CIAO DATE: 09/2014
Volume: 18, Issue: 2
Summer 2014
SYRIA'S SILENT WEAPONS (PDF)
Jill Bellamy
The decommissioning of Syria’s vast chemical weapon arsenal has brought its weapons of mass destruction into the media spotlight. Far less attention has been paid to Syria’s admitted biological warfare program, one of the largest in the Middle East today. While Asad’s chemical weapons have been monitored for decades, biological weapons are silent weapons. There are no identifying heat signatures, no activities such as mixing precursor materials for loading into conventional warheads, which could be indicative of a chemical weapon facilities and few observable activities by which to identify a biological weapons laboratory. Biological weapons usually exhibit a combination of selected characteristics: they are highly infective, highly transmissible, have lengthy incubation periods and are untreatable (no vaccines or medical counter-measures available), among other desired attributes. Above all, they are silent weapons, in some instances deniable until noted epidemics and pandemics occur. A primary concern for this weapons class is continuity of command and control over the laboratory infrastructure required to support it. The looting of Asad’s laboratory infrastructure which supports this weapon complex, due to internal fighting and Syria’s ongoing civil war, is of extreme concern for international public health security. The potential that the looting of dual-use technologies and weaponized agents may have allowed Al Qaeda to fulfill their decades-long quest for a biological weapon capability makes the security of Syria’s biological weapon infrastructure critical. This paper explores the possibility that Al Qaeda has looted Syria’s laboratory infrastructure and the consequences such an acquisition may mean to the international community as whole.
IN THE ARENA OF THE ZU’AMA – REVIEWING HIZBALLAHʼS ROLE IN LEBANON (PDF)
Dan Naor
Hizballah is usually defined as an Iranian group whose origins are found within the Shi’a and Iranian traditions. In this paper, however, we examine the activity of Hizballah as a Lebanese za’im, namely, within the context of the Lebanese elite families (zu’ama). We explore various aspects of Lebanese zu’ama that also typify Hizballah. These aspects include the provision of social services to the people, and the use of surveillance measures in order to control its supporters. Then, we will suggest a new “za’im” definition of Hizballah that encompasses its activity in Lebanon.
FROM STATION Z TO JERUSALEM (PDF)
Barry Rubin, Wolfgang G. Schwanitz
WHAT DOES THE ARAB NEWSPAPER THINK ABOUT ITSELF? (PDF)
Yonathan Gonen
Recent data appear to demonstrate the weakening of the Arab newspapers versus strengthening of the digital media. However, this weakening is less extensive than the corresponding erosion of Western newspapers in their own markets. This study examines the question of how Arab newspapers see themselves. A content and discourse analysis of articles in seven newspapers of different characteristics and distribution zones indicates an ambivalent attitude towards the Arab newspaper: On the one hand, many articles and reports express a positive attitude towards the newspapers and a hostile attitude to the Internet, but, on the other hand, more than a quarter of the articles expressed a negative attitude towards the newspapers and most of the articles admitted that Arab newspapers are in crisis. Based on this finding, the reporters and editors of the Arab newspapers can be seen as an interpretive community, which structures its identity. The shared discourse that they produce around the topic of newspapers’ status is a marker of how they see themselves as journalists.
Hayat Alvi
The diffusion of intra-Islamic violence and terrorism is increasing because of the empowerment of extremists based on the proliferation of Salafi/Wahhabi ideologies. The concept of “takfir,” which militants use to judge a Muslim as a “non-believer,” hence exacting the punishment of death for apostasy, serves as the justification for killing civilians. This study analyzes the Salafi/Wahhabi source of inspiration for the diffusion of intra-Islamic terrorism, and the implications for security in the Middle East and South Asia. This study posits that the primary source of the export of Salafi/Wahhabi ideology is Saudi Arabia, in the context of competing against Iran’s Shi’a ideology. The 2011 Arab Awakening in the Middle East and North Africa has also empowered some Salafists, who are asserting themselves in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and elsewhere. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), as well as affiliated groups throughout the region adhere to the “takfiri” ideology that targets fellow Muslims. Therefore, this study exposes the dangers of the global export of Salafi/Wahhabi ideology.
PROCEEDING WITH CAUTION: THE CURRENT BALANCE OF FORCES IN THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR AND ISRAELI CONCERNS (PDF)
Jonathan Spyer
Aided by Hizballah and Iraqi Shi’a volunteers, the Asad regime scored significant gains in the civil war in Syria in the first months of 2014. The regime has completed its re-conquest of the Qalamoun mountains and driven the rebels out of Homs. These gains constitute a consolidation by the Asad regime of its area of control in Syria, which runs from Damascus to the western coastal area, and now includes all the country’s provincial capitals with the exception of Raqqa city and half of Aleppo city. The regime’s advance does not yet mean disaster for the rebels, in that the regime has not yet begun a far-reaching campaign to re-conquer the large swathes of rebel-held territory in the north and east of Syria. Some additional gains have been made, however, as Asad’s forces seek to surround rebel-held eastern Aleppo. Reports have also emerged of continued use by the Syrian regime of chlorine in its attacks on rebel-controlled areas. The Syrian rebellion has not collapsed, and shows no signs of doing so. At the same time, it has failed to coalesce around a single leadership and remains divided into an enormous number of militia “brigades” representing a wide ideological spectrum. The most powerful, largest and most able rebel units are committed to one or another form of Sunni Islamism. Among these are two al-Qaeda type jihadi groups, Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham).The West and the Saudis are therefore faced with the difficult objective of trying to prevent the defeat of the rebellion and shoring up its foundations, while at the same time avoiding a situation where advanced weapons systems find their way into the hands of extremist jihadi organizations. Israel is also cautiously increasing its engagement with the war across its borders. Israel has two major areas of interest: Jerusalem is deeply concerned at the possibility of al-Nusra elements finding their way to the border between Syria and the Golan Heights and attempting to strike at Israeli targets from this area. In order to prevent this, Israel is reportedly carrying out its own projects involving contact and assistance to non al-Qaeda rebel elements close to the border, as well as inducements to border villagers to prevent cooperation with the jihadis.