Introduction

Negotiating the rise of new powers

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The rise of new powers is seldom solely a function of growing economic or military prowess; much depends on how power is exercised, in relation to whom, the motivations that underpin this exercise, and further how action and reaction are interpreted or misinterpreted. The rise of new powers is thus fundamentally a story of bargaining and negotiation. The purpose of this special issue of *International Affairs* is to analyse the negotiation of power transition in the international system today.

In this Introduction, I outline the framework that was offered to the contributors to facilitate the development of this project in a cohesive, integrated and holistic manner. I focus particularly on three sets of issues that underpin the individual articles: key actors; negotiating behaviour (conceptualized in terms of negotiation strategy, coalitions and framing); and the key areas in which implications may arise from an analysis based on these factors. I then present a brief summary of the main findings of the contributions and conclude with some comparative insights, suggestions on how the individual articles add up to a bigger picture, and some provisional policy recommendations.

Key actors

This issue has been divided into two parts. Part one comprises case-studies of three rising powers—Brazil, India and China—while the articles in part two cover the various actors and entities that have reason and/or ability to attempt to manage the rise of new powers.

Rising powers are defined as those states that have established themselves as veto-players in the international system, but have still not acquired agenda-setting

power.[1] All three of our rising powers enjoy large and growing economic might; China and India also possess significant military prowess. All three have historically been associated with the global South, and have, to varying degrees, used their status as southern powers and leaders to claim positions of importance in international affairs. They 'share a belief in their entitlement to a more influential role in world affairs', and further, 'they have all historically espoused conceptions of international order that challenged those of the liberal developed West'.[2] That both the aspirations of rising powers and their visions of global order are taken seriously is evident not only in the bilateral deals that major powers have signed with them but also in the attempt to integrate them at the heart of some of the mechanisms of global governance. That their 'conceptions of international order' continue to pose a challenge is indicated by the deadlock-inducing clashes of ideas that have dogged multilateral negotiations in several forums, including those dealing with trade and climate change.[3] The rising powers often present themselves as allied with each other, having embraced the acronym of BRICS for leader-level summits,[4] and also a variety of other coalitions such as IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa) across several issue areas (ranging from agriculture, trade, poverty alleviation and UN reform to energy, technical cooperation and peace and security) and BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) in climate change. At the same time, the rising powers' relationships with one another are permeated

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[1] Note that the concept of 'veto-player' does not necessarily equate to the availability of a formal veto in the hands of the rising power. Rather, the concept as it is used here is drawn from George Tsebelis, who defines veto-players in domestic politics as actors 'whose agreement is required for a change in the status quo': see George Tsebelis, 'Decision making in political systems: veto-players in presidentialism, parliamentarism, multicameralism and multipartyism', *British Journal of Political Science* 25: 3, 1995, pp. 289–325. Translated into the international context, this refers to states without whose support any potential agreement would be rendered meaningless. For an application of this concept, see Amrita Narlikar, 'All that glitters is not gold: India's rise to power', *Third World Quarterly* 28: 5, 2007, pp. 983–96.

[2] Andrew Hurrell, 'Hegemony, liberalism, and global order: what space for would-be great powers?', *International Affairs* 82: 1, Jan. 2006, pp. 1–19.

[3] See e.g. Amrita Narlikar, ed., *Deadlocks in multilateral negotiations: causes and solutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Amrita Narlikar, *New powers: how to become one and how to manage them* (London: Hurst, 2010).

[4] The credit for both the concept and the acronym of 'BRICs' (Brazil, Russia, India, China) goes to Jim O'Neill, *Building better global economic BRICs*, Goldman Sachs Global Economics Paper no. 66, 30 Nov. 2001. We have, however, chosen not to include Russia as one of our case-studies for two reasons. First, this issue focuses on negotiating the *rise* of *new* powers. Russia's fit with this category of powers on either criterion, rising or new, is at best arguable: its relative power may have increased over the past few years, particularly given the boom in commodity prices, but compare it with the Russia of the Cold War and most would describe Russia as a power on the decline. Neil Macfarlane, for instance, writes: 'The notion of emergence suggests a state that is growing dynamically and undergoing a transformation; a state whose rising power causes it to question its established place in the system and to assert itself more ambitiously in international politics. This image is far from Russian reality. Russia is more a state that has recently experienced substantial damage and is attempting to stop the bleeding.' See Neil Macfarlane, 'The "R" in the BRICs: is Russia an emerging power?', *International Affairs* 82: 1, Jan. 2006, pp. 41–57. Second, we are particularly interested in investigating the rising powers of the South. This is partly because their movement from the periphery to the core has been the most dramatic and unprecedented in modern times (whereas Russia is no stranger to the 'Great Powers' club; recall, for instance, its role in the Concert of Europe in the nineteenth century or as part of the bipolar system of the Cold War in the twentieth). Besides being the credible new candidates for the club of Great Powers, the historical experiences of the rising southern powers as a periphery of sorts allow them to bring alternative visions of global order and distributive justice to the negotiating table. Their attempts to bargain their way to the top are thus fraught with serious challenges for the system but also exciting opportunities for its reform. Note that the countries themselves have expanded O'Neill's original acronym to include South Africa when they meet as a grouping, and refer to themselves as the BRICS.

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by both cooperation and competition. As power shifts and is put to different uses, the B(R)IC countries thus provide a useful starting point for an enquiry into the bargaining that takes place over power transitions.

Part two of the issue brings together a more eclectic mix of actors, all of which, in one way or another, represent parties that are directly affected by the power transition in progress. These multiple actors may be grouped into four categories, as outlined below.

The established powers

This group comprises states and groupings of states that have acquired, over the past decades, the role of agenda-setters as Great Powers. They have exerted defining influence in shaping the rules and norms of global governance. Despite their relative decline (especially with reference to the rising powers), they still have enough power to act as gatekeepers to the inner sanctums of international regimes. Across issue areas, the European Union and the United States stand out as the chief established powers of today.

Small and marginalized actors

In this category are the countries that represent the proverbial grass that gets trampled when elephants fight. They often form the unfortunate terrain on which scrambles for power can occur, but are also occasionally able to exercise powerful leverage by providing the follower base that aspiring leaders seek, and legitimize claims to greater power by securing for those leaders the backing of large numbers.

Private actors

The shift in the balance of power that we see under way today is not occurring simply between states. Businesses and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have emerged as repositories and brokers of power, effectively harnessed by states at different levels of the hierarchy and harnessing them to serve their own causes in turn.

International organizations and other mechanisms of global governance

This journal issue forms a part of the scholarship that recognizes that most international organizations, regimes and networks are seldom 'actors' in their own right.[5] But different organizations, networks and regimes, even when made up

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[5] Our starting point here is not far off from that outlined by Andrew Hurrell: 'Whatever their undoubted role as facilitators of common interest and promoters of shared values, institutions are sites of power, and unequal power has played a consistently important role in both their construction and their operation . . . It is no surprise that aspiring major powers should devote so much attention to playing the game of institutionalized hierarchy.' See Hurrell, 'Hegemony, liberalism and global order', p. 10.

of similar memberships, show different degrees of adaptability and reform in response to the needs and demands posed by rising powers. On the one hand, mechanisms of global governance serve as playgrounds and battlegrounds where the resolves of new and old powers are put to the test, and where different actors compete and cooperate for influence. On the other hand, these same mechanisms can offer valuable sites for the engagement and socialization of new powers, or indeed avenues for containment and estrangement. Given that they can be loci, objects and facilitators of international bargaining, the different forms of global governance are vital to an understanding of how power transition is negotiated.[6]

With contributions from leading analysts on each of these actors, this issue combines analysis from the perspectives of Brazil, India and China (the 'BICs') with studies of the other actors with which the BICs must negotiate, and whose responses are potentially important sources of socialization (via norm diffusion) or estrangement of the aspiring powers. A central goal is to analyse systematically the nature of the relationships between these diverse actors. From the perspectives of the rising powers, the case-studies of Brazil, India and China explore negotiations with the established powers that these countries seek to displace or with which they seek to cooperate, as well as with other rising powers that are potential allies and competitors; negotiations with smaller countries that may be valuable in providing an audience, followers and legitimization; negotiations with private actors that may serve as important transnational and also subnational allies and agents of influence; and bargaining in international organizations, which can offer vital prestige and power through inclusion in the decision-making core, and further provide useful terrain on which the new power can signal its willingness to take on new responsibilities (or not). The articles in part two work in parallel with this format, investigating the negotiations that take place between the multiple actors, not just with the rising powers, but also among themselves, with other potential allies and competitors, and within international organizations. The article on global governance complements the other contributions by investigating the agenda for reform across different forms of global governance from the perspective of interacting interests and ideas emanating from the rising powers and other actors.

Negotiating behaviour

There are several ways in which negotiating behaviour may be conceptualized. In relation to the types of negotiations that form the subject of our enquiry, three aspects of negotiations are particularly important: negotiation strategy, coalitions and framing. The contributors have used these different tools of negotiation analysis in their case-studies.

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[6] Miles Kahler, 'Asia and the reform of global governance', *Asian Economic Policy Review* 5: 2, Dec. 2010, pp. 178–93.

Negotiation strategy

Negotiation strategy can be conceptualized in relation to a bargaining spectrum, with distributive or value-claiming strategies at one end and integrative or value-creating strategies at the other. Distributive strategies include tactics such as refusing to make any concessions, threatening to hold others' issues hostage, issuing threats and penalties, and worsening the other party's best alternative to negotiated agreement (BATNA). Integrative strategies comprise attempts to widen the issue space and explore common solutions: that is, strategies designed to expand rather than split the pie.[7] Negotiation strategies are undoubtedly influenced by cultural values, which sometimes explain a consistency in a particular country's negotiation behaviour or a significant difference between its negotiation behaviour and that of similarly positioned countries.[8] But equally important determinants of the choice of negotiation strategy are the identity of the other party to the negotiation; how one perceives that relationship; the particular issue under negotiation; and the institutional context. The possibility of exploring the negotiation strategies of the major actors within different governance structures offers us an important opportunity to understand better the conditions and particular negotiating relationships in which value-claiming behaviour will dominate value-creating behaviour.

Coalitions

How a state chooses its friends and allies is an important indication of how it perceives its own interests. Further, the nature of the coalition can determine the extent of negotiating flexibility a state enjoys. A coalition is defined as a group of states that comes together in pursuit of a common end.[9] Two sets of coalition dichotomies are interesting and relevant to our project: bloc-type versus issue-based coalitions, and balances versus bandwagons.[10]

   In the first polarization, bloc-type coalitions usually consist of like-minded states united by a common identity and shared beliefs that often transcend issue specificities. Such coalitions thus often try to adopt collective positions over a range of issue areas and over time.[11] Issue-based coalitions, in contrast, are formed to address a particular and immediate problem; they also tend to disintegrate more easily, either because the threat has been responded to, or because members are

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[7] For a useful classification, see John Odell, *Negotiating the world economy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000); John Odell, *Negotiating trade: developing countries in the WTO and NAFTA* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

[8] Raymond Cohen, *Negotiating across cultures: international communication in an interdependent world* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2004; first publ. 1991); Jeswald Salacuse, 'The top ten ways in which culture can affect your negotiation', *Ivey Business Journal*, Sept.–Oct. 2004, pp. 1–6.

[9] Amrita Narlikar, *International trade and developing countries: bargaining coalitions in the GATT and WTO* (London: Routledge, 2003); Amrita Narlikar and Diana Tussie, 'The G20 at the Cancun ministerial: developing countries and their evolving coalitions in the WTO', *The World Economy* 27: 7, 2004, pp. 947–66; Odell, *Negotiating trade*.

[10] Works focusing on the first dichotomy have usually concentrated on economic issues, while the second dichotomy has usually been applied to the security arena.

[11] Narlikar and Tussie, 'The G20 at the Cancun ministerial'.

faced with threats of greater concern to them in other issue areas and shift their allegiances accordingly. Importantly, these are 'ideal' types: coalitions can and have evolved that combine features of both types. Nevertheless, in most coalitions one can usually find a dominant base of one type or the other.

The second polarization inherent in coalition-building is between balancing and bandwagoning. Theoretical debates on these opposite positions (as well as intervening possibilities such as soft balancing and hedging)[12] provide a useful backdrop against which we may ask: in times of power transition, which actors use balancing and which bandwagoning strategies, and what determines these choices?

The choice of coalition type—issue-based versus bloc, and bandwagons versus balances—provides us with useful insights into the negotiating behaviour of our different cases. It is important to bear in mind that certain types of international institutions are more conducive to coalition-building than others: for example, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was traditionally a more favourable environment for coalition formation than the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The type of institutional environment may also influence the type of coalition type: for example, the choice of coalition partners in the G20 will be more limited than in the wider multilateral setting; one could argue that the power of large numbers in an institution like the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the presence of a large number of developing countries, are conducive to the emergence of more bloc-type and balancing coalitions led by the rising powers, whereas the absence of such allies in the G20 may produce a greater tendency towards soft balancing rather than hedging or hard balancing.

Framing

A fundamental aspect of the negotiation for power is ideational, and the use of ideas in international negotiation is perhaps best captured by the idea of framing. John Odell, for example, argues that 'negotiation is a contest among partisans each attempting to establish the dominant subjective *frame* of reference'.[13] How different powers frame their demands when confronted with the opportunities and challenges of power transition is important from both strategic and normative perspectives. In particular, a study of framing tactics can provide us with valuable insights into the differing and sometimes competing notions of global order that different powers bring to the negotiating table (interesting enough in their own right, but especially so as they have been little studied to date). Framing tactics are likely to vary not only with the position of particular actors in the international hierarchy and their political cultures, but also with the international context and

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[12] See e.g. Hurrell, 'Hegemony, liberalism and global order'; Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, 'Hard times for soft balancing', *International Security* 30: 1, 2005, pp. 71–108; Stephen Walt, *The origins of alliances* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).
[13] Odell, *Negotiating trade*, p. 19 (emphasis added).

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the particular institution in which the negotiation is taking place.[14] A dominant tendency to use certain framing strategies with a high degree of consistency, across different situations, may indicate a behaviour with deeper cultural roots.

Implications

What are the possible implications that arise from this collective study? At least three areas are significant: these relate to the motivations of the rising powers and other negotiating parties; the ability and willingness of these actors to assume the responsibilities of international leadership; and how differing visions of global order conflict or reinforce each other.

Motivations

A world undergoing power transition is a deeply uncertain one. The uncertainty derives partly from a lack of clarity in the motivations of states, for various reasons including concealment and misperception,[15] and partly from the fact that the motivations of the various actors, particularly the rising powers, are still evolving. The collective efforts represented in this issue have the potential to help us better understand the motivations that underpin bargaining behaviour in the following ways.

For the rising powers, we would associate a revisionist tendency in motivation with a tendency to use distributive negotiating strategies with the established powers and integrative negotiating strategies with smaller allies and other rising powers; attempts to form balancing coalitions against the major powers; the use of bloc-type coalitions with limited negotiating flexibility to reinforce the use of a distributive strategy; and framing demands in polarizing terms that appeal to high principles of distributive justice and further presentation of alternative ideas (e.g. conditionality-free aid) to win over allies among the marginalized many.

For the established powers, a tendency to use integrative strategies with the new powers, including offering them places at the high tables of various international institutions, would point to genuine attempts at engagement (perhaps even with the hope of socialization), as would the use of issue-based coalitions that transcend North–South divisions and the encouragement of bandwagons rather than balances of power.

The different mechanisms of global governance provide important testing grounds for the levels of socialization or buy-in (or indeed estrangement) that different institutions have been able to produce on the part of different aspiring powers. The other actors considered in this context, including multinational

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[14] The ideas employed in framing tactics can be studied at different levels. The framework offered by Goldstein and Keohane, drawing a distinction between causal beliefs and principled beliefs, is a useful starting point: see Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, *Ideas and foreign policy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993).

[15] Robert Powell, 'Uncertainty, shifting power, and appeasement', *American Political Science Review* 90: 4, Dec. 1996, pp. 749–64; Robert Jervis, *Perception and misperception in international politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).

companies (MNCs), NGOs and smaller states, all serve as interesting sites of observation for testing the intentions and strategies of the rising powers. As independent actors in themselves, they also offer useful insights into the new constraints and opportunities provided by the changing balance of power, any of which may alter the strategies and possibly even motivations of those negotiating in this new environment. The various studies presented in this issue can offer valuable insights into the extent to which evolving visions of global order are reconcilable in a multipolar world.

Leadership

An important set of implications resulting from the articles in this issue relate to the question of leadership in the international system. Leadership may be defined as the willingness to contribute to the provision of global public goods. We might expect countries that tend to view negotiations predominantly in terms of winning or losing to be unlikely to make the concessions necessary to provide public goods. In particular, we would expect countries using predominantly distributive strategies to be reluctant to share the burden of providing public goods. But the leadership variable is also related to the other two variables of framing and coalitions. Even a country that usually assumes a gloves-off attitude in multilateral and bilateral negotiations may see negotiations with coalition allies more in terms of win–win outcomes; depending on how that country identifies its own interests in relation to those of coalition allies, and further frames its bargaining positions accordingly, it may be willing to provide for certain club goods that are accessible to a restricted group. Hence, for example, we might find that rising powers working in South–South coalitions show a greater willingness to provide club goods, whereas those working in North–South coalitions may be more willing to provide public goods. Similarly, framing of negotiating demands in the polarizing terms of fairness and justice may be conducive to the provision of club goods but militate against the provision of public goods.

Global order

All contributions to this issue have a bearing on the question of global order. While standard economic and political indicators of power offer useful pointers to the nature of polarity in an international system and the norms that underpin it, they do not suffice. For example, while there seems to be general agreement in the existing literature on the relative decline of US power, scholarship is deeply divided on whether the resulting system today is one of diluted unipolarity, emerging bipolarity, multipolarity or non-polarity. There is also little clarity on the extent to which the new powers will accept the norms that the established powers have promulgated over the last 60 years or promote alternative values (which may be old ones, based on sovereignty and pluralism, or new variants that represent a marked departure from the principles that have under-

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pinned the systems of both the post-Second World War era and the post-Cold War era).

Negotiating behaviour can hold the key to understanding how the distribution of power is evolving, and how key actors use opportunities and constraints to advance their own visions of global order. For instance, if we see a general tendency towards bandwagoning, the chances are that the system will show characteristics of unipolarity, whereas balancing would suggest multipolarity or non-polarity. The recurrence of deadlocks may be indicative of either a highly polarized system, where a small but clear set of major actors are in conflict over irreconcilable visions of global order, or a chaotic 'nonpolar disorder' where 'dozens of actors' exercise power and are unable to organize collective action.[16] Continued contestation over the succession to and the sharing or transfer of power, within or outside institutions, with arguments over whether power is to be located in a G2, a G7 or a G20 (and also over who would occupy these loci), would be indicative of non-polarity.

Especially in a multipolar order and a non-polar disorder, we would expect at least some conflict over the norms and visions of global order that different key actors—old and new—bring to the negotiating table. We may find that one or more of the rising powers resist the provision of public goods that global governance currently seeks to furnish, and instead argue that the international order should provide some alternative public goods. Rising powers, moreover, seldom seek such alternative agendas in isolation: they form interstate and transnational coalitions with other actors, bargain with yet others that may adapt their own agendas to such pressures, and often act in multilateral institutions to advance their views of what public goods should be provided and how. Framing strategies are often useful indicators of the particular vision of global order that states and other actors espouse. For instance, recourse to pragmatic justification of one's demands may suggest an easier potential fit with the predominant norms of global order, whereas justification via an appeal to different values (e.g. fairness, equality) may signal a potential push for an alternative agenda driven by a considerably different vision of global order.

Main findings

All the contributions that follow share the starting point outlined in this Introduction and deal directly with the themes highlighted. This section presents the central findings of each chapter and the collective insights that they offer when read together.

The first group of articles deal with the rising powers of, respectively, Brazil, China and India. All three articles recognize the use of distributive bargaining strategies by the BICs, albeit to varying degrees. All three countries use coalitions, but they show interesting variations in their coalition patterns and in their commitment to them.

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[16] Richard N. Haass, 'The age of nonpolarity: what will follow US dominance', *Foreign Affairs* 87: 3, May–June 2008, pp. 44–56.

Sean Burges, investigating the case of Brazil, highlights the resourcefulness that Brazilian negotiators have had to rely on, particularly the appeal to ideas, given the limited hard power available to them. Even though there occasionally 'might appear to be a language of rebellion and substantive revision in Brazil's foreign policy statements, even ostensibly isolationist ideas such as Lula's new international economic geography are fundamentally predicated on maintenance of the existing global governance structures'. Even its distributive bargaining behaviour thus reveals an 'integrative fascia'; rather than simply saying 'no' and presenting direct opposition, Brazilian diplomats turn to technical details to scupper certain deals and also put new ones on the agenda that are more in line with their country's own interests.

In terms of coalitions, Burges points to Brazil's reliance on South–South coalitions and claims to leadership of the South. This would suggest bloc-type coalitions and a tendency to balance against the North. In fact, however, Burges highlights the *realpolitik* that underlies such coalitions. He gives us examples of how Brazilian diplomats sometimes 'drift from the coalition script' to swing events in their favour, and also points to the 'near-naked pursuit of Brazilian self-interest through the articulation of a South–South agenda that clearly creates opportunities for its internationalizing businesses'. Brazil's framing strategies thus become particularly interesting in this context. Burges illustrates how, by strategically framing its own interests in southern terms and appealing to a southern identity, and also by presenting itself as a bridge between North and South, Brazil has managed to achieve considerable success in various negotiations despite its relatively limited repertoire of hard power resources.

Amrita Narlikar examines India's bargaining behaviour as a rising power and argues that how India negotiates depends considerably on whom it is negotiating with. In doing so, she helps mediate a polarized scholarly debate that sees India on the one hand as a 'natural ally' of the West, sharing its values, and on the other as an unreformed Third Worldist revisionist power. India's traditional negotiation strategy with the West was distributive, showing a strong tendency to form balancing rather than bandwagoning coalitions. Interestingly, a rising India, even though it has a more evolved and comfortable relationship with the West (particularly the United States), is not deterred from using distributive negotiation strategies, uses moralistic framing, and resists bandwagoning by firmly refusing to enter into a formal alliance with the United States. India's relations with other rising powers also reveal some degree of distributive bargaining, depending on the issue area and despite the rhetoric of loyalty to the BRIC grouping. The dominance of the state and also its post-colonial legacy lead it to take a tough line not just with MNCs, but also with international organizations (even those that have worked hard to accommodate India's rise). All these negotiating behaviours reveal India's dissatisfaction with the existing global order, and its firm refusal to play the role that some would expect of it as an established democracy, although it is less clear which alternative visions of global order it would be willing to bear responsibility for, were it a Great Power.

Introduction

Interestingly, and in contrast to its dominant bargaining behaviour with several actors (ranging from the established powers to private sector entities), India has consistently used integrative bargaining strategies, formed southern coalitions, and shown willingness to share the burdens of international responsibility with smaller actors. Such deviations from the norm of distributive bargaining, moralistic framing and balancing in blocs are important: the article argues that they reveal that 'India is perhaps not reluctant to be a responsible power per se, but … it sees itself as owing its responsibility to different constituencies'. Moreover, how these responsibilities are conceptualized is still evolving, which opens up some space for negotiation and influence both for India itself and for its negotiating partners. Narlikar offers some policy recommendations in this light.

Sean Breslin's article focuses on Chinese perceptions of global order (and of China's own place in it). The article highlights the nuances in China's bargaining behaviour, which help us to navigate the extremes of the scholarly and policy debates on China as a status quo power or a revisionist power: 'While China might be dissatisfied with the (global) status quo, it will articulate this dissatisfaction and push for change in a responsible manner that does not destabilize the global system. There also seems to be a reluctance to accept leadership roles that might entail costs that impact on domestic development agendas.' Breslin further identifies the competing factors that drive China towards keeping a low international profile versus those that push it towards adopting a more proactive global role.

These competing impulses make for a mixed negotiation strategy. Partly to avoid triggering further alarm in the international system as a response to its rise, China has shown itself willing to use some integrative strategies, particularly in areas that represent 'non-core' interests. Breslin also notes an interesting mixing in its coalition strategies. On the one hand, Chinese negotiators emphasize the importance of South–South alliances, driven partly by commercial interests (e.g. the pursuit of natural resources in Africa) and partly by 'fuzzy and ideational/ ideological/political criteria'. On the other hand, however, Breslin also points to China's role in the region, particularly in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, to illustrate the 'issue-based and pragmatic basis of China's international interactions'. He also stresses the Chinese commitment to finding pragmatic solutions: 'If there is a normative position underpinning China's official approach to reform of global governance, it is perhaps that there should be no normative basis.'

The three articles on the BICs offer some interesting points of comparison and difference. While all three countries profess commitment to the BRICs grouping, it is clear that both cooperation and competition underpin this attempted coalition; it provides a classic illustration of both the reformist agenda that the new powers share and the disagreement that exists between them on the shape that a reformed global order could and should take. Distributive negotiation strategies feature in the repertoire of all three countries, but there are important differences in how they are used. India shows the greatest readiness to use such strategies with most actors (other than some of the smaller state actors); China reserves them

for areas of core interest; and Brazil seems to use them the least. There are also differences in how the three countries use their distributive strategies, or indeed justify coalition strategies or frame their negotiating positions, perhaps pointing to some important differences in their negotiating cultures. Brazil, for example, resorts to technical detail rather than explicit nay-saying when challenging other agendas or pushing for its own. This stands in most dramatic contrast to India's directness in the use of its distributive negotiation strategy, and also differs from China's issue-specific willingness to use a strict distributive strategy when its core interests are at stake. Negotiating culture is not systematically addressed by all articles. But the fact that we see interesting variation on this variable even within the group of BIC countries suggests that this may constitute an exciting subject for future comparative study.

The second section of this issue deals with other key actors in the system that are affected by and potentially influence the rise of the new powers. The first study in this section, by Eleni Vezirgiannidou, focuses on the role of the United States. Observing its relative decline, Vezirgiannidou addresses the question: 'How can it preserve its unique position in the system and at the same time obtain cooperation from emerging powers in solving global problems that affect its interests?' She investigates how the US is managing its relative decline by analysing its relations with other major and minor powers across several multilateral regimes, including security governance, financial governance and development aid governance. The article argues that, on the one hand, the US has little incentive to accept a diminished role for itself in multilateral institutions, which would be a necessary outcome of governance reform. On the other hand, in its condition of relative decline, the US is unable to act without the cooperation of other actors, especially the rising powers. This paradox, writes Vezirgiannidou, has contributed significantly to US disengagement, and decreased willingness to exercise leadership, in multilateral institutions today.

Michael Smith's article deals with another major power that is affected by the rise of the BICs: the European Union. Smith persuasively argues that the nature of the EU as an international negotiated order has encouraged its self-identification as 'a potential leader in global negotiating processes, and as the progenitor of a certain style of diplomacy and negotiation, building on its internal deliberative and coalition-building processes'. This, however, means that the challenges that its diplomacy faces today—partly internal and partly deriving from the rise of the BICs—are tantamount to an existential crisis of sorts for the EU. Thus Smith writes: 'Whereas for other established powers the question is one of adjustment— sometimes wrenching—to new challenges, for the EU it is one of a different order.' While the EU has faced external challenges before, the rise of the BICs presents a new magnitude of challenge, requiring a 'full-spectrum diplomatic response' which the EU's fragmented diplomatic machinery is unable to generate.

Working within these constraints, the EU has adopted strategies that may appear, at first glance, to be integrative bargaining strategies with the BRICs countries via its 'strategic partnerships'. But, as Smith argues, in practice not only is

there considerable variation in what a strategic partnership may entail, depending on the partner involved, but the label may be used to cover clearly competitive relationships, involving a distributive mode of bargaining. Thus, while strategic partnerships are far from proxies for coalitions, Smith points out that the coalition-building efforts between the European Union and the United States have also been limited. The analysis offers valuable insights into an added source of complexity in the EU's attempts to deal with the BRICs: divergence and fragmentation between the EU's collective position towards China and Russia on the one hand and the national positions of member countries on the other. The article identifies several problems in the EU's response to the challenge presented by the rise of new powers, and argues that the EU's failure to employ its preferred approach of integrative bargaining towards the BRICs is a reflection of these problems.

The established powers are not the only group of states to be affected by the rise of the new powers; smaller countries, too, face a range of new constraints and opportunities. Brendan Vickers focuses on the African countries and offers a story of cautious optimism. He writes that 'the rising powers indeed purport to support African countries as they seek to restructure their post-colonial external relations … and integrate more strategically into the world economy on more flexible policy terms than those sanctioned by the West'. He points to several important examples of cooperation between the African countries and the rising powers, and traces Africa's improved agency with them to four sources: 'the commodities boom', 'potential market power', 'collective continental agency', and 'normative and ideological framings' based on the shared commitment of the rising powers and the African countries to South–South cooperation and an agenda for reform. While there is by no means a complete overlap in the interests of the rising powers and those of the many small and marginalized economies of Africa, there are important avenues for cooperation and considerable evidence of integrative bargaining. This also means that the African countries work more often in bloc-type coalitions with other developing countries, which include the rising powers, than in issue-based coalitions. Vickers further argues that the rise of new powers as alternative development partners offers valuable BATNAs (best alternatives to negotiated agreement) to the African countries when they negotiate with the established powers. He also provides us with examples of how African countries have used distributive strategies—against the established powers, but on occasion also with the rising powers—particularly in negotiations taking place within multilateral regimes. An important conclusion of his study is that 'collectively and individually, and in partnership with the rising powers, African countries as historical "rule-takers" are actively contesting global governance in the pursuit of distributive justice'.

States are not the only actors that are affected by power transitions. The last two articles deal with the impact that the rise of new powers is having on NGOs, MNCs and international organizations.

Steve McGuire investigates the role of firms and NGOs in the established and rising powers, both in coping with the challenges and in harnessing the opportunities

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offered by the current power transition. He points out that scholarship over the last 20 years has focused largely on opportunities that MNCs from the West have come to enjoy in labour-abundant and lightly regulated emerging markets. But writings that 'exaggerate the political power of western multinationals and ignore the emergence of firms from the rising powers' present an incomplete picture. McGuire corrects this imbalance by highlighting both the constraints that face western MNCs in their negotiations with host emerging economies and the opportunities that MNCs from the rising powers have successfully exploited in recent years. For example, he points out that western MNCs are often reluctant to complain about their treatment in emerging economies for fear of losing access to the vast consumer markets there. Meanwhile, firms from the rising powers are emerging as significant competitors for western MNCs. The article analyses the sources of their strengths, which include not just state patronage and access to primary resources, but also economic liberalization, which has helped to create more competitive firms in the rising powers. McGuire highlights key differences in the structures and strategies of firms from the established and rising powers, but also some important similarities. For example, firms from both the West and the growth markets are showing tendencies towards greater regional activity and only limited multilateral engagement.

McGuire also explores the extent to which the rise of MNCs in the new powers has come at the expense of NGOs. He persuasively argues that the successful rise of countries such as Brazil, China and India has 'undermined a key argument about the development trap that faced emerging markets, and to an extent justified NGO involvement in countries'. The decline in the relative power of NGOs has led some of them to enter into interesting coalitions with firms, to the mutual advantage of both groups.

The final article is by Miles Kahler, focusing on the role of the rising powers in different mechanisms of global governance. He asks a critical question: to what extent will economic convergence produce benign engagement by the rising powers in international institutions, and to what extent will the current power transition increase the likelihood of conflict 'as incumbents react to stave off relative decline in the face of confident challengers?' Kahler aims to answer this question by investigating the negotiating behaviour of the BICs across economic and security regimes. He argues that their record in international bargaining in and over institutions of global governance suggests that they are no different 'from other powers, past and present, in wishing to extract as many benefits as possible from their engagement with the international order while giving up as little decision-making autonomy as possible'. They have their agendas for reform of global governance, which involve opposition to international hierarchies and support for more inclusive decision-making processes whereby international rules are made. They have used distributive strategies in varying degrees, and have also worked in South–South coalitions (some involving just the rising powers, other large-scale ones involving many developing countries, and also some with specifically regional memberships). But their negotiating behaviour does not suggest an

agenda for revolutionary or even radical reform. The conservatism of the new powers is evident in their preference for intergovernmental organizations, their suspicion of NGOs, which they often regard as traditional allies of the established powers, and even a de facto acceptance of international hierarchy, reflected in their accepting positions of influence in international institutions, with the automatic corollary of keeping other countries out (for instance in the G20).

Importantly, Kahler argues that this conservatism on the part of the new powers should not lull us into believing that they will be 'pliable negotiating partners' for the incumbents or that the risks of conflict are minimal. He identifies three fault-lines for conflict: 'system friction, distributional conflict and institutional efficiency'. He also offers policy recommendations for different actors attempting to manage global governance in an 'era of rising powers and distracted incumbents'.

Conclusion

The contributions to this issue offer many valuable insights, both on their own terms and in a comparative light.

The three case-studies alert us to some interesting differences in the negotiating behaviours of Brazil, China and India. For example, while all three use a mix of negotiation strategies, India's perhaps lies towards the more distributive end of the spectrum, especially when negotiating with the established powers; China shows willingness to use integrative strategies when its non-core interests are concerned; and Brazil is perhaps the most nuanced in its strategies, presenting even distributive moves with an integrative face, and avoiding overt nay-saying. In conjunction, the differences in their negotiation strategies, coalition behaviours and framing strategies illustrate the differences in their perceptions of the responsibility and leadership that they owe and to whom. While the articles do not directly engage with the variable of 'negotiating culture', they suggest there may be important differences among the three (with India occupying one end of the spectrum, where it is acceptable, and in some instances even heroic, to say 'no', and Brazil occupying the other end). All three articles indicate that the three powers are dissatisfied with the existing system (with Brazil perhaps emerging as the least dissatisfied of the three), but also recognize that none of them offers a clear alternative to the existing global order. Somewhat reassuringly, though the rising powers are not satisfied with the status quo, none of them appears to be a revolutionary power. The findings of the first three articles thus fit in nicely with those of the last article by Kahler on global governance.

While the articles on the BICs encourage some degree of cautious optimism that the absence of revolutionary intentions on the part of the new powers may help preserve systemic stability, the article on global governance reminds us of the risks associated with actual or perceived free-riding by these major economies. In fact, the refusal/reluctance of the rising powers to take on international responsibility may well be a source of systemic instability; as Burges, Narlikar and Breslin

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indicate, this reluctance is real (though again varying across the three), and shows little evidence of changing easily or immediately without some external catalysts.

Such external triggers may take the shape of incentives offered by the established powers to the rising powers to assume greater responsibilities. But the two articles on the United States and the European Union illustrate the limited abilities of either incumbent to cope with the rise of new powers. In the absence of an appropriate policy response from the established powers, the dangers identified in the final article on global governance are likely to grow.

In contrast to the established powers, some of the other actors have done well out of the opportunities offered by the emergence of the new powers, while mitigating the dangers. The articles on Africa and private actors provide us with some striking examples of this. Importantly, these alternative actors also offer valuable opportunities to the rising powers: least developed countries, for instance, offer greater legitimacy to coalitions led by the rising powers, and home-grown MNCs have increased the leverage of the emerging markets with other state and non-state actors. The articles on the BICs reinforce the importance of such alliances (again, with varying degrees of commitment from the three countries) and the benefits that they generate, further strengthening the hand of the BICs.

In essence, the story that emerges from this collection of articles is not an alarmist one. The negotiating behaviour of the rising powers does not reveal a clear alternative vision of global order, or the desire for a complete overhaul of the current order. Consequently, the rise of new powers does not pose a direct or immediate threat to the system. However, the reluctance of the rising powers to take on new responsibilities amid expectations from the 'distracted incumbents' that they share the burden of providing global public goods not only makes the system more prone to deadlock but also heightens levels of distrust, thereby increasing the risk of destabilization.

What might be done to guard against such dangers? The fact that the agendas of the rising powers are not yet set in stone gives us reason for some optimism; through effective bargaining and negotiation, they could perhaps be encouraged to develop their own visions of global order, of which they would have greater ownership, and to which they might therefore be more willing to contribute. The articles on India and global governance offer suggestions on how such compromises could be made: Narlikar advances the idea of 'reform-for-responsibility', whereby the rising powers could be offered greater voice and influence in international regimes in return for their willingness to specify the responsibilities they would be willing to assume, while Kahler emphasizes the importance of institutional reform, not just of the global institutions but also of institutions within the new powers. Compromises made by the incumbents in these directions would thus need to take the shape of clear trade-offs rather than unilateral concessions, which may also be more palatable for them domestically.