

The Academy of Political Science

475 Riverside Drive · Suite 1274 · New York, New York 10115-1274
(212) 870-2500 · FAX: (212) 870-2202 · aps@psqonline.org · <http://www.psqonline.org>

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

Volume 123 · Number 2 · Summer 2008

No part of this article may be copied, downloaded, stored, further transmitted, transferred, distributed, altered, or otherwise used, in any form or by any means, except:

- one stored electronic and one paper copy of any article solely for your personal, non-commercial use, or
- with prior written permission of The Academy of Political Science.

Political Science Quarterly is published by The Academy of Political Science. Contact the Academy for further permission regarding the use of this work.

Political Science Quarterly
Copyright © 2008 by The Academy of Political Science. All rights reserved.

Driving wedges of suspicion and distrust between officials and favor-seekers can so increase uncertainty that neither will dare turn to corruption. Because it gives evildoers a way out, he asserts, leniency is more likely to undermine the already-tenuous foundation on which corruption rests than are draconian punishments. Not shooting the guilty might, therefore, do more to kill the scourge of corruption than a bullet to back of the head. Lambsdorff thus offers up a radically different solution to the problem.

The book is not, however, without its problems. First, if corruption is so vulnerable to disruption, why has corruption proven such an enduring political pathology? Perhaps honor among thieves is stronger and criminals less averse to risk than others. Or perhaps the problem is, as Lambsdorff implies, the unwillingness of many governments to tackle corruption. One might suspect, however, that Lambsdorff's "invisible foot" packs less of a kick than he suggests.

Second, Lambsdorff's use of text boxes to discuss the literature severely disrupts the flow of the book. This is, of course, a format that allows a writer to avoid "boring" the average reader with the details that experts crave. It is, however, an awkward compromise because it forces the reader to repeatedly and abruptly shift focus. Serious readers may, therefore, find it hard to keep track of the evolving argument. These shortcomings are, however, overshadowed by the overall importance of this book, which is likely to become a central work in the new literature on corruption.

ANDREW WEDEMAN
University of Nebraska, Lincoln

America and Europe after 9/11 and Iraq: The Great Divide by Sarwar A. Kashmeri. Westport, CT, Preger Publishers, 2006. 152 pp. \$44.95.

After watching the media coverage of French President Nicholas Sarkozy's November 2007 visit to the United States, reading a book about the "great divide" between the United States and Europe is a strange experience. After all, Sarkozy, along with German President Angela Merkel, have done almost everything in their power to heal the bitter rift created by the George W. Bush administration's decision to invade Iraq in March 2003. With pretty much the sole exception of Bush, almost all the leaders who engaged in the vitriol of that period have retired from the scene, and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has made cooperation with Europe over issues like the Iranian nuclear program a high priority. So in some ways, this book feels outdated.

Yet that would be unfair. In many respects, Sarwar Kashmeri is telling a story that is still relevant, and that captures some important aspects of the Iraq crisis and its impact on American and European leaders. The book is based on his conversations with ten American and European leaders during the period February 2003 to February 2004, perhaps the hottest phase of the Iraq dispute. The majority of his interlocutors were Americans, though they

represent the “realists” as opposed to the neo-conservatives. Among the most prominent are former Secretary of State James A. Baker, former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, General Wesley Clark, and even former President George H.W. Bush, though he doesn’t utter anything critical of his son. The Europeans are a little less prominent, but do include John Major, the former British Prime Minister, and Ana de Palacio, the former Spanish Foreign Minister. Out of these conversations, Kashmeri formulates his conclusions.

The first is that the rift between the United States and Europe created by Iraq is “fundamentally different” from crises of the past, and that a new alliance needs to be negotiated (p. 2). His second major conclusion is that the United States has not understood the significance of increasing European integration and the development of the EU, in particular the significance of the launching of the euro as a currency to rival the dollar. The target of this critique is an American leader like former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who sought to divide Europe into “old” and “new” regions but who missed the importance of its growing unity. Kashmeri even tells the story of an American businessman who thought the euro was a “new European airline” (p. 35) to underscore his frustration with American ignorance about Europe’s development. Finally, the author urges a new dialogue between the United States and the EU, especially important because of their common interest in fighting terrorism. He emphasizes how important it is for the United States to end its special relationship with Great Britain, symbolized in the partnership between Bush and former British Prime Minister Tony Blair. (Of course the United States may not be the one to do this; new British Prime Minister Gordon Brown has already put some distance between his government and the Bush administration.)

The recent dramatic rise of the euro against the dollar has certainly educated many Americans about its significance, and it is clear that leaders on both sides of the Atlantic have decided to work hard to restore good relations. As serious as the Iraq crisis seemed, the author also notes that the “\$3 trillion transatlantic business relationship” is the “biggest and deepest commercial relationship between two continents in recorded history” (p. 75), and that the crisis had no perceptible effect on these economic links. It may be heretical to say this, but for all its sound and fury, perhaps Iraq will prove a tale told by an idiot, signifying nothing.

THOMAS ALAN SCHWARTZ
Vanderbilt University

After Anarchy: Legitimacy & Power in the United Nations Security Council by Ian Hurd. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2007. 234 pp. \$35.00.

International relations scholars debate what difference, if any, legitimacy makes in international politics. Ian Hurd’s new book provides a vital contribution to the discussion with a well-specified model of legitimacy that balances a subjec-