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International Relations theory

The Eurocentric conception of world politics: western international theory, 1760–2010. By **John M. Hobson.** Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2012. 393pp. Index. Pb.: £19.99. ISBN 978 1 10760 454 4. Available as e-book.

An ever more pressing issue in the social sciences today is the question of standpoint. From where do social scientists identify and analyse the problems they wish to understand and explain? Which theories do they deploy and why? And what concepts do they use to achieve enlightening results? This question is more often than not elided, both because we feel secure in the use of the standard theories we employ, and because we are not accustomed to think critically about the matter of standpoint, or perspective. Having acquired the theoretical tools of our discipline, we are not tempted to re-examine their merit whenever we embark on our analytical journeys. However, there are now voices calling into question this unthinking use of social, political and economic theories. Two critiques are particularly significant. The first is that which challenges social theory on the grounds that it is the theoretical tool of the West, or North, which is blind to the fact that, in the words of Edward Saïd, it is ‘Orientalist’. The second is that which disputes the ‘scientific’ nature of the so-called social *sciences*.

John Hobson’s oeuvre belongs firmly to the first of those critiques, since he is concerned to demonstrate that International Relations (IR) theories are Eurocentric—by which he means that they are western and therefore biased in favour of the dominant North. In some of his other books, Hobson has endeavoured to reveal the eastern origins of our western civilization, showing that the Enlightenment and the technological revolution it brought about were only made possible because of the advances of Asian (especially Chinese) and Muslim science. In this volume, the author deploys his encyclopaedic knowledge of IR theories to show how the discipline is irredeemably Eurocentric. His method of choice is twofold. On the one hand, he provides a comprehensive chronology of IR theories starting from the eighteenth century. On the other, he re-examines these theories with a view to making plain their western standpoint.

The result is a dense text organized around analytical categories that are not always easy to digest. The book is in four major parts, which classify IR theories according to what the author identifies as their major ‘bias’. Thus we are told that the period 1760–1914 is that of ‘manifest Eurocentrism and scientific racism’; 1914–45 marks ‘the high tide of manifest Eurocentrism and the climax of scientific racism’; 1945–1989 is the apogee of ‘subliminal Eurocentrism’; and 1989–2010 represents a step ‘back to the future of manifest “Eurocentrism”’. The great merit of this scheme is to allow the reader to follow the evolution of IR and track changes in the analysis of world politics. Hobson discusses in minute detail the work of the authors who conceptualized international relations from the Enlightenment

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onwards. His account is fair but his classification of the theories concerned according to their putative 'ideological' standpoint might be open to question. Nevertheless, the book serves as a near-exhaustive exposition of the key writers and of their approach to the non-western 'others'.

Paradoxically, the weakness of this otherwise impressive volume lies in the question of perspective. Although Hobson is razor-sharp in identifying the Eurocentric 'tendencies' of the scholars whose work he dissects, he seems oblivious to the possibility that this critique hinges on *his* standpoint. If it is simple enough to agree with him on the ideological and methodological stance of those writing before the Second World War, it becomes more tricky to establish with similar clarity the assumptions and biases of recent IR without making clear one's own perspective. The author is particularly unforgiving of those current theorists (particularly Marxists) who claim to be anti-imperialist, showing, quite convincingly, that they too share a resolutely western standpoint.

Quite naturally, therefore, the question arises as to how Hobson himself can avoid the charge of Eurocentrism. Indeed, the more one progresses in the reading of this fascinating volume, the more one wonders how the author will extricate himself from this quandary. The best that can be said is that he believes his exhaustive critique of IR scholars will, but only implicitly, mark him out as the one who has managed to stand out from the Eurocentric crowd. But because this book is so absorbing, both as an account of IR and as an astringent assessment of those who practise the discipline, it comes as a surprise to realize that Hobson has not conceptualized the question of standpoint. From my viewpoint, this is the issue that most merits debating today—as I do in my book, *The end of conceit: western rationality after postcolonialism* (Zed Books, 2012).

The key to avoiding the Eurocentric trap is twofold. The first is to weave into the analysis the writer's subjectivities—that is to make explicit the intellectual and personal context within which one writes. The other is to search for concepts making possible theoretical constructs that include a self-critical dimension. And the very first step in that direction is to subject the ideas we use to the most acute critical examination. The advantage of this method is that it makes plain the ideological and intellectual genealogies of the concepts we use to build our theories. This is important because language is not neutral, as Hobson regrettably fails to make clear. His book will be necessary reading for all those interested in IR, but it will not be the self-reflective argument we need to avoid the pitfalls of Eurocentrism.

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The concept of the political. By Hans J. Morgenthau. Edited by Hartmut Behr and Felix Rösch. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave. 2012. 176pp. Index. £22.99. ISBN 978 0 23036 309 0.

Hans Morgenthau's *The concept of the political* is an attempt to establish the nature of politics and to understand the limits of law. Distinguishing between legal and non-legal disputes, Morgenthau argues that the problem of positivist international law is that it presents only a one-dimensional picture of what is at stake in any dispute between State A and State B. The political reveals itself as a mood, an attitude or a tone of elevated pitch, signifying the break between conditions in which legal instruments work, and those in which they are left behind by actors unconvinced of their power to effect change consistent with their aims. What separates the two conditions, the legal and the political, is the issue of intensity. The political is an expression of a more fundamental psychological and social reality than the legal, in that it is a reflection of a will to power which 'can take on three different aspects: it

can aim to maintain acquired power, to increase it, or to manifest it' (p. 106). The political, for Morgenthau, is a realm predicated upon the intensity of feeling and desire for power, which leads to 'an often grotesque disproportion between the object's objective value and the intensity of the will which relates to it' (p. 107).

Morgenthau's determination to stake out a territory between Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt cannot fail to pique the interest not only of historians of international thought, but also of those interested in the very specific challenge that Schmitt's work poses to the theorization of political life. Morgenthau's rejection of Schmitt begins with an identification of his concept of the political as a metaphysical construct, one that is not susceptible to refutation by recourse to 'known empirical facts' (p. 108). Schmitt's critics, according to Morgenthau, must either erect a rival metaphysics 'which amounts to abandoning scientific grounds ourselves in favor of metaphysical ones', or engage in an immanent critique of the internal workings of Schmitt's theory in search of 'contradiction in the principles or the deductions of the doctrine' (p. 108).

Schmitt's error for Morgenthau lies in his isolation of friend-foe as the 'final distinction' of the political because 'the friend-foe concept pair in no way results from the concept of the political with the same logical necessity as that which permits one to deduce, from the concepts of morality, or aesthetics or of economy', such fundamental categories as moral worth, aesthetic worth, economic worth and the corresponding opposites and concepts derivable from them. The friend-foe distinction does not have this foundational aspect, being rather analogous to saint-sinner or thrifty-spendthrift. From this initial category error emerges another problem. The saint-sinner distinction embodies moral worth or worthlessness—the fundamental categories from which they emerge—but the friend-foe distinction does not, as the foe does not represent what is politically worthless, nor does the friend necessarily reflect that which is of political worth. Rather than being a political category, the friend-foe distinction is psychological and social in the widest sense; there is nothing particularly political about having friends and enemies because they exist across all categories: moral, economic and so on.

Creating a concept of the political for Morgenthau revolves around finding what has political *value* and, conversely, what has not got political value in relation to the achievement of specifically political goals: rather than being fundamental, the friend-enemy distinction devolves to a question of whether these persons are useful or not useful in pursuit of whatever goal is in question. Rather than rooting the political in the context of a metaphysical division between friend and foe, Morgenthau prefers to locate the political in the pursuit of power, which in foreign policy finds its expression in the preservation of the status quo, imperialism or the politics of prestige. The political, for Morgenthau, is rooted in a will to power and 'consists in the particular degree of intensity of the connection created by the state's will to power between its objects and the state' (p. 120). Political life, according to Morgenthau, is not simply reducible to struggle, but rather a social field in which tensions and disputes derive from pressures emerging between status quo elements (which find their expression in the law) on the one side, and forces of dynamic change (which find their expression most vividly in revolution) on the other, an 'unsolvable antinomy' that 'results in a more or less enduring *modus vivendi* where the static element predominates' (p. 123).

This short, yet quite dense, text of Morgenthau is supplemented by four chapters written by the editors in an attempt to contextualize *The concept of the political*, doing a good job at this. Although much of the work carried out in this contextualization will be familiar to those who have investigated Morgenthau, the exception to this is the chapter on

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the distinction in his theory of power between *pouvoir* and *puissance*, which genuinely adds something to our understanding of Morgenthau's project at this stage of his career.

Overall, this is a very important book. It reveals a significant phase in the intellectual development of one of International Relations' most important figures and offers an alternative concept of the political that should spark further inquiries into this most central theme of (domestic and international) political theory. The scholarly essays of Hartmut Behr and Felix Rösch, the editors, are valuable contributions to the continuing reinvestigation of Morgenthau, and they are to be commended for bringing this work to the attention of a wider audience.

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Mao's China and the Sino-Soviet split: ideological dilemma. By Mingjiang Li. London: Routledge. 2012. 211pp. Index. £75.00. ISBN 978 0 41569 836 8. Available as e-book.

One of the most singular events of the Cold War, that great polarization between the twin ideologies which emerged victorious from the Second World War, was the catastrophic rift in the 1960s between the world's two great communist powers: China and the Soviet Union. Though seemingly underpinned by a common ideology, a history of shared conflict and the threat of a shared enemy, relations between the two countries turned with remarkable rapidity from fraternal (though sometimes strained) goodwill to savage antipathy.

In this book, Mingjiang Li describes the unfolding of the Sino-Soviet split, using declassified documents from the Chinese Foreign Ministry to shed new light on the political dynamics that propelled China and the Soviet Union from alliance to the brink of full-fledged military conflict in the span of a few years. In doing so, Li's aim is twofold: to enhance our understanding of the process that led to and sustained the split by giving due weight to the influence of China's domestic politics; and to theorize the concept of the 'ideological dilemma' which explains the fluctuating effect of ideology on foreign policy.

The introduction to the book sets out its purpose and anatomy, critiques current theoretical approaches and discusses the concept of the ideological dilemma. The body of the book is chronologically structured, with each chapter describing a phase of the deteriorating relationship between China and the Soviet Union, and the conclusion neatly sums up the points made before drawing out their theoretical implications. *Mao's China and the Sino-Soviet split* is accessible and clearly written, with a wealth of concrete examples from primary sources to illustrate the author's points and substantiate his arguments. Though it assumes a certain acquaintance with the historical context and does not constitute a comprehensive description of the split, the narrative is easy to follow, even if the author's efforts to weave theoretical considerations into the story do occasionally confuse the chronology.

A common view of the Sino-Soviet split is that it originated in the 20th Party Congress in 1956, at which Nikita Khrushchev set out a realignment of Soviet policy and ideology following Stalin's death. In this view, the Chinese leaders could not accept the denunciation of the hitherto venerated Stalin and the new ideological lines, which included peaceful transition to communism and coexistence with the capitalist West. It was this divergence of views that led to deteriorating relations, culminating in a propaganda struggle, withdrawal of Soviet aid to China and the threat of outright war. Li shows, however, that while the ideological reorientation on the part of the Soviets was indeed a necessary condition for the split, it was far from sufficient. He argues convincingly that the real cause of the conflict, the point that turned difference into dispute, and which frustrated a number of Soviet attempts at reconciliation, was the need for Chinese leaders in general, and Mao Zedong in

particular, to attack Soviet revisionism for domestic political purposes. From Mao fending off the criticism of Peng Dehuai in the wake of his disastrous Great Leap Forward, to the attempt through the Cultural Revolution to remove all political and ideological opposition, the threat of revisionism as exemplified in the Soviet Union was held up by radical leaders to sustain the notion of continuous revolution and render any political opposition inherently suspect.

The book goes further than merely demonstrating the central role played by Chinese domestic politics in bringing about the Sino-Soviet rift, however. Li's central thesis, and his contribution to International Relations theory, revolves around the ideological dilemma. This dilemma arises when ideologically motivated action by a state, even if taken for domestic purposes, is seen as an implicit challenge to another state with a different ideology, necessitating a corresponding action intended to shore up ideological legitimacy, thus plunging the two states into a vicious circle of increasing tension and stridency, potentially spilling over into issues of national security. Through the vehicle of the ideological dilemma, and by placing international events squarely in the relevant domestic context, Li provides a useful corrective both to liberal theorists assuming a constant and easily classifiable influence of ideology in international relations, and to Realists dismissing it as a factor altogether.

This short and succinct volume provides an interesting and important study of the role of ideology in foreign affairs. Though it can at times seem as if the book rather falls between the two stools of history and International Relations, it ultimately contributes to both, furthering our understanding of the Sino-Soviet rift as a historical event and helping to paint a more nuanced picture of the fluctuating influence of ideology on foreign policy.

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A dictionary of 20th-century communism. Edited by **Silvio Pons and Robert Service.** Princeton, NJ, and Oxford: Princeton University Press. 2010. 921pp. Index. £103.00. ISBN 978 0 69113 585 4.

If Marxism was the greatest philosophical fantasy of modernity, communism, its offspring, has been the greatest folly. A tragically grandiose combination of political millenarianism and revolutionary romanticism, communism was first and foremost a social utopia that energized, galvanized and motivated collective dreams of mundane emancipation. It substituted religious transcendence with the promise of immanent redemption. It provided the masses with ready-made, simplistic explanations, and it offered the intellectuals the rationalizations they needed to engage in decisive action. It was, as the great French historian François Furet put it, an immense, enthusing illusion, an inebriating faith—one that benefited from its claim to be the embodiment of science. In the 1930s, during what W. H. Auden called 'a low, dishonest decade', many embraced communism because they believed in its internationalist promises, the opposite of fascist barbarism. It offered a heroic ethos and countless individuals were ready to die for it. Too few were those who wanted to know about the horrors of the Gulag. The will to believe prevailed over the will to reason, and seduction buried critical faculties.

To serve the communist movement meant, for the plebeians and for the sophisticated intellectual patricians alike, to take the side of humanism against racist and nationalist obscurantism. Later, the myth faded away, especially after Stalin's death; Khrushchev's demystifying 'secret speech' in February 1956; the Hungarian revolution; the Sino-Soviet split; the Prague Spring; the disgust with Brezhnev's times of cynical stultification of Marxism; and

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the final systemic collapse during the revolutions of 1989–1991. As the editors emphasize in the introduction, putting together such a volume confronted the authors with ‘the tensions between two requirements that cannot be renounced—a moral condemnation of the mass crimes that are scattered through the history of communism and a historical understanding of communism itself’.

To capture this extraordinary historical adventure with its infinite hopes, agonies and tribulations in one book is a most daunting task. It is thus to the credit of Silvio Pons, Robert Service and their admirable collaborators that they were able to bring about a monumental, engrossing, truly comprehensive encyclopaedia of world communism. It spans a whole century or Marxist revolutionary ambitions and endeavours, and it covers the whole planet. It is balanced, fair, superbly documented and insightful.

The biographies of the major communist leaders are breath-taking reading. Of course some are missing (for instance, the ‘Pasionaria of the Balkans’, the firebrand Romanian Stalinist Ana Pauker, or the Chilean Socialist president Salvador Allende), but the most important names are there, with their political backgrounds. They were the zealots of the world revolutions envisioned by Lenin and Trotsky when they engineered the Bolshevik takeover in October 1917. One can thus read about Czechoslovakia’s Klement Gottwald, Rudolf Slansky, Antonin Novotny, Alexander Dubcek and Gustav Husak; about Poland’s Boleslaw Bierut, Wladyslaw Gomulka and Wojciech Jaruzelski; about Romania’s Gheorghiu-Dej and Nicolae Ceausescu; about Hungary’s Matyas Rakosi, Imre Nagy and Janos Kadar. Archie Brown’s biography of Mikhail Gorbachev is particularly well-written and illuminating, a real guide not only to Gorbachev’s political destiny, but also to the shaping of his world-view. In the same vein, Robert Service’s portraits of Lenin and Trotsky, William Taubman’s biography of Nikita Khrushchev and Silvio Pons’s entry on Stalin are genuine Sovietological gems. Readers who do not have the time to read extensive biographies find here reliable and powerfully argued documentation.

Excellent entries deal with communist parties in different area of the world. I would have expected some separate entries on influential Latin American Communist Parties, such as the Brazilian, Chilean and Mexican. The article dealing with the Romanian Communist Party was written by the late historian Florin Constantiniu and, while rich in details, leaves the reader without a deep understanding of how was it possible for a minuscule political sect to turn into a mass organization and, during the Ceausescu years, into a subservient vehicle for a grotesque experiment in dynastic communism.

Communist domination implied ideological regimentation. Terror was indispensable, but Leninist regimes needed a simulacrum of legitimation. This was the function of the official doctrine and the dictionary pays necessary attention to this crucial dimension. Once the orthodoxy started to erode, especially after Stalin’s death, Marxist revisionism spelled out alternative visions of human emancipation. Intellectual groups such as the ‘Budapest School’ in Hungary and ‘Praxis’ in Yugoslavia became voices for heresy and even apostasy. Surprisingly, there are no entries in the dictionary on these critical Marxist endeavours. I was particularly struck by the absence of an entry on the most influential Marxist revisionist, lambasted by the official ideologues, Leszek Kolakowski. In fact, Kolakowski’s biography is itself a synthesis of the drama this dictionary tries to sum up. This is astonishing taking into account the erudite chapter by Giuseppe Vacca focusing on Antonio Gramsci. The entry on Hungarian Marxist Georg Lukacs, written by the Romanian–French philosopher Nicolas Tertulian, is a thoughtful assessment of the thinker’s impact on western Marxism, but falls short of explaining Lukacs’s unrepentant commitment to Bolshevism until the end of his life.

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Special praise deserve the entries on anticommunism and totalitarianism (Abbott Gleason); French communism (Marc Lazar); cult of personality (E. Arfon Rees); fascism (Marco Palla); the Gulag (Nicolas Werth); Adolf Hitler (Richard Overy); messianism (Igal Halfin); the Prague Spring (Mark Kramer); and 'Short Course' (David Brandenberger). The entry on the International Brigades (Gabriele Ranzato) is impressive, but it includes erroneous information about former veterans who became prominent figures of East European communist regimes (Milovan Djilas, Klement Gottwald and Enver Hoxha did not fight in Spain). There are excellent entries of intellectual opponents of totalitarianism, from Arthur Koestler and George Orwell to Jacek Kuron, Adam Michnik and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. In brief, this is an outstanding intellectual achievement, an enduring, indispensable research instrument for all those who want to understand the grandeur and misery of the communist utopia.

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International organization, law and ethics

Justice and the enemy: Nuremberg, 9/11, and the trial of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. By William Shawcross. New York: Public Affairs. 2011. 257pp. £18.99. ISBN 978 1 58648 975 5. Available as e-book.

'You must put no man on trial under the forms of judicial proceeding, if you are not willing to see him freed if not proven guilty. If you are determined to execute a man in any case, there is no occasion for a trial; the world yields no respect to courts that are merely organized to convict' (p. 15). This statement made by Robert H. Jackson in 1945 goes right to the heart of the book under review. Primarily, it reflects the complexities that surround the pursuit of justice in a court of law. Indeed, the above statement was made as Jackson argued that it would be better to shoot Nazi criminals rather than have the process of law corrupted by show trials which intended to find the defendants guilty no matter what. Secondly, it illustrates the author's approach, as William Shawcross invokes the Nuremberg Trials in order to help provide answers to the questions facing 'the West' in a post-9/11 world; for example, the trial of terrorists in federal courts. In other words, Shawcross seeks to establish a historical lineage between the post-9/11 trial of Al-Qaeda terrorists and the post-Second World War trial of Nazis; both of whom are identified as 'the enemy'. This is the book's real strength, as Shawcross draws on a vast array of primary material to offer invaluable insight, while systematically presenting this through an eight-chapter structure on 'precedents', 'crimes', 'conventions', 'responses', 'courts', 'realities', 'verdicts' and 'justice'. The fact that Shawcross's father, Sir Hartley Shawcross, was Britain's lead prosecutor at Nuremberg provides an apt context; one gets the impression that the author has gone 'all out' to do his father's legacy justice. This is all to be credited since the magnitude of the subject-matter at hand should not be overlooked.

On a respectful but critical note, this reviewer found the author's focus on 'evil' highly problematic. Indeed, the very first sentence states that 'the judgement of evil is never simple' (p. 1) and the author invokes the idea of 'evil' throughout the book. As a genocide scholar, I understand why labels such as 'evil' gain currency, but I am reminded of Zygmunt Bauman's claim that in fact even the most heinous crimes are 'done to humans, done by humans' ('Done to humans, done by humans', paper presented at the first Global Conference on Genocide by the International Network of Genocide Scholars, at the Centre for the Study of Genocide and Mass Violence, University of Sheffield, 9 January 2009); when we

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invoke the idea of ‘evil’ we do so in order to distance ourselves from the ‘evil perpetrators’ of the ‘evil crimes’ when in fact it *may* be that all of us are capable of such cruelty. This is not to suggest that such thinking is right but simply to highlight that Shawcross has a responsibility to ground this term rather than present it as a self-evident truth. Furthermore, because of this, the book creates a dichotomy in which the United States is presented as ‘good’ and Al-Qaeda as ‘evil’. The outcome of which is that the author never tackles the controversial question: to what extent does US foreign policy inspire anti-US terrorism? This is particularly evident in the analysis on the contemporary use of drones, as Shawcross fails to address the concern that drones may have short-term strategic success but carry a much greater long-term cost as they fuel anti-Americanism. Finally, the book’s link between the post-9/11 era and post-Second World War era could have been strengthened considerably through an engagement with the issue of *intent*. The idea of ‘genocidal intent’ is discussed extensively in genocide studies, and Al-Qaeda’s intent to destroy ‘the West’ embodies a genocidal element which could have been brought into the analysis explicitly in order to strengthen the lineage being explored. This could have also been used to address the above idea that US foreign policy facilitates anti-US terrorism. One gets the sense that the issue of ‘genocidal intent’ is omnipresent in the book, though implicit rather than explicit; a more direct engagement would have helped strengthen the underlying foundations of the argument and the analysis presented.

Overall, I recommend the book, as it is a very enjoyable read. Notably, for those unfamiliar with the Nuremberg Trials it will undoubtedly illuminate their understanding of the complexities that face the application of the law in volatile and challenging times.

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Hybrid and internationalised criminal tribunals: selected jurisdictional issues. By Sarah Williams. Oxford and Portland, OR: Hart. 2012. 520pp. Index. £75.00. ISBN 978 1 84113 672 1.

Sentencing in international criminal law: the approach of the two ad hoc tribunals and future perspectives for the international criminal court. By Silvia D’Ascoli. Oxford and Portland, OR: Hart. 2011. 468pp. Index. £67.50. ISBN 978 1 84946 116 0.

J. Frank Dobie, the renowned Texan author, once wrote that the ‘average PhD thesis is nothing but a transference of bones from one graveyard to another’. Dobie apparently viewed the majority of student theses as academic requirements, destined to collect dust in a campus repository, rather than substantive works which would contribute to the development of the relevant subject-matter. Presumably, he believed them to contain merely regurgitated existing and presumably less than meaningful information—an exercise that clearly did not achieve the type of preservation he contemplated for his work. Thankfully, the theses drafted by Sarah Williams and Silvia D’Ascoli were not destined for such a fate, finding a saviour in Hart Publishing, which incorporated the texts into its Studies in International and Comparative Criminal Law series.

While bearing some of the institutionalized hallmarks of postgraduate work—most notably the very deliberate construction—both books contribute greatly to areas of international criminal law in need of further treatment.

Moreover, while not the focus of either book, a reading of the two texts in conjunction highlights the continued dichotomy in international criminal law between the development of a unified jurisprudence and the tailoring of international criminal law to specific

situations with local needs and unique circumstances. These contradictory ideals are manifest in the different types of courts analysed by the authors. Williams concentrates on the hybrid and internationalized state courts (such as the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia and the Special Court of Sierra Leone), while D'Ascoli addresses the 'pure' international tribunals (the tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia). As one would intuitively expect based on the nature of the juridical bodies, Williams essentially concludes that the issues she addresses must be resolved on a court-by-court basis, while D'Ascoli seeks to develop a comprehensive set of rules. Although their specific subject-matters (jurisdiction and sentencing) do not directly overlap, the books exemplify the evolution of international criminal law on two distinct tracks.

While the titular issue of jurisprudence of the hybrid and international courts is the ultimate subject addressed in Williams's book, a substantial portion of the text is devoted to defining, or more appropriately determining, that there is no comprehensive definition for hybrid or internationalized tribunals. Rather, there are certain defining features, such as whether the tribunal performs a criminal judicial function; the temporary or transitional nature of such institutions (or at least the international component); the possibility of participation by international judges sitting alongside national judges and other international involvement on other organs; international assistance in financing; a mix of international/national jurisdiction; and the involvement of a party other than the affected state (such as the United Nations, a regional organization or another state). Based on these factors, Williams provides a sliding scale of international courts, with the tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia as 'pure' tribunals on one extreme and domestic courts applying international law on the other.

Williams concludes that a comprehensive definition is critical, as it really does not affect issues of validity or sovereignty. What is reflected in the subsequent chapters is that the same factors that prevent the creation of a comprehensive definition—that each tribunal is unique in nature and purpose—require a court-by-court analysis of the jurisdictional issues. Thus, Williams's insightful review of issues of authority, legality, immunity and amnesties, among others, is most valuable to those practising in or studying specific tribunals.

D'Ascoli, on the other hand, has the benefit of analysing sentencing data from the two 'pure' tribunals. While her fundamental objective—to develop a coherent system of guiding principles for sentencing in international criminal justice—is broader than her analysis of the sentences meted out by the tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, its limited scope provides the opportunity to develop an overarching set of principles. Incorporating a broader review to include the hybrid and internationalized tribunals would introduce significant variables, likely leading to an analysis more akin to that provided by Williams.

After discussing a number of issues relating to the nature and purpose of sentencing, D'Ascoli's most important contribution comes in her statistical analysis of the sentences handed down by the ad hoc tribunals. She finds that the penalties for the Rwanda tribunal tended to be greater than those for the Yugoslav tribunal. However, such a result is logical, given the greater number of casualties and the fact that more defendants were convicted for genocide—the 'crime of crimes'. She also determines that there are high correlations between the length of sentences and leadership level; length of sentences and leadership level associated with type of participation; and length of sentences and the gravity of crime, victimization, superior position and abuse of authority/trust. On the other hand, D'Ascoli observes little or no correlation between length of sentence and modes of liability; type of participation; age of the accused; and composition of the bench.

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D'Ascoli concludes her text with a number of guiding principles and suggestions for sentencing at international courts, some of which are founded upon her statistical analysis, while others are derived from the more general sentencing concepts or are simply logical proposals. These include the need for a distinction between the overall objectives of international criminal law (with its generally broader focus, including issues of peace, stability and reconciliation) and international criminal law sentencing (focusing on individual questions such as retribution, deterrence and rehabilitation). Consequently, D'Ascoli focuses on proportionality, hierarchy of crimes, application of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the need for separate submissions and hearings for sentencing after a finding of guilt.

While reflecting its two diverging approaches, Williams's and D'Ascoli's works prove that international criminal law is a dynamic field with endless room for growth and development. Each should be proud to have contributed in a meaningful way to this emerging body of jurisprudence.

Matthew Kane

The new protectorates: international tutelage and the making of liberal states. Edited by James Mayall and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira. London: Hurst. 2012. 342pp. Index. £20.00. ISBN 978 1 184904 126 3.

Engagement in multilateral peace operations has multiplied since the end of the Cold War. For example, operations under United Nations command increased in number and size from five operations with about 20,000 personnel deployed in 1987 to 21 operations with 145,000 personnel in 1995. This edited volume is about the change in scope. The focus shifted from monitoring ceasefires and keeping the peace between warring parties to complex, integrated and multidimensional peace operations, aiming to build liberal states. In instances, whole territories were placed under direct international administration or became international protectorates. In this collection of 15 chapters, leading scholars and practitioners critically assess the motivations and norms that made these intrusive interventions possible. They explain the underlying dynamics and reflect on the often disappointing outcomes. 'New protectorates' are defined as 'territories where a medium- to long-term international presence, multilateral yet under de facto western leadership, was established with transformative goals at their core' (p. 1). They include the UN Mission in Kosovo (1999–2008); the UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia (1995–8); the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (1999–2002); and the instances of international military and civilian presence and involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Afghanistan and Iraq.

The book starts off with a superb introduction by the editors, offering a clear and insightful perspective on the motivations for the enterprise of international governance and liberal statebuilding and the gaps between discourse and practice. The introduction is both concise and comprehensive; it not only outlines the main themes, but also synthesizes the essential findings and incorporates the conclusions. This makes it the cornerstone of the whole volume and an exciting read, although the downside is that it leaves the reader without a concluding chapter at the end.

The volume then proceeds in two main parts, outlining firstly the historical context and reception of the new protectorates (chapters one to seven) and subsequently their governance (chapters eight to 14). The chapters are crisp and refreshing in style, while providing excellent and succinct summaries. Each of them is a real addition to the litera-

ture. Highlights include a splendid discussion of why not one single trusteeship was implemented in Africa despite the preoccupation with the continent's security (chapter three). The chapters on China and India note their concern about any compromises on sovereignty and their resistance to interventionism based on colonial experiences. Given the focus of the book on western-led operations, the chapters could have discussed the main European colonial powers (France, the United Kingdom, Spain) or the advocacy for liberal norms by Canada and the Nordic states. The chapter on the European engagement in the Balkans is a case in point in this regard. Similarly, Stefan Halper's chapter on the United States' fluctuating and competing positions towards protectorates and interventions over the last 50 years is a key strength of the volume.

The second part engages with the governance of the new protectorates. Wolfgang Seibel (chapter eight) outlines the dilemma and pathologies of UN peace operations designed to fail because of the interplay between member states as principals tasking the UN peace-keeping bureaucracy as agent. Security Council members pursue diverging interests in setting up peace operations and in consequence design them to fail. While the United Nations is incapable of carrying out its mandate, it must adopt a coping strategy of 'successfully failing'. Were the UN to achieve its goals against the conflicting interests of member states, they could further weaken or politically obstruct the process, as in Kosovo. Likewise, Michael Boyle's and Clare Lockhart's contributions are not to be missed. Boyle impresses with a detailed understanding of the challenges that police officers face in peace operations, given their dual responsibility to enforce order and to promote democratic principles. Lockhart's contribution is an eye-opening and spot-on diagnosis of why rebuilding Afghanistan failed. Additional chapters focus on the norms transmitted by the UN Peacebuilding Commission (chapter nine); the political economy of interventions (chapter eleven); civil-military relations (chapter 12); and conceptualizing legitimacy in the new protectorates (chapter 14).

The main criticism of the book is not the quality of its chapters, but the lack of common understanding of the 'new protectorates' and different engagement with the terms trusteeship; international direct administration; peacebuilding; and exogenous statebuilding. This offers a plurality of perspectives, but frustrates the reader at times, as it 'steals' about two pages from each contribution in added depth and coherence. This does not distract from the main point that the volume and each of the chapters succeeds in linking up a rare depth of understanding with a succinct diagnosis of key aspects of the liberal interventionism of the past two decades. The chapters are pitched just right and lucidly written. In brief, the book is an essential read for students, academics and policy-makers engaged in international security, and ought to be on any such reading list.

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Corruption and misuse of public office: second edition. By Colin Nicholls QC, Tim Daniel, Alan Bacarese and John Hatchard. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2011. 782pp. Index. £170.00. ISBN 978 0 19957 727 9.

It is easy to explain why a new edition of this authoritative work was required. Its preparation must have been a massive undertaking, deserving the gratitude of all whose activities are touched by its subject-matter; the team responsible for the first edition remains mostly unchanged. A more interesting question is why a review of this book, much of which deals with the domestic law of the United Kingdom and other countries, should appear in a journal devoted to international affairs.

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The short answer is that the United Kingdom's Bribery Act 2010, which came into force a year ago, marks a new departure point for consideration of this area of the law. But this work's scope goes far beyond the UK's criminal law—indeed, it is hard to think of an aspect of the subject (for instance pursuing the proceeds of corruption, the use of offshore companies, or the role of civil society) that is not treated here. The section on civil proceedings shows that the criminal law is not the only weapon against corruption; this matters since law enforcement authorities may often be poachers rather than gamekeepers.

Proposals for reform of the UK's outdated laws are now dealt with summarily, for the Bribery Act demonstrates that a modern law is achievable. The Act brings Britain into compliance with the OECD Convention on the bribery of foreign public officials and the United Nations Convention Against Corruption. All three regimes emphasize the requirement for businesses to have systems for preventing corrupt practices. A remarkable example of the parliamentary draftsman's art, the Act occupies a mere half-dozen pages (of fairly difficult reading). But the authors' commentary on its provisions and on the substantial official guidance issued to prosecutors and the public will serve to advise, encourage (and warn) those directly affected by the Act or tackling corruption in their own societies. There is extensive analysis of the problem of turning the general language of international agreements, reflecting political as well as linguistic compromises, into workable legislation. The authors have supplemented their own expertise through consultation worldwide with law enforcement agencies, legal practitioners and scholars.

This new edition will be an indispensable work of reference, and not only for lawyers. Much can be learned about a country from looking at its laws, gaps included. How, for instance, should one regard countries where the law apparently recognizes a defence to a charge of bribery like Italy's *concussione ambientale* ("everyone does it")? Was the UK's dilatoriness over implementing its international obligations symptomatic of a general readiness of government to listen to business lobbies? (In fact it is clear that corruption is bad for business.) What can the energy with which the United States enforces its Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977 tell us more generally about its attitude towards the rest of the world? A chapter contributed by Rachel Barnes provides an incisive introduction to that important legislation and its wider implications. A judgment of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals (United States *vs* Kozeny, Frederic Bourke and Pinkerton, 14 December 2011) vividly illustrates, using wiretaps of the appellant Frederic Bourke's telephone conversations, how a serious legal system regards *concussione ambientale*. Even dipping into this work casts light (and a fair number of shadows) on the way the world goes about its business. Before rushing to judgement, though, readers should turn to the discussion of the decision in the *World Duty Free* arbitration. A hefty bribe was paid to the then president of Kenya, but Kenya acquired a valuable asset in return. Should the plaintiff have been turned away by the tribunal? Does the law sometimes go too far in demonstrating its abhorrence of bribery?

Many issues covered by this journal are gravely affected by corruption, which should not be relegated to a throwaway sentence—the academic's equivalent of Frederic Bourke's cynicism. Some acquaintance with the matters dealt with in this work is surely desirable.

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Conflict, security and defence

Manhunt: the ten-year search for Bin Laden from 9/11 to Abbottabad. By Peter Bergen. London: The Bodley Head. 2012. 359pp. £20.00. ISBN 978 1 84792 200 7. Available as e-book.

After his disappearance in the Tora Bora mountains in December 2001, the question of what had become of Osama bin Laden turned into one of the great mysteries of the decade. Aside from periodically emerging to taunt US officials with videotapes and audio messages, Bin Laden became like a ghost, and his fate became more a matter of rumour and legend than of fact. As his trail went cold, both sides began to describe the hunt for Bin Laden in near-mythic terms. For Al-Qaeda's members, his ability to evade capture by US forces was seen as evidence of Allah's favour for their cause. His supporters cheered the fact that he remained the one target that the United States and its allies could never get despite scouring the mountains of Afghanistan and Pakistan with ground forces and highly sophisticated technology for years. For the United States, Bin Laden was a living symbol of the war on terror, and the seeming futility of the search for him suggested to many Americans that this struggle would never end.

In this riveting and well-written book, Peter Bergen answers many of the questions that had perplexed those inside and outside government who followed the hunt for Bin Laden for many years. His account offers some surprises that should make us think twice about the received conventional wisdom that often passes for insight within the terrorism studies community. Contrary to what many outside experts had confidently maintained in the media, US intelligence officials had absolutely no idea where Bin Laden was by 2005, and had resorted to chasing 'Elvis sightings' of him, no matter how implausible they were. Despite this fact, pundits and 'terrorism experts' regularly claimed with authority that he was living in the mountains of Afghanistan and Pakistan, that he was sick due to kidney problems, that he had surrendered control over his organization to others, or even that he was dead. But Bergen's account makes clear that much of this was baseless speculation: no one had any hard evidence about where he was or what he was doing, and most of the common theories about Bin Laden were just repeated pieces of folk wisdom, with no basis in fact.

The secret to capturing Bin Laden turned out to be his courier network, particularly the man known as Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti. Many senior US officials considered efforts to find Bin Laden via his messengers a long shot, but nevertheless were willing to go along with the effort for lack of better options. As Bergen details, some information on the key figures in the courier network was derived from torture of Al-Qaeda detainees; but torture also yielded some false or misleading information, particularly from hardened operatives like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. Contrary to what Dick Cheney and others claimed in the aftermath of the raid, there is no evidence that torture or harsh interrogation played the crucial role in finding him. What played a far more important role was technology, particularly 'geo-location' software that could track mobile phones in real time, as well as the information collection and dissemination procedures that had been developed in Special Forces operations in Iraq. As it fought the insurgency in Iraq, the United States learned how to find and destroy terrorist suspects without the time lag that had traditionally allowed some of the most difficult high-value targets to escape. This military intelligence infrastructure—currently in operation with the drone strikes launched on a weekly basis in Pakistan and elsewhere—played a far larger role in finding Bin Laden than torture or any form of so-called 'enhanced interrogation'.

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The most fascinating parts of Bergen's book are the sections on what Bin Laden was doing in Abbottabad while the United States searched for him. Living in the compound with his wives and children, he became an increasingly isolated figure, trying to issue directives to a terrorist organization that had slipped out of his control years before. In the 'treasure trove' of material discovered in his compound, it becomes clear that Bin Laden despised many of the standard bearers of his movement in Yemen, Somalia and elsewhere, and that he found the willingness of some of the Al-Qaeda affiliates (such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi) indiscriminately to attack Muslim civilians in Iraq abhorrent. Bin Laden even contemplated renaming the Al-Qaeda movement because it had been sullied by the willingness of his followers to shed Muslim blood. Instead of cheering self-starting terrorists such as Faisal Shazad, who tried to blow up an SUV in Times Square, he bizarrely criticizes him for breaking an oath of loyalty to the United States implicit in his American citizenship. Far from being the fearsome terrorist mastermind of most popular accounts, Bin Laden comes across as a pathetic character, offering idiosyncratic and often irrelevant advice to a movement that had long forgotten him as anything other than a symbol.

Much of Bergen's account is devoted to detailing the decision-making process that led to the Navy Seals raid on the Abbottabad compound. The key parts of this story were leaked to the press in the days after the raid, but some interesting facts emerge. To President Obama's credit, he did deliver on his campaign promise to prioritize finding Bin Laden and added new resources and staff to the task after years of neglect under the Bush administration. The discovery of the compound in Abbottabad, however, was more of a stroke of luck than anything else. It was a decision by a spy on the ground to follow the Kuwaiti from Peshawar to Abbottabad that allowed the US to discover a 'fortress'-like structure, which piqued their interest and led them to Bin Laden. Once it was discovered, the Obama administration went through a painstaking process to decide whether the compound was really Bin Laden's, and eventually authorized the raid on a 50-50 chance that he was there. There was awareness in the administration that taking Bin Laden alive carried a lot of risks, so the orders of the Navy Seals were written in a way which authorized them to kill him unless he took the highly unusual step of openly surrendering. The description of the raid itself suggests that there was only a very low probability that Bin Laden could have survived, even if he had merely tried to evade capture.

The only part of Bergen's account that remains unsatisfying is his discussion of whether elements within Pakistan protected Bin Laden in Abbottabad for six years. Bergen notes that senior Pakistani officials seemed genuinely surprised that Bin Laden was present in Abbottabad after news of the raid broke, and on this basis dismisses the claims that the Pakistani military was somehow sheltering him. But Bergen does not address some key outstanding questions about Bin Laden's presence in this town. How did he arrive in a town populated by retired military officers and live so near to a prominent military academy with no one noticing? Why did no military officer in Abbottabad pay attention to the construction of a fortress-like compound that was designed to be 'off the grid' in terms of communications and shielded from satellites? Given that the Pakistani military and intelligence services are ridden with factions, and that their leadership is not always in control of the actions of individual agents, it seems far more likely that some element within the military or the secret service had information on Bin Laden that was not shared widely, perhaps not even with the senior leadership. A full examination of this issue would have benefited this book, even if Bergen's ultimate judgement—that Pakistan was an unwitting host to Bin Laden for years—turns out to be correct.

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Governance, civil society and cultural politics

Sex and world peace. By Valerie M. Hudson, Bonnie Ballif-Spanvill, Mary Caprioli and Chad F. Emmett. New York: Columbia University Press. 2012. 304pp. Index. £18.50. ISBN 978 0 23113 182 7.

Sex and world peace argues that International Relations (IR) scholarship has underestimated the significant relationship between gender equality and the achievement of international peace and security. This ambitious volume provides strong arguments for reconsidering the position that it is a matter of little relevance to the United Nations Security Council that, for many women around the world, 'sex means death' (p. 140).

The authors' argument is threefold: when women are denied empowerment at home, in the workplace and in decision-making bodies, the state and the international community are poorer and less safe. Moreover, the authors argue that this is not just a 'developing world' problem. There remain many 'developed' countries such as the United States that have failed to make communities safe for women; provide women with access to reproductive rights; and (until the recent Ledbetter Pay Act) legislate on earning equality between men and women. These failures in a developed country do not bode well for universal realization of women's empowerment.

The book starts with establishing why gender inequality is the crucial missing explanation for realizing international peace and security in IR scholarship. The authors briefly take the reader through personal stories of where failure to promote gender equality perpetuates instability within communities. Given that the authors are the creators of the Woman-Stats Project and Database, they duly present the numbers to support their argument concerning the relationship between women's empowerment at home, in the workplace and in the corridors of power, with quality governance and peaceful, prosperous societies. In chapter three, we are given the 'global picture' of gender inequality and how nations compare on matters such as family law, domestic violence, education, maternal mortality and gender participation. The role of religion and biology is explored to consider whether the 'second sex' status of women is culturally or biologically inevitable. With extensive use of psychology studies, the author reveals that environment plays a crucial and contingent role in determining how women will be treated in society—this is the good news. The bad news is that this is a long, hard process that requires conversations about gender at home as much as in the halls of power, which I predict will make some IR scholars uncomfortable. But these scholars are undeterred and argue that politics (and international relations) must play a vital role because political language and processes facilitate identification of what is 'normal' (p. 93). When it becomes normal to discuss acid attacks on girls and women as a matter of international peace and security in the UN Security Council, changed social discourse and practices will follow.

Chapter four brings the reader deep into the core argument of the book, revealing that the statistics we have in place at present are quite poor for understanding the extent to which the security of women in the home and in society is deeply connected to international peace and security. I assume not everyone will agree that sex-selective abortion, for instance, should be counted or appreciated in the same way as violent death on a battlefield. This book challenges those who hold this view to ask themselves why they hold this view. As the authors argue, 'might there be more to inquire about than simply the effect of war on women—*might the security of women in fact affect the security of states?*' (p. 96).

However, it would be wrong to describe the authors as just lamenting what is wrong with IR scholarship and governing structures from the state to the multilateral institutions

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of the UN. From chapter five onwards, the focus shifts to the positive stories of engagement with gender equality in the home, in society and in international relations. The authors build their case by demonstrating the wider benefits in societies where honour killings, female genital mutilation and child marriage have been challenged and banned, and the crucial role that the state can play in empowering women. One chapter is devoted to the role of 'top-down' approaches that focus on the influence of ratified international legal instruments, such as the Convention on Elimination of Discrimination against Women, to suggest areas where scholars and policy-makers can facilitate further top-down research and policy innovations. For example, the WomanStats Project on the Responsibility to Protect Women (R2PW) scale (which traces discrepancy between a state's international obligations to women, national laws and the 'real situation of women on the ground', p. 154) is promoted as a possible tool to use in considering sanctions against states that fail in their R2PW. Chapter six explores grassroots approaches, such as the bravery of Mukhtar Mai who was gang-raped on the order of a Pakistani village council for her brother's alleged illicit affair with a woman from a rival clan. I confess that I sometimes struggled in this chapter with the interplay of domestic violence stories in the United States with stories of forced child marriage in Saudi Arabia (for me, the tools and engagement required for interventions are dramatically different), but I understood the point: the success of all local empowerment efforts hinges on the degree to which we engage with them and understand why their success is important.

The R2PW scale outlined in chapter five, and then discussed again in the concluding chapter seven, is a crucial starting point for deepening policy engagement and research. How to marry the four crimes under the Responsibility to Protect principle (R2P) with the broader crimes against women identified in the WomanStats R2PW scale, and whether the UN Security Council will be convinced of the need for a broader interpretation of R2P was relatively unexplored in this book. Indeed, as the authors acknowledge, difficulty in obtaining statistics from states on women's actual conditions was the inspiration for the WomanStats Project.

In the tradition of Cynthia Enloe's *Bananas, beaches and bases* (Pandora, 1989) and Jan Jindy Pettman's *Worlding women* (Allen & Unwin, 1996), *Sex and world peace* should be on top of every introductory International Relations reading list. The authors present a strong case for shifting 'gender studies' in IR from its sub-discipline status to a core IR study. How the other half of humanity seeks security and peace—when for millennia they have struggled to achieve rights equal to men's—should inform IR theory and UN Security Council processes a lot more than it does at present. To paraphrase Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, women's peace and security is not 'soft power', it is 'smart power'.

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After secularism: rethinking religion in global politics. By Erin K. Wilson. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 2012. 222pp. Index. £57.50. ISBN 978 0 23029 037 2.

In recent years, a growing body of literature has sought to reincorporate religion into International Relations theory. This book represents an important contribution to that burgeoning field. Erin Wilson undertakes a much needed interrogation of the definition that secularism has accorded to religion. Secularist thought in International Relations, she indicates, has sidelined religion by way of four moves. It has made the separation between religion and politics both possible and seemingly necessary; subordinated and excluded religion from politics; maintained the exclusion by way of the public/private divide; and

equated the exclusion with progress and development. Connected with these four moves is an essentialized and simplified notion of religion. To delineate the religious from the secular, secularism has approached religion with a framework composed of three fixed dichotomies—institutional/ideational, individual/communal, irrational/rational—and it has reduced religion to three of the dimensions: institutional, individual and irrational.

Wilson proposes relational dialogism as a way to rethink religion. Drawing on philosopher Julia Kristeva's version of dialogism, a concept associated with literary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin, Wilson emphasizes that the categories of the religious and the secular are constantly in flux. She thereby challenges the rigidity of the categories that secularist thought has established. However, she also notes that the constant rupture celebrated by dialogism is potentially debilitating for the creation of new understandings of religion. She therefore incorporates Raia Prokhovnik's relational thought in order to recognize the categories of the religious and the secular as existing in a relationship despite their continual change, making them theoretically manageable and analytically useful. Relational dialogism, in contrast to the fixed either/or categorizations of secular dualist thought, views religion in a both/and manner: institutional and ideational, individual and communal, and irrational and rational.

This alternative understanding represents a valuable addition to discussions on religion in International Relations. Relational dialogism does greater justice to the character of religion in as much as it draws attention to the ideational, communal and rational dimensions that religion displays. Furthermore, it does so in a manner that serves a direct analytical purpose. Importantly, as Wilson outlines, it also draws attention to the religious roots of and enduring religious influence on the supposedly secularized culture, politics and concepts of the West, a reality unacknowledged by many secularist depictions of religion.

In the latter part of the book, Wilson applies the relational dialogist model via a discourse analysis of six American State of the Union addresses so as to demonstrate its analytical utility. Unfortunately, this case-study does not truly demonstrate the value of the framework. Religion's multifaceted presence in American politics is, after all, well known. The relational dialogist model is certainly not the first to draw attention to the ideational (examples explored include the United States as possessing a special calling, or as a messianic figure), communal (public ritual, or service and sacrifice) and rational (values of peace, equality or kindness) dimensions of religion operative within American political discourse, although Wilson does point to some specific examples of note. Uncovering the ideational, communal and rational dimensions of religion within the political discourse of a more obvious representative of the secularization thesis—such as France—might have demonstrated the potential of relational dialogism better.

An analysis of political discourse in a more stereotypically secular country might also have clarified an issue raised in the book but not explored in great detail—whether secularism, at its moments of greatest distance from religion, actually exhibits a religious character of its own. Wilson seems ambiguous on this issue. On the one hand, she distinguishes religion from secularism and political ideologies (examples cited include communism, fascism, liberalism and capitalism) by stating that religion pertains not only to the immanent but also to the transcendent. On the other hand, she suggests that 'secularism itself and other apparently secular political ideologies may also take on the form of "comprehensive world-views"' (p. 47).

Wilson places much emphasis on differentiating religion from secularism according to an immanence/transcendence dichotomy, with the result that she downplays similarities between them. The ensuing problem is that she does not fully challenge secularism's self-justifying claim that there exists a purely immanent 'real' that remains once the 'illusions'

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and 'enchantments' of transcendence have been stripped away. As noted, several indications throughout the book seem to suggest that Wilson would not wish to endorse this claim.

A challenge to this secularist self-understanding, a challenge which Wilson's book evokes but does not really pursue, might entail moving beyond a mere uncovering of the imprint of religion on secularist thought, which Wilson aptly does. It might entail demonstrating more explicitly how secularism in its very immanently focused non-religiosity (on Wilson's definition), rather than representing a supposed 'real' in its immanent purity, in fact embodies its own unique 'illusions' and 'enchantments'.

The above points notwithstanding, this book injects significant insights into the conversation on religion in International Relations. As Wilson notes in the conclusion, it also points towards many interesting avenues for future research.

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Political economy, economics and development

Finance and the good society. By **Robert J. Shiller.** Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 2012. 288pp. Index. £16.95. ISBN 978 0 69115 488 6. Available as e-book.

Finance has become a very dirty word. Blamed for causing the global financial crisis, the Great Recession, and all of the economic misery of the past four years, financial managers have many vocal critics but few defenders. And yet financing is still absolutely central to the operation of the modern global economy and business. Robert Shiller deserves much praise for trying to restore balance to public discussion of contemporary finance. His task is not easy, but he carries it off clearly, succinctly and with great hope for the possibilities of reformed finance. His focus on 'the good society' is absolutely correct: to build the better society that philosophers and social scientists have sought for ages, we badly need a financial system that works, not only for big business but for all of us. 'The essential challenge', he asserts, is for finance 'to help broaden prosperity across an increasingly wide range of social classes', and to make it both easier to use and 'better integrated into the economy as a whole' (pp. 8–9).

The book's dual focus on financial roles and issues is a bit unusual, but works well. Those roles span the spectrum of financial jobs. As a Yale finance professor, Shiller naturally is sympathetic to the work of financial managers, 'among the most important stewards of our wealth' (p. 27), but questions the effectiveness of their investment strategies. Financial technicians almost universally proclaim their success in 'beating the market', yet 'actively managed' funds actually perform worse than those employing a 'passive' strategy of investing in all manner of stocks (p. 28). Such funds' real value lies in creating a form of competition that aids the smartest institutional investors. Shiller suggests that popular fears of financiers' ability to hoodwink investors and abscond with the public's money amount to a fantasy. Bankers face a different form of criticism, based on 'power and presumption' and 'single-minded pursuit of money' (p. 38). Banks traditionally provide safe returns with liquidity, while using resources to achieve the greatest possible returns. Shiller reminds us of a counter-tradition: the democratization of banking, from the British building society movement to Muhammad Yunus's Grameen Bank.

Shiller's selection of issues is commendable for its focus on concerns of social justice, that nearly taboo subject for neo-classical economists and business professors. His intriguing discussion of 'incentives to sleaziness inherent in finance' suggests that the matter is very much subject to perception (p. 159). Comparing contemporary financial firms to casinos,

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both of which carefully employ psychology to lower inhibitions to risky use of money, he notes the mixed motives that drive financial specialists: cognitive dissonance, hypocrisy, inconsistent moral purpose, and (largely male) desire for great wealth and conspicuous consumption. Shiller takes a conservative position on speculation, suggesting that much of it is due to 'animal spirits' (Keynes's term), but supports mild reforms such as shifting financial firms' corporate governance to partnerships, which he feels are more cautious with money. His ideas on speculative bubbles are similarly conservative. He provides one of the most comprehensive definitions of bubbles to date, and suggests that they can occur in non-financial areas and in communist economies, yet feels that bubbles are 'inherently difficult' for governments to prevent (p. 184). Notably, regulatory mechanisms in place before the 2008 crisis were not used to halt the housing bubble.

The book's strongest chapter is a carefully nuanced discussion of inequality. Shiller says that much of the resentment about inequality derives from 'bubbles in financial compensation' in finance (p. 189), family business dynasties, and conspicuous consumption. He believes that conventional measures to address inequality, especially estate taxes and progressive income taxes, are largely ineffective since they are based on muddled objectives. Instead, he promotes an indexing of tax rates to the level of inequality in a society. Such indexing could be crafted to either reverse the degree of inequality, to 'bring it eventually to a more acceptable level', or to 'freeze' it at current levels (p. 194). There's only one problem with this intriguing idea: it will never be enacted into law in any major country.

A valuable book, it nonetheless does not go very far in either diagnosis of the problems or proposals for systemic reforms. It is not enough to say that financiers have mixed motives, norms depend on the eye of the beholder, and boys will be boys. We as societies, through our legislators and bureaucrats, create and enforce economic norms. The financial industry needs to be told that its egregious behaviour in the run-up to the global crisis was indefensible, and has to change. So far, our tepid efforts have not sent a stern message, and the industry has done little to alter attitudes or expectations of its employees. Many observers have called for far more robust curbs on general executive compensation, and on bonuses in the financial sector. Japanese and other Asian top executives get by just fine on salaries of less than \$1 million per year. The public was particularly galled that large financial firms that had been bailed out by taxpayers turned around and began handing out huge bonuses within months of receiving public funds. Also, the degree of risk that financial managers were willing to tolerate in the run-up to the global financial crisis was unacceptable. Lacking adequate internal controls, financial firms played Russian roulette with the world's money and lost. The pre-2008 dicey moves were not traditional practices, but dangerous innovations allowed by lax government regulators. Surely, much tighter regulation of these areas would not only bring greater probity to financial decision-making, it would also give big business enhanced stability and public legitimacy. If we want Shiller's 'good society', let's start with comprehensive reform.

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Energy, resources and environment

Global health governance. By **Sophie Harman.** Abingdon: Routledge. 2012. 177pp. Index. Pb.: £17.99. ISBN 978 0 41556 158 7. Available as e-book.

The potential threat of bioterrorism, ongoing risk of influenza pandemics, periodic outbreaks of foodborne diseases and other crossborder issues have all contributed to a rising interest in global health governance over the past decade. Importantly, this literature is beginning to reach a certain maturity. A growing number of works now go beyond headline-attracting issues to delve deeper into the causal factors that contribute to an unhealthy world and, critically, the collective actions needed to address them.

This book is a welcome addition to the now over 60-strong series on Global Institutions edited by Thomas Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson. The study of global health governance has hitherto been led conceptually and empirically from within the public health field. This is understandable given the immediacy of contact with the issues concerned, as well as a longstanding reticence by International Relations scholars to engage with what has been seen as a domestic social policy issue. However, many aspects of health policy are now recognized as having global dimensions and, as a result, require collective efforts beyond the state.

Sophie Harman's book is written in a highly accessible style, offering a brief and readable account of the key concepts and issues related to global health governance. Any effort to define the term must negotiate voluminous theorizing on global governance, along with conceptual tangles surrounding the term 'global health'. This is not tackled head-on by this book, but it does offer a useful definition of global health governance as 'the management of multiple transboundary health concerns among competing interests, resources, and time periods. The globalized nature of health concerns and threats has necessitated coordinated action among states, civil society organizations, the private sector, and intergovernmental organizations in tackling these issues' (p. 139).

Beyond definition, an important contribution of this book lies in its efforts 'to understand the conceptual underpinnings of how global health is governed, the multiple actors and funding initiatives that constitute the core of global health governance, and how such actors and approaches have been applied to specific health concerns over others' (p. 9). In this sense, rather than dissecting individual institutions, Harman focuses on a whole that is greater than the sum of the parts. Institutional actors, old and new, are given particular attention in chapters two and three. The book's efforts to understand the institutional dynamics of global health governance are then applied to what donors have prioritized as 'the big three'—HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. Harman argues that there has been 'an overarching emphasis on coordination, relevance, balance, and a continuous need to make the case for global responses based on secure and sustained funding' (p. 121). This contrasts with 'neglected health' issues such as neglected tropical diseases, women's health and health system strengthening. The author concludes that 'without political interest and funding that comes with it, health issues and strategies become neglected'.

In such a brief book, it is difficult to cover all the ground of this rapidly growing subject. However, the current generation of global health governance scholars would do well to probe more deeply into why certain health conditions receive greater political interest and funding than others. A more critical eye might ask why the 'big three' have come to be known as such when they are not the biggest killers. This dubious honour belongs to ischaemic heart disease (7.25 million, 12.8 per cent of world deaths); stroke and other

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cerebrovascular diseases (6.15 million, 10.8 per cent); and lower respiratory infections (3.46 million, 6.1 per cent), killing around 16.9 million people in 2008. The ‘big three’, in contrast, collectively account for one-quarter of those numbers at 4 million deaths (World Health Organization, ‘The top ten causes of death’, fact sheet no. 310, Geneva, 2011). Harman explains this anomaly in terms of the infectious nature of the three diseases: ‘The infectious aspect of tuberculosis and HIV, the global susceptibility to malaria, and the commitment between both the private and public sector marks these three diseases as exceptional’ (p. 89). There may be simpler explanations. In the competitive world of donor funding and public accountability, strokes and lower respiratory infections do not lend themselves easily to media-friendly photographs or quantifiable goals. More cynically, the epidemic of heart disease and other non-communicable diseases is often attributed to gluttonous and inactive individuals. Global health governance, in other words, is shaped by the world-views of the powerful.

Harman writes that ‘it is awareness and a compulsion to address this inequality that has precipitated the emergence of a broad and complex system of global health governance’ (p. 2). This may be an optimistic reading of the current state of affairs. Despite widespread recognition of the need for collective global health action, there remains fundamental disagreement about the purpose of global health governance. Is it to protect ourselves from the health threats that loom outside our borders? Is it to address stark inequalities in health status and outcomes? Is it to create a well-functioning global marketplace for health care goods and services? These very different visions have led to an overabundance of institutional arrangements but a lack of true global health governance.

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Phake: the deadly world of falsified and substandard medicines. By Roger Bate. Washington DC: The AEI Press. 457pp. Index. £31.95. ISBN 978 0 84477 232 5. Available as e-book.

Counterfeit medicines are a controversial topic among members of both the World Health Organization (WHO) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). This reflects, in particular, the fears of some developing countries that efforts to combat counterfeiting will entrap legitimate generic drugs produced by them, in ways harmful both to their industries and to their consumers. These fears were exacerbated when European Union officials a few years ago hamfistedly detained mainly Indian drug shipments in transit to third countries.

And Roger Bate is an author with a controversial past. A free market enthusiast, now with the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, he has at various times been a global warming and environmental sceptic, an opponent of tobacco controls and a critic of the WHO. He helped establish a non-governmental organization, Africa Fighting Malaria, to champion the reintroduction of DDT insecticide—in his view also a metaphor for demonstrating the generally harmful effects of exaggerated western environmental concerns on the health and prosperity of developing countries.

Given that combination, we surely have a right to expect a controversial book. In fact what we get is a solid, comprehensive and relatively balanced global overview of the scale and impact of the problem and an invaluable insight into how manufacturers of falsified and substandard medicines and those seeking to combat them operate in practice. The book describes the history and nature of the problem and reviews the situation in different parts of the developing world and the online market, informed by numerous interesting case-

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studies of the activities of counterfeiters, regulators, drug companies and law enforcement agencies. The final section concludes with a number of policy proposals, the centrepiece of which is the idea of an international convention to combat medicines counterfeiting.

Since this is a subject area where reliable information is notoriously hard to come by, and where what few data are available are often misused by one interested party or another, the author is to be congratulated on pursuing this trail with such persistence over the last few years, and throwing a beam of light on this hitherto murky darkness.

Bate's empirical analysis is based on examining the quality of drug samples in three classes (antimalarials, antibiotics and tuberculosis drugs), procured from pharmacies in cities in 17 developing countries, the results of which are then subjected to statistical and econometric analysis. The essential finding is that of 2,512 samples tested, only 307 (12.2 per cent) failed one or more quality tests. In Africa, 19 per cent of products failed, but in India only 9 per cent. More antimalarials failed (19 per cent) than the other two classes (8 per cent each).

However, it is annoying that there is no table that sets out these results in full, and analyses them systematically by drug class, city, country and region. In fact, this is a general criticism of the book—the results are set out discursively and confusingly. A good editor was badly needed to give it more focus and coherence. In addition, there is a completely inadequate discussion of the statistical validity of the methods used. There are a host of unanswered questions about sample techniques and sizes, biased results and so on. That R^2 is described on page 319 as the correlation coefficient does not inspire great confidence. The discussion of the results in chapter 13 is confusing at several points. For example, failure rates for drugs with regulatory approval were 5 per cent, but 37 per cent of the much smaller number of unregistered drugs (p. 273). But if registered drugs include fake registered drugs, then 5 per cent failure seems too low, unless the fakes are pretty good. Either way, more explanation is required. Thus the way the data are presented and analysed tends to raise more questions than answers, and casts doubt on the validity of the findings.

Underlying the controversies is an unresolved issue concerning the definition of 'counterfeit' medicines. That is why the WHO refers clumsily to 'substandard/spurious/falsely-labelled/falsified/counterfeit' medical products. Is a counterfeit product a term referring solely to trademark violations, as defined by the WTO? Or is it, as in common parlance, synonymous with 'fake' or 'falsified', referring to any medicine purporting to be something it is not, in particular containing the wrong ingredients? Bate neatly sidesteps the issue in his title but favours the latter definition. However, as the analysis relies on quality assessments, it does not clarify whether or not most 'fakes' also violate trademarks. Separately, Bate has maintained that they do, but the book fails to provide the evidence.

Perhaps it is the fate of all works on this subject that we shall never know the exact scale of the problem, let alone trends, because it is too costly or difficult to find out. And would it make much difference to policy-making if the scale was \$75 billion annually, as is often claimed, or \$14 billion as the book 'guesstimates' based on a number of assumptions? The policy proposals made are on the whole sensible, but one wonders if negotiating a treaty is really part of the answer, even if in the light of the controversy it were possible.

Charles Clift, Centre on Global Health Security, Chatham House

The European Union as a leader in international climate change politics. Edited by **Rüdiger K. W. Wurzel and James Connelly**. London: Routledge. 2011. 289pp. Index. £85.00. ISBN 978 0 41558 047 2. Available as e-book.

After an introduction by the editors, John Vogler develops categories that can be used to define the ability to act: ‘autonomy’, i.e. independence from its member states, the basis of which is the Treaty in its latest Lisbon version (p. 23); ‘volition’, i.e. the will to formulate distinct policy—European Union environmental policy (pp. 25–6) is a good example; ‘negotiating capability’—negotiations at the Copenhagen climate conference are mentioned, but obviously as a negative example; and ‘policy instruments’, such as economic policies in support of EU climate policies (p. 29). These four categories are introduced along the lines of Vogler’s previously developed theory on (EU) actorness on the international stage. Internally, environmental policy ranks very high, for example in contrast to the United States, an environmental laggard. This, importantly, helps to enhance the internal identity of Europe, but it also compels the EU to deliver on its environmental policies.

A chapter by Pamela Barnes covers first the role of the Commission within the institutional framework of the EU, exemplified in its policy of ecological modernization. Not too surprisingly, under the liberal Barroso Commission, only the linkage of environmental issues with energy security and key economic objectives such as job creation gave EU environmental politics the dynamism we see today.

Sebastian Oberthür and Claire Dupont deal with ‘The Council, the European Council and international climate policy: from symbolic leadership to leadership by example’. Overall, they argue that the Council of Ministers and the European Council have been crucial in developing the international leadership record of the EU on climate change. The main reasons are that strategies to tackle climate change could result in strengthened energy security and improved EU competitiveness and sustainability. Climate policy also has the potential to enhance the institutional legitimacy of the (European) Council and to reinvigorate the European integration process in general. Environmental issues transcend and extend well beyond the relatively narrow confines of the member states, meaning that these issues constitute real supranational community fields.

Tim Rayner and Andrew Jordan consider ‘The United Kingdom: a paradoxical leader?’. They start their analysis by arguing that UK environmental policy has been neither coherent nor continuous over the past decades. At the outset, Britain was among the pioneers, creating one of the first environment ministries in Europe. Overall, British leadership in environmental issues has tended to move by fits and starts, with significant inconsistencies, despite well-founded claims to environmental leadership at certain periods of time.

Joseph Szarka considers ‘France’s troubled bids to climate leadership’. France has claimed environmental leadership because of its success in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Nuclear technology has enabled France to achieve both emissions reduction and the decoupling of greenhouse gas emissions from economic growth. Nuclear power was, however, not in fact embraced for that particular purpose, but essentially with a view to the vital prize of energy independence, which is why the author dubs France an ‘inadvertent pioneer’ (p. 114). Because of this unflinching commitment to nuclear power as the main energy resource, France has been successful in achieving its reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, but it has been unsuccessful in winning environmental leadership by convincing other nations of the merits of nuclear power.

Martin Jänicke deals with ‘German climate change policy: political and economic leadership’. Since the 1970s, Germany has been one of the leading European countries in environmental policy. The current government tries to make Germany the most modern

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of the national economies through ecological modernization—a classical argument of the Green party. Feed-in tariffs for green electricity, the ecological tax reform and the EU emissions trading scheme all contribute to this ecological modernization. Surprisingly enough, for Realists such as the CDU in Germany, ecological modernization has also been an *economic* success story. In contrast with the French philosophy, ecological modernization in Germany has shown that nuclear energy is not indispensable as a factor in achieving far-reaching climate protection targets. Thus, Germany has led by example, taking considerable risks, and it seems that ecological modernization can actually work.

The conclusion, by Rüdiger Wurzel and James Connelly, shows that national claims to environmental leadership, such as in the German case, enable the Commission to bind all the member states to common environmental targets, for instance EU burden-sharing agreements, in order to achieve the Kyoto protocol targets. Climate change is no longer perceived only as a threat but also as an opportunity to enhance EU energy security and to streamline its economy through ecological modernization. ‘However, the EU’s cognitive leadership ambitions have been hampered by the fact that some EU institutional actors, member states and societal actors, have either accepted a weak version of ecological modernisation belatedly or have remained less than fully convinced as to the claim that ambitious climate change policy measures are beneficial for both the environment and economy’ (p. 282). In conclusion, this book gives a very good insight into the main actors, the interests and objectives in EU climate change policies. The different chapters cover those aspects in depth and remain at the same time enjoyable to read. Therefore the book should be of primary interest to students and academics, but can also appeal to a more general public.

Thomas Hörber, École supérieure des sciences commerciales d’Angers, France

International history*

Documents on British policy overseas: series III, volume VIII: The invasion of Afghanistan and UK–Soviet relations, 1979–1982. Edited by Richard Smith, Patrick Salmon and Stephen Twigge. London and New York: Routledge. 2012. 444pp. Index. £90.00. ISBN 978 0 41567 853 7. Available as e-book.

Another damn’d thick, square book from the Foreign Office’s historians, covering British policy towards the Soviet Union from the invasion of Afghanistan through the crisis in Poland to the death of Brezhnev. The documents it contains are a tribute to those who wrote them: models of clear analysis and sensible advice, essential reading for future scholars. They are prefaced by an admirable editorial introduction summarizing the evolution of British policy during those three years. It was a policy of measured realism, laced with a dash of scepticism about the intentions and performance of the other players, Soviets, Americans, Europeans; laced, too, with a sober view of Britain’s own ability to influence events, even with the advantage of a feisty new prime minister in the shape of Mrs Thatcher, towards whom Foreign Office officials felt a mixture of admiration and apprehension.

During the Cold War, Britain had a growing amount of first-class military intelligence, but almost no reliable intelligence about Soviet policy-making at the top. Even so, the analysis of Soviet actions and intentions in London and in the British embassy in Moscow was surprisingly accurate, as Soviet documents and memoirs published later have confirmed. As for Britain’s own policy, there was little disagreement on most of the issues

* See also Silvio Pons and Robert Service, eds, *A dictionary of 20th-century communism*, pp. 1117–19.

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we faced during those two years, either within the British government or between us and the Americans, with whom we worked very closely throughout.

The Russians' Afghan adventure gave Britain the opportunity to excoriate them in public and at the United Nations. We accused them of naked aggression in pursuit of their worldwide goals, even though we privately suspected that they had undertaken the invasion reluctantly. We agreed to apply against them whatever effective sanctions we could agree among ourselves: not many, as it turned out. And we decided within weeks that we would help the Afghan *mujahideen* with arms: though at first with little expectation that they would be able to sustain much of a fight for long. These policies were eventually crowned with success. The Russians had hoped to withdraw from Afghanistan in a matter of months, without having to fight, leaving behind a stable and friendly government able to defend itself against its enemies. Instead, they dragged themselves off nine years later, undefeated on the battlefield perhaps, but weary and heartsore, their prestige in tatters.

It is fashionable to denounce the western policy-makers of those days for failing to understand that, by supporting the fanatical *mujahideen* against the Russians, by financing people like Osama bin Laden and the Pakistani military intelligence service, they were simply storing up trouble for themselves. This is of course a hopelessly unrealistic way of looking at great events. Policy-makers have to deal with the here and now, not with what may—or may well not—happen decades later. The Cold War that we were fighting in 1979 had many of the characteristics of a real war. Each side painted the other in the darkest colours. The judgement of both was distorted by paranoia. Each was inclined to attribute to the other a degree of rationality, cunning and aggressive determination of which neither was capable. What was worse, by the late 1970s the West had partly lost confidence in itself, in the ability of its ideals and its institutions to prevail over those of the Soviet Union, even if by then it was—or should have been—clear that the Russians and their empire were in even greater disarray than the West.

The Soviet invasion presented the West with a highly tempting—and in the circumstances, entirely legitimate—chance to rub the Russians' noses in the consequences of their own misjudgement. For the Americans it was, moreover, a chance to get their own back for the humiliations of Vietnam. The real mistake came later, when we failed to devise our own policy for stabilizing Afghanistan after the Russians had gone, and the country collapsed into a vicious civil war, which was ended by the victory of the Taliban, a victory at first welcomed by many Afghans. But by then we were wrestling with the more urgent and frightening problems of what to do about the collapse of the nuclear-armed Soviet superpower, the breakup of Yugoslavia and Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. There are only so many things policy-makers can take on at any one time.

For all that, there were prescient voices. In November 1979, as a Soviet invasion seemed increasingly on the cards, one Foreign Office official wondered: 'Wouldn't we be better off with a socialist regime rather than a reactionary Islamic type that is giving us problems elsewhere?' But great institutions can only operate effectively and coherently on the basis of a consensus. The official was ignored.

Rodric Braithwaite

Marigold: the lost chance for peace in Vietnam. By James G. Hershberg. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 2012. 960pp. Index. £33.95. ISBN 978 0 80477 884 8. Available as e-book.

Diplomatic historians and International Relations theorists spend a lot of time—perhaps most of their time—examining the causes of war. This is as it should be, as there are fewer aspects of the human condition that are more interesting, important or consequential. They spend somewhat less—but still quite a lot—of time and effort on the aftermath of war: the immediate consequences, the establishment of postwar peace settlements, and the after-shocks that years later may lead to the outbreak of other wars.

While devoting attention to the beginning and end of wars, however, scholars spend almost no time on the middle: after delving deeply into the causes and consequences, they often fail to look at the actual course of major conflicts; that task is presumably left to the military historians. And within that already unnecessarily narrow field, diplomatic historians and IR theorists spend even less time thinking about the termination of war, and whether wartime negotiations, while the belligerents are still engaged in fighting each other, can bring about an early peace.

Into this breach steps James G. Hershberg, with his enormous (and enormously engrossing) new book, *Marigold: the lost chance for peace in Vietnam*. Using a particular case-study from the Second Indochina War—a convoluted, drawn-out but rather important 1966 Polish–Italian peace initiative code-named ‘Marigold’—Hershberg explores with great sophistication and intelligence as well as wit and drama the issue of how countries negotiate while they are simultaneously fighting. At over 900 pages, *Marigold* is forensic, at times microscopic. But while it is richly detailed and exhaustively researched, it often reads like a thriller. It is, in short, the very best kind of scholarship in international history.

The war in Vietnam provided ideal conditions for a peace process of fighting while negotiating. All wars are political in nature, but Vietnam was especially so; even more than other wars, political jockeying was an inherent aspect of military strategy. It was not a total war but emerged through gradual escalation on both sides, and such incrementalism offered space for mutual consideration and reconsideration. It also afforded an opening for the many third parties who had an interest in the war, and wanted it to end before it spread to include either China or the Soviet Union, but were not belligerents themselves—such as Poland and Italy.

Hershberg’s central thesis is that Marigold could have succeeded, that the war could have ended before 1968—let alone 1975, when it did actually end—and that President Lyndon B. Johnson and his key foreign policy advisers sabotaged the peace process in the belief that they could win on the battlefield what could only be lost at the conference table. If Hershberg is right, the verdict of history on Johnson will be very harsh indeed (on this point, he is swimming against the prevailing historiographical current, which has produced something of a rehabilitation for Johnson after years of derision). But even if Hershberg is not—and however exhaustive his research or convincing his argument about the Johnson administration’s culpability in killing the peace initiative, *Marigold*’s persuasiveness ultimately rests upon an unprovable counterfactual—his book is still essential reading. Historians of the Vietnam War, and the Cold War more broadly, will learn much from this remarkably fresh and revealing historical account. But even more, given the ‘small wars’ of counter-insurgency the United States and the United Kingdom have fought since the end of the Cold War, including in Afghanistan today, Hershberg has a lot to say to IR theorists and policy-makers about how wars can be brought to an end. Should the West negotiate with

the Taliban? Those in Washington and London who actually have to make that decision will learn much from the strange and depressing story Hershberg tells in *Marigold*.

Andrew Preston, University of Cambridge, UK

Ending empire in the Middle East: Britain, the United States and post-war decolonization, 1945–1973. By **Simon C. Smith**. Abingdon: Routledge. 2012. 248pp. Index. £85.00. ISBN 978 0 41543 121 7. Available as e-book.

In this concise yet dense volume, Simon Smith provides much telling detail on the tensions, rifts and mistrust that often came to define the Anglo-American relationship in the Middle East during the era when British imperial power was in retreat. Despite all the aspirations that were voiced by their political leaders for Britain and the United States to work closely together, it often proved impossible in practice to reconcile competing interests, attitudes and commercial rivalries. This was exemplified at the very start of Smith's timeframe by the sharp clashes that were witnessed as Britain withdrew from the Palestinian mandate between 1945 and 1948 in the face of what British officials considered a reckless US policy dictated from the White House by domestic political considerations.

Overall, the account that Smith offers is very much a conventional interpretation, with the United States tending to see the problems of the Middle East from the early 1950s onwards in essentially Cold War terms—where the main source of danger was Soviet encroachment and the spread of communist influence—juxtaposed against a British preoccupation with countering the threats to their embattled imperial position presented by local nationalist pressures. These differing perspectives are charted over several key policy areas, such as contrasting approaches to the Baghdad Pact, the alliance that Britain had sponsored in April 1955 but which Washington proved reluctant to join. Smith is thoroughly conversant with the body of work done on such topics, and at several points he provides expert commentary on the different interpretative positions formed towards such episodes by scholars, making the book a valuable primer for anyone approaching the subject needing an authoritative overview.

When it comes to the Suez Crisis of 1956, and reflecting what has become virtually a new orthodoxy in recent treatments, Smith is at pains to downplay the importance of the Anglo-American breach in its longer-term effects on cooperation in the region. Shortly after the crisis, the Americans, in fact, were coming to regret the opposition they had shown towards steps to forcefully remove Nasser from power, as Washington began to see the Egyptian leader as a major threat to western interests. Despite such shared perceptions, differences of approach remained. Both Britain and the United States were alarmed by the possible consequences of the Iraqi revolution of 1958, Smith notes, but the Anglo-American interventions in Jordan and Lebanon that followed were very far from being united and well coordinated, with separate planning in evidence for military operations, for example.

Another key argument of the book, albeit one which has been expressed several times before by others, is that Suez, as some have claimed, was not the major turning point after which the United States usurped British power and influence in the Middle East. For one, the Americans showed themselves very reluctant after 1956 to assume Britain's traditional role, recognizing both the opprobrium that would be attracted by any western power trying to dictate terms to the Arab states, and the material costs associated with adopting the post-colonial burden. This US attitude was discerned also in the reactions to Britain's decision in 1967 to withdraw its bases and forces from the Gulf. An unwillingness to take Britain's place was combined with a recognition that the permanent presence of troops

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alone was not necessarily synonymous with the maintenance of influence, making Britain's role in states such as Oman throughout the 1970s an important one for Washington policy-makers. A second way in which Suez is rightly minimized by Smith is in the examples he provides of instances afterwards where the British proved perfectly ready to follow their own policy line even when it was at odds with what the Americans would have preferred. Thus, for example, over Kuwait in 1961, the United Kingdom intervened militarily in order to counter what it saw as a threatened Iraqi invasion when Washington was less alarmed; Britain promoted covert intervention in South Arabia in 1962–4, in defiance of US wishes; and in 1967–8 took decisions over the withdrawal from South-East Asia and the Gulf which met with US opposition.

The interpretations offered in the book still leave many fascinating issues to explore: for example, one can question whether the effect on the Anglo-American relationship of the decision to withdraw from East of Suez in 1967–8 was quite as deleterious as Smith stresses, and one might point instead to the fact that the concrete repercussions were so apparently minor, while the bonds in other areas of the relationship remained tight. There is also much still to be said about perhaps the biggest issue of all: was the rise of American influence in the Middle East after 1945 a symptom of Britain's declining imperial reach and role, or its cause? This is a relatively short book of synthesis, but Smith manages to pack an enormous amount of contemporary commentary and evidence into its pages, with copious footnotes accompanying each of its chapters: for anyone seeking a starting point and introductory guide to the tensions that marked Anglo-American relations in the period, it will be an important source.

Matthew Jones, University of Nottingham, UK

The sorrows of Belgium: liberation and political reconstruction, 1944–1947. By **Martin Conway.** Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2012. 407pp. Index. £65.00. ISBN 978 0 19969 434 1.

In February 2010 Nigel Farage, the leader of the United Kingdom Independence Party, insultingly referred to Belgium as 'pretty much a non-country'. Nevertheless, according to recent OECD figures, its GDP per capita is roughly the same as that of the UK and its performance with regard to unemployment, poverty and education is rather better. Its history is both interesting and important. It was the first continental European country to industrialize; what is now the largest African state (the Democratic Republic of Congo) was its colony; the violation of its neutrality in 1914 precipitated British entry into the First World War; and since 1945 its political leaders have been among the most enthusiastic supporters of the European project, which perhaps accounts for Farage's contemptuous remark.

Martin Conway's excellent book adds considerably to our knowledge of the history of this small, but far from insignificant, country. Moreover, it deals with an important period in European history as a whole: the immediate aftermath of the liberation of the Continent from the Nazi yoke. While this led to a seismic shift in the balance of power and important changes in the political, economic and social systems of many countries, Conway shows, in detail, how various challenges to the stability of the Belgian state—such as the Resistance, militant labour, Walloon separatism and the exile of King Leopold III—were successfully contained and the country returned to something resembling its prewar norm. 'By the end of 1945', he writes, 'much—if not yet quite everything—had been settled in the postwar state of Belgium. The authority of the state institutions had been reasserted; substantial constitutional change had been rejected, the principal prewar parties had reasserted their

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control of the parliamentary system, and social tension had been channelled into negotiations between the state and the representatives of the various social interest groups' (p. 276). One could not say this of France or Italy, for example.

In his final chapter Conway offers an explanation of why the postwar system broke down and Belgium became, in effect, a federal state divided along linguistic lines, a process which he attributes largely to 'the sheer pace and scale of the economic and consequent social change that took place during the post-war decades' (pp. 374–5) and to a shift in power and prosperity from the French-speaking south to the Dutch-speaking north.

The author's analysis is both extensive and subtle throughout and solidly based upon a wealth of archival sources and secondary literature in both French and Dutch, as well as unpublished British documents, including the informative diary of Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, who was ambassador to Belgium in the 1940s. (It might have been better for most readers, however, if the author had translated the French and Dutch sources he cites in the body of the text, while printing them in the footnotes in their original language for the benefit of the specialist.) Unfortunately, the book says little about foreign and colonial policy and the reader will have to go elsewhere to learn more about Belgium's important agreement with the United States for the supply of Congolese uranium, vital to the development of American nuclear weapons; its role in British plans for a postwar West European security system and the onset of the Cold War; and its first steps towards European integration. Conway's study nevertheless remains a major achievement, not only for what it says about Belgium itself, but also as a fertile source of ideas and approaches which can be applied to the study of other European countries during the period it covers.

Geoffrey Warner

The devil in history: communism, fascism, and some lessons of the twentieth century. By Vladimir Tismaneanu. Berkeley, CA, and London: University of California Press. 2012. 326pp. £24.95. ISBN 978 0 52023 972 2.

Amid the economic storms battering the contemporary globalized world, it is beneficial to revisit the destructive experiments of the recent past. The world only emerged from fanatical tyrannies based on ideological hubris just under a generation ago. At a time when liberal values are showing their frailty and salvationist mythologies are returning to favour in different places, an absorbing comparative essay is provided on the origins, ravages and ultimate failure of the radical totalitarian movements of the last century: communism and fascism.

Vladimir Tismaneanu is an appropriate guide, a polymath steeped in the philosophical, literary and social science texts spawned by defenders, apostates and analysts of this phenomenon. The contrasts are not lost sight of. National socialism never achieved a level of theoretical coherence comparable to the Marxian paradigm and its offshoots. Stalin was the apotheosis of the party and the carrier of its historic mission, while Hitler's legitimacy stemmed from being the emanation of the national *völkisch* struggle to prevail at all human costs. But the underlying political drives, organizational methods and contempt for human life show both creeds intent on destroying the inner man and implanting a totalitarian creed in his soul. Mass terror and suffering were essential reference points for both the chief dictators, Hitler and Stalin. Leszek Kolakowski's assertion that Bolshevism and fascism represented two incarnations of the presence of the devil in history is invoked: 'The devil ... invented ideological states, that is to say states whose legitimacy is grounded in the fact that their owners are owners of truth. If you oppose such a state or a system, you are an enemy of truth' (pp. 2–3).

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Amid his encyclopaedic knowledge of the *corpus* of literature on the subject, Tismaneanu is able to make telling observations about the rudimentary evil of totalitarianism in practice through small observations and vignettes, such as the post-1945 campaign against 'female thieves' in Russia (in reality war widows) or the lowering of the age of criminal responsibility to twelve in 1935. He describes the rise, maturation and deflation of Marxism/Leninism, and is particularly assured in exploring the malaise in the ruling structures of Russia and its satellites, and the alternative intellectual currents and dissident struggles that paved the way for iconoclasm and fundamental change in the 1980s. He shows understanding for the agonizing of Gorbachev as he struggled to burst through the mental horizons determining his attachment to the existing system. He tried to humanize an inherently inhuman creed while later accomplishing the journey towards embracing democracy.

Tismaneanu has less empathy for the belief of fashionably high-profile Marxists like Slavoj Žižek that 'a return to Lenin' will permit an authentic contemporary revolution to unfold without the ugliness and excesses of twentieth-century prototypes. Bolshevism was not an 'accidental deviation' from the democratic project but its complete antithesis. He believes that the potential for the 'falsification of the idea of good' (p. 49) is still immense and hence communism and fascism remain all too relevant for understanding our times and indeed ourselves. Deviations and reversals in political standards can easily occur in times of turmoil and disappointment. After all, Leninism was a mutation in the praxis of social democracy. Today, there are plenty of European social democrats who seem willing to fulfil Rosa Luxemburg's warning about the grim outcome if 'the only active part of society would be bureaucracy' (p. 21).

As the president of a commission investigating communist era excesses in Romania from 2006 to 2012, a country that he lived in until emigrating to the United States in the 1980s, Tismaneanu knows only too well the fury that can be stoked, even in the country's parliament, when the President dared to condemn the communist system as 'illegitimate and criminal' in 2007.

Perhaps more could have been written about the potency of salvationist mythologies, stemming from the ascendancy of theoretical blind alleys like post-modernism, the fall-from-favour of human-centred projects, and the retreat of mainstream ideologies into shallow belief in technocracy, or else careerism based on unrepresentative cliques. That may well prove the subject of another book. Nevertheless, this one is a polished and bracing intellectual essay based on a critical and constructive interpretation of a vast body of literature. It offers a reminder to desensitized, rather neurotic and often these days self-pitying Europeans about how absolute the collapse was when fanaticism and rigid certainties replaced reason and moderation in the pursuit of political goals.

Tom Gallagher, University of Bradford, UK

Molotov: Stalin's cold warrior. By **Geoffrey Roberts**. Washington DC: Potomac. 2012. 240pp. Index. £24.00. ISBN 978 1 57488 945 1. Available as e-book.

Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, Stalin's long-time deputy, is best remembered today for putting his name to the infamous Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact of 1939, which precipitated the division of Poland and the start of the European war. Few can picture Molotov, but those who can think of the bespectacled bureaucrat in Stalin's shadow, an extension of Stalin's personality, the face to the grim, uncompromising, even sinister façade of inscrutable Stalinist diplomacy. Molotov was christened Mr No for his propensity to drive a hard bargain. In their time, exasperated western politicians appealed for Stalin's help in

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making Molotov heed the voice of reason. To them, and to generations of later historians, Molotov was anything but a 'peacemaker'. Molotov of Geoffrey Roberts is, however, a peacemaker, someone intent on cooperating with the West to avert, and then to end, the Cold War. This different Molotov is a refreshing substitute for the familiar villain, although the pretty dove's tail at times renders him unrecognizable.

Roberts spends little time on the early Molotov, or on his work in the 1930s, when the old revolutionary guard perished, one after another, at Stalin's hands. Molotov played his cards wisely, and Stalin rewarded his loyalty with power and responsibility. In 1939, Molotov was handpicked to replace Maksim Litvinov as the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and it is from that point that Roberts follows his career closely, as Molotov conspired with the Nazis, forged the Grand Alliance, negotiated the postwar settlement, and, after Stalin's death, attempted to find common ground with the West to end the Cold War. This biography can therefore be read as a history of wartime and postwar Soviet diplomacy, a primer on the origins of the Cold War. It is an original one at that, as Roberts advances interesting and controversial interpretations of Soviet foreign policy, which do on balance shift some of the blame for the Cold War off Stalin's and Molotov's shoulders.

To give a few examples: Stalin and Molotov, we learn, were not intent on the Sovietization of the three Baltic states before these were annexed in 1940; it would appear that it happened somewhat inadvertently. Stalin, contrary to what many historians believe, did not mean to betray the Poles in the Warsaw Uprising of 1944, or let the Polish nationalists be wiped up by the German forces; simply, the Soviet offensive in Poland ran out of steam. The Soviets gave up on their demands to Turkey not because they faced a strong US response, but because Stalin did not want the Turkish troubles in 1946–7 to undermine his broader efforts to reach a form of accommodation with the West that would secure a Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and resolve the German problem on acceptable terms. Most controversially, perhaps, Roberts claims that Stalin and Molotov consistently held the view that a united, neutral Germany (even if it was 'bourgeois' in Soviet-speak) was a better alternative to a divided Germany under partial Soviet occupation. Molotov's advocacy of this idea after Stalin's death is what ultimately makes him, in Roberts's eyes, the kind of peacemaker that we never think he was.

The book is too concise to permit detailed discussion of the evidence. Several chapters have a solid archival base (one should commend Roberts, in particular, for excellent use of the Foreign Ministry Archive in Moscow). Sometimes, though, the evidence cited makes it difficult to distinguish means from ends, serious intent from propaganda, or bureaucratic paperwork from policy decisions. This is, in particular, the case with Roberts's discussion of Germany, or with his very intriguing claim that Stalin was not only genuinely interested in the 'communist peace movement' but it constituted his 'main international interest' in the late 1940s to early 1950s (p. 123). Stalin and Molotov thus genuinely engaged in the 'struggle for peace', which reminds me of a Soviet joke that probably dates from around this time: a caller to the Armenian radio asks: 'Will there be a war?'—'No,' the radio answers, 'there won't be a war, but there will be such a struggle for peace that not a stone will be left standing'. Jokes aside, one should of course take Roberts's claims seriously, because of their potential to change the historiography of the early Cold War, if further research conclusively proves the author right.

I thoroughly enjoyed reading this accessible, stimulating biography; it made me think of Stalin and Molotov in a different light. I wish I learned more from this book about Molotov's personal life, but it proved difficult, even for a masterly storyteller such as Roberts, to separate surgically Molotov from Stalin's pervasive presence. Molotov takes on

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a more appealing shape after Stalin's death, and Roberts does an excellent job in accounting for the unrepentant Stalinist's struggle for power with Khrushchev, Molotov's ultimate disgrace and expulsion from the Communist Party. I recommend this book to anyone interested in Soviet foreign policy or the early Cold War.

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Europe

Hungary: between democracy and authoritarianism. By Paul Lendvai. London: Hurst. 2012. 258pp. £25.00. ISBN 978 1 84904 196 6.

The biggest-selling items in market stalls and shops throughout Budapest are t-shirts, key rings and various tacky trinkets bearing one motif: a map of 'Greater Hungary', the country as it was when part of the Habsburg empire before the Treaty of Trianon after the First World War reduced its land mass by two-thirds. One car in ten on Hungarian roads bears a sticker with either that symbol or the Arpad flag, which between the wars was the emblem of the fascist Arrow Cross group. In a recent opinion poll, 70 per cent of Hungarians said they believed Jews were too prominent in the business world, and around half thought they bore responsibility for the banking crisis of 2008.

After the collapse of the Soviet empire it seemed that Hungary—often called the merriest barracks in the communist camp—would be the East bloc country best placed to make the transition into a liberal democracy. In this deeply disturbing book, the veteran journalist and historian Paul Lendvai shows how from the heady optimism of 1989, Hungary has turned into the most autocratic state in the European Union. It has a government now that is reminiscent in style, if not ideology, of the one-party states of the Soviet era. And he argues, powerfully, that Hungary's slide backwards from shared European values has created a democratic deficit that poses a fundamental challenge to the EU every bit as dangerous as the financial deficits faced by countries like Greece.

Lendvai was for 20 years the *Financial Times*' most knowledgeable and best-connected correspondent in Central Europe. Essentially, he is right that the European Union has done far too little to stand up to the Budapest administration's flagrant disregard of democratic principles. However, at times he is too partisan. Since the fall of communism, Hungary has been the worst governed of all the former East bloc countries. Successive governments of the left, right and centre have failed to tackle the big social and economic issues, preferring to put off difficult decisions. Lendvai lets off far too easily the socialist administrations which have run the country for half the period since 1989. No government genuinely attempted a reckoning with the era of dictatorship, which in Hungary predated by three decades the communist takeover after the Second World War. All of them were mired in sleaze, spent too much, borrowed too much and were generally incompetent.

The politicians did agree, though, as did the voters, on the kind of country Hungary wanted to be: a liberal democracy at the heart of Europe. At least until Viktor Orban won a thumping election victory two years ago and began to change direction completely.

Lendvai depicts Orban as a monster of ambition, whose man-of-destiny narcissism threatens the stability of Hungary and, by fanning the flames of nationalism, potentially of the whole of Middle Europe.

Orban's journey from bearded dissident firebrand in the late 1980s, whose favourite remark was 'never trust anyone over 35', into populist firebrand, has been well documented. Lendvai, though, is excellent on the depressing details of how Orban has turned his Fidesz

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Party, the Alliance of Young Democrats, from the byword of revolutionary cool, a group of chic young liberals campaigning against authority, into a largely clerical, staunchly nationalistic party entirely loyal to one leader.

Orban lost an election once—after his first four-year term as prime minister from 1998 ended in failure. As Lendvai shows, he is determined never to lose again—hence the new constitution introduced this year, which removes all notion of separation of powers, and the way Fidesz is gerrymandering the electoral boundaries, so constitutionally, the party will be handed a parliamentary majority for the foreseeable future. Orban's party hacks have been given terms of up to twelve years on new bodies that appoint the judiciary and a media council that has Soviet-era powers over the press, broadcasting and the internet. No wonder that one of the last acts of the great anti-communist crusader Vaclav Havel before he died last winter was to condemn Viktor Orban. Adam Michnik, one of the guiding lights of the Solidarity movement, has said Orban wants to create a one-party state, with Fidesz as the Party.

Lendvai is more concerned with the cultural aspects of rule by Orban than the minutiae of the new constitution. The language of politics in Hungary has become deeply distasteful, with racial slurs and xenophobia thought unacceptable elsewhere in western Europe. Fidesz seldom criticizes extremists who violently attack, even murder, Roma. Orban is not an anti-Semite, but people around him are; some have been known to use the word 'cosmopolitan' with abandon, playing on the Stalinist pejorative code for Jews as 'rootless cosmopolitans'.

It can be argued that Hungary is a small country, a faraway place of which we know little, with a unique history. But the worry for the European Union should be what may happen elsewhere on the periphery of Europe where democratic roots are shallow. As Lendvai concludes, Hungary has re-established 'authoritarian rule under a paper thin veneer in the heart of Europe ... it is a sample of what may follow more widely if this depression continues'.

Victor Sebestyen

Turkey: what everyone needs to know. By Andrew Finkel. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2012. 212pp. Index. Pb.: £10.99. ISBN 978 0 19973 304 0. Available as e-book.

The title of a book rarely reflects its content, but *Turkey: what everybody needs to know* is a pretty good description of what you get. 'Basic' questions often heard—'Is Turkey becoming fundamentalist?'; 'Was there an Armenian genocide?'; 'Are we going to see another military coup?'—are answered in a clear, concise and concrete way. The book is neither an academic work nor a personal essay, but a good synthesis offering a broad, factually accurate presentation of contemporary Turkey. Given that it is not an academic work, a lot of knowledge has nonetheless been mobilized to present today's Turkish economy and politics. The book contains few, but perfectly to the point, personal anecdotes, reflecting both Andrew Finkel's past professional experience as an editorialist (*köse yazari*) in one of the country's most important newspaper, *Zaman*, and his intuitive perception of Turkish society based on decades of regular contacts. Hence maybe the refreshing lack of clichés: the Ottoman empire is correctly described as essentially a European one, and the 'secular' Turkish state is convincingly described as organized to control the religious field as closely as possible.

The book's structure is simple, easy to follow and mostly convincing. After an introductory chapter devoted to some key notions about Turkish identity and language, and some (political) geography, chapter two focuses on the historical background, mostly the

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republican history and Atatürk, the founder of the Republic. In the third chapter, which offers an overview of the Turkish economy, Finkel describes the main shift from a relatively centralized economy to a thriving and export-oriented one over the last 30 years. Chapter four looks at Turkish foreign policy, from the relationship with the United States to the more controversial European Union membership process. On this point, I would disagree with the (carefully) optimistic idea that the Turkish candidacy will ultimately succeed, but the analysis is solid enough. Chapter five is about politics, which in Turkey means also the military; the reader will learn a lot about both the intricacies of the series of scandals involving Turkish generals in the last decade and the limits of free speech in the current system. The last chapter is about society and religion: under this title the author presents a nuanced description of the current situation of civil rights (homosexuality, women's rights) and debated issues (the headscarves, the Armenian genocide).

Accurate as the book generally is, one can find a few debatable points. For example, regarding the Armenian genocide, Finkel states that 300,000 Armenians survived the war (p. 178), which is much less than what is generally recognized (a little over 800,000 for most researchers). Chapter two, 'Historical background', is probably the weakest since trying to sum up centuries of Ottoman/Turkish history, with few references, is the limit of the exercise. A better approach might have been to introduce a few historical notes directly relating to current events, which is nicely done for the pages on archaeology in Turkey, and later in chapter six for the Armenian genocide. In addition, it would have been interesting to point out that the celebration of the fall of Constantinople (1453) was not such a popular event before 1990 and the rise of Islam-oriented parties in Turkey. Finally, the reader will find very few footnotes, which is sometimes frustrating since the 'Further reading' section is not sufficient guidance for someone who would like to learn more. These minor points should not obscure the fact that the book is a valuable introduction to students, travellers and whoever rightly thinks Turkey a fascinating story.

Gilles Dorronsoro

National and European foreign policies: towards Europeanization. Edited by **Reuben Wong and Christopher Hill.** Abingdon and New York: Routledge. 2011. 304pp. Index. £85.00. ISBN 978 0 41561 084 1. Available as e-book.

Over the last decade or so, the literature on the 'Europeanization' of national foreign policy has grown considerably. Early efforts to examine the domestic effects of European Union integration in the essentially intergovernmental realm of foreign policy gave great attention to conceptual aspects. Yet many scholars have tended to customize their own analytical frameworks, rather than build on previous studies. Moreover, the contributions to this developing research agenda have been centred on individual or a small number of EU countries. In order to further 'accumulate knowledge', calls for large-scale comparative studies have been frequent. This important gap in the literature is directly addressed by *National and European foreign policies: towards Europeanization*. Edited by two eminent specialists in the field, this volume represents the first systematic study of Europeanization of foreign policy covering a large group of EU members, including some of the later entrants.

The book sets out to explore 'the nature of the relationship between the foreign policies of the Member States and "European" foreign policy', considering 'the extent to which Member State foreign policies are being Europeanized into more convergent, coordinated policies'. To tackle this subject, the introductory chapter presents a threefold conceptualization of foreign policy Europeanization: 'downloading', 'uploading' and 'crossloading'.

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Even though this conceptualization offers no major innovation in relation to frameworks previously developed in the literature (with important contributions by the editors of this book), it appears suitable in this case as the main goal seems to be to provide an extensive and methodical test for Europeanization assumptions, which in turn might facilitate subsequent theoretical refinements. Less fortunate is the fact that some passages of this introductory part are written in a dense and much aggregated way, making for less fluid reading.

The common analytical framework is applied to ten individual country studies: France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Greece, Spain, Finland, Poland and Slovenia. The countries were selected to represent a 'broad cross-section' of EU members: large and small, from the north and south, developed and developing economies, as well as members from each wave of enlargement until 2004. Moreover, the focus is put on the post-Maastricht Treaty era and on a set of specific themes: relations with external powers (especially the United States, Russia and China); the European Security and Defence Policy; Middle East policy; and decision-making. Each study was written by country experts who, in general, follow satisfactorily the common model of the book. The chapters on Italy, Denmark, Spain, Finland and Poland, in particular, have a well-balanced structure, clear writing style and fine analysis. On the whole, the case-studies offer new and interesting empirical insights.

Another strength of the book is certainly its rich and nuanced conclusions. Written in a lucid manner, the final chapter starts with an overview of the 'pattern of behaviour' that emerges from the ten countries examined. A valuable effort is made to identify at the outset 'what a Europeanized foreign policy looks like' and to specify categories expressing different degrees of Europeanization. Among the main findings it is noted that while only the foreign policies of some of the smallest countries can be considered as significantly Europeanized, all have been meaningfully Europeanized to some degree. Moreover, while none of the covered countries are strongly resisting involvement in common processes, all like to upload their preferences to the collective level when possible. This 'mixed' pattern would reflect the nature of the European 'system' of foreign policy and the 'three and a half-level game' within which EU members operate. Drawing on the case-studies, the chapter also lists 'drivers' of Europeanization of foreign policy (EU institutions and treaties, socialization, leadership, external federators, politics of scale, legitimization of global role, geo-cultural identity), as well as 'obstacles' (ideological hostility to integration, domestic politics, international forces, special relationships). It is concluded that even if no 'snowball effect' is taking place (as divergences persist), 'there is a trend, albeit broad and slow, towards convergence'. Therefore, Europeanization could be considered a 'relevant concept' in the area of foreign policy, as well as an 'independent variable'. According to the editors, the impact is stronger at the level of procedure and of general orientation than at the level of detailed policy, 'where domestic and other international factors can generate idiosyncratic national positions'. In that sense, Europeanization could only represent a 'middle-range theory', needing to be combined with other approaches in order to provide a 'full picture'.

Overall, the volume is a welcome addition and significant contribution to the literature on Europeanization of national foreign policy. Even if more in-depth studies involving other EU countries are needed, the scope and richness of the empirical and theoretical insights of this book move forward the field and provide substantial groundwork for future theory building. In sum, this is highly recommended reading for students and scholars with an interest in this subject area.

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Russia and Eurasia*

Deception: spies, lies and how Russia dupes the West. By Edward Lucas. London: Bloomsbury. 2012. 372pp. Index. £20.00. ISBN 978 1 40880 284 7. Available as e-book.

In his second book on Putin's Russia, Edward Lucas unveils the deeply troubling deeds of the secret service (FSB) and military intelligence, and makes a fierce attack on criminal abuses by men and organizations working under the banner of the 'Russian state'. He continues the investigation presented in *The new Cold War* (Bloomsbury, 2008) and offers a breath-taking demonstration of the blunt *modus operandi* of the 'power men', or *siloviki*, in Russia, the former Soviet republics and in European countries.

A senior editor at *The Economist*, Lucas is a former correspondent to Moscow and a frequent traveller to the Baltic states and the former Central European satellites of the USSR. He does not mince his words and tells 'the story of how the ex-spooks and their friends, in effect in a criminal conspiracy, took over one of the world's largest countries, hugely enriching themselves and duping the West' (p. 7). The book is divided into two: the first chapters deal with the role of the FSB and Putin-related networks ('spookdom', 'officialdom' and 'gangsterdom', pp. 78-9) in misruling the economy and the state. The second half is devoted to intelligence undercover operations in the Baltic states and Georgia, and inside NATO and European Union institutions.

The author's determination to leave no stone unturned in his investigation was cast in iron after a young Russian lawyer, Sergey Magnitsky, died of mistreatment in prison in November 2009. Magnitsky worked for Hermitage Capital, an investment company run by American-born financier William Browder (now a British citizen) until the latter fell from grace in 2005 and eventually was stripped of his assets in Russia. Magnitsky was arrested in 2008 as he had gathered evidence of wrongdoing by several high-level officials in Moscow and filed a dossier to the state investigative committee. He proved that the operation against Hermitage not only deprived shareholders of their property rights, but also stole taxpayer money.

The Browder/Hermitage/Magnitsky case is emblematic of the methods used by the *siloviki* in many other cases which do not make headlines, Lucas claims; he concludes that 'the spoils of office now are colossal' (p. 66). Although the current system of spoils finds its roots in the Soviet KGB past, 'under the new system, the men who run Russia, by and large, also own it. The dividing line between public and private interest is hopelessly blurred ... The FSB runs the state' (pp. 71-2)

The book does not, however, give detailed assessments of other abuses. As the author repeatedly reminds the reader, in order to protect them he cannot disclose all his sources, and he often has to rely on scant evidence shredded in suspicious circumstances. Lucas may thereby fall easy prey to criticism of 'one-sided' polemic analysis. Objections against his method do not stand precisely because of the very sensitive nature of the issue; the magnitude of the financial and political vested interests; and the incredible secrecy and veil of lies surrounding the biggest deals made by Kremlin-controlled agencies, companies and individuals.

This book is not a World Bank study on corruption in post-communist Russia. It is a book by an engaged journalist who explains how members of the elites dismiss law and moral values in a state that protects them because the law may be bent at will by those who tightly control economic and political power. Lucas is not a 'yes, but' writer. He has the merit of stating his position very clearly from the start. His book is not for those who

* See also Geoffrey Roberts, *Molotov: Stalin's cold warrior*, pp. 1142-4.

believe Russia is ‘a specific historic case’, which can be ruled only by a strong autocratic leader served by a fierce secret police. He may be relying too much on a few Russians he can meet with and trusts, like Vladislav Inozemtsev, who is critical of the regime, but also pays lip service by organizing the Yaroslavl forum around Dmitri Medvedev, not too different from the Valdai club organized around Vladimir Putin, which Lucas decries sharply.

The book’s second part is about spying. It challenges western governments, intelligence services and corporate firms in their inadequate reactions to Russian deception. Edward Lucas has followed closely the trajectories of the tiny Baltic republics that played a key role in the collapse of the Soviet empire in 1989–91. He tells the fascinating story of Herman Simm, a former Soviet Estonian policeman who joined the Estonian Defence Ministry after 1991 and leaked strategic information to Russia. ‘Simm also provided Russia with damaging insights into the weakness of NATO’s counter-intelligence efforts’, Lucas writes, adding that ‘in the run-up to Estonia’s admission to NATO, Simm obtained the alliance’s procedures for issuing security clearances’ (pp. 292–3). Lucas also provides some new insight into the 2012 spy scandal when ten Russian agents, including Anna Chapman, were arrested and expelled from the United States.

What does not come out clearly from Lucas’s demonstration is what the ultimate goal, or core motivation, is on the Russian side. The FSB and all *siloviki* structures, under Vladimir Putin’s supervision, invest a lot of time and money in spying and deception. What for? The book makes a strong argument at showing how inadequate the old methods are when it comes to Russia’s modernization and competitiveness. Putin is failing to strengthen the national economy and mobilize society. Russia is running behind in many technological and scientific fields. So why continue along the same unpromising path? Could it be that the Putin group simply ‘go for what they know’, carry on what they are best able to do, with the same old tricks, for lack of capacity to renew their repertoire? Or that they are afraid of the future, and defend their monopoly over the ‘power structures’ and the ‘economic monopolies’ (oil and gas, arms, trains and planes, and so on) by all means? Maybe they are unwisely greedy and simply seek to yield ever more profits tomorrow, not caring for longer-term achievements?

Are the Russian leaders in a ‘defensive’ mood—save the status quo and buy time—or in an ‘offensive’ strategy—destabilize rivals and enemies, inside and outside, and strengthen their grip on their country and on neighbouring countries? The answer suggested by Lucas is that spying and penetration are successful in exposing the vulnerabilities of western organizations like NATO and the European Union, and in ‘skewing our decision-making’. The book ends with a plea to western governments to be less complacent.

Marie Mendras, Sciences Po, France

Restavratsiya vmesto reformatsii: Dvadsat’ let, kotorye potryasli Rossiyu. By Vladimir Pastukhov. Moscow: OGI. 2012. 528pp. £15.50. ISBN 978 5 94282 656 7. [Restoration instead of reformation: twenty years that shook Russia]

Unfortunately, the incisive and perceptive Vladimir Pastukhov has been read less widely than other scholarly writers on the recent and present political system in Russia, such as Lilia Shevtsova and Andrei Piontkovsky, not to speak of more flamboyant authors and journalists like Yuliya Latynina and Stanislav Belkovsky. This is mainly because Pastukhov, a doctor of political sciences and a well-trained lawyer, has, until recently, preferred to publish mainly in small-circulation professional journals, which have escaped the close attention of the wider public and, perhaps fortunately, the authorities. More recently, some

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of his shorter articles have appeared in *Novaya gazeta* and on the website www.polit.ru, but his new book is essential reading for those who are concerned about what has been taking place since 1991 in Russia and what is likely to happen further in the twenty-first century.

The title of the volume sheds light on its main thesis and *leitmotiv*. While acknowledging that Russia has always been and still is closer to the West than to the East (the neo-Eurasianists receive very little attention—which might turn out to have been a mistake), Pastukhov insists that his country is *still* not an integral, let alone integrated, part of European civilization; he makes much of the fact that Russia, which did not experience a period of western-type feudalism, has *still* not gone through either a secular or a religious re-formation/Reformation with the subsequent concern for the individual rather than the community (*obshchina* etc.). (It should be added that there is remarkably little in the book about Russia's geography as a defining influence on its history and politics.) Thus the civilizational paradigm is *still* much the same as it has been for centuries, meaning that even the communist period of Russian history showed continuity rather than change at a deep psychological and cultural level. For the author, culture, in its widest sense, is no less important than politics and economics in determining the course of Russian history, which has its own internal logic and consistency. Oversimplified so crudely, this view may strike the reader as stale, trite, too deterministic and excessively influenced by philosophers such as Hegel and Berdyaev. Indeed, this reviewer is not happy, for instance, with Pastukhov's insistence that the October 1917 revolution was the product of the Russian intelligentsia *almost as a whole*, rather than a wartime fluke brought about by a small part of the *semi-intelligentsia*. But apparently, unpredictable things do happen, not least in Russia. Who, in December 1991, would have believed that less than ten years later the president of that country would be an unprepossessing lieutenant-colonel of the KGB? Was that also a fluke, or is Pastukhov correct in looking for some profound, consistent thread running through centuries of Russian history?

Whether one completely agrees with Pastukhov or not, his three-part book is full of ideas and facts that will be new to many of its readers. After the initial statement of intent, 'Power [*Vlast*'] and culture: the case of Russia' (he uses the term *vlast*' far more frequently than the words for 'state' and 'government') comes section one, on the critical place of schism (*raskol*), internal conflict and dissent(ers) in Russian history. The attempted 'Soviet reformation' failed. Postcommunism is a 'black hole' in Russian history. There are premonitions of civil war.

Section two contains essays on Russian ideology and politics and their relationship to Europeanism. What are the prospects now for a real reformation in and of Russia? What are the chances for genuine federalism in the 'Russian Federation'? Can Russians manage for long without a 'national idea'? Is what is happening now a Russian counterrevolution?

Section three presents seven essays on Russian law and constitutionalism. Pastukhov hopes that a Constitutional (not Constituent) Assembly will be convened, and that the law will finally become an independent branch of power in his country. Here, as throughout the book, Pastukhov makes very few *ad hominem* remarks, partly perhaps because he and most of his Russian readers are all too well aware of the mind-set of the two 'graduates-in-law' (if not 'thieves-in-law') who currently occupy the posts of president and prime minister of the Russian Federation. The foreign reader may wonder how much longer the neo-Soviet regime will be able to keep its to some extent post-Soviet subjects under control. Pastukhov's healthily provocative volume should stimulate a great deal of new thinking about the prospects for Russia's future.

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The political economy of Putin's Russia. By Pekka Sutela. Abingdon: Routledge. 2012. 256pp. Index. £85.00. ISBN 978 0 41569 737 8. Available as e-book.

This is the best available book on the contemporary Russian economy. In case that sounds like faint praise, let me add that it is, by any standards, excellent. It is economically highly literate but clear to the non-specialist; Pekka Sutela's command of a wide range of both western and Russian sources is admirable; and the text is full of judicious assessments based on evidence that is clearly presented and carefully weighed.

The general tone of those assessments might be summed up by the words 'don't panic'. This will be disappointing to some Russians and Russia watchers who would like more drama, but sobriety and caution have so far served well in interpreting developments in post-communist Russia. The last two sentences of the book, about future prospects, are characteristic: 'Once again, muddling through may well be the outcome. The evidence in favour of other alternatives is difficult to find' (p. 231).

This does not mean that Putinist economic institutions and policies are given the all-clear. On the contrary, the well-known, and profound, problems of corruption, insufficient competition and the lack of secure property rights are all clearly identified and duly stressed. But the underlying approach is constantly to ask how these and other institutional features of the Russian economy have evolved, with the implication that further evolution is possible.

The book consists of seven chapters. The introduction, subtitled 'Burden of the past', focuses on the late communist, Gorbachev and Yeltsin periods, and includes an excellent summary of the attempts to put into effect the standard prescriptions of liberalization, privatization and stabilization. Chapter two, 'The Putin regime', is about the political economy of Putin-era economic policy-making. Here, Sutela notes that policy objectives shifted over time but that economic reform did not entirely cease in Putin's second term—witness the unbundling and partial privatization of electricity production. Chapter three, 'Economic growth', is an authoritative overview of where Putin-era growth has come from, both on the demand side and on the supply side, and noting, of course, the role of oil price windfalls.

Chapter four, 'Energy', is a survey mainly of policies on oil and gas, though with some reference also to coal and electricity. It includes the important points that the major new resource for maintaining and perhaps increasing hydrocarbons export volume is the large possible increase in efficiency in domestic energy usage, and that this in turn depends heavily on a convergence of domestic and export prices for gas that is politically highly sensitive.

Chapter five, 'Money, banking and financial policy', is an expert account that includes more about budgetary policies than the title might suggest. There is a particularly perceptive account of the Central Bank of Russia's difficulties in moving from exchange-rate targeting to inflation targeting, and a convincing defence of the controversial stepwise depreciation of the rouble in late 2008 to early 2009. Chapter six, 'Welfare' might be better, if less succinctly, entitled, 'The consequences for the population'. Sutela asks whether, in the 2000s, Russia became a 'socially-oriented welfare state', but he also reviews income distribution and Russia's demographics.

The final chapter is an epilogue on Russia's handling of the global financial crisis. The author notes the relatively large estimated fiscal stimulus, and observes that this was possible without a buildup of national debt because reserves prudently accumulated in the boom years could be drawn upon.

Throughout, the emphasis is on surveying available evidence, including both Russian and foreign econometric studies. This, together with Sutela's close familiarity with the

politics of economic change in Russia, gives the book an impressive solidity. On a few of the broader conclusions, Sutela seems occasionally to be uncertain. On page 40, for example, he argues that Putin's earlier faith in natural-resource-based development was gone by 2006, while on page 45 Putin is described as consistent in following the strategy he laid out in 1999. In chapter six it is not clear whether Sutela judges that an effective welfare state has in fact been established or not. That chapter is characteristically full of information but uncharacteristically somewhat lacking in clear structure.

One general question I would raise is whether Sutela has brought out sufficiently strongly the severe weaknesses of the business environment. They matter more than ever at the moment, when continued economic growth and regime stability look more problematic than they did in mid-2011, when Sutela finished writing. Since then, the mounting eurozone crisis and the unexpected surge of anti-regime protests have darkened the prospects of the Putinist order. Muddling through is perhaps a little less of a safe bet than it looked a year ago.

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Putin's United Russia party. By Sean P. Roberts. Abingdon: Routledge. 2011. 226pp. £90.00. ISBN 978 0 41566 902 3. Available as e-book.

This book examines the role which the United Russia party has played in the post-Yeltsin period in shaping Russia's 'dominant-power politics'. This term is borrowed from Thomas Carothers to describe a political system in which, despite the formal institutions of democratic governance and competition, power is monopolized by one political group and competition marginalized.

Sean Roberts's main thesis is that the United Russia party is a product rather than an agent of this process. United Russia was from the start a 'political technology' created from above by the executive to secure control over the legislature and neutralize the inter-branch conflict between Duma and presidency, which had plagued the Yeltsin years. As a result, Roberts argues, while United Russia has developed into the undisputed 'party of power', it has never truly been *in* power. The party has relied heavily on its association with Vladimir Putin for its electoral success, thus reinforcing rather than qualifying Russia's personalized politics. Since 2003, it has been the largest party in the Duma, yet it does not form the government and has only marginal influence on its agenda. The party's powers of oversight are insubstantial and its relations to the executive unambiguously subordinate. As one senior party official complains to the author, 'we don't have any parliamentary control; in fact we don't have parliamentary investigation'. United Russia is thus a hybrid phenomenon, which is simultaneously 'both more and less than a typical party' understood in classical terms. Paradoxically, as United Russia's membership and electoral dominance have grown, its political agency has remained unchanged or even weakened.

The author devotes little space to the ideological content of United Russia, arguing that the party's manifestos are vague, catch-all documents devoid of policy content. The intention of United Russia was undoubtedly to deaden the public political sphere—as the party's Chairman Boris Gryzlov infamously put it: 'parliament is no place for discussion'. Yet after the wild pluralism of the 1990s, the sudden emergence of a centrist, ideologically isotonic ruling party, was a complex political process which could have been examined in more detail. The author could have used the example of United Russia as a vehicle to investigate more deeply the basis and values underpinning the 'Putin consensus'.

Indeed, the absence of a broader political context makes the book's conclusions seem something of an anti-climax. Since the function of the party was in part to keep the locus

of power out of the Duma, the story of United Russia comes across as something of a bureaucratic sideshow to a more dramatic political plot being played out elsewhere. The author's theoretical framework is primarily that of comparative party politics. However, in the closing pages Roberts concludes that United Russia resembles more of a bureau than a party, something akin to a 'department for voting and elections'. It is understandably beyond the scope of this monograph to attempt a full panorama of political change in Russia during this period. Nevertheless, greater depth could have been added by considering the creation of United Russia within the context of the main political drama of the post-Yeltsin period: the reconstitution and recentralization of state and executive power under Putin. This study could have provided original insights into this issue by studying the genesis of the party and its predecessor, Unity, the rise of which coincided with the emergence of Putin as Yeltsin's successor. Since the party was created from above for an initially unresponsive elite, its success provides insights into how executive power was recreated in the early 2000s. Likewise, light could have been thrown on the structure of Russian governance by looking in more empirical detail at how the party interacts with the executive and informal networks of power. This could be achieved by focusing on specific inflection points, such as elections to the Duma, when executive strength is by necessity exercised in concert with United Russia in order to secure the support of the electorate.

The book concludes by considering scenarios for United Russia's future development. According to a positive scenario for Russia's democratic evolution, United Russia would gradually adopt an autonomous institutional logic responsive to societal interests 'from below' rather than executive diktat from above. As the author points out, however, the comparative experience shows that parties reliant on other organizations or institutions not only take longer to acquire independent value, but are also prone to sudden collapse. Indeed, it appears that United Russia's institutionalization may not come soon enough to save it. In December 2011, the opposition cast the parliamentary elections as a referendum on the legitimacy of the regime as a whole. The sharp fall in support for United Russia has provoked new uncertainty regarding the viability of the current political order. As Roberts observes, 'it is not inconceivable that the party will be the first to show any serious schism or weakness in the authority of the current ruling group and so serve as a valuable early warning of regime breakdown'.

Any move towards a grassroots party politics will be hampered by the enduring features of Russia's structure of governance: executive strength, a patrimonial economic and social order, and enduring distrust of parties and institutions of power. These factors have both driven the rise of United Russia and now constrain its evolution into an autonomous political institution. As the political analyst Sergei Markov observed to the book's author: 'It's not a party. How to make real parties, nobody knows.'

Alex Nice

Russian politics: the paradox of weak state. By Marie Mendras. London: Hurst. 2012. 288pp. Index. £25.00. ISBN 978 1 84904 113 3.

In her views on Russia, Marie Mendras is an outstanding representative of the 'school of Richard Pipes', which implies maximum realism and minimum romanticism in respect to the subject of research. Mendras belongs to that rare breed of researchers of Russia who are attracted by Russian politics but certainly not amused by it. As a result, she looks at things detachedly, perhaps even slightly condescendingly, yet without prejudice dictated by ideological preferences.

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Impartiality in its evaluations and the refusal to replace the actual with the desired—a sin many contemporary studies of Russia fall into—is an undoubted advantage of this fundamental work, which summarizes the observations undertaken by the author over several decades in a country that remains in a process of continuous and difficult-to-interpret changes. The dryness of Mendras's diagnosis is what makes the book so valuable.

The angle from which the author examines Russian policy is dictated by a few strict though objective judgements of the condition of the Russian state and society at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century. Simply stating the facts, the book points out that after 20 tumultuous years of transition, the Russian state still aims to be an empire; Russian society has not become a nation; and management (governance) has substituted administration (ruling). Rigidly established on the basis of these 20 years, the political regime is defined as 'personalized, clientelistic and authoritarian'. These judgements, in fact, determine the trajectory of the author's arguments.

Russian politics begins with a rather impressive and elaborate description of modern Russian political history, couched in the spirit of the same 'school of Pipes'. But the focus still lies on the results of the evolution of the post-communist regime. Final estimates are no less stringent and realistic than the opening postulates. Mendras, laying out some strong factual material and basing her evaluations on an extensive literature review, records the defeat of the constitutional movement; a malignant bureaucracy; degradation of public institutions; and social stagnation.

When talking about Russia, we are really talking about the state of a society and government typical for the classical model of a 'failed state', reflected in the book's subtitle. What does Mendras then consider a paradox? The answer to this question can be found in the second part of the work. With a surgeon's precision, Mendras describes how alongside the failing state booms a regime of personalistic unlimited power, forming its own system, secure from the attacks of opponents, and politically capable of reproducing itself over and over again.

The book pays special attention to the genesis and main characteristics of the personalistic powers created by Putin. Interestingly, Mendras considers Putin's decision to become the party leader, after which the parliamentary elections turned into a plebiscite, to be the starting point for the development of this system. From that point onwards, she examines the work of political institutions in Russia only in the logic of 'imitation of the democracy'. In her view, after having been stabilized, the system began actively to expand itself, first internally and then externally. The first stage was a nationalization of the elites, through which the regime acquired a certain kind of social base. In the second stage, the regime began actively to build a new 'quasi-empire', accompanied by the regeneration of an aggressive foreign policy.

Although the book pays a lot of attention to analysing the contradictions within the system and the role of some of the new movements that have emerged during the Medvedev presidency, one is left with the impression that Mendras does not consider these movements a serious threat to the regime. Staying within both the analysis of the facts available to us and strict logic, one can only endorse this approach. The only problem is that throughout its history, Russia has often demonstrated an unprecedented ease in overcoming the limits set by the logic of history. However, the study of abnormal logics, in turn, is beyond the scope of scientific analysis.

This is a crucial work on Russian politics, designed for those who prefer hard realism in assessing expectations and assumptions, based on exercises in the philosophy of Russian history. Among the large number of works devoted to Russia, this book differs in that it

has its own face: it is as recognizable as everything written by Mendras, due to its deeply personal perception of Russian political reality, without embellishment.

Vladimir Pastukhov

Roads to the temple: truth, memory, ideas, and ideals in the making of the Russian revolution, 1987–1991. By Leon Aron. New Haven, CT, and London: Yale University Press. 2012. 483pp. Index. £40.00. ISBN 978 0 30011 844 5. Available as e-book.

The revolutions of 1989 that swept away communist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe started in fact earlier. What Pope John Paul II called an *annus mirabilis*, a miraculous year, could not have taken place without the radical changes in the USSR initiated and promoted by Mikhail Gorbachev. Leon Aron's book, a genuine *tour de force*, is a fascinating chronicle of the main ideas that caused and inspired the revolutionary upheaval in the USSR. A respected student of Soviet and post-Soviet affairs, Aron is the author of a major Yeltsin biography and of numerous articles dealing with Russia's political culture. For him, what happened in the USSR between 1987 and 1991 amounted to the complete disbandment of all political myths that had served as justification for the Leninist Leviathan.

Aron is right to highlight what the liberal philosopher Isaiah Berlin called the power of ideas. In other words, material forces, always emphasized by Marxists, matter, but they are not the only and not even the most significant factor that leads to political revolutions. The Soviet Union had long been in terminal crisis, but this agony could have lasted for many other decades had the revolutionary ideas associated with Gorbachevism not come to the fore and imposed a new political vision. Aron contrasts Gorbachev's ideological revolution with Khrushchev's half-hearted and inconclusive reforms. The most important distinctions concerned to two areas: the imperial identity of the Soviet Union and the Stalinist legacies. Whereas Khrushchev avoided a radical response to these two challenges, Gorbachev and his supporters moved boldly ahead and engaged in a fundamental overhaul of what historian Martin Malia once called ideocratic partocracy, i.e. a party monopoly on power and ideas. *Homo Sovieticus* was exposed as ideological bogus, the opposite of classical humanism.

Aron's main contribution is to retrieve a whole universe of ideas, aspirations, values, emotions and sentiments put forward by the main proponents of historical fairness, political openness and moral frankness. The book is a superb archaeology of what can be called the symbolic matrix of Gorbachev's revolution. In fact, the philosophy of glasnost as a liberation of the mind developed even before 1987 in the writings of banned authors such as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Vassili Grossman (about whom Aron writes with intense empathy). Its thrust was the absolute opposite of the long-held set of mendacities that formed the foundation of Soviet ideology.

Many of Gorbachev's close associates were party intellectuals whose political itineraries moved from early infatuation with Stalin and Stalinism, to disappointments and disgust with the bureaucratic despotism, and finally to the deep desire to change the system. Yes, the Gorbachevites did not say it explicitly, pretended that their goals were intra-systemic, but the more they attacked Stalinism's legacies, the more the revolutionary impetus gathered momentum.

Often called the architect of glasnost, Aleksandr Yakovlev is the main hero in Aron's captivating discussion of the myth-breaking endeavours of those years. A Second World War veteran, recruited into the propaganda apparatus during Stalin's times, Yakovlev was indeed what is called a child of the 20th Congress. This is a reference to the February 1956 party conclave when, during a closed session, Nikita Khrushchev dealt a mortal blow to

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Stalin's myth. After that shock, Yakovlev could never accept uncritically the official line, though for decades he kept his doubts to himself and very few confidants.

As an opponent of the increasingly nationalist direction of Soviet ideology under Leonid Brezhnev, Yakovlev lost his job at the Party headquarters and was sent as an Ambassador to Canada. Gorbachev met him there and, once in power, brought him to Moscow. Yakovlev became the chief ideologue and, in this quality, was instrumental in allowing for an extraordinary relaxation in cultural life. He surrounded himself with other party intellectuals, including many who had worked in Prague at the international journal 'World Marxist Review' (the Russian edition was titled 'Problems of Peace and Socialism'), and who had been contaminated with neo-Marxist, revisionist ideas, especially regarding the dignity of the individual and universality of human rights. Arguably the most anti-Stalinist of all the members of Gorbachev's entourage, Yakovlev championed the themes of de-Bolshevization, de-ideologization and democratization. He became the nemesis of party conservatives. Later, after the demise of the USSR, he authored several devastating books about the fundamentally criminal nature of Leninism. He prefaced the Russian edition of the *Black book of communism* and chaired the Committee for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression.

Aron's book is essentially about the democratic ideas that corroded the Soviet edifice during the Gorbachev revolution. Among these, most important were the rediscovery of human freedom as a non-negotiable, universal value. For more than seven decades, the Soviet utopian experiment was based on duplicity, subservience, conformity, fear, suspicion and hypocrisy. This dismal moral situation led to rampant cynicism, demoralization and despair. The book's title comes from a great film by Georgian director Tengiz Abuladze, 'Repentance'. The major question in that masterpiece was human salvation. Redemption is impossible without atonement. Democracy and memory are inseparable.

If individuals lost any moral direction, they would not be able to find a road to the temple, to the church. They will be, as Polish poet Aleksander Wat once put it, children in the fog. The men and women of the Russian revolution, this world-historical event masterfully explored by Leon Aron, looked for a moral and political compass and they found it. All the post-1991 dismay, disenchantment and dereliction notwithstanding, something sublime lay in that rediscovery of freedom, dignity and honour. Leon Aron's book succeeds marvellously in resurrecting what Hannah Arendt called the lost treasure of the revolutionary tradition.

Vladimir Tismaneanu, *University of Maryland (College Park), USA*

Power games in the Caucasus: Azerbaijan's foreign and energy policy towards the West, Russia and the Middle East. By Nazrin Mehdiyeva. London and New York: I. B. Tauris. 2011. 310pp. £56.50. ISBN 978 1 84885 426 0.

With the exception of the numerous studies dedicated to Russia and Iran, the analysis of the foreign policies of the Caspian riverine states has represented a much understudied issue in the scholarly production on post-Soviet politics and international relations. Very seldom has the attention of the international academic community focused on the likes of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. This proposition immediately captures the innovative nature of the contribution made by Nazrin Mehdiyeva's *Power games in the Caucasus* to our understanding of the international relations of the Caspian region.

The interconnection of energy security, Great Power interaction and authoritarian leadership has represented a crucial nexus in the consolidation of the international outlook

of the Caspian states. This book convincingly responds to this challenging framework by presenting a balanced analysis of the complex process through which the Azerbaijani state managed entry into the international community.

It could be said that the eight chapters in which *Power games in the Caucasus* is articulated are approximately concerned with two main lines of enquiry. Chapters one to three (pp. 1–73) beautifully set the scene, by detailing the analytical lens through which Azerbaijani foreign policy will be discussed, offering a convincing study of the interaction of power, personalities and institutions in the making of Baku's foreign policy. Chapter three contains some of the book's most interesting insight, as it expands on the challenges that early statehood posed to Azerbaijani foreign policy-making, while outlining the different impacts that the personalities and leadership styles of Abulfaz Elchibey and Heydar Aliyev had on Azerbaijan's place in the world. Outstanding research work supports the argument presented here, with the author relying on first-hand sources and numerous interviews with political leaders to outline the interconnection between leadership style and foreign policy in Azerbaijan.

Chapter two offers a necessary introduction to the main theoretical tasks the book is designed to face. Here, the illustration of the constraints set by Azerbaijan's small size is successfully presented through a theoretical framework organized around a bandwagoning–balancing divide. Although this choice inevitably brings some limitations to the volume's breadth, it provides the fundamental framework for Azerbaijan's foreign policy agency. *Power games in the Caucasus*, as a consequence, advances an investigation of Azerbaijan's international relations that clearly departs from the Great Game discourse so popular in the 1990s and early 2000s. This perspective reverberates a trend in academic literature on the Caspian region and, as a consequence, places Mehdiyeva's book at the innovative end of the scholarly production devoted to Caspian politics and international relations.

Seeing post-Soviet Azerbaijan as an active foreign policy agent (and not as a mere pawn in the geopolitical game played by different Great Powers) allows the author to present the operational dimension of Azerbaijani foreign policy through a convincing investigative pattern. Chapters four to seven develop the volume's second line of enquiry, by investigating the frameworks through which the Azerbaijani state interacted with neighbouring states (Russia, Turkey) and more distant international actors (namely those located in the West). By rejecting the Great Game discourse, Mehdiyeva can indeed argue that the Azerbaijani leadership pursued a rather consistent policy of strategic manoeuvring, which led Azerbaijan to adopt different external postures while dealing with different partners or, most interestingly, while dealing with the same partner (the Russian Federation) in different areas. Separating the military and the energy dimensions of the Russo-Azerbaijani relationship—analysed in chapters four and five—allows the author to reinforce this particular line of argument.

In her conclusions, Nazrin Mehdiyeva updates her analysis by reflecting on most recent events to demonstrate that a stable policy of strategic manoeuvring led Azerbaijan to increase its negotiating power within the geopolitics of Caspian energy. Whether this scenario remains sustainable in the medium term will probably depend on evolutions in Azerbaijan's relations with Russia and two of the actors that are not mentioned in Mehdiyeva's book, namely Iran and China. There is hence more to Azerbaijani foreign policy than presented in this book. However, *Power games in the Caucasus* does advance a very interesting and well-argued analysis of the way in which a small state like Azerbaijan became a relevant international actor. This book will certainly appeal to an academic readership, yet its accessible style will also make it an interesting read for the wider public.

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Middle East and North Africa

Saddam Hussein's Ba'th Party: inside an authoritarian regime. By Joseph Sassoon. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2012. 336pp. Index. £18.05. ISBN 978 0 52114 915 0.

The Saddam tapes: the inner workings of a tyrant's regime, 1978–2001. By Kevin M. Woods, David D. Palkki and Mark E. Stout. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2011. 392pp. Index. Pb.: £22.50. ISBN 978 1 10769 348 7.

For years, westerners struggled to understand the Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein. Neo-conservatives portrayed him as an irrational mad man, who without provocation invaded two neighbouring countries, Iran and Kuwait, and whose removal from power was needed to prevent him from using his weapons of mass destruction against western interests, particularly in the light of 9/11.

Thanks to the capture of Ba'ath regime records by the Coalition Forces in 2003, we now have access to a treasure trove of recordings of Saddam's private meetings as well as documents detailing the bureaucratic minutiae of the Ba'ath Party, which allow us to develop a much deeper understanding of Saddam and his regime.

In *Saddam Hussein's Ba'th Party: inside an authoritarian regime*, Joseph Sassoon has worked his way through the meticulous records in the archives to put together what is a fascinating portrait of the regime, explaining how the Ba'ath Party was organized, its relationship with the army, the security organizations, the personality cult around Saddam, and how the regime extended its control over all aspects of life in Iraq. In so doing, he analyses how the Ba'ath Party rose to power after a series of coups and power vacuums which left Iraqis yearning for stability, and how it managed to maintain control so effectively for so long. He details how Saddam succeeded in co-opting the population, drawing large numbers of people into the Ba'ath Party's web, through rewards as well as fear. Saddam deliberately sought to weaken the military and to subordinate it to the Ba'ath Party. Once the Party had gained control over the levers of power, it subjugated its opponents and eliminated opposition. Saddam manipulated the rivalries between different groups within the Ba'ath Party, while consolidating his own power. The security organizations developed a comprehensive system of repression and surveillance, which led Iraqis to fear that informers were everywhere.

Sassoon describes how the imposition of sanctions on Iraq in the 1990s cemented the Ba'ath Party's control over society, as it policed the rationing system and managed imports and exports. The vast majority of Iraqis submitted to the system and complied in order to survive.

Ba'ath ideology was set aside in favour of promoting the personality cult of Saddam. Saddam believed that he had been destined to rule Iraq. Sassoon comments: 'Scouring the party's archival material, one would be hard pressed to articulate its ideology and substance ... Given its weak intellectual and theoretical base, the Ba'th ideology lent itself to authoritarian rule' (p. 277). Sassoon describes how Saddam was disappointed with the results of the 1996 referendum in which he won 99.9 per cent of the vote. He blamed the Ba'ath Party for failing to convince an estimated 5–6,000 people of his worth. In the October 2002 referendum, he won 100 per cent.

Following the fall of Saddam, the Coalition introduced a new system of government that, for the first time in Iraq's history, introduced sect and ethnicity as the primary organizing principle. Many blame the accentuation of identity politics as a key factor contributing to the country's descent into civil war. Sassoon notes that the Ba'ath Party defined Iraqis not by

their religion or ethnicity but by their support for the regime. Saddam emphasized that the Ba'ath Party should 'oppose the politicization of religion by the state and within society'. Many Shi'is and Kurds were part of the Ba'ath Party. Saddam was 'egalitarian' in his brutal treatment of anyone suspected of disloyalty.

In the *The Saddam tapes: the inner workings of a tyrant's regime, 1978–2001*, the editors have sorted through masses of recordings to provide transcripts of the most pertinent discussions which reveal Saddam's views on the US, Israel, the wars with Kuwait and Iran, and the UN weapons inspections. The tapes reveal that Saddam was in fact a rational actor, concerned with his regime's security, but with a deeply flawed understanding of the United States. Saddam believed the West sought to undermine Iraqi unity by emphasizing Kurdish, Shi'a and Sunni divisions, while he sought to stress Iraqi unity and Iraqi identity. No references are ever made in private or public to Iraq's Shi'a population or 'Sunni–Shi'a divide', even during the war with Iran. However, there are frequent disparaging comments about 'Persians', a term used to refer to Iraqi Shi'is who were suspected of being loyal to Iran.

The tapes reveal that he believed that the US tried to use Israel and Iran against Iraq, and that the US wanted to perpetuate the Iran–Iraq War to weaken Iraq against Israel. Saddam viewed Israel as an expansionist and aggressive state, with a strong military and a capable intelligence service, and as a threat to the entire Arab world. Despite restoring diplomatic relations in 1984, Saddam continued to view the US as 'treacherous and conspiratorial'. Saddam completely misjudged how the US would respond to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. After the war, Saddam boasted that he had achieved a great victory over the US in the 'mother of all battles'—as he called the invasion of Kuwait—as the US had requested a ceasefire and failed to topple his regime. The tapes reveal that Saddam viewed the 1991 uprising—dubbed the 'page of treason and treachery'—as part of a grander plot against Iraq. In the run-up to the 2003 war, Saddam was 'very confident' that the US would not attack.

In terms of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), only a fraction of the Ba'ath regime's documents survived the Iraqi efforts to destroy official records on the topic. However, from the documentation that still exists, it is clear that Saddam saw nuclear weapons as a deterrence and as a means of furthering his regional ambitions. The recordings reveal that Saddam had destroyed his WMD in the early 1990s. However, he believed that the US would pursue regime change regardless of Iraqi compliance with the UN weapons inspectors. When he was in US custody, Saddam acknowledged that he had been deliberately ambiguous about disarmament in order to meet international demands while not appearing weak to Iran and Israel.

Both books are well worth reading as they provide unique insights into the workings of an authoritarian regime and the calculations of its leader, and expose the flaws in the assumptions and analysis of western powers.

Emma Sky, King's College London, UK

The Syrian rebellion. By Fouad Ajami. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press. 2012. 260pp. Index. £14.95. ISBN 978 0 81791 504 9.

Fouad Ajami, author of *The Arab predicament* (CUP, 1981), a bombastic argument about the stalemate of political ideas in the Arab world, has written a timely and passionate account of the bloody events in Syria. The author is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, whose mandate states that 'the war of ideas with radical Islamism is inescapably central to this Hoover endeavour' (p. xii), and the focus on religion and politics certainly underpins

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the central narrative of *The Syrian rebellion*. Ajami's main argument is that the Syrian regime under Bashar al-Assad is a 'monstrous state' (p. 70), which has manipulated the sectarian makeup of the country to ensure control, a control that would now appear to be fatally challenged. Indeed, the current rebellion is described as 'an irresistible force [that] has clashed with an immovable object. The regime could not frighten the population, and the people could not dispatch the highly entrenched regime that Assad Senior had built' (p. 9).

The work puts today's events into context with an abridged history of the Assad dynasty's rule over Syria. The history focuses on how the Assad family and their Alawite community would sow the seeds for a future sectarian conflict. Ajami describes them as 'mountain people' without the 'diaspora that knit them into a bigger world. There was the military and, in time, the Baath Party that brought them out of their solitude' (p. 14). The book quotes Martin Kramer who tellingly wrote that 'the Alawis, having been denied their own state by the Sunni nationalists, had taken all of Syria instead. Arabism, once a convenient device to reconcile minorities to Sunni rule, was now used to reconcile Sunnis to the rule of minorities' (p. 25).

According to the book, the story of the Syrian rebellion that began in March 2011 is that of a Sunni majority trying to overthrow the Assad-led Alawite government. Ajami explains that: 'It would simplify things to depict this fight as the determined struggle of the Sunni majority to retrieve its world from minoritarian domination. But that was the truth that finally animated, and shaped, this struggle' (p. 174).

Unlike a number of books on the subject, in particular *The Arab revolution* by Jean-Pierre Filiu (Hurst, 2011, reviewed in *International Affairs* 87: 6) and *The battle for the Arab Spring* by Lin Noueihed and Alex Warren (reviewed below), Ajami largely ignores the underlying causes of the Arab Spring that have been manifest across the region. Instead of examining issues of youth unemployment, lack of political freedoms, communication technologies and protest, the central pillar of the book sees the conflict through a sectarian lens. Ajami dismisses the idea that people rose up over 'unequal access to economic opportunity and state patronage', and notes that 'on the face of it, this kind of proposition could be given credence. But the resentments were long in the making' (p. 137). The author's juxtaposition of the Sunni majority with the minority communities leads to overly simplistic scenarios whereby the minorities, as if homogenous groups, have a choice between the 'shield of the secular dictatorship, or the risks and rewards of democratic politics ... the Christians had bet on Arab nationalism, but it had failed them as it was Islamized from below' (p. 115).

In such a rapidly changing conflict the book has of course already been overtaken by events, as this review has likely been too. Ajami rejects any international stomach for intervention and writes that 'no Srebrenica had yet occurred in Syria' (p. 192) before the massacres in June in the towns of Qubair and Houla. Depressingly, the author outlines how the development of 'tolerance aplenty for massive human suffering' (p. 192) means that bloodshed in Syria may be stomachached indefinitely.

Beyond the Hoover Institution's ideology Ajami's personal perspectives make the book feel like an extended op-ed rather than a classic work of academia. As Ajami puts it: 'I did not hide my sympathies in this book. No author is a moral umpire calling strikes, and I did not pretend to be one in this endeavour' (p. 215). Ajami was born in Lebanon and is particularly scathing of Syria's numerous interventions in the country, describing Syrian rule over Lebanon a 'great, pitiless hoax'. He reflects bitterly on the decision to allow a Pax Syria following the end of the Lebanese civil war in 1991, bemoaning how 'the Syrian arsonists had come to be seen as the fire brigade of a volatile Lebanese polity' (p. 47). There are no foot- or endnotes but a limited bibliography at the end, and much of the final part of

the book is made up of interviews with the Syrian opposition conducted on a brief trip to Turkey that offers little beyond anecdotal snapshots. That said, it is a very readable account by an individual who has spliced a broad knowledge of the subject with a core of emotion.

The options for the near and medium future in Syria appear bleak. Ajami writes of the Alawite dilemma—that they ‘were invested in the regime and captured by it’ (p. 123)—and posits the larger debate over the ‘the unity of this odd nation-state’ (p. 89). The scale of the challenge for the future of Syria is encapsulated in an activist’s quote on Twitter about how a ‘revolution for a change’ has become ‘a battle for existence’.

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The battle for the Arab Spring: revolution, counter-revolution and the making of a new era. By **Lin Noueihed and Alex Warren**. Newhaven, CT: Yale University Press. 2012. 304pp. Index. £18.99. ISBN 978 0 30018 086 2. Available as e-book.

Reuters correspondent Lin Noueihed and Middle East analyst Alex Warren have written a comprehensive account of the revolution and counter-revolution underpinning the Arab Spring over a year after its inception. The book attempts the ambitious feat of investigating the origins of the Arab Spring, the particular dynamics of the ‘battleground’ states as well as the more subtle geopolitics and identity politics that provide the arena in which events have taken place.

The authors trace the origins of the Arab Spring to before the 2011 ‘explosion’, chronicling the wave of protests that swept the region in 2008 in response to rocketing food prices. The roots of the feelings of injustice felt by millions is covered widely and presented effectively in a chapter entitled ‘Bread, oil and jobs’, where words like ‘malaise’, ‘frustrations’ and ‘corruption’ dominate. A particularly well-made argument explores why other economically disadvantaged areas have not reacted in the same manner as the Middle East and North Africa region, making the persuasive point that ‘perhaps the key difference in the Arab world was the combination of economic hopelessness with political powerlessness’ (p. 42).

The Arab Spring at the core of its explosion was a well-networked population rejecting the legitimacy of the ‘owners’ of the state. What makes the timing of *The battle for the Arab Spring* particularly interesting is that it can comment on the counter-revolution that followed the heady optimism that came with the rapid fall of Ben Ali, Mubarak and Gaddafi, with each of the ‘battleground’ states getting an assessment of the likelihood of the revolution’s success.

Tunisia comes out as the most successful to date with a well-educated populace and more stable history as a state. The prospects are less rosy in Egypt where the authors look back a year to what they describe as a ‘protest inspired coup’ (p. 99) that could be only ‘half completed’ (p. 113). The current battle between the newly elected President Morsi and the military authorities, whose ‘establishment ... had ... provided all the presidents since the overthrow of the monarchy sixty years earlier’ (p. 111), could have numerous consequences against an increasingly bleak economic climate. The focus on the fate of Coptic Christians (10 per cent of the Egyptian population) in ‘post-revolutionary’ Egypt should be of particular concern. The expectations around the Arab Spring remain at their most uncertain in Egypt, and the book makes the succinct point that ‘if the first stage of the revolution took eighteen days, the next will take years, if not decades’ (p. 133).

Whereas ‘bread and freedom’ lay behind much of Egypt’s and Tunisia’s revolutions, the spirit of change swept into Bahrain, a country where a ‘history of activism’ had been created

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by a Sunni monarchy ruling over a majority Shi'i country. Within Bahrain's uprising the book touches upon the multilayered nature of the Arab Spring, whereby new dynamics interact with existing conflicts. Perhaps most complex of all is the 'cold war' between Iran and Saudi Arabia and how it manifests itself in sectarian terms. While Warren and Noueihed chronicle the challenges facing the Arab monarchies and have a chapter that stands alone debating meaning and application of 'Islamism', the reader feels slightly short-changed that the Saudi–Iranian conflict was not described as a clearer arena within which much of the battleground states are directed.

Libya's 'revolution from above' is outlined in a powerful chapter that puts at its beginning the ramifications of this 'new phase' of the Arab Spring that would see tens of thousands of people killed (between 30,000 and 50,000 were killed in the six months after the NATO intervention). Unfortunately, the book fails to unearth the catalyst that turned peaceful marches into such a deadly armed insurrection and perhaps places too much emphasis on the role of Bernard-Henri Lévy in the NATO decision to intervene. The chapter paints a bleak future for the new militia-ridden post-Gaddafi Libya, speculating that 'it will be almost impossible for the new government not to inherit the way that Gaddafi distributed power between different groups. It is the only means of holding the country together through a long transitional period' (p. 189).

Syria is likely to remain at the centre of global attention for some time. The book provides a nuanced look at the urban–rural divides that would drive much of the early protests. The authors accept the western bloc consensus that Bashar al-Assad will go, but how long it will take and how many will die is unknown; a powerful quote from a Syrian protester sums this up: 'it's like faith in God, once you stop believing, you can't go back' (p. 229).

The book concludes by recognizing that the Arab Spring is by no means over and that the notion of any regime being 'too big to fail' is obsolete. The overall scope and breadth of the work make it deserving of special recognition. The authors' personal experiences are combined well with a riveting narrative that plays especially well in explaining the 'battleground states'. Less successful is the attempt to overlay the aspects of both Islamism and various geopolitical dynamics to create a more coherent structure, although perhaps this is inevitable considering the scale and unique differences across such a vast and diverse region.

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Lebanon: the politics of a penetrated society. By **Tom Najem**. Abingdon: Routledge. 2011. 176pp. Index. Pb.: £23.99. ISBN 978 0 41545 747 7. Available as e-book.

Lebanon adrift: from battleground to playground. By **Samir Khalaf**. London: Saqi. 2012. 285pp. Index. Pb.: £18.99. ISBN 978 0 86356 434 5. Available as e-book.

Scholarship on Lebanon is growing fast in the International Relations debate. Tom Najem contributes to this literature with a useful introductory work on Lebanese history and institutions, and Samir Khalaf proposes a remarkable sociological analysis of the contemporary Lebanese public.

Najem's study offers an overview of the history and political system of Lebanon that successfully matches succinctness with clarity. The Canada-based scholar puts forth an analysis which starts with the process of modern state formation, followed by a historical overview of the period preceding the civil war. Najem looks into the events of the civil war to conclude that its main consequences were a loss of state authority (which was already weak before the war); a change in the political elite; and an increased degree of external

interference in Lebanese affairs, especially from Israel, Syria and Iran. These aspects remain the framework through which he accounts for Lebanese events until the 2009 elections. He notes how Lebanese statehood has remained plagued by the same kinds of deficiencies across its various historical phases. The occupation by Syria and its interferences with Lebanese affairs are the main focus of Najem's analysis of postwar Lebanon, which subsequently turns to a discussion of the Lebanese political scene after the withdrawal of Damascus's troops. He also considers the limits of the so-called Cedar Revolution of 2005, and claims that the coalition which led the anti-Syrian movement (the 14 March alliance) was affected by 'inherent political and ideological differences' within its own components, but also suffered from the strength of the opposition, the continuing interference of Syria in Lebanese affairs and discontinuous support from its international patrons.

The study is complemented by two chapters that allow the reader to gain a more comprehensive view of the Lebanese case. Firstly, Najem discusses the postwar political economy of Lebanon and in particular the reconstruction process led by the late Rafiq Hariri, the former prime minister assassinated in 2005. This is perhaps the most original part of Najem's work, in that it does not shy away from denouncing the pathological corruption and conflicts of interest which have afflicted the reconstruction of Beirut. He speculates nonetheless that Hariri's political competitors would likely have been subject to the same criticism had they been in Hariri's position. According to Najem, corruption and office abuses are rooted in the sectarian logic of the country; he discounts individual responsibilities to draw the reader's attention to the systemic problem of sectarianism. Finally, the author proposes an analysis of Lebanese foreign policy, reiterating several aspects previously mentioned in the study, but putting these in the perspective of Lebanese foreign policy determinants.

Najem's conclusions that the Lebanese state is primarily affected by a sectarian mind-set, external interferences and weak statehood are hardly innovative, though his systematic analysis of Lebanese history and institutions makes this book a valuable source that is remarkably clear and accessible for readers new to the intricate political dynamics of this Levantine state.

On the contrary, Samir Khalaf's *Lebanon adrift* may require more familiarity with the country. Khalaf, an experienced sociologist based at the American University in Beirut, proposes a thought-provoking enquiry of contemporary Lebanese society, which he sees as being in a perennially liminal condition that he defines as 'adrift'.

He argues, persuasively, that Lebanese society is presently oscillating between two extremes: 'profaned religiosity and sacralised consumerism' (p. 18). The first category refers to the abuse of the religious as an instrument of 'retribalization', a process in which religiosity is emptied of its spiritual value and becomes both the 'emblem' and the 'armor' of communities in Lebanon (p. 39). He points out that international political actors have hyped this process of retribalization especially during and after the civil war. Khalaf argues that this process has shifted the Lebanese conflict from a focus on divisible goods to a concentration on non-negotiable principles. This has made the conflict intractable and without the possibility of identifying winners or vanquished, hence procrastinating its end indeterminately.

According to Khalaf, Lebanese society is trapped in its retribalization (from which it was never immune, it should be noted) matched by a sacralization of consumerism. With this notion, he refers to how Lebanon has become a centre of individualist consumerism, characterized by a widespread hedonistic lifestyle manifested by ostentatious luxury, ubiquitous sensuality and a widespread kitsch taste. This social behaviour is a form of

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palliative, producing forms of collective amnesia with regard to the country's history of violence. It is this contradictory mix of retribalization and consumerism that tears apart Lebanese identity and produces the condition of a society 'adrift'.

All along, the study shows the author's command over a wide-ranging sociological and philosophical literature, which he aptly puts to use in his empirical analysis of the Lebanese case. Khalaf refers to the Durkheimian concept of 'anomie' to describe his idea of an 'adrift society'; he places his study in the broader international sociological debate, often referring to Zygmunt Bauman's 'liquid modernity' (*Liquid modernity*, Polity, 2000); but he also draws on the theories of Pierre Bourdieu, Richard Rorty and, with a more critical view, Benjamin Barber.

Among the several argumentative threads, Khalaf's study aims at the mediation of dichotomies. Although he acknowledges that ideal-type categories (in the Weberian sense) can be useful for analytical purposes, he proposes midways to resolve the social tensions within Lebanon. For example, he observes that the dichotomy between cosmopolitan and communitarian claims can be solved by an idea of cosmopolitanism that is receptive of local communal traditions. Agreeing with Martha Nussbaum, he claims that in Lebanon 'roots' can become 'routes' to forms of social coexistence (p. 112–4).

Khalaf's study is a rich source of stimulating thoughts, which poses new and old questions. Avoiding facile answers, he guides the reader towards a deeper understanding of Lebanese society and, in general, of contemporary life in the Middle East.

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Sub-Saharan Africa

Catastrophe: what went wrong in Zimbabwe? By Richard Bourne. London: Zed. 2011. 288pp. Pb.: £16.99. ISBN 978 1 84813 521 5.

Zimbabwe has long had a particular allure for writers. Through colonial, settler and post-independence times, there has been a steady stream of publications by Zimbabweans and non-Zimbabweans alike. There have been periods when particular episodes or events in that country's tumultuous history have created a surge in writing. Broadly speaking, the 'boom' periods when there has been complementarity between a large written output and an audience to read it have been from 1900 to 1930 (after the first liberation war—Chimurenga); 1975 to 1985 (the second Chimurenga fostered 'struggle' literature and Rhodesian accounts, as well as a new generation of fiction writers); and during the post-2000 period, when Zimbabwe's travails and resilience have spawned a broad canvas of works, ranging from the fiction of writers such as the late Yvonne Vera and the impressionistic diaspora writings of Harare North author Brian Chikwava to the non-fiction 'Zimbabwe as ruins' works of numerous authors, and everything in between.

At first glance, *Catastrophe* seems to indicate yet another Zimbabwe-as-disaster tome which fits into the Zimbabwe 'delenda est' publishing industry that has thrived over the past decade. Although many of these works do contain writing of value, all too often they are weakened by selective contextualization; a paint-by-numbers, obligatory demonization of Mugabe; and a ritual lamentation of Zimbabwe as a paradise lost. So it is a pleasant surprise to see that although Mugabe is a key character, the book is really a contemporary history of Zimbabwe. Admittedly, little is new in Richard Bourne's version of events, and there are times when the author's wish to push on the pace, and get to the meat and potatoes of Zimbabwe's post-2000 trajectory, is palpable; but Bourne contextualizes Zimbabwe's

history better than most. He also writes with a fluid narrative style and is even-handed in his treatment of Zimbabwe's heroes and villains from colonialism to the present. Bourne, an outsider, is not beyond regurgitating some familiar stereotypes; for instance, he states that 'The Ndebele were courageous, regimented, but extremely brutal in their raids on the Shona villages ... some Shona became vassals' (p. 6). Violence undoubtedly played a large part in Shona-Ndebele relations in pre-colonial times, but it was not the only characteristic. In fact Shona-Ndebele relations were complex and characterized as much by trading as by raiding. Even the raids, often portrayed as a Ndebele prerogative against the Shona were not one-sided; there are numerous instances, particularly in the 1870s, of Shona raids on the Ndebele. Bourne does, however, make the important point that 'cultures of violence and impunity were built into the DNA of the state created by Cecil John Rhodes' (p. 23).

Although the book is primarily a political history of Zimbabwe from colonialism to the present, the author usefully contextualizes his essay within the evolving socio-economic milieu of the times. There is a detailed analysis of the rise of early Zimbabwean nationalism and its evolution from the trade unionism of the immediate post-1945 era; to the new generation of more militant nationalists in the 1960s who supplanted the trade unionists. This is juxtaposed with the internal fissures among white Rhodesians and the fault-lines between the hard-line Rhodesia Front led by Ian Smith, and the British governments of Macmillan and Wilson in the 1960s. The Rhodesia Front Unilateral Declaration of Independence in November 1965 was a direct settler challenge to British authority, and Bourne reminds us of the huge international ructions UDI caused between Britain and its former African colonies, many of whom suspected British collusion with the Rhodesians. There has been endless speculation about why the UK did not use military force to crush the Rhodesian revolt. Britain's uncertainty about its military power was certainly an issue, but Bourne points out another, more mundane factor: 'With an infinitesimal majority in the House of Commons, it would only have needed three pro-Rhodesian members of the Labour Party to have brought down the government' (p. 61).

Zimbabwe's second Chimurenga was a decades-long struggle against the racism of the settler system in Rhodesia. The topic has been extensively covered in various works, and Bourne, with little new to add to the discourse, wisely keeps his narrative focused on the events, and the rise of Robert Mugabe. The author could usefully have teased out more on the fact that the second Chimurenga was as much a civil war as it was a war of liberation. The book gives a detailed analysis of the post-1980 period, when reconciliation, nation-building and economic growth nestled cheek by jowl with the mass murders committed by the military in the Gukurahundi campaigns in the mid-1980s.

In his chapter 'Disaster years and the third Chimurenga', Bourne charts Zimbabwe's tumultuous descent in the 1990s. The unresolved land question; the rise of a new, nationally based opposition movement (the Movement for Democratic Change—MDC); economic decline; the rise of the war veterans; and political polarization, came together in a 'perfect storm' in 2000 and would last for the rest of the decade. Bourne is unstinting in his critiques of the violence of the period and also of ZANU-PF's determination to stay in power at whatever cost. However, he does give a more sympathetic portrayal of another demonized figure, former South African president Thabo Mbeki, who was the regional mediator on Zimbabwe from 2002 to 2009. Mbeki has often been criticized—sometimes unfairly—for his quiet diplomacy on Zimbabwe; Bourne makes the useful point that Mbeki's approach was conditioned as much by internal ANC dynamics and regional push and pull factors as it was by his own ideological proclivities. In the last chapters of the book, Bourne covers the 'ground zero' of 2008 when Zimbabwe, ravaged by disputed elections, embedded criminal

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and political violence, cholera, grinding poverty and increased emigration, came close to total collapse. The impending apocalypse pushed the region to broker a Global Political Agreement between the key political stakeholders. This in turn led to the coalition Government of National Unity, which includes the two MDC formations and ZANU-PF.

Although Robert Mugabe is a central figure in this book, Bourne is at pains to contextualize Mugabe within Zimbabwe's history, and not the other way round, as is so often the case with many contemporary Zimbabwe books. This gives the book a deeper resonance than many other works. But the work never truly humanizes the real central character: the people of Zimbabwe. We never really get a sense of the lives of ordinary people, or of how those who stayed in Zimbabwe during the decade of 'jambanja' managed to survive. And the narratives of resilience and entrepreneurship (fortunes *were* made in the 2000s, at the height of the economic calamity) are only hinted at, yet these are key motifs. *Catastrophe* is a solid work and worth reading; but it is at heart an outsider's impression of Zimbabwe. It is not a work which really shows us the soul of Zimbabwe; for that, we will have to wait a while longer.

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South Asia

Pakistan on the brink: the future of Pakistan, Afghanistan and the West. By **Ahmed Rashid**. London: Allen Lane. 2012. 234pp. Index. £20.00. ISBN 978 1 84614 585 8. Available as e-book.

The future of Pakistan. By **Stephen P. Cohen and others**. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. 2011. 311pp. Index. Pb.: £19.99. ISBN 978 0 81572 180 2. Available as e-book.

If there is one question that has come to dominate recent works on Pakistan it is this: how to make the best of a bad job? The two books under review are no exception. Both underscore the severity of Pakistan's problems: its tortured history; its perilous dalliance with religion; its chronically dysfunctional institutions; its troubled relations with regional neighbours. Yet both authors persist, bravely, in trying to chart a way forward.

The tone is set by Ahmed Rashid, who in the preface to his new book, *Pakistan on the brink*, pre-emptively charges of playing Cassandra by emphatically drawing on the power of hope to extricate his country from its present traumas. While refusing to be lulled by false optimism about the prospects for Pakistan, he confesses that, 'I am constantly looking for that open window and hoping it will stay open long enough for peace to emerge' (p. xx). Stephen Cohen in his lead contribution to *The future of Pakistan* also declares that, even if hope is not a policy (taking his cue from George Shultz), we must still 'hope for the best, but at least think about the worst' (p. 59). These wise words, lined with an albeit fragile faith in Pakistan, deserve our attention, for both Rashid and Cohen can justly lay claim to having given us some of the most penetrating insights into Pakistan over many years of close and sympathetic observation.

Rashid needs little introduction. His analysis of the complex regional dynamics that bind the fortunes of Pakistan and Afghanistan with Central Asia are today quite simply unparalleled. His prescient and ground-breaking study, *Taliban*, published in 2000 (Yale University Press), which warned of the rise of Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan (and which some at the time dismissed as scaremongering), became the stuff of legend after 9/11 and earned him the ear of world leaders. He followed it with his magisterial study, *Descent into chaos* (Allen

Lane, 2008, reviewed in *International Affairs* 85: 2), which still stands out for its coruscating analysis of how America's decision to go to war against Iraq effectively wrecked the chances of a successful transition in Afghanistan—an analysis that has since been widely echoed in the corridors of the policy-making establishment. And it is the legacy of the flawed decision to lose sight of Afghanistan and Pakistan that constitutes the main focus of Rashid's latest book. As such, it serves as a fitting end to a trilogy in which Rashid, the otherwise inveterate reporter, sets aside reportage to reflect on the 'arrogance, hubris, rigidity, and stubbornness' (p. xx) that have widened fractures in the world's most unstable region.

Those reflections range widely and are undeniably gloomy. Much of Rashid's disillusionment centres on the three main players he holds responsible for squandering the opportunity for peace: the US administration of President Barack Obama, the current Afghan leadership under President Hamid Karzai and Pakistan's present hybrid regime, which maintains the façade of civilian control while bowing to military fiat. All have disappointed Rashid, who makes no secret of the expectations he harboured about Obama's radical vision to end the war, about Karzai's unflinching devotion to the cause of Afghan national reconciliation, and about Pakistan's elected government's resolve to shelve the military's security-dominated narrative in favour of economic and political reforms.

However, it would be a mistake to regard this book as merely an account of one man's thwarted hopes. Its real significance lies in the warning it carries for the future stability of Pakistan (and given Rashid's prescience in judging the course of regional affairs we would be well advised to listen). For Rashid is convinced that ultimately 'the core issue is what happens in Pakistan'. The country's strategic location, its nuclear weapons, its massive population, its terrorist sanctuaries, and its crumbling economic and political institutions, all 'make it more important—and more vulnerable—than even Afghanistan' (p. 189). As for the much vaunted capacity of Pakistan's army to hold the whole structure together, Rashid gives it short shrift. He argues, rightly, that it is in fact the army that is very largely to blame for keeping Pakistan chained to a narrative which has been the source of much instability. This narrative, which is predicated on war with India, driven by the patronage of militant proxies, and obsessed with securing 'a friendly government' in Afghanistan, must be jettisoned if Pakistan is to avoid meltdown.

But Rashid is no less clear-eyed about the abject failure of the United States to take responsibility for a war it precipitated. US irresponsibility, he argues, extends to both 'action and inaction'. By allowing the CIA to manage legally questionable drone strikes against Pakistan without the accountability that would normally attach to military decisions such as 'who should live and die' (p. 55), the US has sought to avoid responsibility for the dangerous spiral of rage that now fuels Pakistan. The US is also culpable of inaction. Rashid warns that the continued refusal of the United States to detail its aims or outline its policies for the region has not only accentuated regional instability but threatens to take Pakistan over the edge.

Precisely what constitutes 'the edge' is a moot point, which nevertheless occupies Cohen and his team of well-known experts assembled to explore *The future of Pakistan*. They are agreed that, in the complex case of Pakistan, 'the edge' must be open to a range of definitions and include a spectrum of possibilities: 'at the minimum another military takeover; at the maximum the break-up of the state'. Indeed, the broad consensus that flows from this lively discussion is that we would almost be better advised to think in terms of futures, rather than a future, for Pakistan.

It is not surprising therefore to find that none of the contributors chooses to predict any single outcome for Pakistan. Instead, most prefer to hedge their bets and to conclude that Pakistan will 'muddle through' over the next five to seven years even if some anticipate

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unexpected challenges. Few entertain the prospect of complete 'state failure', but fewer still envisage an easy ride to a stable democracy. In between there lie any number of plausible scenarios, each dependent on a host of variables. This approach, however instructive, may leave some readers frustrated and none the wiser about the current course of Pakistan, even if they can rest assured that 'extreme' scenarios involving a breakup of the state are unlikely in the short to medium term.

That said, this volume represents a valuable undertaking brimful of keen insights and, sometimes, much needed cold logic. Cohen's excellent introduction serves as a model. In it he lays out the four main sets of variables (domestic concerns; issues of identity; structures of state and society; and foreign relations), which he believes will shape Pakistan's future. Many of these variables will be familiar to those already acquainted with Cohen's earlier work, *The idea of Pakistan* (Brookings Institution Press, 2004). What is new and interesting here are the sharply diverging perspectives that are brought to bear on the analysis. Some are quite obviously informed by national perceptions. The Pakistanis, who form a minority of the contributors, appear to be relatively more sanguine about the future of their country and confident of its potential to correct itself given the right policies and political will—although neither seems anywhere in sight. By contrast, the non-Pakistani contributors tend to project a bleaker future based on their belief that structural constraints and issues of identity may now be so deeply divisive in Pakistan that 'extreme scenarios [the breakup of the state] were no longer inconceivable' (p. 288). This points to yet another conspicuous difference between the contributors. For while the non-Pakistani contributors are ready to wrestle with the question of Pakistan's collective and constitutional identity, especially its complex relation to Islam, as a key variable in determining the future of the state, the Pakistanis studiously avoid this difficult (even discomfiting) issue.

Ultimately the real worth of Cohen's endeavour will be judged against how things play out in Pakistan. At a time when the country is entering yet another period of intense uncertainty many will want to turn to this volume for guidance. Scholars and policy-makers would do well to keep a copy of both books to hand.

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Religion and conflict in modern South Asia. By William Gould. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2012. 342pp. Index. £60.00. ISBN 978 0 52187 949 1. Available as e-book.

To the outside observer over the past 100 years, much of the politics of South Asia—that is of British India and Ceylon for the colonial period and of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka for the post-colonial period—is to be understood in terms of religion. Religious movements have constantly undermined forms of secular progress. Religious violence has been a bloody and running sore across the societies of the region. William Gould's book first reminds us that thinking about South Asia primarily in terms of religion derives from the colonial past, and second, demonstrates that this mode of thought conceals more than it reveals. Two themes run through the book: the first is a distinction between religion as a set of everyday practices, and religious community, which belongs to the spheres of representation and politics; and second, the need to restore the importance of the state, and actors in the state, to a political analysis which has tended to become distorted by the weight given to subaltern agency.

Gould begins his work with an excellent discussion of religious community and conflict in South Asia. He then goes on to analyse: how religious communities came to be founded

in the late nineteenth century; how by the 1920 these communities had political organizations, and how most importantly, too, these religious affiliations came to be complicated by other allegiances—those of landlords, of occupational groups, of local networks of power and of social hierarchies. Further chapters deal with: the role of violence in the events leading up to the partition of India; the role of religion in helping forge, or not as the case may be, a national consensus in Sri Lanka, India and Pakistan up to the late 1960s; the ‘crisis of the state’ in South Asia in the 1970s and 1980s; and the increase in religious violence in all South Asian states since the 1990s. In concluding, Gould emphasizes four strands of argument: that communalism, that is promoting a ‘religious community’ interest in the political sphere, cannot be studied without considering the nature of the state and how that state is perceived by different groups; that the political interests surrounding representations of religious community must always be taken into account, for instance the way in which Hindus might be mobilized to protect the interests of Hindu urban elites; that attempts to define and mobilize religious communities have tended to expose more complex solidarities which cut across these communities; and that so-called religious or communal violence usually has less to do with religion than with the non-religious interests of powerful political and state actors. In this light, much of his general thrust is summed up by the final sentences of his last chapter: ‘In reality, for many in India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, everyday experience does not correspond to these images of [religious] conflict. And religious practice and sentiment only connects in a tangential way to the agendas of the political mobilisers of religious community. Indeed, it is the very refusal of most inhabitants of South Asian states to acquiesce in the idea that the traditions of Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Sikhism or Christianity can be reduced to a political posture that continues to offer one of the greatest challenges to organisations of communal mobilisation’ (p. 308).

I have two reservations about this book. The first is that in his rightful keenness both to restore the state to the centre of analysis and to emphasize the political dimensions of communalism, Gould has tended to underplay, indeed to ignore almost completely, the role of religious revivalism—the so-called ‘Protestant shift’ in all South Asian religions from the late nineteenth century, which has meant growing numbers of devotees who believe in this-worldly action, a belief which could and did have political outcomes. The second concerns Gould’s prose, which is in places dense and hard to follow. Indeed, one wonders if the book may not have been written too quickly. That said, this book is a considerable achievement. It offers a way of thinking about the relationship between religion, religious community and the state throughout the South Asian region since the nineteenth century. At the same time, it constantly reminds the reader of the politics and the undergrowth of complexity which surround this relationship. These achievements make it essential reading for academics and those in public policy roles regarding South Asia.

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East Asia and Pacific

Maonomics: why Chinese communists make better capitalists than we do. By **Loretta Napoleoni**. New York: Seven Stories Press. 2011. 373pp. Index. \$26.95. ISBN 978 1 60980 341 4. Available as e-book.

The onset of the global recession and the twin financial crises which began to grip the United States and Europe after 2008 have magnified what has been a longstanding debate about China’s economic model, and its ability to weather global shocks as compared to the

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West. The question of whether there exists an alternative Chinese approach to economic development has made the move from abstract policy debate to a more serious analysis among both policy-makers and academics, especially since Beijing is now viewed as one of the few components of the global economy still above water. There is therefore much room for study of the current state of Chinese economics and trade, and even the question of whether at least some elements of China's financial system are proving to be more durable and adaptable to western policies. *Maonomics* pulls few punches with its argument that in view of the considerable troubles facing western economies, China's model for modernization—albeit imperfect—should be viewed globally in a more powerful and favourable light.

However, despite the title of this work, there is little deep analysis into either the Chinese government or its economic system, and what is presented is rather on the surface and, at times, lacking necessary detail given the intricacies of Beijing's greatly expanded economic interests in the world. Instead, the book examines the question of how, in theory, the Chinese government would view the current state of western economics, beset by examples of overspending, debt, corruption and accountability problems, which resulted in the recession. Although the author does explain that China's opening to the free market system was at times very destabilizing, most of the arguments made in this work are directed, occasionally polemically, towards the failures of the free market system in the West. In some areas, comparisons between Chinese and western economic policy directions are made in broad and potentially misleading terms. One example: 'In response to the political storm of 1989, Iceland decided to enthusiastically embrace the neoliberal credo and transform the entire nation into a giant hedge fund. China on the other hand, remained communist and distanced itself from the West' (p. 82).

The book falls into two traps, which in the past have hampered scholarly attempts to develop a deeper understanding of Beijing's often unique economic structure and policy directions. The first is that the book frequently focuses on what China is *not* as an economic actor, thus obscuring needed study behind a dark cloud of debate directed to the West's economic shortcomings rather than China's still developing modernization processes, which have their share of problems and obstacles as well. Secondly, 'China' is treated in the book as a monolithic actor which moves and acts with one voice on both domestic and foreign policy, a 'China Inc.' if you will. Even before the global recession took hold, there was ample evidence of considerable policy debates and even demonstrable rifts within the Chinese Communist Party regarding the ideal paths which the country's economy should take. Recently, these splits have only been exacerbated, due to serious internal concerns about whether the recession will eventually lead to an unacceptable slowdown of the Chinese economy, and whether its focus can successfully shift from a risky dependence upon exports to more of a concentration on promoting internal growth. Many issues facing China's economy are indeed noted in the book, such as workers' rights and environmental damage, but they are given little weight compared to a concentration on the blanket failures of American and European governance. Although *Maonomics* can be read as a treatise and a font for debate about the causes of the recession and structural failings of current western governments, it falls short of making a significant contribution to the ongoing debate about China's economic model.

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Korean unification: inevitable challenges. By Jacques L. Fuqua Jr. Washington DC: Potomac. 2011. 201pp. £24.00. ISBN 978 1 59797 279 6.

Will Korea ever reunify? This remains the key question that many Koreans and seasoned observers of political developments in the Korean Peninsula ask themselves when thinking about its future. Most would agree that eventual reunification is likely, if not inevitable. The question then is when it will take place and what the politics, economics and society of a unified Korea will look like.

Tackling the first of these issues, Jacques L. Fuqua Jr explores whether reunification is possible. In several passages, Fuqua claims that there are doubts regarding the feasibility of reunification, due to the starkly different political and socio-economic structures that characterize both Koreas today. Nonetheless, his general view is that reunification will probably occur, albeit later rather than sooner. The book therefore aims at taking readers on a tour of the most pressing issues affecting the Korean Peninsula, both those preventing swift reunification and the challenges that a reunified Korea would face.

This volume by Fuqua starts with a first part in which he sets the backdrop against which reunification would take place. Korea's long history, its location between China and Japan, the colonization by the latter in the first half of the twentieth century, and the realities of the Cold War have shaped a geopolitical landscape inevitably affecting how potential reunification would proceed. Most importantly, Fuqua argues, Korea has formally been a divided state since its inception, with what today constitutes North Korea being distinct from the South. He goes on to contend that the notion of Korea and Koreans as a single race and nation only emerged in the late nineteenth century, when the country had to open up to foreign powers before eventually being colonized by Japan.

If one accepts this premise, it follows on that reunification is not inevitable. The argument by Fuqua implies that a unified, racially homogenous Korea is a relatively recent construct, with no historical traction. Thus, one day this construct might be replaced by another focusing on past divisions in the Korean Peninsula. Indeed, Fuqua includes data purporting that the idea of Koreans constituting a single race seems to be a decreasingly shared axiom in South Korea. Is reunification therefore possible at all?

Yes, it is—but it will not be easy. The explanation lies in the second part of the book. Fuqua argues that there are important domestic challenges to Korean reunification. Chapters seven to eleven focus on several of them. The possible collapse of North Korea and subsequent absorption by the South, the difficulty that North Koreans would face in adapting to life under a capitalist economy, their problems with studying under an education system emphasizing knowledge and skills over ideology, inefficiencies in the work being done by South Korean authorities for North Korean refugees to adapt to their new country, and the need to reform the South Korean welfare system to accommodate the needs of North Koreans each merit a separate chapter in the volume by Fuqua. Chapter twelve is devoted to another challenge, in this case external—the fact that not all neighbours would necessarily welcome a unified Korea.

Some might accuse the volume of not being sufficiently scholastic. Indeed, there are several instances of references to selected newspaper articles and data that support the author's viewpoint rather than analyse the issue under discussion. But that criticism misses the point of this volume. Fuqua asks the reader to carefully consider the challenges that Korean reunification poses. He wants to bring to the table issues that need to be considered in any process leading towards eventual reunification. At that, he succeeds.

This book will be useful for those with an interest in affairs pertaining to the Korean Peninsula. It is especially recommended for anyone with more than a cursory understanding

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of them, who therefore wants to explore in detail the challenges to Korean reunification. As a retired US army officer who served in South Korea and Japan, Fuqua brings a refreshing view to one of the few remaining flashpoints of the Cold War.

Ramon Pacheco Pardo, King's College London, UK

Escape from Camp 14: one man's remarkable odyssey from North Korea to freedom in the West. By **Blaine Harden**. London: Pan Macmillan. 2012. 256pp. £16.99. ISBN 978 0 23074 873 6. Available as e-book.

The past decade has seen a number of excellent books about North Korea, each telling of life in this ultra-nationalist, ultra-repressive and ultra-secretive country. Shin Dong-hyuk's life story takes us to its most secret, dangerous and depraved part: its political prisons. Shin is the only person known to have been born into and successfully escaped what is essentially a Gulag within the larger Gulag of North Korea. His remarkable story reminds us that North Korea is not just about nuclear weapons, famine or the absurdities of the kleptocratic communist dynasty of the Kims, headed now by portly Kim Jong Un, a man of similar age to Shin. Shin's story, like an increasing number of others documented by campaign groups, international organizations and governments, shows that North Korea's vast system of political prisons constitute a crime against humanity. Modelled on the Soviet Gulags but having long outlasted them (while receiving far less attention), they today hold an estimated 200,000 prisoners. They have remained hidden from view and off the agenda in discussions about or with North Korea. Stories such as Shin's and various campaigns are pushing them to the fore.

Blaine Harden, a US journalist, spent several years putting together Shin's story through detailed interviews and research. Born in 1982 in Camp 14, Shin's life—like that of his fellow 15,000 prisoners—was a miserable daily struggle to survive. Growing up, he was surrounded by death (his first memory was the public execution of another prisoner who had tried to escape), beatings, abuse, snitching, strict discipline often carrying death as punishment, bullying, thieving, illness, cold, dirt and relentless hard labour. In a country where food was scarce the prospects for prisoners were beyond dire. His parents were political prisoners unknown to one another until guards rewarded their hard work by pairing them and allowing them to have intercourse a couple of times a year (sex between prisoners at any other time would lead to them being shot). Shin, born a slave to replenish camp numbers due to high death rates, was the lowest of the low in the strictly stratified social structure of Communist North Korea. He carried the blood crime of his father's brother who had escaped North Korea. This unpardonable act condemned his extended family to three generations of life in prison. For Shin, this meant a life born into and to be spent in prison. Schooling was rudimentary, Shin's low status meaning he was not even deemed worthy of indoctrination into the cult of the Kims. School and everything about the camp taught him that to survive he should have no qualms about informing on others. Aged 13 he thus informed on an escape plan by his mother and half-brother. Suspected of being complicit, he was detained within an underground prison, severely tortured for weeks and upon his release made to witness the public executions of his mother and half-brother. At the time Shin felt nothing but anger towards his family members, feelings only understood by reading about the dehumanizing impact of life spent in a prison where prisoners rarely felt friendship, care or compassion. Shin knew no better, nor did he hope for a better future, as hope requires knowledge of something better and he knew of no other world. His life changed when a new prisoner told him of the world beyond the prison. Shin's escape was

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driven by dreams not of freedom but of the food that world might offer. While his escape plan was fantastically naive, a combination of luck, his own resourcefulness and the chaos of the famine then gripping North Korea allowed him to reach China and from there South Korea. The book ends with a description of Shin's struggle to come to terms with his life in the camp, his guilt towards his mother and half-brother and the knowledge that his father was almost certainly tortured and executed because of his escape.

Shin's story is told in a short 200 pages, easily covered in one sitting but not easily digested mentally. Between chapters outlining the stages of his life, other chapters provide context for Shin's life and escape through discussion of North Korea's politics, history, the Kims' kleptocratic totalitarian regime and its international relations. The book can therefore be easily read by those new to North Korea. The book will also be of interest to anybody interested in how humans survive in the face of extreme political oppression. As such, it has been compared to *The diary of Anne Frank* or Dith Pran's account of his escape from Pol Pot's regime in Cambodia. The scale of the misery Shin experienced and the luck of his escape lead some to question his story, but Harden has gone to meticulous lengths to verify it. Some also might wonder what point there is in publicizing the pain of a damaged man. Shin now campaigns by using his story to highlight the situation in North Korea. For Shin and Harden, the world can no longer ignore the crimes North Korea inflicts on its people. It is not just North Korea's nuclear weapons the world needs to discuss and address but an entire regime of unmatched political repression and brutality. This important book, one no reader will easily forget, shows why.

Tim Oliver

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Haiti: a shattered nation. By Elizabeth Abbott. London: Duckworth. 2011. 492pp. Index. £20.00. ISBN 978 0 71564 080 7. Available as e-book.

Fixing Haiti: MINUSTAH and beyond. Edited by Jorge Heine and Andrew S. Thompson. Tokyo: United Nations University Press. 2011. 277pp. Index. Pb.: £23.99. ISBN 978 9 28081 197 1.

As Haiti prepared to celebrate the bicentenary of its independence in January 2004, rumbling disquiet—internal and external—surrounding Jean-Bertrand Aristide's second presidency rapidly turned violent as rebel forces descended on the capital. Aristide, ousted for a second time, left the country on a US plane in circumstances that remain controversial. Whereas emphases on the bicentenary would inevitably have drawn the focus back to Haitian history, this political instability, compounded by four cyclones in 2008 and the 2010 earthquake, generated considerable international interest in the country's present and future. Studies have proliferated, produced for an academic readership as well as for policy-makers and an enlightened general public, challenging and often correcting misconceptions generated by lurid cultural representations and historiographies reliant on mythology or hagiography. There is a pressing need not only for sound histories of Haiti, but also for contemporary analyses based on up-to-date observation. The two books under review, despite very different approaches, respond admirably to these demands.

Elizabeth Abbott's *Haiti: a shattered nation* revises and updates her 1988 volume *Haiti: The Duvaliers and their legacy* (first published by McGraw-Hill). Motivated to revisit this earlier work by critical questioning of Haiti's president and government following the

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2010 disaster, Abbott seeks to explain the ways in which ‘the deadliness of the earthquake and the relentless horror of its aftermath’ (p. 8) are rooted in complex historico-political circumstances. Abbott is frank about her proximity to the contemporary history under scrutiny. She is a former sister-in-law of Henri Namphy, leader of Haiti’s interim government after Jean-Claude Duvalier’s ousting in 2006 (he was president during the ‘Bloody Sunday’ massacres the following year, when the first democratic, post-Duvalier elections were abandoned as a result of extreme violence). Abbott was consequently able to use this position to conduct the numerous interviews on which the book depends. She acknowledges that the volume is ‘not a scholarly book’, but adds that ‘many of the stories in it are the stuff of primary historical source material’ (p. 12). The history of Haiti, from the Revolution to the US occupation, is recounted succinctly, highlighting the over-militarization and structured pigmentocracy consolidated in this period, which provided the context for the emergence of the Duvaliers. Gaps here—the importance of President Hippolyte’s regime; the signs of hope in the two decades following the US withdrawal in 1934—may be filled by the excellent recent work of Laurent Dubois and Matthew Smith; Abbott’s principal focus remains 1957–86. She offers a meticulous account of these Duvalier years, describing the progressive use of political terror and the exploitation of opportunities afforded by fluctuating international (particularly Haitian–American) relations. The central thesis is about a systemic economics of misery—or the Duvaliers’ recognition that, for a small minority, ‘well-managed poverty pays’ (p. 14). Given the lack of specific sources, it is at times difficult to distinguish between historical fact and more lurid hearsay, although this dimension is reduced in the substantial new sections on Aristide, about whose challenging struggle against the crushing burden of the Duvalier legacy Abbott offers a sobering account (including a discussion of the increased violence, poverty and food insecurity that followed his removal from power). She argues for the existence of a persistent Duvalierist substructure (‘Duvalierism without Duvalier’) underpinning the country’s political culture. The aptness of this model to explain Aristide’s second term is not fully tested, and although Abbott recognizes the dangers of those who greeted nostalgically Jean-Claude Duvalier’s return to Haiti in early 2011, there is a risk that such an analysis perpetuates a tragic vision of Haiti and fails to take account of the clear differences between patterns of rule, dictatorial and democratic.

Abbott’s concluding comments privilege questions of economics, governance and justice in post-earthquake Haiti, criticizing neo-liberal interventionism and the proliferation of non-governmental organizations, and seeing in the return of Duvalier evidence of functional paralysis in the judicial system. This is the immediate context to which the contributors to *Fixing Haiti* also respond. This impressive collection of papers emerged from a workshop on the role of MINUSTAH in post-Aristide Haiti, although many chapters were redrafted in the light of the new complexities that emerged following the 2010 earthquake. (One contributor, Gerard Le Chevallier, died in the disaster.) The volume provides an impressive overview of current governance challenges in contemporary Haiti, concentrating on the role of the international community in ‘stabilization’ and on the crucial question as to when withdrawal is appropriate. The emphasis is on Haiti not as a ‘failed’ but (in Amélie Gauthier and Madalena Moita’s terms) as a vulnerable and ‘fragile’ state, one of those ‘ungoverned spaces’ to which particular attention has been paid in the post-Cold War era. Already beset by deforestation and other forms of environmental devastation, by poor infrastructure and political instability, by narco-terrorism, HIV/AIDS, food and energy insecurity, and by an absence of a sense of citizenship, Haiti faced new problems following the earthquake, relating not least to the difference between immediate reconstruction and

longer-term, sustainable development. Mirlande Manigat provides an analysis of constitutional questions, and Patrick Sylvain—comparing the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake with the similar disaster of 1842—considers the key question of ‘how to create an integrated and productive civil society and secure long-term investments in human capital’ (p. 78). A number of contributors provide compelling first-hand accounts of international intervention (military, economic and diplomatic), and the concluding chapters explore the differing national approaches to Haiti across the hemisphere, underlining changing patterns in Latin American engagement (especially by the ABC Powers), and offering a balanced critique of Canada and the United States. An additional focus on the European and wider Caribbean dimensions of international intervention would have been illuminating. Little attention is paid to violence carried out by MINUSTAH personnel in the early days of the mission or to methods of repression it has deployed, and the book appears to have gone to press before the 2010 cholera outbreak was linked definitively to UN troops. What is perhaps missing from the volume are more (and more diverse) voices from within Haiti itself, in particular from civil society perspectives. In an illuminating chapter, Chilean General Eduardo Aldunate explores his experiences of engaging the local population during (and after) a stabilization mission. In their searching conclusions, the editors follow this logic by observing that UN- and Organization of American States-sanctioned trusteeship, however well meaning, is no solution. In their terms, Haiti must remain ‘not only a democratic project but a hemispheric project’ (p. 256), although it is nevertheless one in which ‘[i]t is imperative for the Haitian people to take ownership of the situation and move forward’ (p. 255).

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Bolivia: refounding the nation. By **Kepa Artaraz.** London: Pluto. 2012. 241pp. Index. Pb.: £18.99. ISBN 978 0 74533 089 1. Available as e-book.

The burgeoning literature on contemporary Bolivia may be loosely divided into three broad categories. Authors on the right predictably have been sharply critical of Evo Morales and the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), as much for its external alignment with Cuba and Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela as for its domestic policies that have reinscribed statism and, it is claimed, undermined democracy. At the other extreme, discordant voices on the left, intent on an ideologically prescribed path of fundamental transformation, have condemned the MAS for being too ‘reformist’ and its policies in effect as amounting to little more than a ‘reconstituted neo-liberalism’, though the party wins approval for its international orientation. Occupying the centre ground is a more extensive—though by no means uncritical—corpus of work that commends the MAS for having embarked on a bold attempt to incorporate the Bolivian masses, in particular the historically excluded indigenous majority, in a more inclusive polity that is responsive to the objective of national development rather than to the interests of transnational capital. Kepa Artaraz’s new book falls into this latter category: it is both laudatory of the proclaimed aims of the MAS political project and critical of a certain slippage in its implementation.

Indeed, Artaraz, in the course of his analysis, appears quite torn between an optimistic belief that Bolivia under the MAS is truly ‘forging a path towards a new kind of political and democratic practice’ (p. 31)—a government of social movements in which power notionally flows upwards from the grassroots—and a more sobering reality. This stems from a recognition that the party has in practice co-opted much of the leadership of the social movements through ministerial appointments; has attempted to ride roughshod over groups outside its core constituency who are opposed to some of its policies, particularly

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evident in 2010–11 following its overwhelming victory at the polls in the previous year; has practised a ‘double discourse on the environment and climate change’ (p. 176); and has demonstrated in the municipal elections of 2010 that it was ‘not immune to the opportunistic wheeling and dealing politics of the past’ (p. 186). The author is also especially critical of the government’s concessions to the opposition in 2008 to secure its agreement to the holding of a referendum: these ‘had the effect of significantly undermining the new constitution and the legitimacy of the process by which it was produced’ (p. 72). In sum, although Artaraz acknowledges that all is not as new as it has been claimed to be in the ‘new’ Bolivia, he stops well short of endorsing the critique of the far left and believes that the ‘jury is still out on the long-term potential of the current constitution to deliver its promise in the context of long-established social cleavages’ (p. 189).

The book follows a largely thematic approach. The author first lays out starkly the ‘double crisis of legitimacy’ (p. 8) facing the Bolivian body politic following the return to democracy in 1982 as a result of the wholesale imposition of neo-liberal economic prescriptions and of the unresponsive elite-dominated political system and the growing crescendo of opposition, which culminated in the remarkable MAS victory at the ballot box in December 2005. He does a sterling job in elucidating the ideational underpinnings of the new plurinational Bolivia and the Andean concept of *suma qamaña* (‘living well with and within nature’) that has to a degree informed the policies of the Morales government and its stance in international forums. The government’s welfare and macroeconomic policies are examined in the light of these guiding principles. Separate chapters consider the dramatic shift in the nature of US–Bolivian relations under Morales, and Bolivia’s place in the wider refashioning of the hemispheric order consequent on the decline of US regional hegemony. It is here that Artaraz is perhaps on a less firm footing than in his treatment of internal Bolivian developments: the broad historical generalizations in which he engages inevitably require some qualification on closer inspection. His extended discussion of the emergence of the South American bloc UNASUR (Unión de Naciones del Sur) over the last five years, in addition, is overly celebratory, glossing over a number of perceived weaknesses: the dominant role of Brazil; the exclusion of Mexico, the other regional powerhouse and a possible counterweight to the former’s overbearing influence; and the diversity of purpose among the grouping’s adherents, poignantly illustrated by the signature of the US–Colombian bases agreement in 2009, the very year that UNASUR established its defence council.

All told, this thoughtful, measured exploration of the dynamics at play in the making of the ‘new’ Bolivia will be of interest to novice and specialist alike.

Philip Chrimes

The Amazon from an international law perspective. By **Beatriz Garcia**. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. 2011. 379pp. Index. £60.00. ISBN 978 0 52176 962 4. Available as e-book.

A great deal has been written about the Amazon over the last few decades, especially concerning the accelerating rate of deforestation and its alarming ramifications for global climate change. The twin issues of the legal responsibility of the Amazon basin states, which claim exclusive sovereignty over the region, to prevent further degradation, and of the legitimacy and validity in law of the international community’s concern, however, have been aired only intermittently. Beatriz Garcia’s erudite and timely tome, based closely on her doctoral dissertation, proffers a well-structured framework for a more comprehensive

understanding of the legal foundation for growing international cooperation on this vital matter.

After providing a necessary introduction to the distinguishing characteristics of the region and a summary of the historical antecedents of contemporary regional cooperation, Garcia successively examines the degree of collaboration among the Amazonian states themselves and between them—both individually and as a group—and the international community at the regional and global level, always with an eye to laying out the contracting parties' legally binding and non-binding obligations. She rightly devotes a lengthy chapter to the 1978 Amazon Cooperation Treaty, 'the only international treaty involving all Amazon states with the purpose of protecting the Amazonian environment' (p. 121)—the reasons for its negotiation, its evolution since entering into force in 1980, and its 'normative deficiencies' and 'institutional inadequacies' (p. 124) even after the establishment of a permanent secretariat in 2003; in the book's conclusion, the author suggests a number of ways to improve the effectiveness of this core treaty. Since all eight signatories of the treaty belong individually to different regional and hemispheric organizations, inter alia the Andean Community, Mercosur (the Southern Cone Common Market) and the Organization of American States, Garcia outlines these linkages and their relevance to at least that part of the Amazon to which the respective countries claim sovereign rights. Proceeding to a global level, she delineates the international commitments of the Amazon countries—to the stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere and to the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity—in the international environmental treaties to which they have each subscribed. She next offers an overview of the efficacy of a number of schemes that have been undertaken to protect the Amazon, in the only section of the book that treats substantively with ameliorative measures at a local level. Garcia then embarks on a fulsome discussion of the current status of the Amazon in international law, in which she firmly rejects the admissibility of proposals that infringe on the sovereignty of the Amazonian states, such as the one put forward by then environment secretary David Miliband in 2004, while arguing that the international community does indeed have a legitimate right of 'common concern' and a *droit de regard*.

This work's outstanding contribution to the broader literature on the Amazon, then, is its welcome focus on the changing rights and duties of states over time, a subject that has generally received short shrift in studies essentially concerned with the magnitude of the environmental problem and one that has been confined hitherto mainly to the pages of international law journals. That said, Garcia's book reads at times a little too much like an international law textbook, rather than a work (presumably) directed at a broader audience than the legal fraternity: for example, a number of Latin terms are nonchalantly employed—*lege feranda* [*sic*], *motu proprio* and *erga omnes*—whose meaning is simply taken for granted. Furthermore, the author often overwhelms the reader with a large number of indigestible facts—facts for facts' sake—and with her overly punctilious rendition of the convoluted official designations and reference numbers of a multitude of international agreements, documents and statements that would have been better reserved for the footnotes. The latter, which occasionally take up half a page, moreover, frequently contain extensive citations of legal rulings in Portuguese and Spanish without benefit of translation. Inevitably, too, a work referring to a large number of international organizations and agreements is burdened by a surfeit of acronyms, all of which are helpfully set out at the beginning of the book; far more wearisome is the quite unnecessary use of non-standard abbreviations (all carefully listed though they may be), such as COP for Conference of Parties, GHG for greenhouse gas, JI for joint implementation, MMFA for Meeting of

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Ministers of Foreign Affairs and (my favourite) POP for the 1994 Protocol of Ouro Preto, which only serve to impede the flow of the narrative even more. None of this, of course, makes for easy reading.

Philip Chrimes