

Review article

The evolution of the responsibility to protect: at a crossroads?

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Global politics and the responsibility to protect: from words to deeds. By **Alex J. Bellamy**. London: Routledge. 2010. 246pp. Index. Pb.: £24.99. ISBN 978 0 41556 736 7. Available as e-book.

The responsibility to protect: norms, laws and the use of force in international politics. By **Ramesh Thakur**. London: Routledge. 2011. 232pp. Index. Pb.: £24.99. ISBN 978 0 41578 169 5.

Humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect: who should intervene? By **James Pattison**. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2010. 284pp. Index. £53.00. ISBN 978 0 19956 104 9. Available as e-book.

International authority and the responsibility to protect. By **Anne Orford**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2011. 235pp. Index. Pb.: £23.99. ISBN 978 0 52118 638 4. Available as e-book.

Can intervention work? By **Rory Stewart and Gerald Knaus**. New York: W. W. Norton. 2011. 236pp. Index. £14.99. ISBN 978 0 39308 120 6. Available as e-book.

Ten years have passed since the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) unveiled the report which first introduced the language of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P),¹ and six have passed since a modified version of the doctrine was endorsed by the member states of the United Nations in the World Summit Outcome Document.² The introduction of the R2P doctrine has done two major things: it has reframed what had become an entrenched debate around the legality and legitimacy of humanitarian intervention;³ and it has provided an important focus for how the international community should respond. It has, Alex Bellamy argues, created ‘a collection of shared expectations’ (p. 84).

* I would like to thank Tim Dunne for helpful comments and Sabine Wolf for suggesting this article.

¹ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The responsibility to protect: report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001).

² United Nations General Assembly, ‘2005 summit outcome’, A/60/L.1, 20 Sept. 2005, paragraphs 138–40.

³ For an example of these debates, see J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane, *Humanitarian intervention: ethical, legal and political dilemmas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

As all five of these works demonstrate, the main debates of the past decade around the R2P—most importantly, on the need to justify its existence—are over. Instead, we see a growing need to understand the R2P doctrine more concretely in both academic and policy terms, as well as to grasp how the doctrine fits with the linked issues of humanitarian intervention and state-building. For Bellamy, the central question is how the R2P can be implemented to stop mass atrocities. For Ramesh Thakur, it provides a way to address humanitarian intervention and states' responsibilities towards their own citizens while protecting and providing a role for the Global South. Other authors seek to challenge and expand on the basic assumptions within the doctrine. For James Pattison, the question of humanitarian intervention remains a critical one, and a question not fully addressed by the R2P. For Anne Orford, the R2P provides an account of formal international authority to reinforce the informal practices undertaken by the UN. Finally, Rory Stewart and Gerald Knaus focus on the after-effects of intervention, and provide a direct challenge to simplistic assumptions around state-building.

In essence, these works represent an emerging second generation of scholarship on the R2P, one that is concerned more with its implementation than with its origins. And here is the second theme that unites these works: that this project remains a nascent one, with many complex questions remaining. Yet, while the international community's response to mass atrocities may remain haphazard—for every successful invocation of the doctrine in cases like Côte d'Ivoire and Libya, there are failures such as Darfur or Sri Lanka or attempts to misapply the doctrine such as in Georgia and Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar⁴—these five works clearly demonstrate that, overall, how the international community responds to mass atrocities has changed for the better. No longer may it turn a blind eye to mass atrocities and genocides such as Rwanda in 1994 or, even worse, provide cover for supporting perpetrators as occurred in East Pakistan in 1971 and Cambodia in 1979.⁵

The United Nations and the responsibility to protect

For both Bellamy and Thakur, the consensus view of the R2P doctrine which has emerged within the UN is a positive one. Bellamy argues that the question has shifted from being 'not whether [the R2P] applies, but how it is best exercised' (p. 80). For him, the main focus for R2P is how we can proceed with its implementation. This is—and will continue to be—the main task, given that governments are reluctant to prioritize prevention and that there will always be 'difficult prudential concerns' (p. 2). Implementation, consequently, will require nothing less than the 'reconfiguring of state identities and national interests so that the prevention of atrocities becomes habitual' (p. 6).

⁴ Bellamy (chapter three) provides an overview of these cases.

⁵ Nicholas J. Wheeler, *Saving strangers: humanitarian intervention in international society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

The pillar approach, introduced in the 2009 Secretary General's report on R2P,⁶ substantially modifies the original doctrine proposed by the ICISS in 2001. To the need for states to protect their citizens from genocide, mass killing and ethnic cleansing, as laid out in the ICISS report, the World Summit Outcome Document added war crimes and crimes against humanity, and also raised the 'threshold for when responsibility transferred from the host state to the international community ... to situations where the state had "manifestly failed" to protect civilians' (p. 23). The pillar approach has accordingly reframed the R2P as three linked responsibilities. Pillar one refers to the state's own responsibility to its population, pillar two to the international community's responsibility to assist the state, and pillar three to the duty of the international community to take timely and decisive action in situations where the state has manifestly failed to protect its population (pp. 35–9).

How do these pillars interact? Here is a point of contention. Bellamy argues that they are both non-sequential (one does not need to be applied before another) and of equal importance, 'such that the whole edifice of R2P would collapse if it were not supported by all three pillars' (p. 35). Thakur disputes this, suggesting that the metaphor has been taken too far, and that 'the most important element—the weightiest pillar—is the state's own responsibility and the most critical is the international community's response to fresh outbreaks of mass atrocity crimes' (p. 150). Certainly, Thakur is right to argue against the view that a single consensus on the pillar approach has emerged—the recent concept note from the Brazilian government on 'Responsibility while protecting', for example, argues that the pillars 'must follow a strict line of political subordination and chronological sequencing'.⁷ But Bellamy's response provides an important underpinning for his book. He argues that Thakur's perspective is problematic because it marginalizes pillar two, and in doing so 'seems [to be] out of step with both contemporary practice on the protection of civilians and what states agreed in 2005' (p. 40).

It is in exploring the range of potential responses within pillar two that the strength of Bellamy's book lies. Even though R2P may be universal, the form of response, Bellamy notes, remains 'indeterminate ... it is seldom—if ever—clear what, exactly, the R2P requires in a given situation' (p. 86). This leads him to an ambitious undertaking: detailing the different forms of response that can fall within pillar two. These encompass direct engagement with 'root causes', including issues such as economic development and democracy; the role played by early warning programmes (which may originate with the UN, regional organizations, NGOs or states); the involvement of regional organizations; and, finally, the role of the Security Council. This coverage points to one of the problems inherent in the way the UN consensus frames R2P. As Bellamy notes, the effect of the pillar strategy 'is to emphasize R2P as a broad based policy agenda focused on the "upstream" prevention of genocide and mass atrocities through capacity-building and inter-

⁶ Ban Ki-moon, 'Implementing the responsibility to protect', A/63/677, 12 Jan. 2009.

⁷ UN General Assembly, 'Annex: responsibility while protecting: elements for the development and promotion of a concept', A/66/551, 11 Nov. 2011, p. 1.

national cooperation' (p. 81). The problem is that such categories cover a range of policy spaces from security through development into human rights. As a result, the R2P risks duplicating the vagueness embodied within current discussions of human security.

The challenge facing Bellamy, then, is to demarcate the scope of these different implementation issues. The United Nations, he argues, is pivotal here as it can play a necessary coordinating function, but only following substantial change which will be difficult to achieve. Thus, for economic development and democracy, a reformed Peacebuilding Commission is necessary to construct coherent and context-specific plans which would link together national reformers and international actors (pp. 110–11). The proposed UN joint office of genocide prevention and R2P would help to coordinate and centralize early warning efforts (pp. 140–41). Regional organizations, he argues, continue to suffer from a lack of both capacity and resources, but also from the effects of consensus decision-making and powerful regional norms of non-interference (pp. 153–5). Even so, he suggests the UN can play a cooperative role with these organizations. But this is not necessarily one-sided. Elsewhere, he has argued that regional organizations increasingly play a role as gatekeepers on R2P questions, influencing the issues debated by the Council, how they are framed, and what responses emerge.⁸ Finally, the Security Council, while still playing the role envisioned in the R2P, can also highlight the much broader continuum of protection measures that are available to it and push for improved protection doctrine and training (p. 187). Increased coordinating capacity on the part of the UN is welcome. However, it is unclear how these proposed steps will lead to the wholesale re-envisioning of state interests that Bellamy argues is necessary for clear implementation.

Thakur similarly envisions a role for the UN. His book, a collection of essays all but one of which have been published since 2000, provides a good overview of the debates around humanitarian intervention associated with the NATO campaign in Kosovo, the genesis of the R2P doctrine and the doctrine's progressive development. As a series of discrete pieces, the book offers a more episodic treatment than Bellamy's comprehensive overview.

Even so, a key theme for Thakur is the critical role the UN plays as a bridging organization between the Global North and South. He sees a gap opening up, with the South's concerns over intervention not adequately appreciated by the North. He argues that these latter countries 'are unable to empathize with the concerns of developing countries who do fear being the targets of international intervention by tomorrow's moral majority' (p. 124). NATO's role in Kosovo is an example of this disparity of view. While for westerners, he notes, NATO is 'an alliance of democracies', for most Asian ex-colonies 'it is a military alliance of former colonial powers' (p. 71).

In this context, Thakur argues, the R2P 'offers developing countries better protection through agreed and negotiated-in-advance rules and roadmaps for

⁸ Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, 'The new politics of protection? Côte d'Ivoire, Libya, and the responsibility to protect', *International Affairs* 87: 4, July 2011, p. 826.

when outside intervention is justified and how it may be done under UN authority rather than unilaterally' (p. 140). This does not mean he regards the UN, and in particular the Security Council, as perfect; indeed, he feels that the veto and the current distribution of power have served to delegitimize it (p. 183). Reform, he suggests, is necessary.

But the question of UN reform is tied into a fundamental shift in global politics. The clear limits to US and NATO power in Iraq and Afghanistan have not removed the South's fear of the superior power of the North, but have set constraints on the North's 'previous capacity to set standards and rules of behaviour for the world' (Thakur, p. 13). As the South, and particularly China, India and Brazil, become more prominent in the global polity, Thakur argues that their contestation of 'so-called global norms cannot summarily be dismissed as norm spoilers' (p. 182). He sees this shift as a key question: can the countries of the South 'manage their transformation from perennial spoilers to responsible globalizers?' (p. 195).

Equally important is how the dialogue around R2P proceeds alongside with this shift. Thakur argues that this is a conversation that should occur primarily among the countries of the South, 'because they will be the primary victims and potential beneficiaries' (p. 159). This assertion stands in direct contrast to Bellamy, who is seeking to create a view of R2P which links the North and the South around pillar two activities; a dialogue among only one group must, by its nature, be limited. Moreover, how does the issue of military intervention play out in this conversation? Regional organizations from the South are likely to be either unable or unwilling to take direct action, while Thakur notes the United States is likely to remain the only country, and NATO the only organization, with the capacity to undertake action around the globe (pp. 74, 92). Thus the United Nations becomes the key institution, not only in providing a bridge between these two groups, but also as a means to legitimize military action when it must occur.

Intervention, authority and culture

Pattison offers a direct challenge to this view. His goal is to rehabilitate humanitarian intervention as a concept distinct from the R2P. For him, the R2P is a broad doctrine which 'encourages states to live up to their responsibilities to protect their citizens' human rights' (p. 13), but has the central aim of avoiding 'the need for military intervention' (p. 252). For him, humanitarian intervention is thus broader than the R2P in that it can 'be undertaken in response to a variety of humanitarian crises and does not require Security Council authorization' (p. 13). As Pattison does not discuss how these humanitarian crises differ from the R2P criteria, the main point of contention can be reduced to the role of the Security Council (p. 212). This is a major point of distinction. His focus is on determining who should have a responsibility to intervene—a responsibility, he argues, the R2P 'fails to identify', instead offering only a procedure through the requirement for Security Council authorization (p. 4). He states that its provision of legality to an intervention is not necessary (p. 64).

Pattison argues that two properties—effectiveness and legitimacy—should be used to identify would-be interveners with the overall goal of increasing the enjoyment of human rights (as defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) (p. 72). Effectiveness is the ‘primary, necessary, and sometimes sufficient determinant of its legitimacy’ (p. 74). Effectiveness does not relate only to the intervener’s actions within the country subject to intervention (which he terms local external effectiveness) but also reflects whether or not the intervener promotes or harms the enjoyment of human rights in the world as a whole and also by the intervener’s own citizens (pp. 74–5).

Legitimacy, for Pattison, is narrowly defined, reflecting only ‘morally justifiable power’. But it possesses a scalar quality: ‘We can distinguish between an intervener possessing full legitimacy and an intervener possessing an adequate degree of legitimacy’ (p. 32). Hence an intervener’s legitimacy reflects a range of different factors. These include not only how effective it is, but also the actions it takes (in particular whether it holds to the principles of *jus in bello*) and the intervener’s own internal representativeness, how the action is supported by its population, and whether the action is supported by those subject to intervention (p. 129). Given these scalar properties, a number of agents may possess an adequate degree of legitimacy, and have a right to intervene, but it is the most legitimate intervener that has a duty to intervene. Unfortunately, after examining a number of potential existing agents (including on a spectrum from most to least legitimate, NATO, states, the UN, regional organizations and private military companies), he concludes that none of these agents is fully legitimate (p. 181).

And herein lies the main dilemma: in the pursuit of legitimacy Pattison has jettisoned the concept of legality in exchange for a well-developed account of effectiveness, one that takes into account not only the intervener as an agent but also its population, that of the state being intervened within, and the international community as a whole. And he points to decisiveness, to immediate deployment, as a critical element. But how can this alternative account of legitimacy be measured, and particularly in a prompt fashion? As he notes, an intervener can conduct referenda or opinion polls and ‘consider other indicators of the public mood’, while within the state subject to the intervention the intervener can ‘ascertain directly the opinions of those in the political community ... or ... use indirect indicators, such as information provided by reliable intermediaries’ (p. 184). But what level of support do we look for? Ahmed Chalabi certainly supported the US invasion of Iraq, and argued that the Iraqi population would do likewise. Clearly, in retrospect he was not ‘reliable’; but given the time pressures likely to exist in the lead-up to any humanitarian intervention, such errors remain likely. Pattison’s account does accept these limitations through the scalar property of legitimacy, but here it is easy to reduce the account down to effectiveness (a view he argues against). International legal approval, while problematic on a range of grounds, does at least provide a proxy for international support for the intervention. Equally, his argument does not take into account the widespread concerns held by states from the Global South around the practice

of illegal yet legitimate interventions which an author like Thakur raises and answers by endorsing the R2P.

If Pattison neglects the role of the United Nations, Orford's project is to anchor the R2P doctrine directly to the UN's claims of international authority. In so doing, she reverses the usual causal argument. For her, the significance of the R2P 'lies not in its capacity to transform promise into practice, but rather in its capacity to transform practice into promise, or deeds into words' (p. 2). Conceived of in this way, the R2P provides an answer to questions of UN authority which date back to the period of decolonization. She argues that with the growth of state membership at that time, the UN—and in particular Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld—feared both an increase in conflict and a negative impact on the capacity of the UN to work expeditiously (pp. 45–6). Hammarskjöld responded by creating a new form of administrative rule (p. 13) in which the UN would temporarily intervene within states with 'no effect on internal politics' (p. 88). It would be guided by impartiality and 'should aim only to act as an impartial arbiter between positions' (p. 86).

For Orford, this is problematic for three reasons. The first is that 'Hammarskjöld offered no developed account of why power should vest with the UN rather than the peoples of the decolonised states' (pp. 86–7). Thus, as such operations grew in the post-Cold War period, the lack of a coherent view meant that the organization faced two sets of questions. One was around recognition: 'With which local actors should the UN engage? Was impartiality an appropriate or useful principle to draw upon in answering that question?' (p. 97). The other focused on issues of jurisdiction, particularly why 'should the UN, rather than the people of a territory, have the authority to decide who should govern?' (p. 100).

She argues that the R2P doctrine, by building on a tradition she roots in the work of Thomas Hobbes and Carl Schmitt around 'the existence of a worldly power with the capacity to protect its subjects [as] the solution to the problem of civil war' (p. 111), provides an answer to this question. But this answer is equally troubling: for in effect it defines a recognizable lawful authority as one that is capable of protecting populations at risk. Thus, 'by focusing upon *de facto* authority' the R2P doctrine 'implicitly asserts not only that an international community exists, but that its authority to govern is, at least in situations of civil war and repression, superior to that of the state' (p. 120). In effect, the UN supersedes the state. And this is her third concern—that this shift will mean that the UN will be unable to maintain its neutrality around questions of protection and intervention as the doctrine 'grounds authority on the capacity to guarantee protection' (p. 192). Thus, it will be forced to choose between competing institutional claimants for authority and the techniques which must be used to maintain order and protect life (pp. 192–3).

But, as her account of Hammarskjöld's experiences of the 1956 Suez crisis and the UN's 1960 intervention in the Congo makes clear, this has always been an issue: impartiality has never been strong. In the case of the Congo, Andrew Cordier, the interim Special Representative to the Congo, made the deliberate

decision to support Congolese President Joseph Kasavubu's removal of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba in violation of the support of the Congolese parliament, a decision which led not only to Lumumba's eventual assassination, but also to the first of two military coups led by Joseph-Désiré Mobutu (pp. 80–84). And with this, she highlights the central contradiction between the UN's roles as a neutral impartial actor and as an authoritative actor: 'Some administrators were comfortable taking a partisan position in relation to internal conflicts between authorities. Indeed, from Cordier in the Congo onwards, there were numerous international officials who considered that it was necessary to sideline those local leaders or elected officials who were resistant to implementing the policies decided by the international community' (p. 98).

Further, if there is a weakness in this account, it is the primacy assigned to the UN Secretariat and the person of the Secretary General, Hammarskjöld in particular. The role of the Security Council, for example, tends to be dismissed beyond statements such as that 'the Council also treated the Secretariat and Secretary-General "as its main executive agent"' (Orford, p. 47). And if Hammarskjöld was responsible for starting this shift, what happened between him and Boutros Boutros-Ghali, a period that Orford does not examine?

Even so, she is right to highlight the clear cultural tensions that exist between the UN and the state. Bellamy also points to the clear need for support for R2P-related actions by the indigenous national political leadership (pp. 108, 119). This is the core point of the critique launched by Stewart and Knaus. Their book, written as two extended essays, one by each of the authors, with a linking introduction, draws directly on their own experiences in interventions and post-conflict state-building: Stewart's in Afghanistan and Knaus's in Bosnia, respectively.

While not framed within the R2P debates—Bosnia predated the concept and the intervention in Afghanistan was framed within the 'global war on terror'—their accounts reinforce the challenges that the R2P doctrine faces around the use of force. Stewart's account is part critique of the Afghan intervention, part account of his own advocacy work against the surge of troops. His first criticism is that framing terrorism as an existential threat (p. 61) has led to a narrow set of options which are constantly reinforced. Worst-case scenarios become presented not 'as one possibility among many—but as the inevitable and inescapable result of any block on troop increases (still less proposed reductions)' (pp. 63–4). But more importantly, he suggests a critical lack of knowledge among the interveners. Few of the people involved, he suggests, have real experience on the ground in Afghanistan, a deficiency attributable to 'tour length, security restrictions, linguistic and cultural barriers, and barriers of ideology' (p. 25). He argues that this can be fixed by using foreigners with knowledge and experience in the country (pp. 83–5) and by making better use of the country's nationals: 'the sooner responsibility and broad scope are given to the locals, the better' (p. 80).

Knaus's critique similarly focuses on knowledge and culture as key problems for interventions. He suggests that state-building assumptions can be grouped into three main schools of thought: the planning school; liberal imperialism; and the

futility school. The planning school, based on ideas such as those in RAND's *Beginner's guide to nation-building*,⁹ assumes that nation-building will succeed because it 'has been done before' (p. 140). And yet, he notes that the historical track record does not provide sufficient data to draw 'generalizations about the necessary inputs' (p. 140), that there are few cases of state-building under fire, and that those which have occurred—such as in Vietnam—tend to be ignored (p. 139). Further, there is the assumption that even if the mission is going badly, it is a simple matter to 'readjust the balance between means and ends by increasing the number of inputs; in other words to "surge"' (p. 133).

The main alternative view, liberal imperialism, contradicts this. Here, it is assumed that sufficient authority on the part of the international actors, including both a strong mandate and charisma, can be sufficient to challenge would-be spoilers (p. 128). This, he argues, is the perceived view of Paddy Ashdown's work as High Representative in Bosnia: that with a bold vision and a holistic and comprehensive plan, success was possible, particular in the first 'golden hours' of the effort (pp. 149–50). But Knaus argues that this view is based on a fundamental misreading of the intervention. It provides little explanation as to where the effectiveness of the High Representative's Office came from and fails to acknowledge that, in effect, it was a myth: 'In the end it was only in Iraq in 2003 that the seven universal principles of state-building were actually put to the test. It was a test they failed' (p. 157). The third school, the futility school, assumes simply that an intervention has little chance of working and therefore offers only extreme choices to the international community: 'The option is either partition (with the obvious risks of further displacement and conflict, even renewed fighting) or an eternal international protectorate' (p. 167).

Knaus argues in favour of a fourth approach, which he terms principled incrementalism. This, in effect, is about 'muddling through with a sense of purpose' (p. 188). Interveners are never going to have enough information, and they are 'never in a good position to understand what objectives are actually achievable or how to achieve them before a mission starts. It is by trial and error—by learning from failure as well as success—that a mission understands gradually what it might be able to achieve' (p. 188).

These five books seek not to demonstrate the R2P's relevance, but to extend it. Bellamy focuses on how it is linked to international assistance, Thakur on how it provides a bridge between the Global North and South. For Orford, it provides a clear (albeit potentially problematic) account of why the UN has the authority to supersede governments. Pattison, by contrast, focuses on how we can determine a legitimate humanitarian intervener, while Stewart and Knaus question whether any intervention can succeed. If one question can be said to animate all five of these works, it is: How can we improve the international response to mass atrocities? For all of them, the answer lies in better implementation, better institutional support, and clearer connections between the international and domestic levels.

⁹ James Dobbins, *The beginner's guide to nation-building* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007).

These books also raise three critical issues. First, under what criteria should we intervene? Once the commitment to intervene has been made, governments have staked their credibility on the issue. Stewart may be right to say it is wrong to assume failure is never an option, but there will always be a very difficult threshold for governments to cross in order to remove themselves from a failed intervention. Pattison makes the assumption that we should look to the most legitimate intervener, based in part on its effectiveness. But Stewart and Knaus argue that we can never know how ‘effective’ an intervention will be before it begins. These works point to the nebulous nature of legitimacy. As Ian Clark has noted, it can contain both a ‘normative input’ which can be specified in advance—Pattison’s goal—and a ‘behavioural output’ which becomes ‘knowable only “after the event”’—Stewart and Knaus’s critique.¹⁰

Second, it is here that the strength of the UN becomes apparent, as Bellamy, Thakur, and Orford argue. It has the credibility, and the normative input legitimacy, to move the agenda forward, something that regional organizations lack either the legitimacy or the capacity to do. But there are tradeoffs. The language adopted by the UN with respect to the R2P, particularly its basing the threshold at which the Security Council may take action on a state’s manifest failure to exercise its responsibility, to be assessed case by case, means that there will be future failures to intervene. Pattison provides an answer to that problem in the form of another, legitimate, intervener stepping forward. Yet such a move is likely to destroy the fragile consensus of the past ten years.

Third, either implicitly or explicitly, these books are grappling with a cultural argument around the role of the UN, intervention and state-building. Séverine Autesserre’s recent critique of international peace-building in the Congo reflects on the fact that international actors—whether UN, NGO, or state-based—share a culture composed of ‘ideologies, rules, rituals, assumptions, definitions, paradigms, and standard operating procedures’. In the Congo, she argues, this culture ‘established the parameters of acceptable action ... this culture made it possible for foreign interveners to ignore the micro-level tensions that often jeopardize macro-level settlements’.¹¹

It is within these constraints that all operations must proceed—whether through military intervention or through assistance. To assume international knowledge at the expense of the local, to assume that a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach will work irrespective of the country, is intensely problematic. Unfortunately, it is only through the practical application of the R2P—through its use—that we can begin to understand and hence develop better ways of overcoming these cultural problems, of providing institutional support, and of bridging the international and local gap.

¹⁰ Ian Clark, *International legitimacy and world society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 18.

¹¹ Séverine Autesserre, *The trouble with the Congo: local violence and the failure of international peacebuilding* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 11.