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the Gulf War, and recession (chap. 3), as well as to case studies on inaugural addresses and state of the union messages (chap. 4) and public events (chap. 5), *A Presidency Upstaged* reviews the largely critical media commentary on this strategy. Illustrated are the intricacy, occasional successes (Kuwait, for example), and foibles of weeks-long, coordinated message campaigns, the considerations that went into them, and how hostage some became to coordination challenges and events. Interesting nuggets of their fates include how Bush actually exceeded the number of public events Reagan did (showing how modern presidents cannot avoid this exposure), the press' penchant for the analysis of "style" and Bush's increasing frustration with it, how CBS consistently provided less-positive coverage than other networks and was given less access in turn, and how the relationship further soured as the press felt manipulated during the Gulf War.

The book brims with irony and paradox as it chronicles the substance, sources, and progressive deterioration of Bush-media relations over his term. These include how enhanced press "access" bred media charges that he was too accessible and not presidential enough—after chiding Reagan for the opposite. Noted, too, is the paradox of a president suited well for earlier media eras, but ill-suited for a media focused on critical commentary rather than hard news reporting, as well as on gaffes, personalities, and conflict. Illuminated is the dysfunctional relationship of the U.S. press with contemporary governance, and the perverse media business model incentives driving those actions.

These strengths notwithstanding, a major weakness of *A Presidency Upstaged* is not dealing adequately with an obvious question: If the Bush communication strategy was so deficient and the messenger so flawed, why were his polling numbers so high until the final year of his administration? Consistent 60 percent-plus ratings exceeding Reagan's and Clinton's even prior to the Gulf War suggest success, not failure. Perhaps communications strategies really do not matter; events make good strategies look bad or bad strategies look good. Is it really a mistake to develop a communications strategy to avoid a president's weaknesses or preferences? Or was the mistake one of execution? Readers looking for clear answers to this puzzle will be disappointed. Still, *A Presidency Upstaged* is worthwhile reading, showing how strategy, tactics, presidential predisposition, events, and personalities interacted to affect Bush's public presidency—and probably the efforts of all presidencies.

ROBERT F. DURANT
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China, the United States, and Global Order by Rosemary Foot and Andrew Walter. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2010. 352 pp. \$32.99.

China's relationship with the rest of the world is increasingly pivotal to the existing international order, and progressively more complex. Yet, academics

and policymakers alike have found it exceedingly difficult to come to terms with these trends. In contrast, Rosemary Foot and Andrew Walter's remarkable *China, the United States, and Global Order* comprehensively elucidates the main dynamics within contemporary Chinese (and American) foreign policy, and does so in a manner that is both conceptually sophisticated and empirically rich. The book weaves together three broad issues: global governance, great-power politics, and international regimes. It asks to what degree China and the United States have contributed to the contemporary global order, how much both actors are constrained by this production (and its attendant international regimes), and to what extent their relationship with each other is both framed by, while at the same time constitutive of, such a construct.

While this open-ended query might have resulted in a muddle in less-skilled hands, Foot and Walter deftly avoid such a pratfall by specifying in the opening pages of the book their main theoretical interests and how they are related to each other. The co-authors then utilize this introductory framework throughout the ensuing empirical chapters that examine the manner in which China and the United States have acted in regard to the use of force, macroeconomic policy surveillance, non-proliferation, climate change, and financial regulation. Each of these case studies easily stands alone, but they are also impressively tied to the book's broader themes of global order and compliance. In composite, the book argues that across each of these issue areas, policymakers in both Beijing and Washington have acted according to perceived national interests (with a particular eye toward domestic costs), but such rational decisions have also been framed by wider, if somewhat diffused, international normative factors.

This nuanced argument is both engaging and compelling. The work, however, has minor flaws. First, while the authors are remarkably disciplined in regard to utilizing the same organizational model for each chapter (and thus are able to present a tight survey of a broad array of trends and actors), their dedication in places leads to a degree of narrative repetition that might have been avoided if each section of the book had been allowed to develop more organically. Second, Foot and Walter never settle for simplifying claims about why Washington and Beijing take particular actions, yet such an aversion to parsimony at times seems to have prevented the co-authors from providing the reader with a clearer articulation of their core claims. Third, the book is encyclopedic in its scope, yet the rationale for case selection in the introductory chapter is both convoluted and not especially convincing. As a result, the failure to include a consideration of human rights and international trade issues in the body of the book is quite striking (especially as both would seem to speak directly to the work's central concerns).

Despite such small missteps, Foot and Walter's work should become required reading for anyone interested in China's current "rise," as it tells a convincing story about this development (while concurrently shedding light

on America's own role on the world stage). Moreover, it is among the first sustained academic treatments of how Sino–U.S. relations, and international order more broadly, have been impacted by the economic turmoil of the last several years. In light of these strengths, the book is certain to be of interest to both specialists and general readers as well.

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Governing for the Long Term: Democracy and the Politics of Investment by Alan M. Jacobs. *New York, Cambridge University Press, 2011.* 320 pp. \$90.00.

True enough: most of us get old. But whether we experience the financial security of a pension is an open question, one that is at the center of *Governing for the Long Term*, Alan Jacobs's well-written and engaging examination of the development of pension systems in democratic governments.

At the center of *Governing for the Long Term* is a puzzle familiar to political scientists. Common wisdom holds that democracies, characterized by elections at short-term intervals, are plagued by quick-fix and myopic policymaking. Politicians, catering to the demands of short-sighted voters, offer immediate benefits or defer painful policy choices in order to retain office. We should, thus, not expect democratic governments to invest in long-term policymaking.

And yet democratically elected governments across a range of ideologies often impose significant costs on a present electorate to achieve future policy goals—a clean environment, a healthy and educated population, or a secure financial safety net for the elderly. It is this reality, held up against common wisdom, that leads Jacobs to ask: “Under what conditions [do] governments adopt policies that, while costly in the short run ... deliver substantial net long-term social gains” (p. 38). It is a great question, and one that Jacobs makes the most of theoretically and empirically.

Jacobs constructs a compelling (albeit somewhat complicated) theoretical framework that argues that three conditions are necessary for policymakers to invest in the future. These are first, electoral safety: governments invest in the long term if they are shielded from voter retribution for their policy choices; second, positive long-run social returns: politicians must perceive the policy as a down payment for future gains; and third, institutional capacity: governments must have the institutional capacity to enact their policies.

Jacobs's contribution is to flush out the cognitive challenges that policymakers and interest groups confront when considering policy investments for which the benefits occur many decades into the future. Institutions matter, but so do ideas. How a policy is framed vis-à-vis its long-term impact, as well as mental maps (that is, public pensions are analogous to private insurance),