The Academy of Political Science

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comparison of elected officials and urban professionals would have been very useful. California cities are justifiably concerned about environmental issues, traffic congestion, and urban sprawl, but these cities have a very different set of economic challenges than do slow-growth icons such as Seattle and Portland. Granted there has been some spillover discourse from these anti-growth icon cities in the north, but the current fiscal crisis of California interrupts the norm of deliberate and contextual thinking. What is also striking about this book is that there is little about the ongoing fiscal crisis of the state. California seems to be in an endless cycle of budget cuts and deficits.

Despite the weaknesses discussed above, *Custodians of Place* provides empirical evidence for understanding the operating norm of urban economic development professionals. In sum, Lewis and Neiman have produced an important book that should be read by students of urban politics and planning.

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Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security *by Richard K. Betts. New York, Columbia University Press, 2007. 264 pp. $26.95.*

What are the causes and consequences of, and possible solutions to, the problem of intelligence failure? Richard Betts, one of the most important and thoughtful analysts of intelligence and national security, addresses these questions in this collection of previously published essays and new material.

According to Betts, the intelligence enterprise faces three enemies that can frustrate its work. The first, "outside" enemies, are the targets of intelligence collection and analysis, such as foreign states or terrorist groups. Outside enemies seek to counter intelligence efforts by masking their true intentions and capabilities.

Outside enemies are the subject of many works on intelligence. Betts, in contrast, focuses on the second and third enemies he identifies. The second is "innocent" enemies who inadvertently undermine the goal of generating accurate and timely intelligence. Long-standing and often out-dated barriers to sharing intelligence across agencies, mismatches between the community's collection capabilities and current needs, or an intelligence workforce with the wrong skills or mindset to tackle contemporary problems are all examples of innocent enemies.

Betts argues that such innocent enemies get an unfair share of the blame for intelligence failures. This is why the responses to most intelligence failures focus on reforming the organization and processes of the intelligence community. For example, Betts discusses in some detail the two most recent major intelligence failures—not preventing the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,

and the conclusion that the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction. He documents how the major response to these failures—the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004—focuses a great deal of attention on organizational issues. The Act sought to encourage more sharing and coordination by creating a new Office of the Director of National Intelligence, to focus more of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's efforts on counterterrorism, and so on. The creation of the Department of Homeland Security a year earlier also focused heavily on organizational reform by merging a wide range of domestic security agencies into one cabinet-level department.

Betts's main argument is that such organizational reform can, at best, marginally improve the performance of the intelligence community. The reason is that effective intelligence collection and analysis faces a range of far more challenging "inherent" enemies. It is simply very hard to do intelligence well all or even most of the time. Outside enemies actively seek to conceal their goals and capabilities. Collection efforts provide analysts with information that is ambiguous. Intelligence analysts are subject to psychological biases in information search, retrieval, and analysis. There are trade-offs between sharing intelligence widely and ensuring that secrets are kept secure. These inherent enemies of accurately assessing and predicting the behavior of others are the most important and intractable sources of intelligence failures. The difficulties of inadequate organization, while real, are far less important. This is why the benefits of reorganization are always limited; indeed, too-frequent reorganization itself imposes costs on the intelligence community and can contribute to intelligence failures.

Many who work in the intelligence community, or who have studied its operation, will recognize the insight of these ideas. And Betts does not mean to suggest that the inherent difficulties of intelligence excuse failure or, more to the point, mean that no improvement is possible. Instead, he makes a range of suggestions for improving intelligence that rely less on organizational fixes and more on addressing the inherent enemies he identifies.

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The Politics of Income Inequality in the United States *by Nathan Kelly. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2009. 216 pp. $75.00.*

What do we know about inequality in the United States? There is a lot of it, more so than in other advanced countries. Inequality has also increased sharply since the early 1970s, again more so than in most other advanced countries. Underlying this rise in inequality is a host of structural changes, including globalization, immigration, skill-based technological change, and industry shifts.