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William Walker and Nicholas J. Wheeler (University of St. Andrews and University of Birmingham) open this issue with a discussion of an under-theorized problem, that posed by internally weak states that either possess or seek to acquire nuclear weapons. They propose models for three different kinds of weak states, discuss the characteristics of the organizations within states responsible for producing nuclear weapons and materials and managing their security and operations, and offer recommendations on how to more systematically analyze the resiliency of these organizations in the face of instability and conflict within the states in which they reside. Michael D. Cohen (University of Southern Denmark) confronts the conventional wisdom that says the nuclear security challenges in South Asia are not like the Cold War divide in Europe and, in particular, that the stability-instability paradox does not explain how nuclear proliferation affects the potential for conflict there. Rather, Cohen argues that there are strong similarities between the present situation in South Asia and Europe during the Cold War, and that the paradox does explain South Asian behavior. He further suggests that short-term instability (generated by the development and deployment of nuclear weapons) may be a necessary precondition to long-term stability. Avner Golov (Comparative National Security Project at the Interdisciplinary Center and Institute for National Security Studies) takes a close look at a recently published collection of official Iraqi documents to re-evaluate why Saddam Hussein did not use chemical or biological weapons against Israel during the 1991 Gulf War. Golov examines a number of hypotheses and concludes that, contrary to popular belief, US and Israeli deterrent threats played only a minor role in Iraq's forbearance. In addition, he considers the implications for a declared no-first-use policy. Peter Tzeng (Yale Law School) utilizes hundreds of declassified but unpublished documents from multiple archives to explain how the United States during the 1970s used technical and financial leverage to dissuade Brazil, South Korea, and Pakistan from acquiring sensitive nuclear technologies. Because much of this leverage-involving technology, financing, and nuclear fuel-has diminished over time (thanks to a growing global nuclear power marketplace), Tzeng assesses present day proliferation threats and surmises that the ability of the United States to intervene has been weakened. J. Christian Kessler (State University of New York at Stony Brook and NorthRaven Consulting) explores the factors behind the success of the Hexapartite Safeguards Project-an international effort involving six governments, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the Euratom Safeguards Directorate-that between 1979 and 1983 negotiated an agreement to safeguard gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plants, at the time a new technology. Notwithstanding significant political differences and economic concerns, all the parties agreed on the need for a solution and ultimately came together in a way that strengthened the core verification principles of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Kessler reviews the history of the effort and considers what lessons can be learned for similar future negotiations. Stephen Mladineo and Sarah Frazar (Pacific Northwest National Laboratory) analyze the concept of safeguards culture (built around the global safeguards system established by the IAEA to ensure the peaceful uses of nuclear technology) and assess its importance to the safeguards community. They argue that understanding a state's safeguards culture will enable the IAEA to optimize its technical assistance and training programs, thereby improving its safeguards inspections. The authors also explore how to develop and promote safeguards culture. Giorgio Franceschini, Matthias Englert, and Wolfgang Liebert (Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, Interdisciplinary Research Group in Science, Technology and Security at Darmstadt University of Technology, and Institute of Safety and Risk Sciences, Vienna, respectively) consider fusion reactors which, although not yet a viable source of energy, have the potential to become a proliferation problem. In particular, fusion reactors could produce plutonium and tritium for nuclear weapons. The authors discuss the political, economic, technical, and regulatory conditions that will determine whether states pursue this option and recommend some preventive actions, including regulatory controls, to forestall such an occurrence. Harald Müller (Peace Research Institute Frankfurt) challenges two academic icons-Thomas C. Schelling and the late Kenneth N. Waltz-who, in recent years, both argued that nuclear deterrence is better than nuclear disarmament, in part because there are too many uncertainties about what a world without nuclear weapons would look like. Müller demonstrates the flaws in their approach to the problem, an approach that is mirrored by many others who denigrate the desirability of a nuclear weapon-free world. He concludes that nuclear deterrence is neither as safe nor as stable as Schelling and Waltz believe and that eliminating nuclear weapons is less dangerous than they suggest. We wrap up this issue with a review by Janne E. Nolan (Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University) of a book that debunks myths about the role US nuclear weapons played during the Cold War and examines how US nuclear strategy was not based on strictly military considerations but was strongly influenced and largely determined by political factors. Stephen I. Schwartz, Editor sschwartz@miis.edu