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British and Americans failed to appreciate the extent to which his knowledge aided in the Soviet development of the H-bomb.

It is well known that the United States and the United Kingdom learned of the first Soviet test through air sampling that picked up radioactive traces. What Goodman makes clear, however, is the major role played by such sampling (supplemented by analysis of rainwater, and even of pinecones) in following further developments. The science became increasingly sophisticated, allowing analysis of the kinds of weapons being tested and their efficiency. Seismic and acoustic stations also played a role, especially in determining the location of Soviet test sites. As intelligence officials realized, while they were able to make quite good inferences about the current status of the Soviet nuclear programs, predictions were generally beyond them.

Goodman stresses that it was a major achievement for Britain to sustain cooperation with the United States in light of the McMahon Act of 1946 restricting the sharing of atomic information and the devastating revelations about the well-placed British diplomats, intelligence officials, and scientists who were spying for the Soviet Union. Partly in order to placate the Americans, the British tightened their security procedures, but even so the maintenance of this intimate cooperation was possible only because of the skillful maneuvering of the officials on both sides of the Atlantic who screened the arrangements from Congress and the public.

Spying on the Nuclear Bear is often repetitive, written in a lackluster style, and not particularly analytical. But it is valuable for specialists and tells an important story.

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Why Dominant Parties Lose: Mexico's Democratization in Comparative Perspective by Kenneth F. Greene. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2007. 368 pp. \$85.00.

How do dominant parties win in hybrid political regimes, that is, authoritarian regimes that permit significant political competition? Why do they ever lose? Mexico and Taiwan had, and Singapore and Malaysia still do, long-lived and comparatively low-repression political systems featuring elections free enough that opposition parties form and seriously contest the incumbents.

Greene seeks to understand what he calls "equilibrium dominance"—a catchall incumbent party that holds the political center, facing opposition niche parties that are extremist or focus on issues of low salience to a mass electorate. He addresses three questions in his study of Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), with comparative extensions to other dominant-party authoritarian regimes. First, how do dominant parties win without becoming single-party authoritarian regimes? Greene argues that dominant parties succeed through incumbent hyper-advantages. He draws from and adapts the

literature of incumbent advantages in fully democratic elections. One key point is the economic size of the state, marked by either many state enterprises or extensive regulatory powers. Incumbents divert funds from state firms or the government budget or elicit campaign financing from private business—a financing thus denied to the opposition. Incumbents may resort to fraud or repression but incumbent hyper-advantages short of those practices may still induce most careerist politicians and many voters to join “the party of the state” rather than opposition parties.

Second, are opposition leaders irrational? Greene shows that elections are sufficiently open, and significant issues arise, to motivate opposition politicians to create parties. Opposition party leaders focus on specific social cleavages or ideological issues; they care about these concerns and seek to disseminate their message. The incumbent party makes opposition work a high-cost low-benefit activity, however. Opposition parties also find it ideologically difficult to move to the political center where most voters are. Opposition parties have trouble recruiting careerist politicians but find it easy to recruit those who would rather fight ideologically than win the election. Opposition parties lack resources to communicate with the public or to promise programs or jobs in elections that they are unlikely to win. Moreover, the opposition often fragments because leaders and supporters, with no governments to run, focus on their differences. Dominant parties rarely face a united opposition and multiple opposition parties are also often factionalized. The opposition thus faces serious inter- and intraparty coordination problems. These are “niche organizations with tight links to core constituencies and high barriers to new activist affiliation” (p. 208). They have difficulty in becoming catchall parties.

Third, why do dominant parties ever lose? Greene shows that incumbent parties lose their advantage as privatization shrinks the number and size of state enterprises and deregulation decreases the role of the state in the economy. This implies democracy by accretion, not by cataclysm. Mexico, as other hybrid regimes, witnessed the simultaneous decline of the state’s role in the economy and those of the PRI’s resources along with the gradual buildup of the opposition’s partisan capacities. The PRI lost in 2000 specifically because Vicente Fox, the candidate of the National Action Party (PAN) was less wedded to his party’s ideology and tradition, moved to the political center, and succeeded in drawing enough Left voters who cared more to end 71 years of PRI rule than to fall again on the sword of ideological purity.

Readers learn less about the origins of the dominant party and its political regime. Moreover, the timing of dominant party defeat remains indeterminate—it seems the polity needs good luck that a politician skillful at coordination would appear. But, overall, this is a scholarly *tour de force* in its formal models, applied statistical work, qualitative case studies, and vision of party formation and regime transition.

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