

of assistance in favor of unilateral intervention, but again we see a shift toward multilateralism as the mission transitions to state-building. Finally, in Iraq, we see how misperceptions about both the urgency of the situation and the commitment involved result in a largely unilateral intervention, with little possibility of substantive multilateralism due to the U.S. alienation of its allies.

While the book focuses on U.S. interventions, Kreps is making a broader point about when powerful states choose multilateralism. All states considering intervention face the same trade-offs between unilateralism and multilateralism, though most have less potential for unilateral intervention than the United States. One particularly interesting observation Kreps makes is that the heavy U.S. reliance on multilateralism may be because of its power preponderance, not despite it. The United States has been able to use its power to help build coalitions, by offering putative allies incentives to join it; so as its power declines, we may see a shift away from multilateralism.

Overall, this book is definitely useful to scholars interested in multilateralism, as well as to anyone generally interested in post-Cold War U.S. military interventions.

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Playing Our Game: Why China's Rise Doesn't Threaten the West
by Edward S. Steinfeld. New York, Oxford University Press, 2010.
280 pp. \$27.95.

As China's economy grows larger and the country more powerful, most scholars are focused on the distinctive nature of the Chinese state and the depth of its intervention in the economy. China is often identified as an East Asian developmental state, or as representing a new model of development distinct from the West. Edward Steinfeld of MIT asserts that these interpretations overlook the fundamental transformation that Chinese society writ large has undergone during the past two decades to become much more Western than most observers recognize.

The driving force of change has been globalization. To be successful in a global economy, Chinese companies and the government have had no choice but to change their stripes. Whereas most observers look at economies country by country, company by company, Steinfeld implores us, through a breakdown of products such as the iPhone, to show that firms are rarely vertically integrated and instead are small cogs in widely fragmented production networks that stretch from Atlanta to Anshan and from Silicon Valley to Shenzhen.

To fit in, Chinese enterprises have reconstituted themselves into Western-style companies, with huge consequences for internal governance and external oversight. He identifies how, in a process he calls "institutional outsourcing," basic regulatory structures for the economy, from rules governing cross-border

transactions to intellectual property protection and financing institutions such as stock markets, have been imported en masse. Even China's approach to foreign currency, derided in Washington, has changed dramatically since the mid-1990s. China's currency peg is maintained not by fiat but through open market operations. "Participation in global production," Steinfeld writes (p. 121), "requires harmonization of certain core domestic practices with prevailing global norms. Put simply, capitalism with Chinese characteristics is fine on the margins, but not at the core. In its most elemental social constructs and rules, China today is defined not by its own version of capitalism but rather by that of the world's leading commercial pacesetters, Western companies and consumers."

Steinfeld demonstrates his point by reviewing the attempted acquisition of Unocal by state-owned China National Offshore Oil Corporation. Whereas Richard McGregor (*The Party*, 2010), sees the large hand of the state behind the scenes, Steinfeld describes a company that could be of any nationality egging Goldman Sachs and J.P. Morgan on to acquire Unocal as part of the standard game played by big majors in the industry.

Steinfeld provides an invaluable service in detailing the global context in which Chinese firms and policymakers are situated as they engage the world. China's location in global production networks both constrains and defines their behavior. At the same time, Steinfeld carries his argument further than deserved. China has adopted a slew of foreign regulations and procedures, and it is far from certain that they have redefined how industry operates in practice. China has boards of directors and stock markets, but these are not critical levers of corporate governance; the Chinese Communist Party is still highly influential down to the firm level. China has an intellectual property rights law, but such rules are not widely valued or integral to company business strategies. If there is wide variation in capitalism from the United States to Western Europe to Japan and Latin America, it should surprise no one that China also has some distinctive features.

Steinfeld also has an overly benign view of the West's "rules of the game" and the "game" itself. He sees no fault in the rules and norms regarding corporate governance, finance, and technology, to name a few. He shuts the door on the possibility that in its quest to adopt Western norms, China may be acquiring some of the West's pathologies. Western corporate governance mechanisms did not stop Wall Street, the Federal Reserve, and credit rating firms from generating the global financial crisis. Chinese reforms may not threaten the West, but if China blindly adopts Western practices, it will not naturally lead to beneficial outcomes for China or others. And even though many Chinese firms see themselves as part of positive-sum relationships with Western counterparts, many Chinese companies hope to move up the value-added chain and vanquish their foreign rivals. And certainly, many in the Chinese government hope that with greater economic success will come greater international influence. Games are not just about following the rules, but about winning and losing. China may not be a threat to the capitalist system, but

we should not overlook the fact that within this context, there is still extensive corporate and political competition between China and others.

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Politics and Strategy: Partisan Ambition and American Statecraft
by Peter Trubowitz. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2011.
200 pp. \$24.95.

In the twenty-first century, the numerous and diverse challenges—security, economic, political—that the United States faces in a highly interdependent international system point to the need for an overarching grand strategy to guide foreign policy making. But the obstacles to developing such a strategy can be daunting, both substantively, in identifying long-term interests and the resources to achieve them, and politically, in building support for a doctrine to reshape policy priorities and choices. Peter Trubowitz’s ambitious undertaking to examine the development of grand strategy from the origins of the American Republic to the present significantly advances prospects for achieving such far-reaching goals.

To understand how grand strategies are created, this book identifies two contextual considerations that have consistently shaped their development over time: the risks in the international system, particularly the presence of a potential aggressor; and the domestic political environment, specifically political costs and benefits from investing in defense over social-welfare policies. Given these considerations, two variables serve to establish a fourfold classification for grand strategies, namely, ambition and cost. Highly ambitious states that are willing to expend resources on military capabilities tend to pursue imperialist strategies. States with lesser ambitions but extensive military resources typically pursue status quo strategies, though they may at times engage in preemptive war to maintain their place in the international system. Highly ambitious states that are not willing to sustain high military expenditures may pursue subversive strategies, such as blackmail, to achieve their ends. And less-ambitious states that keep defense spending low are likely to pursue such strategies as appeasement, isolationism, or neutrality.

After presenting this classification, the book examines a series of case studies from the nation’s founding into the twenty-first century, thereby illustrating how the model endures through the evolution of the American political system and the rise of the United States as a great power. In so doing, it skillfully presents new perspectives on traditional interpretations of grand strategies. Appeasement, for example, is commonly viewed as a failure of leadership by the head of state. This book makes the case that appeasement is better understood as competing challenges of threats from a foreign aggressor as well as domestic pressure to limit defense spending. Consequently, “In the context of the tug of war between foreign and domestic priorities,