CIAO DATE: 01/2015
Volume: 21, Issue: 1
March 2014
On the Road to the 2015 NPT Review Conference: An Insider's Perspective of the 2013 NPT PrepCom (PDF)
William C. Potter, Ambassador Cornel Feruta
The second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference (RevCon) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) highlighted two issues in particular- progress toward a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone and the Joint Statement on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons-that may not only greatly affect the health and vitality of the NPT and the 2015 RevCon, but possibly also have implications for the international nonproliferation regime as a whole. Dr. William Potter, director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, interviewed Ambassador Cornel Feruta, chairman of the 2013 PrepCom, to discuss these and other issues related to the meeting and the future of the treaty and its review process.
Correspondence (PDF)
Tanya Ogilvie-White, David Santoro, David D. Palkki, Avner Golov
William Walker and Nicholas Wheeler's article ("The Problem of Weak Nuclear States," 20.3, November 2013, pp. 411-32) offers a timely reminder of why we need to ensure that the Nuclear Security Summit process is successful. The third summit, which will be held in the Netherlands in March 2014, provides an opportunity to monitor and advance the security of nuclear weapons and fissile materials in states with the most extensive nuclear infrastructure, reducing the risk that they'll fall into the hands of malicious actors.
Economic Competition and Nuclear Cooperation': The "Nuclear Renaissance" Revisited (PDF)
Jeffrey S. Lantis
The number of bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements surged during the “nuclear renaissance” of the past decade. This proliferation is only partially explained by the prevailing approaches that focus on strategic imperatives. To supplement these explanations, this study draws on neoliberal models of economic competition to posit that bilateral agreement negotiations also exhibit conditions of “uncoordinated interdependence” and maneuvering to gain market share. Case evidence suggests the contours of supplier state bids for civilian assistance are determined at least as much by considerations about economic competition as they are by positive strategic goals. In addition, this study identifies several cases of cooperation where there appears to be little or no strategic motive for export agreements. The study concludes that patterns of economic competition and the influence of peers in defined competitive spaces alter material payoffs and impact policies. It also identifies a surprising role for principled restraint in dampening strategic and economic competition in some dyads.
The Relative Efficacy of the Biological and Chemical Weapon Regimes (PDF)
Jason Enia, Jeffrey Fields
The biological and chemical weapon nonproliferation and disarmament regimes are often put forward as models of what the nuclear nonproliferation regime could (or should) be. But are these regimes effective? If so, is one stronger and/or more effective than the other? What is it that makes them relatively stronger than the nuclear nonproliferation regime? In this article, we return to and expand upon a framework for assessing regime health and effectiveness. We utilize this framework to engage in a comparative analysis of the chemical weapon (CW) and biological weapon (BW) nonproliferation regimes, respectively. Our analysis reveals that these two regimes are comparatively healthier than their nuclear counterpart. While some of their behavioral features might be troubling-such as the disputes over stockpile destruction of CW-these tend to be mitigated by the presence of a strong norm against possession and proliferation of both CW and BW. This norm is adequately embedded into the existing institutional features of the regimes in ways that do not exist in the nuclear nonproliferation regime.
Zia Mian, Alexander Glaser
Nuclear weapon states historically have attached great secrecy to their nuclear weapon and fissile material production programs and stockpiles, despite warnings that this would fuel fears, handicap informed debate and decision making, and drive arms races. As evidenced by the “Action Plan on Nuclear Disarmament” agreed upon at the 2010 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Review Conference, however, the international community now sees greater transparency about nuclear weapon and fissile material stocks as necessary for enabling and monitoring progress toward nuclear disarmament. To support this effort, the International Panel on Fissile Materials has proposed a step-by-step program for weapon states to declare their inventories, production histories, and disposition of nuclear warheads and fissile materials, and to set up joint projects to develop methods for verifying these declarations. This openness initiative is described here, and could be adopted at the 2015 NPT Review Conference, laying a basis for negotiating verifiable deep reductions in nuclear arsenals and their eventual elimination.
Serious Rules for Nuclear Power Without Proliferation (PDF)
Henry Sokolski, Victor Gilinsky
The authors propose five principles for addressing the major deficiencies of the current treaty-based approach to nonproliferation. These involve: effectively closing the door to withdrawals from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); defining which nuclear technologies fall within the NPT's “inalienable right” provision, so as to maintain a reasonable safety margin against possible military application; expansion of International Atomic Energy Agency inspections to include greater readiness to use its “special” inspection authority; creation of an NPT enforcement regime, to include a secretariat; and universalizing the NPT so as to apply to all states, while creating a path for current non-parties to come into compliance. There is no illusion here about the prospects for the adoption of this approach. At a minimum, the world needs to be frank about the gap between nuclear programs and current nonproliferation protection. Encouragement of greater use of nuclear power should be predicated on closing that gap.
Beyond Technology: The Social Dimension of the Biological Weapon Threat (PDF)
Gregory D. Koblentz
Kathleen Vogel has authored one of the most important books written about biological weapons in recent years. As a Cornell University associate professor in the Department of Science and Technology Studies, Vogel tackles head-on the conventional wisdom regarding the biological weapon (BW) threat, successfully challenging assumptions that have gone largely unexamined by the broader biodefense community regarding their possession by states and non-state actors. She also uncovers some deeper organizational and social forces that have shaped US intelligence and threat assessments since the end of the Cold War. Thus, this book is a must-read for scholars and practitioners in the field of international security, not just those with an interest in biodefense or intelligence. (In the interest of full disclosure, we are both members of the Scientists Working Group on Biological and Chemical Weapons at the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation in Washington, DC.)
Better than the Bomb (PDF)
Anne I. Harrington
There is a bias toward searching for the next bomb woven into the very fabric of (non) proliferation studies. This bias is traceable to the conceptual origins of nuclear proliferation: Albert Wohlstetter's 1961 article on the "N+1" problem.1 In it, Wohlstetter hypothesized that there would be a domino effect as each new state to acquire a nuclear weapon created an incentive for its neighbor to acquire one as well. The term "proliferation" captures the perceived automaticity of the cascade that would ensure-almost as if nuclear weapons would become self-reproducing, populating the earth with warheads unless someone limited their fertility.