This article offers a three-prong approach to investigating the emergence of contemporary Indonesian radical Islamism in the post-Suharto era (from 1998 onward). First, it places it within the historical context of radical Islamism in Indonesia, its past connection to colonialism, as well as a more contemporary one to Middle Eastern Islamism. Second, it puts this resurgence within the larger context of global jihad movements; it traces the origins of the ideology of radicalism itself, which is the global jihad meta-narrative that dominates much of the discourse on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Arab countries. Third, it discusses the dissemination of radicalism in society, including how the media, particularly the internet, plays an important role in spreading the jihad meta-narrative and its stylized version of contemporary history.

In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, followed by the Bali and Marriott bombings in 2002 and 2003, attention has turned to Indonesia. The country has become a so-called “hotbed for terrorist groups.”[1] However, facts also show that the vast majority of Indonesian Muslims practice a moderate form of their religion. While most Indonesians are concerned about the response of the United States to the terrorist attacks, the vast majority does not as yet support radicalism.[2] Since the 2001 attacks, some radical Islamist groups have become increasingly vocal in the period. In addition, a number of reports have repeatedly argued that there are connections between these groups and transnational terrorist networks originating in Middle East, such as al-Qa’ida.[3] though these ties have not been proven adequately.

With “the emergence of violent Muslim vigilante groups employing a jihadist discourse and mobilizing followers for jihad”[4] in areas that never had any interreligious conflicts before, such as the Moluccas and Poso, no one can deny that Islamist radicalism has emerged in Indonesia. It has become one of the most noticeable events in the post-Suharto era.[5] However, there is a difference between radical Islamism and terrorism. Indeed, all terrorist groups are radical by definition, but not all radical Islamist groups are terrorist. Islamist groups in Indonesia cannot be categorized in one or two simplified groups such as terrorist and non-terrorist or radical and non-radical. To make it more complex, there is also a religious fundamentalism, which is not necessarily radical.

This article will not seek to enlighten the discussion by identifying which group is which. Nor will it attempt to classify Indonesian Islamist groups into categories. Rather, this article’s aim is to offer a partial explanation about the resurgence of radical Islamism in the post-Suharto era and to examine it in three ways. First, it places the existence of contemporary radical Islamist groups within the historical context of radical Islamism in Indonesia, its past connection to colonialism, as well as more contemporary one to Middle Eastern Islamism. Second, it puts this resurgence within the larger context of global jihad movements by tracing the sources of the ideology of radicalism itself, which is the global jihad meta-narrative that dominates much of discourse on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Arab countries.
Third, it discusses the dissemination of radicalism in society, including how the media—particularly the internet—plays an important role in spreading the jihad meta-narrative and its stylized version of contemporary history.

A Brief Historical Context of Radical Islamism in Indonesia

The roots of contemporary radical Islamist groups in Indonesia can be traced to two local Islamist political movements in the country’s history—the Dar al-Islam movement and the Masyumi party, as well as to several more recent transnational Islamist networks.[6] Masyumi was created during the Japanese occupation as an umbrella organization for all Islamic organizations. Japan gave the *ulama* (the Muslim leaders) military and political training. Masyumi was thus politicized to compete with radical nationalist and pro-Dutch groups, which were seen as endangering Japanese authority. However, during its war of independence, the ulama declared jihad against the Dutch, who were attempting to reoccupy Indonesia. With its military capability, the Muslim leaders cooperated with the nationalist group in defending the independence movement.[7]

The Dar al-Islam movement began in 1948 as separatist movement of Islamist militias in West Java against the Republican government, which had accepted the unfavorable Renville Agreement with the Dutch.[8] Led by a charismatic leader, Kartosuwiryo, this movement attempted to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia under *Shari’a* (Islamic) law. During the final years of the Indonesian revolution and until the capture of its leaders in 1962, it remained a serious competitor to the Republic of Indonesia and an alternative to the essentially secular republic led by Sukarno, the first president.

**Masyumi: Its Factions and Related Groups**

With Sukarno’s favor for communism (PKI), Masyumi was marginalized. Nahdatul Ulama (NU), currently one of the largest Islamist organizations, was part of Masyumi, but it broke away in 1952 due to internal structural conflicts. In 1960, Sukarno ordered Masyumi to dissolve itself, and in 1962, its leaders were imprisoned.[9] From 1965 to 1966, after the PKI had been physically destroyed, Masyumi returned in the form of Parmusi (the Indonesian Muslim Party). Some Parmusi leaders transformed the party so that it devoted its energies to *da’wa* (the call to Islam) rather than politics and formed a council, the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII), in 1967.[10] While concentrating on Islamic missionary activities oriented toward the Middle East (Saudi Arabia, in particular), the council became one of the most important voices of dissent during Suharto’s New Order. The DDII established close relations with the Islamic World League, of which the former’s leader Muhammad Natsir became one of the vice chairmen.[11] The DDII also cooperated with the Saudis, who attempted to spread the Wahhabi ideology using their oil money.

During the 1980s and 1990s, many other understandings of Islam penetrated Indonesia, mainly through
young intellectuals who studied abroad. Liberal teachings of Islam, like Shi’ism (associated with the Iranian Revolution), were disseminated mainly by U.S.-based Indonesian students. Due to the spread of liberalism, the DDII, sponsored by Saudi and Kuwaiti networks, attacked Shi’ism as a threat to the Muslim world from “within” alongside the external threat of the Jewish and Christian “conspiracy.”[12] This idea is discussed further in the next section.

Individual Masyumi’s members, who did not form any particular group, were suspected to be acting from within Suharto’s Golkar party. In the early 1970s, Golkar was still dominated by secular interests and ostensibly Muslims, but by the late 1980s, these were becoming a minority; and in the 1990s, conservative Islam, patronized by Suharto, became a dominant voice of Golkar. Contributing to the “greening” of Golkar was the role of the Muslim Student’s Association (HMI),[13] whose ideology was close but not affiliated with Masyumi.[14] HMI was (and still is) very popular in university campuses. Among Indonesian students, HMI split into two groups, with one accepting the Pancasila,[15] a national ideology, as the sole foundation and the other claiming that Islam was the only guidance. HMI alumni from the first group became very influential figures during the New Order period. In addition to HMI, the PII (the Indonesian Islamic Students), which was secretly affiliated with Masyumi, also had a presence on campuses. The PII, however, went underground and its activists were silenced in 1987. In 2007, however, the PII came back to the political arena and currently has been registered as one of the formal mass organizations in Indonesia.[16]

In contrast to the NU, whose leaders mostly chose to study classical fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) texts within a traditionalist framework that had little connection to Wahhabism, another group of individuals from Masyumi, called the Muhammadiyah, chose to follow Cairo’s modernism.[17] This group was heavily influenced by the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood, which rejected secularism, considering it a European colonial culture, and an ethos of development that increasingly challenged the traditional authority of Islam.

The Brotherhood materials became most influential in this circle during the 1980s and 1990s. The largest fundamentalist Islamist movement in Indonesia, Tarbiyah, which took shape in the 1980s, heavily adopted this understanding. Centered in the Salman Mosque of the famous Institute of Technology Bandung, this movement grew through the campus and mosque youth networks. It started as a moderate movement based on Muhammadiyah teachings, with social activities in a small group, called usroh. There were two different groups within this movement, and in 1994, the radical wing won the contest of power. In the Reformasi (reform) period, this group was metamorphosing into a political party (the Justice Party or Partai Keadilan, PK), student association (KAMMI), and women’s organization (Salimah). The group has been very active in disseminating ideas and doctrines through the translation of Middle Eastern books and the publication of magazines and journals.[18]

The most puritanical group of Masyumi was Islamic United or Persis. Its ideology was based on local beliefs and traditional practices with a literal reading of the Koran and authentic hadiths. The group, which never showed much interest in politics, adopted much of the Wahhabi concept of purification through ritual and belief, very much in line with the Saudis’ sponsored understanding of Islam.

The Dar al-Islam (DI) Network
The DI was physically disbanded in the early 1960s. However, it is widely believed that the DI network still existed long after that. Even Suharto’s chief advisor in the 1970s, Ali Murtopo, was believed to be cultivating a group of DI veterans. Murtopo allowed them to maintain a network of contacts as a secret weapon against “communism” and other enemies. This network was meant to be ready for mobilization at any moment.

The Komando Jihad (KJ), which was associated with “Islamist terrorism” in the 1970s and early 1980s through the bombing of churches, night clubs, and cinemas, was one of the creations of DI veterans. These DI veterans genuinely believed in the long-term goal of building an Islamic state and short-term goal of destroying “communism.” KJ was also referred to by other names such as Teror Warman and NII/TII.[19] The DI also had an underground network that consisted of a number of intelligence-control veterans, but also had an ability to draw a bigger number of disaffected radicals into its movements. One of the important nodes of the DI network was the Ngruki pesantren (Islamic boarding school) in the Solo region run by two Arabic teachers, Abdallah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. Both were well connected to the Masyumi/DDII circles and would become infamously associated with the Bali bombings.

The Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with the World of Islam (KISDI)

In the late 1990s, Suharto changed his attitude toward both Islamic and Islamist movements due to the decline of support from the military. He allowed his successor, Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie, to establish an Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI), restructured his cabinet ministers, and kicked some Christian leaders out of his inner circle. During this period of change, the Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with the World of Islam (KISDI) gained prominence. Its founders belonged to the most hard-line wing of DDII and espoused the belief in a Jewish-Christian conspiracy to destroy Islam. [20] KISDI was also the group pioneering the spread of the sentiment of solidarity with the Palestinians (against the Jews and the United States). KISDI remained loyal to Suharto until the very end of his reign.

The Reformasi Period (1998-Present)

The early Reformasi period was marked by the emergence of new Islamic parties, some of which ran in the 1999 general elections. The oldest and strongest Islamic party was the conservative United Development Party (PPP), founded over two decades earlier. The PPP was followed by the moderate National Awakening Party (PKB), which was heavily rooted in the NU. Muhammadiyah, led by Amien Rais, formed the deliberately pluralist National Mandate Party (PAN). Meanwhile, the KISDI activists led by former Minister of Justice (2001-2004) Yusril Izra Mahendra formed the Crescent Star Party (PBB), which claimed to be the true successor of Masyumi. The only party with an explicit Islamist political ideology was the Justice Party (PK, and currently is changed into PKS, The Prosperous Justice Party), which was rooted in the Tarbiyah movement (Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood).
The jihad movement and the call for the implementation of Shari’a law became popular during the Reformasi period, mainly through the street politics of radical Islamist groups. The most dynamic were the Majelis Mujahidin, which originated from an underground Dar al-Islam movement, and the Laskar Jihad (LJ), the most puritanical wing of the Islamic student movement. Members of both groups have declared to have fought or received military training in Afghanistan and many are linked with transnational Islamist networks. In addition to these two prominent radical groups are the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI), Hizb al-Tahrir Indonesia, Hamas Indonesia, and other smaller ones.

**Laskar Jihad**

The Laskar Jihad[21] was a paramilitary wing of the Sunni Communication Forum (Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama’ah, FKAWJ) and was heavily influenced by the most puritanical form of Wahhabi-Salafism.[22] Many of its members had university educations and had ties with the underground Dar al-Islam network. Its charismatic leader, Ja’far Umar Thalib, had spent several years in Saudi Arabia and had been sent to Afghanistan by a Wahhabi-Salafi network to participate in jihad.[23] The LJ claimed it did not take part in the efforts to build an Islamic state and instead attempted to improve the quality of Islam for every Muslim individual.

The LJ itself was established on January 30, 2000, in response to the rising number of Muslim victims in the Maluku conflict. The organization became known internationally in April 2000, when its members—along with other groups of Muslims—held a street demonstration in Jakarta calling for a jihad in the Maluku Islands. The LJ clearly had the backing of elements in the military and the police; neither body made any serious effort to carry out President Abd al-Rahman Wahid’s order to prevent them from going to Maluku. The LJ was made up of over 10,000 members,[24] some of whom had been active in Maluku and Poso communal violence. It claimed to carry out a three-part mission—social work, Muslim education, and a “security mission.” Its founder reported to have rejected approaches from al-Qa’ida but supported the September 11 attacks on the United States. In mid-October 2002, three days after the Bali bombing, the LJ announced that it had been disbanded.[25]

**Majelis Mujahidin**

The Majelis Mujahidin (MM) is a front of underground Dar al-Islam-related groups. It is headed by Irfan S. Awwas and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir of the Ngruki pesantren. The latter also founded the Usroh movement and was arrested in 1978 in connection with the Komando Jihad trials.[26] MM seeks to enforce the implementation of Shari’a law in Indonesia. The movement is supported by many Islamic scholars and leaders. Though unsuccessful at introducing Shari’a into the constitution, it has been actively penetrating the provincial and district levels (indirectly supported by the government’s regional autonomy policy) for the adoption of Islamic law. MM also supported the jihad, and sent members to the Maluku Islands, though fewer than LJ.
During his exile in Malaysia, MM leader Ba’asyir, had “established a network of contacts with other Islamic radicals in Malaysia, [the] Philippines and Singapore–occasionally referred to as Jamaah Islamiyah,”[27] for which the Ngruki pesantren[28] acted as a branch. While Ba’asyir has been repeatedly accused of being al-Qa’ida’s regional leader and of organizing terrorist attacks throughout Southeast Asia, as of yet, there has been no public evidence or indication of this or of his control of the network.

Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defender Front)

The Islamic Defender Front (FBI) is on the frontline of street politics. However, unlike LJ and MM, this group does not have a strong ideology. It is made up of a combination of groups and street mobs. The organization is headquartered in Jakarta and is led by Muhammad Rizieq Syihab, of Arab Hadrami descent. It also includes some other Habibs (of Arab descent). The FBI actively holds public political demonstrations and attacks bars and brothels. Following September 11 and during the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, the FBI threatened Americans in Indonesia, compelling many to leave the country.

Hizb al-Tahrir (HT)

The Liberation Party or Hizb al-Tahrir is a branch of the Middle Eastern movement of the same name. This campus-based organization strongly rejects democracy and the political institutions of the secular nation-state as Western or non-Islamic constructs. HT’s efforts focus on the enforcement of Shari’a law and the re-establishment of Islamic Caliphate—the formation of an Islamic government for all Muslims worldwide in order to restore the “greatness and pureness of Islamic civilization.” This ideology was mainly derived from the teachings of Shaykh Taqiuddin al-Nabhani, a former leader of the Muslim Brotherhood.[29]

Hamas Indonesia

Hamas is an abbreviation of Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya, meaning the Movement of Islamic Struggle. Hamas Indonesia is a branch of the global Hamas movement, which focuses primarily on the Palestinian issue. On its former website, Hamas defined its movement as a people’s movement whose goals were to “create a conducive situation to realize the independence of Palestine people, to free them from persecution, to free their land from the colonizer Israel and to halt the Zionism project which is supported by modern imperialism.”[30] While Hamas Indonesia no longer has a website, the organization still exists. It claims that the Islamic community is one body; therefore any attack against Palestine would be considered an attack on Islam as a whole. Jihad is thus proposed to be necessary in order to defend Muslims throughout the world from any enemies, especially the Zionist enemy.
The Jewish (Zionist) “Conspiracy”: The Global Jihad meta-narrative

The discussion about radical Islamism in Indonesia is very much linked with how the issue of Zionism is dealt with. The discussion about Jews has been part of Islamic discourse in Indonesia for very long. First, Jews are frequently mentioned in the context of Muslim anxiety about the “conspiracy to demonize Islam.” All aspects of modernization, including secularization, rationalization, the shifting of traditional values (to more liberal values), the development of a global economy culture, individualism, and hedonism, are seen as part of the plot against Islam.

This “secret conspiracy” to destroy Islam is identified with Jews and Zionism, and anybody who is viewed as helping this conspiracy, regardless of religion or origin, can be called “Zionist.”[32] Moreover, anybody who does not show hatred of Israel and the United States (the symbol of globalization and protector of Zionism) is marked as a “Jew” as well. Thus, many moderate Indonesian Muslim leaders and their organizations, such as leader Gus Dur, Nurcholish Madjid and his Paramadina Foundation, and Islam Liberal in particular, are referred to as “pro-Jewish Zionists.”

Second, conspiracy theories and the tendency to scapegoat Jews originally came from the Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Egypt. Their hatred of Israel is related to the Palestinian issue but also to the belief in a Jewish conspiracy to destroy Islam and to dominate the world. This is not only a reaction to Israel’s existence but also to antisemitism, including that disseminated from the West. The source that is frequently referred to is the Protocol of the Elders of Zion,[33] which is seen as proof of this conspiracy. The Arabic translation, al-Maqa‘id al-Yahudiyya, was published in the 1950s. It was translated and adapted to Indonesian in the 1980s.[34] The Indonesian publishers and editors of these adaptations and translations saw the book as a historical document and believed its statements about secret plans of a Jewish organization to rule and dominate the world through capitalism, communism, democratization, authoritarianism, revolution, and economic liberation.

The global jihad meta-narrative spread from the Middle East to Indonesia in the 1980s but has only become a hot topic among Indonesian Muslims since the end of the Suharto regime. For the global jihad movement and today’s Indonesian jihadists, this conspiracy theory has become a non-negotiable truth to justify violence against non-Muslims (Christians). The Saudi government actively cultivates this meta-narrative, which is taught in schools as a guide for Saudi Arabian youth to “deal with the world.”[35] Moreover, to strengthen this justification, radical Islamist leaders continue to reference a very selective group of Koran verses that seemingly legitimize violent jihad.

Al-Baqarah: 120 is the most cited verse used by radical Islamist groups to justify their conspiracy theory. The groups point to the conflicts in Palestine, Bosnia, Afghanistan, the Maluku Islands (Ambon), Poso, and other places in the world as proof of that verse. As an extension of this proof, another verse, al-Baqarah: 190, is used to justify jihad in the form of physical violence.

The Role of the Media in Disseminating the jihadi Ideology
Before the September 11 attacks on the United States, the global jihad meta-narrative was already present in the media, particularly on the internet. In Indonesia, the LJ was mainly responsible for the dissemination of this meta-narrative through its website Laskar Jihad Online. No other mass organization in Indonesia has been as advanced as LJ in its use of new media and communications technology. Since its establishment, LJ used computers and fax machines to develop its organization and to disseminate information. Later, it adopted the internet as a main tool with which to coordinate its operations, disseminate information, to recruit members, and fundraise.

LJ also used traditional tools such as the print media. Among its publications are the *Maluku Today Bulletin*,[36] *Salafi* monthly,[37] the *Laskar Jihad Bulletin,[38] and books printed by the FKAWJ and others.[39] LJ also holds rallies throughout Indonesia, in which thousands of students and youth participate. Thousands of LJ sympathizers also volunteer by distributing bulletin copies and collecting donations on the streets.

While FKAWJ had two websites ([http://salafy.net](http://salafy.net) and [http://salafy.org](http://salafy.org)), LJ had one site, Laskar Jihad Online (LJO, [http://www.laskarjihad.or.id](http://www.laskarjihad.or.id)), which was launched in June 2000 and officially shut down in October 2002. During its operation, the website was the group’s main vehicle for maintaining and developing the its presence. Well-designed, bilingual (Indonesian and English), and regularly updated, the LJO showed how LJ, while being ultra-conservative in its ideology, was ultra-modern in its use of technology and was also very much aware of the media’s important role.[40] Ayip Syarifuddin, one of LJ’s founders, once called the sword and pen LJ’s weapons.

In addition to its website, LJ also had more than 1,400 members—scattered in 53 branch offices across Indonesia—on its internet mailing list.[41] While Laskar Jihad Online was the first to do so, many other websites targeting Muslims in Maluku and elsewhere in Indonesia were later created and also conveyed the narrative of the “Zionist-Crusader conspiracy” (they also initially linked to LJO).[42] The websites of other Islamist radical groups, including Hamas[43] and Hizb al-Tahrir,[44] clearly show that they share the same ideology and identify themselves as part of the global jihad movement. Selected Koran verses, especially al-Baqarah, are repeatedly cited in the print media disseminated by these movements (including *Republika, Media Dakwah, Suara Hidayatullah, Salafi, and Sabili*), with the global jihad meta-narrative serving as the main cause of events such as the Maluku and Poso conflicts, September 11, and the Bali/Marriott bombings. Books about ethno-religious conflicts (including in the Maluku Islands and in Poso) published by Islamists from 2000 to 2003 also refer to this meta-narrative.[45] Due to greater funding for radical Islamist groups, such books are becoming increasingly popular. They are also more accessible and cheaper than books published by moderate/liberal Islamic movements.

The jihad concept is also a main theme of many Indonesian Islamic children’s books. Comic books with heroic stories of holy wars and *lasykars* (holy troops) “fighting the enemy in the name of Allah,” with pictures of the hero or heroine holding a saber are abundant in the children’s sections of bookstores in major Indonesian cities, including Jakarta (See figure 1).
Conclusion

Radical Islamism in Indonesia is not just a recent phenomenon; it is deeply rooted in the local and global histories of Islamist movements as well as in Islam’s relations with the nation-state, the world political system, and the global economy. By putting forth a perspective from within the nation-state of Indonesia, the foregoing discussion also shows that changes in the nature of Muslim political movements after the Reformasi period appear to have been a response to the changing political environment (from repressive state to Reformasi) rather than to some internal dynamic within Islam itself. However, this is not the sole determining factor. Along with this there has also been a flow of money, ideas, and people from the Middle East, in particular from Saudi Arabia, which has been extremely important for the growth of radical Islamism in Indonesia.

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[5] Suharto was the second President of the Republic of Indonesia. His authoritarian regime ruled the country for 32 years from 1966 following the removal of the first president, Sukarno, until his forced resignation in 1998.


[15] Pancasila is derived from Sanskrit and is literally translated as “five principles” (panca = five; sila = principle). It is a set of loosely defined principles, namely “belief in the oneness of God,” humanity, national unity, democracy, and social justice. It was created by Sukarno, the founding father and the first president of Indonesia.


[22] Lim, *Radicalism and Anti-Americanism in Indonesia: The Role of the Internet*.

[23] Bruinessen, “Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism.”

[24] Thalib claimed that LJ consisted of about 40,000 members and several hundred thousand supporters.


[26] Bruinessen, “Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism.”
[28] For more about the Ngruki network, see International Crisis Group, *Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the “Ngruki Network” in Indonesia* (Jakarta/Brussels: ICG, 2002).


[31] Jean-Francois Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1984). Lyotard defines a “meta-narrative” as a big story of mythic proportions that claims to account for, explain, and to subordinate all lesser, little, local narratives. “Meta” refers to overall, totalizing. Thus Lyotard rejects the narrative that is assumed to be the ultimate universal narrative. See also Michel Foucault, *The Archeology of Knowledge & the Discourse on Language* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972). Foucault associates the concept of the meta-narrative with legitimacy, as it can be used as a tool for social and political mobilization against perceived antagonistic, hegemonic forces while it also seeks to create its own hegemony.


[36] The *Maluku Today* (*Maluku Hari Ini*) bulletin is a single two-sided printed sheet. It included daily reports on the Maluku Conflict sent to LJ branch offices throughout the country. The LJ logo, contact, and donation information appeared on every bulletin issue. Occasionally, thousands of copies were also distributed to the public.

[37] *Salafi* (*Majalah Islami bulanan Salafi*) magazine is a simple radical Islamist monthly.

[38] The Laskar Jihad national bulletin (*Buletin Nasional Laskar Jihad*) was a 16-page weekly featuring articles mainly about LJ’s activities and FKA JW’s ideology, including color photos and some advertisements. Its circulation was roughly 100,000.


The mailing list was created on May 17, 2000. It was a one-directional newsletter, not intended for dialogue, which provided news “from the battlefield.” As of October 2001, there were 1,419 members on the list. It stopped on October 4, 2001.


For the website of Hizb al-Tahrir Indonesia, see http://www.al-islam.or.id, redirected to the new website http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/ (last accessed on 4 July 2011).