Building National Armies after Civil War: Lessons from Bosnia, El Salvador, and Lebanon

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THE RECENT LITERATURE ON CIVIL WARS IS WIDE and deep; a number of major studies compel us to rethink what we know about this important subject. One of the areas that *has* eluded concerted scholarly attention has been the question of how national armies can be developed that satisfy the imperatives of post-civil war reconciliation and democratic consolidation. This issue is at the center of this article.

Civil wars are fought for different reasons in very different settings and are resolved differently. Nevertheless, it is possible to draw valuable lessons of building national armies from even highly disparate attempts in very different post-civil war environments. The principal goal of this article is to highlight, through their contrasting achievements and shortcomings, lessons we can learn from three cases.

Because the objective of this article is best served by a "most different systems design," it features cases that could hardly be more dissimilar: Bosnia, El Salvador, and Lebanon.[1] The opposing sides of the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter BiH or Bosnia, 1992–95) were set

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[1]Theodore Meckstroth, "'Most Different Systems' and 'Most Similar Systems,'" *Comparative Political Studies* 8 (July 1975): 132–157.

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apart primarily by their religion (Muslim Bosniaks, Roman Catholic Croats, and Orthodox Serbs) and the regions they have traditionally inhabited. The antagonists of the Lebanese civil war (1975–1990) were also differentiated by ethnicity, region, clan membership, and religion (Shia and Sunni Muslims, Maronite Christians, and Druze) and political factionalism. In contrast, the civil war in El Salvador (1979–1992) was based chiefly on socioeconomic class identity. This was a conflict in the Marxist sense, a fight between marginalized and dominant social classes.

The foremost objective in all three countries, as in virtually all post-civil war contexts in which armies are built, was to develop truly *national* armed forces. A secondary aim was to build democratic armies, that is, armies supportive of democratic governance. In the past two decades, all three states have largely attained the first and most crucial goal, even if there is some way to go before they reach the second. Nevertheless, they could not have achieved these outcomes in a more dissimilar fashion. Bosnia continues to struggle with several fundamental political issues, but from a narrow civil-military relations perspective, it has been quite successful. Civil-military relations in El Salvador have also improved significantly, but a number of issues that were left unregulated by the 1992 Chapúltepec Peace Agreement have constituted problem areas. Given that Lebanese Armed Forces have had to co-exist with Hezbollah's paramilitary arm, another force viewed as legitimate by a significant part of the population, politicians in Beirut had different and perhaps even more-trying obstacles to contend with than their colleagues in Sarajevo and San Salvador.

The analysis proceeds in three main parts. The first part traces the political process that led to the end of the civil wars in Bosnia, El Salvador, and Lebanon and evaluates the peace accords. The next section, examines the alternative methods with which BiH, Salvadoran, and Lebanese politicians chose to build their new armed forces, and the successes and the shortcomings of this process. It also assesses the continued role of outside political forces during this undertaking. The conclusion, gathers the lessons to be learned from these very different experiences. The chronological parameters of the case studies are from the peace agreements to 2010, a period that is sufficient to recognize key trends. "Civil war" is a controversial concept mainly because it is often thought of quite differently by individuals fighting on opposite sides: the aggressors are likely to call it "civil war," while to those attacked, such terminology suggests that all sides are equally culpable. This article considers civil war, along with Stathis Kalyvas, as "armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized entity

between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities."[2]

FROM CIVIL WAR TO PEACE

El Salvador's civil war was a guerilla war between the leftist Farabundo Martí Liberation Front and an extraordinarily oppressive political class that was often unable to control the armed forces—both regular army units and privately financed death squads —that did its bidding. The opposing sides in Bosnia, however, were the armies of Bosnia, Croatia, and the Republika Srpska (the Serb Republic), all complemented by local and foreign volunteers. Unlike most civil wars that are played out primarily in rural settings, Lebanon's 15-year conflict is an example of predominantly urban guerrilla warfare between the fighters of numerous distinct groups identified by religion, ethnicity, and region.

The Peace Process

The Salvadoran peace process received a boost when Alfredo Cristiani of the Conservative Nationalist Republican Alliance won the presidential elections in 1989. Cristiani was willing to declare and defend his democratic principles and his commitment to ending the civil war and developing a more just and liberal society. The time was propitious for other reasons as well. The end of the Cold War darkened the prospects of financial and military aid both for the guerrillas' Farabundo Martí Liberation Front (FMLN) formed by a number of left-wing groups and supported by the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Nicaragua, and for the government's forces, bankrolled primarily by the United States. Moreover, the downfall of international communism took the ideological wind out of the FMLN's sails. Finally, overall conditions in El Salvador had by this time deteriorated terribly, not just because of the ongoing civil war but also owing to a devastating earthquake in 1986 and the declining world market price of coffee, the country's biggest export earner.

Cristiani let it be known that enduring peace would require not only the demobilization of the FMLN's forces but also the curbing of the political power traditionally held by the Armed Forces of El Salvador (FAES), and publicly acknowledged that the civil war originated in the injustice and social inequity that had long characterized Salvadoran society. The first talks between the government and the FMLN took place in September–

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[2]Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 17. For definitional issues, see Nicholas Sambanis, "What Is a Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48 (December 2004): 814–858.

October 1989. Soon after, extremists eager to derail the peace process killed trade unionists and assassinated six Jesuit priests and their housekeepers. FMLN guerrillas retaliated by taking over the Sheraton Hotel in San Salvador. The international condemnation that followed these actions achieved its goal: the army's top brass was particularly sensitive to the outrage voiced by the U.S. Congress, which had the power to withhold military aid from the FAES, and returned the parties to the negotiating table.

The road to peace was not a linear process in Bosnia either. A major milestone along the way was the March 1994 signing of the U.S.-initiated cease-fire, the Washington Agreement, between the Bosniak and Croat sides. The United States offered its support to Croatia's application for membership in European institutions and to facilitate aid for the country in return for Croatia's acquiescence to an accord with Bosnia. The Agreement established the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter the Federation) with two constituent nations, Croats and Bosniaks, and a military alliance between them directed against Bosnian Serbs. Croatian paramilitary groups and Bosniak army units continued to exist as separate entities but began to cooperate in operations against the Bosnian Serbs. In the summer of 1995, Croat and Bosniak forces set out to re-conquer the territories held by the Bosnian Serbs since 1992. Realizing that the tide had at last turned against them, Serb leaders now signaled that they were prepared to engage in serious peace negotiations.[3]

Both in El Salvador, and especially in the BiH, the role of foreign actors in ending the war and negotiating the peace agreement was important. In the former, the military's growing dependence on American assistance and internal tensions within the officer corps had made it particularly vulnerable to U.S. pressures. When in the summer of 1990 talks bogged down over military reform issues, the U.S. Congress's decision to withhold half of the $85 million in military assistance earmarked for the following year was surely a factor in the softening position of the Salvadoran high command.[4] Although the shift in Washington's policy clearly contributed to ending the war, the United States had little credibility as a would-be peacemaker in El Salvador, given its long-standing past support of the government and its armed forces.[5] The heavy lifting in El Salvador was done by the United

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[3]Roland Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 98.

[4]Philip J. Williams and Knut Walter, *Militarization and Demilitarization in El Salvador's Transition to Democracy* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997), 151.

[5]For an analysis of foreign involvement in the conflict, see William LeoGrande, "A Splendid Little War: Drawing the Line in El Salvador," *International Security* 6 (Summer 1981): 27–52.

Nations, whose mandate for the operation—United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL)—was granted by the two warring sides and ratified by the U.N. Security Council.[6] Established in 1991 in the midst of civil war, it became one of the most-successful U.N. internal peacemaking efforts since the Cold War.[7] It is important to recognize, however, that in contrast to their colleagues in the BiH, Salvadoran elites began to adopt liberal political norms to make themselves more credible as peace-seekers and legitimate partners in conflict resolution *before* international organizations began to play a mediating role.[8]

In the BiH, however, there were no serious attempts at reconciliation: it was the U.S. government that literally and figuratively brought the antagonists to the peace conference near Dayton, Ohio. Once Washington committed itself to resolving the crisis, it stayed engaged and played a central role in ending the war. The U.S. contingent was also the lead component in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led force that the United Nations Security Council authorized to provide security in the extremely volatile period between cease-fire and peace.

Quite differently from both Bosnia and El Salvador, in Lebanon, ending the civil war was not primarily the work of foreign actors, although mediators from the Arab League, the United States, and especially Syria, played an important part. Rather, after a long learning process, the opposing sides finally acknowledged that their ideal outcomes would not be realized and that without compromises their country would continue its descent into chaos. Following the September 1988 expiration of President Amine Gemayel's term, a transitional government took power until a new president could be elected.[9] The interim cabinet consisted of the six members of the Military Council, headed by Commander Michel Aoun, three Christians, and three Muslims representing Lebanon's main ethno-religious communities. Most Muslims, and Syria, the neighboring state most influential in Lebanese politics, were unhappy with Aoun's appointment and backed Prime Minister Salim Hoss's rival government. Thus, a peculiar and unprecedented situation developed that split politics between two central authorities publishing separate degrees unrecognized by the other, controlling contending armed units that at times clashed. In the end, these

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[6]Lisa Morjé Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 92.
[7]Ibid., 88.
[8]David Holiday and William Stanley, "Building the Peace: Lessons from El Salvador," *Journal of International Affairs* 46 (Winter 1993): 415–439.
[9]This paragraph draws on Oren Barak, *The Lebanese Army: A National Institution in a Divided Society* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2009), 153–159.

precarious conditions actually promoted the desire for a political settlement on both sides.

Chapúltepec, Dayton, and Ta'if

The document that brought an end to El Salvador's civil war was signed in Mexico City's Chapúltepec Castle on 16 January 1992. The most important short-term impact of the agreement was a nine-month cease-fire that took effect on 1 February 1992, and was never broken. The Chapúltepec Peace Accords created an historic opportunity to radically transform civil-military relations in El Salvador; this was possibly its most-important long-term outcome. The agreement outlined a specific plan for ending the war, demobilizing forces, reintegrating combatants into society, dealing with past human rights abuses, preparing for free and fair elections, and a number of other issues in nine chapters and several annexes.[10] The accord included a number of key provisions with respect to the armed forces of the FMLN and the government.[11] The FMLN's forces had to be dismantled by 31 October 1992, and the manpower of the FAES had to be cut by half—that is, down to 31,000—by 1994. The government's paramilitary National Police and Treasury Police forces would be absorbed into the regular army, and a new civilian police force with the participation of former FMLN combatants was to be created. The Salvadoran Civil Defense and the FAES's five American-trained elite battalions were to be dismantled. At the same time, all intelligence organizations were transferred under the authority of the President of the Republic. An independent three-person committee was established to purge human rights violators from the officer corps and a Truth Commission to investigate the worst cases of abuse. Furthermore, all political prisoners were to be freed.

The Chapúltepec agreement reflected the determination of *all* parties to diminish the FAES's political clout and social autonomy by curtailing its force, structure, and mission (reduced to protecting El Salvador from external threats). In doing so, the agreement not only terminated the civil war but also laid the foundations for El Salvador's transition to democracy.[12] This is not to say that Chapúltepec did not have some serious drawbacks or that it did not overlook a number of important aspects of

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[10]For a synopsis, see Alvaro de Soto and Graciana del Castillo, "Implementation of Comprehensive Peace Agreements: Staying the Course in El Salvador," *Global Governance* 1 (May–August 1995): 191–193. For the full text of the agreement, see http://www.elsalvador.com/noticias/especiales/acuerdosdepaz2002/index.html, accessed 26 March 2014.

[11]See Andrew P. Miller, *Military Disengagement and Democratic Consolidation in Post-Military Regimes: The Case of El Salvador* (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 2006), 69.

[12]Tricia Juhn, *Negotiating Peace in El Salvador* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), 4.

military politics. In the end, the peace treaty stipulated not a single recommendation or provision for economic reform. Though the greatest political price for the peace agreement was undoubtedly paid by the Salvadoran armed forces, it could have been forced to give up even more of its prerogatives. For instance, the agreement did not lay out a system of effective legislative control over the defense budget nor did it provide for executive control over the promotion of senior military officers or settle whether the military could retain its influence over telecommunications and water services. Thus, in these areas, the FAES had retained some autonomy, even if the treaty had severely curbed its overall influence in the country's political and social life.[13]

The Dayton Agreement was a very different document occasioned by a different situation and for a different purpose. The agreement's signatories— the presidents of the BiH, Croatia, and Yugoslavia—committed to "the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of the Bosnia-Herzegovina."[14] Aside from the main document, the Dayton accords contain 11 annexes that detail the responsibilities of the Bosnian parties and the international agencies charged with monitoring implementation.[15] It also includes a constitution annexed to the agreement that outlines the divisions of federal power between the national government of the BiH and the governments of the two entities, the Bosniak-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska (RS). The Agreement was a peace resolution that focused chiefly on establishing a peacekeeping arrangement. Annex 1A, "The Agreement on Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement," created a multinational military Implementation Force (IFOR) composed of units from NATO and non-NATO nations to ensure compliance with the agreement and the implementation of its military directives. The signatories agreed to not just a cessation of hostilities but also to a withdrawal of foreign forces from Bosnia within 30 days. Moreover, the document prescribed the redeployment of Bosniak, Croat, and Serb forces, the deployment of IFOR, the creation of a Joint Military Commission (chaired by the IFOR commander and made up of local commanders and representatives), and specified the conditions of prisoner exchanges. Annex 1B was concerned with regional stabilization and outlined confidence and security building measures as well as guidelines for regional and sub-regional arms control.

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[13]Douglas A. Kincaid, "Demilitarization and Security in El Salvador and Guatemala," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 42 (Winter 2000): 39–58, at 44.

[14]Susan L. Woodward, "Bosnia and Herzegovina: How Not to End a Civil War," in Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder, eds., *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 87.

[15]See http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=380, accessed 26 March 2014.

Croats and Serbs residing in Bosnia had a "mother country" to turn to for help and, if necessary, for citizenship, but Bosniaks enjoyed no such security guarantee and thus were the one group with a clear incentive to rearm and to use the peace settlement as a period to prepare for war. In a scenario in which Bosniaks should have had to defend themselves from a combined Croat–Serb campaign, they would have found themselves in a 1:12 force ratio.[16] To remedy this situation and to win Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović's agreement to the settlement, U.S. negotiators added a special military assistance program called "Train and Equip" for the Federation to address the Bosniak and Croat perception that they were and would be outgunned by the Bosnian Serbs.

Like Chapúltepec, Dayton, too, had some shortcomings, but perhaps due to the inherently more difficult and volatile situation of the BiH—three nations in one country divided by religion and regional identity—its deficiencies were graver and more difficult to resolve. While Chapúltepec created the basis for substantive democratization and military reform, in some respects, Dayton "sowed the seeds of instability by creating a decentralized political system that undermined state authority."[17] While Chapúltepec brought the insurgents and the government together, Dayton froze the conflict in place and generated new sources of insecurity. First, the agreement left two opposing armies in one country, one of them itself divided into two mistrustful components. Second, the framers of Dayton allowed the Serb portion of the BiH to retain the name, "Republika Srpska," which might have seemed a largely symbolic gesture but which could be seen by Serbs as encouraging future efforts to achieve autonomy. Third, arbitrary time limits for IFOR (one year) could have left the impression on Serbs that they might be able to outwait the enforcing powers. In terms of its military conditions, the special "Train and Equip" program *appeared to* countermand Dayton's arms control provisions even though it stayed within the specified limits. The same program also increased the Bosnian Serbs' perception of vulnerability and encouraged the militant wing of the Bosniak political spectrum "to entertain the prospects of an eventual military victory to liberate territory from the Bosnian Serbs."[18]

In October 1989, surviving members of Lebanon's 1972 parliament met in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia, to deliberate a "National Reconciliation Accord." The goal of the Ta'if Agreement, ratified on 4 November, was to end the long

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[16]Woodward, "Bosnia and Herzegovina," 103.
[17]Patrice McMahon and John Western, "The Death of Dayton," *Foreign Affairs* 88 (September–October 2009): 70.
[18]Woodward, "Bosnia and Herzegovina," 104.

civil war, to politically accommodate the demographic shift in favor of the Muslim majority, and to reassert Beirut's authority over Israeli-occupied South Lebanon. The most important part of the accord was its resolution removing the numerous sectarian militias that had perpetuated the war but never gained widespread legitimacy. As in Bosnia, the assignment of political offices to certain ethno-religious communities was a feature of the Ta'if Agreement as well, though, to be sure, in Lebanon, this was a practice even before independence in 1943. Ta'if transferred executive power from the president (Maronite Christian) to the cabinet, and the prime minister (Sunni Muslim), the commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), would remain a Maronite, whereas the powers of the parliamentary speaker (Shia Muslim) were enhanced by extending his/her term of office to four years. These measures removed the old Maronite–Sunni political alliance at the helm and replaced it, responding to opposition demands for curbed presidential authority, with a "multi-communal troika."[19]

The Agreement was decisive in determining Lebanon's Arab identity, confirming its unity, and defining its new political system as a parliamentary democracy based on the principles of separation, balance, and cooperation among the three branches of government. The accord was likewise clear about supporting a capitalist economic model and about setting the abolition of political sectarianism as a fundamental national goal to be realized gradually.[20] In two important areas, however, the Ta'if Agreement left issues subject to future discussion. First, it did not and could not resolve the conflict between Israel on the one hand and Lebanon and Syria on the other. While the Agreement legitimized Syria's military presence in Lebanon, it stipulated that Syrian forces would stay in Lebanon for no more than two years; afterward a joint Syrian–Lebanese commission would decide whether their deployment should be extended, where, in what strength, and for how long. Second, although the Agreement introduced as many as 31 constitutional amendments, a number of questions regarding internal political reforms and their implementation were left unanswered. One important such issue was the mechanism, deadline, and actualization of the abolition of confessionalism—the proportional allocation of political power among a country's communities—another national goal identified by the Agreement.[21]

[19]Barak, *The Lebanese Army*, 162.
[20]See Hassan Krayem, "The Lebanese Civil War and the Taif Agreement," in Paul Salem, ed., *Conflict Resolution in the Arab World: Selected Essays* (Beirut: American University of Beirut Press, 1997), 422.
[21]Ibid., 423. See also Imad Harb, "Lebanon's Confessionalism: Problems and Prospects," Peace Brief (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, March 2006), accessed at www.usip.org/publications/lebanons-confessionalism-problems-and-prospects, 26 March 2014.

Insights from different approaches illuminate the disparities among the three peace accords. Realist scholars have for long maintained that international actors can best overcome the challenges associated with ending civil war, such as demobilization and reaching peace settlements, by offering enforceable security guarantees for the disarming side.[22] This tactic has been followed in many cases, including in Bosnia. More recently, constructivist scholars have noted that in some contexts "noncoercive, liberal international intervention" has been used to resolve civil wars as a substitute for security guarantees. Mark Peceny and William Stanley argued that if the dominant side demonstrates a firm commitment to liberal norms and practices, then "even a limited liberal social reconstruction can be a sufficient condition for settlement."[23] El Salvador may be the best illustration for this argument: there the Cristiani administration's continued insistence that adopting the fundamental objective of liberal democracy was the best way out of the conflict eventually proved persuasive to former combatants on both sides. The notion that in the period leading up to Ta'if, Lebanese political elites were also eager to convince one another that they were intent on establishing a more equitable and democratic political arrangement, rather than relying on conventional external security guarantees, lends further support to the contentions of the constructivist approach.

IMPLEMENTATION AND BEYOND: BUILDING POST-CIVIL WAR ARMIES

The actual building of post-civil war armies in Bosnia, El Salvador, and Lebanon was quite dissimilar. Accomplishing this task was more difficult and took longer in Bosnia, where a new army had to be created from the forces of three former antagonists. In El Salvador, however, the objective was to integrate into the FAES some erstwhile FMLN combatants whose size simultaneously had to be reduced. Still, some of the basic tasks, such as demobilization, the destruction of excess weapons, the democratization of civil-military relations, were similar in all three cases. In all three countries, the armed forces have emerged as the most successfully integrated institutions. In Bosnia, perhaps owing to the many still-unresolved issues and shaky political stability, the building of the new Bosnian army stands out as

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[22]See, for instance, Barbara F. Walter, "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement," *International Organization* 51 (June 1997): 335–364.

[23]Mark Peceny and William Stanley, "Liberal Social Reconstruction and the Resolution of Civil Wars in Central America," *International Organization* 55 (Winter 2001): 149–182, at 150. See also Elisabeth Wood, *Forging Democracy from Below: Insurgent Transitions in South Africa and El Salvador* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 27–110.

the great success story of the past decade and a half. In El Salvador, the army has acquired a large measure of societal esteem, given its complete withdrawal from politics and increasing professionalism. And in Lebanon, the LAF has become one of the country's few truly national institutions, a symbol of unity and hope for the future.

The Hard Road to Success in Bosnia

A few weeks after the December 2005 formal transfer of authority from United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to IFOR, units of the latter began to supervise the demobilization of the Bosniak–Croat and Serb armies in Bosnia, the transportation of weapons into storage sites, and the redeployment of forces on either side of the entity boundary lines. In a short time, some 300,000 soldiers of the total 420,000 at the end of the war were demobilized. The process did not go without some hiccups; for example, Bosnian Serbs were putting police uniforms on soldiers, an act expressly forbidden by the Dayton Agreement's military annex, but in the end, it was accomplished more or less on time. The number of troops was further decreased in several stages. In 2002, for instance, 10,000 soldiers left the army of the Federation and 3,500 the army of the Republika Srpska, effectively reducing the total military strength of Bosnia to about 20,000.[24] At the same time, the size of foreign peacekeeping contingents (IFOR [1995–1996], then the Stabilization Force [SFOR, 1996–2004], then the European Union's EUFOR [2005–]) had gradually shrunk from the initial 60,000 to 12,000 by 2003 and to less than 2,000 in 2010.

Although during the first eight years after Dayton, efforts to create a single Bosnian army led nowhere, this period was not without achievements in the security realm.[25] In 1996, the Federation established a joint defense ministry and military command in order to receive the benefits of the "Train and Equip" program. A project run by the International Organization for Migration helped thousands of soldiers transition into civilian life. In the meantime, NATO organized numerous seminars and meetings—at first held abroad but later moved to Bosnia—to facilitate reconciliation between officers who fought against one another during the war. Patient and considerate handling of this process by NATO and the gradual expansion of topics discussed began to mend the rift between the

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[24]Graeme P. Herd and Tom Tracy, "Democratic Civil–Military Relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina," *Armed Forces & Society* 32 (July 2006): 549–565, at 558; and Sultan Barakat and Steven A. Zyck, "State Building and Post-Conflict Demilitarization: Military Downsizing in Bosnia and Herzegovina," *Contemporary Security Policy* 30 (December 2009): 548–572.

[25]See Florence Gaub, *Military Integration after Civil Wars* (London: Routledge, 2010), 94–101.

participants.[26] For much of this period, the three armies remained dependent on foreign assistance.

The turning point after which the true transformation of the Bosnian defense establishment began in earnest came in 2002. One of the key opponents of the army's state-level reorganization, Mirko Šarović, the Serb member of Bosnia's three-person presidency (one representing each major nationality), resigned his post owing to revelations that the RS sold some of its excess armaments to Iraq in defiance of the UN arms embargo. This was the perfect window of opportunity for the Office of the High Representative—an ad hoc international institution created by the Dayton Agreement and charged with overseeing the implementation of the accords—and other international actors, along with supportive Bosnian elites, to push for substantive defense reform. In January 2003, the Standing Committee on Military Matters, an institution established by the BiH Constitution, introduced "Five Pledges" that affirmed the objective of developing democratic civilian control over state-level defense and security institutions. The pledges, inspired by the BiH's foreign policy decision to pursue membership in NATO's Partnership for Peace, included targets such as strengthening the role of the presidency in the national security realm, creating parliamentary oversight of the armed forces, and restructuring the military in preparation for eventual NATO membership. It is worth underscoring that the carrot that the international organizations dangled in front of BiH politicians was the prospect of joining NATO and, further down the line, the European Union; once membership in these organizations became a realistic goal, the transformation of the military establishment received priority consideration.

In May 2003, the High Representative established the Defence Reform Commission, with successive mandates to set up democratic, civilian state-level command and control of the entity armies, to create the first post-war BiH Ministry of Defence and central military staff (2003), to implement the 2003 agreement and legislation (2004), and to establish a single military force in BiH (2005). Based on these foundations, in 2003–2006, comprehensive defense reforms were implemented that resulted in a single army with a unified command and control structure.[27] The reforms were the result of intense negotiations between the Bosnian Serbs (who, fearful that

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[26]Author's interviews with army colonels Senad Kljačić and Robert Susać, at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School (Monterey, CA, 10 June 2008) and with Zeljko Grubešić of the legislature's Joint Defense and Security Committee (Sarajevo, 12 April 2010).

[27]See Defence Reform Commission, *The Path to Partnership for Peace* (Sarajevo: Defence Reform Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina, September 2003).

the numerically stronger Bosniaks could overrun them, wanted to get rid of conscription), Bosniaks (who, fearing Serbia, clung to the idea of a mandatory draft), and Croats (who, given their relatively small numbers, supported a state-level army, expecting to get equality in decision making). Preparatory work proceeded in 11 working groups, with a co-chair each from the international community and from Bosnia, with altogether 120 experts working on the reforms. State-level legislation was passed by the BiH Parliament to codify the first stage of having two entity armies under the BiH Ministry of Defence (MoD) and central military staff (2003), and the second stage, when entity armies were replaced with a single state-level army (2005). By 2003–2004, all generals who served as generals during the war were retired from the armed forces along with other high-ranking officers who did not pass SFOR's muster.

In all consequential personnel appointments in the defense sector, as in other areas of public life, ethnic quotas were utilized. The armed forces' commander in chief is the three-person presidency. The presidency names generals and makes decisions regarding the deployment of military units. Decisions not approved by Parliament within 60 days become invalid. The legislature monitors the entire defense establishment with the exception of intelligence. Its Joint Committee for Defense and Security was established in November 2003 and is composed of six members from each house of Parliament. It has been one of the most pro-active committees in the legislature, with bimonthly meetings and frequent field visits. It deliberates and passes legislation, oversees the implementation of defense and security policy, and plays an important part in the periodic defense and strategic review. The legislature, through the Joint Committee for Defense and Security, controls and oversees the budget of the entire defense and security sector; its budget hearings are attended by the defense minister and the Chief of the Joint Staff. Committee members check all elements of the military's budget and make necessary changes.

The state-level MoD was established in early 2004, and those of the entity level were abolished on 1 January 2006. The MoD operates as a civilian bureaucracy. Its staff is made up of approximately 320 civilians and 60 uniformed officers and exercises administrative control over the armed forces. The civilian minister has two deputies, all three coming from the different ethnic groups. The MoD is responsible for the management of the armed forces, implements all decisions pertaining to financial matters, and reports to the president and the Council of Ministers. Military personnel may turn to the ombudsman—an office maintained by the legislature—with their grievances. The Joint Staff (JS) has conventional military responsibilities. Its Chief, also aided by two deputies, the highest ranking

uniformed officer of the land, is a three-star general who is the top defense counselor to the presidency. Although the MoD and the JS have often been at odds over several issues, these have not posed an overt challenge to civilian control. The two have worked reasonably well with NATO and other international organizations. One source of frustration has been the lack of qualified professionals, a concern only exacerbated by the imperative of ethnic balancing.

The Bosnian armed forces remain the largest multiethnic institution in the country. Their size was stabilized at 10,000 uniformed personnel, 1,000 civilians, and 5,000 thus-far non-existent reservists. The duration of mandatory military service had been reduced repeatedly; by 2005, when it was abolished, it was down to six months. Since then, the Bosnian Army has been made up entirely of professional soldiers. No significant ethnic factionalism has been reported in the military, which is partly a result of careful ethnic balancing and the practice of reaching all consequential decisions based on consensus. For instance, officer recruitment proceeds according to a 45 percent Muslim, 38 percent Serb, 17 percent Croat formula. Each of the army's three infantry brigades is made up of three separate ethnically homogeneous battalions, with ethnically mixed brigade headquarters and supporting units. The MoD provides religious services for the three major faith communities in the armed forces. Military education is being reformed with particular attention to bringing personnel from different ethnic backgrounds together. Given that Bosnia does not maintain a military academy, virtually all officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) have received some military training abroad, particularly in the United States, Germany, Austria, and Turkey.

Despite the general success story that Bosnia's post-civil war army has become, some problems do remain. Although the defense establishment has maintained good relations with the media, there are few nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) with a military-security focus and few independent security experts to advise politicians. The pension system for retired military personnel is still based in the entities rather than on the central state level. The defense budget, $245 million in 2012 or 1.35 percent of the gross domestic product in 2012, is far too low to allow the investment and equipment purchases Bosnia needs to join NATO.[28]

The ultimate objective of and motivation for Bosnian defense reforms is gaining full NATO membership. BiH political elites expect that NATO membership will provide long-term security benefits *and* offer a stamp of

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[28]*The Military Balance, 2012* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012), 97.

international approval that can be converted into foreign economic invest-ment and improved reputation abroad.[29] In part to improve Bosnia's chances, NATO has maintained a Peace Support Operations Training Center in Sarajevo, now run by a Bosnian colonel. Bosnia needs to develop a NATO-compatible defense doctrine and create new capabilities to engage in peace support operations. Toward that end, in recent years, the MoD has sent observers to the Congo, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Afghanistan, a platoon to Iraq to dispose of unexploded ordinance, and another to NATO's Inter-national Security Assistance Force from early 2011. At their October 2010 meeting, NATO ministers agreed to grant the BiH a Membership Action Plan to help the country advance toward membership in the Alliance.

Achievements and Deficiencies in El Salvador

As in Bosnia, international organizations continued to play a role in El Salvador after the peace accords, but, importantly, their involvement was less intensive and lasted for a much shorter time. ONUSAL's mandate expired in the spring of 1995 and, up to that point, it helped to create a stable political and social environment in the country. More specifically, ONUSAL's military division, dominated by Spanish personnel, was respon-sible for monitoring the cease-fire, counting troops and weapons, weapons collection and disposal, and overseeing troop movements, among other things.[30] ONUSAL was followed by a new United Nations Mission in El Salvador under the authority of the General Assembly for one year, mainly to show the flag and to confirm continued UN support for peace building in El Salvador. (Since 2003, members of the FAES have participated in UN peacekeeping operations in Libya, Côte d'Ivoire, Haiti, and the Sudan).

In El Salvador, as in Bosnia, the demobilization of the erstwhile combat-ants—one of the critical but also usually the most sensitive tasks of post-civil war army building—was not an uneventful process. Initially, the FAES resisted the implementation of some of the peace accord's conditions, particularly the demobilization of the National Guards and the Treasury Police. According to the agreement, they were supposed to be dismantled, but at first, the government simply renamed them and incorporated them into the armed forces. Following ONUSAL's and the FMLN's serious objections to such a brazen violation of the accord, the two organizations were abolished, though, in the end, many of their cadres found positions in the Salvadoran security sector. Just as importantly, the army's manpower

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[29]See Zoltan Barany, *The Future of NATO Expansion* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); and Zoltan Barany, "NATO's Post-Cold War Metamorphosis," *International Studies Review* 8 (2006): 165–178.
[30]Howard, *UN Peacekeeping*, 114–115.

was reduced from 63,000 to 31,000 in 1993, a year ahead of schedule, and to 28,000 in 1994. In many post-civil war settings—most recently in Nepal[31]—the side that fought against the state often demands that its forces be merged with those of the central state's military. In the Salvadoran case, too, this was a long-standing condition of the FMLN for a peace agreement. In the end, the FMLN dropped this demand for two reasons. First, the massive reduction of the FAES personnel allowed the dismissal of those guilty or suspected of human rights violations and made adding new personnel particularly difficult. Nonetheless, approximately 2,200 former FMLN soldiers were allowed to enter the regular army.[32] Second, instead of the actual merging of the two armies, the FMLN settled for the incorporation of its fighters into the new civilian police force that replaced the widely despised brutal security forces.[33]

Government and military elites readily agreed to such a large-scale demobilization for three reasons. First, most of the discharged personnel were soldiers powerless to protest. Second, many officers, particularly those suspected of human rights abuses by the Truth Commission, were moved to other jobs in government. Third, the continuation of U.S. military aid was an effective incentive for the FAES to follow the demobilization calendar.[34] After demobilization was completed, El Salvador still had the highest per capita level of militarization in Central America (5.1 soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants compared with 3.4 in Nicaragua and 3.2 in Guatemala and Honduras).[35] It was hardly an inexpensive process: in 1993 alone, El Salvador needed $250 million to reintegrate ex-combatants into society and to develop democratic institutions.[36]

The FMLN protested against inadequate concentration and storage facilities that were making its demobilization difficult and government harassment of some of it fighters; for example, their forced eviction from lands they had long occupied. It took the intervention of UN Undersecretary General Marrack Goulding to settle the conflict between the FMLN and the

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[31]See Utpal Parashar, "Six Years After Civil War, Nepal Peace Process Ends," *Hindustan Times*, 13 April 2013; and author's interviews with Dr. Deepak Prakash Bhatt and Sanandan Prasad Kurmi (Kathmandu, 16 February 2014).

[32]Ricardo Córdova Macías, *El Salvador: Reforma Militar y Relaciones Cívico-Militares* (San Salvador: Fundación Dr. Guillermo Manuel Ungo, 1999), 11. See also Francisco Barahona and Manuel Carballo, *Reconversión Militar en Centroamérica* (San José: CEDAL-Fundación Ebert-Universidad para la Paz, 1995), 128–130.

[33]Williams and Walter, *Militarization and Demilitarization*, 152.

[34]Miller, *Military Disengagement*, 72–73.

[35]Kincaid, *Demilitarization and Security*, 44.

[36]Cited in Matthew Hoddie and Caroline Hartzell, "Civil War Settlements and the Implementation of Military Power-Sharing Arrangements," *Journal of Peace Research* 40 (May 2003): 303–320, at 317.

Cristiani administration. Once 20 percent of the FMLN's forces were demobilized, the government agreed to several legislative changes that included, most importantly, provisions to recognize the FMLN as a legitimate political party in the final stages of its demobilization and weapons destruction.[37] As in Bosnia, the demolition of excess armaments and ammunition constituted a serious issue in El Salvador, particularly because a chance event brought attention to the FMLN's duplicity. In May 1993, one of the organization's illegal weapons storage facilities exploded in Managua, Nicaragua, demonstrating that the FMLN intended to preserve some of its arsenal, even though this was prohibited by the peace accord. Following further UN mediation between the predictably dismayed government, which wanted to revoke FMLN's status as a political party, and the FMLN, which now intended to affirm its bona fides by divulging the location of and destroying more than 1,000 arms caches, the crisis was resolved.

These events only illuminated the underlying issue emblematic of post-civil war environments: the lack of trust between the former warring sides, which usually takes a considerable amount of time to develop. In the end, notwithstanding some more or less foreseeable problems, the peace process in El Salvador was not seriously challenged: both sides remained committed to pursuing their political objectives peacefully. Salvadoran governments have eschewed extremist policies, whereas the FMLN has been remarkably successful in "transforming itself from a clandestine operation into an open, well-organized party."[38] Reforming civil-military relations—more specifically, taking the military out of politics—was key to the negotiated settlement at Chapúltepec. Although several things have gone right, in part owing to the aforementioned omissions in the agreement, the institutional arrangements of Salvadoran civil-military relations leave room for improvement.

The President of the Republic is also the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and is advised by the National Security Council. The 84-seat Legislative Assembly is empowered by the Constitution to be permanently involved in defense issues. In practice, though, the National Defense Committee—comprising 11 members—does not control military expenditure in any substantive way. When activist legislators manage to "force" the defense minister to present the defense budget to them, they merely score Pyrrhic victories, because they lack the information to ask anything but the most perfunctory questions.[39] According to some experts, there is an implicit deal

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[37]Howard, *UN Peacekeeping*, 115–116.
[38]Tommie Sue Montgomery, *Revolution in El Salvador: From Civil Strife to Civil Peace* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995), 253.
[39]See, for instance, Juhn, *Negotiating Peace*, 168.

between the state and the military: the soldiers stay out of politics but the state takes very good care of them.[40]

The Ministry of National Defense executes the conventional defense ministry functions such as the implementation of government policy, the coordination of military activities, and the preparation of the draft defense budget. The minister also proposes promotions, appointments, dismissals, etc., to the president after consulting with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces.[41] The president does not have a free hand in appointing defense ministers; he is constrained by the high command, which would not accept a civilian defense minister. All Salvadoran defense ministers have been high-ranking serving military officers. Active-duty military personnel are entitled neither to vote nor to stand as candidates for elected political office (though their retired comrades have the right to do both).

In contrast to the relatively transparent Bosnian army, the FAES as an institution has remained well screened from the general public, but no more so than most Latin American militaries. As prescribed by the peace accords, the military high command was purged of human rights abusers (more than 100 officers, including the defense minister and his deputy, most of the flag officers and many colonels) through a primarily internal process. Many of those who had to leave the FAES were retired or reassigned to public sector jobs. Even though in 1994 an entirely new Supreme Court took office, the judiciary has been reluctant to deal with human rights abuses dating from the civil war; in fact, only a small number of officers have ever been brought to trial.[42] Letting the perpetrators of human rights abuses go free not only ignores the victims, many of whom were illiterate and poor peasants who—unlike the Argentine and Chilean victims of military rule who tended to come from more-socioeconomically privileged backgrounds—do not have the clout or media access to protest, but also sends a message of impunity to the contemporary criminal organizations. In 2010, President Mauricio Funes announced the creation of a state commission that would propose measures for the moral, symbolic, and material reparations of victims. Signs of growing military openness toward society began to appear in the mid-1990s. After 1994, the new high command, led by Defense Minister Col. José Humberto Corado, was ready to engage civilians

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[40]Interview with Carlos Dada, editor of the San Salvador daily *El Faro* (Austin, TX, 18 November 2010).
[41]Red de Seguridad y Defensa de América Latina, *A Comparative Atlas of Defence in Latin America* (Buenos Aires: Ser en el 2000, 2008), 199.
[42]For a comparative perspective, see Mark Ensalaco, "Truth Commissions for Chile and El Salvador: A Report and Assessment," *Human Rights Quarterly* 16 (November 1994): 656–675.

in dialogue concerning the army's future role.[43] Conferences were organized on civil-military relations, military officers lectured at civilian universities, and a new School of High Strategic Studies was established in 1993 that served the educational needs of not just military officers but civilians as well.[44] The School, along with a number of emerging NGOs began to train independent civilian experts on defense issues.

Two additional and related problems raise questions about the overall health of Salvadoran civil-military relations. The first has to do with the internal role of the armed forces. According to the Chapúltepec Agreement, the FAES is constitutionally limited to external security operations (defense from external threats) and providing help in national emergencies (this was to denote natural disasters). At the same time, the peace accords dissolved all three national police organizations and replaced them with a new National Civil Police (PNC). Partly because of the escalating and enduring crime wave and partly owing to political maneuvers and turf wars, through the years, the PNC has become a repressive organization that has been occasionally out of control.[45]

From our perspective, this is particularly germane because Salvadoran presidents starting in 1994 have allowed FAES troops to be used in Joint Task Force units (GTCs) with the PNC. These detachments are composed of 7 to 15 FAES troops under the command of one or two police officers. Also in 1994, nearly 7,000 FAES soldiers were deployed in the countryside, ostensibly to make up for the vacuum created by the lay-off of 400 corrupt counter-narcotics agents. When opposition politicians raised the issue, the government responded that the operation was legitimate because crime in rural areas had reached emergency proportions.[46] In addition, FAES personnel have also worked in the security detail at the National Airport in San Salvador, have been used to intimidate protesters and as back-up for PNC officers in crowd control operations, and have conducted roadblocks searching for gang members. To be sure, these practices stem not from FAES initiatives—in fact, the army leadership apparently is against them—but from orders placed on it by the executive and the powerful director of the PNC.[47] The problem is not so much that the military has been used

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[43]Williams and Walter, *Militarization and Demilitarization*, 169–170.
[44]Ibid., 170.
[45]For a more-general perspective on this issue, see Charles Call, "War Transitions and the New Civilian Security in Latin America," *Comparative Politics* 35 (October 2002): 1–20.
[46]Macías, *El Salvador: Reforma Militar*, 7.
[47]See Alfredo Gonzales, "Civil-Military Relations in El Salvador: Change, Continuity, or Transformation?," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Portland, OR, April 2004.

against the Mara gangs—transnational criminal organizations that have managed to penetrate Salvadoran political institutions and law enforcement agencies[48]—because the state simply has no one else to turn to. The problem is the constitution's very restrictive definition of the role of the armed forces that this practice directly contradicts.

The second troubling issue has to do with the first year of Mauricio Funes' presidency. Even though a major achievement of Salvadoran politics since 1992 has been the removal of military influence from political life, Funes has made a concerted and successful effort to court the military's support. Perhaps mindful of the military action that unseated Honduran President Manuel Zelaya in 2009, Funes has empowered the FAES and has dangerously broadened its role. Rather than terminating the practice of incorporating military personnel in domestic police operations, Funes has actually expanded it in direct violation of the peace accords. In doing so, the president might have voluntarily restored some of the political influence the top brass lost in the 1990s. Nevertheless, this is a calculated political move that Funes might have been forced to make by the crisis in public safety that shows no signs of abating; involving the military in the anti-Maras campaign was the answer to the widespread criticisms of his crime-fighting record. As a result, Funes has gained substantial political backing from the FAES leadership but, not unexpectedly, has undermined his own core support base in the FMLN.[49]

The Lebanese Army's Unique Path

The first tasks following the Ta'if Agreement were to expand state authority over the entire territory of Lebanon and to demobilize the different militias still in existence. The majority of the militias demobilized willingly, particularly when they saw that the LAF began to deploy to the greater Beirut area as early as December 1990 and then continued this operation throughout early 1991. The LAF raided the bases of non-cooperating militias, disarmed them and collected their weapons, often with the assistance of Syrian troops. The LAF's success in decommissioning the militias enhanced its legitimacy in most quarters of Lebanese society. Nearly all armed groups were entirely deactivated by the deadline (30 April 1991, as stipulated in the Ta'if Agreement). The progress the LAF made in extending its authority

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[48]See, for instance, Sonja Wolf, "*Maras transnacionales*: Origins and Transformations of Central American Street Gangs," *Latin American Research Review* 45 (2010): 256–265.
[49]Alexander Brockwehl and Juan Pablo Pitarque, "Concessions of a Leftist Party: The FMLN's Dilemma in the Face of Funes' Centrist Policies," *Council on Hemispheric Affairs Research Report*, 28 June 2010.

over the country was very gradual; the last illegal ports on the Mediterranean did not come under its authority until 1994.[50]

The demobilization of the militias was advanced by the 1991 amnesty law according to which no one would be held accountable for crimes committed during the civil war. The law was something akin to state-sponsored amnesia and did not prevent relatives of the thousands of individuals who disappeared during the conflict to challenge it.[51] Nonetheless, after 1991, most militias had transformed themselves into legitimate political parties, similar to the FMLN in El Salvador, and many of their erstwhile commanders had metamorphosed into prominent politicians. Therefore, prosecuting them would have been extremely costly in terms of the national reconciliation project. In Lebanon, as in many other contexts, the price of stability included letting the human rights violations of the past go unpunished.

In contrast to all other militias, Hezbollah, the Shia Muslim paramilitary organization, was allowed to continue its existence. Given Hezbollah's proven record as a guerrilla-fighting force and in view of the Syrian and Iranian support it has long enjoyed, it is quite likely that by the late 1990s, even if the Lebanese government had wanted to, it could not have rid itself of this militia. Quite simply, by this time, the LAF was no match for Hezbollah's 6,000–7,000 experienced and highly motivated fighters and its superior arsenal.[52] Furthermore, Lebanese political, social, and military elites concurred that the country's archenemy was Israel, and Hezbollah's uncompromising hostility to Israel, coupled with its effectiveness, made it an invaluable strategic ally. The LAF and Hezbollah have viewed each other as legitimate fighting forces in the name of the broadly defined national interest. While there is an element of competition and mistrust between the two, especially in instances of overlapping deployments, they also have a record of cooperation and intelligence-sharing on security operations.

Following its full-scale military intervention in Lebanon in 1976, Syria had stationed 15,000–25,000 troops on Lebanese soil for nearly three decades. After the Ta'if Agreement, the influence of Damascus further increased, allowing Syria to ensure that the LAF had pro-Syrian senior commanders and, more generally, to put its stamp on the development of

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[50]Barak, *The Lebanese Army*, 180–181.
[51]Karen Abi-Ezzi, "Lebanon: Confessionalism, Institution Building, and the Challenges of Securing Peace," in Vanessa E. Shields and Nicholas D.J. Baldwin, eds., *Beyond Settlement: Making Peace Last after Civil Conflict* (Teaneck, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2008), 163–164.
[52]Joseph A. Kéchichian, "A Strong Army for a Stable Lebanon," *The Middle East Institute Policy Brief* #19 (September 2008), 5.

the Lebanese defense sector.[53] The May 1991 Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination bolstered by the Syrian-drafted Defense and Security Agreement four months later served as the formal bases of Syria's clout in Lebanon's security domain.[54] Syrian troops remained in the country far longer than anticipated by the signatories of the Ta'if Agreement. After the former Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafiq al-Hariri, was assassinated in 2005, allegedly by Syrian agents, mass demonstrations protested excessive Syrian meddling in Lebanese politics. Concerted pressure from the United Nations and the international community eventually persuaded Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who must have realized that he did not need to keep thousands of troops in Lebanon to influence Lebanese politics, to withdraw his troops.[55]

In short, for 15 years after the Ta'if Agreement, the LAF did not have effective control of the portion of their country that was occupied by Syrian forces. The withdrawal of Syrian troops in 2005 redefined the LAF's role. Although Damascus continued to hold some sway over Lebanese military affairs—it offered training and provided weapons for the LAF's campaign against the Fatah al-Islam organization in 2007—its overall role has diminished.[56] The stipulations of the Ta'if Agreement regarding civil-military relations were implemented with few problems.[57] The president continues to be the "supreme commander" of the armed forces, although the cabinet's authority in the defense realm was expanded to include declaring states of emergency, war and peace, general mobilization, overseeing all intelligence services, and approving high-level LAF promotions. Protecting the homeland and, when necessary, assisting the Internal Security Forces in the maintenance of public order are the LAF's basic functions. The most-important constraint on the development of Lebanese civil-military relations, however, has been the continued existence of a large force free of state control: Hezbollah's military wing.

The reconstruction of the Lebanese Armed Forces was perhaps the most important component of increasing state authority in post-civil war Lebanon. As in Bosnia, integrating all major ethno-religious communities into the armed forces was the crucial undertaking of the LAF's reform, but while in Bosnia individual units were segregated by ethno-religious group, in

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[53]See, for instance, Farid el-Khazen, "Lebanon–Independent No More," *Middle East Quarterly* 8 (Winter 2001): 43–50; and Barak, *The Lebanese Army*, 179.

[54]Adam Nerguizian and Anthony H. Cordesman, *The Lebanese Armed Forces: Challenges and Opportunities in Post-Syria Lebanon* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009), 21–22.

[55]Ibid., 188–189.

[56]Nerguizian and Cordesman, *The Lebanese Armed Forces*, 22.

[57]This paragraph draws on Barak, *The Lebanese Army*, 164.

Lebanon they were integrated. Lebanese political elites aimed to eradicate the sectoral identity of soldiers to increase their loyalty to the LAF as a *national* institution in four steps. First, in a relatively short time, virtually all commanders (down to platoon level) were shuffled around different units. Soldiers and NCOs were also reassigned, but following a more-relaxed time-table. Second, the LAF leadership's objective was to set a 60:40 ratio between Muslims and Christians in each brigade and a 65:70 to 35:30 ratio among enlisted personnel in each brigade and battalion. Special forces, commando regiments, and the Republican Guard were assigned a 50:50 quota.[58] Former militiamen had the right to apply to the rapidly growing LAF (its personnel increased from about 25,000 in 1991 to 59,100 in 2010) but, in the end, only 6,645 of them, mostly Muslims, entered the LAF.[59] Actually, it was necessary to *recruit* Christians in order to maintain the ethno-religious equilibrium in the army. Between 1991 and 2004, the sectarian distribution of the officer corps shifted to 47 percent Christian and 53 percent Muslim, along with the growing proportion of Muslims in the country.[60]

Third, every six months, each battalion was to relocate to a different region to avoid the cultivation of special links between individual units and districts. Given Lebanon's modest size, this was not a particularly difficult initiative to put into practice. Finally, for the first time in the country's history, mandatory military service was introduced in order to promote the socialization and intermingling of Lebanese youth. Conscription ended in February 2007, because after 14 years, the government judged the LAF's integration a success and the conscription no longer necessary.[61]

The abolition of the draft underscored the LAF's success in a critically important respect: it has become a national army free of a sectarian identity and accountable only to the state. Military and civilian elites have portrayed the armed forces as "from all of Lebanon and for all Lebanon," whose pursuit of security was impartial and in accordance with legal regulations. Within a few years, the government succeeded and the LAF, like the Bosnian army, has become one of the country's most popular institutions, which is one of the reasons for the victory of two former Army Commanders,

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[58]Ibid., 177. See also Elizabeth Picard, *The Demobilization of the Lebanese Militias* (Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1999), 6–16.

[59]Ibid., 173. See also Kari Karamé, "Reintegration and the Relevance of Social Relations: The Case of Lebanon," *Conflict, Security, and Development* 9 (December 2009): 495–514.

[60]Nerguizian and Cordesman, *The Lebanese Armed Forces*, 9.

[61]*The Military Balance, 2008* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008), 251. See also http://www.lebarmy.gov.lb/English/FlagService.asp, accessed 9 March 2012.

Émile Lahoud (1998) and Michel Suleiman (2008), in recent presidential elections. The LAF is widely considered to be the country's most representative national institution.[62]

In spite of obvious achievements, the LAF has suffered from two ills, both rooted in its political environment. First, it remains a force with an insecure and weak command, primarily due to the steady pull of political, sectoral, and regional loyalties.[63] The LAF has shown itself to be hesitant to take action and is extremely risk averse lest it should jeopardize the delicate cross-sectarian make-up of its ranks. Second, the LAF has to coexist with Hezbollah's military wing as one of the two armed forces in the country. While the LAF is considered legitimate by all sectors of Lebanese society, Hezbollah is mostly seen as such by the approximately 27 percent-strong Shia Muslim community.[64] The state controls the LAF and recognizes the legitimacy of Hezbollah but certainly does not control it.

The summer 2006 Hezbollah–Israel war illustrated the LAF's ambiguous status as Lebanon's protector. The LAF made no attempt to disarm Hezbollah after its fighters attacked an Israeli patrol on the Israeli side of the Blue Line security zone. To be sure, the LAF was ill-equipped to do so, but its non-involvement confirmed the co-existence of two separate armies. During the 33-day war in southern Lebanon, the LAF acted as a bystander, committing only a few symbolic acts against the Israeli Defense Forces.[65] The war resulted in a Hezbollah victory of sorts and allowed 15,000 LAF troops to be deployed in formerly Israeli-held South Lebanon.[66] A National Dialogue to deliberate whether Hezbollah should lay down its weapons planned for that summer was indefinitely postponed, mainly because the militia once again demonstrated that it was a more effective force to fight Israel than was the LAF.

CONCLUSION

Building democratic armies after civil wars is a process that is quite different from building armies in other settings, such as following military rule, state socialism, or a colonial past. Let us now consider what patterns emerge from the three cases.

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[62]Nerguizian and Cordesman, *The Lebanese Armed Forces*, 10; Gaub, *Military Integration*, 60–62.
[63]Yezid Sayigh, "'Fixing Broken Windows': Security Sector Reform in Palestine, Lebanon, and Yemen," *Carnegie Papers #17* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 2009), 8.
[64]International Religious Freedom Report 2010 (U.S. Department of State), accessed at www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2010/148830.htm, 26 March 2014.
[65]For Hezbollah's 2006 war against Israel, see Thanassis Cambanis, *A Privilege to Die: Inside Hezbollah's Legions and Their Endless War Against Israel* (New York: Free Press, 2010), 39–54 and 63–97.
[66]See Anthony H. Cordesman, *Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007).

1. *The role of international actors.* The very nature of civil wars seems to necessitate an essential role to be played by extraneous political and, at times, military entities in ending the violence and resolving the conflict. It is no coincidence that all three peace accords we looked at were signed abroad and with the indispensable backing and participation of foreign negotiators (with the partial exception of Lebanon). Foreign actors usually but certainly not always (think of South Africa and Rwanda) also assume an important role in post-conflict engagement. Just which international organization or foreign state might be the best situated to take a leading role in mediation depends on the specific context. International organizations considered impartial— like the United Nations or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or the Organization of American States—are clearly preferable to individual states. When international organizations are not equipped, willing, or capable of stepping in, neutral states or states with no particular stake in the country plagued by conflict are best to turn to. In some instances, however, the conditions may be so desperate that they can be ameliorated by almost any state and/or international organization willing and able to help.

International organizations also hold an important trump card: the key to membership. The long-term prospects of Bosnia are brightened by the fact that future membership in NATO and the EU provide, in theory, at least, substantial long-term incentives to political elites to sort out their differences and learn to get along. For states eager to advance economic development, domestic political legitimacy, and popular approval, obtaining membership in a prestigious club like NATO or the EU signifies great achievement. But post-civil war states can gain much from the assistance and support of the international community in many other ways, too. Attracting direct foreign investment, being invited to participate in multinational projects, gaining positive media notice abroad can be equally important and profitable. At the same time, it is imperative that the foreign actor involved carry not just a carrot but also a stick, so that it is capable of deterring and, if necessary, punishing, non-compliance with treaty clauses and actions detrimental to reconciliation and political stability.

2. *The importance of peace agreements.* The peace accords that follow the end of civil wars are critically important in mapping and deciding future political, military, and social arrangements. Foreign intervention in the absence of a peace agreement is likely to trigger violent opposition by parties who value the pre-intervention status quo.[67] Peace settlements need to be

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[67]Stephen John Stedman, *Implementing Peace Agreements in Civil Wars* (New York: International Peace Academy, 2001), 10.

comprehensive and anticipate yet-unseen problems that might emerge (of civil-military relations and otherwise). The future political price to be paid for overlooking fundamental issues may be substantial. All three peace agreements we have considered had major flaws, mostly of omission and, to a lesser extent, ambiguity. Nonetheless, it needs to be recognized that at the time peace accords are negotiated, some issues might be too sensitive to deal with and some developments simply cannot be foreseen. It is useful to remind ourselves that the most-important aims of peace agreements are to stop the fighting and quickly demobilize, even if the rest of the process will be messy and contentious.

3. *Encouraging domestic responsibilities*. Weaning domestic actors off their reliance on international organizations as quickly as practicable is an important objective of post-civil war environments. Just how soon foreign players might leave depends, of course, on the individual context. Shutting down the UN mission in El Salvador in 1996, merely four years after the peace agreement, was entirely appropriate, just as 17 years after Dayton, terminating the presence of international organizations would still seem hasty. Domestic actors, including civilian leaders and experts as well as NGOs can make a major contribution to demilitarization and demobilization. The prospects of defense reforms will be enhanced if carefully vetted local military elites are allowed to play a substantive role in their conceptualization, planning, and implementation.

4. *Demobilization and related concerns*. The demobilization of forces and the reintegration of erstwhile combatants into civilian life are two of the most pressing goals of post-civil war democracy builders. The terms of demobilization must be precisely outlined in the peace agreements. The collection and destruction of excess weapons and ammunition are related tasks that, as we have seen in our case studies, are often very contentious. Owing to the lack of trust between former enemy forces, it is not surprising that they want to retain some strategic advantage or security guarantee that would enable them to resume fighting if necessary. Therefore, promoting transparency and building trust between the different sides through a variety of confidence-building measures implemented by impartial security institutions is critically important for long-term stability.

5. *Balancing personnel, promoting a national identity*. In post-civil war environments, the need to balance public sector positions from the chief executive and the army general to the postal employee and the corporal between the various former enemy communities assumes great significance.

Quotas are based on whatever issue divided the population and led to war, whether it was religion, ethnicity, regional origin, or social class. Apportioning jobs on the basis of identity may generate corruption, often dilutes the merit principle, might create jealousies and inefficiency, but, more importantly, is likely to go far in preserving peace.[68] In the military realm, putting ethno-religious quotas into practice is a similarly difficult endeavor that can be accomplished according to different methods and with varying levels of success. Nonetheless, fostering the creation of a truly national identity, particularly in the armed forces, is an important long-term objective.

In Bosnia, the unusual strategy of keeping soldiers in units segregated by religion may be in large part responsible for the preservation of division, aversion, and distance between different ethnic communities in the military. The LAF, like most post-conflict armies such as those of Guatemala, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and South Africa, has been fully integrated; this has generated no major sectarian problems. In Salvadoran army units, too, former guerrillas and government soldiers have quickly found a way to put the past behind them and concentrate on their tasks. As in many other settings, regular and intensive training not only helps the army's professionalization but also deepens its esprit de corps and common purpose.[69]

6. *The need for gradualism.* Virtually every aspect of post-civil war politics demonstrates the need for gradualism. Given that in civil wars, by definition, the warring sides know one another, healing the rift between them is likely to take far longer than between strangers after, say, a war between different states. For starters, the amount of time between the realization of opposing sides that a cease-fire and peace settlement are desirable and the actual signing of a peace agreement may be considerable. True reconciliation between the erstwhile antagonists is nearly always a long process; indeed it might take generations. At the same time, it must be relentlessly pursued because as long as politics is about identity rather than issues, nationalist and extremist parties will enjoy an influential political role at the expense of political organizations with more substance-oriented agendas.

In sum, notwithstanding the profound disparities between Bosnia, El Salvador, and Lebanon, several common themes have emerged regarding

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[68]Gaub, *Military Integration*, 14–16.
[69]Florence Gaub, *Rebuilding Armed Forces: Learning from Iraq and Lebanon* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute Monographs, May 2011), 22–27.

building armies after civil wars. Nevertheless, one is hard pressed to pinpoint a common thread with respect to the post-civil war military elites' commitment to democratic rule. In militaries divided along ethnic and religious lines, one's group membership is likely to trump all other loyalties, although in time, particularly given favorable political and social developments, commitment to democracy may become more robust and, eventually, might even dominate other forms of identity.

At the end of the day, the necessary involvement of outside actors, the imperative of demobilization, along with the need for gradualism, the need for power sharing and ethno-religious balancing all suggest that post-civil war environments require a delicate balancing act between all these and often some additional factors. Bringing former warring parties back together and then moving forward as one is what post-civil war settings are all about.