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He bolsters his quantitative results with well-chosen case studies that cover the full range of his independent (power projection/common enemy) and dependent (sensitive nuclear assistance) variables, including a nice treatment of selected "shadow cases" of non-assistance. Israel is his central case, an excellent comparison of why France, with its inability to project power but with a common rival (Egypt) in the area, chose to aid the Israeli program, but the United States, a superpower without such a rival, did not. He also takes on the primary case that would seem to disprove his argument, the Soviet Union's assistance to China, a state that the USSR could project power over, and makes a strong case that although power projection concerns were present, the desire to balance against the United States through China overrode these concerns.

However, he does underestimate the power of domestic political considerations to tilt assistance decisions. For example, he understates Charles de Gaulle's opposition to assisting Israel once he came into power, arguing that he "merely took steps to cover up the official role of the French government in assisting Israel's nuclear program" (p. 75). Yet, de Gaulle initially demanded a complete end to cooperation and an opening to inspections, and only after two years of bargaining was this position softened (see Avner Cohen's classic *Israel and the Bomb*). Similarly, the administrations of John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, and Richard Nixon all had very different positions toward Israel and China.

Such an underestimation does not undermine the book, however; rather, it simply suggests an additional avenue that future scholars who seek to understand the supply side of proliferation could investigate: the role that particular governments play in the ebb and flow of proliferation policy. This book is a must read for scholars of nuclear politics as well as for policymakers who seek to understand why countries would ever give away the secrets to the most powerful weapon in the world and why the United States has such a difficult time convincing others to back its nonproliferation policies.

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Going Local: Presidential Leadership in the Post-Broadcast Age *by Jeffrey E. Cohen. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2010. 256 pp. $26.99.*

This ambitious book focuses on presidential activities in the contemporary political environment that Jeffrey Cohen characterizes as marked by polarized political parties in Congress and fragmented mass media. Building on his own work (for example, the recent *The Presidency in the Era of 24-Hour News*) and the contextual theory that Samuel Kernell develops in the classic *Going Public*, Cohen connects presidential behavior to the organization of Congress and the mass media. As the shift from congressional institutional pluralism (which Cohen

identifies as prevailing 1953–1969 [p. 43]) to individual pluralism (1970–1988) helps explain presidents' increased emphasis on public activities covered by national media, so more-recent changes in political context have affected presidents' public behavior. Cohen argues that congressional polarization and media fragmentation (1989–present) help explain recent presidential efforts to more narrowly target constituencies via interest groups and local media. As an example of this tactical shift, Cohen notes President George W. Bush's schedule of domestic travel to circumvent his "national Pooh-Bahs" (p. 2) and build support for legislative initiatives.

Cohen documents a decrease in the ratio of major prime-time presidential addresses to minor speeches and an increase in the number of presidential appearances outside of Washington since 1989. From these he infers increased presidential targeting of narrow political interests, communicated via presidential events not intended for general public attention, and smaller geographic constituencies via travel. Cohen is more persuasive on the second point, recognizing the difficulty in systematically ascertaining the purposes of presidential events he tallies, the topics the president addressed in them, or the constituencies he intended to serve (pp. 44–45).

To gauge presidential effectiveness at news management, Cohen examines the relationship between presidential public activities and the quantity and tone of presidential news in 24 local newspapers in 2000, as well as the quantity of presidential coverage in 56 local newspapers and *The Washington Post* over time (1990–2007). He finds that presidents can effect more and better local coverage by making more speeches; the relationships between presidential speeches and the quantity and tone of these news stories are curvilinear. While these analyses suggest that local media are still covering the president in an era of press downsizing and transition from old to new media, these findings do not clearly suggest that presidents are targeting local news outlets in their speeches or favoring them over national media.

In the sweep of its argument, *Going Local* is a well-crafted and quite useful assessment of contemporary presidential press politics. However, the book's conceptual breadth may also limit Cohen's contribution. He defines two of his most-important concepts with intentional vagueness: *context* appears to encompass the entire "external political environment" (p. 20), and *presidential news management* consists of "all activities that presidents engage in to affect the content and other characteristics of their news coverage" (p. 73). More-precise definitions would help Cohen guide the reader to his measures—attributes of Congress and mass media for the contemporary context and the quantity of presidential speeches for news management. Were Cohen to identify presidential news management techniques more closely with the purposes of presidential events, the topics they covered, or who was invited to them, he would provide even more persuasive evidence that the president is targeting narrow interests and intentionally going local rather than broad and national. Cohen explicitly recognizes many of these concerns, and in spite of them, the work is pertinent

and compelling. *Going Local* contributes to our understanding of presidential activities as an able extension to research that underscores structural influences on contemporary presidents, a particularly fruitful line of research for political scientists.

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The Civil Rights Movement and the Logic of Social Change *by Joseph Luders. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2010. 264 pp. Cloth, $75.00; paper, $25.99.*

Following in the footsteps of such luminaries as C. Vann Woodward and V.O. Key, Joseph Luders questions the oversimplified view of the "solid South" by pinpointing the varied pressures Southern whites faced during the Civil Rights Movement. Across regions (Greensboro, New Orleans, Atlanta, Albany, Birmingham, Greenwood, Selma) and across issues (public school integration, voter registration, and desegregation of public accommodations), Luders disaggregates business interests (farmers, local merchants, professionals dependent on external investment, chain stores, manufacturing, and national corporations) and political variables (public opinion, mass attentiveness, and political mobilization) to illuminate the ways in which white Southerners calculated their support for or resistance to civil rights. By focusing less on the proponents of change and more on the targets of change, Luders successfully challenges the conventional approach, which tries to ascertain movement outcomes solely from the behavior of movement activists. Luders abstracts four archetypal targets of change (accommodators, resisters, vacillators, and conformers) and demonstrates how their respective cost–benefit analysis was historically contingent and strategically dynamic.

The most interesting insights have to do with his use of sectoral variation across business interests and his explanation for differential policing across the South. Countering the generalized presumption that economic development is inherently a moderating influence, Luders convincingly demonstrates that only certain kinds of economic development lend themselves to political moderation. Also, his analysis of differential policing breaks with the traditional narrative that divergent law enforcement responses stem primarily from differing personalities. Instead, Luders situates policing practices within a context of "specific local political incentives" (p. 111).

In other words, Luders reminds the reader that histories matter. But to what extent? Luders's critique of the "solid South" raises questions of its own. Luders's cost–benefit analysis characterizes racism as seemingly rational to the point that one wonders if there is anything distinctive about the South. The very fact of "calculating" the cost of racism also obscures the illiberal premises by which those calculations can even be posited. What partly made the South