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on the history of China–Russia relations clearly show that the prospect of discord between the Bear and the Dragon is at least as potent as the prospect of their alliance or cooperation against the United States.

Third—and even assuming that something could be intuitively divined from the historical narratives that are not in any way linked to the theoretical chapters—the design of the study does not allow for any credible inference. Only U.S.–China and Russia–China historical cases are explored—but to make the case of China–Russia versus the United States, one would need at a minimum to also include the historical case of U.S.–Russia. Finally, with or without linkages with any of the theoretical arguments, the author offers no guidance as to how much any event or fact means with respect to the putative outcomes (war, conflict, bargaining, rapprochement, etc.).

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On the Ethics of War and Terrorism by Uwe Steinhoff. *New York, Oxford University Press, 2007. 184 pp. \$55.00.*

Can terrorism, defined to mean “the direct attack on innocents for political purposes,” ever be justified? Uwe Steinhoff, a political philosopher at Oxford University, argues that there are indeed some circumstances in which the answer may be yes. Much of his analysis focuses on traditional just-war theory’s prohibition of attacks on noncombatants, and what he considers to be its unconvincing equation of noncombatants with “innocents,” who by virtue of their innocence must be immune from attack, even in a defensive just war. In essence, his argument is that adult civilians who support an aggressive and unjust war carried out by their democratically elected government are not truly innocent. He has in mind Israelis and Americans, and I shall argue that this creates real problems in his argument.

The problems inherent in just-war theory of defining “noncombatants” or “innocents” have long been recognized and addressed, so in this respect, Steinhoff’s argument is not a new one. Still, he has made a respectable case that attacks on noncombatants (terrorism) cannot be absolutely morally prohibited, if employed in a just cause which cannot be attained by any other method, but which might be attained by the resort to such attacks. The case that terrorism may be justifiable is particularly strong, he argues, when it is counterterrorism, directed against aggressor states that are using state terrorism as one of their methods of oppression—that is, when “the civilians of a weak people are systematically attacked by a strong aggressor, and where there is no other possibility to stop these attacks than the counter-attack on the innocent civilians on the other side” (p. 134).

The objections to such an argument are obvious; yet, it is my view that the argument is an important and challenging one. Unfortunately, he has placed

far too much emphasis on contemporary Israeli policies (as well as on U.S. support of those policies and on other American policies, such as the Iraq war). Israel, he argues, is the strong-state aggressor and the occupier, employing state terrorism against a weak people who are defending themselves and fighting for justice and liberty. While this reviewer largely agrees with this assessment of Israeli policies, Steinhoff gets himself into serious trouble when he argues that even though Hamas (a terrorist organization) refuses to recognize Israel's right of existence, it doesn't follow that it doesn't have a just cause, "because one may doubt the right to existence of a state with ... an exclusively 'Jewish identity'" (p. 16). What can that mean? Even if it means only that the Jews had no right to create a Jewish state in 1948, it is entirely unconvincing, in light of the plight of the Jews throughout centuries of history in general and the just-ended Nazi Holocaust in particular. Worse, even if it was an error—a moral error?—to have created a Jewish state in 1948, it would be entirely irrelevant to the question of whether it had a "right to existence" today. Put differently, a Jewish state was created in order to ensure that Jews had the right to exist; now its right to exist is in question *because* it is a Jewish state?

That bit of madness aside, Steinhoff has erred in placing such heavy emphasis on contemporary and controversial political issues as his primary examples in a book that is presumably intended to be a contribution to long-standing ethical theory about war. Indeed, some readers—and not without reason—are bound to question whether the main purpose of the book is to clarify important philosophical issues or to serve Steinhoff's obvious political agenda. If so, the author's provocative arguments about just-war theory may not have the impact that they otherwise might.

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A Pact with the Devil: Washington's Bid for World Supremacy and the Betrayal of the American Promise by *Tony Smith*. New York, Routledge, 2007. 296 pp. \$31.50.

The argument here is that neoconservatives and neoliberals are first cousins. Both subscribe to democratic peace theory, and think pretty much alike on key issues of spreading democracy around the world as the only path to international security. Throughout the Cold War, American policymakers were constrained—even in their hegemonic role—by an understanding of the limits of power. With the end of the Cold War, that perception disappeared. In its place arose the "Bush doctrine," in which there was no role for realist thinking. Realists had concentrated on the question, "Why War?" But that had been replaced by one favored by traditional liberals, "How Peace?" (p. 98).

Smith has little sympathy for arguments that the Bush doctrine was no break with the past, but solidly grounded in American history. He sees the