; that Croatia and Albania joined NATO

in 2009; and that Croatia has finished membership negotiations and became a full EU member in 2013 are clear signs of Western commitment in the region.

The Stability Pact was formed in the wake of the policy failures of the 1990s and in response to the pressing need for stabilisation in the Balkans. It was also the product of the growing awareness of the interdependence of the region. This pact, which has been described as the "most complex political venture of the 20th century",[13] was founded by more than 40 countries and international organisations. The Stability Pact was an intergovernmental body providing a forum for cooperation with no independent financial resources or means of implementation. It was basically modelled on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) with three working groups matching the three dimensions of this body. Working group 1 was focused on democratisation and human rights; working group 2 dealt with economic reconstruction and trade development, investment and infrastructure construction; and working group 3 was devoted to security issues. The Stability Pact, in which the EU played an important role, demonstrated the long-term commitment of the international community to the Balkans.[14] The Stability Pact was replaced in 2008 by the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) as a new body to guide and monitor regional cooperation in the

Balkans.[15] The RCC was an important step towards the implementation of the principle of local ownership and is connected with the Southeast European Cooperation Process, SEECP.[16]

Aspirations towards closer European integration by the states of the Western Balkans had initially generated little support in the EU, which had envisaged a form of limited integration through cooperation and trade agreements and some form of association. However, the establishment of the Stability Pact has drastically changed the EU's approach to the Balkans and has held out the prospect of eventual EU membership. The EU contributed to the Stability Pact by developing the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP). After the democratic reforms in Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the EU launched the SAP at the 2000 Zagreb Summit.[17] This new and ambitious process was specifically designed for the Western Balkan countries and consisted of six elements: i) the development of economic and trade relations with and within the region; ii) the development and partial redirection of economic and financial assistance; iii) assistance for democratisation, civil society, institution building and education; iv) cooperation in justice and home affairs; v) the development of political dialogue (including at a regional level); and vi) the conclusion of new Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA). The

most important element was the last, since this would create the basis for realising the others and open the way for eventual EU membership.[18] The effective implementation of the SAA is a prerequisite for any further progress towards EU membership.

The conditionality of the SAP was designed to accord with the situation of Western Balkan countries. The regional countries were supposed to introduce a market economy, privatise state-owned property, re-establish economic cooperation, respect human rights, minority rights and democratic principles and cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). These conditions had already been formulated at the 1997 EU Council. However, additional criteria were added on an individual basis in accord with the stage or flexibility of the reform process. The SAP is based on the 1993 Copenhagen criteria and it is rather a process whereby the Western Balkan countries prepare themselves for EU entry and start their reforms.[19] In June 2003, the Thessaloniki Summit confirmed the SAP as the main EU policy framework for Western Balkan countries.[20]

In 2001 Macedonia became the first country of the former Yugoslavia to sign the SAA with the EU, and this agreement was gradually signed by all the countries in the region except Kosovo. As for Kosovo, the EU started pre-accession negotiations with this country through an SAP tracking mechanism in 2002. This was followed in 2006 by a European Partnership Policy.[21] However, this process stalled after the declaration of independence by Kosovo in 2008 because of internal divisions in the EU over the recognition of this country.[22] In 2010 the EU reiterated that Kosovo had a European perspective in line with that of the Western Balkans[23] even though the road map for Kosovo was not clarified.

Since early 1999 impressive progress has been achieved in stability and security in the Balkans. The collapse of authoritarian and nationalistic regimes, first in Zagreb and then in Belgrade, created a new regional environment in which the initiatives of the international actors met with less resistance than in the past or actually received cooperation and support from the local leaderships. Progress in reconciliation, democratisation and institutional reform is evident in several countries in the region. Nevertheless, despite these positive developments, the Macedonian crisis in 2001 and the violence in Kosovo in 2004 have shown quite clearly that stability and security in the Balkans are still fragile.

The ongoing disagreement between Serbia and Kosovo over the independence of Kosovo and the tension between the Serbs in the northern part of Kosovo and the central administration constitute some of the major problems in the region. Macedonia, which was

on the brink of a civil war in 2001, is still not free from some serious political problems, even though it now enjoys much greater stability. On the other hand, the integration of Macedonia with the EU and NATO has been blocked by Greece. Another Balkan country, Albania, seems to be much more stable than it was in 1997; however, it has weak democratic institutions and often faces domestic political crises. As for Bosnia-Herzegovina, although the development and aid policies of international organisations and external donors were designed to stimulate local growth capacity, the country still remains heavily dependent on foreign assistance. More importantly, coexistence between the different ethnic groups still remains problematic and requires the continued presence of an international military force.[24] The February 2014 protests have indicated that Bosnia-Herzegovina is still the most fragile country in the region.

Within the framework of its long-term strategy of ensuring the stability and integration of the Balkans, the EU has assumed growing responsibilities in conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict resolution in the region, and this trend is likely to continue in the coming years.[25] In 2001, EU mediation played an important role,

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alongside the US, in the signing of the Ohrid Agreement between the Albanian minority leaders and Macedonian officials. This agreement, which improved the rights of the Albanian minority in Macedonia, brought to an end the military conflict between the Albanian guerrillas and the Macedonian army, which might well have turned into a civil war. The implementation of the Ohrid Agreement is now one of the key aspects of the relationship between Skopje and Brussels. In 2002 the EU was also successful in brokering the Belgrade Agreement between Serbia and Montenegro, which wanted to break away from Yugoslavia. Although the establishment of the joint state of Serbia and Montenegro was not a final solution for its status, the mediation of the EU contributed to the avoidance of an armed conflict between the remaining two components of Yugoslavia.[26] This process established a basis for a peaceful separation of Montenegro from Serbia in 2006.

As in other parts of the Balkans, Bosnia-Herzegovina has also witnessed the increasing influence of the EU in the post-Dayton period. Between 2002 and 2011 the High Representative (HR) of Bosnia-Herzegovina was also the European Union Special Representative (EUSR).[27] In January 2003 an EU-led

police mission took over from the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF) and, although limited in size and avoiding any active engagement in executive policing, it helped build and monitor the local police force. The EU carried out its first military mission under the "European Security and Defence Policy" (ESDP) in Macedonia (CONCORDIA) following an agreement between the EU and NATO in March 2003, which allowed the EU to have access to NATO planning resources. This mission was a serious test for the EU's ESDP and it was followed towards the end of 2004 by the replacement of the NATO Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia by the EU Force (EUFOR).[28] Operation ALTHEA in Bosnia was a bigger military operation than the previous one in Macedonia and showed that the EU could merge its military capabilities with its diplomatic and economic instruments.[29] In 2008 the EU established the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), the largest civilian mission ever launched within the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The main target of the mission was to assist Kosovo authorities, particularly in the police, judiciary and customs sectors. The EU now plays an important role in the stability of Kosovo through EULEX, the EU Office and a double-hatted EUSR/Head of Office.

There is a general belief that instability in the Balkans may easily spill over into EU countries. The illegal trafficking of migrants, arms and drugs, and the links between the criminal gangs in the Balkans and those in Western Europe, as well as the possibility that international terrorists may use the region as a safe area for their operations in Western countries, seem to be the major concerns of the EU states. At the same time, a stabilised Balkans will offer more economic opportunities for EU countries, which are already economically quite active in the region. The EU has tried to establish links between the SAP and the diplomatic and crisis management initiatives of the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the local special representatives in the Balkans. The failure of EU stabilisation efforts in the Balkans would deal a serious blow to the EU's credibility, since it is in this region that the EU's security and defence policies are being tested.[30] In the words of Javier Solana, the former EU High Representative, EU foreign policy was initiated in the Balkans and the EU has invested too much to allow the countries in the region to slip away from the EU centre of gravity.[31] All of the above factors increase the importance of the Balkans to the EU, while for the Balkan countries growing EU influence means security, political stability and economic prosperity. Thus, the full integration of the Balkans within the EU seems to be the best option in the interests of the

Balkan countries as well as of the EU itself.

The EU was plunged into a serious crisis after the French and Dutch rejection of the European Constitution in 2005. The failure of referenda on the EU Constitution in two founding members of the EU has caused concern in the Balkan countries. "Enlargement fatigue" seems to be a factor involved in the outcome of the referenda in both of these countries. According to many commentators, there was a general feeling in Western Europe that in admitting 10 new members in 2004, eight of which were former communist states in Eastern or Central Europe, the EU had moved too far and too fast. Despite the fact that Croatia is now an official EU member, and Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia have been given candidate status, the mood in the EU has seemed to have become less accommodating to new applicants.[32]

Although most of the local leaders have tried to put a brave face on it and have insisted that the rejection of the European Constitution need not have a directly negative impact on their accession to the EU, the new situation has caused a slow-down in the enlargement process for all Balkan countries. Yet it has strengthened the hands of Euro-sceptics throughout the Balkan countries and slowed down reform. It is noteworthy that on the day after the French referendum the Bosnian Serb parliament rejected a police reform package regarded as one of the most important conditions in the negotiations of the SAA between the EU and Bosnia-Herzegovina.[33]

However, the Treaty of Lisbon, signed by EU leaders in 2007, improved the capabilities of the CFSP. In accordance with the Lisbon Treaty, a new High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy was to increase the influence of the EU.[34] A new European External Action Service (EEAS) was created (in 2011) by merging the Council and Commission foreign policy departments to provide a coherent and consistent support to the High Representative. As for the decision-making process, the Commission would no longer be able to make proposals in the area of the CFSP. The Lisbon Treaty also limited the CFSP instruments available to European decisions (on positions, actions and arrangements for implementation) while the principle of unanimity was confirmed for CFSP, preserving member states rights to cast a veto on specific policy proposals.[35] Despite these positive developments, the financial crisis in the euro-zone seems to have undermined the EU's renewed focus on the Balkans. Even though the formal commitment to Balkan integration remains and the enlargement machinery still rolls, there are strong disagreements between the Commission and the Council as well as among member states as to how to proceed with the integration process.[36]

> EU decision makers should be very careful regarding the definition and timing of the conditions, in which a balance should be struck between their aims and the political, socio-economic and cultural realities on the ground.

There is a widespread belief within the EU that European integration will not be completed without the full integration of the Western Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia). However, the conditions of the SAAs, which are designed particularly for the Western Balkans, are more severe than those demanded from the Central and East European countries. The signatories of the SAAs are not only required to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria but also to participate in regional cooperation. Yet the SAAs do not offer any guarantee for full membership, even though they may constitute an important step towards European integration. Some of the Western Balkan countries are being considered as "potential candidates" for EU membership, but this term has no official definition and does not confer on the holder a de jure right to EU membership. It seems that membership prospects will depend very much on the dynamics of EU enlargement.[37] Although the strategy of stabilisation and integration followed by the EU towards the Western Balkan countries has produced some promising results, it has also been confronted by some important dilemmas.

Towards Greater Security and Stability in the Western Balkans

The EU's strategy and policies towards the Western Balkan states are of great importance for the political stability, economic prosperity and security of the region. Political conditionality is one of the most controversial aspects of EU policy towards the Western Balkans. The advocates of tough conditionality and of more tactical conditionality have different arguments to justify their positions. In the 1990s political conditionality became an important tool for the EU to force a policy change and to ensure the compliance of the Central and East European countries with its values. Its importance increased in the 2000s when the EU was faced with more challenging and demanding questions in the Western Balkans, Turkey and in its neighbourhood. Despite the fact that without political conditionality many of the changes would not have been carried out or would have taken longer for their implementation there has been a reaction to it in most Western Balkan countries.[38] EU decision makers should be very careful regarding the definition

and timing of the conditions, in which a balance should be struck between their aims and the political, socio-economic and cultural realities on the ground. However, once the conditions are laid down, the EU should keep to its commitments and stand by them. A watering down of the EU's accession criteria would send a wrong signal to the region and set a precedent for a new resistance to the reform process.

The EU should restore the credibility of its approach to the Western Balkans and formulate its priorities with a united voice. The differing priorities of different European institutions are contributing to confusion over the requirements to be fulfilled. For example, in Bosnia-Herzegovina the Commission has always favoured an end to the Bonn powers (such as removing public officials from office or adopting binding decisions) while the Council has been more cautious and keener on retaining an international presence. Divisions also remain regarding the powers of the EU special representatives in the post-OHR (Office of the High Representative) era. These and similar

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internal divisions between the EU institutions and the member countries encourage the local politicians in the exploitation of EU division to their own advantage. The lack of benchmarks and clear guidelines creates ambivalence in the policy of the EU towards the region. The EU, for example, has failed to clarify the standards in the key areas in which Bosnia-Herzegovina needs reforms, especially as regards the police and the constitution.[39] Lack of clarity shows the EU's relative lack of interest in the specifics of a conflict and creates a space for local actors to manoeuvre, possibly legitimising initiatives that are in both spirit and practice far removed from fulfilling EU goals.[40]

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is de facto an international protectorate, conditionality is not working as "conventional conditionalities" as was the case of Central and Eastern European countries. After the Dayton Accords, the peace-building and state-building processes occurred simultaneously. Both of these processes were limited by the state structure that was shaped by the Dayton Accords. That both NATO and the

EU have interchangeably played roles of "peace builder" and "state builder" made the imposition of conditionality more complex. Emphasis was put on the state-building agenda rather than the acquis. However, NATO conditionality during the defence reform process was successful due to the use of local triggers and strong international leadership, while the absence of such leadership, as well as a lack of a conducive international and domestic atmosphere, would in the end cause the failure of the police reform driven by EU.[41] Despite conventional conditionality not at play during the defence reform process, and that the power of the OHR rather than a socialisation process of local elites played a decisive role, the success of NATO clearly shows the importance of international leadership.

The EU should be more creative and contribute more actively to the solution of regional problems instead of waiting for the local countries to solve their problems on the risky and uncertain road leading to the EU. EU policies should consider the regional realities and take into account country-specific problems. The weakness of the state institutions and the fragility of democratic practices are important factors which make the possibility of crisis in the region more likely.[42] In addition, the EU has difficulties in overcoming the deep interethnic divisions in countries such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Kosovo. Although EU officials have underlined the ethnic problems in the Western Balkans and pointed out the need to adjust the process of enlargement to the specific conditions of the region since the first SAP annual report, there is a gap between the EU's declared goals and its efforts on the ground. The EU should divert further resources towards the promotion of inter-ethnic consensus and devote more energy to strategic thinking on how to address these problems.[43] The EU should have realistic aims and try to reduce the risks of conflict rather than eliminate them.[44]

> The future European and democratisation prospects of Western Balkan countries depend on the development of the middle classes that have slowly been re-emerging in the region in the post-2000 period

While Bosnia-Herzegovina signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU in 2008 it has lagged behind its neighbours. Ongoing ethnic tensions in Bosnia-Herzegovina have prevented that country from carrying out the necessary reforms for Euro-Atlantic integration. That Bosnia-Herzegovina is composed of two different entities and that the legislation process can easily be blocked by an ethnic veto makes

the situation more complicated. The EU should revise its strategy towards Bosnia-Herzegovina and a post-conflict paradigm should play a more dominant role. The EU should not only focus on the outstanding political questions but also on the target factors influencing the likelihood of conflict.[45]

In 1995/96 there were 54,000 peacekeeping troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The number of ALTHEA troops was 6,300 in 2004, but in 2007 the number fell to around 1,600. The force now numbers some 600, and a single manoeuvre battalion of the EUFOR remains in Sarajevo. The tendency among EU members to reduce the number of EUFOR troops and the possibility of turning ALTHEA into a training and monitoring mission is raising questions about ALTHEA's ability to preserve a safe and secure environment in Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to the results of empirical researches the expenditure on international peacekeepers strongly reduces the risk of violence in the post-conflict situation. Given that Bosnia-Herzegovina is still a fragile post-conflict country, the presence of international combat forces is of great importance for its security. The EU should therefore show more determination in its commitment to Bosnia-Herzegovinian security and should not weaken the presence and mission of the EUFOR.[46]

Another crucial factor for the security of the Western Balkans in general

and Bosnia-Herzegovina in particular is cooperation between the EU and NATO. In 2003 the "Berlin Plus" Agreement was signed between the two organisations, guaranteeing access to NATO capabilities for the EU.[47] The main reason for the agreement seems to have been the problems in the handover of the Macedonia stabilisation mission from NATO to the EU. It was the first time that the EU had assumed responsibility for a military operation and it faced some difficulties. Yet this deal between NATO and the EU can also be seen as an attempt to establish ground rules for Macedonia and for other theatres in the region. The EU-led operations in Macedonia and later in Bosnia-Herzegovina were heavily dependent on NATO military resources. The EU forces in the Balkans now operate under arrangements which are known in NATO-speak as Berlin Plus.[48]

It is important to note that NATO, even after the formal handover to EU-led forces, has retained its military headquarters in both Macedonia[49] and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Though the NATO headquarters in Sarajevo and Skopje are small they have symbolic significance. The continued presence of NATO shows the challenges in implementing the July 2003 EU-NATO agreement on the Balkans. Generally these headquarters are working with the governments to secure defence sector reforms. But in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in

addition to that work, a NATO force has been given the task to apprehend indicted war criminals and to thwart the attempts of the militant Islamists to establish a foothold in that state. Also, the continued presence of NATO and US troops is of great importance in providing a degree of reassurance to the local population that EU forces by themselves cannot provide. This has been more the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where for many Bosnians of all ethnic backgrounds the record of the 1990s war proves that the EU on its own is unable to deal efficiently with a serious breach of security.[50] All the developments since the early 1990s in the Balkans have shown very clearly that it is very important that EU and NATO develop means and methods of cooperation to prevent any duplication or rivalry and to guarantee the overall security in the Balkans.[51]

The future European and democratisation prospects of Western Balkan countries depend on the development of the middle classes that have slowly been re-emerging in the region in the post-2000 period.[52] There is a direct correlation between poverty and security. Poor people are affected by different kinds of violence, such as ethnic-regional conflict, human and drug trafficking, terrorism, etc. There is a growing literature that points to the relationship between economic growth and security.[53] Research shows that levels of per capita income and the rate of economic growth are important factors

in reducing the risk of conflict.[54] That an estimated 30% of the Balkan population lives on $5 a day and that it is slightly worse than the highly vulnerable portion of the lower middle-class stratum[55] shows the fragile structure of the local economies. The high unemployment rates in Western Balkan countries are another factor undermining security in the region. In Kosovo, unemployment is very high, holding at 35.1% despite a new registration system that was launched in 2012, which officially reduced the number of the registered unemployed by 22%. This sharp reduction was the result of the new registration system rather than any improvement in the labour market. Moreover, the number of unemployed Kosovars with university education is rising, and there are few job opportunities for young Kosovars. There are thus significant weaknesses in the labour market of Kosovo.[56] Unemployment in Macedonia is also very high, at 28.8%, and youth unemployment was 51.7%, in 2013. As in Kosovo, there are deep-rooted structural impediments in the labour market of the country.[57]

Bosnia-Herzegovina is another country which has a high unemployment rate, with the officially registered unemployment rate reaching 43.8% in June 2012. The drastic difference between the registered and survey-based labour figures shows the existence of a large informal labour market and certain structural rigidities.[58] Unemployment is particularly high

among the young population (15-24), where it has reached 63.1%.[59] Although there is a certain amount of stability in the macroeconomic and financial sectors in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there are serious problems at the microeconomic level. The 5+2 objectives/conditions put forward by the international community to close down the Office of the High Representative refers only to fiscal sustainability.[60]

> One of the most important consequences of the protests in Bosnia-Herzegovina is the fact that the economic problems have the potential to easily transform into ethnic conflicts.

Despite the impressive economic developments in the second half of the first decade of the 21st century, poverty rates have remained high and constitute an important impediment to the socio-political stability in the Western Balkans. Moreover, the pattern of poverty in the Western Balkans includes quite a large segment of the local population living in extreme poverty (in 2005, 12% in Kosovo and 4.7% in Albania). Extreme poverty is particularly apparent in the Roma communities living in different countries in the region.[61] According to research conducted by the United Nations Development Program in Croatia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Bosnia in 2009 (near the start of the global and regional economic crisis), considerable tension between rich and poor was seen as a major problem. Bosnia had the largest number of respondents (88%) who saw rich-poor tensions as a problem. This even exceeded the percentage indicating the existence of the ethnic cleavage (79%). The second highest figure was in Macedonia where 57% of those surveyed indicated tensions between rich and poor groups. The combination of perceived intergroup tensions of both a socioeconomic and ethnic character differentiated Bosnia from other countries in which the research was conducted.[62]

The mass protests in Bosnia-Herzegovina in February 2014 have indicated the strong correlation in the Western Balkans between peace and stability and local economic conditions. These protests were triggered by the collapse of state-run companies which left hundreds of people unemployed in Tuzla. They spread rapidly to the more than 30 towns, including the major cities of the Bosniak-Croat Federation, and escalated when the party and government buildings in Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zenica and Mostar were attacked, with some set on fire. Clashes with police resulted in hundreds of injuries, and the leaders of the Una-Sana, Zenica-Doboj, Tuzla and Sarajevo cantons resigned.[63] The demonstrations reached a critical

dimension when some protesters crossed to the Croatian side at Mostar and attacked some government and party buildings.[64] The abolishment of the cantons and of the Republika Srpska were also among the demonstrators' demands.[65] The possibility that the demonstrations could turn into an ethnic conflict drew the attention of the international community to Bosnia.

> That the UN-sponsored negotiations between Greece and Macedonia that have been continuing for years have brought about no result shows the necessity for the EU to take a greater initiative in this issue.

The fact that the demonstrations were held in Bosniak-inhibited areas and that the overwhelming majority of the demonstrators were Bosniaks has led to some discussions about the dynamics of the protests. Some Serbian and Croatian politicians insisted on the term "Bosniak Spring" instead of "Bosnian Spring", while there were other comments which called it the "Bosniak antibureaucratic revolution".[66] The politicians who considered the protests a Bosniak ethnic movement stressed that it was now time to create a Croatian entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina. On the other hand, Milorad Dodik, the Serbian leader of the Republika Srpska, reiterated support for the Croatian demands of a third entity and argued that Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state has no chance to survive.[67] Moreover, he threatened a referendum on outright independence for the Republika Srpska if a deal on Bosnia as a confederation of three units were not possible.[68] The demonstrators had no homogenous structure and were composed of different groups. However, their demands and complaints, put forward during protests and in public plenums established in different cities, were similar, and basically economic and social.[69] Unemployment, difficult living conditions, dysfunctional local administrations and deep distrust of politicians constituted the main concerns of the protesters.[70] Reviewing corrupt privatisations of local companies, lowering salaries for official, and scrapping benefits and other payments to politicians were some of the concrete demands of the protesters.[71]

One of the most important consequences of the protests in Bosnia-Herzegovina is the fact that the economic problems have the potential to easily transform into ethnic conflicts. The existence of two different political entities and the cantonal structure of the Bosniak-Croat Federation make the decision-making process very complex and delicate. The inability of the Bosnian administration to produce consensus on

the main political and economic issues is outraging the Bosniaks who are suffering under tough economic conditions, while the centralisation efforts face particularly strong resistance from the Bosnian Serbs. Moreover, the majority of Bosnian Croats would like to create their own entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina.[72]

The EU should increase its commitment to Bosnia-Herzegovina under a revised strategy. The improvement of the Bosnia-Herzegovina economy should be included among its priorities. Another important aim of the EU should be the fight against corruption. Breaking the link between crime and politics would contribute to the long-term stability of Bosnia-Herzegovina.[73] Even though these aims are already on the EU's agenda, the EU's efforts are not sufficient to achieve them. One should not forget the fact that the most important problem in relations between the EU and the Balkan countries seems to be not so much the lack of ideas as the absence of the political will to put them into practice.[74] To promote the economic development in the region, the EU needs more resources than those offered by the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA II). The European Investment Bank, the European Commission, the Council of Europe Development Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development should increase their commitment to the "Western Balkans Investment

Framework".[75] The EU should pay special attention to the economic cooperation of the regional countries within the framework of the "SEE 2020 Strategy", which was sponsored by the Regional Cooperation Council. The realisation of this project, which aims to stimulate high and sustainable economic growth through greater competitiveness and create one million jobs in the region in the current decade,[76] should be carefully monitored by the EU. And, the EU, in cooperation with international financial organisations such as the World Bank and IMF, should explore further means to encourage economic growth and strengthen competitiveness in the region. The economic development and the reduction of corruption in the Western Balkans will make important contributions to the stability in the whole region including Bosnia-Herzegovina. The citizen plenums established by Bosnian demonstrators in several cities of Bosnia provide important information about the economic, social, and political concerns of Bosnian citizens. The complaints of common Bosnian citizens should be taken into consideration by EU officials. Even though the demonstrators were mainly Bosniaks, their economic problems are also representative of those of Croats and Serbs living in the region. It is important to note that some rallies were also held in Zagreb and Belgrade in support of the protests in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The EU's early reaction to the Bosnian protests underlines the need for socio-economic measures in the short term. While the EU again urged local political leadership to carry out the necessary reforms to improve governance, there is no indication that the EU will assume a major responsibility on this issue.[77] The EU should increase its pressure on local politicians to create a functional state structure. As Paddy Ashdown, the former high representative of Bosnia-Herzegovina, stated, the country should have some internal integrity before it can join the EU.[78] In other words, the new EU strategy towards Bosnia-Herzegovina should be a comprehensive one since the success of economic, social and other reforms are dependent on the functionality of the Bosnian state. The Council of Europe's Venice Commission concluded in 2005 that constitutional reform was indispensable in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The European Court of Human Rights ruled in 2009 that the Bosnian constitution was violating the European Convention on Human Rights, since it required that the three-member Presidency and the parliamentary House of Peoples be equally divided among Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats through restricting others' access. However, the reforms that have been attempted by western countries since 2006, which have focused mainly on state-building rather than human rights, have yet to bring about any concrete results.[79] The

EU, along with the US, should take the necessary lessons from these failed attempts, such as the "April Package", "Butmir Process," and "High Level Dialogue", and explore some new ways to carry out the necessary reforms to make the Bosnian state functional.

> Macedonia's membership in the EU and NATO is of great importance not only for the domestic political stability of this country but also for the peace and stability of the whole region.

Relations between Serbia and Croatia and their policies towards Bosnia-Herzegovina are of great importance for the stability of the Western Balkans. The EU has made an important contribution to the "conflict-transformation" in the two countries and it seems that there is no longer any risk of war between Croatia and Serbia.[80] For both countries, the preservation of good relations with EU is more important now than the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina.[81] Croatia has pursued a "no-problems" foreign policy during its EU accession talks and has paid special attention to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Croatia backed Bosnia's NATO and EU bids and cooperated with EU and US diplomats in putting an end to the political crisis there. Croatia has also

supported Bosnian territorial integrity and promoted the integration of the Bosnian Croats.[82] The fact that Croatia has become a full EU member is not only an important contribution to the peace and stability in this country, but also in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Western Balkans more generally.

As for Serbia, which is a key player in the region, the EU's conditional diplomacy played a vital role during the creation and dissolution of the Union of Serbia and Montenegro between 2002 and 2006, even before the country's official EU candidacy. The union of Serbia and Montenegro, which was created by the 2002 Belgrade Agreement and mediated by Javier Solana, the then High Representative for the CFSP, was a temporary solution. During the transitional period relations between the two countries were shaped by the prospect of closer integration with the EU. The referendum on Montenegrin independence, which ended this union, was made in 2006 under the supervision of the EU and resulted in a non-violent separation of the two countries.[83] The Belgrade Agreement can be considered an instance of conflict prevention rather than of conflict settlement and resolution.[84] Another important example which shows the capacity of the EU to contribute to the peace and stability of the region is the fact that the socialisation effect created by the presence of the EU in Serbia influenced the Serbian

government`s decision not to militarily respond to Kosovo`s declaration of independence.[85]

On 2 March 2012, the EU granted candidacy status to Serbia[86] and accession negotiations between the EU and Serbia started in January 2014. These developments are of great importance not only in the promotion of democracy and stability in Serbia but also for peace in the Western Balkans. The cooperation with the ICTY has been the most important factor in shaping relations between Serbia and the EU since 2000.[87] Serbia had already signed a SAA with the EU in 2008 but it was suspended due to lack of cooperation with the ICTY. However, the prospect of EU integration has encouraged Serbian leaders to cooperate with the ICTY and the political atmosphere has also started to change. The Serbian parliament's apology in March 2010 for the massacre of more than 8,000 Bosniaks in Srebrenica was an important step towards peace in the region, even though the Serbian parliament avoided the use of the term "genocide". The insistence of some EU countries on cooperation with the ICTY as a precondition for any progress on its EU integration finally resulted in the handover of Ratko Mladic to the ICTY on 31 May 2011. The trial of the person most responsible for the Srebrenica genocide was a giant step forwards towards peace and stability in the Balkans.

> The examination of the EU's absorption capacity shows that the full membership of three Western Balkan states would not create a serious absorption burden for the EU.

However, despite these positive developments, the EU has been unable to exert significant influence on Serbian policy towards Bosnia-Herzegovina. Serbia's complex agenda has forced the EU to devote enormous energy and resources into keeping Serbia on track while supporting the independence of Kosovo to the detriment of some other priorities in the Western Balkans, such as those regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina.[88] However, Serbia's closer integration with the EU in the future may offer some important opportunities for cooperation over Bosnia-Herzegovina between the EU, Croatia, and Serbia. This cooperation could play a key role in the political future of this country. Serbia has the capacity to pave the way to European integration for Bosnia-Herzegovina by encouraging pro-EU policies in the Republika Srpska. Moreover, Serbia, which is following a policy of neutrality, will also play a decisive role in NATO membership for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

From a constructivist point of view, it is possible to argue that the convergence of European and Serbian identities will take more time than was the case for Croatia. In contrast to Croatia, where the European identity was strong even before EU membership, the European idea in Serbia is not universally shared, and alternative identity narratives built around the myths of Kosovo and cultural affinity with Russia are challenging it. Yet the perception of the previous relationship with Europe as negative is another important factor weakening the European identity in Serbia.[89] Moreover, in the March 2014 Serbian elections, Aleksander Vucic and his nationalist Serbian Progressive Party (SND) gained a clear victory. However, even though during the Yugoslav wars Aleksander Vucic supported the idea of "greater Serbia", he has followed a pro-European policy since 2008. The important deal between Kosovo and Serbia in 2013, sponsored by the EU, could not have been done without his permission. Finally, even though he is a Russophile, Vucic has kept silent on the comparison between Crimea and Kosovo made by Putin[90] while Milorad Dodik, the leader of the Republika Srpska, has argued that the decision to join Crimea with Russia was legal.[91]

Kosovo's declaration of independence in February 2008 has strained the relations between Kosovo and Serbia. More than four years after independence, following the decision of the International Steering Group that Kosovo had substantially implemented the terms of the Comprehensive

Settlement Proposal (CSP), Kosovo declared the end of the supervision of its independence and the mandate of the International Civilian Office in September 2012.[92] In this new process, the EU will assume more responsibility for the full implementation of the CSP, the promotion of a multi-ethnic Kosovo and complete decentralisation and the implementation of the Kosovo-Serbia agreements.[93] Despite the strong EU presence in Kosovo, the fact that five EU members have not yet recognised its independence prevents Kosovo from having a clear European perspective. However, there is no legal obstacle to the signing of an SAA with Kosovo.[94] Kosovo is now participating in the Stabilisation and Association Process and it has engaged in the Stabilisation and Association Process Dialogue (SAPD).[95] This process will not only strengthen the European perspective of this country but also create conditions for the Serbian minority to be able to feel that they are an integral part of Kosovo's future.[96]

The EU-sponsored dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia has played an important role in the reduction of tension in the region. It has produced a landmark deal, the "First Agreement on Principles Governing the Normalisation of the Relations", on 19 April 2013, which was complemented one month later with an implementation plan. The establishment of the association of Serbian municipalities, the integration

of all police in northern Kosovo into the Kosovo police force, the integration of all judicial authorities within the legal framework of Kosovo, and the 2013 municipal elections in northern Kosovo were the most important parts of this deal. Both parties have also promised not to block the other side's progress in their respective integration processes with the EU. The implementation of the other agreements reached between the two countries during the dialogue process, such as the ones concerning the regional representation of Kosovo, integrated border management (IBM), free movement of persons, the recognition of university diplomas, customs stamps, civil registries and cadastral records, are continuing despite some problems.[97] The most important challenge for Kosovo is now the integration of the Serbs in the north and with Serbia as a key country in the relationship between the Kosovar Serbs and the Kosovo government. The fact that Serbia took all these steps, despite protests from the Kosovar Serbs, also shows the importance of the growing EU-Serbian relationship for peace and stability in the region. In this context, it is important to note that the developments in Kosovo and in relations between Serbia and Kosovo are being followed closely by Serbs in the Republika Srpska. An independent Kosovo still has the potential to serve as a precedent for the Bosnian Serbs to declare independence of Republika Srpska. This likelihood seems

to remain at least theoretically on the agenda of the Bosnian Serb leaders until the recognition of the independence of Kosovo by Serbia.

> Turkey's full membership in the EU will also increase the credibility of the EU in the eyes of Balkan Muslim communities who consider Turkey their natural ally or protector, making EU a more powerful political actor in the region.

Another post-communist country in the region with deep ethnic problems is Macedonia. The Republic of Macedonia declared its independence in 1991 and, due to its peaceful political transformation in the 1990s, was considered a success story among the former Yugoslav republics. However, Macedonia found itself on the verge of civil war in 2001 and only avoided it as a result of mediation by NATO and the EU. The Ohrid Agreement signed between the leaders of the Macedonian majority and the Albanian minority in 2001 initiated a new period in the political life of Macedonia. As a result, the implementation of this agreement became an important factor in the relations between Macedonia and the EU.[98] Macedonia was granted the status of candidate country by the European Council in December 2005, but the dispute over the name between Macedonia and Greece, which rejects the use of "The Republic of Macedonia" as its name, remains the main obstacle blocking the Euro-Atlantic integration of Macedonia.

Although the European Commission has made several recommendations to the Council to open negotiations with Macedonia since 2009, the Council has not decided on the Commission's proposals.[99] In 2008, Greece also prevented Macedonia from obtaining NATO membership. Macedonia brought this issue to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and in December 2011, the ICJ concluded that Greece had violated the Interim Accord between the two states. However, no pressure was put on Greece by either NATO or the EU in the aftermath of the ICJ judgement.[100] That the UN-sponsored negotiations between Greece and Macedonia that have been continuing for years have brought about no result shows the necessity for the EU to take a greater initiative in this issue. Macedonia's membership in the EU and NATO is of great importance not only for the domestic political stability of this country but also for the peace and stability of the whole region.

The integration of the Western Balkan states with the EU seems to be the best option for the interests of both sides. The concepts such as "enlargement fatigue", "absorption capacity" or "local

ownership" should not prevent the EU from strengthening its commitment to the Western Balkan states by developing more concrete and attractive membership prospects. Although the Western Balkan states were given assurance in 2003 that they might join the EU once they satisfied the conditions, they have still been offered no timetable[101] and the road to full membership is still full of uncertainties. The only exception is Croatia, which became a full member of the EU in 2013. The examination of the EU's absorption capacity shows that the full membership of three Western Balkan states would not create a serious absorption burden for the EU. Despite their important problems, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia are politically and economically close to the objective benchmarks of the EU. Moreover, these three states reached similar economic and political levels in comparison to Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia in the years of their accession, while having smaller population burdens than Bulgaria and Romania.[102]

Finally, Turkey's eventual full membership in the EU as a large Muslim country will strengthen political stability and security in the Balkans. Even though the possible effects of Turkey's EU integration at the international level have been comprehensively discussed in the literature, there is relatively less research on its possible effects on the Balkans. Turkey has a tradition of strong cultural

and historical relations with the Muslim communities in the Balkans that can be traced back to the Ottoman period. Turkey's full membership in the EU will also increase the credibility of the EU in the eyes of Balkan Muslim communities who consider Turkey their natural ally or protector, making EU a more powerful political actor in the region. During the Bosnian War, Turkey stressed the need for the use of force to end the Bosnian War in diplomatic forums, yet avoided any unilateral action that could have provoked the proliferation of the conflict throughout the region. Turkey supported EU action in the Balkans and sent peacekeeping troops to the region. Turkish troops sent to the Balkans were welcomed by the local community and have proved successful in their missions. Moreover, the increasingly close ties between Turkey and Serbia in recent years have resulted in the establishment of the tripartite mechanism between Turkey, Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, which has created a new forum for the discussion of regional problems. Despite Serbia's later withdrawal, the tripartite mechanism has shown the ability of both key countries in the region to cooperate in a pragmatic way.

Turkey's integration in the EU will contribute to regional cooperation in the Western Balkans and strengthen the integration of the Muslim and Turkish minorities with the political and social systems of their own countries. It is also

important to note that the integration of Turkey and the Western Balkans with Europe are not rival processes, as asserted by some EU officials, but complementary ones. As a Muslim Balkan country, Turkey's integration with the EU can play a key role in European integration and in the security of the Western Balkans. Within the framework of the EU, Turkey, along with the other Muslim communities in the region, will symbolise the harmony between different civilisations and cultures and help to reduce ethnic and religious tensions.

Conclusion

The Bosnian protests in February 2014 have shown the fragility of peace and stability in Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as in the Western Balkans. These protests have again confirmed that the Dayton Constitution is not able to meet the needs of the Bosnian state almost 20 years after the end of the Bosnian war. The main goal of the Dayton Accords was to put an end to the Bosnian War, and this was done at the expense of the rational functionality of the Bosnian state. The state structure, which is based on two different entities and ten cantons, each with its own government and ministers, has created a very complex bureaucracy. However, the lack of consensus among ethnic groups in Bosnia, as well as in the international community, has prevented changes in the Dayton Constitution thus far.

The international community should increase its commitment to Bosnia-Herzegovina to make the Bosnian state functional. Previous failures to introduce necessary reforms do not justify the argument that the international community should stop meddling into Bosnian affairs. The international community has created in Bosnia-Herzegovina a "de facto protectorate" which cannot function without external help. The international community-which created the Dayton regime-now has the responsibility to make the Bosnian state functional. The relative success of Dayton up to 2006 clearly shows the importance of international leadership. The reduced international commitment to Bosnia-Herzegovina since 2006 is one of the important factors behind the deterioration of political conditions in the country.

The initial reactions from EU officials to events in Bosnia emphasise socio-economic measures rather than constitutional reforms. Even though the EU again urged local political leadership to carry out the necessary reforms, there is no clear signal that the EU will play a decisive role in this process. The new EU strategy should focus more on the improvement of the Bosnian economy and the fight against corruption. The EU's policy towards Bosnia-Herzegovina should not ignore the local actors and should take local state of affairs into consideration. However, the EU should

also assume more responsibility to carry out the constitutional reforms and should not leave the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina at the mercy of local politicians.

Finally, the recent events in Bosnia-Herzegovina have illustrated once again the inefficiency of the EU policy towards the Western Balkans and that the EU must develop and follow a more decisive enlargement policy supported by innovative economic initiatives towards the whole region. This comprehensive policy should also include Turkey's EU membership. As a large Muslim Balkan country, Turkey's integration with the EU can make an important contribution to lasting peace and stability in the region.

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Unveiling the Unknown Face: The Role of the United Nations in Promoting Democracy

Bekim SEJDIU* and Murat ÖNSOY**

Abstract

The general tendency in academic writing about the UN is to highlight its contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security, as well as its role in boosting economic, social and other forms of cooperation among states. One aspect that has been left rather in the shadow is the UN's role in democracy promotion. This article explores the UN's engagement in promoting democracy around the world through theoretical, legal, historical and conceptual lenses. The major question it addresses is whether the UN is engaged in promoting democracy, and, if yes, how this role has manifested itself on normative and institutional grounds. This article identifies fundamental ways in which the UN contributes to the globalisation of the norm of democracy. The major argument underlined by the article is that the UN has a long history of involvement in democracy promotion, although it has done so more spontaneously than in pursuit of a clear objective and strategy.

Key Words

Democracy promotion, United Nations, post-Cold War era, transitional democracy, electoral assistance, democratic institutions, peace-building, norm-making, Arab Spring.

Introduction

Democracy is not one of the first terms that would come to mind when we think of the United Nations (UN). Yet the UN has a long history of commitment to democracy promotion around the world. This aspect of UN activity remains largely understudied by both international relations scholars and those from other disciplines. As a result, the debates on the UN and democracy have been varied and do not comprise a comprehensive academic analysis. In essence, these debates usually pertain to the democratic credentials of the UN itself, particularly that of the Security Council. However, although the UN might look "undemocratic" from outside, it has consistently performed the function of a "silent" supporter of democracy.

This article explores the UN's engagement in promoting democracy

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around the world through theoretical, legal, historical and conceptual lenses. The major question it addresses is whether the UN is engaged in promoting democracy, and, if so, how this role has been justified on normative and institutional grounds. This paper argues that since its creation, the UN has been involved in promoting democracy, but that it has done so instinctively, and not in the pursuit of any clear objective and strategy.

> The major question is whether the UN is engaged in promoting democracy, and, if so, how this role has been justified on normative and institutional grounds.

To lay the foundation for this argument, this paper's first section provides a brief overview of the contextual debate related to the UN's involvement in promoting democracy, with particular focus on its legal dimension. This section contends that, with the disappearance of intense Cold War rivalries, the UN has greatly expanded its engagement in democracy promotion. In the second section we examine the normative context, exploring the current legal status of the UN in democracy promotion. We argue that the pattern of UN involvement in such processes cannot be understood without understanding the normative context in which it occurs. The third part

investigates the UN's involvement in democracy promotion using a historical perspective, emphasising that the roots of this endeavour can be traced back to the decolonisation era. The fourth and fifth parts of the study analyse the UN's methods used in promoting democracy, focusing on two processes of consent: that of the target state and the collective consent of UN member states. The final section analyses the UN's administrative capacity to support democracy in light of more recent events, including the Arab Spring.

A Brief Summary of the Conceptual Debate

The idea that the norm of democracy needs to be externalised across political and socio-cultural frontiers had drawn the attention of scholars and policy-makers before the UN was created. Yet it should be highlighted that the literature related directly to the UN and democracy promotion is scarce. The supporters of the UN as promoter of democracy have advanced three general arguments. First, democracy and human rights are deeply interrelated and therefore reinforce each other. Second, democracy helps to avoid the "scourges of war." Third, democracy stimulates economic and social development.[1]

The positive interaction of democracy with peace, human rights and socio-

economic development has been solidly established. This has permeated the UN vision since the end of the Cold War. Thus, in the "Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action" it was underlined that democracy, development and human rights and fundamental freedoms are interdependent and mutually reinforcing.[2] Sixteen years later, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon underlined in his "Guidance Note of the Secretary-General on Democracy" that "democracy based on the rule of law is ultimately a means to achieve international peace and security, economic and social progress and development, and respect for human rights-the three pillars of the United Nations mission as set forth in the Charter of the UN".[3]

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If democracy leads to peace, and if it reinforces human rights and stimulates development, we may think of it as the "magic ingredient" that fulfils the major promises of the UN, namely peace, human rights and socio-economic development. Yet, the reality is more complicated. Napoleon reportedly once said that simplification is an enemy of precision, and it is oversimplification to claim that democracy alone is a panacea for most important world diseases, namely war, underdevelopment and the violation of human rights. Democracy is born and takes its shape from the intersection of socio-cultural, political, economic and other factors. How democracy interacts with the issues of peace and war, and whether or not and to what degree it creates a supportive environment for human rights and development, depends on the interplay of more than one factor.

In practice, the relationship of democracy with human rights is much stronger than with the development. Authoritarian regimes are inimical to human rights, and therefore some of the most fundamental human rights and freedoms guaranteed by international conventions can be protected only within a democratic context. This includes, for example, the right to freedom of thought, freedom of expression, freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association with others, as well as the right to form and to join trade unions along with others. These rights are enshrined in some of the most fundamental human rights instruments, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights.

While the relationship between democracy and human rights is not subject to heated debates, the same cannot be said for that to war and peace. Quite the contrary, democracy's relationship to war and peace is today one of the most debatable issues in the field of political science and international relations. Immanuel Kant, the renowned German philosopher, dreamed about attaining eternal peace among states, about two centuries before the UN was created. In his essay, "The Perpetual Peace" Kant suggested that states with the republican form of civil constitution are capable of forging a pacific union with each other. And Kant's republic was a prologue of today's democracy, for it embraces the principles of freedom and equality, representative governments and the separation of powers.[4]

> Authoritarian regimes are inimical to human rights, and therefore some of the most fundamental human rights and freedoms guaranteed by international conventions can be protected only within a democratic context.

Kant's democratic peace theory is the most emblematic product of the liberal paradigm of international relations discipline. The liberal claim that republics are not only the best form of governance but also a powerful source of peace, marked a sharp challenge to the propositions advocated by philosophers such as Thucydides and Machiavelli, for whom the republics were indeed zealous war-makers inclined towards imperialistic ambitions.[5]

Attempts to introduce the idea that democracy produces peace in the practical realm of international politics were first initiated by the eminent American President Woodrow Wilson. He believed that wars between states could be avoided through forging a new international order based on the principles of international law, public diplomacy, free trade and the self-determination of peoples. Some of these ideas were laid down in his famous "Fourteen Points" regarding the post-war order in Europe. Bruce Russet observes that Wilson wrote his Fourteen Points ''almost as though Kant were guiding his writing hand''.[6] Wilson argued that "a steadfast concert of peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic states".[7] This "Wilsonian impulse" was not, however, present in the San Francisco Conference, nor could it be felt throughout the Cold War.

With the end of the Cold War, the UN assumed the role of supporting democracy through promoting not only peace but also human rights and socio-economic development, which today are seen as inextricably linked. For the UN, human

rights have emerged from a peripheral importance in the international arena to a position of primacy. Similarly, socio-economic development, a marginal issue when compared to security concerns during the Cold War, has become a key issue for the UN. Both of these are now widely addressed in UN documents as well as in declarations of the secretary-generals. The UN recognises that policies linking economic and social development can contribute to reducing inequalities among countries, as well as assist in promoting democracy. Moreover, many UN agencies recognise that democracy and development are mutually reinforcing, while development deficits can conversely undermine democratic practices. Aiming to support and promote the essential and mutually beneficial aspects of both processes, the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Right to Development[8] in 1986. The declaration presents underdevelopment as a violation of human rights and present as a serious obstacle to the development of democracy.

Perhaps the clearest example of a UN agency working under the causal belief that a link between democracy and development exists is the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The UNDP's annual *Human Development Report* portrays very clearly the link between democracy and development. The UN also has a central role in promoting international cooperation for development in the context of economic interdependence. These two subjects have been included on the agenda of the Economic and Finance (Second) Committee of the General Assembly since 1999. Today, the UN extensively promotes human rights and socio-economic development as a result of paradigms newly developed in the post-Cold War era that integrate socio-economic development, respect for human rights and adherence to democratic forms of government.

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The historically oriented discussion above provides the background regarding the gradual emergence of the UN as a democracy promoter. With this established, the following section address the legal dimensions of the UN's role in democracy promotion.

Reviewing the Normative Context

International law suffers from the lack of a legislative body entitled to legislate

binding legal norms, a world government to execute them or a court empowered to sanction violations. The legal scope of the UN mandate, therefore, is set by the vague language of international treaties and the political will of its member states, particularly the permanent five members of the Security Council. Ironically, these flexible legal confines within which the UN operates have proved to be an advantage rather than a hurdle, for they have made it possible for the UN to find manoeuvring space in a political milieu heavily underpinned by rigid national interests and the principle of state sovereignty. It was this resilient legal backdrop that enabled the UN to invent "chapter six-and-a half" as the procedural venue for launching peace-keeping operations during the Cold War.

> From a legal standpoint, the UN's engagement in supporting democracy is uncontroversial if this is carried out with the explicit consent of the targeted state, or if democracy promotion is part of the peace-building mandates approved by the Security Council or the General Assembly.

As to the spreading of democracy, a general overview of the legal context underlines the fact that the UN does not need to be very inventive to find legal justification for such an enterprise. Some of the key legal instruments of the UN, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (1960), leave no doubt that democracy is among the global aspirations that the UN must pursue. A non-*adlitteram* interpretation of the UN Charter would hint at the same conclusion: that democracy was a universal ambition. Although the UN is a club of nation-states, the Charter opens with the slogan "we the people." This has been noted by many observers, including a former secretary-general, Boutros Boutros-Ghali. In *An Agenda for Democratization*, Boutros-Ghali argues that

> The word "democracy" does not appear in the Charter. However, with the opening words of that document, "We the Peoples of the United Nations," the founders invoke the most fundamental principle of democracy, rooting the sovereign authority of the Member States, and thus the legitimacy of the organization which they were to compose, in the will of their peoples.[9]

Unlike the Charter, whose support for democracy promotion should be deduced from its spirit, other key instruments of the UN mentioned above give an explicit approval for this. Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is emblematic. It stipulates that

"the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures." The Declaration is not a legally binding document, yet it has served as inspiration and a beacon for the establishment of an international human rights regime under the auspices of the UN. As such, in terms of its moral influence, it comes immediately after the Charter. The formula that "the will of the people constitutes the basis of the government" has been the crux of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

The increasing inclusion of democracy in various documents adopted by the UN and regional organisations has not been followed by any genuine debate in academia about the current legal status of the norm of democracy. In an article written in 1992, Thomas Franck observed that an individual right to democracy is emerging in the global stage. This "emerging right" has manifested itself in the most apparent way in Haiti in 1994, Sierra Leone in 1998 and the Ivory Coast in 2011.[10] In all cases, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII, authorised the use of military force to bring elected regimes to power. In all these cases enforcement actions to defend democracy have been

undertaken in reaction to severe political or humanitarian crisis. On the other hand, the reference in Chapter VII shows that these actions have been justified on the legal rights of the UN to undertake enforcement actions in face of the threats to international peace.

> The widespread belief that democracy should emerge entirely from within and hence the outside factors are irrelevant is too simplistic.

In essence, the cardinal legal question is not whether the UN is mandated to work for promoting and strengthening democracy around the world. The legal contradictions may arise when it comes to determine under which conditions the UN can undertake such tasks. From a legal standpoint, the UN's engagement in supporting democracy is uncontroversial if this is carried out with the explicit consent of the targeted state, or if democracy promotion is part of the peace-building mandates approved by the Security Council or the General Assembly.

Boutros-Ghali[11] clearly expressed such an approach in the following terms: "The United Nations possesses a foundation and a responsibility to serve its Member States in democratization, yet it must receive a formal request before it can assist Member States in

their democratization process." Tom Farer observes that the capacity of the UN to promote democracy when it has the consent of the affected state seems to be beyond reasonable dispute.[12] The voices that see the norm of sovereignty as a firm prohibition against any form of interference in domestic affairs of sovereign states are exceptional today. The best example of this is the human rights regime. If the UN has the right to ask member states to observe human rights norms, one might legitimately ask why cannot it do the same with regards to democracy?

> The UN had its first, albeit very indirect, experience in promoting democracy during the decolonisation era and in the pursuit of the principle of self-determination.

The analysis presented above highlights the fact that even if the UN lacks an explicit legal basis for engaging actively and constantly in globalising the norm of democracy, no one can claim that it is prohibited from doing so. In other words, everything ultimately depends on the UN's "creativity" in finding legal venues for supporting democracy, provided that there is the political will among its key member states.

UN and Democracy Promotion in Retrospective: From Decolonisation to An Agenda for Democracy

Every debate about the importance of internal versus external factors in democratisation underlines the corollary that domestic factors are determinant in fostering democracy. However, the widespread belief that democracy should emerge entirely from within and hence the outside factors are irrelevant is too simplistic. How could we otherwise explain the fact that democracy's anchor in the former communist countries of Eastern Europe was much stronger than, for example, their counterparts in Central Asia? Surely, a conjunction of many factors of political, economic and socio-cultural nature is to be accounted for the democratic flourish in Eastern Europe. Yet, the pressure for democratisation generated from the process of integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures, namely the EU and NATO, played an important role in this direction. The EU, in particular, made the adoption of democratic standards a key criterion for measuring the progress of any country of Eastern Europe wishing to join its ranks. Schraeder claims that "roughly two thirds of the sixty one democracies that existed at the beginning of the 90's owed their origin, at least in part, to deliberate

acts of imposition or intervention from outside".[13]

While not as demanding as the EU regarding the democratic credentials of its new members, the UN has also supported the distribution of power and authority along the lines of democratic principles. The UN had its first, albeit very indirect, experience in promoting democracy during the decolonisation era and in the pursuit of the principle of self-determination. This basically meant arranging the transition of political power from colonial to indigenous institutions. The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, which was adopted by the General Assembly on 14 December 1960, served as the legal basis for decolonisation. The Declaration embraced the principle proclaimed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that "the will of the people constitutes the basis of the government." Accordingly, it affirmed that, by the virtue of the right to self-determination, "all peoples freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."[14]

Obviously, the Declaration's language had been tailored so as to serve the decolonisation process, namely the termination of the rule of one nation by another. This means that in this endeavour the UN was not inspired by the ideological ambition of spreading democracy to the nations ruled by the colonial powers, but by the political objective of facilitating their independence. However, the above paragraph of the Declaration makes clear reference to the "free will of the people as the basis for determining the political status."

On the ground, the UN's role was more than that of a babysitter in a process agreed between the coloniser(s) and the colonised. Farer shows that the UN went as far as "to decide for itself which indigenous political parties should be deemed legitimate representatives of the subjugated people and whether the conditions existed for the exercise for an authentic popular choice of post-colonial political status."[15] This does not sound a democratic way of promoting democracy. Nor does it mean that the UN was successful in inculcating the seeds of democracy in the colonial countries. Nonetheless, this topic goes beyond the scope of this analysis.

Obviously, the ideological severity of the iron curtain would have rendered impossible any attempt of making democracy promotion an explicit part of the decolonisation paradigm, or of any other UN action for that matter. With the end of the Cold War the situation fundamentally changed. More than anything, the victory of the western bloc was seen by many as a firm indication of the uncontested superiority of liberal democracy *vis-à-vis* totalitarian ideologies.[16] Consequently, the spreading

of liberal democratic norms and institutions started to be perceived as a natural outcome of this "ideological Darwinism." The UN was not spared from the liberal fervour unleashed by the collapse of Soviet-Communism. In its search for a soul in the new environment, the UN has steadily abandoned its ideological neutrality that was prevalent during the Cold War era. While responding to the challenges of the new security environment remained the central concern for the UN, issues related to democracy, human rights and other concepts of liberal ideology began to gradually creep into its agenda. Many significant documents adopted by the UN pertaining to the role of this organisation in the new environment have embraced concepts stemming from the democratic ideals. Typically, the democratic concepts have been mentioned in conjunction with issues of human rights and good governance. This conjunction is perceived to be an essential condition, under which human dignity can be attained and peace can be boosted. On the other hand, the post-Cold War speeches of the secretary-generals have sometimes resembled the philosophical thoughts of the classical liberal writers, rather than the

> The new wave of democratisation unleashed with the ending of the Cold War brought the UN to the forefront of international support for countries undergoing a democratic transition.

traditional documents produced by the high-ranking UN civil servants. As early as 1992, Boutros-Ghali underscored in his *An Agenda for Peace* that the spread of democracy was becoming a "global phenomenon"[17] as authoritarian regimes were "giving way to more democratic forces and responsive Governments"[18] Furthermore, the former secretary-general went further by pointing out that the "respect for democratic principles at all levels of social existence is crucial in communities, within states and within the community of states." The subsequent documents adopted by the UN clearly confirm the penetration of democratic concepts into the UN's vision. Accordingly, *An Agenda for Development* identified five fundamental dimensions of development respectively as follows: "peace as a foundation of development, the economy as engine of progress, the environment as a basis for sustainability, justice as a pillar of society and democracy as good governance."[19] The same language characterises *An Agenda for Democratization*, which goes further by heralding that "the basic idea of democracy is today gaining adherents across cultural, social and

economic lines."[20] In the *Millennium Declaration*, the General Assembly confidently proclaims that the UN will spare "no effort to promote democracy."[21] In his landmark report *In Larger Freedom*, Kofi Annan argues that a "larger freedom implies that men and women everywhere have the right to be governed by their own consent, under law, in a society where all individuals can without discrimination or retribution, speak, worship and associate freely."[22] Lastly, in a message for the International Day of Democracy, 15 September, Ban Ki-moon declared that the dramatic events that swept throughout North Africa and the Middle East in 2011 confirm that "democracy is a universal model yearned for by the people and alien to no culture."[23]

In parallel with the concepts of democracy becoming clearer in UN resolutions and various documents, the UN increased its activities on the ground in supporting democratisation. The following two sections aim to identify four basic ways in which the UN promotes democracy in the world. The activities that UN undertakes in this direction can be divided into two broad categories: first, activities undertaken with the explicit consent of a targeted state, and second, the promotion of democracy with the collective approval of member states.

Promotion of Democracy with the Explicit Consent of a State

The UN has been very active in supporting democracy upon the explicit request of a particular member state. As already indicated, this approach has been confirmed by Boutros-Ghali, who emphasises the necessity of having a "formal request"[24] for democratic assistance from the beneficiary state. When the UN is invited by a state to support its democratic transition, its role is that of an assistant and its services are mainly of a technical nature. There are two basic forms through which the UN provides democratic assistance to the countries, upon their explicit request or consent: (i) electoral assistance and (ii) support for democratic institutions and infrastructure.

Electoral assistance

The most typical form of the UN support for democracy is electoral assistance. The new wave of democratisation unleashed with the ending of the Cold War brought the UN to the forefront of international support for countries undergoing a democratic transition. Electoral assistance became a focus of the UN activities. That was conducted in two ways, either upon the invitation by individual member states, or as a part of peace operations.

Since 1989, the UN has rapidly increased its involvement in organising elections in many countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Some of the most prominent cases where the UN organised, monitored or validated elections in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War include Namibia (1989), Nicaragua (1989), Haiti (1990), South Africa (1990), Cambodia (1991), Eritrea (1992) and Mozambique (1992). In the meantime, regional organisations, such as the Organisation for the Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the EU, the African Union and the Organisation of American States (OAS), have also become heavily involved in electoral assistance, usually through monitoring.[25] Between 1989 and 2005, the UN received 363 official requests for electoral assistance from the member states, and it has provided this service in 96 countries.[26] The types of electoral assistance provided by the UN include supervision, organisation and conduct, verification, co-ordination and support, technical support and domestic observation.

Initially, the UN's involvement in electoral assistance raised certain controversies. Some member states were concerned that the organisation might stretch its authority well beyond the traditional limits of non-interference in domestic affairs, through dictating the model and validity of elections.[27] These concerns have been eased, at least to some extent, by the fact that the UN involvement always follows the formal request of the member state concerned.

The growing demand for electoral assistance forced the UN to establish certain rules and guidelines to this end. From 1988 to 1994, the General Assembly adopted annual resolutions entitled: "Enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections." Since 1994 the title has changed to: "Support by the United Nations system of the efforts of Governments to promote and consolidate new or restored democracies."

Since the beginning of the 1990s, assistance to democratic governance has been a key priority. According to the UNDP, each year 34 % of its budget is dedicated to democratic governance programs and projects.

Resolution 46/137 adopted by the General Assembly in 1991 was of great significance, as it made important proposals for establishing rules and institutional structures for the conduct of the UN electoral assistance. This resolution "endorses the view of the Secretary-General to designate a senior official in the Office of the Secretary-General to act as a focal point for

electoral assistance."[28] It also "requests the Secretary-General to allocate staff and financial resources to support the official who will be appointed as a focal point, in carrying out his or her functions." The Under-Secretary-General of the Department of Political Affairs and the Electoral Assistance Division has the primary responsibility of providing electoral assistance to the countries requesting it. Member states asking for electoral assistance must submit a written request at least 12 weeks before the elections.[29] This request can be submitted to the Electoral Assistance Division (Under-Secretary of the Department of Political Affairs) or to the office of the Secretary-General. After receiving the request, the first step is the building and deployment of a "needs-assessment mission" (NAM). As a general rule, the Assistance Division (i.e., "the focal point") dispatches a NAM to the country within a few days (routinely ten days) after receiving the request for assistance. The NAMs are composed of one member of the Electoral Assistance Division and one specialised consultant. The NAM team consults with all key stakeholders in the country, including the election commission, government, political parties, civil society, media, etc. The Resident Coordinator of the UNDP plays a central role in the conduct of the NAM and other forms of the UN's electoral assistance.[30] The basic aim of the NAM is to determine whether the

UN should approve the request for electoral assistance, and if yes, what type of support it should provide.

The need for legitimising electoral results, or to receive financial or other types of support, are the major drive for countries to submit requests for electoral assistance. The NAM's opinion including the recommendations is presented in a written report.[31]

Supporting democratic institutions and mechanisms in transitional democracies

Another dimension of the UN engagement in promoting democracy is the technical support provided to the democratic institutions and mechanisms in transitional democracies. As in the case of electoral assistance, UN activities in this direction are based on the consent of the targeted country.

The UNDP plays the leading role in delivering long-term democratisation support for institutions in the democracies in transition. Since the beginning of the 1990s, assistance to democratic governance has been a key priority. According to the UNDP, each year 34 % of its budget is dedicated to democratic governance programs and projects. Thus 166 countries benefited from this support in 2009.[32] Some of the programmes and projects are designed in response to the instant needs of countries,

while the others aim at reaching long-term human development objectives, including reaching the Millennium Development Goals. The UNDP's approach to democracy promotion is labelled as "developmental," and focuses primarily on building up indigenous governing capacity.[33]

> Peace-building operations thrive on the assumption that the fundamental causes of conflict are of political, economic and social nature, and they can be uprooted through far-reaching societal transformations.

UNDP activities aiming at supporting the democratic governance are spread across a wide spectrum of state and non-state actors. This includes support for parliaments, electoral management bodies, legislative institutions and processes, constitutional reform and empowerment of civil society.[34] According to the UNDP's official documents, the activities undertaken in this direction are concentrated in four principal areas: (i) Expanding people's opportunities to participate in political decision-making; (ii) Making democratic institutions more accountable and responsive to citizens; (iii) Promoting the principles of democratic governance; and (iv) Supporting country-led democratic governance assessments.[35]

It is worth mentioning that the UNDP places a particular emphasis on supporting national legislative bodies. In 2010, for example, the UNDP worked intensively with 46 parliaments, including regional parliamentary groups, on issues such as strengthening parliaments, oversight of executive action, increasing transparency of legislative and executive bodies, improving the investigative capabilities of committees and other issues. In general, the most common forms of the UNDP support for parliaments include training and research programmes (also for political parties and civil society), institutional development, constituency relations or technical support for constitutional reform.

Promotion of Democracy with the Collective Consent of Member States

The UN does not always need a formal request from a particular member state in order to engage in supporting democracy. In some instances, the mandate to do so derives from a collective decision generated either within the framework of the Security Council or the General Assembly. This takes place in three instances, namely within the peace operations missions, through norm-creating activities and through cooperation with other international organisations.

Promotion of democracy through peace-building operations

The term peace-building was first defined by Boutros-Ghali as an "action to identify and support structures, which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into the conflict." Peace-building operations thrive on the assumption that the fundamental causes of conflict are of political, economic and social nature, and they can be uprooted through far-reaching societal transformations. For some authors, such as Amitai Etzioni, such processes of profound and multifaceted transformations amount to social engineering, whereas the social changes it produces do not follow the spontaneous or ordinary path but they are stimulated, if not imposed, from outside.[36]

The liberal democratic model serves as a point of reference for engineering these transformations. Peace-building adopts an integrated approach by establishing an inherent association between sustainable peace, economic development, democracy and good governance. Writing a year after his remarkable *An Agenda for Peace*, Boutros-Ghali underlined that the democratic process is an essential ingredient of peace building.[37] Roland Paris is more concrete in revealing the ideological facets of peace building. He observes that all the peace-building operations have endorsed free and fair elections, the construction of democratic political institutions, respect for civil liberties and market-oriented economic reforms or the basic elements of the Western-style liberal market democracy.[38]

> The institutional set up created by the UN embraced the core democratic concepts of separation of powers, checks and balances, an independent judiciary and, of course, multiparty elections.

In many cases peace building involve crafting state structures almost from the scratch. Afghanistan, Bosnia, East Timor and Kosovo are some of the typical examples. The democratic model, with multi-party competition and market economy, has been used in all these cases. There is no other alternative model available to the UN anyway. Drafting electoral laws, supporting election institutions, training election officials and political parties, supporting media and civil society are some of the constant tasks performed by the UN in all peace-building operations. These tasks are given to the UN, either by the Security Council resolutions (as in Kosovo and East Timor), or by the political settlements brokered by international community (as in the "Paris Agreement"

for Cambodia, or the "Bonn Agreement" for Afghanistan). Beyond this, in cases when peace-building involves elements of interim territorial administrations, the UN has been in charge of basically establishing the overall democratic political systems for governing the country. In these cases, the UN and other regional organisations working under its umbrella, pushed to far the limits of liberal internationalism. The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK, 1999-2008) and the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET, 1999-2000) are good examples.[39]

> Transparency, accountability or coherence cannot be found in the decision-making process; nor is there a system of checks and balances.

These UN missions were empowered with very sweeping and multidimensional responsibilities and objectives, ranging from constitution-making and legislative functions, managing return of refugees, verification and/or maintaining ceasefire, human rights protection and promotion, electoral functions and exercising other classical executive functions.[40] In these and similar instances, the institutional set up created by the UN embraced the core democratic concepts of separation of powers, checks and balances, an independent judiciary and, of course, multiparty elections. In case of Kosovo, UN mission even involved a separate pillar called "democratization and institution building".[41]

The overall record of peace-building operations is mixed, and so is their success in planting the seeds of liberal-democracy. What else could be expected, when, for example, *Magna Carta Libertatum* is drafted by diplomats and politicians of various countries in peace conferences, or when the special representatives of the Secretary-General play the role of Thomas Paine and Thomas Jefferson. The "democratic nation" evolved in the West over the course of many centuries.

Democracy promotion through UN norm-making activities

The general impression might be that the UN's greatest contribution to promoting democracy is through election assistance, technical support or peace-building operations. However, the UN is playing a crucial role in giving a universal formal character to the norm of democracy and this is its most fundamental contribution in this regard. It is worth mentioning, however, that most of the UN resolutions which refer to democracy have been adopted by the General Assembly, not the Security

Council. This means that they are not legally binding. The same can be said for the Secretary General's reports. Nevertheless, it is very indicative that no member state has ever opposed the implicit or explicit references to democracy in landmark UN documents, such as the Millennium Development Goals, *An Agenda for Peace* or *In Larger Freedom*. This can be considered as a positive indication, as the UN's engagement in democracy promotion disturbs the elusive boundaries of the legal norm of state sovereignty and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of states. This backlash might appear later, as the norm of democracy continues to be globalised with the help of the UN.

> If democracy in essence means empowering people politically, making the UN more democratic through abolishing the veto system does not lead necessarily to the increasing of the leverage of citizens over the political decision-making in their own countries.

Two explanations should be underlined at this point. First, how democracy is perceived and absorbed by different states and cultures varies significantly. In its *Human Development Report* on "Deepening democracy in a fragmented world",[42] the UNDP observes that, inevitably, countries will be "differently democratic," as the form of democracy a nation chooses to develop depends on its history and circumstances. Hyland captures this "deeply problematic paradox of the unquestionable value and unique legitimacy of democracy." He observes that "everyone purports to be in favor of democracy, but there is little agreement of what democracy is".[43]

Second, the UN's ability to promote democracy to its member states is not linked to its own democratic credentials as the UN organs lack democracy. For instance, one of the UN organs through which democracy is promoted, the Security Council, has its own decision-making structure that is undemocratic, unrepresentative and unfair to developing nations and small states. Moreover, transparency, accountability or coherence cannot be found in the decision-making process; nor is there a system of checks and balances. These shortcomings arguably have an impact on its ability to promote democracy. A more just, equitable decision-making structure would contribute positively to the UN's image as an emerging actor in this field. Therefore, the UN's decision-making processes should be reformed to achieve a more transparent, accountable, coherent and inclusive system.

In parallel with trying to support democracy beyond national frontiers, the UN should constantly work to improve

its own democratic image. An obsession with the veto power of the permanent five is not the best way to move the democratisation process forward. The UN does not have an entirely independent personality. Having said this, it follows that the UN's political position rests on the equilibrium between the parameters of *realpolitik vis-à-vis* the aspirations of *idealpolitik.* Furthermore, if democracy in essence means empowering people politically, making the UN more democratic through abolishing the veto system does not lead necessarily to the increasing of the leverage of citizens over the political decision-making in their own countries. Rather, this would make states more equal in international arena, but not more democratic domestically.

Promotion of democracy through cooperation with other international organisations

The UN cooperates with other core international organisations, particularly the EU, NATO and the African Union. While the UN has formalised relations with these organisations on many aspects, this is only partly true with regard to the promotion of democracy. This is perhaps due to the absence of a consistent and harmonised democracy-promotion agenda within these organisations. UN-EU cooperation, which is built upon the concept of "effective multilateralism," could lead to mutually productive and reinforcing cooperation. While "effective multilateralism" does not yet include cooperation on democracy promotion, it could be as freedom, democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law are fundamental for the legitimacy of both of the organisations. The key aims of the EU-UN "effective multilateralism" are to reform the Security Council and to cooperate on peace-keeping, peace-enforcing and peace-building missions. Both of these goals are directly linked to the UN's democracy promotion. A reformed Security Council would mean the democratisation of the UN itself; in essence, an internal democratic restructuring of one of the UN's most powerful bodies would help the UN in promoting democracy externally. Secondly, democracy promotion is part of the peace-building mandates approved by the Security Council or the General Assembly. Cooperation between the UN and the EU in peace building would therefore also lead to a more effective democracy promotion strategy.

The so-called Arab Spring, a series of revolts and revolutions against dictatorships that swept the Arab world beginning in December 2010, has repeatedly raised questions regarding the UN's capacity to influence pivotal developments and profound transformations with global ramifications.

Overall, it is too early to claim that a binding norm of democracy exists. However, democracy has been established as a global aspiration, and the UN has been serving as a mechanism or milieu for forging global political consensus on this issue. Similar to the development of the human rights regime, it is only natural to expect the UN to be at the forefront of the global struggle for a democratic one.

The UN and the Arab Spring: Limits of Ideological Multilateralism

The so-called Arab Spring, a series of revolts and revolutions against dictatorships that swept the Arab world beginning in December 2010, has repeatedly raised questions regarding the UN's capacity to influence pivotal developments and profound transformations with global ramifications. This episode presents a key source of momentum for the UN to confirm its political will and administrative capacity to support democracy.

It has been commonly observed that the world was caught off guard by the Arab Spring. However, between 2001 and 2005 the UNDP produced a series of reports analysing the social, economic and demographic features and developments in the Arab world. These reports, titled "Arab Human Development Reports," warned that unless economic and social reform was accelerated, there could be political upheavals in the Arab world.[44]

Judging the UN's reaction to the Arab Spring solely from the perspective of the Security Council provides an incomplete account of the UN's reaction towards the Arab Spring.

A general assumption is that the image of the UN's attitude towards the Arab Spring was mirrored in the (in)actions of the Security Council. This might be understandable as the Security Council essentially functions as the muscle of the UN; it imposes sanctions and authorises military interventions. However, judging the UN's reaction to the Arab Spring solely from the perspective of the Security Council provides an incomplete account of the UN's reaction towards the Arab Spring. The UN has a dual identity when it comes to confronting such international crisis involving grave humanitarian dimensions. First, the UN is comprised as a club of nation-states, in which the entrenched instincts of *realpolitik* are juxtaposed with universalist aspirations for peace and justice. Second, the UN is also as a complex web of bodies, bureaucrats and instruments, each with its own

operational and functional logics. While this division is not as clear-cut as one might hope, it is clear that over the decades the UN system has evolved to something more than merely a nation-states clique. This aspect manifests itself in responses towards the Arab Spring.

The UN faltered when the Muslim Brotherhood was ousted by the military and its leader, democratically-elected Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi, was put in jail.

As a demonstration of this, the first line of the UN's response to the Arab Spring developments came from the Security Council and the General Assembly. Robust global political action can be articulated only at this level. The second line of response consists is the other bodies, with the Secretary General, the Human Rights Council and the Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights playing a prominent role. The actions of these UN bodies have meaningful moral weight and produce political implications. However, the UN can influence the course of events in the Arab world only from the first line of action. The Security Council's swift and effective action in Libya and its embarrassing paralysis on Syria are clear confirmation of this division.

Along these general lines, the UN has assumed an active and important role in articulating a global response to the popular uprisings in the Middle East. By doing this, the UN has been positioned as a global agent of democracy; this dimension of the UN's involvement in the Arab Spring is, however, almost totally absent from analysis on this issue. In nearly all of the revolutions, the UN took the people's side without hesitation, and provided valuable political and technical support for transition. The particular circumstances of each case, however, permitted different levels of UN involvement.

In Tunisia, the UN entered into arrangements with the interim government, and, in July 2011, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Tunisia was opened, becoming the first such office in North Africa. In addition to work on protecting human rights, the UN provided active assistance to promote a democratic transition in Tunisia, particularly through electoral assistance and capacity building. In a rare show of unity, in Libya the UN first suspended Libya from the Human Rights Council,[45] and later adopted two resolutions under Chapter VII. The final one, Resolution 1973 (Russia, China, Brazil, Germany and India abstained from voting), set the ground for outside military intervention in Libya. Encouraged by the Arab League's calls for a no-fly zone in Libya, this Resolution authorised Member States

"acting nationally or through regional Organizations or arrangements… to take all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi…"[46] The NATO-led military action against Ghaddafi's forces ultimately shaped the outcome of the Libyan conflict. The UN launched the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), whose mandate is to assist Libyan authorities in promoting the rule of law, strengthening human rights and helping restore public order and security.[47]

> The UN's efforts, particularly in ameliorating the humanitarian catastrophe, have been overshadowed by the impotence of the Security Council to take political action to end the civil war.

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon sided with the anti-Mubarak protesters within weeks after the Egyptian episode of the Arab Spring began. He urged the Egyptian government to react positively to the demands of the people and called on world leaders to view the protests in Egypt as a chance to address "the legitimate concerns of their people."[48] Yet the UN's involvement in Egypt's rocky transition has been incoherent. The UN (through its Electoral Assistance Division and the UNDP) provided electoral assistance services to Egypt in the 2012 elections and constitution-writing process.[49] However, when the Egyptian transition deviated from a democratic path, the UN returned to its traditional humanitarian discourse as a way to react to the crisis. Initially, the UN ignored the conflicting course that Egyptian transition embarked upon with the Muslim Brotherhood coming into power. Later, the UN faltered when the Muslim Brotherhood was ousted by the military and its leader, democratically-elected Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi, was put in jail. Egypt has attracted scant attention at the UN ever since, generally only in reaction to violence with the street confrontation between the Brotherhood's supporters and the police.[50]

Although it goes largely unnoticed, the UN played an important role in setting the path or the political transition in Yemen. UN played a key mediating role for the agreement of November 2011, which paved the way for the transition of power. It also provided its assistance in organising the presidential elections of February 2012.[51]

It will be Syria, however, that will put the final stamp on the UN's response to the Arab Spring. So far, the UN's efforts, particularly in ameliorating the humanitarian catastrophe, have been overshadowed by the impotence of the Security Council to take political action to end the civil war. The United Nations was responsible for a "collective

failure" to halt more than two years of atrocious violence in Syria, lamented Ban Ki-moon.[52] Russia and China have three times vetoed a Security Council resolution that might set the ground for coercive measures against the Assad regime.[53] The Syrian episode shows that the UN's autonomy of action can be stretched to the point where it scratches the walls of *realpolitik*, which lie at the political basis of the Security Council. At this point, politics is largely devoid of moral considerations. The irony is that Russia and China have not opposed the statements of the Security Council, such as that of 3 August 2011, which, *inter alia*, condemned the Syrian regime's widespread and systematic violations of human rights and use of force against civilians.[54] As Syria was dragged into a full-fledged civil war and the sufferings of civilians increased to dramatic proportions, the other UN bodies- primarily the OHCHR and HRC, but also the General Assembly and the Secretary-General- issued reports, statements and resolutions strongly condemning the actions against civilians and expressing concern at the grave humanitarian situation. UN Human Rights Commissioner Navi Pillay has been very vocal in arguing that the deadlock at the Security Council has emboldened the regime towards more violence. She has urged that the Assad regime's crimes be referred to the International Court of Justice.[55] The UN has launched a fact-finding mission, a commission of inquiry, the Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) and has appointed two top international figures, Kofi Annan and Lakdar Brahimi, as joint UN-Arab League of States envoys to Syria. Almost every UN body that deals with human rights and humanitarian issues has engaged with Syrian crisis. Regrettably, in addition to discrediting the Assad's regime, and perhaps blurring the image of its supporters in the eyes of Arab societies, these efforts produced nothing of substantive impact on the situation. As the UN Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson put it succinctly, the lack of a Security Council consensus has weakened UN efforts to find a peace formula.[56]

> As an emerging democracy promotion actor, the UN should reform internally to produce a more democratic decision-making structure.

Conclusion

In an increasingly globalised world the political value of the UN does not come exclusively from its commitment to protect sovereign states, but also from its ability to empower people. And giving political power to the people constitutes the core of democracy. This brief political and legal analysis has indicated that while the theme of democracy promotion from outside continues to

stir controversies at the academic level, in practice a permissive political and legal context for the UN's engagement in such enterprise is emerging. As laid out in the historical analysis, the UN encountered its first vague experience with democracy during decolonisation. Then, its role in promoting democracy has gained a new dimension in the aftermath of the Cold War. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the biggest ideological contender of the Western democratic model, based on political pluralism and a market economy has disappeared. The UN was not spared from the "liberal-democratic fervour" that was unleashed from the rubbles of the Berlin Wall. The best illustrations of this are the speeches and reports of the subsequent secretary-generals and various UN documents. Yet the references to democracy as a global aspiration has been an explicit or implicit part of many key reports, resolutions or other documents produced by the UN, particularly by the secretary-generals. Major documents that try to identify the UN's aspirations and translate them into the guidelines for actions, such as *An Agenda for Peace*, *In Larger Freedom*, *An Agenda for Democratization*, or the Millennium Development Goals, are heavily imprinted with the ideological colours of democracy. The analysis of the four types of activities that promote democracy carried out by the UN highlight the fact that in the practical life, this organisation has been actively engaged in assisting states to move towards democracy.

The UN has a legal commitment to democracy promotion and has been actively involved in supporting democracy. However, its democracy-promotion policies are fragmented, and there is an absence of a consistent and harmonised democracy promotion agenda within the organisation itself. In this respect, the UN needs a clearly defined and comprehensive strategic vision. More importantly, as an emerging democracy promotion actor, the UN should reform internally to produce a more democratic decision-making structure.

Some of the key legal instruments of the UN, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (1960), leave no doubt that democracy is among the global aspirations that the UN must pursue. In recent years there has been an increasing inclusion of democracy in various documents adopted by the UN and regional organisations. However, the UN still lacks an explicit legal basis for actively and consistently engaging in globalising the norm of democracy. It neither has a transparent definition of democracy nor a catalogue of what constitutes democracy promotion; however, no one can claim that it has been prohibited from introducing them. In other words, everything depends on the UN's "creativity" in finding legal venues for supporting democracy in the world, provided that there is political will among its key member states.

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Pride and Prejudice: The Failure of UN Peace Brokering Efforts in Cyprus

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Abstract

During the five decades of its involvement in the infamous 'Cyprus problem', the United Nations (UN) has undertaken several large-scale attempts to lead the process of conflict resolution, however, the UN's mediation has failed to produce a settlement on the island. The issue at the heart of the conflict, political inequality, remains the major stumbling block. This block is firmly and consistently embedded in the UN's successive resolutions on Cyprus which continue to sustain the status of inequality and thus, perpetuate the problem. By drawing attention to the roots of the current conflict in Cyprus, and to the UN's positioning in the conflict, this article challenges the UN's myopic policy towards Cyprus. It is argued that the UN's partiality protracts the conflict, and that attempts to reach a workable solution are deemed improbable as long as the UN's stance on Cyprus remains uncontested.

Key Words

Cyprus conflict, UN mediation, UN policy towards Cyprus, peace-keeping, peace-making.

Now, which of them was most to blame
'Tis not for me to say;
But this I know: the load is there
Unto this very day
(Ivan Krylov "The Swan, the Pike and the Crab")

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Introduction

The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) continues to be one of the UN's longest-running peace-keeping missions. The UNFICYP was dispatched to the island in March 1964 when armed confrontation between the communities of Cyprus threatened to pull Turkey and Greece-two NATO allies - into the conflict. The UN Security Council resolution 186 (1964), adopted on March 4, noted that the situation in Cyprus was likely to threaten international peace and security, and recommended the creation of the UNFICYP with the mandate "to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of the conflict and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions." "A return to normal conditions", referred to in the UN Resolution 186 (1964)[1], implied the return to the constitutional arrangements of 1960, which laid out provisions for the functioning of the Republic of Cyprus as a bi-communal state with equitable representation of

the two prominent communities- Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot- in all governing structures.

Apart from the deployment of peace-keeping troops on the island, the UN has engaged in multi-level initiatives ranging from the issuance of resolutions to drafting several comprehensive settlement plans. All these attempts have failed to reach any workable solution despite negotiations on the settlement in Cyprus continuing almost uninterrupted for fifty years. The result being that the Turkish Cypriot community has been effectively reduced to one of non-existence, a pariah state, with UN policies fomenting the process.

> During the five decades of its involvement in the infamous 'Cyprus problem', the United Nations (UN) has undertaken several large-scale attempts to lead the process of conflict resolution, however, the UN's mediation has failed to produce a settlement on the island

The UN's positioning in, and subsequent effects on, the 'Cyprus problem' can only be appreciated with an understanding of the origins of the current conflict, namely the Constitutional Crisis of 1963, and the resulting political disparity. Historical developments, which followed the Constitutional Crisis, did not reduce, but rather exacerbated the significance of the 'inequality' issue at the very heart of the conflict. The UN's early involvement in the conflict, and its partiality, are intertwined with the conflict itself. Thus, it is inevitable that a study of the origins and progression of the conflict includes a record of UN initiatives and reactions.

Foundation of the Republic of Cyprus

Cyprus, the former British Colony, was granted independence in 1960. The foundations of the new state were established by the Zürich and London Agreements of 1959, which were embodied in several treaties: The Treaty of Establishment,[2] the Treaty of Guarantee,[3] and the Treaty of Alliance.[4]

The British negotiated to retain the two sovereign military bases of Akrotiri and Dhekelia (99 square miles) in accordance with the Treaty of Establishment. Turkey and Greece secured the right to station troops on the island under the Treaty of Alliance (an army contingent of 950 officers and men from Greece and 650 from Turkey).[5] The Treaty of Guarantee provided a safeguard for the observance of the Constitution and political mechanisms. The Treaty also prohibited any activity to promote union with any other state, or partition

of the island. These special provisions were necessitated by a history of almost a century-long campaign of agitation for *enosis* (union with Greece), and a later emergence of the *taksim* (partition of the island) movement.

The idea of *enosis* was imported to Cyprus from Greece in the 19th century, as part of the irredentist movement, or the claiming of Greek speaking lands in the name of Greece. The struggle for *enosis* in Cyprus escalated into a five-year-long armed campaign against the British in 1955-1959 and was waged by the guerrilla organization EOKA (*Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston*/National Organization of Cypriot Fighters). Towards the end of the 1950s, the Greek Cypriot *enosis* movement was confronted by calls for *taksim* emanating from the Turkish Cypriot camp, but the goal of *taksim* was not unification of the entire island with the Republic of Turkey. Fearing the prospect of becoming a minority in a state dominated by the *enosis* ideology and the intensifying Greek Cypriot violence, *taksim* proponents asked for the division of the island into Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sections where Turkish Cypriots could have self-rule.

The agreements which shaped the structure of the newly established Republic of Cyprus represented, therefore, a compromise; they also acknowledged the possible threats to the normal functioning of the state, and

overtly forbade propagation of either *enosis* or *taksim*.

The Constitution of the Republic, signed in Nicosia on 16 August 1960, laid out the foundations of a bi-communal state with a presidential regime, where the two prominent communities- Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot- were to be recognized as partners. The economic, social and political rights were clearly outlined in the Constitution within the frame of this partnership approach.

Constitutional Crisis

The communal partnership and, hence, the Constitutional arrangements at the foundation of the Republic, lasted only three years. The 1960 Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus was abrogated in November 1963 by the then President of the Republic, Archbishop Makarios, who tried to create a unitary Greek Cypriot state based on a majority rule, in which Turkish Cypriots would be considered a minority. Thirteen amendments proposed by Makarios on 30 November 1963 undermined the principles of bi-communality and were not accepted by the Turkish Cypriot members of the government.

If there was any room for dialogue between the two parties, armed attacks on Turkish Cypriot civilians in December 1963 by re-armed Greek Cypriot police and irregulars from the banned EOKA

movement, made any constructive initiatives impossible.

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According to the UN Secretary-General's report of 10 September 1964, approximately twenty-five thousand Turkish Cypriots and five hundred Greek Cypriots had become refugees since the outbreak of violence in December 1963. The report stated that "in 109 villages, most of them Turkish Cypriot or mixed villages, 527 houses have been destroyed while 2,000 others have suffered damage or looting".[6] Those fleeing from their homes sought refuge in the areas already densely populated by Turkish Cypriots. These 'enclaves' would exist up until 1974 and would absorb a considerable portion of the Turkish- Cypriot population.

The return of the Turkish Cypriot deputies to the government of the Republic of Cyprus in 1964 was not a viable option. The President of the Republic, Makarios, who declared the constitution to be "dead and buried,"

announced that he did not recognize the Vice-President and "cut off even telephone contacts with Dr Küçük".[7] The UN Mediator, Galo Plaza, confirmed in his report to the General-Secretary that "since the outbreak of disorder in December 1963, the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President and the Turkish Cypriot Ministers were barred from their offices and from meetings of the cabinet".[8]

With the gradual restoration of a ceasefire on the island, Turkish Cypriot deputies to the Government of the Republic of Cyprus made an attempt to return to the government as partners in the Republic, under the provisions of the 1960 Constitution. Any possibility of such return was impeded by parliamentary acts which were passed unilaterally by the remaining Greek Cypriot members of the parliament. As reported by Droushiotis, on 20 July 1965, "the Council of Ministers approved a revision of the electoral law, abolishing the Turkish Cypriots' rights separately to elect the Vice-President and the Members of the House of Representatives from their community".[9] In response to the request by the Turkish Cypriot representatives to attend the session of the House, the then Speaker of the House Glafkos Clerides imposed conditions which were "tantamount to an acceptance of minority status by the Turkish Cypriots".[10] Following the statement of Clerides on 22 July 1965 that the Greek Cypriot community "did

not recognise the relevant provisions of the Constitution", the Greek Cypriot press announced that Turkish Cypriots "had no right to return to the House of Representatives".[11]

The control of the state was effectively left in the hands of the Greek Cypriots. The UN resolutions confirmed recognition of this state of affairs as satisfactory, as they continued referring to the government of Cyprus in its truncated version as the legitimate government of all Cypriots. The acceptance of solely Greek Cypriot representation in the United Nations on behalf of all Cypriots validated the UN's stance on the established situation in Cyprus.

The Turkish Cypriots maintained that the structure of the republic rested on the existence of two communities as equal partners, and not a majority/minority division. The 'minority' issue was not based on a body numbers. The concept of 'minority', despite its popular misassociation with a numerical, statistical minority, refers to categories of members of society who hold fewer positions of social power. It was precisely this loss of any political influence that worried the Turkish Cypriot co-partners of the Republic.

The Turkish Cypriot community was mainly concerned with unjust treatment in their own country, and the concerns were well justified. The political inequality of the two

communities did not only manifest at the level of parliamentary structure. The loss of any political influence resulted in a systematic harassment of Turkish Cypriots by a powerful Greek Cypriot majority impacting on many levels of their daily existence.

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During the second half of 1964, the government, led by Makarios, initiated an economic blockade, restricting the movement of food, clothes and other commercial materials between areas controlled by Turkish Cypriots. In view of the fact that many Turkish Cypriots were now refugees, some having to camp in the open, the blockade significantly aggravated the situation. The Greek Cypriot authorities also imposed restrictions on the movement of Turkish Cypriots and obstructed the delivery of the Red- Crescent food supplies and other relief material sent from Turkey.[12] The evidence provided by the Secretary-General in 1964 supported his evaluation

of the situation as amounting to a veritable siege. Reporting on systematic obstructions placed by the "Government" on the movement of UNFICYP escorts to the Red Crescent convoys, and on the desperate situation of the "beleaguered Turkish Cypriots", the Secretary General warned "of the serious consequences that the Government measures could bring about".[13]

A report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operations in Cyprus to the Security Council on 10 September 1964 contained details of "serious misgivings" about the Government of Cyprus. It is worth noting that throughout the report, references are made to the "Government" and to the "Turkish Cypriot leadership", thus cementing the erroneous official position taken earlier by the UN, treating the Greek Cypriot faction as the sole and legal government, and accepting the ousting of the Turkish Cypriot community from the Republic's government as a *fait accompli*.[14]

UN-led Cyprus Talks 1965-1974

As the inter-communal relations came to a standstill, and the economic and political gap between the two communities widened, the UN began brokering negotiations with the aim of resolving the conflict. UN Mediator Galo Plaza held a number of consultations with each party throughout 1964-1965 only to conclude that it was not appropriate at that stage "to set forth precise recommendations".[15] His suggestion was that the two communities of Cyprus should meet together and that the search for a solution "must go on, with patience, tolerance and good faith."[16]

The two communities carried on their negotiations until 1967, when the Greek Cypriot assaults on Turkish Cypriot villages brought all talks to a halt. In November 1967, the Greek Cypriot National Guard, led by the Greek General Grivas, launched an attack on the two Turkish Cypriot villages of Boğaziçi and Geçitkale. On 15 November of the same year, armed troops attacked the Turkish Cypriot quarter of Ayios Theodhoros and Kophinou. The UN Secretary-General's report of 8 December 1967 stated that the incidents of 15-16 November at Ayios Theodhorou and Kophinou "were the gravest since the disturbances of 1963-1964, and the situation in Cyprus has undergone a serious deterioration in consequence".[17]

Turkey's threat to take military action, following the attacks, prompted international concern. The UN Secretary General sent three appeals to the President of Cyprus, and to the governments of Greece and Turkey, urging them to avoid further outbreaks of hostilities.[18] An agreement between the involved parties was reached on 30 November

1967, in which the Greek government agreed to withdraw the nearly 12,000 Greek military personnel who had been clandestinely smuggled into Cyprus, and to recall General Grivas to Greece. In return, Turkey disbanded its forces in south Turkey that were preparing for a landing in Cyprus. As part of his promise to extend normalization measures on the island, President Makarios lifted most of the restrictions on the Turkish Cypriot enclaves and allowed freedom of movement for the Turkish Cypriots throughout the island.

Resuming in 1968, inter-communal talks under UN auspices took place intermittently until 1974 between Rauf Denktaş and Glafkos Clerides, who represented the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities respectively. During the first round of the talks in 1968-1971, the Turkish Cypriot side agreed to considerable concessions, yet firmly resented any possibility of downgrading their partnership status to that of a minority.[19] Meanwhile, Glafkos Clerides insisted that the Turkish Cypriots were given representation in government disproportionate to the number of their population and, hence, declared that it was impossible to return to the Zürich-London Agreements.[20] Denktaş's position on the matter was as follows:

> In the modern concept of democratic rule the primary business of political democracy is to defend the rights of all. Where the will of the minority is not given expression within these rights, 'mob rule' replaces 'democratic rule.' The concept of the partnership status in Cyprus was evolved in order to establish a modern system of democracy with sufficient safeguards to prevent its ultimate emergence as tyranny or mob rule.[21]

The military assaults on Turkish Cypriots in 1967 were all too vivid illustrations of what mob rule could bring about in the absence of political parity or of any possibility of the Turkish Cypriot side to participate in the management of the state. If the insistence of the Greek Cypriot administration on its control over the entire Cypriot population went against Turkish Cypriot desire of equal political representation in the Republic of Cyprus, overt claims to pursue the policy of *enosis* were met with resolute indignation by the Turkish Cypriot leadership. The UN Secretary-General, reporting on the impasse in the inter-communal talks in 1971, noted that the public statement made by Archbishop Makarios earlier in 1971 that "he would never sign an agreement that barred the way to *enosis* made the issue a fundamental one for the Turkish Cypriot side, which would accept no agreement unless it closed the door to *enosis*".[22]

The talks that had broken down in 1971 were reactivated by the UN Secretary-General and his Special Representative, and the second round of the inter-communal talks (1972-1974) commenced the following

summer. This round of talks was undermined by the intensification of *enosis*-inspired activity in Cyprus, which was now vigorously backed up by the fascist military junta of Greece. In September 1971, General Grivas returned to Cyprus and set up the new terrorist organization EOKA-B. The Cypriot National Guard and EOKA-B aimed their violence primarily against Greek Cypriot supporters of Makarios. Even though Makarios never renounced the idea of *enosis*, he retracted from actively promoting it after the military junta seized power in Greece in 1967. Makarios himself was now seen as a major obstacle to *enosis* by the extreme nationalists in Cyprus and in Greece, and, whatever progress was achieved during the second round of talks between the two Cyprus communities (1972-1974), was negated by the Greek-staged *coup d'etat* in Cyprus on 15 July 1974.

By preventing enosis, Turkey had preserved the island's independence. As noted by Loizos, Turkey's intervention stopped the miniature civil war between the Greeks in Cyprus, and so it is impossible to say how long it would have gone on, and how many lives would have been lost in it.

Events of Summer 1974

On 15 July 1974, the Cypriot National Guard and Greek officers led an armoured attack on the presidential palace in Nicosia. Makarios was hastily proclaimed dead and the presidency was assumed by Nikos Sampson, who had distinguished himself as a convicted murderer of British civilians and police in the 1950s, and was later nicknamed 'the butcher of Omorphita' for his ruthless assaults on the Turkish Cypriots in 1963-1964, specifically for his leadership of the attacks on the mixed suburb of Omorphita. Although he announced that the ensued fighting on the island was an internal Greek Cypriot affair, Sampson's presidency became an imminent threat to any possibility of peace for either the Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot population.

The elaborate plan codenamed *Iphestos 1974* [volcano], which was captured with other documents of the Greek Cypriot National Guard in the weeks following the *coup*, contained the specifics of the annihilation of the Turkish Cypriots, up to the exact location as to where to bury their corpses.[23] The raging attacks on Turkish Cypriots in summer 1974 were all the necessary proof of the vulnerability of the Turkish Cypriot population in the face of extremists' control over the island.

The Greek Cypriots themselves were not spared during the days following

the *coup*; clashes ensued among different factions in the Greek Cypriot society including Makarios supporters, communists, EOKA-B militants and their sympathisers, and plain civilians. Describing the events which followed the coup, Loizos remarked that "the game was now a deadly one, and its name was civil war."[24] As reported by Borowiec, an estimated 2,000 Makarios supporters were killed by Greek officers and EOKA-B militants in the four days following the coup.[25]

> The ceasefire line (buffer zone) established in August 1974 and the following exchanges of population were necessary measures for the maintenance of peace on the island, and for the first time in ten years, the Turkish Cypriot population was able to live in safety.

Makarios managed to escape from the island with the assistance of the British forces. On 19 July 1974, he addressed the UN Security Council and asked the Council members "to do their utmost to put an end to this anomalous situation which was created by the coup of Athens".[26]

No denunciation of the Greek-led *coup* or of the assaults on the civilian population in Cyprus was made by the UN Security Council.

A round of consultations between Turkey and Britain (the two guarantor powers), as well as bi-lateral and multi-lateral diplomatic exchanges between Turkey, U.S., Greece, and Britain, went on for several days following the *coup d'etat* in Cyprus, with no reasonable resolution on how to halt the bloodshed in Cyprus. On 19 July, the National Security Council of Turkey made a decision to intervene under the auspices of the Treaty of Guarantee. Six thousand Turkish troops landed in the northern port of Kyrenia on 20 July, and by the evening of 22 July, Turkey accepted a ceasefire from the Greek-led militia.

The outcome of this operation (First Peace Operation in Cyprus) was the restoration of a democratically elected government in Cyprus with Makarios as President. By preventing *enosis*, Turkey had preserved the island's independence. As noted by Loizos, Turkey's intervention stopped the miniature civil war between the Greeks in Cyprus, and so it is impossible to say how long it would have gone on, and how many lives would have been lost in it.[27] The intervention had aided the overthrow of the brutal dictatorship in Greece; the junta regime was toppled the day following the landing of the Turkish troops in Cyprus, and civilian democratic rule in Greece was restored.

In order to protect the Turkish Cypriot community, the Turkish forces carved out a piece of land- seven percent- which

would become a safety island under protection of the Turkish troops until other proper guarantees to the Cypriot population were installed.

> The proclamation of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus in 1975 was an inevitability, and reflected the reality of the two separate political and territorial entities on the island.

A round of talks between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus in Geneva on 25-30 July 1974 (First Geneva Conference) resulted in a Declaration, signed on 30 July, which stipulated the establishment of a security zone, immediate evacuation of all Turkish Cypriot enclaves occupied by Greek and Greek Cypriot forces, and the release of detained military personnel and civilians.[28] The provisions of the First Geneva Conference were immediately violated by Greek and Greek Cypriot forces, who continued to attack and put under siege Turkish Cypriots residing outside the protective umbrella of the Turkish armed forces. According to Türkmen, the Turkish Cypriot inhabitants of Aloa, Sandallaris, Maratha, Tochni, Zigi and Mari were "almost entirely wiped out."[29] UNFICYP admitted that its resources did not "permit complete surveillance over all the areas concerned",[30] but regular reports

of the Secretary-General in July-August 1974 registered instances of looting, and harassment of civilian population, as well as instances of the National Guard taking prisoners and undertaking military action against Turkish Cypriot enclaves throughout the island.[31]

The Second Geneva Conference, with the participation of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, took place on 9-13 August 1974. As the talks were going on, the occupation and siege of Turkish enclaves in the Greek sector of the island continued; the situation in the regions of Serdarlı and Nicosia were particularly disturbing. On 14 August, talks broke down and Turkey undertook a second intervention. The operation was concluded on 16 August 1974 and resulted in demarcation of the territory (approximately one third of the island) in the north of Cyprus, where Turkish Cypriots could live under the protection of Turkish forces.

Slengesol reports that an American envoy, Hartman, who was sent to Cyprus "on a fact finding mission" in the interim period between the two Geneva Conferences in summer 1974, concluded that "there were 'genuine reasons' for the Turkish Cypriots to feel threatened".[32] Hartman's observation was also that a separation of both communities was necessary and that "two autonomous administrations existed on the island and would continue to exist regardless of constitutional arrangements".[33]

Throughout the summer of 1974, and most of 1975, groups of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots alike were escorted where possible by the UNFICYP and British Armed forces, to areas of protection. A Population Exchange Agreement was signed on 2 August 1975 in Vienna.[34] Most Greek Cypriots moved to the south to live under the governance of a Greek Cypriot administration and most Turkish Cypriots moved to the north to live under the governance of a Turkish Cypriot administration. The ceasefire line (buffer zone) established in August 1974 and the following exchanges of population were necessary measures for the maintenance of peace on the island, and for the first time in ten years, the Turkish Cypriot population was able to live in safety.

On 13 February 1975, the Turkish Cypriot community, which had already been governed by its own autonomous administration for more than ten years, proclaimed the establishment of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. The proclamation of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus in 1975 was an inevitability, and reflected the reality of the two separate political and territorial entities on the island. The Security Council Resolution 367 (1975) regretted the declaration of a Federated Turkish State, which it saw "*inter alia*, tending to compromise the continuation of negotiations between the representatives of the two communities on an equal footing."

What exactly the authors of the UN resolutions perceived as "equal footing" remains unclear. There has been no evidence of equal footing in the UN's dealings with the Cyprus problem since the outbreak of the conflict in 1963. The UN's regrets of any efforts undertaken by the Turkish Cypriot community to establish some form of political and administrative mechanisms to run the affairs of their community were short of constituting an equal footing approach. The acceptance of a Turkish Cypriot state would establish political parity between the two communities of Cyprus. Yet, an obdurate insistence of the UN resolutions that the Greek Cypriot administration was the legal government of all Cypriots, compromised equal footing and endorsed continuing political and economic disparity between the two communities.

The Status of Inequality Continues and Intensifies

All parties were affected by the Greek-led *coup* and its aftermath. The relocation of thousands of refugees was a painful experience for Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots alike. The process of recovery, however, was shaped differently, and the political and economic disparity between the two communities, which was already well pronounced by 1974, reached unprecedented levels in the subsequent years.

The Greek Cypriot section of the island was by now confirmed as the Republic of Cyprus by the UN. By completely erasing the records of Greek Cypriot responsibility for initiating and perpetuating the divide between the two communities of the Republic of Cyprus, the Greek Cypriot administration altered the history of the Cyprus conflict into a myth of Turkey's aggression, and consequently drew on the sympathy and benevolence of an ill-informed world community.

> Turkish Cypriots therefore had no avenue by which to present their side of the conflict and were kept isolated by an uninterrupted flow of UN resolutions deploring its existence.

According to Borowiec, "in the early 1980s, Cyprus was probably one of the most subsidized countries in the world, to the tune of US$50 million a year for a population of over half a million", and the total amount of aid for distribution was handed to the Greek Cypriot administration. [35]

In addition to generous support coming from abroad, the legality of its existence allowed speedy development of industries, trade, and tourism in the Greek Cypriot administered part of the island. The economy of this section of Cyprus, which benefitted from exporting of manufactured goods and agricultural produce to the Middle East and the European Economic Community, expanded at a 6 percent rate between 1974 and 1978.[36] Manufacturing increased at double-digit rates during much of the 1980s, and the per capita gross national product (GNP) was about US$7,200 or C£3,597 in 1988, compared with C£537.9 in 1973.[37]

Open access to its ports, combined with the generous tax concessions and the island's geographical position, turned the southern part of the island into a shipping hub, and by 2006, Cyprus ranked among the top ten maritime nations.[38]

In the UN annual reports on Human Development, starting with 1991, Cyprus (i.e. the Greek Cypriot administered area of Cyprus) appears in the list of High-Income Countries Aggregate, in other words a country with a GNP per capita of US $6,000 and above. Throughout the years 2000-2012, it maintained its ranking in the top 30, with the GNP per capita growing steadily.[39]

While the standard of living of the Greek Cypriot community under the name of Cyprus has been meticulously calculated and ranked as 'high' and 'very high', the Turkish Cypriot state is nowhere to be found in the UN Human Development Index. It is not even listed under 'other countries and territories'. It simply does not exist!

Since the Turkish Cypriot side of the island was kept under international political sanctions, it was not allowed to establish diplomatic relations with any other countries, with the exception of Turkey. Turkish Cypriots therefore had no avenue by which to present their side of the conflict and were kept isolated by an uninterrupted flow of UN resolutions deploring its existence. In parallel, the Turkish Cypriot state was not allowed to develop its economy on the same terms as the Greek Cypriot side.

International non-recognition of the Turkish Cypriot state posed challenges unimaginable in any other modern community. The political isolation of the Turkish Cypriot state meant that there were no direct international telephone lines, no postal addresses, no membership in international legal and institutional resources, and no direct flights to or from the country.

Tourism could not flourish in northern Cyprus, whose ports of entry were declared illegal. Trade could not be properly developed because the community of northern Cyprus was precluded from any international business dealings outside its borders

> An aggressive campaign, run by the Greek Cypriot administration to assert that it was the sole rightful government entitled to controlling the entire population and territory of Cyprus, jeopardized any possibility of developing mutual confidence.

(except for Turkey). Needless to say, the northern part of Cyprus was less than attractive for investments.

To add to the economic hardships of the Turkish Cypriot community, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled in 1994 that member states were disallowed to accept the import of citrus fruit and potatoes from northern Cyprus (ruling 5 July 1994). In 1995, the ECJ expanded its ban to the imports to the European Union of products originating from the Northern part of Cyprus and, as a consequence of the ECJ decision, around 3,000-4,000 people in Northern Cyprus were laid off.[40] The ECJ ruling resulted in a considerable decrease of Turkish Cypriot exports (mainly citrus and dairy products) to the European Union (EU) and forced the Turkish Cypriot state to turn to Turkey for foreign trade as it was the only nation to formally offer recognition. A UK Foreign Affairs Committee Report on Cyprus for 2006-2007 estimated that 80% of goods leaving northern Cyprus did so through Turkey and that this imposed "high costs on Turkish Cypriot businesses, harming their competitiveness".[41]

UN-led Cyprus Settlement Proposals after 1974

Following the events of 1974, the UN continued its engagement in the negotiation process on the settlement in Cyprus. Invitations were regularly sent to the representatives of Cyprus which, in the UN formulation, included only Greek Cypriots. The UN extended its invitations to Turkish Cypriot representatives under a special provision, so they could participate in talks with 'representatives of Cyprus', i.e. the Greek Cypriot party.[42] Thus framed, the UN-led negotiations continued.

Six rounds of talks, lasting from April 1975 to the middle of 1976, known as the Vienna Talks, were undertaken under UN auspices. However, little was achieved in Vienna.

In May and June 1978, Kyprianou and Denktaş, the representatives of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities respectively, were in New York. Whilst Kyprianou was hosted by the General Assembly and could deliver his version of developments in Cyprus, Denktaş was not allowed to address the Assembly, as he represented a government that was not recognized by the UN. Thus, the Turkish Cypriot party was entirely excluded from the debate. The General Assembly received one side of the story, as has been the standard practice in the UN- Cyprus affair. Dodd

notes that Kyprianou, "fortified by UN resolutions in favour of Greek Cypriot side", refused to meet with Denktaş in New York, not even socially.[43]

In Spring 1979, Kyprianou met with Denktaş at the UNFICYP Headquarters in Nicosia in the presence of the Secretary-General. The Ten-Point Agreement reached on 19 May 1979 between Kyprianou and Denktaş stipulated that "there should be respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all citizens of the Republic" (Point 3) and that the parties would "abstain from any action which might jeopardize the outcome of the talks and special importance will be given to initial practical measures by both sides to promote good will, mutual confidence and the return to normal conditions" (Point 6).[44]

Continuing restrictions on movement, and the political and economic blockade of the Turkish Cypriot state, was an outrageous violation of human rights. An aggressive campaign, run by the Greek Cypriot administration to assert that it was the sole rightful government entitled to controlling the entire population and territory of Cyprus, jeopardized any possibility of developing mutual confidence. The UN's one-sided approach, with a bias in favour of Greek Cypriot side, did not promote mutual confidence either.

The inconsistencies in the UN pledges to run negotiations on an equal

footing, and the reality on the ground, were obvious. Thus, for example, the Resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly on 20 November 1979, once again called for "respect of the human rights of all Cypriots" and "for the urgent resumption in a meaningful, result-oriented and constructive manner of the negotiations …to be conducted freely on an equal footing".[45] The resolution also called "upon all States to support and help the Government of Cyprus to exercise the above-mentioned rights".[46] Whilst calling for the respect of the human rights of all Cypriots, the UN was denying rights to Turkish Cypriots, including the right of equal representation, the right for economic development, the right to freedom of movement and freedom of self-determination. Whilst calling for negotiations on an equal footing, the UN Assembly refused to hear the voice of the Turkish Cypriots, and the UN's references to 'Cyprus representation' did not take account of the Turkish Cypriots in such representation. Moreover, the UN affirmed its support to a government that consisted solely of Greek Cypriots, and which had lost both its legitimacy and the moral ground once it violated the Constitutional provisions, imposed an economic blockade, and perpetrated brutal armed assaults on the living community under its alleged legal control. The UN's call to support the Government of Cyprus to exercise its right to control the entire Cypriot population became the UN's consent on long-lasting abuses against the Turkish Cypriot community by the erstwhile Government. This contradicts any UN claims to seek equal footing in the matters of the 'Cyprus problem.'

The Turkish Cypriot community undertook various steps to end its precarious state of non-existence. On 5 August 1981, the Turkish Cypriot side presented a comprehensive proposal in response to the UN Secretary-General's renewed efforts to bring the two sides together. The discussion of the proposal, which continued until 1983, ended with no solution.

By the beginning of the 1980s, the impossibility of a return to Constitutional arrangements was obvious. The territorial and administrative separation of the two communities became a living fact. A unitary system under Greek Cypriot domination was resolutely rejected by the Turkish Cypriot community. Failure to reach any acceptable agreement with the Greek Cypriot party, and continuing sanctions imposed on the Turkish Cypriots by the UN, left the Turkish Cypriot community in a political limbo.

On 15 November 1983, The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) was proclaimed. The UN Security Council resolution 541 (1983) promptly deplored the declaration of the TRNC. The resolution considered the declaration of the Turkish Cypriot

State to be "incompatible with the 1960 Treaty concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus".[47] But so was the abrogation of the Constitution in 1963 by Makarios and further unilateral changes to the 1960 Constitutional arrangements by the Greek Cypriot administration. The UN resolution 541 (1983) considered the declaration of the Turkish Cypriot State illegal, but so was the Greek Cypriot administration which ousted Turkish Cypriot partners from the Republic's government and appropriated the name of the Republic of Cyprus. Neither exists in agreement with the 1960 Treaty concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. So, there is no juridical justification of the UN's acceptance of one fraction of the Republic of Cyprus as legal and the other as illegal.

With the UN obviously leaning in their favour, and riding on the crest of economic prosperity, the Greek Cypriots had little to lose, regardless of the outcome of any proposed solution. The losing party, as always, were the Turkish Cypriots, and the incessant negotiations did not bring any notable results.

> Despite the fact that the Turkish Cypriots and their leadership were commended for their willingness to compromise to reach a settlement in Cyprus, and were promised by the UN and the EU bodies that they would lift the economic and political sanctions imposed, the pledges died on the vine and have remained in place to this date.

In 1985, the UN Secretary-General, Perez de Cuellar, hosted a new round of meetings between Greek and Turkish Cypriot parties in New York. While Denktaş, the Turkish Cypriot representative at the talks, was prepared to sign the Secretary-General's complete proposal, his Greek Cypriot counterpart, Kiprianou, objected to almost every paragraph in the document.[48]

The successor to Perez de Cuellar, Boutros Ghali, who assumed his position as UN Secretary-General in 1991, moved the existing proposals on Cyprus to a new level. The 'Set of Ideas' developed under his leadership laid out the ground for UN discussions with the two Cypriot communities. The 'Set of Ideas' was underpinned by the understanding of the importance of equal standing of the two communities if a solution to the Cyprus problem was to be reached. UN Resolution 744 (1992) reaffirmed that the settlement in Cyprus must be based on a State of Cyprus "comprising two politically equal communities".[49] Three rounds of talks took place in phases from June to November 1992. The Turkish Cypriots accepted 91 out of

100 paragraphs of the 'Set of Ideas' and the Greek Cypriots "only accepted them subject to the provisions they had listed, which were substantial."[50]

On 3 July 1990, the Greek Cypriot Administration (again, presenting themselves as the Republic of Cyprus) submitted a unilateral application for membership to the European Economic Community (EEC), without any talks on the matter with the Turkish Cypriot community. In 1993, the European Commission erroneously concluded that the application was made in the name of the whole of Cyprus. In early 1994 Greece assumed presidency of the EU Council and urged EU membership for Cyprus.

The European Council, which met in Corfu in June 1994, welcomed "the significant progress made regarding the application of Cyprus" and asked the Commission "to do their utmost" to bring to a rapid conclusion the efforts of Cyprus towards integration into the European Union.[51] The European Council's Corfu discussion on the progress of Cyprus was, of course, limited to the Greek Cypriot community. It was amidst this "progress of Cyprus" in the background, that the Turkish Cypriot community suffered the 1994 ECJ ruling imposing the forbidding of member EU states to export goods originating from the Turkish Cypriot state, with the result that economic sanctions imposed on the Turkish Cypriot community

intensified. Following the meeting of the European Council in Corfu in June 1994, the UN reaffirmed its position that "a Cyprus settlement must be based on a State of Cyprus…comprising two politically equal communities" but once again reiterated its call not to recognize the existence of the state of the Turkish Cypriots.[52]

Trying to use the possibility of EU accession as a catalyst for settling the Cyprus problem, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan called for negotiations on 29 June 1999. Numerous discussions and consultations, as well as a continuous process of making concessions by all sides and of amending the text, finally shaped into a comprehensive settlement plan. On 11 November 2002, a plan sponsored by the UN, Kofi Annan's plan (named after UN General Secretary at the time), was proposed. The two communities had two years (2002-2004) to study the plan and to hold a referendum in April 2004 to voice their support or rejection of the plan of re-unification. The Turkish Cypriots voted YES (64.91%). Greek Cypriots voted NO (75.83%). The Republic of Cyprus was allowed to join the EU on 1 May 2004 as a part of a divided island. The TRNC community was left out and continues its existence as an ostracized community, largely dependent on Turkish aid, since political embargoes and trade restrictions do not allow the TRNC to develop its own

economy to reach the level of modern developed economies.

> Convinced in their righteousness by strong UN backing, the Greek Cypriot administration has learnt that it could scorn proposed settlement plans without any loss of the privileges it has been granted by the international community.

Kofi Annan, the then Secretary-General of the UN, noted in his report following the referendum of 2004 that the Turkish Cypriots' vote in the referendum had "undone whatever rationale might have existed for pressuring and isolating them".[53] Despite the fact that the Turkish Cypriots and their leadership were commended for their willingness to compromise to reach a settlement in Cyprus, and were promised by the UN and the EU bodies that they would lift the economic and political sanctions imposed, the pledges died on the vine and have remained in place to this date.

Present Day

As the negotiation process towards an alternative political arrangement in Cyprus continues, there are, in fact and in substance, two separate states in Cyprus: the TRNC in the north, and the Greek Cypriot controlled area of the Republic of Cyprus in the south. They function as two states independent from each other, and a stark political and economic disparity exists between the two communities.

Despite the constraints imposed on the TRNC by its precarious existence as an internationally unrecognized political entity, the TRNC has all the characteristics and institutions of a nation-state. But as the UN continues to call to all countries to deplore the existence of the Turkish Cypriot state, a living community of the TRNC carries on its daily subsistence in a state which is customarily referred to as 'quasi state', 'so-called state', 'runaway state', 'the north of the green line', 'the nation-in-waiting' or '*de facto* state.' This list is not comprehensive but it provides an idea of the unusual nature of the Turkish Cypriot state's existence.

At the time of this writing, negotiations on the settlement of the Cyprus problem continue. The most recent (at the time of this writing) UN resolution asks all parties to engage "fully, flexibly and constructively in the negotiations" and makes a note that "the *status quo* is unsustainable".[54] In point of fact, the *status quo* in Cyprus is sustainable and is being sustained precisely due to the UN resolutions, which do not allow for an equal standing of the two parties in conflict. Convinced in their righteousness by strong UN backing, the

Greek Cypriot administration has learnt that it could scorn proposed settlement plans without any loss of the privileges it has been granted by the international community.

The *status quo* in Cyprus will sustain itself for as long as the United Nations continues to endorse the conditions of inequality between the two parties. The root of the problem was (and is) the issue of inequality. The UN's endorsement of the status of inequality of the two prominent communities in Cyprus has escalated the problem to the point of a deadlock. As the UN continues to send emissaries to the island, it would be timely to review the organization's myopic policies, and to consider focusing on the roots, and not the symptoms, of the conflict.

Afterwards

Glafkos Clerides, a long-term Greek Cypriot negotiator, summed up the Cyprus problem as the following:

> Just as the Greek Cypriot preoccupation was that Cyprus should be a Greek Cypriot state, with a protected Turkish Minority, the Turkish preoccupation was to defeat any such effort and to maintain the partnership concept, which in their opinion the Zurich Agreement created between the two communities. The conflict, therefore, was a conflict of principle and for that principle both sides were prepared to go on arguing and even, if need be, to fight, rather than to compromise.[55]

Indeed, the Cypriot conflict has been a matter of principle, or rather, two very different principles. If the Greek Cypriot principle of domination at any cost can be seen as an atavism of a supremacist ideology which has been shamed and banished from the scene of modern human order, the Turkish Cypriot principle of equality is not at odds with any of the principles underpinning the philosophy of the modern Western world.

The UN's wilful imposition of political and economic sanctions on the Turkish Cypriot community, and its partiality in the Cyprus conflict, contradicts the very foundational principles of the organization's existence and operation.

The slogan of modern democracy *Liberty, Equality, Fraternity* has been held high in Western society. The UN Charter itself was founded on the principles which adhere to liberty and equality as necessary pre-conditions for a dignified human existence. As it is stated in the Preamble to its Charter, the Organization of the United Nations was established in order "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations

large and small" and "to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom".[56] It was also foreseen that the formation of the organization would be a way "to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples."[57] The purpose of the creation of the UN was to ascertain the existence of an impartial organization which would safeguard basic human rights "in conformity with the principles of justice" and "based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of people".[58] The UN was not foreseen as a tool of manipulation and certainly not as a tool of arbitrary punishment.

The principles of justice, equality, and the right for the economic and social advancement have no less significance today than they did in 1945, when the UN Charter was adopted. The UN's wilful imposition of political and economic sanctions on the Turkish Cypriot community, and its partiality in the Cyprus conflict, contradicts the very foundational principles of the organization's existence and operation.

The UN's prejudice in the case of Cyprus is of an even greater sorrow, since the core of the Cyprus problem is the issue of inequality, and the UN's endorsement of inequality exacerbates the problem.

It is argued here that the UN has failed to lead the island towards a workable solution, because it has actively prevented any possibility for the two sides to act as equal partners in the process, and has not created a level playing field. There are no more reasons to grant legality to a separatist Greek Cypriot administration than there are to deplore the proclamation of the Turkish Cypriot state. As stated in numerous UN reports and resolutions, the two sides indeed have to be on equal footing; and to go forward, either both have to be treated as legal political partners or both deplored. It is hardly possible to anticipate any success in the UN's attempts to fraternize the two communities of Cyprus unless equality is achieved first. Although the UN has advocated for equal footing, its partiality has, in fact, hobbled the process of settlement in Cyprus.

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The "Rebirth" of a Dead Organization?: Questioning the Role of the Arab League in the "Arab Uprisings" Process

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Abstract

The League of Arab States, known as the Arab League (AL), has historically proven to be largely ineffective in its endeavors at conflict resolution within and between Arab states. The AL has had neither impact nor respect in the region. However, since 2011 it has demonstrated uncharacteristically decisive stances during political uprisings in Libya and Syria, raising hopes for it becoming a more effective regional actor. Some scholars evaluate these attempts as signalling the rebirth and reassertion of the AL, while others consider them as a façade for appeasing the protesters and international society. Many also see the AL as having continued its passive stance.

This paper analyzes the involvement of the AL in political upheavals, unrests as well as civil wars that emerged along with the Arab Uprisings and asks whether the AL has played an 'effective role' or has 'functioned well' in adressing security challenges and in efforts mediating disputes in member states. In other words, whether it has acted purposively and has been able to shape outcomes in the Arab Uprisings process.

Drawing from the literature on regional organizations, this article focuses on AL's main organizing principle, institutional capacity and operational experience to evaluate its performance in addressing security challenges

and contributing to conflict resolution. It is argued that the AL can not turn into an effective regional organization because of problems with its overemphasis on sovereignty as an organizing principle, organizational weaknesses and difficulties in decision making, and lack of credibility. In order to be more effective, it needs to enhance human rights protection mechanisms and play a proactive role at least in post-conflict situations.

Key Words

Arab League, 'Arab Uprisings', regional organizations, conflict resolution, human rights.

Introduction

Since December 2010, starting with Tunisia, many countries in the Arab world including Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria observed mass mobilizations in the form of street protests and revolts, which have come to be called the Arab Spring, Arab Uprising(s), Arab Awakening, and Arab Revolts. Arab states have been heavily influenced by these developments and the political landscape has been transformed

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by the events that forced governmental change in Egypt and Tunisia, destabilized Yemen and Bahrain, and led to civil war in Libya and Syria. The League of Arab States, known as The Arab League (AL) intervened in this political transformation process as the sole regional organization of which all of the self-identified Arab states are members. It appeared as a natural regional interlocutor despite the fact that it has long been known as an ineffective organization that supports the traditional status quo in the region. However, some scholars and journalists argue that the AL has proven to be a more useful regional organization during the Arab Uprisings, particularly in Libya and Syria, because it has attempted to take a stance against dictatorial regimes and to favour popular calls for democracy.[1] The Arab Uprisings transformed the AL because it diverged from its traditional philosophy of non-intervention towards involvement in Arab states' domestic affairs.[2] Some analysts linked this proactivity with the growing influence of Qatar and Saudi Arabia, which are able to dominate the AL because of their wealth, and the ongoing internal problems of traditional Arab countries such as Egypt, Iraq, and Syria.[3] Colombo has identified a "double standard approach", in which these two countries influenced the AL in an inconsistent and interest-driven way.[4] For example, while they supported the Bahraini monarchy against the protestors without raising the issue to the AL, they chose to utilize the AL to call for international military involvement in Libya and Syria.

> While Qatar and Saudi Arabia supported the Bahraini monarchy against the protestors without raising the issue to the AL, they chose to utilize the AL to call for international military involvement in Libya and Syria.

On the other hand, evidence shows that the AL's stance on Libya and Syria is not a radical shift. First, the AL failed to undertake efforts at independent dispute resolution in Libya. In Syria, there are particular diplomatic constraints limiting actions, and the AL retains a fundamental lack of institutional capacity to resolve the conflict without reliance on international support. Hence, even if the regional balance of power were not in favor of Qatar and Saudi Arabia, the AL would only be able to play a limited role because of other factors than regional power distribution.

Drawing from the literature on regional organizations, this article focuses on the factors of main organizing principle, institutional capacity and operational experience to evaluate the AL's performance in addressing security challenges and contributing to conflict resolution. It is argued that the AL

has neither the willingness to play a substantial role due to its over-emphasis on sovereignty, nor the adequate institutional capacity to become an effective agent due to its organizational weaknesses and difficulties in decision making and enforcement procedures. The League also lacks credibility due to its poor record in solving previous conflicts and enforcing human rights protection. Nevertheless, the AL's quest for an active role and for visibility in intra-state disputes has been observable during the Arab Uprisings, particularly in the Libyan and Syrian crises. Thus, it can be said to have displayed tenacity and flexibility in its diplomatic initiatives, played a salient role in the internationalization of issues, and questioned the possibility of adopting new measures like building a specific regional peace-keeping force.

States prefer forming regional bodies to create common platforms for diplomacy, economic, political and cultural interactions that will inhibit neighbors from using military means.

The paper will review the literature on regional organizations and the ways in which organizations achieve collective action, in order to provide a theoretical framework for assessing the performance of the AL. Similar to many other regional bodies, the AL was designated as the provider of a forum for mediating disputes. Hence, it has been expected that it would take some collective initiatives to settle members' intra-states disputes that occurred along with the region-wide Arab Uprisings, thus threatening the security of the entire region. The literature on regional organizations provides answers for the following questions that are also important in examining and measuring the effectiveness of the AL. These questions include issues of why organizations like the AL are established in the first place, which functions they should carry out, ways in which their performances can be evaluated, and which factors influence their performance. After this review, the paper moves on to discuss the historical background of the AL and to present evidence of the AL's initiatives during various crises. The discussion section will provide an analysis of factors influencing the League's performance.

Regional Organizations, Functions and Measuring Effectiveness

Economic and political cooperation attempts through regional organizations

have been long observed in world politics. Since the end of the Cold War, the number and scope of regional organizations have extended and they gotten more involved in practising collective action in security challenges. Countries share interests and problems related to their security that can be only solved through regional coordination and cooperation. The UN also acknowledged the importance of regional arrangements by stating in its Charter that mediation initiated and managed by regional agencies is one of the techniques for solving international conflicts, and UN members are encouraged to "make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements."[5]

There has been a growing scholarly literature on regional organizations. While some studies examine organizations' institutional mechanisms and autonomy, some others analyze the conditions under which these organizations become a significant actors in regional and global governance or able to produce collective security goods.[6] A plethora of studies focus on single cases to evaluate the performance of a given organization in a certain sector.[7] The field of study has been mainly dominated by empirical and theoretical research on the European Union (EU). There have also been scholarly attempts to compare different cases in order to reach generalizations.[8]

Theoretically, regional organisations can have two different functions for regional peace. Classic, neofunctional theory approaches regional integration as a driving force for peace. States prefer forming regional bodies to create common platforms for diplomacy, economic, political and cultural interactions that will inhibit neighbors from using military means. The advantage of creating a zone of peace and prosperity or "a security community" is acknowledged by all its members.[9] The EU integration process is taken as the first and most succesful example serving for this function, because it exemplifies how a regional organization transformed from being simply an instrument for economic cooperation to being a political actor, and for creating a zone of peace.

The second theoretical approach focuses on the importance of explaining the origins and the management of conflicts at the regional level.[10] The end of the Cold War demonstrated that conflicts are not confined to nation-states, they have serious implications at the subregional and regional levels in the forms of refugee flows, proliferation of weapons, and export of violence.[11] National mechanisms are often inadequate to meet these challenges and there is therefore the need to develop regional arrangements for sustainable regional peace. So, the regionalization of conflict is the reason for forming or reactivating existent regional organizations. They may contribute by containing unrest, limiting the spread and adverse impacts

of violent conflicts, and solving them in order to avoid disastrous humanitarian and developmental effects as well as to stop spillover effects into the region. It has been argued that post-Cold War conflict management would be better served by an increased focus on regional, rather than global multilateralism.[12]

Borrowing from the literature on international organizations, the effectiveness of a regional organization can be measured by examining their outputs' (referring to their programmes, operational and information activities) contributions to resolving international problems that individual states are unable to tackle and/or to influencing target actors' policies in ways conducive to the achievement of the organization's governance role.[13] A recent article by Kirchner and Dominguez provides a typology for possible instruments that regional organizations may use in security governance in a region. These are: i) stipulation of presence of treaty provisions or strategic statements with regard to security governance ii) the provision of coordination actions permitting the organization to assume roles of agenda setter, consensus maker, and lead actor, iii) implementation of common policies involving the monitoring of policies, the administration of funds and the management of personnel such as in peacemaking or peacekeeping missions and iv) enforcement and solidarity provisions via institutional courts and

bodies or via force. These instruments are used by regional organizations to become effective in preventing, mitigating, and solving both interstate and intrastate conflicts. Some might argue that using force, in particular, serves well for ending violent conflicts, nevertheless it is a less preferred instrument by member states.

> Turkey has joined in many summits of the AL as an observer, along with Brazil, Eritrea, India and Venezuela. Turkey also established the Turkish-Arab Cooperation Forum within the AL in 2007

Abdel-Fatau Musah's empirical study on the the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) demonstrates that a regional organization can be effective in conflict management. ECOWAS bears some resemblance to the AL because it was established with the idea of pan-Africanism (like Pan-Arabism in the case of AL) and with a goal of establishing a larger West-African State (like the ideal of a united Arab States). It also works in a very conflict intensive region, West Africa (like the Middle East).[14] Unlike the AL, it has proven to be an effective regional organization, since its involvement in Liberia (1989-96) provided greater civilian political oversight with fewer

civilian causalties and instances of human rights violations. It was also able to contain crises in Guinea Bissou (2003) and Togo (2005), preventing the descent of those political upheavals into outright wars.[15] ECOWAS used some of the instruments Kirchner and Dominguez introduced in their typology. It has treaty provisions with regards to security governance like many regional organizations. Furthermore, when an internal conflict or unrest emerges, the ECOWAS Council of the Wise and Special Mediators intervene to seek for immediate political solutions through fact finding missions and facilitiation. If resolution does not work out, vanguard forces are deployed to seperate the belligerents and limit the spread and adverse impact of conflict. Then, according to the circumstances, force may be expanded to stabilize the situation. ECOWAS forces are then converted into a UN mission.[16]

It is expected that, similar to ECOWAS, the AL could be involved in the resolution of disputes and conflicts that arise in the region, including intrastate conflicts. It could contribute to fewer civilian causalties and instances of human rights violations, and help to contain crises and to prevent the descent of political upheavals into outright wars. Since it was not able to achieve any of these functions in the intrastate political upheavals and unrest in Tunusia, Egypt and Libya or to help in preventing the

ongoing civil war in Syria, it might be considered as ineffective in its involvement. The detailed evidence supporting this argument will be provided below. The important question is, why was it ineffective?

The literature on regionalism proposes some factors that influence the degree of regional organizations' empowerment and their ability to take collective action in solving the regional problems.[17] Factors can be grouped as those related to member states, regional common characteristics, and organizational characteristics. Factors related to member states are economic factors (human development, economic freedom, and government effectiveness), and political factors (corruption, rule of law and political rights).[18] Factors related to regional characteristics include the systemic and sub-systemic power distributions in a given region, and the presence or absence of extra regional institutions and non-state actors. Factors related to organizational characteristics include the history of the given institution, its organizing principle, its mandate, institutional mechanisms and operational experiences.[19] In addition, the nature and the intensity of regional problems may influence the capacity of organizations.

This article will focus on the role of organizational characteristics to evaluate AL's effectiveness in taking collective action in intra-state conflicts during

the Arab Uprisings. Hence, it will test three hypotheses: i) an overemphasis on sovereignty as an organizing principle inhibits the organization's ability to take collective action, thus it has an impact on the AL's effectiveness; ii) the weaknesses in the AL's institutional mechanisms and its lack of adequate operational experiences negatively influence its effectiveness; 3) the AL's poor performance in previous crises creates a credibility problem and this influences its level of effectiveness. Before discussing these hypotheses, a look at the background of the AL is in order.

Regional Organizations in the Arab World and the Arab League

Middle Eastern countries constitute a regional system due to their geographic proximity, common language, religion, social culture, political and economic commonalities, as well as more or less similar historical experiences (with the exception of Israel and Iran).[20] However, the area is relatively under-regionalized and less-integrated, and it lacks a functioning collective economic, political and security framework.[21] As Balamir Coşkun notes: "In the Middle East, regionalization of conflict has been realized, but it has failed to generate durable regional structures for conflict prevention and conflict management."[22]

The Arab League's poor performance in previous crises creates a credibility problem.

The roots of integration attempts in the region can be traced back to the 19th century, when Arabs living under the authority of the Ottoman Empire aspired to establish some kind of union.[23] Since then, the ideal of Arabism, then Pan-Arabism have been sustained among mainly Arab nationalists, who believed that Arab countries should achieve unity since they share the same interests, geography, history and culture, they are therefore entitled to form a union.[24] Serious proposals were set forth after the Second World War. General Nuri al-Said of Iraq proposed to reunify Syria, the Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan as one State and to form an Arab League with a permanent Council. The council would be responsible for common defence, foreign affairs, currency, communications, custom and protection of minority rights.[25] On 25 September 1944, a Preparatory Committee, composed of the delegates of the Arab states, met in Alexandria in order to discuss the various proposals about the unity scheme. The idea of full union was found unattainable given the fact that countries did not want to give up their sovereignty. The Preparatory Committee, except for Saudi-Arabia and Yemen,

decided to sign the Alexandria Protocol on 7 October 1944, thus providing a base for the establishment of a League of Arab States. It would be governed by a council called the Council of the League of Arab States, whose membership would be based on the sovereign equality of the member states.[26] The League of Arab States, then known as the Arab League, emerged with the signing of a modified version of the 1944 Alexandria Protocol, by the delegates from Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt on 22 March 1945. Since its establishment, membership in the AL has been limited to independent Arab states.[27] As of 2013, it has 22 member states, including Syria, whose membership is currently suspended. It leaves out major non-Arab regional actors in the Middle East, namely Iran, Israel, and Turkey, although Turkey has joined in many summits of the AL as an observer, along with Brazil, Eritrea, India and Venezuela. Turkey also established the Turkish-Arab Cooperation Forum within the AL in 2007.[28]

As pointed out above, the AL has been part of the broader and ambitious political project of Pan-Arabism. The idea of Arab unity was bolstered by the foundation of Israel and the long-lasting Arab-Israeli conflict. The motivation behind the AL's establishment confirms the second theoretical function of regional organizations, "regionalization of conflict". The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is a true-sense regionalized conflict, threatening to many Arab countries. Similar to other conflicts, it has led to refugee flows, proliferation of weapons, and export of violence with serious spillover effects in the region. Arab countries have sought for ways in which they could act collectively against the security threat, thus common threat and common Arab identity have emerged as uniting themes. They aim to build closer relations and to coordinate their political activities in collaboration through the AL.

On the other hand, member states of the AL have a strong stance against any form of organization that would be perceived as a threat to their sovereignty.[29] Since its establishment, the AL guarantees to safeguard member states' independence and sovereignty, as well as to take the affairs and interests of all Arab countries into account.[30] Sovereignty has been emphasized in all treaty provisions, statements and practices as a main organizing principle. Article Eight of the League Charter states that "each member state shall respect the systems of governments established in the other member states and regard them as exclusive concerns of those states." Such emphasis on sovereignty is closely related to the characteristics of the member states. Many of them are authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes enjoying very limited legitimacy and have inward-looking survival strategies aimed at

consolidating the personal power of their leaders.[31] Not only competing domestic political agendas, but also the suspicion and lack of trust derived from the history of bilateral relations, hinders possible cooperation.[32] Therefore, political factors related to member states and regional characteristics have influenced the organizational characteristics of the organization. Member states prefer to grant very little autonomy to the AL, in order to maintain the status quo in internal and regional affairs.[33] As Barnett and Solingen have argued, the "League's design should not be seen as an unintended outcome but instead as the result of the clear imperative of regime survival that led Arab leaders to prefer weak regional organizations."[34] The sanctity of state sovereignty, as an organizing principle, has therefore been an important impediment to the AL in taking an active role in regional affairs, specifically in intervening in intra-state conflicts. What about the other organizational characteristics of the AL that can affect its performance, including its mandate, decision-making procedures, organs and operational capacity?

The main decision-making organ of the AL is the Council of the League, made up of representatives of the member states. The General Secretariat is the executive body which administers day-to-day affairs. All secretaries of the League have been Egyptians, except

for the period between 1979 and 1991 when Egypt was expelled due to its peace treaty with Israel. The AL also has a special Council of Ministers, the transitional Arab Parliament, which has no legislative power, and a number of permanent committees dealing with cultural, economic and political issues. An informal component of the League's operational structure is the 'summit conferences' of the Arab heads of state. In terms of decision making, all substantive matters related to security and political issues require unanimity, and majority decisions are binding only for those members who vote for them.[35] The AL's voting system also makes the implementation of policies difficult. All substantive matters related to security and political issues require unanimity, which hinders achieving possible consensus, drafting common policies, and implementing them. Majority decisions are binding only for those members that vote for them. Implicitly this means that each state has a virtual veto power. Taking a majority vote is very daunting task, as there are conflicting interests among member states. The AL had adopted more than 4,000 resolutions by the 1980s, of which 80 % were never implemented.[36]

The areas of cooperation in the AL have been very limited. It has performed poorly in terms of economic cooperation, with limited inter-Arab trade and insignificant intra-regional

capital movements within the Arab world. In terms of political cooperation, a formal commitment to international human rights law only entered League conventions in 2004. This was ratified in 2008, when eleven members agreed to adopt the Arab Charter on Human Rights.[37] The human rights organs of the AL include the Permanent Human Rights Commission, the Arab Human Rights Committee, the Human Rights Department, and the Arab Court on Human Rights. The Permanent Human Rights Commission, established in 1968, is still in charge of the protection of human rights.[38] Its principal focus has been on Israel's human rights violations in the occupied Palestinian territories. The Arab Human Rights Committee is the treaty body attached to the Arab Charter on Human Rights (1994, 2005). The committee can only use official state reports and information from NGOs that are registered in their countries of origin.[39] Another body within the AL, the Human Rights Department is under the authority of the Secretary General, and is supervised by the Assistant Secretary General for Legal Affairs; however it lacks a clear mandate. The last organ, the Court, is still at the planning and establishment stage. The principle of its establishment was adopted by the Member States during the Arab Summit in Doha in March 2013. Once established, individuals may raise cases about human rights violations, often perpetrated by member states.[40]

Although there are different organs in charge of human rights issues, the AL is very weak in terms of its human rights regime. This is categorized as a weak declaratory regime which includes norms but no significant decision-making procedure. It provides guidelines to member states, but these are inadequate to encourage states to implement norms and disseminate information concerning state practices. Also, it does not have bodies or procedures to determine whether violations have occurred or not. It lacks binding enforcement authority, such as judicial or quasi-judicial mechanisms or the use of force.[41] More specifically, it does not have a mandate to publicly qualify the human rights situation in member states, to investigate any allegations, to issue recommendations and resolutions, or to decide on interim measures in a given situation.[42]As the states are political representatives, it is highly unlikely that the victims of human rights violations themselves would bring cases to the AL.

Another possible field for cooperation for regional organizations is that of collective security. The AL anticipated only interstate conflicts, and its legal instruments and protocols were thus created according to interstate conflicts not intrastate conflicts, because of its emphasis on sovereignty principle. However, the League`s Charter did not propose a goal of collective defense or security. Only article five of the Charter

authorizes the Council for dispute mediation and settlement.[43] According to Pinfari, "The Council of the League was from its inception designated as the provider of 'good offices' for mediating disputes that could have led to the use of force, and as the forum in which acts of 'aggressions' should be addressed."[44] However, the AL's involvement in conflict resolution and use of force are only authorised under very strict conditions. The council may become involved in arbitration if the dispute "does not involve the independence of a State, its sovereignty or its territorial integrity," and if "the two contending parties apply to the Council for the settlement of this dispute". Further: "The decisions relating to arbitration and mediation shall be taken by a majority vote."[45] Such conditionality makes the involvement of the AL very difficult in political crises/conflicts between member states, and almost impossible in crises/conflicts within member states. In 2008, the Council got involved in the resolution of the border dispute between Djibouti and Eritrea at the request of Djibouti and decided to send in a fact-finding mission on the ground.[46] In the same year, the Council reacted strongly against the conviction of

Sudanese president Omar El-Beshir by the International Criminal Court.[47]

The absence of a supranational authority and any kind of authorization that requires member states' compliance on decisions can be also included as an institutional constraint. Hence, instruments introduced by Krishner and Dominquez can be seen as still very weak in the case of the AL, despite its long history. For example, it lacks central institutional courts and bodies to enforce its provisions due to an overemphasis on sovereignty. It is only able to suspend membership within the organization or impose sanctions.

> The AL is required to involve itself in developments related to the Arab Uprisings because it is the sole regional organization in which all self-identified Arab states are members.

Despite the presence of some conflict resolution mechanisms, the League has had a bad record in this field, which creates the problem of credibility. Differentiating among various types of conflicts (inter-state wars, civil wars, boundary wars and political crises), Pinfari finds that the League intervened repeatedly in minor wars, and succeeded in promoting at least a partial settlement in 40 % (8 out of 20) of the recorded boundary wars and political crises. Between 1945 and 2008, the AL was involved in 19 of 56 regional conflicts. It had a 21 % success rate for its direct and partial contributions.[48] Pinfari adds that the

League proved hesitant to mediate in civil conflicts when major regional powers were involved.[49] It did not behave like a typical mediator in intrastate wars or extra-systemic conflicts in the Middle East, because member states have tended to refuse to call for any intervention in intrastate conflict.[50] As a result, the AL had to bypass many conflicts and crises arising in the region. It only managed to impose mediation in six of 77 inter-Arab conflicts, which it dealt with between 1945 and 1981.[51] Three important exceptions to the League's pattern of intervention, when it succeeded in reaching some resolution, were the Kuwait-Iraq dispute in 1961, Iraq's 1973 attack on Kuwait. and the 1976-77 conflict between Algeria, Morocco, and Mauritania.[52] In the last two decades, the AL has also played a mediator/observer role in some regional issues. These include its role in negotiations to end the Israel-Lebanon war in July/August 2006, the Doha Agreement between pro- and anti-government forces in Lebanon in May 2008, and the partition of Sudan in 2011. In the 2006 Israel-Lebanon war, the AL held emergency meetings, issued joint Arab declarations, pleaded with the international community to exert pressure on Israel and sought to influence the drafting of UN Resolution 1701 to put an end to hostilities. In the 2008 Lebanon case, a Qatari-led delegation and AL officials worked together under the umbrella of the AL to end the political crisis and intermittent violence that had been ongoing for 18 months in Lebanon. They also convinced the parties to elect Michael Suleiman, the consensus presidential candidate, to adopt a new electoral law, and they encouraged the formation of a unity government. In Sudan, the AL monitored the referendum held in March 2011 on the right of self-determination for southern Sudan.

During prolonged street protests in Bahrain and Oman in the summer of 2011, the AL kept its silence despite the fact that some human rights activists and opponents of the regime were ill-treated, tortured, imprisoned, lost their citizenship, and were given death sentences due to their political activities.

The AL received some credit for its performance in these instances. On the other hand, a number of historical developments have raised questions about the AL's credibility over the years. The first development was Egypt's agreement with Israel in 1979. The League had long tried to rally the reaction of Arab states against Israel because the Palestinian cause is of central importance

and is a unifying and mobilizing theme of regional politics.[53] However, many states favored a better relationship with Israel for their own domestic interests over the course of time. When Egypt, an influential member of the League, signed a peace agreement with Israel, it was expelled from the organization. The expulsion lasted between 1979 and 1989, but the AL's credibility was eroded as a result. The Gulf Wars were the second test for the AL. The First Gulf War seriously damaged what little remained of pan-Arabism, putting Arab regimes on competing sides of the war. The strategic vulnerabilities and preferences of states meant there was little success in building region-based Arab cooperative security. In the Second Gulf War, rhetoric condemned the war, even labeling it as an aggression against an Arab state, but practice followed states' interests. The AL held meetings at the ministerial level but it failed to generate a common stance due to objections, reservations and abstentions. While the AL condemned the war and called for the immediate withdrawal of Coalition forces from Iraq, it was neither able to prevent the American invasion of a member state nor to reconcile conflict among Iraqi factions. These demonstrated deeper polarizations within Arab countries, further weakening pan-Arabism and discrediting the AL. In the case of post-war Iraq, the presence of many factions raised the question of whether the AL

could serve as an impartial mediator in internal Iraqi affairs. Al Marashi notes that Kurdish and Shiite Islamist factions in the Iraqi government were distrustful of the regional organization, as opposed to an Arab Sunni opposition that had called for a greater role for the League to counter American dominance in Iraq's political process.[54] The League's reconciliation initiative failed due to the conflict of identities, the lack of legitimacy and the credibility of the AL itself. As a final example, the League was also discredited by its inactivity over the genocide in Darfur carried out by Sudanese supported Arab militias.

Arab League Responses to the Arab Spring Revolts

The AL is required to involve itself in developments related to the Arab Uprisings because it is the sole regional organization in which all self-identified Arab states are members. The AL appeared as a possible regional interlocutor and a partner for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the UN, which preferred to coordinate with a regional actor to overcome their own legitimacy and credibility problems in the region.

While the AL was silent during the uprisings in Tunisia, it cancelled its annual summit in 2011 because of the turmoil there. At the first top level

AL meeting after the protests, an Arab economic summit held on 19 January 2011 in Cairo, the head of the AL, Amr Moussa, said that the "Arab soul is broken by poverty, unemployment and general recession", and he warned that "the Tunisian revolution is not far from us, Arab citizens entered an unprecedented state of anger and frustration."[55] As a response to this call, Arab leaders committed to grant US $2 billion to faltering economies. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait promised to pay half of the grant. But it was not clear how the funds would be dispersed and who would be qualified to benefit. In the same meeting, Egypt's (former) President Hosni Mubarek emphasized the importance of economic cooperation, framing it as a national security priority.[56] The AL proposal, based on grants, proves that it was not able to adequately address the roots of protests, particularly the serious limitations to the political freedom of Arab publics, and their social dissatisfaction compounded by corruption, nepotism, unemployment and lack of opportunities.[57] Grants were very much considered as 'bribes' to appease the masses and protect governments against uprisings, regardless of their poor human rights records, weak governance and political repression.[58] The AL could be expected to take a firm stance in the beginning to address not only the economic roots of the problem but also Tunisians' call for dignity, equality and social justice. After the

president of Tunisia was ousted, however, the AL showed its support.[59] It called for Tunisians to reach a "national consensus on ways to bring the country out of this crisis in a way that guarantees respect for the will of the Tunisian people."[60] The AL's involvement in the post-revolution transitional period in Tunisia did not go further than this.

> As death tolls increased and the Syrian government failed in opening a dialogue, the AL suspended Syria's membership in an extraordinary meeting held on 12 November 2011.

In the case of the Arab Spring revolts in Egypt, Nabil Al-Araby, following the Egyptian Amr Moussa, was appointed as the AL secretary-general in May 2011. Al-Araby was well known due to his support of the Egyptian protest movements. He was among thirty high-profile Egyptians acting as liaisons between the protesters and the government, and then served as foreign minister in the post-revolution cabinet between March and May 2011 before taking up his post at the League. The AL's selection of Al-Araby was considered as demonstrating its support of the uprisings. But its support remained limited to this appointment. When the Egyptian case become more conflictual, culminating in an the ousting of the

Muslim Brotherhood government by the Egyptian army in 2013, the AL was asked by human rights organizations and networks in the region to take an active role and put the situation in Egypt on the agenda of the Council.[61] Despite this, however, the AL did not intervene in the Egyptian crisis.

In Libya, by contrast, the League showed a relatively strong stance. On 22 February 2011, it suspended Libya's membership. In March, it suggested the enforcement of a no-fly zone in cooperation with the African Union and then with the UN Security Council. This was considered as an "extraordinary move" by the Arab League because it invited Western military forces to intervene on Arab territory.[62] The UN passed Resolution 1973 authorizing member states to act both individually and in regional bodies to "take all necessary measures to protect civilians under threat of attack…while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory"[63] All of these enabled NATO to play a decisive role in Libya for swinging the war to the rebel side.[64] NATO authorized several months of airstrikes in Libya, resulting in the ousting of Libya's leader, Muammer al-Qaddafi, after 30 years of rule. But the AL did not undertake serious mediation efforts following the outbreak of political instability in Libya, where there was and continues to be an urgent need for reconciliation between different warring

parties and restruction of political institutions in order to provide stability. This could thus be considered as evidence of the AL's unwillingness and/or ineffectiveness in post-conflict periods, as in Iraq after the Second Gulf War.[65] This ineffectiveness is closely related to the organizational characteristic. The AL may only mediate if conflicting parties request such action. The AL was not able to intervene in Libya because its help was not requested.

During prolonged street protests in Bahrain and Oman in the summer of 2011, the AL kept its silence despite the fact that some human rights activists and opponents of the regime were ill-treated, tortured, imprisoned, lost their citizenship, and were given death sentences due to their political activities. Human rights organizations like the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), made calls to the secretary general, Nabil Al Araby, to urge the Bahraini government to cease human rights abuses, and to initiate national dialogue,[66] but the AL did not take any action. It can be argued that the AL's silence in these two Gulf countries was related to the serious influence of other important Gulf countries: Qatar and Saudi Arabia.[67] These two countries pushed hard to prevent the spillover effects of popular mobilization to additional Gulf countries, considering it a threat to stability, while in contrast they explicitly supported revolutionary

movements against unfriendly regimes in Libya and Syria.[68]

The real test for assessing the League's effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) is its stance during the Syrian crisis. The Syrian protests against President Bashar al-Assad, which started in March 2011, quickly turned into a deadly civil war. In 2011, the AL's Council of Foreign Ministers issued 10 statements on the situation in Syria and organized several extra-ordinary sessions. Nabil Al-Araby met Assad in July to discuss the ongoing crisis and find out whether there was hope for reform in Syria. On 2 November 2011, Bashar Al-Assad and the Arab Ministerial Committee agreed on an action plan that included halting all acts of violence, releasing the people detained after the protests, withdrawing all armed manifestations from cities and residential neighborhoods, and providing open access for concerned organizations of the AL, the Arab and international media to freely move about in all parts of Syria to view the actual conditions and monitor the events taking place.[69] Both Syria and the AL committed to preventing any type of foreign intervention as had happened in Libya. But the continuing violence made it clear that the Syrian government was not complying with the full and immediate implementation of the plan.[70] As death tolls increased and the Syrian government failed in opening a dialogue, the AL suspended Syria's membership in an extraordinary meeting held on 12 November.[71] The suspension was approved by 18 members, with Yemen and Lebanon opposing, and Iraq absent. In the evening of the same day, anti-regime protestors in Syria were chanting in favor of the AL. This was not a common occurrence anywhere in the Middle East.[72] It was a signal that the protestors were very hopeful about the involvement of the AL.

Due to the concerns over the credibility of the AL, it was believed that the AL should have referred the Syrian issue to the international community, particularly to the UN Security Council.

The AL also decided to impose sanctions on Syria in November. Sanctions included a travel ban against senior officers, a ban on transactions with Syria's central bank and an end to commercial exchanges with the Syrian government. In decisions on sanctions, 'no' votes by member states, like those of Yemen and Lebanon, might make decisions ineffective according to the AL charter, but the charter was not taken into account at this time. For some member states, this implied that the AL charter was violated under the influence of Qatar. It is known that Qatar enthusiastically took the leadership position, exerting

control over the decision-making process in the Arab League in the last years due to its economic power and the decreasing power of Egypt, which has historically held great influence over the League.[73] Yemen and Lebanon were not required to comply. Furthermore, sanctions were not implemented by Iraq and Jordan. The Iraqi government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh said that "We reject sanctions because they have a negative effect on the people and not the regime…nevertheless [we] still supported the Arab League's efforts to end the Syrian crisis."[74] So, the decision-making procedure of the AL negatively influenced the possibility that sanctions as an instrument would shape the outcome.

The next serious initiative was the peace protocol agreed by Syria and the AL on 19 December 2011 (Council of the AL Resolution Number 7439). The purpose of the Protocol is declared as being to protect Syrian citizens through convincing the Syrian Government to stop acts of violence, release detainees and withdraw all military presence from cities and residential neighbourhoods.[75] The protocol mandated an Observer Mission comprising civilian and military experts from Arab countries and Arab nongovernmental human rights organizations. One hundred sixty-six monitors from 13 Arab countries and six relevant Arab organizations were appointed and were sent to 15 zones covering 20 cities and districts across

Syria. The overall goal was to lead to dialogue among the warring parties in Syria and the launching of a parallel political process. The mission reported that there was nothing frightening in Syrian cities but that in some zones, armed entities reacted by attacking Syrian security forces and citizens, causing the Government to respond with further violence. In the end, innocent citizens paid the real price for this struggle.[76] The stance of the AL mission was found to be problematic on two counts. First, Mustafa El-Dabi, a controversial name due to his involvement in war crimes in Darfur, was appointed as the head of the observer mission. Second, the report of the mission was found unreliable and subjective. Moreover, a number of factors in the monitoring process weakened the credibility of the delegation. For example, the observers were completely dependent on the Syrian government for transport and security. Their access was restricted to particular hot spots.[77] As a result, Qatar and Saudi Arabia withdrew their observers from the delegation. The AL suspended the observed mission in January 2012. It became clear that the AL was not capable of observing and objectively reporting on the situation in Syria. It remained unable to explore the realities of the crisis in its initial steps and to develop further plans. It was also ineffective in forcing Syria to comply with the protocol due to the lack of instruments.

The AL proposed another peace plan on 22 January 2012. This was crafted under Qatar's temporary (rotating) leadership of the AL Council, with strong Gulf Cooperation Council support. The plan asked President Bashar al-Assad to transfer power to a deputy, establish a national unity government and hold early elections. At the Cairo meeting on 11 February 2012, the AL called for severing diplomatic relations with Syria and providing economic and political support to the Syrian opposition. It called on the UN Security Council to pass a resolution calling for an end to the violence and demanding access for humanitarian groups. Furthermore, it asked the UN Security Council to create a joint Arab-UN peacekeeping force to oversee implementation of a prospective cease-fire, despite the draft resolution being vetoed by Russia and China in the Security Council.[78] Within the AL, Lebanon and Algeria opposed the deployment of peace keeping forces. Syria certainly did not recognize the decision. At the same time, these moves by the AL also demonstrated one of its serious shortcomings. As the AL does not have an active regional peacekeeping mission- an important instrument for regional security governance according to Kirchner and Dominguez (2014)- it had to rely on the UN for a joint peacekeeping force. This inhibited its effectiveness in contributing to a possible cease-fire in Syria. The lack of instruments can be explained by the organization design of AL and its overemphasis on sovereignty.

> The AL thought that the representation of opposition groups in the League would bring momentum for their international recognition as well as for developments on the ground.

Based on their former peace plan, the AL delegates, with the United Kingdom and France, prepared a draft resolution asking to form a joint mission for Syria in coordination with the UN. According to the AL, this observer mission would have to be larger than the first mission and go with a different mandate as well as international backing. In early February, the draft resolution was put to the UN Security Council meeting. Although it was vetoed by Russia and China, a special UN-Arab League envoy to Syria was initiated as a part of the UN resolution backing the AL plan. The envoy, Kofi Annan, proposed a six-point peace plan in March 2012. The plan asked the Syrian government and opposition to stop fighting and achieve an effective UN-supervised cessation of armed violence, pull back heavy weapons from urban areas, ensure timely provision of humanitarian assistance, intensify the pace and scale of the release of arbitrarily detained persons,

ensure freedom of movement throughout the country for journalists, and respect freedom of association and the right to demonstrate peacefully.[79] Neither the Syrian government nor the opposition complied with the plan's terms. The AL lacks instruments for enforcing its plan in the case of uncompliance. A UN unarmed observer mission with 300 observers, established in April 2012, was suspended less than four months later, because of safety concerns after fighting intensified. The UN mission expired in June 2012 and was not renewed. The AL chief Al-Araby asked for a change in the UN mandate and a new type of mission, stating:

> And by that I mean a peacekeeping force and not a military force...When there are two parties that have (resorted) to fighting, you cannot have someone just observing unless they both accept (a settlement). So what you need is someone who can impose a ceasefire and not to fight.[80]

Due to the concerns over the credibility of the AL, it was believed that the AL should have referred the Syrian issue to the international community, particularly to the UN Security Council. In January 2012, one ambassador to the League said that "the Syrian regime did not implement the Arab plan under existing Arab pressure, so there was no other way except to approach the Security Council."[81]

Member states believe that the AL will not succeed in being impartial in dealing with regional problems. For instance, in response to the usage of chemical weapons in Syria, the AL condemned it and called for an impartial international investigation - not a regional investigation.

> Although the AL member states have formed mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution since 2000, the AL does not have a mandate to become involved in intra-country conflicts.

Although its request about forming a new UN mission was not met, the AL took another step by establishing a committee on Syria in November 2012. The committee aimed to submit a plan for a political solution to the conflict in order to show a unified Arab stance regarding the international effort. This centered on the idea of forming a temporary national unity government and deploying a UN peacekeeping force in Syria to guarantee stability during the transitional period.[82] The idea of a joint UN-Arab mission to Syria came from the UN-Africa Union force UNAMID, which was sent to Sudan's war-torn western Darfur region.[83]

One of the later decisive steps of the AL was the transfer of Syria's vacant seat to the representatives of the opposition,

a delegation led by Mouaz al Khatib, on 26 March 2013.[84] The AL thought that the representation of opposition groups in the League would bring momentum for their international recognition as well as for developments on the ground. The AL's action was taken as an effort to legitimize and endorse the opposition. Such regional recognition is critical for international recognition and support, particularly for recognition at the UN. As expected, this move was considered very provocative and was harshly criticized not only by the Syrian government but also by Russia and Iran.[85]

Overall, the actions of the AL between 2011 and early 2013 have been criticized by both the Syrian regime and by anti-government protestors. The regime accused the AL of dismissing them and of violating Syrian sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention. The Syrian government conceived the proposal on a joint peacekeeping force as a 'hostile act' and an endorsement of 'foreign intervention' in Syrian affairs. On the other side, protestors have complained that the AL was too late to act and failed to meet the demands of the Syrian people. From the AL side, however, the disunity of the Syrian opposition forces made support largely impossible.

The AL did not want to fully interfere in the crises in Syria, Bahrain, Yemen and Egypt. It limited itself in coordinating actions in the form of agenda setting and consensus making if possible. This reaction is not only related to the Arab Uprisings themselves; the original design of the AL made intervention very difficult because many crisis were considereded as the internal affairs of member states, touching on the crucial issues of independence and sovereignty.[86] The member states' concern with sovereignty prevents them from building the concrete collective security instruments noted in Kirshner and Dominquez's 2014 typology. Although the AL member states have formed mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution since 2000, the AL does not have a mandate to become involved in intra-country conflicts. While these mechanisms allow the establishment of peacekeeping missions when necessary, they do not include internal conflict situations. The AL lacks real instruments to implement common policies and is therefore ineffective in enforcing

> Despite its failures, the AL has been able to transform itself into a more effective actor in the Libyan and Syrian crises by playing a more active role compared to its previous poor performances in other intra-state conflicts in the Arab world.

provisions. Also, the emphasis on sovereignty shapes the AL's agenda-setting. The serious problems of member states regarding human rights and freedoms, which became evident during the Arab Spring protests, were not addressed in AL meetings because these issues were considered to be related to member states' sovereignty. In terms of human rights, significant attention has only been given to Israel's policies in the territories controlled since 1967. Systematic human rights violations in AL member states have often been ignored and denied. Also, the AL has not yet established its human rights court. Furthermore, despite insistence by non-governmental organizations, the AL is unlikely to support initiatives that urge the UN Security Council to refer the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court.[87]

Conclusion

In the opening session of the Arab League summit on 25 March 2014, Kuwait's Emir Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmed al-Sabah said that "the dangers around us are enormous and we will not move towards joint Arab action without our unity and without casting aside our differences."[88] As he pointed out, the Arab Uprisings and the events afterwards made it clear that the Arab countries suffer from serious internal conflicts that challenge permanent regional

peace. Also, they have demonstrated that human rights protection is very important for the human security of the Arab states and for enduring stability in the region.

> In order to be more effective, the AL needs to work on its organizational characteristics, and enhance both its human rights protection mechanisms and instruments that might be used in conflict resolution of intrastate disputes.

Al-Sabah's selection of the AL summit to make his call is meaningful, because the AL is one of the few common platforms where all Arab states come together to address regional issues. It is also the oldest organization in which almost all Arab states hold membership. Despite its failures, the AL has been able to transform itself into a more effective actor in the Libyan and Syrian crises by playing a more active role compared to its previous poor performances in other intra-state conflicts in the Arab world. In Libya, the AL denounced the authoritarianism and atrocities taking place, and called for outside intervention. In Syria, it got involved in the process in numerous ways. For example, it built a dialogue with one of the warring parties, sent in a large observation mission,

imposed a political and economic boycott, and worked on various peace plan frameworks. This was more than it had tried in relation to Libya, Yemen and Bahrain. Second, the AL played an important role in placing the issue on the agenda of the international community - particularly the UN Security Council - through drafting peace plans, although it was silent during the protests in Tunisia and Egypt. Third, unlike in Libya, it did not fiercely promote foreign intervention from the very beginning, despite the eagerness of some member states including Qatar and Saudi Arabia. The lack of support for foreign intervention in Syria can be seen as a very wise action, given the fact that international intervention in any Arab country is problematic for member states because of the Iraqi experience. Any type of intervention might damage the impartiality of the AL because member states generally want "a political transition with a hand over of power rather than foreign intervention."[89] Further, because of its complex socio-political dynamics, Syria is seen as a fault line in the region. Foreign intervention might have dramatic spillover effects in neighboring countries. Fourth, it was the first time the AL discussed the necessity of a specifically regional peace-keeping force to settle an intra-state dispute.

Nevertheless, these partial achievements did not turn the AL into influential regional actor. It failed to function effectively during the Arab Uprisings because of its organizational characteristics, including its overemphasis on sovereignty, difficulties in decision making, the lack of instruments to enforce decisions, and the problem of credibility.

In order to be more effective, the AL needs to work on its organizational characteristics, and enhance both its human rights protection mechanisms and instruments that might be used in conflict resolution of intrastate disputes. Institutional reform of the decision procedures and a robust secretariat can bring greater leverage. It can ameliorate the problem of credibility that impedes member states in consulting with the AL and dealing with post-revolution/crisis periods, as seen in Libya and Egypt. AL's human rights work could be transformed and improved. Implementation mechanisms could be enhanced by focusing on reporting, investigation and petitions. The creation of a war crimes investigatory capacity could help the AL in gaining credibility. The possibilities are there for the AL to start functioning better in post-revolution and transition periods.

Although it is difficult to generalize from a single case, nevertheless the case in hand provides some insights about the role of regional organizations in solving regional problems. It demonstrates that member states of some regional organizations are reluctant to cooperate

in security related issues, because of their emphasis on the principles of sovereignty, nonintervention and self-determination. These concerns create serious problems for regional organizations with regards to empowernment and autonomy as well as for developing necessary instruments like peace-keeping forces. The collective commitment to deal with regional security related problems is very low. The case also shows that characteristics of problems constrain the organizations' role and impede progress. If the problems are intra-state and touch on sovereignty and regime survival, as is often the case, regional organizations may hesitate to take an active role. If the problems are long-standing and region-wide, organizations may fail to develop sustainable solutions. Overcoming these problems appears particularly difficult for organizations outside Europe. It might therefore be concluded that there is a need to have a modest expectation of what regional organization can realistically achieve in solving regional problems in conflict intense regions. They may start with enhancing human rights protection mechanisms and playing a proactive role, at least in post-conflict situations.

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Balancing for (In)Security:
An Analysis of the Iranian Nuclear Crisis in the Light of the Cuban Missile Crisis[1]

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Abstract

Israel and the US are currently balancing against Iran because both perceive a nuclear-armed Iran as a threat to regional and world security. But does balancing really work? Does it reduce threat and provide security? I will use Stephan M. Walt's "Balance of Threat" theory to address these questions. In addition to Walt's theory, I assume that perceiving a state's intention(s) as aggressive is decisive for that state being (perceived as) a threat. I hypothesise that balancing fails and likely backfires in that it exacerbates the security dilemma and reinforces the threat perceived by the balancing states (Israel und the US). The use of balancing strategies in the current Iranian nuclear crisis would be futile and, if anything, would only strengthen the belief in Tehran that Iranian nuclear weapons are a necessary means of deterrence and self-defence.

Key Words

Cuban missile crisis, "balance of threat"-theory, balancing, perception and misperception, Iranin nuclear crisis, Stephen M. Walt.

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The US, Israel and Iran: Balancing the Threat

Israel and the US are currently balancing against Iran because both perceive a nuclear-armed Iran as threatening to regional and world security. As US President Barack Obama stated in 2011: "We are not taking any options off the table. Iran with nuclear weapons would pose a threat not only to the region but also to the United States."[2] As repeated, and even enhanced, by Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during a UN General Assembly session in September 2012 (and illustrated with a cartoon-like bomb): "[J]ust imagine Iranian aggression with nuclear weapons…. Who among you would feel safe in the Middle East? Who would be safe in Europe? Who would be safe in America? Who would be safe anywhere?"[3] From the Iranian perspective a military strike against it must at least appear quite likely.[4]

I consider Stephan M. Walt's "Balance of Threat" theory[5] to be a convincing theory for explaining state behaviour as I agree that states react to threats, not to power. In line with the "Balance of

PERCEPTIONS, Summer 2014, Volume XIX, Number 2, pp. 113-138.

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Threat" theory, I define balancing as a countervailing state strategy[6] designed to counter a perceived external threat through military or non-military means[7] that are internal or external in direction,[8] and that aim to reduce the threat and pursue security.[9] This understanding is open to a wide range of potential state reactions: military build-up as well as the forming of alliances, economic sanctions or diplomatic pressure. Although there is obviously some disagreement about the meaning of balancing, it is nevertheless possible to identify the central tenets nearly all balancing conceptions rest on: balancing is a state behaviour,[10] its purpose is to pursue security,[11] and its aim is "to counter an external threat",[12] i.e., to shift the state's relative power[13] to its advantage compared to the threatening state's power.[14] Consequently, balancing is directed at a particular target, "the most threatening state or the most powerful state, that is, a potential threat or even a traditional rival".[15] Therefore, the purpose of balancing is to weaken a state or alliance perceived as a threat. Balancing can take on four different forms: it can be hard or soft balancing, and either can be pursued through a positive or negative approach.

The "Balance of Threat" theory thus opposes the core assumption of the "Balance of Power" theory, namely that states attempt to prevent a potential hegemon from arising by balancing against it.[16] The latest and maybe most striking example for the accuracy of Walt's theory is the current Iranian nuclear crisis.[17] Moreover, the crisis over Iran's nuclear weapons programme[18] is symptomatic of a conflicting security policy that aims to create greater security but has achieved the exact opposite. Why is this? The problem is as follows: The action that one state must take in order to increase its security will be perceived as a threat to the security of another state, which will then initiate the appropriate countermeasures. This will only increase the insecurity of the first state. In political science, this is known as a security dilemma, which was first described by John Herz: "A structural notion in which the self-help attempts of states to look after their security needs tend, regardless of intention, to lead to rising insecurity for others as each *interprets its own measures as defensive and measures of others as potentially threatening*".[19]

> When speaking of power, the term should be understood to represent more than raw capabilities.

The Iranian crisis is posing such a security dilemma. Iran has felt threatened, perhaps even endangered, for some time. Tehran's perceived adherence to its nuclear weapons programme can therefore be explained as a reaction

to this perceived threat. The solution to the crisis therefore depends on successfully changing Iran's perception. The perception and misperception of security and insecurity are crucial to understanding the crisis in Iran, and the Cuban Missile Crisis provides a convenient blueprint for analysing this. The focus on perception means that the following is not a question of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of political acts but of how these acts are perceived by Iran (as well as the US and Israel) and the consequences that these perceptions have on security.

My guiding assumptions are as follows:

- First, balancing aggravates the threat instead of reducing it as proven by the Cuban Missile Crisis; and

- Second, the perception of a state's intentions as aggressive is decisive in that state being (perceived as) a threat.

My hypothesis can therefore be formulated as follows: Given that balancing fails and likely backfires in that it exacerbates the security dilemma and reinforces the threat perceived by the balancing state(s), the use of balancing strategies would be counterproductive. Thus, for the current Iranian nuclear crisis, balancing against Iran would be futile. If anything, it would strengthen the belief in Tehran that Iranian nuclear weapons are a necessary means of deterrence and self-defence.

What Makes A State A Threat?

The US and Israel, two hegemonic powers with global or regional scope, see themselves threatened by the much weaker Iran when measured in terms of military capabilities and economic data, which Walt refers to as "aggregate power".[20] That leads us to question what makes a state a threat. Walt distinguishes four different sources of threats:[21]

- Aggregate power refers to "a state's total resources",[22] the greater the aggregate power, the greater the threat a state can pose.

- Geographic proximity refers to distance that lies between the potential competitors; the greater the distance, the more limited "the ability to project power",[23] and the more limited the potential threat.

- Offensive power refers to the size of "offensive capabilities";[24] the greater the offensive power, the greater the threat a state can pose. Offensive power is closely related to both aggregate power and geographic proximity.

- Aggressive intentions refer to how states perceive a potential foe.[25]

I assume that aggregate power, geographic proximity, and offensive power are not decisive for constituting a threat.[26] Along these lines, "[T]here is not much that nuclear weapons can do

that cannot be done with an ice pick".[27] It is not the weapons available but rather the resolve that constitutes a threat:

> With a combination of bombing and blockade, eventually invasion, and if necessary the deliberate spread of disease, the United States could probably have exterminated the population of the Japanese islands without nuclear weapons. It would have been a gruesome, expensive, and mortifying campaign….[28]

During the Cold War, for example, the nuclear weapons of the US, the UK and France were not threatening to Germany; notwithstanding the tremendous supremacy of the US in terms of aggregate and offensive power. Given the vast number of intercontinental ballistic missiles, the remoteness between the US and Germany is inconsequential. The image that Germany had/has of the US (as well as the UK and France) was, and still is, decisive: The US is neither perceived as aggressive nor as hostile. Therefore they are not and were not a threat to Germany.

Thazha V. Paul provides an analogous example with regard to the Kosovo War that was led by NATO and headed by the US. Although Russia and China practiced extensive soft balancing behaviour[29] that should have culminated in a Russian-Chinese-Indian alliance, the alliance ultimately failed to materialise because "the principal powers began to perceive the likelihood of 'potential American military intervention in their internal wars of secession in Kashmir, Chechnya, and Xinjiang' as extremely low".[30] Despite the tremendous military power of the US, the perception of the US as non-threatening was crucial for Russian and China. Therefore, I assume that perceiving a state's intentions as aggressive is a decisive factor in that state being (perceived as) a threat.

In the following pages, I provide an analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis, which fundamentally resembles the current Iranian nuclear crisis;[31] in both crises, I find strong motivations for balancing against a perceived threat (the nuclear missiles on Cuba or nuclear weapons in Iran). For both crises, I describe the same vicious circle of perception and misperception that makes resolving the Iranian crisis as impossible as resolving the Cuban Missile Crisis, during which John F. Kennedy thought the likelihood of war to be "somewhere between one out of three and even".[32]

Balancing on the Brink of a Nuclear War

During the Cuban Missile Crisis, both Khrushchev and Kennedy tried to balance the opposing side. First, Nikita Khrushchev felt the need to protect Cuba from renewed US aggression; second, he wanted to reduce the feeling of strategic vulnerability; and third, he wanted to repay in kind. Taken together, these

reasons made stationing nuclear missiles in Cuba seem like the best available solution for Khrushchev. The US policy towards post-Batista Cuba and the Soviet Union can also be described as balancing.

Protecting Cuba

Since the successful revolution and expulsion of the dictator, Fulgencio Batista in January 1959, the regime of Fidel Castro had been confronted with a number of attempts by the US to change the system or, more precisely, to bring about a counter-revolution in Cuba. The first, on 17 April 1961, was an attempt by Cuban exiles with US support to overthrow Castro. The invasion failed, however, and Kennedy was humiliated.[33] Between November 1961 and February 1963, the CIA, via numerous covert operations under "Operation Mongoose", again tried and failed to destabilise the regime in Havana and kill Castro.[34] At the same time, the US held off a series of large-scale manoeuvres which- albeit poorly disguised- constituted preparations for a possible invasion of Cuba, something that Khrushchev feared. "I was haunted by the knowledge that the Americans could not stomach having Castro's Cuba right next to them. They would do something. They had the strength, and they had the means".[35]

Considering that Cuba had both great strategic and emotional significance for Khrushchev- the latter because Cuba had taken the path to socialism without interference from the Red Army; the former because of its proximity to North America- his reaction to the perceived immediate threat of the US was only rational. Andrei Gromyko, Soviet Foreign Minister from 1957 to 1985, recalls that for Khrushchev, there was a direct link to the threat to Cuba. He therefore decided to deploy nuclear missiles there: "[I]t is essential to deploy a certain number of our nuclear missiles there. This alone can save the country [Cuba]. Last year's failed assault isn't going to stop Washington".[36]

Strategic vulnerability

The Soviet Union launched *Sputnik 1*, the first artificial Earth satellite, on 4 October 1957. Given that it was visible worldwide and that its radio pulses were detectable, *Sputnik 1* simply reinforced that the USSR was as good as, if not superior to, the US. Sputnik haunted the US because Khrushchev made an honest effort to generate the feeling of Soviet superiority in the US after the successful Sputnik mission.[37] Concerns that the US could be inferior to the USSR became the dominant topic of the presidential campaign. Kennedy massively criticised President Dwight D. Eisenhower for being responsible for the so-called missile gap. Kennedy warned that the US might become "second in space- second in

missies".[38] After his election, Kennedy initiated the biggest US military build-up during a time of peace.[39]

However, the opposite was true: The US was indeed superior to the Soviet Union, both in terms of the number and technical maturity of nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles. This was not unknown to Khrushchev, who did not only see himself challenged in Cuba. He therefore reacted with a rhetorical show of force: At the height of the 1959 Berlin Crisis, Khrushchev forcefully warned Ambassador Averell Harriman against maintaining the US position in Berlin: "If you send in tanks, they will burn and make no mistake about it. If you want war, you can have it, but remember it will be your war. Our rockets will fly automatically".[40]

In response to the increasingly bellicose rhetoric of Khrushchev (from the perspective of the US), which had caused near-catastrophe at Checkpoint Charlie in divided Berlin in October 1961, Kennedy allowed Deputy Secretary of Defence Roswell L. Gilpatric to publicly declare the military superiority of the US on 21 October 1961: "In short, we have a second strike capability which is at least as extensive as what the Soviets can deliver by striking first. Therefore, we are confident that the Soviets will not provoke a major nuclear conflict".[41] While Kennedy saw the appeasement as a means of moderation, Khrushchev took it as an open threat. Gilpatric's

declaration made clear that the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal was no longer a credible deterrent for the US. For Khrushchev, the possibility of a US first strike must have seemed realistic- and the missiles in Cuba, a necessary means of self-defence.

Tit-for-tat

Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba, which could have easily reached and destroyed Washington, were an unprecedented provocation from a US perspective. The missiles were not, however, unprecedented: the US had begun to install nuclear missiles in several NATO partner states in 1959. First, medium-range *Thor* missiles with a maximum range of 5,500 kilometres were stationed in the UK. Medium-range *Jupiter* missiles with a range of more than 2,000 kilometres were then stationed in Italy. In April 1961, *Jupiter* missiles were also stationed in Turkey. This decision of the Eisenhower administration was a direct response to the US fear of Soviet strategic superiority, which was provoked by the Sputnik. Therefore, for the US, these missiles were merely a defensive means of deterrence. Khrushchev, however, perceived them differently. For him, these missiles-especially the *Jupiter* missiles stationed in Turkey- were a threat. While they could have easily reached and destroyed the Soviet capital, the *Jupiter* missiles were extremely vulnerable; even

with conventional weapons they would not have survived a Soviet attack. The Soviet Union, however, considered them to be offensive weapons- even though they were solely meant to deter a possible Soviet attack on Europe and the US.[42]

Why Perception Matters

The efforts of Khrushchev and Kennedy to balance against the threat both perceived in the opposing side led the world to the brink of a nuclear war:

> At the time [of the Cuban Missile Crisis], John F. Kennedy estimated the likelihood of war to be "somewhere between one out of three and even". Nikita Khrushchev was equally pessimistic. A week after the crisis, he told newsmen in Moscow that "we were on the edge of the precipice of nuclear war. Both sides were ready to go."[43]

Objectively speaking, nuclear weapons represent a massive threat. From the perspective of those at risk, there is indeed a difference between possessing nuclear missiles and/or deploying them on allied territory and an opponent doing the same. Khrushchev regarded the deployment of nuclear missiles in Cuba as a means of defending the island against the threat of US invasion. Kennedy perceived this as an immediate threat to US security. He made it clear that the US would not tolerate missiles in Cuba under any circumstances:

> But this secret, swift, and extraordinary buildup of Communist- in an area well known to have a special and historical

relationship to the United States and the nations of the Western Hemisphere, in violation of Soviet assurances, and in defiance of American and hemispheric policy- this sudden, clandestine decision to station strategic weapons for the first time outside of Soviet soil- is a deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the status quo which cannot be accepted by this country if our courage and our commitments are ever to be trusted again by either friend or foe.[44]

The ultimate deciding factor is how the relevant key players perceive and judge the intentions of the threatening state (or alliance), a perception which is strongly influenced (but not determined) by an image already formed.

The problem here was that any action taken by the US or the Soviet Union in order to increase security was perceived by the other as a reinforcement of the perceived threat, which only caused more rigorous countermeasures and made the security situation for both sides even more precarious. This mutually reinforcing process is highly dependent on the perceived intentions of the potential adversary. As Robert Jervis states: "The decision maker who thinks that the other side is probably hostile will see ambiguous information as confirming this image, whereas the same

information about a country thought to be friendly would be taken more benignly."[45] In other words, the same information can lead to quite different assessments and evaluations.

Self-perception and external perception may also fundamentally differ, as former US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles stated: "Khrushchev does not need to be convinced of our good intentions. He knows we are not aggressors and do not threaten the security of the Soviet Union".[46] Unfortunately, the opposite was true: Khrushchev felt threatened by the US, which led to his decision to station nuclear missiles in Cuba.

Richards J. Heuer offers an explanation for this "perception problem". He describes perception as "an active rather than a passive process; it constructs rather than records 'reality'".[47] This process, in which people construct their own version of reality, is "strongly influenced by their past experience, education, cultural values, and role requirements, as well as by the stimuli recorded by their receptor organs".[48] As one fundamental principle of perception, Heuer suggests that "[w]

e tend to perceive what we expect to perceive".[49] Therefore, with respect to policy against a perceived threat, it is irrelevant whether the state (or alliance) under suspicion really plans to attack the US (as the Kennedy administration falsely assumed during the Cuban Missile Crisis) or merely wished to satisfy a need for security.

The ultimate deciding factor is how the relevant key players perceive and judge the intentions of the threatening state (or alliance), a perception which is strongly influenced (but not determined) by an image already formed. The image of a state as aggressive and the perception of its intentions as aggressive are mutually reinforcing: The image influences the perception, and the perception fosters the image. This dynamic process[50] I've illustrated and described in greater detail in my working-paper *Why Balancing Fails: Theoretical Reflections on Stephan M. Walt's "Balance of Threat" Theory.*[51] I believe that these reasons, although slightly modified, as well as this dynamic process can be found in the Iranian nuclear crisis.

> The concept of "Mutually Assured Destruction" (MAD), through which both superpowers were granted secure second-strike capability during the Cold War, is the highest expression of nuclear deterrence and no-deployment doctrine: Even a successful nuclear first strike cannot prevent a nuclear response with mutually disastrous consequences.

Tehran's Desire for Nuclear Weapons

Why does Iran want to gain mastery of the complete nuclear fuel cycle? This would, of course, include the capacity to produce nuclear weapons of mass destruction (WMD) when Tehran deems it necessary. This is a legitimate question considering that the paradox of nuclear weapons hasn't changed since the end of the Cold War: "The only winning move is not to play!"[52] They are needed in order to decrease the likelihood of their use. The concept of "Mutually Assured Destruction" (MAD), through which both superpowers were granted secure second- strike capability during the Cold War, is the highest expression of nuclear deterrence and no-deployment doctrine: Even a successful nuclear first strike cannot prevent a nuclear response with mutually disastrous consequences.

> A first strike would be as self destructive for Iran as it was for the US or the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Tehran would have to reckon with massive nuclear and conventional retaliation from both Israel and the US. From Iran's standpoint, a nuclear first strike would be highly irrational and should therefore be regarded as highly unlikely.[53]

Nevertheless, Israel assumes that Iran's potential nuclear armament poses an existential threat. Tel Aviv perceives the potential nuclear weapons as offensive weapons and imputes equally offensive intent to Iran:[54] "A nuclear Iran would pose a terrible threat on the Middle East and on the entire world. And of course, it poses a great, direct threat on us too", warned Israel's Premier Benjamin Netanyahu in October 2011 in a speech to the Knesset.[55] Netanyahu clearly summarised Israel's defence doctrine: "[I]f someone comes to kill you, rise up and kill him first".[56]

From the perspective of a rational actor, adhering to the nuclear weapons programme makes little sense. One might assume that Iran is an irrational actor. Thereby, the Iranian quest for nuclear weapons, as irrational as it seems, would once again make sense. In fact, Iran is behaving as a soberly calculating, rational actor: "Iran behaves as a logical actor- even in Iranian terms- that considers the risks and costs incurred by its actions and is not guided by ideological-religious considerations alone…".[57] Thus, this situation resembles Khrushchev's decision to secretly deploy nuclear missiles in Cuba. From a contemporary perspective, this step appears irrational and highly risky. From Khrushchev's perspective, however, it was not completely irrational to expect the US to tolerate nuclear missiles (which could have easily reached Washington) in its own backyard. Khrushchev perceived the deployment of missiles to Cuba as a purely defensive measure, and as Cuban leader Fidel Castro recalls: "He was constantly talking about this, constantly

talking about peace, constantly talking about negotiations with the United States, trying to do away with the Cold War, with the arms race and so on".[58] In a letter addressed to Kennedy, Khrushchev defended his decision as a backlash to the nuclear missiles in Turkey: "Your missiles are located in Turkey. You are disturbed over Cuba. You say that this disturbs you because it is 90 miles by sea from the coast of the United States of America. But Turkey adjoins us…"[59]

The same applies to Iran's adherence to the nuclear programme despite massive, long-standing, and sustained international pressure. Here, we must try to understand why Tehran has apparently decided to resume its nuclear programme and military development. Fears of Iranian nuclear weapons usually have a common denominator: the assumed hostile intent toward Iran. Of course, the Iranian nuclear weapons plans can be perceived from an Israeli, American or European perspective. From Iran's perspective, the nuclear programme certainly appears as a rational means of self-defence, self-preservation (of the regime) and retribution (tit-for-tat).

Vulnerability

The fact that Iran so eagerly seeks possession of nuclear weapons is essentially the result of Western or, more precisely, US interventionist policy. Since the mid-20th century, the US has

first positioned itself as a stabiliser and supporter of the Shah and second as a supporter of Saddam Hussein and Iran's enemies. However, Iran has done little to promote constructive relations with the US following the Islamic Revolution. The 444-day-long hostage situation of 52 US diplomats and embassy staff in Tehran from 4 November 1979 to 20 January 1981 was only the first of many problematic events.[60]

In 1953, the US actively participated in the overthrow of a popular prime minister and the restoration of the Shah,[61] and this plays an especially large role in the collective memory of Iran. The first Gulf War should have decisive weight in setting the course for Iran's security and should profoundly and lastingly change the assessment of WMD.

The fall of the Shah in January 1979 and the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran forced the US to seek a new ally in the Gulf region. To ensure their own hegemony, the US had relied on two partners: Saudi Arabia and the regime of the Shah of Iran. With the end of the Shah, Washington chose Iran's neighbour, Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor to US President Jimmy Carter, stated on television:

> We see no fundamental incompatibility of interests between the United States and Iraq. We feel that Iraq desires to be independent, that Iraq wishes a secure Persian Gulf, and we do not feel that American-Iraq relations need to be

frozen in antagonism… we do not wish to continue the anomalous state of US-Iraq relations, though we recognize that the road towards improvement is a long one.[62]

With the support of Saddam Hussein, the US hoped that the regime in Tehran could not only be contained but perhaps even abolished. That Iran would emerge victorious from the First Gulf War, which was started by Saddam Hussein on 22 September 1980, was horrific for President Ronald Reagan. In order to officially support Iraq in the war against Iran, the US removed the Baghdad regime from the blacklist of terrorism-supporting states in February 1982. Between 1983 and 1987, not only did Iraq receive trade credits equivalent to several hundred million US dollars, but the US also supplied Iraq with important intelligence. Furthermore, Washington encouraged its European partners to co-operate with Baghdad. In addition to weapons from the UK and France, Baghdad received indirect support for the construction of biological and chemical weapons factories: "German firms also rushed in without much compunction, not only selling Iraq large numbers of trucks and automobiles but also building vast complexes for Iraq's chemical warfare, biological warfare, and ballistic missiles program".[63] Through the use of Iraqi chemical weapons, which, according to the UN, the Baghdad regime could never have produced without foreign aid,[64] approximately

50,000 Iranian soldiers were wounded during the First Gulf War, and another 5,000 were killed.[65] This massive use of chemical weapons by Iraq, which was also directed against its own people and which was a serious violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, did not, however, generate a reaction from the international community. In fact, the US showed the opposite reaction. As former US Ambassador Peter W. Galbraith writes: "…when Iraq turned its chemical weapons on the Kurds in 1988, killing 5,000 in the town of Halabja, the Reagan administration sought to obscure responsibility by falsely suggesting Iran was also responsible."[66] In the following years, the US even intensified the cooperation with Saddam Hussein:

The next year [1989], President George H.W. Bush's administration actually doubled US financial credits for Iraq. A week before Hussein invaded Kuwait, the administration vociferously opposed legislation that would have conditioned US assistance to Iraq on a commitment not to use chemical weapons and to stop the genocide against the Kurds.[67]

In Iran, there was a reversal in the evaluation of WMD. Ayatollah Khomeini had originally deemed the use and possession of WMD as being incompatible with Islam. Iran therefore suspended its nuclear programme, which had been initiated under the Shah with Western help.[68] Today, Iran is a contracting party of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Convention and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Treaty (NPT). But the First Gulf War taught Iran that such agreements do not guarantee protection and that Tehran must provide for its own self-defence.[69] After 1984, Khomeini was convinced that nuclear weapons were a necessary means of deterrence and self-defence.[70] Only a few years later, Hashemi Rafsanjani, speaker of the Iranian parliament (*Majlis*), declared that:

> Chemical and biological weapons are the poor man's atomic bombs and can easily be produced. We should at least consider them for our defence. Although the use of such weapons is inhuman, the war taught us that international laws are only scraps of paper.[71]

The Iranian self-perception as a vulnerable state was responsible for a fundamental change in the direction of security policy. Khomeini's rejection of WMD was not justified by power politics. The experience of political impotence in the mid-1980s led Khomeini to believe for the first time that nuclear weapons were a rational and power-political means of deterrence and self-defence. This sense of treat and vulnerability has remained unchanged.

The protection of the regime

Even today, Iran fears that the US could attempt to bring about a regime change. The Cuban Missile Crisis proved that the perception of intention does not need to have anything in common with actual intentions.

It is therefore not important whether or not the US had really been working towards a regime change in Tehran (or perhaps even still is). It is only important that US policy toward Iran had created this impression (and still does).

Since Ronald Reagan, who actively support Saddam Hussein's Iraq against Iran, no U.S. president has abandoned the aggressive rhetoric toward Tehran; no matter whether Republican or Democrat. In 1994, Bill Clinton dubbed Iran a "rogue state". In 1995, he imposed strict oil and trade sanctions against Tehran and practically prevented all trade between the US and Iran. George W. Bush followed this line, and included Iran among the "axis of evil", together with Iraq and North Korea, in his State of the Union Address on 29 January 2002:

> States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic.[72]

Iran perceived Bush's speech to have a special meaning. Not only did this end the brief phase of strategic cooperation between Washington and Tehran after the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan,[73] but it also encouraged[74] Iran to believe

that nuclear weapons are a necessary means of self-defence. The US had led regime change in Iraq, and in October 2006, Pyongyang only briefly declared its possession of atomic weapons before Washington provided a security guarantee.[75] However, no such guarantee has been made for Iran.

Iran has shown a general interest in de-escalation. In 2003, immediately after the start of Operation "Iraqi Freedom", President Mohammad Khatami explored the options for a sustainable reconciliation with the US. Via the Swiss ambassador to Tehran, Khatami shared with Bush a concrete road map for the cessation of enmity between the two countries. Khatami offered to stop supporting militant Palestinian groups, to transform Hezbollah into a purely political organisation, to work to for a two-state solution between Israel and Palestine and to disclose its own nuclear programme. In return, Iran demanded the lifting of US sanctions, free access to civilian nuclear technology and security guarantees.[76] Bush was also to withdraw his statement about Iran being part of the "axis of evil".[77] But the Bush administration rejected this initiative.[78]

Tit-for-tat

In the debate over Iran's nuclear programme, it is conveniently forgotten that, next to the five official nuclear powers (the US, Russia, France, the UK, and China), there are other non-official states with nuclear weapons: India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea. Under the NPT, none of these states should have the right to possess nuclear weapons, because according to Article IX only a state that "has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967" has the right to nuclear weapons.

> Given the particularly anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli tone of Iranian rhetoric and the proximity of Israel to Iran, Jerusalem will presumably perceive the possibility of an Iranian nuclear weapons programme as a greater threat than the US.

On the basis of the NPT, Iran should therefore be treated no differently than North Korea, India, Pakistan and Israel.[79] Nevertheless, these nuclear powers will be tolerated. It is thereby completely irrelevant whether the legality of nuclear weapons is concerned with a democracy, dictatorship or theocracy. One might argue that since India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea are no longer party to the NPT that its provisions no longer apply. By this logic, only Iran should follow the example of North Korea and withdraw

from the NPT, and no damage would be inflicted to the non-proliferation regime. This is an unconvincing argument, and was unacceptable to the international community in the case of North Korea. The NPT now comprises 189 countries and this raises a general validity claim should it be enforced differently against Iran than North Korea or Israel.

Why Balancing Backfires

If Iran implements a specific policy, such as buying clandestine uranium centrifuges, how is this policy perceived by the US or Israel? The clandestine purchase of centrifuges may be perceived as clear and convincing evidence for an Iranian nuclear weapons programme i.e., as a threat. Given the particularly anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli tone of Iranian rhetoric and the proximity of Israel to Iran, Jerusalem will presumably perceive the possibility of an Iranian nuclear weapons programme as a greater threat than the US. How the US and Israel react will depend largely (if not exclusively) on the perceived intentions of Iran.

The perceived intentions underlying on the Iranian policy are strongly influenced (not to mention determined) by an image already formed of Iran as an aggressive, anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli country. This image has been durable, and as Alexander L. George already noted in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War: "[P]olicymakers [in the US] retained their image of a hostile, threatening regime in Tehran that would need to be 'balanced' in the future".[80]

> The image of a state as aggressive and the perception of its intentions as aggressive are mutually reinforcing: the image influences the perception and the perception fosters the image.

Therefore, with respect to the policy against a perceived threat, it is irrelevant whether the state (or alliance) under suspicion really has aggressive intentions (as the Kennedy administration wrongly apprehended during the Cuban Missile Crisis) or just wants to satisfy a need for security. Ultimately decisive is how the relevant key players perceive and judge the intentions of the threatening state (or alliance); a perception which is strongly influenced (not to say: determined) by an image already formed. This can be considered a vicious cycle. The image of a state as aggressive and the perception of its intentions as aggressive are mutually reinforcing: the image influences the perception and the perception fosters the image. In case of Iran this means that the image of Iran as aggressive, anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli influences the perception of Iranian policy as aggressive, and the perception of Iranian policy (as aggressive) fosters the image of Iran as an aggressive, anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli country (see Fig.

1). Therefore, with respect to the policy on Iran, it is irrelevant whether Tehran actually seeks the bomb or merely controls the nuclear fuel cycle. Balancing the perceived Iranian threat (i.e., that it is perceived as aggressive, anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli) tends to backfire. Given that balancing is not limited to joining a powerful alliance (like NATO) or building up arms, two classical forms of balancing, but refers to all state strategies intended to reduce a perceived threat by improving the security situation of the threatened state(s) in comparison to the state(s) perceived as a threat.[81] Therefore, to balance against Iran means de facto to threaten Iran. This may only convince the leaders in Teheran that full mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle (which includes the ability to build a nuclear device) is a necessary means of counter-balancing and self-defence.[82]

Therefore, balancing against Iran will enhance (or, in the worst case, even create) rather than reduce the threat of a nuclear armed Iran by reinforcing the policy that initiated the balancing behavior in the first place.

And this means that the dynamic process just described also works the other way.[83] By changing Iran on the one side and the U.S. and Israel on the other, you get the same self-reinforcing vicious cycle with Iran feeling threatened and under pressure to react (see Figure 1). From Iran's perspective, having a nuclear weapons programme would then be quite rational as it is a security measure to reduce the vulnerability of the country and safeguards the regime against external attempts to bring about a regime change. At the same time, however, it leads Iran, Israel and the US to the brink of war, which will make both sides feel even more threatened and less secure.

Figure 1 (Graphic designed by the author)

Iran is anti-Semitic and
anti-Israeli, i.e.:
Aggressive!

From Iran's perspective, having a nuclear weapons programme is quite rational as it is a security measure: Nuclear weapons reduce the vulnerability of the country and safeguard the regime against external attempts to bring about a regime change. It also compensates for the obvious unequal treatment of the non-proliferation regime of the NPT. Iran's nuclear programme is also highly unreasonable as it leads Iran to the brink of war. Thus, the nuclear weapons programme makes security interests impossible although it was with these perceptions that made it necessary in the first place.

Is there a Possible Solution to the Conflict?

A solution to the conflict over Iran's nuclear programme is indeed still possible, but it will neither be quickly nor easily reached. This is why the conflict with Iran, which involves more than just the nuclear programme, has lasted so long. Basically, the current problem is restoring the confidence that was destroyed on both sides over the last few decades.[84] In January 2006, Tehran allowed the IAEA's seal to be removed from the enrichment plant at Natanz, which was not only a symbolic step towards the resumption of the nuclear weapons programme but also a serious blow to international confidence in the regime.

In order to defuse the conflict, one side must take the first step towards de-escalation and make concessions. This can only be the US. The US can reach out to Tehran without altering the security threat because a nuclear-armed Iran represents no significant threat to the US. Conversely, the US is the greatest threat to the regime in Tehran. Any concessions to Washington would therefore be interpreted as a sign of weakness and increase Tehran's sense of insecurity. Therefore, this step could hardly be expected.

In fact, I believe that there is no alternative to de-escalation- if the conflict with Iran is to be successfully defused. Military action against Iranian nuclear facilities would be counterproductive because it would only slow down the nuclear programme instead of permanently hindering it. If anything, an attack on Tehran would strengthen the belief that Iranian nuclear weapons are a necessary means of deterrence and self-defence.

A different rhetoric

The first step toward understanding has to be to moderate the rhetoric against Iran. Rhetoric that does not threaten Tehran with military strikes and regime change could reduce the sense of threat on the part of Iran and thus contribute to a détente. President Obama already took the first step with his "A New Beginning" speech which he gave in 2009 in Cairo

promising "a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world" that is "based upon mutual interest and mutual respect".[85] Now, in his second presidential term, he has to uphold this promise, which also addresses the Iranians and which offers direct talks and the delegation of an US ambassador to Tehran.

Accepting the realities

The US and Europe must deal with the reality of the Iranian theocracy and accept Khamenei as an interlocutor. In the end it is Khamenei who will make decisions regarding the realignment of Iranian security policy. Thus, contacts with religious leaders of Iran are prerequisite to increasing the feeling of security also on the part of US and its allies. Therefore, it is counterproductive to de-legitimise Khamenei as a "non-elected decision maker".[86] The election of Hassan Rouhani as Iranian president also offers a chance for president Obama to initiate a new start. Rouhani is not Mahmoud Ahmadinejad; this could make it easier for the US to accept the reality of an Islamic state.[87]

> From Iran's perspective, having a nuclear weapons programme would then be quite rational as it is a security measure to reduce the vulnerability of the country and safeguards the regime against external attempts to bring about a regime change

Sanctions

The system of sanctions against Iran has long been an integral part of robust diplomacy in the dispute over its nuclear programme. However, the penalty system should be modified so that it does not simply escalate the conflict.

First, the US (as a veto power in the UN Security Council) should show probable cause that the offer of "double suspension" will continue to be maintained. The basic idea is that the sanctions will be suspended if Iran suspends its uranium enrichment programme. In an additional step, Tehran must be convinced that the system of sanctions has a strictly limited focus: to ensure compliance with the provisions of the NPT. Iran, particularly with respect to Pakistan, has repeatedly stated that it has a vital interest in a reliable non-proliferation regime. The diplomatic task is therefore to dispel the deep-seated fears on the part of Tehran: that the sanctions are neither aimed at changing the system nor at destroying Iran's economy nor are they meant to punish Iran.[88] As Robert Jervis writes, a plausible scenario for US leaders could be to "to try to communicate that they

are ready for an agreement by letting the Iranian regime know that they are studying how to suspend sanctions in stages and developing various forms of security guarantees".[89]

Security

The Iranian nuclear programme is a rational response to perceived security threats to the country and regime.[90] A sustainable solution to the nuclear dispute must therefore aim to sustainably change these perceptions.

The diplomatic task is therefore to dispel the deep-seated fears on the part of Tehran: that the sanctions are neither aimed at changing the system nor at destroying Iran's economy nor are they meant to punish Iran

The focus is once again on the US. As it did against North Korea[91] and probably also against Muammar al-Gaddafi's Libya, Washington must present Tehran with a credible offer of regime security. In 2003, Tripoli abandoned its WMD programme,[92] and in 2005, Pyongyang had been contractually obliged to dismantle its plutonium reactor (which could not, however, prevent the nuclear test in 2006).

The road map that was prepared by Khatami in 2003 could serve as a basis for the offer to Tehran. It addresses the essential concerns of both sides: Iran would accept the two-state solution in the Israel-Palestine conflict, cease support for militant Palestinian groups and disclose its nuclear programme. In return, Iran would receive explicit security guarantees from the US and the assurance that Iran's sovereign rights to civilian use of nuclear energy would remain intact.

If Tehran assesses the US security guarantee to be credible and alters its perception on the importance of the nuclear programme, adhering to the military nuclear programme would then be irrational. Because Iran's nuclear programme would make the security guarantee of the US impossible, the nuclear programme itself would present a perceived threat to security. The pursuit of atomic weapons would thus be no longer a rational means of self-defence.

The possible measures described focus on the underlying causes of the perceived crisis with Iran and aim to enhance the security of the actors involved (Iran, Israel and the US) without implementing the core tenet of all balancing strategies: to weaken the threatening state. What would be the alternative to such an approach? It would be a perpetual conflict that is constantly at the brink of a devastating war. Here, once again, the current Iranian nuclear crisis resembles

the Cuban Missile Crisis: The warning Khrushchev issued to Kennedy at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis is no less true:

> Mr. President, we and you ought not now to pull on the end of the rope in which you have tied the knot of war, because the more the two of us pull, the tighter the knot will be tied. And a moment may come when that knot will be tied so tight that even he who tied it will not have the strength to untie it. And then it will be necessary to cut that knot.[93]

Endnotes

1   I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for the valuable comments and suggestions to improve the quality of this analysis.

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10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Martin, *Balances of Power Versus Balancing: A Conceptual Analysis*, p. 8.

13 Power or capability is here understood as an aggregate concept that encompasses a state's total re-sources, such as its population, industrial and military capability and technological prowess (Walt, *The Origins of Alliances,* p. 22).

14 He, "Undermining Adversaries", p. 161.

15 Ibid., p. 163.

16 Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, p. 118- 221.

17 Andreas Bock, *(Un-)Sicherheitsfaktor Atombombe. Eine Analyse der Krise um das iranische Nuklearprogramm*, Berlin, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2012; Andreas Bock, "Irans Sicherheit und die Atombombe. Über Rationalität und Wahrnehmung in der Nuklearkrise", *Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2013), pp. 77-100.

18 According to the report of the IAEA on 8 November 2011, there are indications or grey areas for the existence and the continuation of an Iranian nuclear weapons programme (IAEA, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran", at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2011/gov2011-7.pdf [last visited 29 March 2014]). However, Tehran continues to deny that the use of nuclear technology goes beyond civil research. Authors like Michael Lüders also raise concerns of whether Iran really strives for the atomic bomb (Michael Lüders, *Iran: Der falsche Krieg: Wie der Westen seine Zukunft verspielt*, Munich, Beck, 2012, pp. 81-83). For the policy towards Iran, it is irrelevant whether Tehran actually strives for the atomic bomb or merely the mastery of the fuel cycle; the only decisive factor is how the key players, the United States, Israel and the EU, perceive the Iranian policy.

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26 Andreas Bock and Ingo Henneberg, *Why Balancing Fails. Theoretical Reflections on Stephan M. Walt's "Balance of Threat" Theory*, Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik und Außenpolitik (AIPA), Cologne, University of Cologne, 2013.

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29 Russia and China soft-balanced against the US-led NATO war: "Moscow suspended its participation in the Russia-NATO Founding Act and the Partnership for Peace Program; it withdrew its military mission from Brussels and suspended talks on setting up a

NATO information office in Moscow; it attempted to improve its military ties with CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] allies; and it conducted joint military exercises with Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan." (Thazha V. Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of US Primacy", *International Security*, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2005, p. 61). And China, after "the mistaken US bombing of China's embassy in Belgrade on May 8, Beijing cut off all military exchanges and human rights dialogues with the United States and stepped up its strategic collaboration with Moscow, including the activation of a hotline" (Ibid., p. 63).

30 Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy", p. 63.

31 From a current perspective, Khrushchev's decision to secretly deploy nuclear missiles in Cuba appears irrational and highly risky: How could Khrushchev believe that the US would tolerate nuclear missiles that could easily reach Washington in its own backyard? In order to understand why Khrushchev held to the deployment of the missiles in Cuba, even though this was obviously irrational, one must try to understand why he wanted to deploy missiles there in the first place. The same applies to Iran's adherence to the nuclear programme despite the massive, long-standing and sustained international pressure. Here, one must also try to understand why Tehran has apparently decided to resume its nuclear programme and military development.

32 Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, *We All Lost the Cold War*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1994, p. 5.

33 Juan Carlos Rodríguez, *The Inevitable Battle: From the Bay Of Pigs to Playa Girón*, Havana, Editorial Capitán San Luis, 2009, pp. 39-114.

34 Jacinto Valdés-Dapena, *Operation Mongoose: Prelude of a Direct Invasion on Cuba*, Havana, Editorial Capitán San Luis, 2004, pp. 26-61.

35 Nikita Khrushchev, "Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy", at http://www. state.gov/www/about_state/history/volume_vi/exchanges.html [last visited 29 March 2014].

36 Lebow and Stein, *We All Lost the Cold War*, p. 30.

37 Only three days after the successful launch of Sputnik, Khrushchev told the New York Times: "We now have all the rockets we need: long-range rockets, intermediate-range rockets and short-range rockets" (quoted in Ibid., p. 33).

38 Quoted in Ibid.

39 Ibid., p. 34.

40 Quoted in Schelling, *Arms and Influence,* p. 39. But, as Lebow and Stein write, this was just part of the story: "I [Harriman] laughed. He [Khrushchev] asked, 'What are you laughing about?' I said, 'What you're talking about would lead to war, and I know you're too sensible a man to want to have war.' He stopped a minute and looked at me and said, 'You're right'." (Quoted in Lebow and Stein, *We All Lost the Cold War*, p. 390).

41 Roswell L. Gilpatric, "Address Before the Business Council", at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB56/BerlinC6.pdf [last visited 29 March 2014].

42 Bock, "Irans Sicherheit und die Atombombe. Über Rationalität und Wahrnehmung in der Nuklearkrise", pp. 86-87.

43 Lebow and Stein, *We All Lost the Cold War*, p. 5.

44 John F. Kennedy, "President John F. Kennedy's Speech Announcing the Quarantine Against Cuba, October 22, 1962", at https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kencuba.htm [last visited 29 March 2014].

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46 Quoted in Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 68.

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48 Ibid.

49 Ibid., p. 8.

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51 Bock und Henneberg, *Why balancing fails. Theoretical reflections on Stephan M. Walt's "Balance of Threat" Theory.*

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The Soldier and the Turkish State: Toward a General Theory of Civil-Military Relations

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Abstract

The study of civil-military relations remains dominated by Samuel Huntington's 1957 book, The Soldier and the State, *but it is unclear if the work retains external validity when applied in a contemporary context. Turkey's volatile history of civil-military relations makes it a useful case with which to test Huntington's propositions. Specifically, I examine the 28 February Process of 1997 and the subsequent shift in Turkey's civil-military relationship to test the propositions that military autonomy and professionalism are the keys to civilian control of the military. These propositions are supported by underlying assumptions that privilege ideational factors and establish a division between different forms of civilian control. The Turkish case undermines these assumptions and contributes to the pursuit of a more generalisable theory of civil-military relations.*

Key Words

Civil-military relations, 28 February Process, coup, institutions, democratisation.

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Introduction

Samuel Huntington's canonical study of civil-military relations, *The Soldier and the State*, offers sweeping analysis that few in the field have attempted to replicate since the book's publication in 1957.[1] Many studies of civil-military relations seek to build on Huntington's theoretical framework, making minor amendments without seriously challenging the consistency of his theory. Yet, scholars continue to lament the state of civil-military relations theory, often calling for a more generalisable theory.[2] I thus utilise Turkey's record of civil-military relations to determine if Huntington's theory can be applied beyond the American context and to thereby ascertain how a more generalisable theory, if possible, may be produced.

Huntington's theory consists of two main propositions. First, military autonomy breeds military professionalism. Second, a professionalised military will voluntarily stay out of politics. For Huntington, the best (but not the only) way to ensure civilian control of the military is

PERCEPTIONS, Summer 2014, Volume XIX, Number 2, pp. 139-158.

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thus to make the military and civilian spheres largely autonomous, thereby inculcating military professionalism.[3] Enhanced professionalism is alleged to create ideational change in the officer corps, making military intervention unthinkable through a process of socialisation. If this is the case, we should expect more coups and a generally more stormy civil-military relationship when the military lacks autonomy. Moreover, a professional military would not be expected to stage coups d'état.

In addition to the propositions introduced above, an analysis of the Turkish case will allow for an exploration of two assumptions that pervade theories of civil-military relations. First, many assert that ideational factors are the most significant drivers of civil-military relations. Such theorists take their lead from Huntington, for whom military professionalism is the key to civilian control. Second, most theorists have again adopted Huntington's framework by assuming that two different types of civilian control exist. "Objective" and "subjective" civilian control thus provide a starting point for most studies of civil-military relations. Objective control utilises military autonomy to inculcate professionalism, which allows civilians to establish control of the military. Civilians acquire subjective control, the lesser of the two for Huntington, merely through maximising their power in relation to the military. Few have asked if these two key

assumptions are descriptively accurate or conducive to the creation of a general theory of civil-military relations.[4]

Turkey has a tumultuous history of civil-military relations. After experiencing coups in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997, Turkey's political leaders finally appear to have established control of the military. Although the relationship remains precarious, the "post-modern" coup of 1997 (also known as the 28 February Process), the military's last major intervention in Turkish politics, now appears to be an inimitable feat. Yet, the ruling Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP) is exactly the sort of party- a conservative, Islamist one- that has often been assailed by the military. Previous coups targeted conservative leaders- Adnan Menderes in 1960, Süleyman Demirel in 1971 and 1980, and Necmettin Erbakan in 1997. That the AKP's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has remained at the forefront of Turkish politics for over a decade is a testament to his party's consolidation of power over the military. I focus mainly on the 28 February Process and the recent shift in Turkey's civil-military relations to assess the generalisability of Huntington's theory.

Turkey makes a useful, appropriate case study for two reasons. First, its multiple coups provide data that allow for a straightforward examination of the subject. Second, those coups make

Turkey an apparent outlier. Scholars agree that the Turkish military has been autonomous and professional since the foundation of the Republic, conditions that Huntington predicts should produce a positive civil-military relationship.[5] Data richness allows for the testing of Huntington's theory; Turkey's status as an outlier makes it an appropriate case from which to derive a new theory (or the foundations thereof).[6]

> Huntington sets objective control as the goal for all societies and argues that subjective control remains the norm in many non-democratic and democratising states because of "the tendency of many civilian groups still to conceive of civilian control in subjective terms".

I begin by elaborating on Huntington's major contributions to civil-military relations theory, and I briefly survey other theories of civil-military relations to trace Huntington's influence in the field. I then assess Turkey's recent history of civil-military relations to determine if the Turkish case is consistent with Huntington's propositions. I provide an alternative explanation for change in Turkey's civil-military relationship, and I conclude with a discussion of the lessons to be derived from this case study and applied to future theories of civil-military relations.

Huntington's Propositions and Theories of Civil-Military Relations

Samuel Huntington provides the starting point for any discussion of civil-military relations because he was the first to make a serious attempt at crafting a theoretically rich study of the subject.[7] Many others have written on the topic of civil-military relations, but few have matched the scope and resilience of Huntington's work. To briefly define the scope of this subject, "civil-military relations" is defined as "the interaction between the leaders of the armed forces and political elites occupying the key national government positions in the state", while civilian control is "that distribution of decision-making power in which civilians alone have the authority to decide on national politics and their implementation".[8]

In *The Soldier and the State*, Huntington argues that there are two possible patterns of civilian control, subjective and objective. These are presented as "directly opposed", mutually exclusive possibilities.[9] Subjective control requires the empowerment of certain civilian groups or institutions, creating an imbalance of power that favours civilians.

Objective control relies on military autonomy to inculcate professionalism and secure civilian control. Huntington contends that objective control is the ideal form of civilian control and that it is best secured by creating a professional officer corps. That is, the key to establishing a durable system of civilian control is to change the attitudes of military officers.[10] Where this optimal form of civilian control exists, military intervention is unthinkable; civilian control becomes "the only game in town".[11] Huntington sets objective control as the goal for all societies and argues that subjective control remains the norm in many non-democratic and democratising states because of "the tendency of many civilian groups still to conceive of civilian control in subjective terms".[12]

From this argument I derive two testable propositions. First, the military's degree of autonomy should affect its proclivity for coups, with more autonomous militaries less likely to plot or execute coups. Second, increasing military professionalism should similarly reduce the likelihood of coups. That is, Huntington posits an inverse relationship between the degree of military autonomy and professionalism and the likelihood of coups. According to this argument, increased military autonomy and professionalism should play a significant role in Turkey's turn towards civilian control. For Huntington,

professionalism is distinguished by "expertise, responsibility, and corporateness".[13] Expertise denotes the specialised knowledge and skill necessary to become a professional in a given field, responsibility refers to Huntington's requirement that a "professional man" be involved in work that is essential to the maintenance of society and corporateness is the sense of unity shared by a group.[14] Huntington never clearly defines military autonomy, but it can be defined as "an institution's decision-making authority".[15] These definitions have been rightly criticised for being difficult to operationalise and compare across cases, but they provide a starting point that has not moved since 1957.[16] While more precise, measurable definitions would be useful, the creation of such concepts is beyond the purview of this study.

As mentioned above, Huntington's two most basic assumptions are that ideational change is the key to civilian control and that civilian control can take two different forms. Many subsequent works on civil-military relations rely on at least one of these assumptions. Morris Janowitz, a contemporary of Huntington, offers a somewhat different formulation of civil-military relations that relies on the same assumptions. He argues that militaries are heterogeneous and will necessarily be politicised to some degree, meaning that military autonomy cannot be assured.[17] This approach leads

to a different policy prescription but not to a significantly different theory. In Janowitz's telling, a politicised military must be countered by more rigorous civilian oversight, not greater autonomy.[18] While Janowitz differs on the details, he ultimately arrives at the same basic conclusion as Huntington. "The constabulary officer performs his duties… because he is a professional with a sense of self-esteem and moral worth."[19] Janowitz and Huntington both see military professionalism as the key to civilian control; they differ only on the mechanism best suited to foster military professionalism. Again, ideational change is at the core of the argument.

More recent works on civil-military relations have taken many different approaches, but almost all pay homage to Huntington. Alfred Stepan considers factors like public opinion and the character of the military, following the field's typical emphasis on ideational factors.[20] Michael Desch, whose work identifies the threat environment as the key to change in civil-military relations, adopts Huntington's preference for "objective control".[21] Scholars have also introduced less theoretical approaches to examine variation in civil-military relations, assessing the interplay between civilians and the military in war and crises.[22] In doing so, these analyses have shown that a durable system of civilian control requires constant reinforcement, but no general theory of civil-military relations

has emerged from recent scholarship. The few that have attempted to craft general theories of civil-military relations have failed to gained traction, and Huntington retains his prominent place in the field of civil-military relations.[23]

Adopting Huntington's assumptions may be justifiable given the few alternatives, but many scholars have similarly taken the problematic approach of focusing on the United States. While scholars of international relations have understandably focused on great powers, this preference need not be imported to the narrower examination of civil-military relations.[24] Rather, it would be more productive to find cases that have a relatively high degree of variance in patterns of civil-military relations. The United States has experienced little change therein and is likely studied for its successful record of civilian control. Scholars may arrive at a better understanding of the forces that drive civil-military relations by examining cases in which the variables in question display greater change over time. Turkey, with its experience of lengthy periods of both civilian and military dominance and a history that has been punctuated by coups, is an ideal case study with which to test Huntington's propositions.

Some scholars, finding early works on civil-military relations lacking in theoretical rigour or predictive accuracy, have called for a more systematic approach to the study of civil-military

relations, while other have declared that a general theory of civil-military relations is unworkable.[25] Peter Feaver contends that Huntington and Janowitz, "the two deans of American civil-military relations", failed to such an extent that an entirely new theory is needed.[26] Feaver asserts that there are four requirements of such a theory- it must start with the assumption that civilians and the military occupy separate spheres; it must explain "the factors that shape how civilians exercise control of the military"; it must transcend the idea of military professionalism; and it must be a deductive theory.[27] This study does not put forward such a theory but instead seeks to add to Feaver's list and to assist in the creation of a more generalisable theory of civil-military relations.

Framework

I have already established that according to Huntington's theory, concomitant increases in the Turkish military's autonomy and professionalism would be expected to precede the Turkish turn towards civilian control. In order to test this theory, I trace Turkey's civil-military relationship from the post-modern coup of 1997 to the present day, providing qualitative examinations of the Turkish military's autonomy and professionalism. I also examine an alternative explanation to see if it follows the Turkish case more closely than Huntington's theory.

> Civilians must possess power over the officer corps and wield it effectively.

As indicated above, I seek to test Huntington's propositions on his own terms and therefore do not re-define any key words. I refer to the two ideal types of civilian and military control when I mention "patterns of civil-military relations", and when I refer to civilians and militaries, I refer to particular institutions in which policy-making power is vested- in Turkey, for example, the General Staff is the most prominent decision-making body within the Turkish Armed Forces. Other studies have argued for the inclusion of a third actor, the general public, in the definition of civil-military relations.[28] I do not find the arguments for this addition persuasive, however, given the typical national security community's insulation from public pressure.[29] Indeed, Huntington points out that previous attempts to foster a greater connection between the military and society failed.[30]

This study is informed by realist theories of international relations, as is noticeable in my preference for material factors and power considerations. Put plainly, "When civilian government is ineffective, the executive is unable to control the military."[31] Civilians must possess power over the officer corps

and wield it effectively. When I speak of power, however, the term should be understood to represent more than raw capabilities. I emphasise "the ability of one group to influence and control… another group," an ability that in the domestic sphere is often dependent upon mundane items like veto players.[32] Realist theory also informs the generally positivist assumptions and methods I use to advance the search for a parsimonious theory of civil-military relations.

> The Turkish military has long been an autonomous entity, to the extent that Turkey has been described as having "a double-headed political system" split between civilian leaders and the military.

The study of civil-military relations is a necessary venture because democratic consolidation can only occur where civilian control is the dominant pattern of civil-military relations.[33] While some works on civil-military relations emphasise this connection, the literature on democratisation exhibits little interest in the civil-military relationship.[34] Moreover, scholars rarely make specific recommendations on how to manage civil-military relations, often ascribing shifts in the relationship to higher powers at work in the international system or to more nebulous variables over which civilians have no control. By refining theories of civil-military relations, future research may uncover more practicable recommendations on the attainment and maintenance of civilian control.

The Turkish Case

The post-modern coup of 1997 is the focus of this study, but it must first be situated in the context of Turkey's lengthy struggle to gain control of its military.[35] For over 20 years after it became an independent state in 1923, Turkey was controlled by a single party led by former military officers- Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his successor, İsmet İnönü. Once Turkey adopted a competitive, multi-party system, the military began to chafe under direction from conservative politicians. After the conservative Democratic Party (*Demokrat Parti*, DP) defeated Atatürk's Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi,* CHP) in 1950, it took only 10 years for the military to stage its first modern coup in 1960.[36] The military would later overthrow democratically elected but conservative political leaders in 1971 and again in 1980.[37] The latter represented the military's most direct, sustained attempt to shape the political system, and after holding power for three years and introducing a new constitution, the military called for elections in 1983.[38] These three major coups laid the

foundations for the post-modern coup of 1997. I briefly explore this episode, also known as the 28 February Process, before turning again to Huntington's propositions and assessing their validity in light of the Turkish experience.

The conservative Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*, RP) emerged from the 1995 election with the greatest number of seats in parliament, but it held only 28.7% of available seats. Still, the firmly secularist parties that finished second and third failed to form a coalition and were unable to block the RP and its Islamist leader, Necmettin Erbakan, from assuming power.[39] Instead, the runner-up, the True Path Party (*Doğru Yol Partisi*, DYP) formed a tenuous agreement with the RP in which each party leader would act as prime minister for two years of the four-year term.[40] Erbakan was to serve the first two-year term.

With little effective opposition, Erbakan did not have much to fear from political rivals, but his conservative policies antagonised the military. Erbakan's foreign policy consisted largely of overtures to Middle Eastern and North African states- a turn in Turkish foreign policy made possible by the dissolution of the Soviet Union- and his rhetoric often went beyond the bounds deemed acceptable by the military.[41] The military made its misgivings known in a private meeting with Erbakan shortly after he made an official visit to Libya in late 1996.[42] Still, the conflict did not come

to a head until 31 January 1997, when municipal officials in the RP-controlled Sincan district of Ankara organised a meeting to decry alleged Israeli human rights abuses and to express support for Hamas and Iran.[43] The military promptly sent tanks through the streets of Sincan and followed this show of defiance by submitting to the government a number of directives ostensibly intended to secure the secular character of the state. The military enumerated these commands after the National Security Council meeting of 28 February.[44]

> The Turkish military's autonomy has been in steady decline for several years, but this does not appear to have affected its professionalism. The link between these two variables is tenuous at best.

Erbakan refused to accede to the military's demands and resigned amid sustained pressure.[45] Uniquely, though, the military did not directly intervene to overthrow the prime minister. Instead, the military relied upon less direct methods, leaking information (and misinformation) of political scandals to Kemalist media outlets and relying on the support of Kemalist elements of civil society- this is why it received the "post-modern" label.[46] Nonetheless,

the coup hastened the disintegration of Erbakan's RP, and continuing political and economic turmoil prevented other parties from gaining a strong hold on parliament.[47] With new general elections approaching in 2002, however, two factions emerged from the remnants of the RP and sought to rebuild the party, despite the recent memory of military intervention. The outlawed party had split into groups dominated by the "traditionalists" and the "innovators", the respective creators of the Felicity Party (*Saadet Partisi*, SP) and the AKP.[48]

The AKP won 363 of the 550 seats available in the parliamentary elections of 2002 and has dominated Turkey's political system ever since. Most significantly, the party's dominance has extended to the military. Though the civil-military relationship is still troubled- the so-called Sledgehammer Plot uncovered in 2010 is among the most visible signs of these tensions- it is markedly better than in decades past when the military could easily depose any civilian governments.[49] Despite the military's occasional discontent with the state of affairs, the AKP has rebuffed any pressure the military has brought to bear. That is, it has assumed control of the military. Civilians alone are now in charge of policy-making in Turkey. I now return to Huntington's propositions to determine if increased military autonomy and professionalism played any role in Turkey's turn towards civilian control.

Huntington's first proposition is that increased military autonomy yields greater military professionalism. The Turkish military has long been an autonomous entity, to the extent that Turkey has been described as having "a double-headed political system" split between civilian leaders and the military.[50] Since the AKP came to power, however, a variety of legal and institutional reforms have made the military less autonomous. These changes include greater civilian oversight of military promotions, the removal of military officers from certain governmental institutions and constitutional reforms designed to reduce the political power of military institutions like the National Security Council.[51] Moreover, this trend is continuing. If the AKP succeeds in its attempt to craft and pass a new constitution, it may ensure that the Chief of the General Staff, who currently reports directly to the prime minister, reports in the future to the defence minister.[52] The Turkish military's autonomy has been in steady decline for several years, but this does not appear to have affected its professionalism. The link between these two variables is tenuous at best.

Huntington's second proposition holds that a professional military will voluntarily stay out of politics. Professionalism in the Turkish military has been a constant, however, and this has not prevented it from overthrowing civilian governments.[53] Turkey inherited

its army from the Ottomans, for whom the matters of military professionalism and modernisation drove major reforms in the 19th century.[54] Modern Turkey's military officers believed that it was a professional obligation to intervene "whenever the civilian politicians had made too great a mess of things".[55] Indeed, one scholar argues that in the Turkish case, greater professionalism may have undermined rather than solidified civilian control.[56] Any analyst seeking to impugn the professionalism of the Turkish military would have to define the term in a tautological manner, labelling any military that stages a coup unprofessional. Utilising Huntington's own criteria to determine professionalism (expertise, responsibility and corporateness), it must be acknowledged that the Turkish military has been generally professional even while orchestrating coups.

An Alternative Explanation

The Turkish case does not match Huntington's expectations. Turkey's turn towards civilian control was made while military autonomy was in decline and while professionalism was held constant, bringing the generalisability of Huntington's theory into question. The circumstances surrounding the 28 February Process and the AKP's consolidation of power point instead to the importance of institutional

arrangements in establishing an effective civil-military relationship.

> Economic and political stability has strengthened civilian institutions in relation to the military.

Although most theories of civil-military relations borrow from Huntington by using a framework that privileges ideational factors, some focus on institutions. Samuel Finer, for example, argues that patterns of civil-military relations can be explained with reference to different "levels of political culture", a term that initially appears to be another ideational factor.[57] His measure of political culture, however, is based on the level of coherence of a country's institutions.[58] As with most other variables identified in theories of civil-military relations, Finer's measure may be difficult to operationalise, but it is clear that it is based on the relative strength of civilian institutions. This gauge is given a more accurate name- institutional development- in Huntington's later work, *Political Order in Changing Societies*.[59] A high level of institutional development is characterised by strong political institutions that can repel or deter military intervention, allowing civilians to assume and maintain control of the

military.[60] Institutional development may prvide the best explanation for Turkey's assertion of civilian control.

Turkey was plagued by political fragmentation, economic instability and polarisation for much of the multi-party period.[61] It is factors like these that prevented civilians from establishing control of the military. Indeed, the AKP has effectively combated such problems, spurring steady economic growth, weathering the global economic crisis and gaining enough popular support for it to form one of Turkey's rare non-coalition governments.[62] The party's policies have induced a measure of financial and political stability not seen in Turkey since the days of Atatürk. This has strengthened civilians and allowed them to reduce the power of the military. Although the military responded negatively when the AKP first began to assert control of the military- many high-ranking officers resigned and scores were convicted for allegedly plotting a coup- the Turkish government is now able to thwart coup attempts and retain widespread public support while doing so.[63] This is not because of any fundamental change in the way Turkish officers think about their duties, but because there is little the military can realistically do to challenge a generally successful, stable government.[64] Economic and political stability has strengthened civilian institutions in relation to the military.

> A national military's organisational structure typically makes it a relatively powerful entity from the start, forcing civilians to develop robust, stable institutions if they are to compete.

Huntington's two propositions fail to explain how Turkey has instituted civilian control of its military, pointing to flaws in his theory's underlying assumptions. The first assumption, that ideational factors like military professionalism are the most significant drivers of change in civil-military relations, fails in light of the Turkish case. As mentioned above, the Turkish military has always been considered professional. The Turkish military's professionalism and the weakness of Turkey's prior civilian governments would suggest that civil-military relations are not about a state's "intellectual climate", as Huntington contends, but its institutional framework.[65] Indeed, Turkish political institutions have been strengthened by several years of economic growth and declining political fragmentation. Civilian power relative to the military has been growing, and Turkish politicians have introduced reforms to further accentuate this power disparity. Material factors, not ideational ones, are ultimately responsible for the shifts in institutional development that have

enabled the Turkish government to gain control of its military.

Huntington's second main assumption is that civilian control can be divided into two basic types, objective and subjective. Objective control, the ideal form of civilian control, relies on military autonomy and professionalism to keep the military out of politics, while civilians can assume subjective control by merely increasing their power in relation to the military. Indeed, the Turkish case might look like one in which only subjective control exists. I argue, however, that this division is unhelpful in crafting a theory of civil-military relations and that the ideal types of civilian control and military control are more useful.

The line between subjective and objective control is hazy at best, and even when they are taken as two separate forms of civilian control, it is not entirely clear how a state benefits from the establishment of objective control. Huntington wrote *The Soldier and the State*, after all, due to his fear that the Cold War would foist upon the United States a crisis in civil-military relations.[66] Objective control is supposedly founded on an ideational shift that makes military intervention anathema to the officer corps, yet it apparently cannot defray conflict between civilians and the military. There is no point at which civilian control becomes irreversibly entrenched. In reality, objective and subjective control look very much alike,

and the broader term of civilian control seems better suited to describe the desired basis of civil-military relations. The dichotomy of subjective and objective control offers a distinction without a difference, and future theories of civil-military relations can replace these terms without sacrificing analytical clarity.

> Without civilian control of the military, democratisation is unlikely to succeed, and the most effective way to ensure civilian control of the military is to strengthen civilian institutions.

As indicated above, Huntington's later work, although it relegates civil-military relations to a supporting role, show a greater appreciation for the role of effective, legitimate political institutions in discouraging military intervention.[67] The contrast between subjective and objective control fades too as Huntington moves farther from *The Soldier and the State*. Yet, his initial preference for ideational factors and different forms of civilian control has been replicated in many subsequent works on civil-military relations. While some recent works have begun to focus on institutions and other material considerations, Huntington's assumptions still significantly influence the field.[68]

Future theories of civil-military relations would do well to abandon Huntington's assumptions and focus more specifically on the balance of power between civilian and military institutions. A national military's organisational structure typically makes it a relatively powerful entity from the start, forcing civilians to develop robust, stable institutions if they are to compete. A glimpse at Turkey's lengthy history of economic instability and political fragmentation- two problems that have been largely alleviated under the AKP's rule- would suggest that such factors play a larger role in shaping patterns of civil-military relations that do ideational factors like military professionalism. Previous theories of civil-military relations have often focused on the military and its characteristics; future theories ought to focus on drivers of change in the relative strength of civilian and military institutions.

Conclusion

Contrary to Huntington's propositions, a careful study of the Turkish case suggests that military autonomy and professionalism are not enough to ensure civilian control of the military. Rather, the balance of power between civilian and military institutions is of greater consequence. This undermines the two main assumptions that Huntington and his successors have made regarding civil-

military relations- that is, the assumptions that ideational factors are the keys to change in civil-military relations and that civilian control is best described as objective or subjective. This conclusion yields two main recommendations, one for scholars and the other for policy-makers.

> In order to establish a durable imbalance of power in their favour, governments must pay closer attention to material factors than to ideational factors like military professionalism.

For scholars and students of civil-military relations, this study suggests that a new, more generalisable theory of civil-military relations will need to depart from the propositions and assumptions mentioned above. Huntington's theory does not travel well. Others have already described some requirements of any new theory of civil-military relations. I add to that list by emphasising the primacy of material factors in establishing civilian control of the military.[69] Though there is unlikely to be a single factor that contributes always and everywhere to civilian control, from the Turkish experience I conclude that economic and political factors are likely to be more important than military autonomy and professionalism. Future research is

needed to more clearly identify which factors are the most significant drivers of change in civil-military relations and to incorporate these variables into a general theory of civil-military relations.

For policy-makers, my conclusions suggest that efforts to promote democratic consolidation ought to focus on strengthening civilian institutions. Without civilian control of the military, democratisation is unlikely to succeed, and the most effective way to ensure civilian control of the military is to strengthen civilian institutions. Though this seems intuitive, studies of civil-military relations rarely yield policy recommendations focusing on material factors that can be manipulated by policy-makers. In the Turkish context, for instance, political fragmentation might be reduced by changing election laws, particularly those relating to Turkey's electoral threshold.[70] In relation to democracy promotion as an aspect of foreign policy, much has been made of military-to-military engagement as a means to inculcate professionalism in foreign armies.[71] Unfortunately, such policies will not prevent civilians from being overthrown if they prove to be incompetent. If democracy promotion is to be used as a tool of statecraft, such efforts should simply focus on strengthening civilian institutions- political parties, the judiciary, electoral regimes and the like- but such efforts remain a risky business.[72]

Future theories of civil-military relations must emphasise institutional development. Given the centralised, hierarchical nature of the military, institutional arrangements must be weighted in favour of civilians. In order to establish a durable imbalance of power in their favour, governments must pay closer attention to material factors than to ideational factors like military professionalism. This explanation for shifts in civil-military relations removes the field's traditional emphasis on the character of the military and places the focus on the strength of competing institutions. To adapt Kenneth Waltz's maxim on war, coups occur when there is nothing to prevent them.[73] The onus is on civilians to ensure that militaries do not have such an opportunity.

Endnotes

*   The author would like to thank Roger E. Kanet, Joseph M. Parent, Bradford R. McGuinn, Alexander R. Arifianto, and Daren G. Fisher for tireless assistance with earlier versions of this article.

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3   Huntington, *The Soldier and the State,* pp. 83-85.

4   Ronald H. Coase, "How Should Economists Choose?", in *Essays on Economics and Economists*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1995, pp. 15-33. Coase argues for the necessity of accurate assumptions.

5   Mehran Kamrava, "Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 115, No. 1 (January 2000), pp. 67-92; Ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu, "The Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Political Autonomy", *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 29, No. 2 (January 1997), pp. 151-166.

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68 Perlmutter, "The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army", p. 389. Perlmutter offers his own term: political institutionalisation.

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Book Reviews

Greece, Financialization and the EU: The Political Economy of Debt and Destruction

This is an ambitious and thought provoking account of the Greek financial crisis, a crisis which has attracted widespread attention in recent years due to its extremely costly social and human consequences. Standard accounts of the Greek crisis tend to emphasise either the institutional weaknesses of Greek's domestic political economy or the design failures of the eurozone system, with its costly consequences for the European periphery. There are also accounts that try to combine the interplay of domestic political economy and external factors to provide a more complete and nuanced picture of the recent Greek crisis.

What is novel in the present book is that it attempts to locate the current crisis in a broader historical and global context using the lenses of Marxian political economy. In retrospect, there are two elements that represent distinct and unique contributions to the literature. The first argument is that we need to understand the Greek crisis not as a purely local national level phenomenon or even a regional level phenomenon. Both the eurozone crisis and the specific case of the Greek crisis should be analysed within the broader context of neo-liberal globalisation, with "financialisation" constituting its most distinctive defining element, as well as the profound shifts in the centre of economic and political power taking place in the current era from west to east. The "global fault lines" approach developed by Fouskas and Gökay in an earlier study is used here as a basis for understanding the specificities of the Greek situation.

The second argument is that class structure matters and there is a need to understand the nature of the Greek capitalist class, and its relation to the Greek state and the nature of its alliance with the transnational capitalist classes, as a basis for understanding the historical roots of the distorted pattern of economic development in Greece that eventually culminated in a major economic and financial crisis. Indeed, the authors make a significant effort to show that the structural weaknesses of the Greek economy are not novel. They have been built up over time and the process of integration into the European Union and subsequently into the European Monetary Union have aggravated these basic structural deficiencies. The book

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is quite rich in terms of the accounts of the evolution of Greek political economy over long stretches of historical time going back well into the early 19th century.

The over-ambitious nature of the book and the sweeping nature of some its statements also open it to criticism. For example, the link between the emerging "global fault lines" and the Greek crisis needs further elaboration to convince the sceptics. A central question that comes to mind is whether the "global" element is overplayed given the highly differential impact of the eurozone crisis, both on its Southern and Eastern periphery. How do we explain the fact that Poland has emerged quite strong from the eurozone crisis? Similarly, how do we account for the fact that countries like Spain and Italy, although deeply affected by the eurozone crisis, did not experience the same degree of collapse and disintegration as in the case of Greece? Another issue to be raised is whether the authors are too dismissive of the European integration project. We should not underestimate the enormous benefits brought upon by the process of European integration on the countries of the European periphery, especially on the path to full-membership, in terms of economic development and the consolidation of liberal democratic norms. The transformative impact of the EU has been tremendous both in Southern Europe and the Eastern Europe at different times. Even Turkey, a unique case with uncertain membership prospects, has benefited

from the transformative capacity of the EU, especially in the late 1990s and the early 2000s. There is no doubt that the impact of EU on the Greek economy is mixed, with the eurozone clearly creating moral hazard problems and disincentives for undertaking long-term economic reforms designed to create a more competitive and sustainable structure. At the same time, we should not underestimate the positive impact of the EU in the spheres of economic and democratic development.

Two additional critiques relate to class analysis and policy relevance of the book. First, although the Greek capitalists and upper classes have benefited disproportionately from lop-sided growth, is it also not true that large segments of the Greek society also benefited from an overextended welfare state and were quite resistant to reform? Second, what can policy-makers, faced with difficult and immediate choices, learn in concrete terms from such over-arching global and historical accounts of major crises, such as the current Greek experience?

In spite of these criticisms, the book deserves a wide audience given its provocative thesis and its attempt to move beyond purely economistic accounts of and take into account the broader social and political context to provide an integrated, holistic explanation of the current Greek crisis.

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Troubled Partnership: US-Turkish Relations in an Era of Global Geopolitical Change

By Stephen F. Larrabee
Santa Monica California: RAND Corporation, 2010, 162 pages, ISBN 9780833047564.

The relationship between Turkey and the United States has been the subject of many books and articles. Although bilateral relations can be traced back to even the Ottoman period, the two countries upgraded their relationship to a strategic partnership right after the Second World War and the start of the Cold War. Although this relationship had its ups and downs, during the Cold War Turkey was protected and supported by the West and served Western interests in that it helped prevent the expansion of Communism. In the post-Cold War era the relationship between the US and Turkey got even stronger, while relations between Turkey and Europe lost momentum, as Turkey came to fulfil another role, that of the "bridge" between the West and the East. Example of this new "identity" was the Gulf War against Iraq and the assistance that Turkey provided to the US Army. This partnership, however, reached its lowest level in March, 2003 when US-led NATO forces asked for permission to launch attacks against Iraq through Turkey soil and the Turkish parliament voted against it.

The strategic partnership has had serious strains ever since, and Stephen F. Larrabee's book highlights these strains and focuses on this troubled partnership so that he can warn Washington that, if not handled with extra caution, Turkey "could be lost". The purpose of the book, as the author writes, is to explore the sources of these strains and their future implications on relations. There are nine chapters in the book, with a tenth that serves as a conclusion.

In the introduction Larrabee talks about the origins of the partnership between the US and Turkey, which started at the end of the Second World War, and was made stronger in 1952, the year that Turkey joined NATO. In the second chapter, the author talks about the transition of the US-Turkish partnership from Turkey as "barrier" to Communism to it being a "bridge" between the West and the East. The end of the Cold War did not lead to a loosening but rather to a strengthening of bilateral ties. Turkey became even more important for the US. Washington saw Turkey as a "stabilising force" as it was a Muslim country in an unbalanced and volatile Middle East and Central Asia. Special focus is given here on the American base in Incirlik (in southern Turkey) and

its role in providing logistical support from/to Iraq and Afghanistan. In such an unpredictable environment, the US and Turkey need each other. In Chapter 3, Larrabee explains how the relations of US and Turkey deteriorated due to the parliamentary vote that did not allow US forces access through Turkey to launch attacks on Iraq. The Iraq war that led to the ousting of Saddam Hussein also brought up some new dangers and threats for Turkey, such as sectarian violence and Kurdish nationalism. The author states that Turkey was "one of the biggest losers of the US invasion of Iraq". Both the US and Turkey started losing faith and trust in each other due to this war.

In Chapter 4, the author talks about Turkey's efforts in diversifying its foreign policy, especially in the Middle East, and the growing independence in its diplomacy. It describes briefly Turkey's relations with its neighbours in the Middle East. Special focus is given to Syria and Iran but since the book was written right before the Arab Awakening it is quite outdated. In Chapter 5, the author describes relations between Russia and Turkey. He starts by saying that in the post-Cold War era the Turkic former republics of USSR were seen by then-Turkey's President Turgut Özal as a new frontier for expanding Turkish interests, but soon this dream collapsed as this region was still within the Russian sphere of influence. He focuses on the fear in the West (especially the US) that Turkey may start seeing Russia as a

security alternative to NATO, but that was highly unlikely due to the mistrust that is embedded in Turkish historical consciousness and most importantly because such a move would be a blow to the traditional Kemalist policy of Westernisation. Larrabbe believes that such an alliance would be "anathema" for the Turkish military as well.

In Chapter 6, the author talks about the chronically problematic relations between Europe and Turkey, and the fact that Turkey is still viewed by many in Europe as the "other". In moments of deterioration of Euro-Turkish relations, Turkey has always turned to the US for support but now this is more difficult because of the troubled partnership. So again he is expressing his fears that if the EU permanently closes the door to Ankara, then Turkey could abandon the West and seek alternative options. In Chapter 7, Larrabee focuses on defence cooperation and argues that the US should get engaged in a broad strategic dialogue with Ankara about the future use of military bases in Turkey, especially the Incirlik base. He fears that due to the currently strained relationship Ankara will be highly sensitive about allowing full access to the US military for the Middle Eastern contingencies. According to the author, Incirlik should be kept as it is one of the most important bases in the whole region. In Chapter 8, the focus is turned to Turkey's domestic affairs and Ankara's efforts to fully democratise the country. When the ruling Justice and

Development Party took over in 2002, a wave of reforms started, but in recent years the democratisation process has slowed down. The US should encourage Turkey to revitalise the whole process. In Chapter 9, the author makes some predictions about Turkey's future, and he describes four possible future scenarios: a pro-Western Turkey fully integrated into the EU, an "Islamisised" Turkey, a nationalist Turkey and a possible military intervention. Finally, in Chapter 10, Larrabee concludes that given the geopolitical changes that are taking place today in Turkey's surrounding regions, it is vital that the two countries remain close allies. Revitalising the US-Turkish partnership should be considered a top US policy priority; Obama's visit in 2009 right after he took office shows exactly this. But the author believes that actions are needed more than words and official visits.

The purpose of this book may have been to highlight the strains in the partnership between US and Turkey and offer suggestions of how to overcome them but we should not neglect the fact that the book was published by the RAND Corporation, which is a think tank that gets financing from the US government. Stephen F. Larrabee is the Distinguished Chair in European Security at the RAND Corporation. The real aim of this book is to warn Washington that such a strategic ally should not be lost or should not be driven to look for other security alternatives in that such a probability would harm the American interests in the area. Keeping Turkey as a close ally, Larrabee suggests, should be made US policy because of the interests that are at stake. I recommend this book to both students and practitioners of international relations who are interested in this region, as it will show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the US needs Turkey more than Turkey needs the US.

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The Fall of the US Empire: Global Fault-Lines and the Shifting Imperial Order

By Vassilis K. Fouskas and Bülent Gökay
London: Pluto Press, 2012, 196 pages, ISBN: 9780745326443.

The debate on the United States (US) as a declining power has been around since the late 1960s. It was reinvigorated in the 2000s, mainly due to the rise of China, and gained pace with the US led global financial crisis. Among those scholarly works, it is worth paying attention to *The Fall of the US Empire:*

Global Fault-Lines and the Shifting Imperial Order with its theoretically in-depth international political economy (IPE) perspective, "global fault-lines" conceptualisation and historical insights.

The principal aim of the book is to investigate the roots of the global financial crisis that hit "the Anglo-American heartland" in the summer of 2007. It argues that the US has been a declining empire since the late 1960s and its policies of globalisation/financialisation and neoliberalism- which the authors call "financial statecraft" I (1971-91) and II (1991-2011)- have failed to hinder this decline and/or global power shift to the east, particularly to China and India. Even though the authors appreciate the usefulness of Trotsky's notion of "uneven and combined development" (UCD) to assess the power shift, they criticise the notion's Eurocentrism and prioritisation of global economic structure at the expense of political, societal, cultural and ideational ones. Going beyond UCD, as a more heuristic and all-encompassing concept, they propose "global fault-lines" to discern totality across historical time and space, whose elements/instances (political, economic, cultural, ideational, societal, geopolitical, geographical and ecological) are discursively interconnected, articulated and mingled, invariably generating political and economic change, global hegemonic transitions and power shifts (pp. xviii-xx).

Indeed, the methodological chapter elaborates on "global fault-lines" by critically reviewing major studies in the field of IPE, such as those of Robert Brenner, Leo Panitch and Giovanni Arrighi, to test its theses. The book proceeds with the second chapter that critically analyses the period between 1944-1971 known as "the Golden Age of Capitalism", in which the foundations of globalization/neoliberalism were laid through the Bretton Woods regime. The third and fourth chapters examine the Anglo-American world's adoption of "financial statecraft" in the periods of 1971-1991 (President Nixon's closure of the gold standard of the Bretton Woods regime in 1971, Reaganism/Thatcherism) and 1991-2011 (currency devaluations, shock therapy, the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, financial innovations, etc.) to prevent its decline. Not to mention global financial vulnerabilities as revealed in the global financial crisis, those financialisation/neoliberalism measures have failed to address the root of the problems, which is a long-term fall and failure to recover the rate of profit, and the outsourcing of employment and industrial investment to the global east. The fifth chapter examines how this failure has set the stage for the power shift to the global East- particularly China and India along with Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia and Turkey, as Andre Gunder Frank anticipated in his seminal work *Reorient* (1998). This chapter also argues that the global

financial crisis has accelerated this shift to the east. Following on from the previous chapters that looked at how new policies caused financial vulnerabilities around the globe, the sixth chapter examines two other vulnerabilities: resource depletion (e.g. end of cheap oil, production peak) and environmental degradation (e.g. climate change). The conclusion chapter outlines the main findings and underlines an urgent need for a new economic system geared to sustainable development and proposes a new socialist alternative addressing the human needs of the many, rather than ensuring privileges of the few.

In many ways, through its encompassing "global fault-lines" conceptualisation, this book provides useful insights on, to use the term of Zbigniew Brzezinski, the "unprecedented instabilities" shaking today's international arena such as trajectory of the Arab "spring" in the Middle East. Most probably due to its publication date, the book has missed a great opportunity to test its theses, particularity those on global vulnerabilities, on the social laboratory that is the Middle East. Nevertheless, the reader would have to evaluate the usefulness of "global fault-lines" concept with its emphasis on historical structures at the expense of agency and/or domestic factors.

Turning to China's rise thesis, from a modernist perspective, a critical reader could be sceptical about the sustainability of the rise of China under an authoritarian communist party

regime. Arguably, it will be tough for democratic China to attract sufficient foreign direct investment (FDI) to keep its current growth rates of around 10% as workers demand higher living standards.

Leaving aside China and India, despite their differing security perceptions and their domestic socio-economic structures and political systems, the book does not offer much hint about the prospects for emerging economies (Brazil, Russia, Indonesia, South Africa and Turkey) to contend with the American imperial order. Why would NATO member Turkey with its fragile economy prefer to challenge the status quo provided by the American imperial order? Apart from aggression in Georgia and Ukraine, and now under heavy Western sanctions, how would energy-rich Russia with its declining resource production contest the US in the long-term?

This point brings us to the American-led "unconventional energy revolution" in shale gas and oil production that will likely dramatically change global energy trends in the coming years, as recently argued by the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the Energy Information Agency (EIA). Nonetheless, the book does not have a persuasive counter-argument against this energy revolution that tremendously favours the US. Without a doubt, this dirty energy revolution is closely related with environmental degradation, particularly climate change and water scarcity. Related chapter of

the book on energy/environment could have further elaborated on this nexus of energy-water-environment.

Against this backdrop, and as an exit strategy for these vulnerabilities (financialisation, resource depletion and environmental degradation), the final chapter hints at a socialist vision to attain global sustainable human development. However, it leaves the reader to contemplate how it would be possible to materialise this radical transformation under current global political economic structures.

All in all, going beyond realism's shallow description of global politics as "the tragedy of great powers", the book's historical/structural political economic perspective in along with its "global fault-lines" conceptualisation provides an encompassing tool to better understand "the tragedy of globalisation". In this respect, it offers a widened perspective for international relations students to explore structural roots of today's socio-economic problems.

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Another Empire? A Decade of Turkey's Foreign Policy under the Justice and Development Party

Turkish foreign policy significantly changed after the Justice and Development Party (JDP) won the 2002 elections, and this change has been the hallmark of the last decade. *Another Empire? A Decade of Turkey's Foreign Policy under the Justice and Development Party* was written to understand the developments and changes in Turkish foreign policy after the JDP took the helm. In addition, this collection of essays seeks to explain the domestic foundations of Turkey's international

relations and the "reform choreography" of conservative change in the JDP era, which has created the context for Turkish foreign policy making. This book examines two important subject areas: the first are the allegations that Turkey's foreign policies have had a "change of axis", and the second relates to claims that the JDP's foreign policies are "neo-Ottoman" and geared at recreating the Empire, despite Davutoğlu's criticism of such an idea. Other important subjects in this book concern relations with

Middle Eastern countries and discussions around Turkey's model country role, or in another words its "big brother role".

This edited book includes three parts and 12 different chapters. The first part focuses on Turkey's transformation, examining new classes, identities, actors and networks. E. Fuat Keyman emphasises the proactivisim in Turkish foreign policy and he argues that "Turkey is a model country or an aspiration for the future of democracy and Turkey is the most successful example today of a secular and constitutional democracy within a Muslim society". Keyman describes three main challenges for Turkish foreign policy and its proactivism. He also underlines the significance of realism and sustainability in foreign policy. According to him foreign policy must be complemented with realistic strategies to be effective and sustainable.

Ayşe Kadıoğlu, who is the other editor of this book, examines the JDP's reform process. She highlights the importance of National Outlook Movement (NOM) traditions and the EU in the creation of the JDP's reform agenda. In another article Nora Fisher emphasises Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoğlu's strategic depth and zero-problem-with-neighbours doctrine. Examining the democratic depth argument, the author says that "Davutoğlu's strategic depth doctrine played a pivotal role in guiding Turkey's transformation over the past decade and with the strategic depth

doctrine's historical and geopolitical foundations help elucidate Turkey's place in the world and its relations with Balkans, Caucasus and ME as well as with Europe and the West".

In chapter four Kerem Öktem looks at Nye's *Soft Power*, using Nye's ideas to examine Turkey's soft power and its different modes of projection. Öktem also tries to explain Turkish soft power by using the Yunus Emre Foundation as an example. He categorises soft power into four areas- "ideological power, development aid, religious network and popular culture"- and underlines the importance of TIKA and the Gülen movement. At the end of the first part Mehmet Karlı analyses global economic power balances, the evolution of Turkish foreign trade and the growth in Turkish foreign trade. In the end he provides important data about Turkey's economic situation, validating his claim that "Turkey is the second largest economy in the region".

In the second part's first chapter Joshua Walker discusses Turkey's relations with the United States in a changing world. While Turkey is a G-20 member and has a seat in the UN Security Council and the European Union, it is also chair of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. This shows that Turkey is an autonomous actor in the region and is also seeking greater regional and global influence. Despite the ups and downs if we look relations between this two

countries, Turkey continues to offer the US numerous opportunities for strategic cooperation and thus remains a critically important partner in the Middle East.

Chapter seven looks at what's wrong in Turkey's relations with the EU. Nilgun Eralp and Atila Eralp argue that the turning point in relations began when the accession negotiations between Turkey and the European Union began in 2005. In addition, the authors discuss the role of the Cyprus issue: "with the membership of the Republic of Cyprus the EU started to lose its catalyst role in the resolution of the Cyprus problem, while the persistence of the issue began to affect the Turkey-EU relationship rather negatively".

In chapters eight and nine Onton Anastasakis's and Dimitrar Bechev's articles examines Turkey's assertive presence in Southeast Europe and they focus on identity politics and elite pragmatism and relations with Greece, Cyprus and the other Balkan countries. For Anastasaki, the "JDP significantly increased its presence in southeast Europe over the past few years and with diplomatic initiatives, mediation, strategic economic investments and stronger cultural ties and Turkey tried to establish itself as a key regional player". The JDP adopted a more forceful ideological justification for Turkey's multi-dimensional foreign policy, promoting an ambitious narrative of Turkey's historical links, cultural

affinities and economic interdependence with the Balkans. In last part in his chapter Bechev gives information about trade, investment and interest in popular culture and tourism with the Balkan countries.

In the third part of book El Fadl examines relations between Egypt, Syria and Turkey. The author looks at the viability of the Turkish model for Arab countries and sees Turkey as an emerging middle power in the Arab World. The author also underlines Turkey's soft power approaches and civil society actors. She finishes her chapter with Gamil Matar's argument regarding Turkey's role: "it is too early to predict how Turkey's role will unfold, but what is certain is that the new players are neither entirely from outside nor from among us".

Chapter 11 outlines the determinants in Turkish-Iranian relations, and looks at the role of soft power. The author examines the opinion of Turkey on the Iranian nuclear programme and he also looks at energy ties. In this chapter we also can find useful data about trade and the economic relationship between Iran and Turkey. In the last chapter of the book, Görgülü examines the historical rapprochement with Armenia. In the epilogue Kalypso Nicloidis from Oxford University writes about Turkish foreign policy's new orientations.

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The Russian Origins of the First World War

By Sean McMeekin
Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2011, 344 pages, ISBN: 9780674062108.

As the centenary of the First World War will be commemorated this year, the debate on the causes of the war continues among scholars. With regards to the Ottoman Empire, the most recent study in English that benefited from Ottoman archives in addition to other sources has been produced by Mustafa Aksakal.[1] He challenged the traditional view that the Ottoman Empire went into the war due to the pro-German attitudes and adventurist character of the leading political figures. Rather, Aksakal showed it was because the empire was in a grave situation, expecting Russian hostilities and unable to obtain weapons and credits from elsewhere. Though following the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, the new regime published a huge collection of material (consisting of dispatches, official correspondence, memoranda, etc.) to condemn the "imperialist war" of the *ancien régime* and its secret diplomacy, Russian military archives were left virtually untouched. This was partly due to the language barrier with regards to Turkish and Russian material. In addition, Russian state archives were inaccessible to most researchers from abroad. However, this situation started to change with the end of the Cold War.

In this vein, Sean McMeekin's *The Russian Origins of the First World War* aims to meet this challenge. The author has used published and unpublished Russian archival material while also benefiting from other states' archives, memoires and other sources. An especially important contribution to the current literature is the unpublished material from the Russian military archives. By relying on these sources, the author also tries to accomplish another important task of deconstructing and challenging the current understanding surrounding the war guilt issue. The view that considers Germany responsible for the war suggests that Germany used the assassination of Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand on 28 July 1914 in Sarajevo as a pretext for its bid for world domination. The main defender of this argument was German scholar Fritz Fischer, who published his book *Germany's Aims in the First World War* by relying on German archival material.[2] Even though Fischer's views, which solely blamed German aggression, were later criticised to some degree, in the popular understanding since then it has become accepted that Germany was the only actor responsible for the war. As the war was seen an "automatic war" due to mobilisation plans, McMeekin also

challenges that point and proves that it was Russia who started mobilisation secretly first as early as 24 July 1914 (war was officially declared on 29 July).

McMeekin challenges this traditional view and tries to bring Russia's role to the fore in the mobilisation process and designs for partitioning the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires. In the author's view, war was welcomed by Russia and regarded as an opportunity to reach its objectives. It was supported by France financially in the pre-war era and improved its railway networks and industrial base and strengthened its armed forces. According to the author, the First World War could very easily labelled "The War of the Ottoman Succession". The author utilizes the example of Russian memoranda to support his argument, one of which was prepared in 1895, on the seizure of Istanbul and the Turkish Straits through the landing of an amphibious force. Russia was encouraged by the Armenian mass protests that took place in 30 September 1895 in Istanbul which ended with armed violence. Following its defeat by Japan and the annihilation of an important part of its naval forces in 1905, Russia had for some time given up the idea. It was again revived following the 1908 Revolution and the schemes for modernising the Ottoman armed forces employed by the Committee of Union and Progress administration created great concern in Russia. The modernisation of the Ottoman military would make the task harder for Russia. In a Russian General Staff memorandum of October 1910 it was stated that an amphibious force would land after an uprising of Christian minorities in Istanbul.

The abundance of archival material provides deep insights into the Russian decision-making processes and allows the reader to understand Russia's ambitious plans. On 21 February 1914, five months before the outbreak of war, there was a high-level special committee meeting in St. Petersburg that dealt with the plans to seize Istanbul. It was accepted that on M+5 (five days after mobilisation), a Russian force of 30,000-50,000 moving on ships from Odessa would land near Istanbul. However the setbacks in other fronts necessitated the postponement of this plan. It was Russia that demanded Britain not deliver the dreadnoughts built for the Ottoman Empire in the British shipyards (the *Sultan Osman* and *Reşadiye*) in order not to change the naval balance in the Black Sea. As the rest is well known, these ships were expropriated by Britain and then Germany sent *Goeben* and *Breslau*, which entered into Ottoman service and were renamed *Yavuz* and *Midilli*. Even while the Ottoman Empire was not at war in late September, Russia was intriguing with the British and French over its ambitions on the Straits and Istanbul.

As France faced a serious German offensive, it always had to come to terms with Russia as it was afraid that Russia would sign a separate peace treaty with Germany. The leverage Russia had over its

allies made them accept Russian territorial demands and the conduct of war because to the displeasure of France, Russia was more interested in beating Austrian forces rather than focusing on the German front in Eastern Prussia. The Gallipoli campaign of Britain and France was organized on Russia's demands and it was agreed that Russia would force the Bosphorus in coordination with the Allied landings in Gallipoli but the promised Russian contribution never came. Instead, Russia demanded that it should send a force only after its allies invaded Istanbul.

With regards to the Russian share in the tragedies of the Armenian population, the author uses Russian material to show that the events in Eastern Anatolia were organised by Russia and Armenian groups were armed secretly to serve its war aims. The most interesting point is that Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Sazonov, who always argued that the Armenians formed a majority in Eastern Anatolia before the war in order to force the Ottomans to grant autonomy to these provinces, changed his mind after the Russian forces invaded the region, and in his correspondence with Grand Duke Nikola (Supreme Commander in the Caucasus Front) instead opposed the idea of autonomy and argued that they did not constitute a majority in the region and

demanded strict control on their activities.

In conclusion, McMeekin's detailed study has illuminated many less well-known parts of the story and challenged the traditional myths that still survive both in the current scholarship and popular imagination. He showed that both Germany and Russia had imperial ambitions. He provides convincing arguments based on concrete proof such as published and unpublished archival material. His approach also allows the reader to see the discrepancy between the memoirs published by the statesmen in the post-war era with the purpose of defending their position and the official documents. His contribution will help in the emergence of a new and broader understanding of the events surrounding the war.

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Endnotes

1   Mustafa Aksakal, *The Ottoman Road to War in 1914: The Ottoman Empire in the First World War*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010.

2   Fritz Fischer, *Germany's Aims in the First World War*, New York, Norton, 1967.

On Baltic Slovenia and Adriatic Lithuania: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis of Patterns in Post-Communist Transformation

On Baltic Slovenia and Adriatic Lithuania, which was originally published in Lithuanian in 2008, garnered the Zenonas Norkus the prestigious Lithuanian Science Award in 2009. He was compelled to write the book to "provid[e] a building block for the Vilnius school of the post-communist studies which would be a worthy successor to interwar Wilno (Polish) school of Soviet studies" (p. 12). The book has had to compete with a number of other books that have analysed post-communist transformation from various perspectives, such as *Understanding Post-Communist Transformation: A Bottom Up Approach* (Richard Rose, Taylor & Francis, 2008) and *Post-Communist Welfare Pathways: Theorizing Social Policy Transformations in Central and Eastern Europe* (edited by Alfio Cerami and Pieter Vanhuysse, Palgrave MacMillan, 2009). Yet, this book is unique in its genre since the author uses the multi-value qualitative comparative analysis (mvQCA) as an analytical framework and employs TOSMANA software. Therefore, this book is "as innovative theoretically

as it is methodologically", as the author argues in the "Introduction".

The author surveys 29 countries in Eurasia in the 10 years following the end of communism and systematically examines 64 post-communist transformation paths, compares them and formulates generalisations. This is summarised in the fourth chapter, which Norkus defines as the central chapter of the book as it provides the conceptual framework necessary to understand the post-communist transformation theory. In so doing, the author has two goals. The first is "to outline a grounded general theory of post-communist transformation, using analytical techniques of qualitative comparative analysis as a framework for the construction of this theory". The second is "to advance political economic understanding of a particular case- the Republic of Lithuania" (p. 335). The two purposes are very well achieved by dividing the book into two parts.

The first part of the book focuses on the concept of post-communist

transformation. In so doing, the author tries to answer a set of questions on the causes and obstacles to the rapid transformation of communist economic and political systems to various types of economic and political systems, namely rational entrepreneurial capitalism (REC) plus democracy (liberal democratic capitalism), REC with no liberal democracy, or liberal democracy with no REC. The theoretical framework that comes out from this approach is quite complex since many elements are taken into consideration. While the first chapter presents the concept of an exit from communism, and presents the project to devise a theory of post-communist transformation, the second chapter discusses in detail the initial conditions of post-communist transformation by means of three variables: a) the orientation of the post-communist transformation; b) the economic mode of the exit from communism; and c) the political mode of exit from communism. On this basis, the third chapter analyses the outcomes of the post-communist transformation. The economic outcomes are described by using three types of capitalism, namely rational entrepreneurial (or Weberian-Schumpeterian) capitalism (REC), political oligarchy and state capitalism. The political outcomes of post-communism transformation cover typologies of liberal democracy and authoritarianism. These three chapters are the basis for the analysis contained in the fourth chapter. The result is ten final patterns for the emergence

or non-emergence of liberal democratic capitalism. The author concludes by stating that these patterns are the "laws" of post-communist transformation. They are "unsimple truths about post-communist transformation, taking into account its diversity and complexity" (p. 193).

Although the subtitle clarifies the content of the book, the first part makes the title quite misleading since the focus is not on the Lithuanian case, but on twenty-nine countries, as previously stated. In this part Lithuania is hardly mentioned. Additionally, the author himself admits that in order to develop the main theme of the study (starting only on page 201) – the post-communist transformation of Lithuania in the context of Central and Eastern Europe – he has to adopt two strategies in the second part of the book. One is to extend the time period taken into account in the theoretical formulation. Thus, in this part he considers not only the first ten years after the end of communism, but he extends this period until 2009-2010. This is necessary to deepen the comparative contexts, he says. The other strategy is to focus on a comparison of Lithuania with only two countries that are Estonia and Slovenia. The reason why Norkus has chosen these two countries is that they are among the top performers of post-communist transformation. Furthermore, in the research on post-communist capitalism, Slovenia is considered the most unambiguous case of coordinated market economy (CME) or social capitalism.

Estonia is instead considered as the clearest case of a post-communist (neo)liberal market economy (LME). Consequently, according to the author, "as extreme cases, Estonia and Slovenia may provide limit points for the scale that can be used to locate and to profile Lithuania which is not such an unambiguous case" (p.206). In spite of this, the comparison inevitably includes Latvia, which is the third Baltic state. The author gives Latvia much space in the analysis together with Estonia and Slovenia. The second part of the book is divided into three chapters. The first answers the question of why Estonia was least hit by a transformational recession compared to others in the early 1990s, and why it recovered first and performed best among the Baltic States. In this context, the differences in the macroeconomic performance of the Baltic States, the advantages of Estonia in the internal and external economic conditions and the government of the ex-communists between 1992 and 1996 are discussed. The Latvian case is also assessed in the analysis.

The second chapter of this section explains why Slovenia can be considered a CME state, while the classification of Estonia as a LME country must be rejected. At the same time, the study answers positively the question about the possibility of a "Baltic Slovenia" while it rejects the eventuality of an "Adriatic Lithuania". Finally, the third chapter of the second section focuses again on the three Baltic countries by analysing an exceptional period in Lithuanian politics when President Rolands Paksas was removed through impeachment in 2003-2004. The author discusses three issues. He starts by looking at why impeachment happened in Lithuania but not in some other Baltic country, or more generally in some other post-communist liberal democracy. He continues by addressing the impact of the presidential impeachment on the consolidation of liberal democracy in Lithuania. He concludes his analysis by explaining why the perceived quality of democracy did not improve much after the impeachment. In this part, the author manages to provide an interesting and fascinating discussion on the post-communist transformation in Lithuania using a comparative perspective. However, he is obliged to extend the theoretical framework developed in the first part by taking into account "many more variables… in addition to orientations, economic and political modes of transformation that were [his] main analytical tools in the search for the general patterns of post-communist transformation" in the first part of the book, as he himself says (p. 201). This contributes to generate a clear split between the two sections of the study.

All in all, the book provides an original and innovative interpretation of post-communist transformation in Eastern and Central Europe by putting the Lithuanian case at the centre of the comparative analysis in the second part of the book.

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Style and Format

Articles submitted to the journal should be original contributions. If another version of the article is under consideration by another publication, or has been or will be published elsewhere, authors should clearly indicate this at the time of submission. Manuscripts should be submitted to perceptions@mfa.gov.tr

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A standard length for **PERCEPTIONS** articles is 6,000 to 8,000 words including endnotes. The manuscript should begin with an indented and italicised summary up to 150 words, which should describe the main arguments and conclusions, and 5-7 keywords, indicating to main themes of the manuscript. The author is also expected to give a brief biography in a footnote at the beginning of the article.

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Names of the authors, places and the publishing houses are required to be written in their original forms. The styles of the references in endnotes should conform the following examples:

Books

John Smith, *The Book Title,* New York, New York Publishing Co., 1999, p. 100.
John E. Smith (ed.), *The Book Title,* New York, New York Publishing Co., 1999, pp. 100-102.
John Smith and Mary Jones, *The Book Title,* New York, New York Publishing Co., 1999, p. 100.
Subsequent references should appear as: Smith, *The Book Title*, p. 100.
In footnotes 'Ibid.' should be used where possible, but it should not be used where the previous note contains more than one source.

Articles in Journals

John Smith, "Article Title", *Journal Name*, Vol. #, No. # (Month Year), p. #.
Subsequent references should appear as: Smith, "Article Title", p. #.

Articles in Edited Books

John Smith, "Article Title", in Mary Jones (ed.), *Book Title,* New York, New York Publishing Company, 1999, p.100.

Official Papers

Parliamentary Papers: Select Committee on Manufacturers (Parl. Papers, 1833, VI), 0.456. Subsequent references as:
SC on ... (PP, 1839, VII), 00.2347.
Hansard (Commons), 4th ser. XXXVI, 641–2, 22 Aug. 1895.

Theses

For titles of published and unpublished theses use italics:
John E. Smith, *Title of Thesis*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Name of the University, Year, Chapter #, p. #

Internet References

Center for Strategic Research of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "A Global Spring- Why NATO needs to go Global", at http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/volume13/autumn/DustinDehEz.pdf [last visited 21 October 09]

Images and Figures

All diagrams, charts and graphs should be referred to as figures and consecutively numbered. Tables should be kept to a minimum and contain only essential data.

Numbers

Numbers under 10 should be spelled out.

Use numerical values (*14, 233*) to express numbers 10 and above.

Figures should be used to express numbers under 10 that are grouped for comparison with figures 10 and above: *The results showed that 2 out of 20 recipients disagreed with the proposal.*

Use figures and the percentage sign to represent percentages: *A significant majority, 62%, said they would support the fundraising campaign.*

Use the word "percentage" when a number is not given: *Researchers determined the percentage of rats…*

Dates, ages, and money should be represented by figures: *2 weeks ago, She was a 2-year old, The workers were paid $5 each.*

Common fractions should be written out: *One fifth of the respondents…*