

# The Academy of Political Science

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## POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

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Volume 123 · Number 3 · Fall 2008

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*Political Science Quarterly*

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election years, they do not tap noteworthy contextual variation. For example, it is quite likely that campaign advertising has greater influence on turnout behavior in midterm elections. Finally, there are important campaign dynamics yet to be explored. Relying on candidate advertising data, the authors do find that competitive campaigns are associated with more ads in general, and more negative ads specifically, but it would be informative to know whether and how strategic campaign elites respond to each other over the course of a campaign in terms of their advertising decisions.

ROBERT A. JACKSON  
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**Congress and the Classroom: From the Cold War to “No Child Left Behind”** by Lee W. Anderson. *University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007. 214 pp. \$29.95.*

It was considered strange and a bit odd when many conservatives in Congress joined liberals to enact the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB), which most political observers argued represented an unprecedented role for the federal government in education policy. By tradition, conservatives had been more likely to prefer state, local, and private initiatives to federal laws and regulations; liberals, on the other hand, favor the federal government offering solutions to help meet needs that states and school systems are unable to meet themselves. Lee Anderson traces the evolution of federal involvement in education as a function of the narrowing ideological positions of liberals and conservatives. While conventional wisdom holds that NCLB represents a marked departure from previous federal policies, Anderson’s position is that NCLB was more of an outgrowth of (rather than as a radical departure from) previous federal education policies.

Lee Anderson’s analysis of the relationship between federal education policies and political ideologies is thoroughly researched, judiciously analyzed, and clearly presented. Anderson’s main interest lies in congressional actions (that is, new laws, reauthorizations of earlier laws) with respect to elementary and secondary education, beginning with the National Defense Education Act of 1958 through the NCLB Act. Anderson chooses to concentrate on contemporary history, although he includes a very short chapter at the start of the book that covers years prior to 1958 that offers a review of the historical precedents for federal aid to education and the context for what occurred subsequently. His primary data sources include House and Senate floor debates, congressional committee and subcommittee testimony, and documents from Congress and the executive branch.

Anderson’s historical analysis reveals that “the camel’s nose got in the tent” (p. 29) hundreds of years before Congress enacted NCLB, but federal

aid to education was most often couched in terms of solving problems of society, not the problems of schools. The federal government stepped-in to award land grants (Northwest Ordinance of 1785) as a means to encourage settlement and sale of public lands. The Morrill Act of 1862, which helped states establish agricultural colleges, was less about higher education and more about supporting western farmers and their representatives. The G.I. Bill was considered a vehicle for staving off unemployment among veterans. This approach continued through the 1960s: the National Defense Education Act of 1958 was about national security, not schools and —the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) was viewed as the cornerstone of President Lyndon Johnson's War on Poverty.

From this point on, most federal education policy built on ESEA and its reauthorizations, from 1966 through to the present when NCLB is now up for renewal. The few exceptions to this approach to federal involvement were categorical aid laws targeted at specific categories of students—special education and English-language learners, to name a few. Anderson's history tries to answer the question of what happened to conservative opposition to federal involvement in education. His concentration is on documenting the ideological shifts; he pays less attention to why they occurred. For instance, Republicans joined Democrats in the mid-1960s to support ESEA because they considered the law general—aid to education (akin to general revenue sharing)—a strategy they supported for the federal government regardless of policy domain. Similarly, conservatives voted for NCLB in large part because of the law's emphasis on accountability for performance, a concept adapted from the private sector's focus on "the bottom line." NCLB makes states more accountable for the performance of their educational systems by holding all students to high standards.

Anderson's goal is to recount America's political history with respect to federal aid to education and his insightful narrative would be of interest to students (both graduate and undergraduate) of congressional politics, generally, and the politics of education, in particular. Additional target audiences might include policymakers (especially those new to the DC scene and working in the educational policy arena) who are looking for an analytic review of the federal role in K-12 education. Scholars and academics, who are unfamiliar with federal involvement in education, would find that the book offers a concise case study of congressional politics and decision-making that could easily be incorporated into courses in the disciplines of political science, political philosophy, or history.

In the end, Anderson concludes that conservatives have softened their objections to the principle of federal aid to education and many legislators (both conservatives and liberals) now argue that past federal investments justify imposing strong accountability requirements on states and schools. In Anderson's final chapter, he considers the implications of this new orientation for future federal education policy—a timely topic since NCLB is up for renewal

and the presidential candidates (both conservatives and liberals) have seized the opportunity to argue for refinements in the law but not its repeal.

PRISCILLA WOHLSTETTER  
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**A Matter of Justice: Eisenhower and the Beginning of the Civil Rights Revolution** by David A. Nichols. New York, Simon & Shuster, 2007. 368 pp. \$27.00.

With respect to civil rights, historians have found Dwight D. Eisenhower missing in action. The Supreme Court decided *Brown v. Board of Education*, and Democrats claimed Ike was indecisive during the Little Rock crisis. Harry Truman desegregated the Armed Forces. Lyndon Johnson, as Senate Majority leader, guided the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960 to passage. Chief Justice Earl Warren noted in his posthumously published *Memoirs* that Ike was chilly to civil rights (and probably a racist to boot), and that has sealed the historical judgment. Each of these conclusions about Eisenhower and civil rights is challenged by David A. Nichols, who like Fred Greenstein in *The Hidden-Hand Presidency*, finds Ike far more involved than contemporaries (or earlier historians) had believed.

The major theme is that Eisenhower, as a career soldier, was a man of deeds who disdained the symbolic gestures we associate with the presidency. He felt Truman's backing a civil rights bill was a waste of time because Truman knew that Southern Democrats would filibuster any bill to death.

Nichols rightly gives a place of prominence to Eisenhower's selection of Herbert Brownell, who was fully committed to civil rights, as his attorney general and partner on racial issues. A key to that policy was filling the federal judiciary with highly qualified (their code for no open support for segregation) men so that the law could be fully enforced. Despite Southern pressure to fill a Supreme Court vacancy with a Southerner, Ike never considered one. For the lower federal courts in the South, Brownell, who screened judicial appointments, selected such civil rights giants as Elbert Tuttle, John Brown, John Minor Wisdom, and Frank Johnson, Jr., and in the 1960s they were instrumental in desegregating the South. Unlike both Truman and John F. Kennedy, Eisenhower would not place a known segregationist on the bench.

While Truman gave the order to desegregate the Armed Forces in 1948, the military brass successfully resisted the order, so much so that when Ike took office two-thirds of army units were segregated and three-fifths of all blacks in the Navy were servants. In less than two years, all combat units were desegregated. Eisenhower also desegregated schools on military bases prior to *Brown*, and veterans' hospitals thereafter. Ike desegregated the District of Columbia and tried to make desegregation of the city's schools a model. Despite *Brown II*'s green light for gradualism, the DC schools were desegregated for the 1955–1956 school year.