

some times and excluded at others. This would go a long way toward seeing just how compromised American health care policy is.

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Coalitions of Convenience: United States Military Interventions after the Cold War by Sarah E. Kreps. New York, Oxford University Press, 2011. 240 pp. \$27.95.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States was left alone with an unusual degree of power preponderance. Such a position of preponderance could have led to a series of unilateral military interventions, but instead, the United States has intervened multilaterally more often than not. In *Coalitions of Convenience*, Sarah E. Kreps offers a convincing explanation for this mixture of unilateralism and multilateralism.

Kreps argues that powerful states like the United States choose multilateralism not because they value it for its own sake, but because doing so helps conserve their power while reassuring other states about their intentions. However, these benefits come at a cost. Multilateralism typically requires time-consuming negotiations prior to the intervention, and may also require that the lead state make significant concessions to gain allies. Kreps argues that because of this combination of costs and benefits, the choice of strategies is sensitive to the perceived urgency of the situation and the perceived costs of intervention. When there is an urgent need to act, states will favor unilateral action, since multilateralism is so time-consuming. Where the situation is less urgent, multilateralism is more attractive as a way of conserving power. However, this depends on the expected costs of intervention. If those are low, there is no need for burden-sharing, so any multilateralism may be formal rather than substantive. Conversely, if the expected costs are high, states have strong incentives to intervene multilaterally.

The majority of the book consists of four well-written and interesting case studies in which Kreps tests her argument against alternate explanations for the observed behavior. These case studies—the Gulf War, the 1994 intervention in Haiti, and the Afghanistan and Iraq wars—include a nice variety of strategic situations. Of particular interest are the three case studies in which the level and type of multilateralism varies. In the Gulf War, the urgent need to protect the Saudi oil fields leads to a unilateral intervention, followed by the construction of a coalition to accomplish the much more challenging task of expelling the Iraqi forces from Kuwait. In Haiti, expectations of little resistance result in an initial intervention that is only formally multilateral, but which converts into a truly multilateral operation as the mission transitions to the more-challenging long-term task of state-building. In Afghanistan, the desire to quickly respond provides a powerful incentive to reject offers

of assistance in favor of unilateral intervention, but again we see a shift toward multilateralism as the mission transitions to state-building. Finally, in Iraq, we see how misperceptions about both the urgency of the situation and the commitment involved result in a largely unilateral intervention, with little possibility of substantive multilateralism due to the U.S. alienation of its allies.

While the book focuses on U.S. interventions, Kreps is making a broader point about when powerful states choose multilateralism. All states considering intervention face the same trade-offs between unilateralism and multilateralism, though most have less potential for unilateral intervention than the United States. One particularly interesting observation Kreps makes is that the heavy U.S. reliance on multilateralism may be because of its power preponderance, not despite it. The United States has been able to use its power to help build coalitions, by offering putative allies incentives to join it; so as its power declines, we may see a shift away from multilateralism.

Overall, this book is definitely useful to scholars interested in multilateralism, as well as to anyone generally interested in post-Cold War U.S. military interventions.

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Playing Our Game: Why China's Rise Doesn't Threaten the West
by Edward S. Steinfeld. New York, Oxford University Press, 2010.
280 pp. \$27.95.

As China's economy grows larger and the country more powerful, most scholars are focused on the distinctive nature of the Chinese state and the depth of its intervention in the economy. China is often identified as an East Asian developmental state, or as representing a new model of development distinct from the West. Edward Steinfeld of MIT asserts that these interpretations overlook the fundamental transformation that Chinese society writ large has undergone during the past two decades to become much more Western than most observers recognize.

The driving force of change has been globalization. To be successful in a global economy, Chinese companies and the government have had no choice but to change their stripes. Whereas most observers look at economies country by country, company by company, Steinfeld implores us, through a breakdown of products such as the iPhone, to show that firms are rarely vertically integrated and instead are small cogs in widely fragmented production networks that stretch from Atlanta to Anshan and from Silicon Valley to Shenzhen.

To fit in, Chinese enterprises have reconstituted themselves into Western-style companies, with huge consequences for internal governance and external oversight. He identifies how, in a process he calls "institutional outsourcing," basic regulatory structures for the economy, from rules governing cross-border