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are rather more ambiguous. Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe is an example. The author describes the second half of his leadership, when "greed begat greed and corruption more corruption" (p. 158). But in the first part of his career, Mugabe, as leader of the Zimbabwe liberation struggle, was seen as the savior of the Zimbabwean people, leading them from the bonds of a repressive government marked by racism and discrimination into a new era of prosperity, education, equality, and advancement. His first wife Sally, the "Mother of the Nation," provided a humanizing and stabilizing influence and a constraint against the more-florid expressions of his self-aggrandizing personality that were increasingly to flower after her death in 1992. In contrast, his second wife, 40 years his junior, who is known as "Grasping Grace," has encouraged flamboyant personal excesses while neglecting his nation's disintegration. Had he stepped down when he had successfully brought his independent nation to power, under the guidance of Sally, he would have been recorded as a nation builder and achieved heroic status in his nation's history, and could well have been in the first section of this volume. Similarly, one of the heroic leaders the author depicts, Kemal Ataturk, was by no means without flaws. In his zeal to establish a homogeneous ethnic population of Turks, he denied commitments he had made in 1923 when he spoke of creating a pluralistic nation of Turks and Kurds. His duplicity in violating this commitment is at the foundation of the Kurdish problem, and of the Kurdish extremism that exists to this very day.

This mild criticism aside, this is a thoroughly excellent volume on the important topic of leadership in the developing world.

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Warlords: Strong-Arm Brokers in Weak States by Kimberly Marten. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2012. 280 pp. $35.00.

Some countries do not have effective domestic sovereignty. In these "weak states," the central government lacks the will or capacity to enforce contracts, punish criminals, or deter terrorists in all parts of the internationally recognized territory. Kimberly Marten's new book, *Warlords: Strong-Arm Brokers in Weak States*, chronicles how order is subcontracted. Marten defines warlords as "individuals who control small pieces of territory using a combination of force and patronage" and who "rule in defiance of genuine state sovereignty but through the complicity of state leaders" (p. 3). What exactly is meant by "complicity of state leaders" varies substantially by context, but at base, Marten employs an extended delegation metaphor: "the principal actor (the state) relies on an agent (the warlord) to fulfill assigned tasks"

(p. 30). The empirical chapters then take the reader on a sweeping tour of the peripheries of Iraq, Russia, Georgia, and Pakistan. *Warlords* demonstrates that in all of these places, state officials can be either hoodwinked or coerced into letting charismatic local authorities build their own invisible patronage networks. Though the theoretical insights are neither new nor controversial to students of comparative politics, the particulars of why resources are funneled to local violence entrepreneurs at the periphery of empire make for a compelling read.

A virtue of Marten's principal-agent framework is that it allows the reader to identify the state in bas-relief, the backdrop against which the warlord moves. What is foreclosed by this approach is the possibility that the state itself is nothing more than a contingent bargain between violence entrepreneurs, as proposed by Harrison Wagner (2007) in his discussion of Rousseau's stag hunt. This is not an abstract theoretical problem, but an empirical one. Consider Georgia or Tajikistan circa 1994. "The state" was quite obviously a group of warlords that had colluded together to seize the capital and install a figurehead civilian president. Manipulating the boundary between the coalition of warlords that are allowed to *become* the state and the warlords that are left adrift to be criminalized and jailed was the practical stuff of civil war settlement. But these politics are obscured by a definition that treats warlords as already and always distinct from the state.

The book concludes with 11 provocative hypotheses, obviously meant to provide signposts for future policy elites. After so many pages of the textured case data, a return to decontextualized abstractions was jarring. Marten's bottom line seems to be that waltzing with warlords, expedient in the short run, trades off with state legitimacy in the long run, and is only defensible if "warlords truly are the least bad alternative" (p. 200).

Marten pivots between roles, variously presenting herself as an academic specialist, investigative journalist, and editorial essayist. Opinions and speculations on the optimal American foreign policy, or on "social evolution" of distant societies (p. 62), are too often presented as if they were well-established factual statements. But with that said, for North American teachers looking to introduce the North Caucasus with a lively seminar discussion, I recommend assigning chapter 5, Marten's biography of Ramzan Kadyrov—the archetype of the charismatic, media-savvy (p. 133), self-aware, celebrity gangster. He has money, weapons, sociopaths on speed-dial, political protection from great powers, and a twitter feed @RKadyrov. The story of how this man came to bind himself to the fortunes of Moscow's ruling class is essentially the story of the settlement of the Second Chechen War.

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