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POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

Volume 127 · Number 3 · Fall 2012

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Political Science Quarterly

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60 days of hospital insurance for those under Social Security to a much broader combination of that expected hospital coverage, physician insurance (Part B), and Medicaid. For Starr, this becomes the key explanatory predicate for why American medicine became both more complicated and, because key groups like the elderly were now protected, how that complexity and interest group defensiveness helped frustrate incremental adjustments to the 1965 moment of reform.

Here there is a causal issue to note. If incrementally expanding Medicare was blocked by the expanded 1965 reforms, how does that square with the incremental history of Canadian health reforms? Throughout this part, Starr is telling largely a U.S. story, with a backdrop on how the United States differs from the sequencing of health and welfare state reform in Western Europe. But that is the wrong comparator. Canada is our most similar sibling. Canada proceeded to universal health insurance in steps over 14 years. Why is incrementalism a policy trap in the United States but not in Canada?

Starr's account of both of the two U.S. cases of reform touches on an enduring problem with historical portraits that provide explanatory and evaluative appraisals. Telling how events unfold does not explain why they did so or whether the result was worthy. In Starr's reform examples, one could argue that each president adopted the wrong strategy. In 1993–94, Clinton pursued the wrong plan unsuccessfully. In 2009–10, Obama and the Democrats succeeded at legislating what turned out to be a flawed strategy. Both of these conclusions are compatible with the narrative of Starr's new book, but are not addressed seriously. They surely will be in the literature to come in the wake of reform's continuing uncertainty.

THEODORE MARMOR
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Hegemony in International Society by Ian Clark. New York, Oxford University Press, 2011. 296 pp. \$55.00.

Is legitimacy necessary for hegemony? This question was thrown into sharp relief under the George W. Bush administration, when the United States was generally seen as having the capacity, and resolve, to pursue its own agenda in complete disregard of other states' preferences. Controversially, Ian Clark claims that American hegemony was already lost in the 1970s. And because America never regained legitimacy, it could not bring back the hegemony it once had, despite material primacy.

Clark's two goals are to show that social legitimation is a constraint on hegemony and that both a concentration and a diffusion of power can lead

to stability. He does a fine job of summarizing the different interpretations of hegemony in the English School tradition. From that perspective, institutions are inter-state practices and relationships through which social control is used to realize common goals. He convincingly argues that hegemony qualifies as a primary institution but does not attempt to resolve why certain inter-state practices count as institutions whereas others do not. Clark develops a taxonomy based on two variables: the composition of hegemony and the social constituency legitimating hegemony. Composition is about who exercises hegemony—a single or several great powers. Social constituency is about who subscribes to hegemony—all states or just a subset of them. Legitimacy can come into consideration in two ways: shared understandings between great powers or acceptance by a social constituency.

The idea of shared hegemony among many great powers is very interesting but not without problems. In particular, it seems difficult to establish hard indicators separating collaboration under collective and coalitional hegemony, given that singular hegemony will involve some cooperation with great powers based on agreed norms.

Clark's categories of hegemonic composition and social constituency segue nicely into procedural and outcome legitimacy, but he does not say when or why great powers follow the logic of appropriateness rather than the logic of interest. Moreover, Clark is not sufficiently clear about how much drift from rules is tolerated or how much normative disagreement is acceptable. Since not all discord is destabilizing, it is uncertain when a loss of legitimacy will lead to loss of a hegemonic position.

The discussion about system stability is illuminating. Clark regards singular hegemony as inherently unstable and a rare phenomenon. Singular hegemony is only legitimated by the social constituency, whereas collective hegemony has the advantage of being legitimated by both other great powers and the social constituency. When power is concentrated with a single hegemon, acceptance is harder to achieve and more directly related to public good benefits. Therefore, singular hegemony will tend to morph into coalitional hegemony with a limited support base or a collective hegemony. Collective hegemony is more stable because of power dispersal and double-checks on legitimacy but less efficient because of internal disagreement. The special case of cohesive collective hegemony could have been usefully explored.

The author skillfully reviews three instances of hegemony—the Concert of Europe and British and American hegemony. The Concert is seen as a collective hegemony and raises the prospect of several simultaneous hegemonies. But the issue of space and time division does not resolve the possible co-existence of these hegemonies in analytical terms. Nor does the account of singular British hegemony sufficiently problematize who

composes the constituency. By leaving out the views of the Indian masses and of the general population of the West Indies, the author seems to imply that empires are intrinsically legitimate, thus missing important interpretations of legitimacy. With regard to the United States, Clark develops the claim that America's coalitional hegemony ends after the 1970s using three cases. The analysis spans Asian regionalism to the Security Council to climate change, but this just is not persuasive in the absence of the economic dimension.

Clark's creative re-theorization of hegemony is a valuable contribution to international relations theory that will fuel many interesting conversations.

CARLA NORLOFF
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Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order by G. John Ikenberry. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2011. 392 pp. \$35.00.

Reading this book makes me feel like I have dropped into a lively cocktail party for leading international relations scholars. The host, G. John Ikenberry, confidently and constantly engages his many guests (generously identified in the notes). The assembled speak in a special but accessible lingo (with frequent reference to hegemony, unipolarity, power balancing, and grand strategy), and they seem preoccupied with the practical puzzle posed by the George W. Bush administration's response to September 11. How much did it undermine the U.S. international position and what policy course might best serve in its aftermath?

Ikenberry's answer is familiar. He posits a golden age of American internationalism. Emerging from World War II as the dominant power, the United States moved quickly to become the presiding presence, putting in place and then sustaining a liberal order marked by openness and governed by negotiated rules. The Bush years thus represent a fall from grace. The serious post-September 11 deviation from enlightened leadership failed disastrously and eroded legitimacy, that precious commodity essential to the exercise of hegemony. In looking ahead, Ikenberry takes the cheery view that neither U.S. leadership nor the liberal system that the United States helped put in place is lost. The system, he argues, is durable, and the United States can recover much if not all of the clout it once had. A renewed respect for a rule-based international order and renegotiation of aspects of that order with the other great powers should get U.S. policy back on track and on top.