

A decade of African Peace and Security Architecture

ALEX VINES

At the African Union (AU) summit in Addis Ababa in July 2012 the outgoing AU Commission chairperson Jean Ping stated that ‘the solutions to African problems are found on the continent and nowhere else’.¹ That month saw the tenth anniversary of the AU, marking a decade since it had followed on from its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), created half a century earlier on 25 May 1963. The premise behind both was to address Africa’s insecurity and underdevelopment and create a more assertive continent—part of a pan-African dream. During the 1960s Ghana’s founding president, Kwame Nkrumah, proposed the idea of an African High Command through which a continental army would be established to prevent external intervention and to undertake wars of liberation.² But Nkrumah was unable to win the support of his fellow leaders for his visionary plan, and as Cold War proxy wars spread across Africa, many of its rulers sought refuge in neo-colonial security pacts.

Fifty years on, the security challenges facing Africa have changed dramatically. Africa has become a focus for inward investment, and many of its countries have enjoyed increasing stability and economic growth, even if the continent’s efforts to replace colonial patterns of activity with a new framework of integration have been slow. (Trade among the AU’s 54 member countries represents less than 10 per cent of the continent’s total, for example.)

In mid-October 2012, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma became the new AU Commission chairperson. Her task will be to reform the AU and make it more effective at enhancing peace and security in Africa. She takes the job at a time when the AU is recovering from very public divisions—over its failure to respond in a unified and coherent manner in Côte d’Ivoire in late 2010 and early 2011, and then over the NATO-led intervention in Libya in 2011.³ In the period preceding her appointment, many African leaders felt that the AU needed to resist external intervention and itself become the prime agent for humanitarian intervention and civilian protection on the continent.⁴ One consequence of this mood was South

¹ ‘AU seeks regional response to conflict’, *Voice of America*, 15 July 2012, http://www.voanews.com/content/au_seeks_regional_response_to_conflicts/1405037.html, accessed 28 Nov. 2012.

² Timothy Murithi, *The African Union: pan-Africanism, peacebuilding and development* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2005).

³ Sadiki Koko and Martha Bakwesegha-Osula, ‘Assessing the African Union’s response to the Libya crisis’, *Conflict Trends*, no. 1, 2012, pp. 3–15.

⁴ Tim Murithi, ‘The African Union at ten: an appraisal’, *African Affairs* 111: 445, Oct. 2012, pp. 662–9.

Africa's attempt to take over the leadership of the AU Commission in late 2011, by proposing Dlamini-Zuma as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) candidate for the chair of the AU Commission. This move, which represented a direct criticism of the incumbent chairperson, Jean Ping, was unprecedented, as there had previously been an informal understanding that no national from a major African state would stand for this post. Nevertheless, in a second ballot held in July 2012 Dlamini-Zuma secured the necessary support to secure her election as chairperson at the AU summit. There remains some bitterness, and Dlamini-Zuma will need to demonstrate her leadership and diplomatic skills and prove she does not promote a national agenda if she is to stand any chance of reforming and improving the effectiveness of the AU.

At ten, the AU is a young organization. Between 2002 and 2008, the then chairperson Alpha Oumar Konaré and the first college of AU Commissioners set about defining a vision, constructing an African peace and security architecture, and placing the AU on the map as the key pan-African interlocutor. The formation first of the AU itself in 2002 and then of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) in 2004 established a framework for the promotion of peace and security on the African continent. A host of policy and strategic management plans were also drawn up, including the Institutional Transformation Programme (ITP), which made some progress initially but lost much momentum towards the end of Konaré's term.⁵

Konaré helped define a vision for the role of the AU, but he failed to persuade member states to provide the AU Commission with coherent mandates, or to transfer to it any significant power or resources. Today, questions of African ownership of the AU project remain real, with opinion on the vision and pace of the project varying hugely across Africa. Institutional rivalries are also evident. South Africa and Nigeria are competitors for any new permanent seat on a reformed UN Security Council, and this rivalry has fed directly into AU decision-making. There remains a lack of clarity on mandates and roles and who is best placed to do what in African integration and response, and this confusion has led often to mixed messages and at times to direct competition. Yet there has been progress. The deputy chairperson of the AU Commission, Erastus Mwencha, has argued:

Africa has made great progress in establishing the institutional architecture for the promotion of peace and security on the continent through the establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). APSA was established by the African Union, in collaboration with the Regional Economic Communities. Its role is to deal with prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in Africa. The operationalisation of the APSA will be achieved through the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System to monitor the Regional Mechanisms with a view to anticipation of conflicts, the African Standby Force (ASF) and African Common Defence Policy. Furthermore, the African Union has deployed significant efforts towards addressing some of the root causes of conflict, and thus promoting the prevention of conflicts. These include the adoption

⁵ Also, the initiators of continental projects such as the New Partnership for Africa's Development and the African Peer Review Mechanism, among them Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal and Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, are no longer in office as national presidents, and their successors lack the visionary drive for a pan-African project.

of instruments such as the Declaration of Unconstitutional Changes of Government; the African Charter of Elections and Democracy; the Protocol to the African Charter of Human Rights on the rights of women; and the Solemn Declaration on the Gender Equality in Africa.⁶

After the passage of a decade, we may reflect on what progress the AU has made in addressing these issues. This article examines how in particular the AU has handled the peace and security challenges it has faced since 2002 and how it has adapted to global challenges and changing politics in Africa.⁷ This article assesses how much of the APSA as defined above functions and enhances peace and security, and what remains aspirational.

Changing security challenges in Africa

Between 2003 and 2012, 12 *coups d'état* took place in Africa, and the AU suspended eight countries—the Central African Republic (CAR), Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania and Niger—from its membership. This alone illustrates the broader scope claimed by the AU beyond that of the OAU and its willingness to oppose unconstitutional changes of government through sanctions as well as providing peace support operations and conducting mediation efforts.⁸

The predominant form taken by AU sanctions is suspension from the AU organization, aimed at stigmatization. In applying this sanction the AU usually seeks the support of other actors, such as the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) or external bodies such as the UN or European Union. In December 2009 the PSC adopted the Ezulwini Framework for the Enhancement of the Implementation of Measures of the African Union in Situations of Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa.⁹ This framework included the decision to create a sanctions committee at the AU in Addis Ababa, aimed at monitoring implementation of the PSC's sanctions policy.

Currently the AU capacity to monitor compliance of sanctions is limited and its record of imposing sanctions (see box 1) is mainly restricted to small and medium-sized states (with the exception of Côte d'Ivoire). AU sanctions may have been applied in response to recent coups, but have never been used to penalize

⁶ Erastus Mwencha, 'Opening remarks', in Geert Laporte and James Mackie, eds, *Building the African Union: an assessment of past progress and future prospects for the African Union's institutional architecture*, Policy and Management Report 18, European Centre for Development Policy Management, Oct. 2010, p. 104.

⁷ This article benefited from one of the special events marking ten years of an Africa programme at Chatham House, a seminar entitled 'Africa's security and stability: key issues and opportunities for progress', Chatham House, London, 7 Nov. 2012. See also Paul Williams, *The African Union's conflict management capabilities* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2011), p. 6.

⁸ Katryn Sturman, 'The use of sanctions by the African Union: peaceful means to peaceful ends?', in *South African yearbook of international affairs 2008/9* (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 2009), pp. 97–109; Mikael Eriksson, *Supporting democracy in Africa: African Union's use of targeted sanctions to deal with unconstitutional changes of government* (Stockholm: FOI, The Swedish Defence Research Agency, June 2010).

⁹ Peace and Security Council, 'Ezulwini Framework for the Enhancement of the Implementation of Measures of the African Union in Situations of Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa', PSC/PR/2(CCXIII)/Assembly/AU3XIV, 17–19 December 2009.

Box 1: AU sanctions 2003–2012

Central African Republic. The CAR became the object of the AU's first sanctions regime in 2003, in a test case of how the AU should deal with unconstitutional changes of government. The AU decided to impose sanctions following a coup by General François Bozize. Although the AU suspended the CAR from all its activities, the Regional Economic Community (CEMAC) declared its support for Bozize. The AU lifted sanctions after elections in 2005.

Togo. AU sanctions were imposed on Togo in 2005 to encourage holding of elections after the death of General Eyadema (president 1967–2005). In this it followed the lead of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

The Comoros. The AU imposed sanctions on the separatists Anjouan and Abdourahim Saïd Bacar in October 2007. These took the form of economic and travel sanctions and the freezing of assets. On 25 March 2008 the AU launched a military intervention and in June 2008 a new election was held.

Islamic Republic of Mauritania. In August 2008, following a military coup led by General Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, the AU tried to mediate. In February 2009 the AU imposed sanctions, but these were lifted on 30 June 2009 in acknowledgement of progress towards elections.

Guinea. Following the death of President Conté on 22 December 2008, the AU suspended Guinea on 29 December. ECOWAS followed suit a week later. On 18 October 2009 ECOWAS imposed an arms embargo. This time the AU followed suit, imposing sanctions on 30 October 2009 which it then lifted on 7 December 2010.

Madagascar. AU targeted measures against the Indian Ocean island came into force on 17 March 2010, after its exiled former leader Marc Ravalomanana was toppled by Andry Rajoelina. They included a travel ban against all members of institutions set up by the Rajoelina administration. In contrast to past practice by which countries that had defaulted on their AU subscriptions were not allowed to take part in the polls for a new AU Commission chairperson, in 2012 only Madagascar was barred.

Côte d'Ivoire. The AU suspended Côte d'Ivoire from membership on 7 December 2010. Sanctions were lifted on 22 April 2011.

Mali. On 3 April 2012 the AU endorsed ECOWAS sanctions against Mali (imposed on 26 March 2012) and 'further decided to impose their own sanctions, with asset freezes and travel bans against leaders of the military junta and all those involved in contributing to the "destabilization" of Mali'.^a ECOWAS lifted its sanctions on 7 April 2012, following an undertaking by the Malian junta to return to constitutional rule, and the AU readmitted Mali on 26 October 2012.

Guinea-Bissau. The AU suspended Guinea-Bissau on 17 April 2012, following a coup. The AU also threatened to impose more sanctions if the soldiers who seized power there failed to respond positively to the call to restore constitutional order.

a 'African Union adds to sanctions in Mali', CNN, 4 April 2012, <http://www.cnn.co.uk/2012/04/03/world/africa/mali-unrest/index.html>, accessed 30 Nov. 2012.

Table 1: Numbers of conflicts and unconstitutional changes of government in Africa since 2000^a

<i>Year</i>	<i>Political and military coups</i>	<i>Unconstitutional incidents</i>	<i>Wars</i>
2000	1	1	11
2001	1	1	12
2002	12	2	12
2003	3	3	7
2004	0	0	8
2005	2	2	5
2006	0	1	8
2007	0	2	9
2008	2	3	8
2009	1	3	5
2010	1	1	0
2011	1	1	3
2012	2	2	4

^a Sample: 39 countries.

Source: Adapted from Mikael Eriksson, *Supporting democracy in Africa: African Union's use of targeted sanctions to deal with unconstitutional changes of government* (Stockholm: FOI, The Swedish Defence Research Agency, June 2010), p. 72.

extension of presidential term limits or against governments in place that initially seized power through unconstitutional means.

The AU has suspended nine of its members, listed in box 1. It has also imposed additional sanctions on six members (CAR, Comoros, Guinea, Madagascar, Mauritania and Togo). In addition, it has issued strong condemnations to 16 countries (Burundi, CAR, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, São Tomé and Príncipe, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Togo).

Although the AU has responded to coups, in only a few cases has it acted against governments that have chosen to prolong their stay in power. Nor, up to 2011, had it taken action against countries with significant democratic challenges, such as Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia. It has also been minimal in its response to elections with significant deficiencies, such as those held in Equatorial Guinea or Cameroon since 2002.

Other trends are also visible. The number of wars in Africa has decreased since the creation of the AU from twelve in 2002 to four in 2012, but the number of localized crises has increased. This has little to do with the AU, although less external backing for combatants and better African mediation efforts may have contributed to the former trend. A look at the record in sub-Saharan Africa over

the last 50 years shows that about 30 countries—some 65 per cent of the total—have experienced armed conflict since independence. The number of conflicts increased in the first three decades of independence and spiked at the end of the Cold War in the 1990s.¹⁰ These included the long wars in Sudan and Angola and also regional conflict such as that seen in the Horn of Africa. About 64 per cent of these African internal conflicts lasted five years or less, while some 22 per cent lasted eleven years or more.¹¹

It is often said that Africa has been a major focus of the UN Security Council over the last 50 years. It is true that Africa has been the continent with the largest number of wars—but it also has the largest number of countries. The frequency and magnitude of killing is actually less in Africa than in Asia from 1960 to 2008.¹²

The greatest change since the 1990s has been the end of big wars for state control such as those in Angola and Sudan. We are also seeing a new development in mobile insurgent groups that move back and forth across national borders—such as the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Al-Shabaab.¹³ The end of the Cold War weakened the dynamics of some conflicts and provided opportunities for others. None of the insurgencies of the 1990s developed into structured conflict; instead we have seen counter-system rebellions such as those by the LRA, Al-Qaeda, AQIM and Al-Shabaab and continued separatist group action in Senegal, Angola and Mali.

On the positive side, there has been a wave of democratization in sub-Saharan Africa. Between 1989 and 1995 the number of multiparty political systems in Africa increased from five to 35. Ruling parties have been voted out of power in Benin, the CAR, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Mali, Mauritius, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Zambia.

But questions remain about the quality of democracy. Electoral violence, sometimes called 'gunpowder politics', has been evident in Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe and could be a key issue again for Kenya and Zimbabwe, along with Madagascar, all three of which have elections scheduled for 2013. In the 1970s and 1980s elections were rare, but the reintroduction of multiparty contests—with more and more regular elections—has raised the stakes and thereby the incentives for violence. There has also been slippage: over the last five years coups and unconstitutional changes of government have become more frequent, although their success has been limited by the AU and international response.

Access to land and water are potential sources of 'social conflict' and the future could see indigenous groups clash with migrants. Resource wars did not die with the 1990s, when rebels sought rents from diamonds, oil and drugs to raise funds. Mali and Guinea-Bissau are good examples of how international organized crime has penetrated Africa and hollowed out African states.

¹⁰ William Reno, *Warfare in independent Africa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

¹¹ Scott Straus, 'Wars do end! Changing patterns of political violence in sub-Saharan Africa', *African Affairs* 111: 443, pp. 179–201.

¹² Straus, 'Wars do end!'.

¹³ Idean Salehyan, *Rebels without borders: transnational insurgencies in world politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009).

Clearly, domestic factors, such as stronger civil societies, economic growth and better institutions, and geopolitical shifts such as the decline of external support for insurgencies are playing a role in the security environment. Quality African leadership remains a key factor—as demonstrated only too acutely by the different paths that Mali and Niger have followed in 2012.

African states remain fragile, many still dealing with the legacies of colonialism, such as colonial boundaries and economies reliant upon the export of minerals or of agricultural products. Multipolarity globally makes a stronger African vision and international voice more vital than ever before, especially as competition for access to African markets is increasing. Maintaining a stable continent is critical for economic growth, and many of the challenges facing African countries, such as organized crime, terrorism and climate change, can only be addressed at a continental level. The architecture that the AU builds to enhance continental peace and security has never been more important.

The African Peace and Security Architecture¹⁴

Since the AU was inaugurated in Durban in 2002 it has expanded to represent every African country except Morocco, and thus occupies a position of continental leadership. Like the EU, on which it is modelled, the AU operates across a broad range of fields, from agriculture through development to peace and security. However, in many respects the two organizations bear little comparison. There are, to be sure, common features: as it has grown to include 54 members the AU has experienced problems similar to those that bedevil the EU in respect of coordination and internal rivalry. The AU is also structured similarly to the EU: it has a commission, a council and a parliament; however, it has a more straight-forward control structure than the EU, without the confusion of different pillar competencies, and the Pan-African Parliament has very limited powers and is not directly elected.

The AU came into existence fully formed, which meant that member states did not have to satisfy any democratic or economic entry criteria before being accepted as members. Hence, unlike in the EU, it incorporates a wide divergence in respect of both democratic ideals and economic performance. It should also be remembered that the development of the AU has been driven more by a political than an economic agenda. In the peace and security field the AU has adopted an official policy that permits intervention in member states in ‘grave circumstances’ (Constitutive Act, Article 4h).¹⁵ The role of the AU in the new APSA is accordingly twofold: it acts both as a legitimizing institution and as a coordinating body. So far, as the willingness to intervene in the politically sensitive theatres of Sudan and Somalia has shown, the AU is able to act effectively as a legitimizing body. The coordinating role is more problematic.

¹⁴ This section draws upon Alex Vines and Roger Middleton, ‘Options for the EU to support the African Peace and Security Architecture’, European Parliament Directorate-General on External Policies of the Union, Brussels, Feb. 2008.

¹⁵ Constitutive Act of the African Union (Lomé: African Union, 2000).




Figure 1: The African Peace and Security Architecture

Source: Alex Vines and Roger Middleton, 'Options for the EU to support the African Peace and Security Architecture', European Parliament Directorate-General on External Policies of the Union, Brussels, Feb. 2008.

The AU Constitutive Act of 2000 established 17 key institutions, some with overlapping mandates. As well as the right to intervene, the Constitutive Act provides the AU with a responsibility to protect in situations of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. The African Union Peace and Security Council was established as a legal institution of the Union through the 'Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union' that entered into force on 26 December 2003.

The AU is trying to deal with almost every aspect of life on the continent, yet its staff is small and of variable aptitude, so that its most effective members are swamped by an ever-growing workload. While the AU looks superficially like an African version of the EU, it is built on different foundations and operates in a radically different, and more difficult, environment. The AU Commission's effectiveness is also hampered by low staffing levels. In 2012 it employed 669 people, compared with the EU's 33,000 employees.¹⁶

The AU's highest body is the Assembly, which comprises the heads of state of all member countries. The Executive Council comprises the foreign ministers of the member states and advises the Assembly. The administration of the AU is the AU Commission, which is made up of commissioners covering different areas of AU activity. The Pan-African Parliament is an indirectly elected parliamentary

¹⁶ 'The African Union at ten: aspirations and reality', seminar held by the Centre for Conflict Resolution and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Berlin, 30–31 Aug. 2012.

assembly with no legislative powers (although these are envisioned for the future). There are also financial organizations, the Economic, Social and Cultural Council, and the PSC. The PSC, in conjunction with the chairperson of the AU Commission, is responsible for all areas of peace and security policy and action.

APSA is meant to be the structure that provides for peace and security on the continent. It incorporates a political decision-making body (the PSC), an analysis centre (the Continental Early Warning System or CEWS), a military element (the African Standby Force or ASF and Military Staff Committee or MSC), an external mediation and advisory body (the Panel of the Wise or POW) and a special fund to cover costs (the Africa Peace Fund or APF). The different elements are intended to provide a comprehensive set of tools with which African actors can address the security concerns of the continent. The PSC receives advice and information from the POW, CEWS and MSC, and then instructs the ASF on the actions it deems necessary. This structure is illustrated in figure 1.

Peace and Security Council

The PSC is composed of 15 members, 10 of whom are elected for a two-year term and five for a three-year term.¹⁷ The PSC is mandated to:

- promote peace, security and stability;
- anticipate and prevent conflicts;
- combat terrorism on the continent;
- develop a common defence policy for Africa;
- promote democratic practices, good governance and respect for human rights.

As the central organ of APSA, the PSC legitimizes and coordinates the actions of all the other elements of the architecture. The MSC is intended to provide advice to the PSC on military and security issues and is made up of representatives from the same countries as the PSC.

African Standby Force

The ASF is still being established, but is being designed to take the role of an African rapid reaction force capable of deployment anywhere on the continent. The force is based on, and divided into, five regions—North, South, East, West and Central—and will draw on military and civilian resources from a combination of some or all of these regions. The standby brigades are envisaged as the operational arm of the planned security architecture. The five forces, each of up to 6,500 military, police and civilian personnel, are intended to be flexible, mobile and capable of deployment. Six scenarios have been assigned to them:

¹⁷ Kathryn Sturman and Alissatou Hayatou, 'The Peace and Security Council of the African Union: from design to reality', in Ulf Engel and João Gomes Porto, eds, *Africa's new Peace and Security Architecture* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), p. 69.

- military advice to a political mission, to be deployed within 30 days of an AU resolution;
- an observer mission to be deployed alongside a UN mission, to be deployed within 30 days of an AU resolution;
- a 'stand-alone' observer mission, to be deployed within 30 days of an AU resolution;
- a peacekeeping force for Chapter VI of the UN Charter or preventive deployment and peacebuilding, to be deployed within 30 days of an AU resolution;
- complex multidimensional peacekeeping missions, with deployment of military elements within 30 days and complete deployment within 90 days;
- intervention by the AU when the international community fails to act, for example over genocide, with deployment within 14 days.

Each region will have regional headquarters and planning elements to support the work of its brigades. As will be discussed later in the article, the precise form of regional structures will vary depending on regional circumstances.

There has been a tendency in the analysis of the ASF to think purely in military terms. This is a mistake as there are clear civilian components to its work, such as good governance, human rights and post-conflict reconstruction. In past AU-led missions, the military have taken a leading role, even under mandates for civilian peacebuilding. Most have been short-term stabilization missions prior to handing over to multidimensional UN missions, as in Burundi (ONUB, later Integrated UN Office/BINUB) or the hybrid mission in Sudan/Darfur (UNAMID).

Continental Early Warning System

The CEWS, which is based in the situation room at AU headquarters, helps to anticipate and prevent conflict. Using open source information, the CEWS compiles reports using software adapted from the European Early Warning System. The reports identify potentially dangerous activity and are then passed to early warning analysts who decide on the level of gravity and potential consequences of the events identified. The CEWS also receives information and analysis from the regional early warning systems. The information and analysis from CEWS help inform decisions reached by the PSC and guide the deployment of the ASF.¹⁸

Panel of the Wise

The POW, made up of five 'highly respected' individuals, works primarily in the area of conflict prevention. Acting on the instruction of the PSC or the chairperson of the AU Commission, or on its own initiative, the POW undertakes action in support of PSC objectives and gives opinions on issues relating to peace and security. In practice this entails mediating between warring groups or in situations where

¹⁸ El-Ghassim Wane, Charles Mwaura, Shewit Hailu, Simone Kopfmüller, Doug Bond, Ulf Engel and João Gomes Porto, 'The Continental Early Warning System: methodology and approach', in Engel and Gomes Porto, eds, *Africa's new Peace and Security Architecture*, p. 109.

a conflict looks likely. It may also involve a role behind the scenes raising issues with the PSC that are too politically sensitive for serving politicians to handle.¹⁹

African Peace Fund

A special Peace Fund has been created to finance peace support operations. The fund is financed from the AU's regular budget and also through voluntary contributions from member states and other fundraising activities. These may include innovative fundraising techniques such as the proposed airline levy.

While the AU is tasked with higher-level organization and the provision of troops for large missions, it is envisioned that the regions will be the mainstay of the new APSA. As noted above in relation to the ASF, APSA has been organized in five regions (North, South, East, West and Central). Each region will provide an ASF Brigade for quick deployment to trouble spots and contribute one member to the POW, and the regional early warning systems will feed into the CEWS. The relationship between the regions and the AU, therefore, is crucial.

Operationalization of APSA

APSA grew out of previous attempts to create a stable and peaceful continent. A major influence on its development has been the principle of African solutions for African problems, epitomized by the operations of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in West African conflict situations in the 1990s. African states have a variety of motivations for participating in peacekeeping operations. South Africa intervened in Lesotho in 1998 for the sake of regional stability, and in the DRC to bolster its position as a leading African nation. Uganda saw advantages in deploying to Somalia in support of US anti-terrorism concerns, while Rwanda's interest in Darfur was motivated by its own experience of genocide. Some states will join a mission to generate funds for their own armed forces and some for more idealistic ends.

More African militaries are contributing to UN operations. According to the UN, only four African countries (including North African states) had more than 500 military personnel in UN operations in April 2002. In 2012, 14 nations contributed at this level, with six deploying more than 2,000 troops. Five of the top ten contributors of military and police forces in April 2012 were African: Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria and Rwanda. Countries such as Ethiopia, Rwanda and Uganda may engage in such missions partly to deflect international criticism over human rights. Such motivation is not always conducive to sustained commitment: for example, following UN allegations that Uganda is supporting M23 rebels in the DRC, Kampala announced in October 2012 that it would withdraw its troop contributions to AU and UN missions in Africa. Through Kenyan forces in Somalia rebadged as AMISOM in 2012, the Kenyans also boosted their military

¹⁹ Tim Murithi and Charles Mwaura, 'The Panel of the Wise', in Engel and Gomes Porto, eds, *Africa's new Peace and Security Architecture*, p. 85.

capacity and gained greater legitimacy, as well as access to the financial and logistical support provided to AMISOM.

Since 2003, the AU has entered into its operational phase and deployed missions to Burundi (AMIB), Sudan/Darfur (AMIS), Somalia (AMISOM), the CAR (FOMUC) and Comoros (AMISEC). Through such missions the AU has sought to operationalize its peace and security norms.

AMISOM is an interesting case. It is expected to amount to about 17,000 troops in 2013 and is the result of multi-annual troop commitments by several African states (Burundi and Uganda in particular, but also Nigeria, Djibouti and Sierra Leone). The first AMISOM troops deployed in 2007 consisted of no more than 1,700 staff from Burundi; the force has since expanded and has had increasing impact over time.

In all the above operations, external donor support was needed. At times, too, external pressures from donors did not take into account the limited capacity of AU structures. In 2004, when AMIS first deployed to Darfur, its headquarters personnel numbered just two dozen. In 2007, the Strategic Management Unit for AMISOM had only eight of 35 proposed staff.²⁰ In such circumstances, the AU has on occasion been able to put together unexpected coalitions—for example, in its intervention in the Comoros in 2008 it brought in support from the only African non-member of AU, Morocco.

The Comoros had been plunged into political crisis in 2007 when Mohammed Bacar declared himself president of Anjouan (also known as Nzwani Island), even though he had been ordered by the federal authorities to postpone polls owing to a lack of security. The AU imposed sanctions and a travel freeze. However, the US took an interest in mediating the crisis, motivated by the growing importance of East Africa in the fight against Islamic terrorism. In January 2008, US Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer visited the archipelago and supported a call for new elections in Anjouan as soon as possible. Finally, on 25 March 2008, the Anjouan crisis came to a climax with a full AU intervention in the Comoro Islands. Operation Democracy in the Comoros went relatively smoothly, with amphibious landings of 450 Tanzanians and 350 Sudanese AU troops by zodiac boats supplied by Libya and non-member Morocco. Paris agreed to transport the AU troops to Mwali but chose not to provide logistical support for landings on Anjouan. The United States provided no direct material or financial assistance for the intervention, but offered valuable moral support and described the AU intervention as 'timely and appropriate'.²¹

In addition to such formal responses to crisis, the AU has also made more reactive ad hoc responses, such as the AU-led Regional Cooperation Initiative (RCI-LRA) against the LRA launched in March 2012 and intended to field a 5,000-strong task force from the CAR, the DRC, South Sudan and Uganda, although deployment has been delayed.

²⁰ Nicoletta Pirozzi, 'EU support to African security architecture: funding and training components', occasional paper no. 77 (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, Feb. 2009), p. 15.

²¹ Simon Massey and Bruce Baker, 'Comoros: external involvement in a small island state', briefing paper AFP 2009/1, Chatham House Africa Programme, London, July 2009, pp. 1–29.

Mediation is a key element of APSA, and the AU has mediated to avoid further conflict in Burundi, the CAR, Comoros, Guinea, Madagascar, Somalia and Sudan. In 2009 and 2010 the AU, jointly with ECOWAS and the UN, mediated to ensure that successful presidential elections in Guinea were held in June 2010. As noted above, the AU intervened in the Comoros in 2008; in fact, the OAU and AU have a history of involvement in the islands dating back to 1995 and the promotion of the restoration of constitutional rule. These mediation efforts at times faced serious problems to do with limited institutional capacity and competition with French efforts, including those by the institution La Francophonie. A similar pattern is evident in Burundi, where mediation first undertaken by the OAU in 1993 was taken over by the AU. Like similar efforts elsewhere, this work faced a number of challenges, such as over-reliance on donor support, inadequate planning and ad hoc procedures. All these mediation efforts illustrate the need for the AU to collaborate with international actors and its lack of a 'strategic approach to mediation'.²²

On 5–6 November 2012 the AU chairperson and the Commissioner for Peace and Security, Ambassador Ramtane Lamamra, met in Cairo at a retreat with all AU special envoys and representatives working on peace and security issues across the continent. The discussions reflected current priorities and focused on the DRC and the Great Lakes region, Somalia, Guinea-Bissau and Western Sahara, as well as on the relations between Sudan and South Sudan, the efforts towards the elimination of the LRA and the overall fight against terrorism.

AU–REC relations

At the AU there is a feeling that the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) are not always fully committed to AU leadership.²³ Conversely, in the regions the AU is sometimes felt to be overstepping itself. The internal dynamics of each region impact on their effectiveness. Sequencing decision-making, liaison and timing each play a role. There are crises which the regions are able to deal with, but other crises, such as the one in Mali discussed below, will need UN and international support beyond the RECs and AU.

The five regions designated by the AU for the purposes of APSA do not correspond directly with the existing eight RECs. For example, East Africa has the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the East African Community (EAC); neither organization has a security element or a comprehensive regional membership. Responsibility for coordinating the East Africa Brigade (EASBRIG), drawn from Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Rwanda, Sudan, Seychelles and Uganda, was given to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); but Seychelles, Madagascar and Rwanda are not members of IGAD, so a new EASBRIG mechanism has had to be established.²⁴

²² Laurie Nathan, 'Plan of action to build the African Union's mediation capacity', paper presented at seminar 'Towards enhancing the capacity of the African Union (AU) in mediation', AU Commission, Addis Ababa, 15–16 Oct. 2009.

²³ Interviews with AU officials, Addis Ababa and Brussels, Oct. 2012.

²⁴ Benedikt Franke, 'Competing regionalisms in Africa and the continent's emerging security architecture',

SADC and ECOWAS both have a security arm within their structure. Tanzania, which is a member of the EAC and SADC, is listed as a member of EASBRIG, yet is also a signatory of the memorandum establishing the SADC Brigade. Angola, another member of SADC and signatory of the SADC Brigade memorandum, is seen as a key state in the Central African Brigade. It may be some time before the exact make-up of the brigades becomes clear.

These regional incoherencies need not mean that the peace and security architecture cannot be established, but they make it harder. Moves to rationalize the regional organizations have been discussed, but there seems little political will to do so. It well suits Angola, for example, to sit in two regions and be able to choose what initiatives to support on an ad hoc basis in accordance with its own interests.²⁵ Daniel Bach argues:

Concomitant membership of several groupings often appears of little practical consequence since policies are episodically implemented and financial contributions irregularly paid. Far from being an inextricable source of conflict, overlapping membership can be negotiated and translates into additional opportunities for the pursuit of conference diplomacy, participation in externally funded ventures or support from regional or extra-regional powers.²⁶

The internal dynamics of the regions are worth examining, especially the role played by key states. In ECOWAS, Nigeria has in the past taken a lead role on security issues and, as it is by far the largest country in the region, this seems a natural position. However, while Nigeria claims to be interested in a stable neighbourhood, other West African states see Nigeria as trying to position itself as a regional hegemon. The difficult relations between Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire, dating back to the Nigerian civil war, have at times made military cooperation between the two states difficult. Nevertheless, whatever the hopes of other countries in the region, Nigeria is, and will remain, the pre-eminent power in West Africa and programmes that include Nigeria are more likely to succeed.

South Africa's role in Southern Africa is central: its military is well equipped and trained, and it has the economic resources necessary to conduct sizeable missions. Although South Africa takes a less prominent role in pushing forward the Southern African peace and security structures than that taken by Nigeria in West Africa, it has been noted that some nations are reluctant to rely on it. This is largely owing to fears of South African dominance in the region and intraregional competition for influence.

In East Africa both Kenya and Ethiopia aspire to regional leadership, and this internal rivalry means that the EASBRIG HQ has been situated in Addis Ababa while the Planning Element is in Nairobi. This is less efficient than having all

African Studies Quarterly 9: 3, Spring 2007, p. 46; Wolfe Braude, 'Regional integration in Africa: lessons from the East African Community', in *South African yearbook of international affairs 2006/7* (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 2007), pp. 131–57.

²⁵ Atieno Ndomo, *Regional economic communities in Africa: a progress overview* (Nairobi: Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, 2009), p. 12.

²⁶ Daniel Bach, 'The global politics of regionalism', in Mary Farrell, Bjorn Hettne and Luk van Langenhove, eds, *Global politics of regionalism: theory and practice* (London: Pluto, 2005), pp. 182–3.

elements of EASBRIG command in one place. EASBRIG must also deal with the ongoing tension between Ethiopia and Eritrea; it is inconceivable that these two countries' troops could serve together in the near future.

In North Africa the rivalry between Egypt and Libya for regional leadership was one of the reasons behind the delay in establishing the North African Standby Brigade. Tension between Morocco (not an AU member) and Algeria over Western Sahara (occupied by Morocco) is another factor.

Harmonization is a problem. At the AU summit in Accra in November 2007, African leaders called for regular consultations and greater cooperation between the AU and the RECs at the highest level; they also recommended the exchange of liaison officers between them. Building on this initiative, the RECs and AU signed a comprehensive memorandum of understanding at the January 2008 summit in Addis Ababa with the aim of enhancing and streamlining their cooperation on the implementation of the continent's peace and security agenda. This 'Memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the area of peace and security between the African Union, the Regional Economic Communities and the coordinating mechanisms of the regional standby brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa' states that the partner organizations will 'institutionalise and strengthen their cooperation and closely coordinate their activities toward their shared goal of ridding the continent of the scourge of conflicts and laying foundations for sustainable peace, security and stability'. All RECs have signed this memorandum, the North African Regional Capability (NARC) being the last to do so in September 2011. Within the framework established by this document, the AU and RECs should hold regular meetings and joint missions, and consultations should take place twice a year at senior official level and annually, on a rotating basis, at chief executive level.²⁷

A set of roadmaps has guided the implementation of APSA. The first covered the period from 2005 to 2008 and guided infrastructure, doctrine, operating procedures and evaluation. A second, for the years from 2008 to 2010, established political and legal mandates, rapid deployment concepts and planning capacities. A third mandate began in 2011 and is scheduled to end in 2015. It adds additional concepts of threats to African security such as maritime control. Although originally the ASF was to have become operational by 2010, this target has not been met—although some regional forces have been declared at initial operating capability. Full capability is now planned for 2015, while a continent-wide rapid deployment is planned for testing by December 2014.

Serious questions remain about AU capacity. 'Amani Africa' training exercises supported by the EU for the emerging ASF over recent years showed that leadership by the AU headquarters or AU operations is work in progress.²⁸ Most of the relevant posts were occupied by staff from outside the AU's Peace Support

²⁷ Kai Schaefer, 'The Africa–EU Peace and Security Partnership and African regional organizations', in Nicoletta Pirozzi, ed., *Strengthening the Africa–EU Partnership on Peace and Security*, IAI research paper (Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2012), pp. 26–7.

²⁸ International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey 2012: The Annual Review of World Affairs* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), pp. 59–60.

Operations Department during these exercises. Familiarity with ASF guidance material and UN best practice was weak, and common language use was also problematic. Low numbers of African ambassadors attending the exercises also signalled a low level of political interest, and any deployment would depend on political agreement.²⁹

The development of APSA is heavily dependent on the commitment of the RECs, because without regional cooperation there will be no ASF and the CEWS and POW will be severely weakened. Unless the AU can get support from the RECs it is difficult to see when any ASF deployment can take place.

The proliferation of RECs works against greater harmonization. The number should be reduced to five, representing the geographical groupings of West, East, North, Southern and Central Africa. It is also evident that there needs to be a clear division of labour between RECs and the AU. Competition between the two needs to be managed: there have been examples of rivalry, such as over leading mediation in Madagascar, and disagreements over when to sanction. There are still moments of ambiguity over which should take the lead in a political crisis. For example, in the Mali crisis of 2012, ECOWAS was weeks ahead in suspending Mali from its membership and calling for action. The AU had to play catch-up.

The subsidiary mismatch between various RECs also needs to be addressed. Western and Southern Africa have relatively well-established RECs with security mechanisms. Yet even SADC has underperformed, its power limited excessively by member states themselves.³⁰ SADC looks better on paper than in reality. Chris Landsberg concludes: 'SADC's secretariat is imbued with inferior decision-making powers, and has a poorly constructed decision-making edifice. One cannot emphasize enough the urgent need for improvements in the organization, management and functioning of the regional organization and its substructures.'³¹ Although the legal basis for a security community exists in protocols and treaties, the political will to implement these arrangements fully lags behind.³² Even SADC's mediation efforts in Madagascar in 2013 are in danger of petering out.

The current crop of conflicts in Africa, Darfur, Guinea-Bissau, eastern Congo and Somalia all provide valuable lessons. The crisis in Mali is highlighted here as it was unexpected and dramatically illustrates both the challenges that APSA faces and the need for fresh thinking and learning for both the AU and the RECs in dealing with changing conflict in Africa.

It is noteworthy that in response to the Mali crisis, the PSC in July 2012 authorized ECOWAS to lead in intervening, after finding itself slow to respond. The crisis in Mali, following an unexpected *coup d'état* on 22 March 2012, has created a major challenge for both ECOWAS and the AU as the political impasse gave

²⁹ IISS, *Strategic Survey 2012*, pp. 59–60.

³⁰ International Crisis Group, *Implementing Peace and Security Architecture (II): Southern Africa*, Africa Report no. 191 (Brussels: ICG, 15 Oct. 2012).

³¹ Chris Landsberg, 'The Southern African Development Community's decision-making architecture', in Chris Saunders, Gwinyayi A. Ozinesa and Dawn Nagar, eds, *Region-building in southern Africa: progress, problems and prospects* (London: Zed, 2012), p. 75.

³² The best assessment of this is by Laurie Nathan, *Community of insecurity: SADC's struggle for peace and security in southern Africa* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012), pp. 1–200.

armed radical groups in northern Mali time to entrench their position and defend their gains.

Good security governance and the return of the army to civilian control are central to Mali's future. The mandate of the ECOWAS ASF, as authorized by the AU PSC at its 323rd meeting in June 2012, set three key objectives:

- 1 ensuring the security of the transitional institutions;
- 2 restructuring and reorganizing the Malian security and defence forces;
- 3 restoring state authority over the north and combating terrorism and criminal networks.

After some months of drift, a high-level meeting on the Sahel took place in the margins of the UN General Assembly in September 2012, and Security Council Resolution 2071 on Mali was adopted on 12 October. The PSC adopted a strategic concept for the resolution of the Mali crisis in Addis Ababa on 24 October 2012.³³

The adoption of Resolution 2071 accepts the principle of an international force in northern Mali. This will need to bring in support from non-ECOWAS states such as Mauritania and Algeria. The favoured strategy of trying to negotiate while rebuilding the Malian military and planning for an international intervention in northern Mali continues, and elections are planned to be held by the end of April 2013 to restore a credible government in Bamako.

ECOWAS currently has no capacity to conduct warfare in terrain like that of northern Mali. Even so, on 11 November 2012 ECOWAS leaders agreed to deploy 3,300 soldiers, provided mainly by Nigeria, Niger and Burkina Faso,³⁴ to Mali to retake the north from Islamist extremists. At a summit, the ECOWAS chairman said the organization was ready to use force to 'dismantle terrorist and transnational criminal networks'.³⁵ The ECOWAS troops could be deployed as soon as the UN approves an ECOWAS military plan. The plan covers a six-month period, with a preparatory phase for training and the establishment of bases in Mali's south, followed by combat operations in the north. The UN gave ECOWAS 45 days from 12 October 2012 to draw up a plan for military intervention to retake the north and Resolution 2085 approved it in December 2012.

ECOWAS maintains that while dialogue remained the preferred option, force may be needed to break up the networks controlling Mali, which 'pose a threat to international peace and security'. Foreign powers are divided on the best approach to the crisis. French Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian warned on 11 November that if nothing was done to tackle the situation in Mali it would make the area a 'terrorist sanctuary'. France has said it will offer support but not troops for intervention in its former colony. But a top adviser to Algeria's president said on 10 November 2012 that an international military intervention in the country would be useless.³⁶

³³ Institute for Security Studies, *ECOWAS Peace and Security Report*, no. 1, Oct. 2012, pp. 1–8.

³⁴ 'West Africa bloc Ecowas agrees to deploy troops to Mali', BBC News Africa, 11 Nov. 2012, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-20292797>, accessed 29 Nov. 2012.

³⁵ 'West Africa bloc Ecowas agrees to deploy troops to Mali'.

³⁶ 'West Africa bloc Ecowas agrees to deploy troops to Mali'.

On 13 November 2012 the PSC endorsed a harmonized concept of operations for the planned deployment of the African-led mission in support of Mali, known as AFISMA. If this operation is to stand any chance of long-term success, Algeria's commitment to any military action in northern Mali is essential. Moreover, ECOWAS will have to provide peace support operations in the north in an effort to build confidence for many years to come following military action, unless this becomes a hybrid or full UN/AU operation.

The AU's many difficulties were clearly evident in the Libya crisis of 2011. The Arab Maghreb Union, the North African REC, was ineffective and the League of Arab States (Arab League) filled the vacuum, announcing in March 2011 that it supported an external intervention backed by the UN Security Council. This undercut mediation efforts by the AU to find a political solution.

The continuing crisis in Somalia and the eastern DRC involving the M23 rebels also serves as a reminder of how neighbouring countries get embroiled in tension and conflict, bypassing the existing missions of the AU and UN. In the case of the DRC, the crisis is partly being addressed by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, not an APSA pillar although initiated by the AU in 2004.

Some of the RECs are evolving more rapidly than the AU. Although in theory ECOWAS is a subsidiary to the AU, its comparative advantage in West Africa often puts it ahead of the AU in dealing with problems affecting the region. The AU's desire to set the continental agenda often runs into internal limitations, resulting in piecemeal and uncoordinated interventions. The AU frequently sends token observers, independent of ECOWAS, to elections in the region, and high-level meetings between the AU and the RECs are rare. States' commitment to their RECs appears much stronger than to the AU as they identify more intimately with local concerns. Given the circumstances and its internal capacity deficit, the AU will probably struggle to exercise oversight of regional processes, including the development of the regional standby arrangements.³⁷

The cases examined above show that regional multilateralism is complex, and any shift by international donors to deeper support of the RECs should be carefully thought through. Clearly, the RECs need to be strengthened; but, as the case of SADC has shown, operability of many of its peace and security functions is only meaningful if there is political will on the part of its members.

Practical challenges

Although China has provided the AU with an impressive new headquarters building in Addis Ababa, many challenges remain. The recommendations of the Audit of the African Union of 2007 and the 2010 assessment study, *Moving Africa forward: African Peace and Security Architecture*, vividly map the shortcomings. They focused extensively on the functioning of the Commission, which the Audit panel described as a 'malfunctioning body' after only four years of existence. Among

³⁷ Abdel-Fatau Musah, 'West Africa: governance and security in a changing region', Africa Program working paper (New York: International Peace Institute, Feb. 2009), pp. 17–18.

some key findings, the panel described the relationship between the Commission president, the vice-president and the eight commissioners as dysfunctional, with overlaps in portfolios, lines of authority and liability, and unclear and ill-defined goals. In addition, a lack of adequate leadership has also led to tension between some commissioners and the teams around them. The panel spoke of a lack of supervision owing to the repeated absences of commissioners and low morale among staff. The departments were described as working 'in silos'.³⁸

There is a management structure within the AU that shies away from delegation and seeks to micro-manage, slowing down the decision-making process and acting as a disincentive to initiative. A few people at the top of the pyramid are extremely busy, while those further down are forced to wait for direction. This makes responding to rapidly changing events difficult.³⁹

In any organization, retaining experienced staff is crucial to building institutional memory. The AU's capacity to recruit and retain skilled workers is weak; its human resources department is one that needs urgent attention. AU staff members often point out that they could earn several times more at the UN or in the private sector, and for some the AU serves only as a place to improve their curricula vitae before moving on to more lucrative fields. There are also accusations that some staff use generous travel allowances to boost their salaries and make unnecessary trips, further reducing their ability to carry out work in a timely manner.⁴⁰ Although pay is a problem this should not be overstated as, by African standards, the rates are attractive. However, the difficulty in negotiating the bureaucracy and dealing with the management structure makes more efficient organizations appear very attractive, especially to those at middle management level, and the failure to empower mid-level staff contributes to the high turnover of qualified people. As in other organizations, less effective staff members are hard to remove, thereby compounding the problem. There is also a tendency to rely on contract staff in key areas. Long-term support from the EU would be helpful in recruiting, training and retaining staff in these areas.

At the centre of the AU's problems in delivering effective peace and security programmes is capacity constraint. Many people complained in interviews that support services such as the finance and human resources departments are simply not able to cope with their workloads.⁴¹

The PSC, the ASF, the CEWS and the advisory bodies are only partly functional. These also remain dependent on external funding. Between 2008 and 2011, African states provided only 2 per cent of the AU's Peace Fund to cover peace and security efforts; the rest came from international donors. The current AU mission in Somalia remains completely dependent on the EU and UN.⁴² In

³⁸ 'Audit of the African Union', 18 Dec. 2007, Pambazuka News, http://www.pambazuka.org/actionalerts/images/uploads/AUDIT_REPORT.doc, accessed 12 Nov. 2012.

³⁹ 'Audit of the African Union'. This section draws on Vines and Middleton, 'Options for the EU to support the African Peace and Security Architecture'.

⁴⁰ See Vines and Middleton, 'Options for the EU to support the African Peace and Security Architecture'.

⁴¹ Vines and Middleton, 'Options for the EU to support the African Peace and Security Architecture'.

⁴² Judith Vorrath, 'Imbalances in the African Peace and Security Architecture', *SWP Comments*, no. 29, Sept. 2012, pp. 1–2.

July 2004, the then AU chairperson Alpha Oumar Konaré said: ‘Today Africa needs a more substantial support to the tune of what Europe obtained from America in the wake of the Second World War, or what the European Union offers to its new members.’ He called for the exploration of new resource mobilization strategies, including taxation on international financial transactions and sales of armaments. It was up to African leaders to mobilize the required funds, argued Konaré, who suggested that AU member countries should contribute 0.5 per cent of their annual revenues.⁴³ Konaré admits that his failure to attract additional African funding for the AU convinced him that he should not run for re-election.

African funding for the AU has come traditionally from the ‘big five’: Nigeria, South Africa, Algeria, Libya and Egypt. Following events in North Africa in 2011, there have been fears that the North Africans might reduce their support and AU staff have sought increased support from states like Angola and Equatorial Guinea, flush as they are with petrodollars.

Chronic underfunding has also been a challenge for ECOWAS, whose member states have often been either reluctant or unable to make their financial contributions. ECOWAS has partly overcome this handicap by devising a community levy system, whereby 0.5 per cent of taxes levied by member states on all imports entering the Community is automatically credited to the institution. The levy generates almost 80 per cent of ECOWAS’s annual operational budget, with external funding making up the rest.

ECOWAS has also set up the ECOWAS Peace Fund to strengthen both regular and unforeseen peace support operations, with contributions from the community levy, the African Development Bank and development partners. This fund is complemented by a pool that is supported by development partners and intended for internal capacity-building.⁴⁴

Conclusions

APSA offers the prospect of more African solutions to African challenges. APSA is a holistic approach to peace and security that recognizes the importance of prevention and mediation as much as peacekeeping: hence the prominent place given to Continental Early Warning and the Panel of the Wise. The adoption of the AU Constitutive Act and its commitment to intervention in extreme circumstances represents an acknowledgement that events such as the Rwandan genocide should not happen again on African soil. It would be naive, however, to think that even a fully operationalized APSA will solve all African conflicts.

APSA is clearly based on a liberal peace model, including the assumption that there are in place democratic systems and a desire to respect human rights and good governance. Christopher Clapham has argued that the AU Charter was

⁴³ ‘Konaré urges African leaders to change strategy’, *Pana*, 6 July 2004, <http://www.panapress.com/Konare-urges-African-leaders-to-change-strategy--12-551072-20-lang1-index.html>, accessed 29 Nov. 2012.

⁴⁴ Abdel-Fatau Musah, ‘West Africa: governance and security in a changing region’, p. 17.

mostly hollow, 'designed to protect continental regimes against external pressures by assuring the outside world that African states were doing something about the issue themselves'.⁴⁵ Across Africa's 55 states, the quality of governance is variable and a number of members of the PSC, such as Ethiopia and Zimbabwe, do not wholly fulfil the requirements of the PSC's statutes in terms of respect for the rule of law and for constitutional and human rights. The UN Security Council's referral of the President of Sudan to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for alleged war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in Darfur triggered a tense stand-off between the AU and ICC that has not been resolved.

The self-interest of nation-states continues to be a constraint on APSA and its success. Over the last decade the AU has found a voice and, despite some setbacks, it has shown through AMISOM in Somalia that it is capable of conducting a successful peacemaking operation. Its biggest challenge is not making the decision to intervene or deploy an ASF in a complex emergency but the capacity of most African states to deploy effectively. APSA will have to reduce its dependence on external partners over the next decade if better African solutions are to be found to peace and security challenges in the continent. Otherwise the AU will risk becoming a weak, donor-dependent institution with limited legitimacy.

The new chairperson, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, needs to find ways of making the AU more self-sufficient financially. She should study the 2007 AU audit and seek to rationalize the AU's commitments, introduce management reforms and sharpen its focus. On 5 November 2012 she acknowledged that the AU is overstretched and that the UN needs to fulfil its responsibilities and authority: 'Are the conditions in Somalia not ripe for the United Nations Security Council to now step in and help to keep peace, after the sacrifices made by African forces to create the conditions for peace? Is the UNSC adequately equipped to deal with the complexities of the conflict in Mali and the Sahel?'⁴⁶

How APSA develops during her tenure will be determined not just by her technocratic skills, but by the AU's success in collaborating effectively with the RECs and international partners to build up better institutions to promote Africa's peace, security and prosperity. Some of these security challenges are African problems that need international solutions, and the RECs, AU and UN all have important roles to play. Jean Ping is wrong: not all of Africa's peace and security problems can be solved by Africa alone but APSA does provide a useful vision framework by which to seek entry points for African and international partnership.

⁴⁵ Christopher Clapham, 'Africa and trusteeship in the modern global order', in James Mayall and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, eds, *The new protectorates: international tutelage and the making of liberal states* (London: Hurst, 2011), p. 75.

⁴⁶ Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, 'Keynote address by the chairperson of the Commission', African Union 2012 high-level retreat of special envoys and mediators, Cairo, 5 Nov. 2012, <http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Dlamini%20Zuma%20Keynote%20Address%20AUC%20Peace&SecurityRetreat4-6Nov2012%20Cairo.pdf>, accessed 29 Nov. 2012.

