

International Affairs and 'the nuclear age', 1946–2013

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International Affairs' first article on matters relating to nuclear technology was published in July 1946, within a year of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The most recent article, at the time of writing, appeared in July 2013. Over nearly 70 years, the journal has published, by my count, 128 articles focused on nuclear affairs plus numerous articles on international strategy, energy policy and other subjects in which nuclear technology plays a significant part. Many books on nuclear topics have also been discussed in the journal's review section. Only *Foreign Affairs* among major international journals can boast of such a long engagement with nuclear politics.

Many other journals have entered the fray over the years, especially in the United States, nuclear literature's hegemon. They include specialized periodicals that have provided a spread and consistency of coverage of international nuclear relations that generalist journals like *International Affairs* and *Foreign Affairs* have had neither the ability nor the desire to match. Among them, *International Security* and *The Nonproliferation Review* became prominent after their respective launches in 1975 and 1986, quite late in the story, the former gaining a particularly high standing in academe owing to its home at Harvard and attention to the development of theory.

Nonetheless, a comparison would probably support the assertion that the 128 articles in *International Affairs* constitute the most important body of work on international nuclear politics published by any journal outside the United States. That includes British journals such as *Survival* and longstanding foreign journals such as *Die Friedens-Wärte* whose readership has been restricted by the dominance of English as the lingua franca of the academy and diplomacy. Although the style, length and content of articles published by *International Affairs* have varied significantly, the journal has also developed a character that is quite distinctive: eclectic in coverage, scholarly but not too esoteric, wary of scientific method and opposed to reductionism, and politically neutral while largely liberal in its sympathies.

It has not been possible in the time available to give all 128 articles due attention, and I apologize if some articles and authors have been overlooked

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or underappreciated. My focus is on articles that contain ideas and analysis of enduring pertinence, and that shine light on the preoccupations of authors and elites at certain moments in nuclear history.

A hesitant beginning

The first article, 'Nuclear energy and its uses' by Sir George Thomson (July 1946), is one of the strangest to have appeared in *International Affairs*.¹ Like many from the 1940s and 1950s, it originated in an address—the word then always used—given to an audience at Chatham House, the journal's host organization. This one reads like a first lesson on nuclear physics and is coy on the subject of military use. The bombing of Hiroshima, still fresh in the public mind (the address was given on 5 March 1946), is referred to only obliquely, and discussion of the weapon's strategic implications is eccentric and evasive. Thomson's surmise is that states possessing nuclear weapons which find themselves in conflict with one another would be forced to evacuate their cities, owing to their vulnerability, and 'have to reckon on running things without them' over stretches of time, war or no war. Populations and governments would move to national peripheries. There is no sign of the theory of nuclear deterrence that Bernard Brodie and others had already begun to develop in the United States by spring 1946.

Sir George did not reveal that he had chaired the Maud Committee's secret research project in 1940–41 that demonstrated the atomic bomb's feasibility, against the conventional wisdom among scientists, including American scientists, that a practical weapon was beyond reach at this time.² Its report, transmitted to Washington in autumn 1941, led directly to the launch of the Manhattan Project in February 1942, enabling the use of the bomb against Japan before the war's end. Without it, history would have been different. The Maud Report remains much the most influential document, of any kind, on nuclear affairs that has emanated from the UK. By March 1946, however, the UK government and atomic scientists, despite their vital early role and the Manhattan Project's joint character, had already been dispatched to the margins of American nuclear decision-making, their exile confirmed by the passage through the US Congress of the Atomic Energy (McMahon) Act in August 1946.

The sense of British impotence, of whistling in the wind, is evident in the little noticed publication of Chatham House's own Study Group, comprising a lord, six knights and nine Fellows of the Royal Society, that met for a couple of years from May 1946.³ Published in 1948, the report contained little that had not

¹ Sir George Thomson, 'Nuclear energy and its uses', *International Affairs* 22: 3, July 1946, pp. 315–22. As was still the journal's habit in 1946, it printed questions and answers that followed the speaker's address. Here is the first on this occasion: 'General Sir G. Le Q. Martel asked whether there was any possibility of getting power through nuclear fission more directly, for instance by atomizing the nuclei and getting rays like the sun's rays.'

² The Maud Committee's work was kicked off by the secret memorandum prepared by Otto Frisch and Rudolf Peierls, refugees working at Birmingham University. It proposed that an effective and deliverable atomic bomb could be constructed if a critical mass of enriched uranium could be assembled.

³ *Atomic energy: its international implications. A discussion by a Chatham House study group* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1948).

already been said and proposed in the United States with greater sophistication and effect.⁴ In fact, to call it a 'report' is not quite accurate, since it was presented as 'a discussion by a Chatham House study group', so described probably because the participants could not agree among themselves. In separately authored chapters, strong advocacy of UN-led international control mixes with realist fatalism, as in Lord Hankey's assertion that: 'For the present the question will be safer in the hands of the United States than of the United Nations.' Irreconcilable differences of opinion may be one reason why nothing from the study group appeared in *International Affairs*.

Ian Hall recently observed that the most influential British writers on military strategy in the interwar years, J. F. C. Fuller and Basil Liddell Hart, had lost respect after the Second World War through their 'questionable sympathies and unfashionable opinions', Fuller having flirted with fascism and Liddell Hart having advocated a negotiated settlement with Nazi Germany. Although Liddell Hart tried to re-establish himself, their reputations did not recover after 1945; indeed, they 'helped to stymie the emergence of strategic studies in Britain'.⁵ Nor did important British scholars of International Relations, such as Herbert Butterfield, E. H. Carr and Martin Wight, display much desire to become engaged in nuclear debates. Outside government the field was left largely to scientists, most of whom lacked experience of military strategy, history and international politics. They included Sir George Thomson, H. E. Wimperis (the Chatham House study group's rapporteur, who had been involved in bombing technology and the wartime radar project), Solly Zuckerman and P. M. S. Blackett, the most impressive and outspoken among them.⁶ Although they had notable scientific counterparts in the United States (Oppenheimer and others), political analysts of the stature of Bernard Brodie, John Herz, Thomas Schelling and Arnold Wolfers did not emerge until the arrival of Alastair Buchan, Hedley Bull and Michael Howard in the late 1950s and 1960s.

British scholars therefore played little part in the development of thought on the consequences of nuclear weapons for international politics and strategy in this foundational period. Had they done so and published their work in *International Affairs*, had the British policy elite been less secretive, and had the journal's editor shown more initiative in inviting American contributions, it might have occupied the high ground at the outset.

⁴ Shorn of their much-vaunted titles and honours, the participants were Henry Dale (chairman), James Chadwick, John Cockcroft, Cecil Desch, Oliver Franks, Maurice Hankey, Harrie Massey, Marcus Oliphant, Arthur Salter, Cecil Tilley, Charles Webster and Harry Wimperis (rapporteur).

⁵ Ian Hall, *Dilemmas of decline: British intellectuals and world politics, 1945–1975* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2012).

⁶ Blackett's *Fear, war, and the bomb: the military and political consequences of atomic energy* (London: Whittlessey House, 1948) is still worth reading. Although Blackett was as distinguished a British scientist as any of this period, a member of the Maud Commission and a founder of operational research, his left-wing views led to his exclusion from some government and establishment groups after the war.

Anxiety about US strategy and behaviour

Did safety lie reliably, as Hankey suggested, in the hands of the United States? Nick Wheeler's first published article in any journal revealed how deeply this question troubled British governments in the Cold War's first decade.⁷ A much weakened UK unavoidably relied on the US and the emerging transatlantic alliance to balance and contain Soviet power, nuclear weapons making it possible to discourage the Red Army without much larger deployments of conventional forces. However, the government and military were acutely aware of Britain's vulnerability, indeed its likely annihilation in any outbreak of armed conflict between the US and the USSR after the H-bomb's development. The presence of American forward bases on British territory would immediately 'draw fire' and count among the Soviet Union's first targets. How to influence Washington and Moscow, the first through persuasion and the second through dissuasion, became a great preoccupation in the 1950s and into the 1960s.

Little of the internal debate that consumed Whitehall at this time spilled out into *International Affairs*, which published only four articles on nuclear affairs in the 1950s. Two are worth revisiting, however. In 1956, Chatham House hosted a debate between Rear-Admiral Sir Anthony Buzzard, Marshal of the Air Force Sir John Slessor and Richard Lowenthal.⁸ Both Buzzard and Slessor were important figures in the debates about nuclear strategy at this time, influential in the US as well as the UK. Buzzard proposed that a clear distinction should be drawn between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons, with the former limited through agreement with allies and the Soviet Union to fission weapons and the latter to H-bombs. A policy of 'graduated deterrence' could then be adopted, a precursor of NATO's later 'flexible response', relying only *in extremis* on the massive retaliation with H-bombs that was being advocated by John Foster Dulles and his American supporters. Slessor disagreed sharply. He did not believe that sufficient distinction could be drawn between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons, whose destructive effects would be equivalent for most Europeans. His concern was to avoid war of any kind, which could be best achieved by threatening the Soviet Union with the severest punishment with strategic weapons. Nonetheless, he shared worries about American willingness to sacrifice the homeland if European countries, including the UK, came under attack. The UK must therefore possess its own strategic capability, giving it an independent deterrent against the Soviet Union.

A year later, Henry Kissinger's book *Nuclear weapons and foreign policy* was published in the United States,⁹ galvanizing the debate about the political and military utility of nuclear weapons, and indeed of warfare, in the age of the H-bomb. He argued that the Clausewitzian linkage of power, warfare and politics could only be maintained if the United States and its allies were prepared to use

⁷ Nicholas J. Wheeler, 'British nuclear weapons and Anglo-American relations 1945–51', *International Affairs* 62: 1, Winter 1985–6, pp. 71–86.

⁸ Anthony Buzzard, John Slessor and Richard Lowenthal, 'The H-bomb: massive retaliation or graduated response?', *International Affairs* 32: 2, July 1956, pp. 148–65.

⁹ Henry Kissinger, *Nuclear weapons and foreign policy* (New York: Harper, 1957).

tactical nuclear weapons in 'limited war'. Otherwise, American power would be neutered by either side's reliance on strategies of mutual destruction.

International Affairs' contribution to this debate took the form of a commentary by P. M. S. Blackett on Kissinger's book and the reactions it had elicited from George Kennan and Stephen King-Hall.¹⁰ Blackett's own view was that the Soviet Union's aggressive intent had been exaggerated, and that nuclear deterrence was engendering a general restraint that made either limited or full-blown war unlikely, at least in the European theatre. In response to John Strachey's gloomy address to Chatham House in June 1960, Blackett remarked that 'the danger [of all-out nuclear war] is less than it was a few years ago ... the major fallacy of the arguments quoted by Mr Strachey seems to me to consist in a gross over-abstractation and simplification of the real problems confronting the two great Powers'. Although the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 would soon make Blackett's view seem complacent, his words reflected the relaxation that had begun in the late 1950s among the British policy elite, helped by the re-establishment of working relations with the US government and design laboratories through the US–UK Mutual Defence Agreement of 1958. It was followed by the Polaris Agreement of 1962–3 and, after the Cuban Missile Crisis, by the easing of East–West relations as the policy of detente took hold. For the time being, the UK appeared more confident in its deterrent and less anxious about falling victim to strains in US–Soviet relations and the whims of American and Soviet decision-makers.

International order, arms control and non-proliferation

The Institute for Strategic Studies was established in London in 1958 following the recommendation of another Chatham House working group, becoming the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in 1964. Under Alastair Buchan's founding directorship, Hedley Bull and other luminaries of strategic and international studies in the UK were drawn to the IISS and as a result did not become closely associated with Chatham House. The IISS henceforth became London's main centre of analysis and debate on security issues, alongside King's College's rejuvenated Department of War Studies under the leadership of Michael Howard followed by Laurence Martin and Lawrence Freedman. The series of Adelphi Papers became the Institute's flagship, its journal *Survival* not gaining such prestige and posing little challenge to *International Affairs*, publishing shorter articles in a more journalistic style. At this time, *International Affairs'* articles were also becoming noticeably richer in content, their style and ambition more akin to articles being published in peer-reviewed academic journals. Despite the emergence of the IISS, the journal continued to publish notable articles by the rising generation of scholars. They included Alastair Buchan's fine article in 1964 on the proposed Multilateral Force (MLF), involving creation of a new force operated and controlled by nuclear and non-nuclear states within the transatlantic

¹⁰ P. M. S. Blackett, 'Nuclear weapons and defence: comments on Kissinger, Kennan and King-Hall', *International Affairs* 34: 4, Oct. 1958, pp. 421–34.

alliance, which was the subject of intense debate in the early 1960s. The article concludes with the accurate prediction that ‘the MLF will in the end prove to have been nothing but an expensive and time consuming *détour* on the road to a more effective system of political and strategic planning among the Western allies’.¹¹ As it turned out, MLF achieved more than that, in that its rejection paved the way for the US–Soviet cooperation on development of the NPT whose Article I would ban transfers of control over weapons to non-nuclear weapon states.

In July 1964, *International Affairs* published Michael Howard’s inaugural lecture following his appointment to the Chair of War Studies at King’s College in March that year. Echoing Bernard Brodie’s claims in *The absolute weapon* (1946) about the transformative effect of nuclear weapons, Howard asserted that ‘for nations so threatened, security can no longer be based on traditional principles of defence, mobilisation and counter-attack’.¹² ‘It can be based only on the capacity to deter one’s adversary by having available the capacity to inflict on him inescapable and unacceptable damage in return ... the advent of nuclear weapons has intensified an aversion to the use of violence in international affairs’ (he was writing before the Vietnam War had reached its full intensity).¹³ He went on to say that: ‘Politics must now interpenetrate military activity at every level as thoroughly as the nervous system penetrates the tissues of a human body, carrying to the smallest muscle the dictates of a controlling will.’¹⁴

In the same lecture, Howard observed that: ‘The order which exists between sovereign states is very different in kind from that which they maintain within their borders, but it is an order none the less ... There does exist a comity of nations, an international community transcending ideological and other rivalries’. This ‘comity of nations’ arose from shared ‘understanding by nations that their capacity to impose and extend their own favoured order is limited by the will and effective ability of other states to impose theirs. The conduct of international relations must therefore always be a delicate adjustment of power to power.’¹⁵ Hedley Bull would probably have agreed, despite placing greater emphasis on the restraining effects of international institutions, including international treaties and regimes, and on their role in the formation and sustenance of regional and global orders. As Robert Ayson points out in his recent biography of Bull, ‘it is the *management* of [the] capacity for organised violence which is the key to Bull’s notion of an international society’.¹⁶ Military power and balancing cannot and should not be removed from international relations. However, their careful management, which has to be collective, is an inescapable responsibility in the nuclear age.

¹¹ Alastair Buchan, ‘The multilateral force: a study in alliance politics’, *International Affairs* 40: 4, Oct. 1964, pp. 619–37.

¹² Michael Howard, ‘Military power and international order’, *International Affairs* 40: 3, July 1964, pp. 397–408. Regarding Bernard Brodie, I am referring to his two chapters in his edited volume *The absolute weapon: atomic power and world order* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1946).

¹³ Howard, ‘Military power and international order’, pp. 400, 401.

¹⁴ Howard, ‘Military power and international order’, p. 404.

¹⁵ Howard, ‘Military power and international order’, p. 405.

¹⁶ Robert Ayson, *Hedley Bull and the accommodation of power* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

In 1965, Lord Chalfont invited Hedley Bull to become the founding director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit (ACDRU) that he was creating within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) where he was Minister. This was also the year in which negotiations to establish a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) were launched in Geneva. Despite his belief in the importance of international institutions, it appears that Bull played little if any part in the NPT's formation during his two years at ACDRU. Instead, his main energies were focused on nuclear strategy and arms control, especially involving ideas about achieving a 'minimum stable balance' between the United States and Soviet Union. As Ayson recounts, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) did not welcome the FCO's movement into what it regarded as its own territory, especially when energized by Hedley Bull's formidable intellect. After Bull's appointment to a chair at the Australian National University in 1967, ACDRU became assiduous in keeping out of the MoD's way, sticking to the development and implementation of multilateral treaties that were the FCO's bailiwick.¹⁷

Back in Australia in the mid-1970s, Hedley Bull published a pair of articles on nuclear non-proliferation and arms control in *International Affairs* and *International Security* respectively, the latter article having top billing in *International Security*'s first issue. They should be on every reading list. The article on non-proliferation came after conclusion of the NPT's entry into force in 1970 and was written in the shadow of the Indian test explosion of May 1974 and after the NPT's first review conference in 1975. That on arms control had more theoretical and philosophical intent, concerned as it was with the effect of nuclear arms and arms control on the 'kind of world order [that] is desirable and feasible' and 'the political structure of the world and the distribution of power within it'.

What the two articles shared was disdain for the

tendency to confuse the national security of the United States and the Soviet Union with international security, the security of international society as a whole; it is the latter objective, not the former, that should be the cardinal one in assessing arms control policies ... It is the peace of the world that is at stake rather than merely the political convenience of the United States or the Soviet Union.

It followed that 'the control of proliferation depends, more than it depends on anything else, on the practice of restraint of the nuclear weapon states'. This assertion still chimes today. Otherwise, the non-proliferation norm would lack legitimacy and there could be no pretence of justice in the international nuclear order. How to build the non-proliferation regime and the institution of arms control into effective and legitimate servants of international society was one of Hedley Bull's abiding concerns at this time. 'Making the states system work must involve the attempt to preserve and ultimately to extend the element of consensus among states about common interests, common rules and common institutions.'

¹⁷ ACDRU survives to this day, having been ably manned by Andrew Barlow and John Walker during most of its existence. Although they have not followed Hedley Bull's boat-rocking example, and are always loyal servants of the state, they have both devoted considerable effort to the maintenance of links with NGOs and the academic community.

Hedley Bull was, however, capable of being very hard-headed and unsympathetic to weak analysis and woolly idealism. I was reminded of this when reading his largely admiring review of Herman Kahn's *On thermonuclear war* in *International Affairs*.¹⁸ His commitment to international institutions always accompanied a strong belief in effective strategy and the balance of power, to the extent of sometimes displaying unfashionable sympathy with India and other aspiring powers' desire to acquire nuclear deterrents, a sympathy that arose partly from his concern over China's future exercise of power in Asia and Australasia. He was a pragmatist, opposed to beliefs that the world's problems could and should be solved through either military assertion or comprehensive disarmament. This said, in some respects his ideas on international society and its potential were not tough enough. He did not, for instance, address in his *International Affairs* article the problem of enforcement that would dog the NPT and divide the UN Security Council from the mid-1990s onwards. How should members of international society respond to states that egregiously violate its rules and norms? How sacrosanct is sovereignty? Had he lived longer, it is easy to imagine his dismay and disdainful response to the emergence of an evangelical political movement (neo-conservatism) in the United States vehemently opposed to the institution-building, and concerts of power, upon which Bull's international society had to rest.

Two crises of nuclear order

When writing in 1975–6, Hedley Bull did not anticipate the severity of the two crises that afflicted international nuclear relations in the decade that followed. I refer to the disputes over civil nuclear trade and development that followed the 1973–4 energy crisis, with extravagant forecasts of worldwide investment in nuclear power, the 1974 Indian explosive test and the American reversion to a policy of denial under presidents Ford and Carter; and to the breakdown of detente in the late 1970s and opening of the 'second Cold War' after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and Ronald Reagan's election to the US presidency in 1979.

International Affairs published several articles, none of huge consequence, on these crises' nuclear and strategic aspects during this period. The ten nuclear-related articles that appeared in the journal between 1976 and 1985 included two short pieces in 1979 on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) II by Christoph Bertram and Lord Chalfont (predictably arguing for and against the treaty), Jonathan Alford's discussion in 1983 of British and French stances on arms control, articles by Philip Sabin on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and James Thomson on US theatre nuclear policy (both 1984), and an article in 1985 by Graham Allison, Albert Carnesale and Joseph Nye that summarized the findings of a book and articles already published in the United States.¹⁹ Most intriguing is the plea by

¹⁸ Published in the Oct. 1961 issue (37: 4), pp. 491–2.

¹⁹ Lord Chalfont, 'SALT II and America's European allies' and Christoph Bertram, 'SALT II and the dynamics of

Malcolm Mackintosh to understand the historical and geopolitical roots of the Soviet stance on armament and disarmament. Written when he was serving in the Cabinet Office, it presumably bore the approval of senior ministers and signalled their frustration with what they considered their American ally's ill-considered policies.²⁰ Apart from Michael Quinlan's 1991 article (discussed below), this is the only occasion on which an article on nuclear affairs written 'from within' has graced the pages of *International Affairs*.

The absence of significant articles on the ructions over nuclear trade is more surprising, since Chatham House hosted a major international initiative in this field between 1977 and 1980. This was the International Consultative Group on Nuclear Energy (ICGNE), bringing together senior diplomats from 16 countries. It was overseen by Ian Smart, then Director of Research at Chatham House, and Mason Willrich of the Rockefeller Foundation, the project's lavish funder.²¹ There is no trace of ICGNE's work in *International Affairs*, perhaps because the Rockefeller Foundation decided to publish the various outputs itself, including its final report. Designed to involve a kind of 'track two' diplomacy helping to resolve the disputes over nuclear trade, it was not a great success, there being too little desire to compromise among its members, although it produced some worthwhile analysis.²² The disputes over trade policy ended a year or two later largely because the bottom fell out of the international market for nuclear power, killing the forecasts of an approaching 'plutonium economy' and the rampant proliferation that was feared might follow, rather than through the formal diplomacy of the US-sponsored International Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) discussed by Philip Gummatt in *International Affairs* in 1981.²³

arms control', *International Affairs* 55: 4, 1979, pp. 559–64 and 565–73 respectively; Jonathan Alford, 'The place of British and French nuclear weapons in arms control', *International Affairs* 59: 4, Autumn 1983, pp. 569–74; Philip Sabin, 'Should INF and START be merged?', *International Affairs* 60: 3, Summer 1984, pp. 419–28; James Thomson, 'The LRTNF [Long-Range Theatre Nuclear Force] decision: evolution of US theatre nuclear policy 1975–79', *International Affairs* 60: 4, Autumn 1984, pp. 601–14; Graham Allison, Albert Carnesale and Joseph Nye, 'Hawks, doves and owls: a new perspective on avoiding nuclear war', *International Affairs* 61: 4, Autumn 1985, pp. 581–9.

²⁰ Malcolm Mackintosh, 'The Russian attitude to defence and disarmament', *International Affairs* 61: 3, Summer 1985, pp. 385–94.

²¹ I was recruited by Ian Smart to serve as secretary to ICGNE in 1978. For two years I organized, with Elizabeth Watson's assistance, the group's meetings in expensive hotels from an office in Chatham House, sitting at a desk under Arnold Toynbee's gloomy portrait. Although my role in meetings was confined to minute-taking, they provided me with a fine introduction to the frustrating world of international nuclear diplomacy. For some time afterwards, it was felt in both Chatham House and the Rockefeller Foundation that ICGNE had absorbed too many resources, contributing to each organization's wariness of such endeavours and detachment from international nuclear affairs in the period that followed.

²² A selection of papers were collected together and published in Ian Smart, ed., *World nuclear energy: toward a bargain of confidence* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982). ICGNE's members were Miguel Barandiaran Alcorta (Spain), Karl-Heinz Beckurts (Germany), Carlos Castro Madero (Argentina), Juan Eibenschutz (Mexico), Akbar Etemad (Iran), David Fischer (IAEA), Russell Fox (Australia), Bertrand Goldschmidt (France), Ryukichi Imai (Japan), Jon Jennekens (Canada), Munir Khan (Pakistan), Myron Kratzer (US), Måns Lönnroth (Sweden), Paulo Nogueira Batista (Brazil) and Homi Sethna (India). Robert Press replaced Lord Flowers as the British member half way through the project.

²³ Philip Gummatt, 'From NPT to INFCE: developments in thinking about nuclear non-proliferation', *International Affairs* 57: 4, Autumn 1981, pp. 549–67.

After the Cold War: whither deterrence and the British nuclear force?

The Spring 1986 issue of *International Affairs* carried three articles on the US Strategic Defence Initiative (Star Wars), published midway between the Geneva and Reykjavik summits that ended the East–West nuclear confrontation and arms race. What happened next was little anticipated. Michael Howard probably wishes to forget an article published by *International Affairs* in July 1989 in which he confidently predicted continuance of the Soviet Union, divided Germany and bipolarity.²⁴ He was not alone. Within a short time, however, the collapse of the Soviet Union and its empire made it clear that fundamental changes were afoot, raising questions about the future need for deterrence and for the UK's nuclear force. As Michael Clarke later wrote, 'the international environment of the Cold War always appeared to provide an imperative answer to the "whether" question, even up to the decisions taken in the early 1980s to develop the strategic nuclear deterrent the UK now operates'.²⁵ Maintaining a nuclear deterrent required fresh justification.

Michael Quinlan became the eloquent exponent of substituting a logic of prudence for the Cold War's logic of necessity when justifying the continued possession of nuclear weapons. Since the mid-1950s, Quinlan had been the principal intellectual shaper of nuclear policy in Whitehall and an influential figure in NATO, playing a significant part for instance in the development of NATO's 'dual track' policy (deployment of Pershing and cruise missiles in response to the Soviet SS-20s). His standing was truly international. A dedicated Catholic, Quinlan insisted that policy and strategy must have sound moral foundations, grounded in reason (he loved argument). 'Moral accountability is a central part of what it means to be a human being. Every human activity must be open to moral examination.'²⁶ Very unusually for a civil servant, he maintained a huge correspondence with individuals outside government, concerned especially to provide a well-grounded ethical justification for nuclear deterrence when it was under attack from inside and outside his Church.²⁷

Following his retirement from the MoD in 1991, Quinlan became a very public figure, giving lectures, speaking at conferences, writing books and publishing articles. *International Affairs* became one of his main outlets. Prudence was the underlying theme of his address to the Soviet general staff in Moscow in November 1990, published a few months later in *International Affairs*.²⁸ It was doubly remark-

²⁴ 'As for German reunification, the recreation of Bismarck's Germany is the last thing we have to fear. However great the desire may be in West Germany for cultural reintegration, or in East Germany for the consumer products of the West, there is little likelihood even of a post-Honecker GDR allowing itself to be absorbed by its dynamic Western neighbour': Michael Howard, '1989: a farewell to arms', *International Affairs* 65: 3, Summer 1989, pp. 407–13. Max Beloff's response to Howard's 'talk' at Chatham House ('addresses' had become 'talks'), on which the article was based, was only slightly more prescient.

²⁵ Michael Clarke, 'Does my bomb look big in this? Britain's nuclear choices after Trident', *International Affairs* 80:1, January 2004, pp. 49–62, at p. 49.

²⁶ Charles Guthrie and Michael Quinlan, *Just war* (London: Bloomsbury, 2007).

²⁷ See Tanya Ogilvie-White, *On nuclear deterrence: the correspondence of Sir Michael Quinlan* (London: Taylor & Francis, 2012).

²⁸ Michael Quinlan, 'Nuclear weapons and the abolition of war', *International Affairs* 67: 2, April 1991, pp. 293–301. Whether the Russian audience understood what he was saying on the day, especially after translation, is a moot point since the speech was delivered in Quinlan's customary mandarin English.

able for a still serving permanent under-secretary of state for defence to give such an address in the capital of the recent enemy, and for a person in his position to be encouraging, in effect, the Soviet Union's retention of its nuclear deterrent, albeit at lower levels of armament in the 'low salience nuclear world' that he now advocated. Given the fickleness of world politics, history of crazy leaders and experience of catastrophic war, the Great Powers would be wise to carry on practising nuclear deterrence, hesitating to discard it, so that wars between them could remain things of the past.

Michael MccGwire became Quinlan's main sparring partner in the pages of *International Affairs*; indeed, he acted almost as the journal's house critic of nuclear deterrence in the seven articles by him that it published between 1988 and 2006.²⁹ In July 1993, Quinlan had again rehearsed his prudential case for British retention of nuclear arms in *International Affairs*, opening the way for MccGwire's detailed picking apart of his argument in April 1994. In MccGwire's view, nuclear deterrence's contribution to the peace had long been exaggerated, espousal of the benefits of nuclear deterrence for the few encouraged nuclear proliferation among the many and weakened the non-proliferation regime's legitimacy, and Quinlan's faith in deterrence required unmerited confidence in the rationality and good judgement of political and military leaders and elites.

The argument between them continued along its familiar lines in 2006 when Trident's replacement, and thus the UK deterrent's future, was opened to public and parliamentary debate by Tony Blair's Labour government. Before then, Ian Smart's 'Beyond Polaris' of October 1977 was the only occasion on which the UK's nuclear weapon policies and investments were discussed at any length in *International Affairs*.³⁰ There had previously been retrospective examinations (by Alfred Goldberg in 1964 and Nick Wheeler in 1985) of the early nuclear decisions, none of which had been accompanied by open public debate.³¹ The private nature of decision-making was rendered unsustainable for Labour in 2006 by the secrecy in which the Chevaline project had been wrapped when the Labour Party was in power in the late 1970s.³²

The July 2006 issue of *International Affairs* was largely given over to discussion of whether and how Trident should be replaced. Articles by Keith Hartley, Julian

²⁹ Michael MccGwire was a British naval commander and intelligence expert turned academic, with experience of postings in the UK and US, and a promoter of the thesis that Soviet behaviour was more defensive than offensive. His articles in *International Affairs* were: 'A mutual security regime for Europe?', 64: 3, Summer 1988, pp. 361–79; 'Is there a future for nuclear weapons?', 70: 2, April 1994, pp. 211–28; 'The paradigm that lost its way', 77: 4, Autumn 2001, pp. 777–803; 'Shifting the paradigm', 78: 1, Jan. 2002, pp. 1–28; 'The rise and fall of the NPT: an opportunity for Britain', 81: 1, Jan. 2005, pp. 115–40; 'Comfort blanket or weapon of war: what is Trident for?', 82: 4, July 2006, pp. 638–50; 'Nuclear deterrence', 82: 4, July 2006, pp. 771–84.

³⁰ Ian Smart, 'Beyond Polaris', *International Affairs* 53: 4, Oct. 1977, pp. 557–71. In private conversation, John Simpson has suggested that Smart was prompted to examine issues concerning Polaris' replacement by friends in the MoD and FCO, where a debate was beginning amid concerns that it could become fractious. A Chatham House study group on Polaris was formed whose visible outputs were the article in *International Affairs* and the linked Adelphi Paper, each written solely by Smart.

³¹ Alfred Goldberg, 'The military origins of the British nuclear deterrent', *International Affairs* 40: 4, Oct. 1964, pp. 600–618; and Wheeler, 'British nuclear weapons and Anglo-American relations 1945–54'.

³² The Chevaline project involved redesign of warheads and re-entry vehicles to ensure penetration of Moscow's anti-ballistic missile system.

Lewis and Paul Rogers accompanied the articles by Quinlan and MccGwire.³³ In retrospect, what was lacking was any foreign comment. In my recollection, there was scant international interest among academic or policy communities abroad in what the UK decided to do. Iran's possible acquisition of a few kilograms of highly enriched uranium was deemed to have much greater significance than the UK's proposal to build four nuclear-powered submarines and arm them with a couple of hundred warheads intended to threaten adversaries with nuclear retaliation for the next half-century. Such is the peculiar distribution of sensitivities in international politics. Foreign disregard also arose from perceptions abroad that the UK's nuclear force was a benign part of the furniture and no longer had much relevance to the balance of power and international stability.

In the event, Tony Blair managed the politics successfully and secured a resounding vote in favour of Trident's replacement in the House of Commons in March 2007. The debate has not ended, however. In *International Affairs*, two impressive, theoretically informed articles by Nick Ritchie have questioned why, when there is no strong security need, the UK and its main political parties (outside Scotland) have remained so attached to possession of nuclear weapons.³⁴ The importance of identity, agency and inertia are highlighted, reflecting the move being taken by American academics away from a strictly realist towards a constructivist interpretation of motivations for acquiring or not acquiring the weapons: 'Relinquishing nuclear weapons will require disassembly of the UK nuclear weapons network through an evolutionary transformation of current collective political-defence identities within the policy elite, such that deployment of nuclear weapons is longer an explicit or implicit requirement for the reproduction of these identities.'³⁵ With the decision to commit full resources to Trident's replacement still lying ahead (in 2016), and the Scottish referendum capable of upsetting the apple-cart if it delivers a 'yes' vote, there may be further occasion for *International Affairs* to visit this issue.

After the Cold War: nuclear proliferation, counter-proliferation and international order

During the Cold War, nuclear deterrence and strategy, involving relations among the nuclear-armed Great Powers, were the main aspects of nuclear politics discussed in *International Affairs*, as in other journals. Those issues did not disappear entirely after the Cold War ended. Like Michael MccGwire in another context, David

³³ The articles in the July 2006 (82: 4) issue of *International Affairs* were: Julian Lewis, 'Nuclear disarmament versus peace in the twenty-first century', pp. 667–73; Michael Quinlan, 'The future of United Kingdom nuclear weapons: shaping the debate', pp. 627–37; Michael MccGwire, 'Comfort blanket or weapon of war', pp. 638–50; Paul Rogers, 'Big boats and bigger skimmers: determining Britain's role in the long war', pp. 651–66; Keith Hartley, 'The economics of UK nuclear weapons policy', *International Affairs* 82: 4, July 2006, pp. 675–84.

³⁴ Nick Ritchie, 'Deterrence dogma: challenging the relevance of British nuclear weapons', *International Affairs* 85: 1, Jan. 2009, pp. 81–98; Nick Ritchie, 'Relinquishing nuclear weapons: identities, networks and the British bomb', *International Affairs* 86: 2, March 2010, pp. 447–87.

³⁵ Ritchie, 'Relinquishing nuclear weapons', p. 487.

Yost became *International Affairs*' favourite commentator on deterrence and on the policies of NATO and the western nuclear powers, publishing five articles on such issues (usually taking a conservative line) between July 2001 and November 2011.³⁶ Mikhail Tsyppkin and Baohui Zhang also provided their assessments of Russia's and China's respective reactions to US policies on missile defence in July 2009 and May 2011 (Zhang's article being the only contribution to the journal from a Chinese author on nuclear affairs); Stuart Croft discussed South Asia's arms control process, or lack of it, in November 2005; and Andrew O'Neil addressed extended deterrence in East Asia in November 2011.³⁷

After 1989, the bundle of issues concerning nuclear proliferation and the non-proliferation regime, and the international nuclear order, took up increasing space in *International Affairs*. During the 1990s the UK was more visibly engaged in such affairs than at any previous time. The UK government, on the margins of the huge Russian and US effort to reconstruct the Soviet Union and manage its nuclear legacy, played a substantial part in negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, extension of the NPT's lifetime, and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in the early to mid-1990s.³⁸ Outside government, notable projects were John Simpson and Ben Sanders' Programme for the Promotion of Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PPNN), run from Southampton University's Mountbatten Centre, preparing ground for the 1995 NPT Extension Conference; Rebecca Johnson's formation of the Acronym Institute and remarkable on-the-spot commentaries on multilateral treaty negotiations; Patricia Lewis's development of the Verification Technology Information Centre (VERTIC) in London; and my own effort with David Albright and Frans Berkhout to build a detailed country-by-country picture of global holdings of the primary fissile materials, plutonium and highly enriched uranium and their regulation.³⁹

None of the London-based organizations concerned with defence and foreign policy—Chatham House, IISS and the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)—engaged significantly with these and other related issues in the 1990s. By and large, the research was carried out by networks of individuals working in non-governmental organizations and universities in Europe and the United States, reaching into governments but financed especially by American charitable foundations (the research councils were sound asleep). Digital self-publishing

³⁶ David Yost's articles in *International Affairs* are: 'Russia's non-strategic nuclear forces', 77: 3, July 2001, pp. 531–51; 'The US Nuclear Posture Review and the NATO allies', 80: 4, July 2004, pp. 705–29; 'France's new nuclear doctrine', 82: 4, July 2006, pp. 701–721; 'Analysing international nuclear order', 83: 3, May 2007, pp. 549–74; 'The US debate on NATO nuclear deterrence', 87: 6, Nov. 2011, pp. 1401–1438.

³⁷ Mikhael Tsyppkin, 'Russian politics, policy-making and American missile defence', *International Affairs* 85: 4, July 2009, pp. 787–800; Baohui Zhang, 'US missile defence and China's nuclear posture: changing dynamics of an offence-defence arms race', *International Affairs* 87: 3, May 2011, pp. 555–69; Stuart Croft, 'South Asia's arms control process: cricket diplomacy and the composite dialogue', *International Affairs* 81: 5, Nov. 2005, pp. 1039–60; Andrew O'Neil, 'Extended deterrence in East Asia: redundant or resurgent', *International Affairs* 87: 6, Nov. 2011, pp. 1439–57.

³⁸ On nuclear aspects of the Soviet Union's breakup, see William Walker, 'Nuclear weapons and the former Soviet Republics', *International Affairs* 68: 2, April 1992, pp. 255–77.

³⁹ Funding for these projects came primarily from charitable foundations, notably the Rockefeller Brothers Fund (guided by Hilary Palmer) in the US and the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust (Steve Burkeman) in the UK. As I recall, the UK research councils were uninterested.

was becoming the norm for independently funded projects. This partly explains why *International Affairs* published only one article, by John Simpson,⁴⁰ on the great developments in non-proliferation policy and multilateral arms control that occurred in the 1990s, and none on UNSCOM and the disarmament of Iraq.

Around the turn of the century, international attention shifted from regime construction to the problems of break-out and non-compliance, as a disparate group of states either defied international norms by testing and deploying nuclear weapons (India and Pakistan), or sought the capacity to do so (North Korea and, it was asserted, Iraq and Iran). Non-proliferation gave way to counter-proliferation and regime change, the radicalization of US policy taking wing after 9/11 with the bracketing of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. The UK government aligned itself with its US counterpart, one manifestation being the FCO's regrettable renaming of its Non-Proliferation Department as the Counter-Proliferation Department (which remains its title).

Partly in reaction to these trends, several articles were published in *International Affairs* on the behaviour of actual and potential proliferators and on international responses to their activities. They include Farzana Shaikh writing about Pakistan, my own article on the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, and a clutch of articles from Wyn Bowen, Joanna Kidd, Hazel Smith and others on Iran and North Korea.⁴¹ More extensive was the May 2007 special issue on the international nuclear order, a topic that the journal had last visited in Hedley Bull's article three decades earlier. I hesitate to discuss this special issue, since it was centred on my own article. Others should judge its and the accompanying articles' quality and significance.⁴² It received sharp criticism—some warranted, some unwarranted—from the guest editor (David Yost) and some of his assembled contributors, turning the event into an experience that I do not happily remember. However, Caroline Soper, the journal's editor, was entirely justified in mounting a special issue on this subject, given that the established NPT-based and deterrence-based order appeared to be breaking down, and was being scorned by George W. Bush's administration, without coherent proposals on its replacement. It also contained some notable articles, Pierre Hassner's among others. In retrospect, I regret not having used Hedley Bull's articles of 1975–6 as the starting-point for a more straightforward discussion of alternative concepts of international order, as applied in the nuclear domain, and their contemporary relevance.

⁴⁰ John Simpson, 'Nuclear non-proliferation in the Cold War era', *International Affairs* 70: 1, Jan. 1994, pp. 17–39.

⁴¹ Farzana Shaikh, 'Pakistan's nuclear bomb: beyond the non-proliferation regime', *International Affairs* 78: 1, Jan. 2002, pp. 29–48; William Walker, 'International nuclear relations after the Indian and Pakistani test explosions', *International Affairs* 74: 3, July 1998, pp. 505–528; Wyn Bowen and Joanna Kidd, 'The Iranian nuclear challenge', *International Affairs* 80: 2, March 2004, pp. 257–76; Hazel Smith, 'Mad, bad, sad or rational actor? Why the securitization paradigm makes for poor policy analysis of North Korea', *International Affairs* 76: 3, July 2000, pp. 111–32.

⁴² The articles in the May 2007 special issue of *International Affairs* (83: 3) were: William Walker, 'Nuclear enlightenment and counter-enlightenment', pp. 431–53; Pierre Hassner, 'Who killed nuclear enlightenment?', pp. 455–67; Joseph Pilat, 'The end of the NPT regime?', pp. 469–82; Joachim Krause, 'Enlightenment and nuclear order', pp. 483–99; Michael Rühle, 'Enlightenment in the second nuclear age', pp. 511–22; Brad Roberts, 'All the king's men? Refashioning global nuclear order', pp. 523–30; Henry Sokolski, 'Towards an NPT-restrained world that makes economic sense', pp. 531–48; and Yost, 'Analysing international nuclear order'. My response to critics, 'International nuclear order: a rejoinder', was published in the July 2007 issue (83: 4), pp. 745–56.

Spurred on by 9/11, continuing concerns about nuclear proliferation, and the Obama administration's desire to recover the respect forfeited by its predecessor, the achievement of complete nuclear disarmament began to be treated with a seriousness in the mid-2000s not experienced since the years following Hiroshima. Several articles in *International Affairs* touched on this development, including Rebecca Johnson's on the 2010 NPT Review Conference and Patricia Lewis's 2013 piece on freeing the Middle East of nuclear weapons.⁴³ I am not aware, however, of any articles in any journals, including American journals, at any time on nuclear disarmament that could be regarded as 'seminal'. Why this should be so escapes me. That epithet can only be applied to publications in other forms, including the series of articles by Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn, William Perry and George Schultz in the *Wall Street Journal*, and the Adelphi Paper *Nuclear abolition* by George Perkovich and James Acton, Michael Quinlan again playing a part by encouraging the latter's preparation from his base at IISS after retirement.⁴⁴

An end to the nuclear age?

It is easy to find gaps in *International Affairs'* coverage of nuclear politics over the years. Missing are discussions of Israel and South Africa, of the ethics and legality of possession and use, of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and (but for one article) of nuclear terrorism. In addition, there are authors that one would hope to find writing on nuclear issues in *International Affairs* who are absent or address them only obliquely. They include, among British scholars, John Baylis, Ken Booth, Lawrence Freedman and Laurence Martin, and among other nationalities Raymond Aron, Thérèse Delpech, Paul Jervis, Harald Müller, George Perkovich and William Potter (invitations may, of course, have been extended and turned down). The proportion of articles by female authors—six out of 128—is also distressingly low, however much this may reflect the notoriously skewed gender balance of the academy, government and industry in this field.

Nevertheless, *International Affairs'* overall record has been impressive, despite the constraints on a generalist journal's contribution to a specific field of international politics. On the journal's anniversary, it is better to celebrate the achievements than dwell on shortcomings. As I hope to have demonstrated, there are plenty of articles in the journal that deserve to be read again, which is the best mark of distinction. There are also many articles, not covered in this discussion, that touch on nuclear issues without giving them centre stage.⁴⁵

⁴³ Rebecca Johnson, 'Rethinking the NPT's role in security: 2010 and beyond', *International Affairs* 86: 2, March 2010, pp. 429–45; Patricia Lewis, 'A Middle East free of nuclear weapons: possible, probable or pipe-dream?', *International Affairs* 88: 3, March 2013, pp. 433–50.

⁴⁴ Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn, William Perry and George Shultz, 'A world free of nuclear weapons', *Wall Street Journal*, 4 Jan. 2007 and subsequent articles in the same newspaper; George Perkovich and James Acton, *Abolishing nuclear weapons*, Adelphi Paper 396 (London: IISS, 2008).

⁴⁵ Examples are: Noble Frankland, 'Britain's changing strategic position', *International Affairs* 33: 4, Oct. 1957, pp. 416–26; Denis Healey, 'The crisis in Europe', *International Affairs* 38: 2, April 1962, pp. 145–55; David Thomson, 'The three worlds of Raymond Aron', *International Affairs* 39: 1, Jan. 1963, pp. 49–58; Laurence Martin, 'The changed role of military power' in the special issue to mark Chatham House's 50th anniversary, *International Affairs* 46: 4, Nov. 1970, pp. 101–115; Roger Morgan, 'Washington and Bonn: a case study in alliance politics',

I wish to draw this reflection towards a conclusion by discussing an article by Ian Smart that *International Affairs* published in October 1975. Of all the articles appearing since 1946, this is the one that I have been most pleased to discover (it is not well known) and that has given me most pause for thought. Among the remarkable generation that included Alastair Buchan, Hedley Bull, Michael Howard and Michael Quinlan, Ian Smart has gained least public recognition.⁴⁶ Yet his intellect was as powerful as any of them—he had an exceptionally incisive and questing mind—and his influence in and over government has probably been underestimated. Unusually, he straddled deterrence and non-proliferation, and the civil and military application of nuclear energy, being involved in energy policy as well as in foreign and defence policy. He also straddled institutions, being a high-flyer in the FCO, with postings in Tel Aviv, Paris and Washington, followed by research directorships at IISS and then Chatham House, after which he ran a private energy consultancy. Unlike Quinlan, he published little after his early retirement. He deserves a biography, or at least a biographical essay.

Smart used his contribution to *International Affairs*, ostensibly a review article, to ask—ranging widely as was his wont—a set of important questions that remain pertinent today. What is meant when writers and practitioners speak of living in ‘a nuclear age’? Is this epithet still appropriate?

If the phrase [nuclear age] is not mere rhetoric, then it must signify a conviction that there is some essential characteristic of the period which can only be conveyed by the use of that adjective ... The ‘nuclear age’ is so called because there has existed a widespread intuition that nuclear energy—or rather, and more specifically, nuclear armament—has exerted a dominant influence over human and international affairs ... The fact remains that the original ‘nuclear age’ was an age of wonder, of vague awe or even of catharsis—an age, one might say, of nuclear superstition. Moreover the object of that superstition was not the influence of nuclear weapons upon some particular and possibly ephemeral situation in international politics but the apparently supernal character of the nuclear weapon itself.

He argues that the influence of nuclear weapons, and the superstition attached to them, has diminished and will (and should) continue to diminish.

He also lets fly at people and governments that value nuclear weapons for their prestige.

there exists an ... impression ... that the countries which possess such weapons have arrogated to themselves a separate and superior position in international politics. The fatuity of the impression is obvious: when the governments of existing nuclear powers have been so unsuccessful in many of their attempts to influence non-nuclear states or to secure their own objectives in international or domestic affairs, it is difficult to see what their alleged superiority means. Unfortunately, the governments which control nuclear

International Affairs 47: 3, Summer 1971, pp. 489–502; Lawrence Freedman, ‘The Atlantic crisis’, *International Affairs* 58: 3, Summer 1982, pp. 395–412; David Reynolds, ‘A “special relationship”? America, Britain and the international order since the Second World War’, *International Affairs* 62: 1, Jan. 1986, pp. 1–20; François Heisbourg, ‘Can the Atlantic alliance last out the century?’, *International Affairs* 63: 3, Summer 1987, pp. 413–24; Phil Williams, ‘US–Soviet relations: beyond the Cold War?’, *International Affairs* 65: 3, Summer 1989, pp. 273–88.

⁴⁶ Ian Smart’s career as a public intellectual may have been inhibited by his florid speaking and writing style, possibly masking a lack of confidence in his own opinions.

weapons have frequently helped to create or sustain that fatuous impression: by foreign policy statements or, more often, by efforts, in their domestic politics, to obtain votes or financial resources for defence [a swipe at the British government?]. In part, they are themselves to blame for the views now heard in countries such as India, where the acquisition of nuclear weapons may seem to offer a cheap and easy road to greater international prestige.

Ian Smart is right about the fatuous (to Quinlan, unethical) attachment of value to nuclear weapons for the prestige that they bring. He is both right and wrong about the passing of the nuclear age. He is right insofar as nuclear weapons have lost that dominant influence over human and international affairs as other security issues have gained prominence and states have become preoccupied with other technological developments (at present, anything 'cyber'). He is wrong insofar as the nuclear weapon retains the aura of 'the absolute weapon', capable of inflicting death and destruction on an unparalleled scale and thus possessing—for some—special symbolism and deterrent value. In South and East Asia, the weapon is becoming a more potent instrument of power projection and balancing, according to present trends. It is there, more even than in the Middle East, that the future courses of nuclear strategy and arms control, and of non-proliferation and disarmament, seem likely to be determined.

Therein lies a particular set of questions for *International Affairs*, given its roots in British institutions and scholarship and its publication out of a region where nuclear technology (military and civilian) has diminishing relevance. Besides continuing to address issues concerning global rules, norms and institutions, can it and should it give greater emphasis to nuclear developments in places far away? In addition to attracting the next generation of British and continental European scholars, can it persuade authors of high calibre from those far places, and from the United States, to submit strong articles on pertinent issues to the journal? I hope so.

Correction Note: During the final stages of production, pages 110–111 of this article were transposed. The error persists in some copies of the printed version of this issue, but the order has been corrected in this version of the article online.