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has written a book that gender and representation scholars—as well as party gatekeepers and potential candidates—cannot ignore.

JESSICA ROBINSON PREECE  
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**Afghanistan from the Cold War through the War on Terror** by Barnett R. Rubin. New York, Oxford University Press, 2013. 528 pp. \$34.95.

If anyone has earned the right to say “I told you so,” it is Barnett Rubin. One of the foremost authorities on Afghanistan, Rubin saw earlier than most the dangers emerging from that blighted land. In his work—as author of *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, an adviser to the United Nations for several years after 2001, a professor at New York University, and an adviser to the U.S. State Department’s Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan from 2009—Rubin worked to warn against, prevent, and mitigate the perennial crises afflicting Afghanistan and South Asia.

Rubin recounts as much in the introduction—sadly, the only original writing—in his new volume, *Afghanistan from the Cold War through the War on Terror*. The chapter is Rubin’s short memoir of his involvement in Afghanistan since the 1990s. Like many Afghan tales, it is a sad and frustrating one. After 2001, Rubin “oscillated between protesting against the inadequacy of the resources allocated to Afghanistan and the excessive ambition of the goals enunciated” (p. 21). That is exactly right: in Afghanistan, the United States talked a good game—maybe too good—but rarely put its money where its mouth was.

Rubin’s expertise and experience make him one of the few scholars capable of writing the definitive history of Afghanistan and the international project there since 2001. Unfortunately, this book is not it. It is, instead, an anthology of Rubin’s published work since 2001. Those who are new to Rubin’s work will find this an interesting collection of essays; those that are familiar with his work will not find anything that is new here. Readers who are waiting for the definitive work on Afghanistan will have to continue to wait. Some of the book, especially its latter portions, will be useful to the policy community. But the bulk of it is probably of interest mainly to the scholar interested in history—not Afghan history, necessarily, of which there are patches scattered throughout the work, but the history of U.S. policy toward Afghanistan and, more so, the history of Rubin’s opinions.

Some of the standouts in this anthology include “Saving Afghanistan,” which appeared in *Foreign Affairs* in 2007 and “The Transformation of the Afghan State,” which appeared in a book published by the U.S. Institute of Peace in 2009. I was working as Director for Afghanistan and Pakistan on the National

Security Staff in the White House at the time and remember the sense of foreboding when I read in the latter essay that “There is no foreseeable trajectory under which the Afghan state will become a self-sustaining member of the international community at peace with its neighbors in the coming ten years” (p. 441). That seemed like a criticism of what we were trying to accomplish. Now, five years after Rubin wrote those words, events seem to be proving him right.

Rubin was prevented by his employment with the U.S. State Department from commenting on current U.S. policy, so the collected writings end with those published in 2009—another weakness of the volume. There is value in the work, but one gets the feeling that editors erred on the side of including anything and everything rather than selecting essays by theme or for original contribution. On the upside, while the definitive history of Afghanistan since 2001 has yet to be written, whoever writes it will have a helpful collection of sources in this anthology.

PAUL D. MILLER

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**Zion’s Dilemmas: How Israel Makes National Security Policy** by Charles D. Freilich. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2012. 336 pp. \$40.95.

The author, a former senior official in Israel’s defense establishment, presents a very informative account of how Israel formulates its national security policy. This book benefits from richly documented research and an insider’s understanding of the decision-making process (DMP). The book also presents an in-depth analysis of the DMP in several major case studies in Israel’s national security history. The author argues that Israel’s DMP suffers from several “pathologies”: unplanned reactive proclivity; a highly politicized process; absence of a clear political hierarchy; an un-institutionalized process; and the primacy of the defense establishment.

While some of the criticism of Israel’s DMP is well taken and often balanced by pointing out Israel’s strengths—such as the ability to make rapid and flexible responses, generally pragmatic decision making, effective planning in the defense establishment, and the skills and motivation of those in involved,—the book is marred by a faulty understanding of the nature of politics, particularly in democratic states. Too often the book reflects the frustrations of a senior bureaucrat with ministers, true political animals who refuse to accept the advice of the professional level and act on the basis of their understanding of what constitutes the national interest.

Most striking is the insistence that the paramount importance of political factors is “pathological,” rather than viewing the political process as reflecting