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exercise is positive and properly belongs to the individual, whereas the disestablishment clause instructs the government on what it *cannot* do.

The Framers of the Constitution, Goldford argues, recognized the need for two complementary religion clauses in the First Amendment: “The assumption is that government can threaten religious liberty not only when it requires you to reject or deny your religious beliefs or values, but also when it requires you to affirm the religious beliefs or practices that are not your own” (p. 236).

The author’s argument that the nation is not essentially a religious community is certainly sound, but I wonder if at least a brief discussion of Robert Bellah’s civil religion argument might not have been worth the detour to underscore his case. Unfortunately, Goldford also uses the deeply offensive term “Christian Right” to refer to the religious right; millions of American Christians do not recognize anything resembling their faith in the political agenda of the religious right.

These cavils aside, Goldford has produced a lively and well-considered book on a vitally important topic; his point that the First Amendment protects religious freedom and not religion is an important and helpful distinction. “An attempt to make politics about God,” he concludes, “is an attempt, witting or unwitting, to change radically the character of the American constitutional order” (p. 244). Because no religion in the United States can claim a majority—even Christians are notoriously divided by doctrine and denomination—we are, all of us as Americans, members of religious minorities, including nonbelievers. We all, therefore, have a stake in ensuring that the interpretation of the First Amendment is not hijacked by sectarians, be they religious or judicial.

RANDALL BALMER  
*Dartmouth College*

**He Runs, She Runs: Why Gender Stereotypes Do Not Harm Women Candidates** by Deborah Jordan Brooks. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2013. 240 pp. \$26.95.

The conventional wisdom, as understood by campaign strategists and the media, is that being a woman is a liability in electoral politics. Female candidates face an impossible task—they must convey the toughness, competence, and confidence of a politician, while simultaneously conveying the warmth and modesty of a lady. Consequently, it is much more difficult for women to successfully navigate a political campaign. Anecdotal evidence supporting this conventional wisdom is easy to find. However, systematic evidence is scarce. Is it possible that the conventional wisdom is just plain wrong? Deborah Jordan Brooks contends that it is.

In a series of experiments using a representative sample of 3,000 U.S. adults, she finds that voters are remarkably even-handed in judging male and female candidates and politicians. Brooks randomly assigns respondents to read one of eight scenarios involving either “Karen” or “Kevin Bailey.” These scenarios include an evaluation of Karen/Kevin’s fitness for office when s/he has extensive experience and when s/he has minimal experience. There are no significant differences in how Karen and Kevin are evaluated in the first, and Karen may be slightly advantaged in the second. The next group of scenarios presents fictitious news reports of “Representative Karen/Kevin Bailey” crying, displaying anger, exhibiting toughness, showing a lack of empathy to constituents, and getting caught in a knowledge gaffe. Again, across a wide variety of outcome measures, respondents penalize or reward Karen and Kevin similarly.

Brooks dubs this the “leaders-not-ladies” phenomenon: once a woman enters the realm of politics, she is judged as a leader, not as a lady. The “double bind” is solved in this way, so party gatekeepers and prospective candidates should stop assuming that being a woman is a political liability. It turns out that all politicians walk a fine line between toughness and empathy and compassion and competence, not just women.

With 180–200 respondents per cell, it is possible that Brooks’s experiment just does not have the statistical power to identify the respondents’ prejudices. And because her presentation of results appears to be targeted toward readers who are not very interested in statistical details (even in the appendices), it is difficult to ascertain whether this might be the problem. Given the fact that so many similar experiments in, for example, business, do reveal gender biases, there is reason to be skeptical. Nevertheless, if voters’ biases were substantively very large, at least some of her outcome variables would show differences. Almost none of the dozens of tests do. So while it might be hasty to dismiss the conventional wisdom as wholeheartedly as Brooks does, it is reasonable to conclude that voters are probably fairer than many observers assume they are.

Additionally, it is odd to ignore the fact that the concept of “leaders-not-ladies” is itself gendered. Gender stereotypes may not disproportionately harm women, but they may still operate. Is the leadership penalty for crying justified? More or less justified than penalty for an angry outburst? Brooks avoids these normative questions. That is her prerogative, but it left a hole in the discussion.

In short, this is an important book that deeply challenges a powerful assumption. Brooks’s decision to use experimental methods allows her to compare apples to apples, which is impossible with observational data. There are valid questions about the external validity of a survey experiment like this, but that does not diminish the importance of what she has done. It will be exciting to see how future researchers build on this study’s findings. Brooks

has written a book that gender and representation scholars—as well as party gatekeepers and potential candidates—cannot ignore.

JESSICA ROBINSON PREECE  
*Brigham Young University*

**Afghanistan from the Cold War through the War on Terror** by Barnett R. Rubin. New York, Oxford University Press, 2013. 528 pp. \$34.95.

If anyone has earned the right to say “I told you so,” it is Barnett Rubin. One of the foremost authorities on Afghanistan, Rubin saw earlier than most the dangers emerging from that blighted land. In his work—as author of *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, an adviser to the United Nations for several years after 2001, a professor at New York University, and an adviser to the U.S. State Department’s Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan from 2009—Rubin worked to warn against, prevent, and mitigate the perennial crises afflicting Afghanistan and South Asia.

Rubin recounts as much in the introduction—sadly, the only original writing—in his new volume, *Afghanistan from the Cold War through the War on Terror*. The chapter is Rubin’s short memoir of his involvement in Afghanistan since the 1990s. Like many Afghan tales, it is a sad and frustrating one. After 2001, Rubin “oscillated between protesting against the inadequacy of the resources allocated to Afghanistan and the excessive ambition of the goals enunciated” (p. 21). That is exactly right: in Afghanistan, the United States talked a good game—maybe too good—but rarely put its money where its mouth was.

Rubin’s expertise and experience make him one of the few scholars capable of writing the definitive history of Afghanistan and the international project there since 2001. Unfortunately, this book is not it. It is, instead, an anthology of Rubin’s published work since 2001. Those who are new to Rubin’s work will find this an interesting collection of essays; those that are familiar with his work will not find anything that is new here. Readers who are waiting for the definitive work on Afghanistan will have to continue to wait. Some of the book, especially its latter portions, will be useful to the policy community. But the bulk of it is probably of interest mainly to the scholar interested in history—not Afghan history, necessarily, of which there are patches scattered throughout the work, but the history of U.S. policy toward Afghanistan and, more so, the history of Rubin’s opinions.

Some of the standouts in this anthology include “Saving Afghanistan,” which appeared in *Foreign Affairs* in 2007 and “The Transformation of the Afghan State,” which appeared in a book published by the U.S. Institute of Peace in 2009. I was working as Director for Afghanistan and Pakistan on the National