

Two other chapters review how states and cities can play a role alongside the federal government.

Perhaps the most-idiosyncratic yet also the most-original chapter discusses what the United States can learn from the rapid evolution and then sudden decline of the Irish “Celtic Tiger” economy. The authors’ distillation of the Irish response to economic adversity reflects the tenor of the book as a whole: “There are clear lessons that America and its states can take away: Fund R&D, partner with business, establish good government, think beyond the moment, and stay focused and strategic—as if your life depends on it. Because it does” (p. 109).

Much of what is covered in *Adrift* will be familiar to political scientists or to non-specialist readers who closely follow politics. However, its snapshots of the current ailments facing the United States could be useful to students or to those who wish to familiarize themselves with key ongoing policy debates. Ultimately, the most valuable feature of *Adrift* may be its optimistic tone amidst deep societal pessimism, and its persistent conviction that constructive reform is still possible at a time when “hope” and “change” have become as much the punch lines to jokes as realizable political goals. The authors advance a centrist, incrementalist vision—which in itself is no small achievement in the era of both the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street.

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Cosmopolitan Power in International Relations: A Synthesis of Realism, Neoliberalism, and Constructivism by *Giulio M. Gallarotti*. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2010. 326 pp. \$29.00.

Power is integral to world politics. This statement is hardly controversial, yet what constitutes power is among the most-contested questions in international relations theory. Realists contend that hard power—the coercive use of military might—is the primary determinant of behavior and outcomes in the international system. In contrast, neoliberals and constructivists argue that “soft power”—the capacity to get what one wants through persuasion rather than coercion—is as important, if not more so, than military might.

Such academic battles, Giulio M. Gallarotti argues, are neither necessary nor fruitful. Realists, neoliberals, and constructivists can find productive common ground in what Gallarotti terms “cosmopolitan power.” Cosmopolitan power is, in essence, a balance between the hard and soft power sources. For Gallarotti, this means that nations must marry coercive power with respect for international norms and law, multilateralism, alliances, a sense of collective interest, and economic openness (p. 30). This synthesis of hard and soft power not only bridges theoretical paradigms, but provides a prudent path for policymakers as well. When military giants abide by existing rules and embrace liberal norms, other states come to admire the leading power, embracing

the leading power's own goals and interests as their own (p. 49). In contrast, states that rely solely on military coercion are likely to be faced with "hard disempowerment," (p. 52) stripped of their effective influence through either balancing or overextension. Gallarotti calls for nations to embrace an "optimal diversity" (p. 48) of hard and soft power, to seek balance in the forces of coercion and persuasion in international politics.

Gallarotti's concept of cosmopolitan power adds to international relations literature calling for increased synthesis among international relations paradigms. He effectively demonstrates that paradigmatic disputes over power are overblown, devoting two chapters to demonstrating that classical realists from Thucydides to Machiavelli to Morgenthau all took soft power seriously. Gallarotti, moreover, makes a compelling case that neoliberals and constructivists too often emphasize norms and rules as constraints, rather than sources of power in world politics. His case studies of British and U.S. economic leadership, as well as U.S. cultural hegemony, suggest instances in which norms facilitated rather than constrained great powers in international politics.

Gallarotti's book raises two critical questions, however. First, to what extent is it possible to separate the effects of hard and soft power, as Gallarotti has defined them in this work? Gallarotti insists that "soft power" is not the same as "intangible" or "ideational" power. Soft power is about acting in accordance with liberal principles (p. 37); the source of power might very well be based in tangible resources, be it military or economic might (think humanitarian intervention or global free trade). But if both hard and soft power stem from the same source, how are we to know the difference? This becomes particularly challenging in Gallarotti's discussion of British and American economic hegemony: did other states emulate these countries because they were "endeared" (p. 21) to soft power, or because emulation made good economic sense? Second, in attempting synthesis among the paradigms, one wonders if Gallarotti has captured the range of paradigmatic understandings of power. Notably, constructivists may be unified in their view that power is as much ideational as material, but many constructivists see ideational power as being coercive as well as persuasive. A search for synthesis may be productive, but it is worth evaluating the costs of such an enterprise, particularly when privileging a liberal conception of power in international politics.

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Power, Politics, and Universal Health Care: The Inside Story of a Century-long Battle by Stuart Altman and David Shactman. Amherst, NY, Prometheus Books, 2011. 492 pp. \$26.00.

While the impact of Barack Obama's 2010 health care initiative will not be known for some time, Stuart Altman and David Shactman make clear that