

The Journal of Public and International Affairs Published since 1886 by the **ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE**

Volume 128 - Number 4 - Winter 2013–14 www.psqonline.org

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"uncomplicated understanding and assessment of legal change" (p. 21). Corrigan also equates the anti-rape movement with government-funded rape crisis centers and then criticizes the movement for being too narrow. Corrigan's narrow focus on rape crisis centers means she misses much anti-rape activism. If she had expanded her study to include anti-rape advocates working outside of the criminal justice system, she might have found more of what she was looking for. For example, Corrigan criticizes the anti-rape movement for not developing "affirmative rights-based language" (p. 8) and failing to pursue unnamed "civil legal services" for sexual assault survivors, yet she only briefly mentions the crowning achievement of the anti-violence against women movement, the 1994 Violence Against Women Act's civil rights remedy. While this provision was struck down by the Supreme Court in 2000, it is a counter-example to the criticism that the movement only focused on the criminal justice system. Another is the recent Legal Momentum campaign to create workplace protections for sexual assault survivors who need time off from work to deal with the assault. Finally, she ignores the really exciting feminist work going on around community-based solutions to violence, like the work of the Women and Girls Collective Action Network in Chicago or Incite! Women of Color Against Violence in Redmond, Washington.

But the most glaring weakness is Corrigan's lack of attention to race. Corrigan says she had intended to focus on the "racial dimensions of institutional responses to rape" (p. 56), yet she excluded from her study advocates working for groups that "offer culturally specific programs for survivors of sexual violence" (p. 54). She states that she found it "fascinating" that she "heard very little talk about race from advocates" (p. 56) that she interviewed, but this does not seem surprising at all considering whom she chose to interview. She also excluded staff at university-based rape crisis centers, another locus of important feminist anti-violence work.

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Global Health and International Relations by Colin McInnes and Kelley Lee. Oxford, Polity Press, 2012. 205 pp. Cloth, \$69.95; paper, \$24.95.

I began exploring public health policy and politics 25 years ago in a world quite different from the one thoughtfully assessed in this analytically penetrating volume. Back then "health" uttered by a political scientist or economist nearly always meant "health care" construed as domestic public and private arrangements that delivered or financed the delivery of defined categories of services by doctors and hospitals. Questions of cost and access loomed large, as now, but primarily as concerns of individual national governments and with "public health" considered, if at all, as a decidedly secondary domain, especially in nations developed enough to have middle classes that took matters like immunizations and basic sanitation largely for granted. Analysts barely spoke of "global" anything, much less "global health," and international relations had only recently begun to blossom beyond its traditional terrain of state-centered security and diplomacy. As Colin McInnes and Kelley Lee recall, "Orthodox International Relations... created little space for the consideration of health issues. In particular, health appeared to International Relations scholars as a domestic concern largely unrelated to matters of international security" (p. 26).

These days, the intertwined global movements of people, products, principles, profits, and pathogens have compelled a transformative blend. McInnes and Lee capture a new analytic reality in an insightfully critical way. By employing a resolutely constructivist lens (using the now-commonplace notion of "narrative" to emphasize that understandings of reality arise within communities embracing assumptions that may go unchallenged) to examine the variety of frameworks that have emerged, they highlight a wide array of potentially problematic aspects embedded in ways of thinking that are, to some degree, embraced by nearly every significant analyst and policy actor on the global health scene.

They are, for example, deeply skeptical of the "New Outbreak Narrative" that highlights novel infectious disease threats as a focus for an emergent global health agenda. Despite the substantial appeal of the narrative, they say, it is important to note that "non-communicable diseases cause far higher rates of morbidity and mortality worldwide, killing over 36 million people in 2008... yet garner far less scholarly and policy attention." And even within the infection category, diseases with "epidemic potential" capture far greater attention than "others which account for a far higher global burden of disease" (p. 36). Thus this narrative offers, like every other, not an objective, value-neutral understanding of the world but rather one that "privileges certain interests and issues." Similarly, the authors argue that the narratives supporting the points of linkage between health and foreign policy have "privileged certain ideas, interests and institutions over others" (p. 53) such as security and governance over, say, human rights because this leaves the state, and those who serve it, in the driver's seat.

Approaching this book as an admitted past participant in bolstering the "new outbreak" obsession, I believe this book usefully synthesizes a vast ongoing discourse, pushing us to reconsider the values and interests lurking in an array of apparently "objective" analytic predispositions. One wishes that the authors had made a bit more of their concluding points, that "civil society is not necessarily always a progressive force" and that "greater plurality can mean an even greater lack of coherence in global health action" (p. 163). Moreover, frames like "social justice" and "human rights" may also empower identifiable interests, ideas, and institutions in ways that deserve some critical distance.

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Electoral Systems and Political Context: How the Effects of Rules Vary across New and Established Democracies by Robert G. Moser and Ethan Scheiner. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2012. 312 pp. Paper, \$29.99.

Electoral rules shape political competition, structure party systems, and influence voter behavior. Politicians and constitution writers often choose these rules to mold the kind of political system they prefer. But Robert Moser and Ethan Scheiner urge electoral engineers to proceed with caution: electoral institutions, they show, have different effects in new democracies than they do in established ones.

Since Maurice Duverger, scholars have predicted that single-member districts (SMDs), where a candidate is elected by plurality, promote two-party competition.

Because voters in these systems know that voting for uncompetitive candidates wastes their vote, they choose strategically between the two most-competitive candidates. In contrast, proportional representation (PR) offers voters a chance to cast sincere ballots, allowing parties to proliferate. Without discrediting these average effects, Moser and Scheiner identify a twist: in new democracies, it is difficult for voters and elites to behave strategically. Because party systems are poorly institutionalized and polling information is scarce, there is too much uncertainty in new democracies about which candidates are more competitive. As a result, SMDs in these settings do not limit the number of parties as they do in established democracies.

Disciples of Duverger also argue that socially diverse districts produce more parties only under PR. But Moser and Scheiner show that social diversity increases the number of parties regardless of electoral rules. And the relationship between diversity and party fragmentation, they find, is curvilinear: both very homogeneous and very heterogeneous districts have fewer parties than districts with middling levels of diversity.

Uncertainty and party fragmentation in new democracies also condition how electoral rules affect women's representation. Studies of established democracies find that PR systems tend to elect more women than SMDs. But